


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Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1995

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Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1995

Introduction

Acts of international terrorism in 51 countries in 1995 continued to threaten civil society and peacemaking, including the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, while international cooperation to combat terrorism intensified. Terrorists failed to achieve ultimate political goals, as in the past, but they continued to cause major political, psychological, and economic damage.

Lethal acts of international terrorism and the number of deaths declined in 1995, but a gas attack in Japan raised the spectre of mass casualties by chemical terrorism. Except for Iran, which actively continued to support terrorism in 1995, international pressure and sanctions largely contained terrorism by other state sponsors such as Libya and Iraq. Furthermore, individual and group-sponsored terrorist acts overshadowed state-sponsored terrorism. Many of these terrorists some loosely organized and some representing groups claimed to act for Islam and operated, increasingly, on a global scale. These transnational terrorists benefit from modern communications and transportation, have global sources of funding, are knowledgeable about modern explosives and weapons, and are more difficult to track and apprehend than members of the old established groups or those sponsored by states. Many of these transnational terrorists were trained in militant camps in Afghanistan or are veterans of the Afghan war. In 1995 a conspiracy discovered in the Philippines to bomb US airliners over the Pacific and led by the suspected mastermind of the World Trade Center bombing, exemplified this kind of transnational terrorism.

Terrorism by extremist individuals or groups claiming to act for religious motives continued to dominate international terrorism in 1995. In Israel new suicide bombings by radical Islamic Palestinians and the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin by a Jewish Israeli extremist continued previous efforts by terrorists to derail the peace process. Islamic extremists also waged a series of terrorist acts in Egypt, France, Algeria, and Pakistan.

Ethnic-based terrorism also continued in 1995. The Kurdish group, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), pressed its terrorist campaign in Turkey and Western Europe. Terrorist attacks or threats erupted in the Caucasus, and Tamil separatists used terrorism to advance their cause in Sri Lanka.

One of the most chilling terrorist acts of the year was the gas attack on the Tokyo subway by the Aum Shinrikyo cult, indicating that terrorism involving materials of mass destruction is now a reality.

Hostage taking continued to be a major form of terrorist activity, especially in countries like Colombia, where terrorists often have been able to extort ransom payments.

This report describes attacks of international terrorism by country and

region and patterns that can be derived from these attacks. It comments on, but does not provide details on, domestic terrorism and other forms of political violence. These are more widespread phenomena than international terrorism, which involve citizens or property of more than one country.

The United States believes that implementing a strict counterterrorist policy is the best way to reduce the global terrorist threat. US policy follows three general rules:

-- First, make no deals with terrorists or submit to blackmail. We have found over the years that this policy works.

-- Second, treat terrorists as criminals, pursue them aggressively, and apply the rule of law.

-- Third, bring maximum pressure on states that sponsor and support terrorists by imposing economic, diplomatic, and political sanctions and by urging other states to do likewise.

Nations around the world are working together increasingly to fight terrorism through law enforcement cooperation. Several governments turned over major terrorists to US authorities for prosecution in 1995, including the reputed mastermind of the World Trade Center bombing, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef. Some of Yousef's suspected gang members also were apprehended by other governments and extradited or rendered to US authorities.

Another major victory for the rule of law occurred in October, when a US court convicted Umar Abd al-Rahman and nine codefendants of conspiring to wage a war of urban terrorism against the United States.

Several multilateral conferences on counterterrorism in 1995 were a sign of recognition that international cooperation against terrorists is critical. Argentina, for example, convened a regional ministerial meeting on counterterrorism in August in the wake of two major car bombings in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994. Senior officials from Chile, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, the United States, and the host nation discussed practical measures against the threat posed in the region.

The Group of Seven plus Russia also held an unprecedented counterterrorist conference at the ministerial level in Ottawa in December, responding to a mandate from the heads of state at the Halifax Summit in June. In their Declaration, the ministers of the G-7 and Russia pledged to take action in the following areas:

- Strengthening the sharing of intelligence on terrorism.
- Pursuing measures to prevent the terrorist use of nuclear, chemical, and biological materials.
- Inhibiting the movement of terrorists.
- Enhancing measures to prevent the falsification of documents.
- Depriving terrorists of funds.
- Increasing mutual legal assistance.
- Strengthening protection of aviation, maritime, and other transportation systems against terrorism.
- Working toward universal adherence to international treaties and conventions on terrorism by the year 2000.

The United States, for its part, has made progress in many of these areas. For example, the Clinton administration has sought to increase the use of extradition as a counterterrorist tool. We are engaged in an active program of negotiating new and updated extradition treaties with nations around the world. At year's end, five new extradition treaties

were pending before the US Senate for advice and consent to ratification, and nearly 20 others were at various stages of negotiation.

In addition, President Clinton signed an Executive Order in January 1995 blocking the assets in the United States of terrorists and terrorist groups who threaten to disrupt the Middle East peace process and prohibiting financial transactions with these groups.

President Clinton and Secretary Christopher stressed the high priority of counterterrorist efforts in their addresses to the 50th United Nations General Assembly in October. In his UNGA speech, President Clinton challenged all the world's governments to negotiate and sign an international declaration on citizen security, including a call for enhanced cooperation on counterterrorism.

Last year, at the dedication of a memorial in Arlington National Cemetery to commemorate those killed in 1988 in the Pan Am 103 bombing, President Clinton said: "Today, America is more determined than ever to stand against terrorism, to fight it, to bring terrorists to answer for their crimes." More and more nations are demonstrating that same determination as the international battle against terrorism gets stronger each year.

Legislative Requirements

This report is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(a), which requires the Department of State to provide Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of Section (a)(1) and (2) of the Act. As required by legislation, the report includes detailed assessments of foreign countries where significant terrorist acts occurred and countries about which Congress was notified during the preceding five years pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (the so-called terrorism list countries that have repeatedly provided state support for international terrorism). In addition, the report includes all relevant information about the previous year's activities of individuals, terrorist organizations, or umbrella groups known to be responsible for the kidnapping or death of any US citizen during the preceding five years and groups known to be financed by state sponsors of terrorism.

Definitions

No one definition of terrorism has gained universal acceptance. For the purposes of this report, however, we have chosen the definition of terrorism contained in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d). That statute contains the following definitions:

-- The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant(1) targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

-- The term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country.

-- The term "terrorist group" means any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism.

The US Government has employed this definition of terrorism for statistical and analytical purposes since 1983. Domestic terrorism is probably a more widespread phenomenon than international terrorism. Because international terrorism has a direct impact on US interests, it is the primary focus of this report. However, the report also describes,

but does not provide statistics on, significant developments in domestic terrorism.

Note

Adverse mention in this report of individual members of any political, social, ethnic, religious, or national group is not meant to imply that all members of that group are terrorists. Indeed, terrorists represent a small minority of dedicated, often fanatical, individuals in most such groups. It is those small groups and their actions that are the subject of this report.

Furthermore, terrorist acts are part of a larger phenomenon of politically inspired violence, and at times the line between the two can become difficult to draw. To relate terrorist events to the larger context, and to give a feel for the conflicts that spawn violence, this report will discuss terrorist acts as well as other violent incidents that are not necessarily international terrorism.

Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox, Jr.
Coordinator for Counterterrorism

(1) For purposes of this definition, the term "noncombatant" is interpreted to include, in addition to civilians, military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed and/or not on duty. For example, in past reports we have listed as terrorist incidents the murders of the following US military personnel: Col. James Rowe, killed in Manila in April 1989; Capt. William Nordeen, US defense attache killed in Athens in June 1988; the two servicemen killed in the La Belle disco bombing in West Berlin in April 1986; and the four off-duty US Embassy Marine guards killed in a cafe in El Salvador in June 1985. We also consider as acts of terrorism attacks on military installations or on armed military personnel when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the site, such as bombings against US bases in Europe, the Philippines, or elsewhere.

Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1995

The Year in Review

In most countries, the level of international terrorism in 1995 continued the downward trend of recent years, and there were fewer terrorist acts that caused deaths last year than in the previous year. However, the total number of international terrorist acts rose in 1995 from 322 to 440, largely because of a major increase in nonlethal terrorist attacks against property in Germany and in Turkey by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). (The PKK also committed lethal acts of terrorism.) The decline in lethal acts of international terrorism was not matched by a reduction in domestic terrorism or other forms of political violence that continued at a high level.

International terrorist attacks against US interests rose to 99 in 1995 from 66 in 1994, and the number of US citizens killed rose from four to 12. The total number of fatalities from international terrorism worldwide declined from 314 in 1994 to 165 in 1995, but the number of persons wounded increased by a factor of ten to 6,291 persons; 5,500 were injured in a gas attack in the Tokyo subway system in March.

Significant acts of international terrorism during the year were:

October, Moroccan authorities arrested 16 persons in the eastern province of Oujda whom the Moroccans alleged were transporting weapons to Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front. Four of those arrested were Algerians, strengthening the government claims that the arms were intended for Algerian insurgents.

Saudi Arabia

On 13 November, a car bomb exploded outside the Riyadh headquarters of the Office of the Program Manager/Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM/SANG). Seven persons died in the blast, five of whom were US citizens, and 42 were injured. At least three groups claimed responsibility for the attack, including the Islamic Movement for Change, the Tigers of the Gulf, and the Combatant Partisans of God. The Saudi Government is aggressively investigating this attack with the assistance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Tunisia

Tunisia maintained effective control of the security situation in 1995, paying special attention to Islamic dissidents, but did not prosecute any individuals for specific acts of terrorism. In May the extremist Tunisian Islamic Front (FIT) issued a warning that all foreigners in Tunisia should leave, but it did not follow up with any concrete threats or attacks. The group also claimed responsibility for a number of operations in Tunisia, including the murders of four policemen. Tunisian authorities have not confirmed or denied the claims.

There are allegations that the FIT is working in conjunction with the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA), and that its members may be training in GIA camps. Several Tunisians were taken into custody in 1995 for alleged involvement with the GIA network in Europe. The FIT claimed responsibility for an attack in February against a Tunisian border post on the Tunisia-Algeria border in which seven border guards were killed, but some officials blame the GIA possibly in conjunction with the FIT for the attack. As of 31 December, there were no similar incidents.

Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism

The United States and its allies continue to focus on raising the costs for governments that support, tolerate, and engage in international terrorism. It is widely recognized that state support for terrorist groups enhances their capabilities and makes law enforcement efforts to counter terrorism more difficult. To pressure states to stop such support, US law imposes trade and other restrictions on countries determined by the Secretary of State to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism by supporting, training, supplying, or providing safehaven to known terrorists. The United States currently lists Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria as state supporters of terrorism. The list is sent annually to Congress, although countries can be added or removed at any time circumstances warrant.

Cuba no longer is able to actively support armed struggle in Latin America or other parts of the world because of severe ongoing economic problems. While there was no direct evidence of its sponsorship of terrorist acts in 1995, the Cuban Government continued to provide safehaven for several international terrorists. Cuba has not renounced political support for groups that engage in international terrorism.

Iran continued in 1995 to be the world's most active supporter of international terrorism. Although Tehran tried to project a moderate image in the West, it continued to assassinate dissidents abroad and

maintained its support and financing of groups that pose a threat to US citizens. Iranian authorities reaffirmed the validity of the death sentence imposed on British author Salman Rushdie, although some Iranian officials claimed that the Government of Iran would not implement the fatwa. No specific acts of terrorism attributed to the Iranian-backed Lebanese Hizballah in 1995 were on the scale of the July 1994 bombing of a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires, which is believed to have been perpetrated by Hizballah. Hizballah continued attempts to undermine the Middle East peace process and oppose Western interests throughout the Middle East. Iran also supports other radical organizations that commit terrorism in opposition to the peace process, including HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). It also provides safehaven to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a terrorist group fighting for an independent Kurdish state that carried out numerous terrorist acts in 1995 against Turkish interests.

During 1995 several acts of political violence in northern Iraq matched Baghdad's pattern of using terrorism against the local population and regime defectors. These included a bombing attack on the Iraqi National Congress and the poisoning of a number of regime defectors. Iraq continues to provide a safehaven for various terrorist groups.

Libya continued for another year its defiance of the demands of UN Security Council Resolutions adopted in response to its involvement in the bombings of Pan Am flight 103 (1988) and UTA flight 772 (1989). These resolutions demand that Libya turn over for trial the two intelligence agents indicted for the PA 103 bombing, cooperate with US, UK, and French authorities in investigating the Pan Am and UTA bombings, pay compensation to victims, and cease all support for terrorism. Instead, Libya continued to foster disingenuous "compromises" aimed at diluting or evading the resolutions. It also continued hosting terrorist groups like the Abu Nidal organization (ANO). Further, an investigation into the murder of PIJ leader Fathi Shaqaqi in Malta in October 1995 revealed that he had long been a Libyan client. Tripoli also continued to harass and intimidate the Libyan exile community; it is believed to be responsible for the abduction of US resident Mansur Kikhia in December 1993 and was blamed by Libyan exiles for the murder of a Libyan oppositionist in London in November 1995. The Libyan charge in London was expelled in 1995 for threatening and surveilling Libyan exiles in the United Kingdom.

North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or DPRK) is not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since 1987. Since 1993 the DPRK has made several efforts to reiterate a stated position of opposition to all forms of international terrorism. The DPRK Government since 1970 has provided safehaven to several members of the Japanese Communist League-Red Army Faction, who participated in an aircraft hijacking in 1970.

Sudan came into sharper focus in 1995 as a center of international terrorist activities. By year's end it was at odds with many of its neighbors. Uganda and Eritrea had severed diplomatic relations with Khartoum because of its support of armed opposition groups in those countries. Ethiopia and Egypt accused Sudan of complicity in one of the year's highest profile terrorist crimes, the unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa on 26 June, attributed to the Egyptian al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group or IG). Surviving assailants captured by Ethiopian police incriminated the Sudanese Government, which is dominated by the National Islamic Front (NIF), in planning the crime and training the assailants. Three conspirators are believed to be in Sudan. When Khartoum refused to cooperate in apprehending them, the Organization for African Unity (OAU) called for Sudan to hand over the suspects. In addition, Sudan continues

to harbor Usama Bin Ladin, a major financier of terrorism, and members of some of the world's most violent groups like the IG, ANO, Lebanese Hizballah and HAMAS. Khartoum is a major transit point and base for a number of terrorist groups.

There is no evidence that Syrian officials have been directly involved in planning or executing terrorist attacks since 1986. Nevertheless, Syria continues to provide safehaven and support inside Syria and in areas of Lebanon under Syrian control for terrorist groups such as Ahmad Jibril's PFLP-GC, HAMAS, Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Japanese Red Army, and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Syria has permitted Iranian resupply of Hizballah via Damascus but continues to restrain the international activities of some of these groups.

Cuba

Cuba no longer actively supports armed struggle in Latin America and other parts of the world. In earlier years, the Castro regime provided significant levels of military training, weapons, funding, and guidance to leftist extremists worldwide. Havana's focus now is to forestall an economic collapse; the government actively continued to seek the upgrading of diplomatic and trade relations with other nations.

Cuba is not known to have sponsored any international terrorist incidents in 1995. Havana, however, provided safehaven to several terrorists in Cuba during the year. A number of Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) terrorists, who sought sanctuary in Cuba several years ago, still live on the island. Members of a few Latin American terrorist organizations and US fugitives also reside in Cuba.

Iran

Iran remains the premier state sponsor of international terrorism and is deeply involved in the planning and execution of terrorist acts both by its own agents and by surrogate groups. This year Tehran escalated its assassination campaign against dissidents living abroad; there were seven confirmed Iranian murders of dissidents in 1995, compared with four in 1994. Iranian antidissident operations concentrated on the regime's main opposition group, the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), and the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI).

Leaders of Iranian dissident groups are the most frequent victims of Iranian intelligence and terrorist operations. In 1995 most antidissident attacks were conducted in Iraq, in contrast to prior years' worldwide operations. Attacks on Iranian dissidents in Iraq during the year included the shooting deaths on 17 May of two MEK members in Baghdad, the murder on 5 June of two members of the Iranian Kurdish "Toilers" Party (Komelah) in Sulaymaniyah, and the killing of three MEK members in Baghdad on 10 July. The shooting death in Paris on 17 September of Hashem Abdollahi, son of the chief witness in the trial of 1994 that convicted two Iranians for murdering former Iranian Prime Minister Bakhtiar in 1991, may have been an antidissident attack.

Sendar Hosseini, a suspect in the 1994 murder of dissident Osman Muhammed Amini in Copenhagen, Denmark, was arrested by Italian police in Bibione, Italy.

Iran provides arms, training, and money to Lebanese Hizballah and several Palestinian extremist groups that use terrorism to oppose the Middle East peace process. Tehran, which is against any compromise with or recognition of Israel, continued in 1995 to encourage Hizballah, HAMAS, the PIJ, the PFLP-GC, and other Palestinian rejectionist groups to form a coordinated front to resist Israel and the peace process through violence and terrorism.

Hizballah, Iran's closest client, remains the leading suspect in the July 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israel Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires that killed at least 96 persons. This operation was virtually identical to the one conducted in March 1992 against the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, for which Hizballah claimed responsibility.

Iran also gives varying degrees of assistance to an assortment of radical Islamic and secular groups from North Africa to Central Asia. For example, Tehran continued to offer the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) safehaven in Iran. Seeking to establish a Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey, the PKK in 1995 launched numerous attacks in Europe and continued its violent campaign against Turkish tourism, including attacks on tourist spots frequented by Westerners. Tehran also provided some support to Turkish Islamic groups that have been blamed for attacks against Turkish secular and Jewish figures.

Iranian authorities reaffirmed the validity of the death sentence imposed on British author Salman Rushdie, although some Iranian officials claimed that the Government of Iran would not implement the fatwa. Tehran, however, continued to mount a propaganda campaign against Rushdie. In February the sixth anniversary of the judgment Iran's official news agency IRNA reported that Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmoud Vaezi "underlined the need for the implementation of the fatwa against the author of the blasphemous book *The Satanic Verses*." Vaezi in May declared that "the fatwa issued by the late Imam [Khomeini] could neither be revoked nor changed by anybody."

Despite increasing Iranian support for extremist groups and involvement in terrorist operations, President Rafsanjani continued to project publicly a "moderate" image of Iran to Western European countries and Japan to facilitate the expansion of its relations with them. This quest for respectability probably explains why Iran reduced its attacks in Europe last year; Tehran wants to ensure access to Western capital and markets.

Iran continued to view the United States as its principal foreign adversary, supporting groups such as Hizballah that pose a threat to US citizens. Because of Tehran's and Hizballah's deep antipathy toward the United States, US missions and personnel abroad continue to be at risk.

Iraq

During 1995 several acts of political violence in northern Iraq matched Baghdad's pattern of using terrorism against the local population and regime defectors. Although Iraq's terrorist infrastructure has not recovered from the blows it suffered during the Gulf war, Baghdad has taken measures to restore its terrorist options.

Iraq remains far from compliance with UN resolutions that require it to cease internal repression and support for terrorism. Iraqi-sponsored terrorism has been commonplace in northern Iraq, where the regime is responsible for more than 100 attacks on UN and relief agency personnel and aid convoys over the past several years. In 1995 there were a number of acts of political violence for which Baghdad is a suspect. For example, a blast on 9 November at the security office in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq of the opposition Iraqi National Congress (INC) killed at least 25 persons. The INC has been targeted before by the regime in Baghdad.

Early in the year, a number of Iraqi oppositionists in northern Iraq were poisoned by thallium. At least one survived and was treated in a British hospital. The British Government confirmed that he was a victim