Crackdown in the North: Suppression of the Woman Life Freedom Movement in Gilan and Mazandaran Provinces

p.par

2 months ago

Executive Summary

The Iran Human Rights Documentation Center (IHRDC) has verified that between September 20, 2022, and September 1, 2023, at least 26 civilians were killed in Mazandaran Province and 31 in Gilan Province in connection with the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests. Among those killed, four individuals in Mazandaran and two in Gilan were minors, while five in Mazandaran and two in Gilan were female. In Mazandaran, 20 individuals were fatally shot with live ammunition or pellet-firing shotguns, while 14 individuals in Gilan were killed by gunfire, many of whom sustained injuries to vital organs. Additionally, 13 individuals in Gilan died under suspicious circumstances either during or following their detention. During this period, five individuals in Mazandaran Province lost their lives under similar circumstances. Moreover, four individuals in Gilan and one in Mazandaran reportedly succumbed to injuries resulting from beatings by security forces.[1] In at least six instances in Gilan and two in Mazandaran, the intentional denial of medical care or delays in transporting injured individuals to hospitals by security forces were contributing factors to their deaths.[2]

In Mazandaran, the city of Amol recorded the highest number of fatalities with nine deaths, followed by Nowshahr with six, and Qaem Shahr with five. Rasht in Gilan Province had the highest number of casualties with 16 deaths, followed by Rezvanshahr and Bandar Anzali with three each. The night of September 21, 2022, marked the deadliest period, with 22 deaths across both provinces.[3] On October 9, 2022, at least 11 inmates were reportedly killed during a riot at Lakan prison in Rasht.[4] The specific details surrounding the incident, as well as the exact locations of the graves of several inmates who were allegedly buried anonymously, remain largely unknown.[5] The killed inmates were reportedly not detained in relation to protests, with at least two of them were behind bars because of their inability to pay off their debts.[6]

In at least five cases in Mazandaran and one case in Gilan, authorities offered the families of killed individuals the official designation of Shahīd (martyr) as a means to deflect demands for accountability.[7] Additionally, in five instances, the killed citizens were falsely identified as members of the Basij militia, and in two cases, they were misrepresented as bystanders uninvolved in the protests.[8] Some families accepted these fabrications, echoed the state’s narrative, or remained silent. In several cases, families participated in interviews with state media, repeating the state’s version of events. These interviews fit a broader pattern of information suppression regarding protest-related deaths.

The Islamic Republic has consistently denied responsibility for civilian deaths, alleging in at least seven cases in Mazandaran and two in Gilan that the victims were killed by political adversaries, so-called rioters, or individuals impersonating law enforcement.[9] Additionally, in five cases in Mazandaran and three in Gilan, authorities fabricated the cause of death, attributing it to car accidents, suicide, or illness.[10] A persistent pattern of impunity is evident across all these cases.

In the majority of cases, burials were conducted under tight security. In many instances, bodies of killed citizens were withheld and only released after families paid money or agreed to state-imposed conditions, including public silence or participation in state-controlled interviews. Families were often not permitted to examine the bodies before burial, and in at least one case in Gilan, the burial was held at night. Victims whose families agreed to endorse the state’s version of events were buried in more prominent locations, including sections reserved for soldiers who died during the Iran-Iraq War, while others were interred in remote or less visible areas. In at least one case in Gilan, a protester’s grave was subjected to repeated vandalism. In at least two other instances in Mazandaran, authorities constructed walls and barriers around the graves of female protesters to restrict public access.[11]

Despite filing criminal complaints in three cases in Mazandaran and two in Gilan, families have reported that these complaints have languished in the judiciary with no resolution in sight. In some instances, security and judiciary officials pressured families to accept diyah (blood money), effectively closing the cases. Additionally, numerous families reportedly refrain from filing criminal complaints due to threats from security forces. In nearly all cases, families have been prohibited from publicly mourning or speaking about their killed relatives, with restrictions ranging from bans on holding memorial services to limitations on social media posts. In several instances, security forces attacked mourners, and in at least two separate incidents in Gilan and Mazandaran provinces, pellet-firing shotguns were used against crowds, resulting in injuries.[12]

Families who rejected the state’s fabricated narrative and sought justice for their loved ones have faced intimidation, persecution, and imprisonment. In at least five cases in Mazandaran, family members were arrested, with some convicted on bogus national security charges.[13] Several families reported health issues caused by state pressure, and in one case, the fiancée of a killed protester was forcibly hospitalized in a mental institution and subjected to involuntary psychological treatment.[14]

Introduction

The Islamic Republic has a documented history of violently suppressing citizens who protest state policies and practices. This record reflects a systemic disregard for international human rights standards, including the right to life, protection from arbitrary detention and torture, and the prohibition of persecution based on gender. It also demonstrates consistent patterns of suppressing information about the true nature of harm inflicted on victims and, in some instances, obscuring the victims’ political beliefs, all of which infringe upon the right to the truth.

In the context of the nationwide protests that erupted following the death of Mahsa “Jina” Amini in the custody of the morality police in September 2022, the Islamic Republic once again violated its international obligations under international human rights laws and engaged in actions that may constitute international crimes, including potential crimes against humanity.[15] The regime’s conduct mirrors previous patterns of abuse, which have become increasingly apparent. These patterns include withholding the bodies of killed protesters, denying accurate information about their deaths, obstructing public memorials, and enforcing nocturnal or heavily guarded burials. Families of victims have been coerced into silence, with authorities intimidating, arresting, and compelling them to make false statements that are then published by state media. Other observed patterns include disseminating contradictory and misleading statements by officials, online censorship, surveillance, and internet shutdowns. Additionally, in certain cases, authorities have conferred the designation of Shahīd (martyr) upon victims as a strategy to suppress dissent and discourage their families from pursuing justice.

Gilan and Mazandaran, two populated provinces in northern Iran, were among the most affected areas by the state suppression, particularly during the initial weeks of the Woman, Life, Freedom protests. With at least 57 reported fatalities related to the protests, these two provinces rank behind the Kurdish-majority provinces, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, and Tehran Province in terms of fatalities. As in other areas of the country, unarmed protesters were either shot in streets or died under suspicious circumstances, with systematic efforts by the state to obscure the truth. This report first outlines the applicable legal framework, then details the research methodology, analyzes several case studies to identify and discuss patterns of human rights violations by the Islamic Republic, and concludes with a verified list of killed individuals in Gilan and Mazandaran provinces. These lists are included to honor and commemorate the lives of killed citizens.

Iranian woman burned her headscarf in Sari, Mazandaran Province -Source social media

I. Applicable Legal Framework

The Islamic Republic of Iran has signed and ratified several key international human rights instruments, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”). Moreover, Iran is bound by customary international law principles as articulated in various international treaties to which it is not a party.

This section evaluates the impact of the actions of the Islamic Republic from September 20, 2022, to September 1, 2023, on fundamental rights and freedoms. The analysis covers, but is not limited to, the rights to freedom of expression, assembly, and association, the prohibitions against arbitrary detention, torture, persecution based on gender and enforced disappearance, as well as the prohibition against arbitrary deprivation of life, and the right to truth.

A. Right to Freedom of Expression, Assembly, and Association

Article 19 of the ICCPR safeguards the right to freedom of expression, encompassing the freedom to seek, receive, and disseminate information and ideas across borders, whether orally or through any chosen media.[16] Article 19(3) permits limitations on these rights only if they are prescribed by law, pursue a legitimate objective, and adhere to the rigorous standards of necessity and proportionality.[17] Nonetheless, freedom of expression is crucial for upholding transparency and accountability; any limitations imposed on this right must not undermine its essential core.[18]

Articles 21 and 22 of the ICCPR guarantee the rights to peaceful assembly and association.[19] Restrictions on these rights must be proportionate, not merely reasonable or expedient.[20] Such restrictions must be lawful and necessary in a democratic society to protect national security, public safety, public order, public health, morals, or the rights and freedoms of others.[21] States must avoid using vague terms and definitions to justify excessively broad limitations.[22] Moreover, individuals should not face harassment or reprisals due to their participation in or affiliation with a peaceful assembly.[23] Acts of isolated violence occurring within an assembly should not be attributed to others or the assembly as a whole.[24] Even if an assembly causes disruption, the protections guaranteed by the ICCPR must still apply.[25]

B. Prohibition of Arbitrary Detention and Torture

Article 9(1) of ICCPR provides, “Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.”[26] Detention is deemed arbitrary if it occurs outside the bounds of established legal procedures.[27] This includes situations where an individual is not informed of the grounds for their arrest, is not promptly brought before a judicial authority, or is denied access to judicial proceedings.[28] Additionally, detaining an individual solely for exercising their lawful rights, such as freedoms of expression and association, is considered arbitrary.[29] The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has further emphasized that arbitrary deprivation of liberty can never be justified as necessary or proportionate.[30]

Torture is characterized as any act where severe physical or mental pain or suffering is intentionally inflicted by, or with the instigation of, a public official.[31] These acts may be carried out for purposes including the extraction of information, punishment, or intimidation.[32] According to Article 7 of the ICCPR, torture, along with cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, is explicitly prohibited.[33] Additionally, Article 10 of the ICCPR stipulates that all individuals deprived of their liberty must be treated with humanity and respect for their inherent dignity.[34] The prohibition of torture is firmly established under customary international law.[35]

C. Prohibition of Persecution Based on Gender

Systematic mistreatment, discrimination, or targeting of individuals based on their gender can be employed by perpetrators to regulate or punish those who are perceived to deviate from established gender norms or expressions.[36] This enforcement is not limited to individuals who directly belong to or embody the targeted gender group; it also encompasses those who are merely sympathizers or associates of the individuals who fall within the targeted category.[37] In other words, the scope of such persecution extends to anyone perceived as supporting or being affiliated with those who challenge or violate prescribed gender norms, regardless of their personal adherence to these norms. The prohibition of persecution based on gender is considered an evolving norm of customary international law.[38]

D. Prohibition of Enforced Disappearance

In 1992, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, which is regarded as reflecting customary international law.[39] The declaration defines enforced disappearance as the arrest, detention, or any form of deprivation of liberty carried out by state agents or individuals acting with state authorization or support, followed by the state’s refusal to acknowledge the detention or the concealment of the person’s fate or whereabouts.[40] Consequently, all United Nations member states are prohibited from engaging in, permitting, or tolerating enforced disappearances.[41]

The Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances outlines three key elements of enforced disappearance: (1) deprivation of liberty against the individual’s will; (2) involvement of the state; and (3) refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or the concealment of the individual’s fate or whereabouts.[42] This includes any state-imposed lack of information or obstacles to accessing information regarding whether the disappeared person is alive or dead, who is responsible for their disappearance, and other relevant details about their fate.[43] Such actions are deemed to constitute enforced disappearance under international law.

An enforced disappearance can occur without any specific duration requirement, and this human rights violation continues for as long as the state conceals the individual’s fate or whereabouts.[44] Enforced disappearance further infringes upon multiple fundamental rights safeguarded by the ICCPR and ICESCR, including the right to life, recognition before the law, liberty, security, freedom from torture, the right to a fair trial, access to an effective remedy, and the right to health.[45]

E. Prohibition of Arbitrary Deprivation of Life

Article 6 of the ICCPR explicitly forbids the “arbitrary deprivation” of life.[46] The Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions has delineated several key features of arbitrary deprivation of life, that are (1) it encompasses both procedural and substantive aspects, (2) it is impermissible under international law and more stringent domestic legal protections, (3) arbitrariness can be inferred from laws and practices that violate the principle of non-discrimination, (4) it involves elements of inappropriateness, injustice, and lack of predictability and due process, (5) deliberate intent is not necessary, as killings resulting from unnecessary or disproportionate use of force by law enforcement are often deemed arbitrary, and (6) protections against arbitrary deprivation of life extend to killings by state and non-state actors.[47] In the same manner, the Special Rapporteur has also emphasized that the bodies of deceased individuals must be treated with respect, and violations of human remains are regarded as assaults on individual’s dignity.[48]

F. Right to Truth

The right to truth encompasses the entitlement to obtain detailed and accurate information about the events in question, including the specifics of what transpired and the identities of those involved.[49] This right also entails understanding the context and motivations underlying the violation.[50] As a fundamental and inalienable right, the right to truth is intrinsically linked to other essential rights, such as the prohibition of torture, and is not subject to any exceptions.[51] The Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity underscores the importance of the right to truth, especially for victims’ families.[52] This framework affirms that victims and their families are entitled to comprehensive information about the circumstances surrounding human rights violations, including the fate of individuals in cases of death or disappearance.[53]

Suppression of protests in Amol (right) and Rasht (left)-Source social media

II. Methodology

Since the onset of the Woman, Life, Freedom protests in September 2022, IHRDC has systematically collected open-source data regarding violence perpetrated by security forces against civilians across the country, including Gilan and Mazandaran provinces. This data, consisting of hundreds of pieces of content, was sourced from platforms such as Google, X (formerly Twitter), Instagram, Telegram, and Facebook, covering the period from September 2022 to early 2024. The content includes media reports and user-generated material in the form of photos, videos, and text posts on social media, as well as reports from human rights organizations.

For the current research, IHRDC utilized only a fraction of the collected open-source data, as the focus was limited to specific locations (Gilan and Mazandaran provinces), a defined period (September 20, 2022, to September 1, 2023), and the particular issue of extrajudicial killings of protesters by security forces, along with the systematic and organized efforts by state officials to obscure details about these individuals.

IHRDC’s methodology in this report combined closed-source information, primarily witness testimonies, with open-source data. The IHRDC legal team interviewed six witnesses in Iran and Türkiye, all of whom had first-hand experience with the protests. Some witnesses requested anonymity. Additionally, media sources were used to provide context and details, and the report references relevant laws and regulations. In some instances, information provided by state-sponsored media has been included, particularly in the context of statements by victims’ families. When such information is used, the report identifies the source and evaluates its reliability.

IHRDC cross-checked and confirmed 57 cases of deaths linked to the protests in Gilan and Mazandaran provinces from September 20, 2022, to September 1, 2023. Each case has been corroborated by at least three independent sources. IHRDC was unable to verify the age of the individuals through state-issued records due to the absence of publicly available information. Consequently, the ages mentioned in the report were corroborated by one or more other sources that provided the same information. There were other cases that IHRDC could not verify due to insufficient reliable and publicly available information. Among the 57 cases of extrajudicial killings, three significant trends were identified: (1) unlawful and excessive use of force; (2) a systematic effort by state officials to attribute civilian deaths to non-state causes or actors; and (3) consistent pressure on the families of those killed to remain silent about the circumstances of their deaths. All case studies in this research demonstrate these trends.

IHRDC’s methodology ensured a rigorous and principled approach in assessing the credibility and accuracy of the sources, adhering to standards of evidence, reliability, and accountability in presenting the information. All names of places, individuals, organizations, and other entities originally written in Persian have been transliterated using the system employed by the International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (IJMES).[54]

III. Case Studies

This section presents case studies of individuals subjected to multiple human rights violations by Iranian security forces in connection with the Woman, Life, Freedom protests in Gilan and Mazandaran provinces. These case studies are grouped into four categories, all of which demonstrate violations of the right to freedom of assembly and association, as well as infringements on freedom of expression. In each case, the individuals were targeted due to their presence in demonstrations or their involvement in protest-related activities. Notably, none of the perpetrators have been held accountable, and a persistent pattern of impunity is evident in these cases. Each case study details the experiences of the victims, and in some instances, their families, following their injuries, detention, or killing.

The first set of case studies (A-B) concerns two individuals who were intentionally targeted by security forces utilizing pellet-firing shotguns and live ammunition in streets, leading to severe, life-changing injuries. Both cases exhibit the unlawful and excessive use of force, with one case also containing elements of gender-based persecution.

The second group (C-D) comprises two individuals who were arbitrarily arrested for their participation in the protests and subsequently subjected to various forms of torture. In both instances, all three elements of enforced disappearance were established. In addition, one of the victims was subjected to systematic persecution and sexual violence by state actors, demonstrating characteristics of gender-based persecution.

IHRDC conducted interviews with individuals from the first two groups. Except for one, the victims were forced to leave Iran due to ongoing intimidation, harassment, and persecution.

The third group of case studies (E-J) pertains to individuals who were arbitrarily and extrajudicially killed by security forces, with their families subsequently subjected to intimidation and harassment for speaking out and pursuing justice. The final group (K-N) involves cases where individuals lost their lives either by gunfire during protests or under suspicious circumstances following detention. The Islamic Republic exerted substantial pressure on their families to conceal the truth regarding the circumstances of these deaths.

The cases discussed in groups three (E-J) and four (K-N) occurred in the early days of the protests, but the pressure on their families has persisted for several months thereafter. Information regarding individuals in these groups primarily comes from open-source material, with corroborating witness statements from IHRDC interviews. These cases reveal a consistent pattern of extrajudicial killings and information suppression by the regime, violating the right to life and the right to truth, in addition to other rights such as the right to liberty. Families of those killed were also victimized: those in group three faced intimidation, persecution, and imprisonment for challenging the state’s false narratives, while families in group four were forced to either accept or refrain from contesting the state’s version of events.

A. Ali Delpasand

Ali Delpasand, 45, was in the streets on November 15, 2022, accompanied by his wife and young daughter. He had previously participated in the Woman, Life, Freedom protests and had even been injured in the shoulder on one occasion. In an interview with IHRDC, he recounted witnessing direct gunfire by security forces at citizens in Moalem Street, Mother Square, and Golsar Street in Rasht. “There was even a case where an elderly woman had stuck her head out from a balcony, and they shot at her, injuring her in the head and eye. On November 15, 2022, around 7:00 PM, a girl, approximately 20 or 21 years old, had been shot from head to knee, specifically targeting her genital area.”[55]

Delpasand explained that he and his family were in the Golsar Deylaman area to purchase school supplies for his young daughter. According to him, security forces violently dispersed protesters around 5:00 PM by firing shots into the air. “A 50-year-old Basiji with a [police] riot helmet and a thick beard, wearing a uniform, warned me to move the child out of harm’s way, otherwise I would bear all responsibility! […] He was pointing a pellet gun at us, but I was holding [my daughter] Respina close to me to shield her from any shots.” After this encounter, the Delpasand family got into their car and went elsewhere to shop, but discovered all stores were closed.[56]

All of Golsar Street was crowded […] it was around 7:00 PM. My wife had a habit of making a victory sign out of the car window. That day, we were exactly at the Gelayol intersection, across from Amir Pizza, when a woman in an SUV made the victory sign from her car, and my wife responded with the same sign. I was honking as well. I think we had driven about 100 meters past Amir Pizza. We were stuck in traffic. Everyone was honking and showing solidarity. [Suddenly] two security forces riding motorcycles, speaking in the Gilani dialect, came from my left and shot me with a pellet gun […] I lost consciousness and only heard my daughter’s screams. I couldn’t move […] If the crowd hadn’t gathered, they would have certainly taken us away […] Later, my wife told me that when she asked the two security forces why they shot us, they just stood there laughing at us![57]

Hospitals in Rasht provided minor treatments and then referred Ali Delpasand to Farabi Hospital in Tehran. One pellet lodged under the eye of his wife, Bahareh, and two pellets struck her eyebrow. Had they been off by a few millimeters, she might have lost one of her eyes. Over the course of 45 days, Ali Delpasand underwent four surgeries. Two pellets had pierced his eyeball, reaching the optic nerve. The doctors informed him that the pellets could not be removed. They were unable to repair the retinal damage, and Ali Delpasand lost vision in one of his eyes.[58] Ali Delpasand and his family eventually had to leave Iran due to fear of persecution.

این ویدیوها از شامگاه ۲۵ شهریور در شهر رشت منتشر شده‌است که در آنها شنیده می‌شود مردم شعار مرگ بر دیکتاتور سر می‌دهند.

همزمان با سالگرد کشته شدن مهسا امینی و آغاز اعتراضات سراسری ایران، فراخوان‌هایی برای تجمع در شهرهای ایران در شبکه های اجتماعی منتشر شده است. pic.twitter.com/6K5trxfgqx

— BBC NEWS فارسی (@bbcpersian) September 16, 2023

B. Anonymous Witness No. 2

Witness No. 2, a young mother residing in northern Iran, has requested anonymity due to concerns about potential further persecution by the security forces. Accordingly, all identifying details, including specific locations and dates, have been deliberately omitted to protect her identity.

In an interview with IHRDC, Witness No. 2 explained that she had been actively participating in the Woman, Life, Freedom protests from the very beginning in September 2022. On one occasion, she was struck by a pellet gun but refrained from going to the hospital out of fear of being arrested. According to her account, riot police and plainclothes security forces, armed with pellet guns and military-grade firearms, were actively involved in suppressing the protesters. She further reported witnessing security forces firing directly at demonstrators and carrying out violent arrests of numerous individuals. Additionally, she later became aware that one of her friends, who had participated in the protests alongside her, had been arrested, became subjected to torture and sexual assault while in custody, and subsequently died under suspicious circumstances. The family of this young woman, under pressure from security forces, did not publicize the matter.[59]

One night, Witness No. 2 was compelled to go to the city center for an errand, accompanied by her young child. That evening, sporadic protests were occurring throughout the city, with a significant presence of security forces. However, in the particular area where she was targeted, no protests were taking place at the time.[60]

That night, I wasn’t wearing a headscarf. I often didn’t wear it anymore. I was holding my child in my arms, and I had just left the store where I had been shopping. Suddenly, three or four officers attacked me and started beating me. They assaulted me solely because I wasn’t wearing a headscarf. My child was thrown to the ground! They were carrying military weapons. One of the officers grabbed my hair and shouted the vilest insults at me […] In that moment, all I wanted was to escape and save my child and myself. I stood up to run, but they shot me from behind. Later, I found out that I had been shot with a handgun. As a result of witnessing the incident, my child experienced severe trauma, which rendered them unable to speak for an extended period.[61]

Subsequently, several hours passed before she was taken to the hospital, as no ambulance was willing to transport her. Once at the hospital, security agents repeatedly obstructed her surgery for several consecutive days, despite the bullet still being lodged in her body. “At one point, I overheard one of the agents who was visiting my hospital room telling the medical staff, ‘[l]et the bullet get infected in her body, so she dies!’” Eventually, she underwent surgery in secret, but due to the bullet striking her spine, she sustained severe and permanent mobility impairment.[62]

According to Witness No. 2, her family filed a complaint against the officers, but they were told that Witness No. 2 had already been identified and was under surveillance due to her participation in the protests. Witness No. 2 stated that the authorities confiscated footage from all the CCTV cameras around the scene of the incident. She further explained that as a result of filing the complaint, she and her family were subjected to threats and ultimately were forced to drop the case.[63]

C. Yalda Dehghani

Yalda Dehghani, aged 27, actively participated in the Woman, Life, Freedom protests throughout Gilan Province. In an interview with IHRDC, she recounted witnessing acts of violence perpetrated by security forces against unarmed civilians and bystanders, with particular focus on women. On one occasion, while in Golsar Street, Rasht, she observed security forces on motorcycles firing at a young woman who was walking with a man.[64]

There was no protest occurring at that time, and these individuals were obviously bystanders. The young woman was attired in a purple artistic outfit and was wearing a headscarf […] I was about 10 to 20 steps behind the man and woman when I heard the sound of gunfire—two shots fired simultaneously. I thought the poor girl had fainted from the noise of the gunfire. However, when I saw blood flowing from her leg into the middle of the street, I realized she had been shot […] I rushed to her to help her. Eventually, I could take her to the hospital that initially refused to accept her. She had profuse bleeding from her leg, which was attached to her knee only with a piece of skin […] I later found out that girl did not receive appropriate medical care and as the result her leg became infected. Doctors amputated her leg from the knee. She was only 24, and her family never publicized her case out of fear of more persecution.[65]

In the early hours of May 22, 2023, Yalda Dehghani was violently detained by officers from the Iranian Police Criminal Investigation Department (C.I.D Police of FARAJA, also known as Āgāhi Police) at her in-laws’ residence in Rasht. She was subsequently taken to the Āgāhi Police detention center in Bandar Anzali, where she was interrogated over several days. In an effort to prevent her transfer to prison, her husband expended his savings and paid substantial bribes to the officer handling her case. Despite his efforts, no attorney would accept her case due to threats from the security forces.[66]

Dehghani later reported that the officer who accepted bribes from her husband raped her in his office. Shortly thereafter, she was transferred to Lakan prison in Rasht. During her detention, agents from the Ministry of Intelligence (MOI) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) transported her from the prison to undisclosed locations for further interrogation. There, she endured physical and psychological torture, including beatings, intimidation, and sexual assault, and was coerced into confessing her involvement in 2022 protests. After 28 days of detention, she was released on bail pending trial.[67]

Three weeks later, Dehghani was arrested again and returned to Lakan prison. She reported further interrogation by MOI and IRGC agents at undisclosed locations, during which she was repeatedly raped by multiple individuals. She was administered small green pills that induced delusions, impaired her cognitive and physical functions, and caused short-term memory loss. Dehghani also witnessed the systematic abuse of other female prisoners.[68]

During her only court appearance before Judge Ahmad Darvish-Goftar, the head of the Revolutionary Court in Rasht, Yalda Dehghani was insulted and denied the opportunity to speak. After multiple delays, she was granted temporary release on October 25, 2023, with an increased bond. The judiciary subsequently imposed a six-month travel ban while she awaited sentencing. Following her release, Dehghani sought medical treatment and was diagnosed with an autoimmune disease. She also received numerous threatening phone calls, warning her of potential violence and urging her to commit suicide. Additionally, her home was raided by security forces on several occasions. Fearing further persecution, Dehghani and her husband ultimately left Iran.[69]

#رشتو
تمام فیلم هایی که امشب گرفتم رو همینجا توییت میکنم.#مهسا_امینی #انزلی pic.twitter.com/HLDYuWqdjI

— حــنــا (@sameoldhana) September 21, 2022

D. Ashkan Soleimani

Ashkan Soleimani, 31, described being active in the Woman, Life, Freedom protests. He indicated that he created an Instagram account and a Telegram channel both called Javanan-e Mahalat-e Rasht (The Youth of Rasht Neighborhoods), which focused on reporting about the 2022 protests in Rasht, and quickly gained thousands of followers. On November 3, 2022, he was violently arrested by MOI agents at his home for allegedly being involved in setting fire to an ambulance during the protests.[70]

In his interview with IHRDC, he described that at the time of his arrest, he was severely beaten and suffered a hand fracture. He was taken to a detention center, held in solitary confinement for twelve days, and injected with an unidentified substance against his will. Ashkan Soleimani was then transferred to Lakan prison in Rasht. He stated that he was subjected to torture, including mock execution, and denied medical care, access to an attorney, and contact with his family for days. He was initially charged with moharebeh (waging war against God), a capital offense, and membership in a group with the intent to disrupt national security. He was released in February 2023, however, following a pardon issued by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[71]

On April 11, 2023, he was arrested by the IRGC intelligence. He indicated that he spent eight days in solitary confinement, was beaten, and threatened with execution. On May 30, 2023, he was released on bail pending trial. On June 17, 2023, following a brief trial of only a few minutes, the Rasht Revolutionary Court, presided over by Judge Ahmad Darvish-Goftar, sentenced him to five years of imprisonment, with two years to be enforced on various charges, including insulting the Supreme Leader. About a month later, while Soleimani and several others were on their way to a cemetery in Karaj, Alborz Province, to pay their respects to the victims of the 2022 protests, their car collided with another vehicle. Ashkan Soleimani described the accident as a deliberate attempt to kill them. Fearing for his life and safety, he subsequently went into hiding. On August 15, 2023, he was arrested for the third time in Orumieh, West Azarbaijan Province. He was taken to the IRGC intelligence’s detention center, where he spent 28 days in solitary confinement.[72]

In Orumieh, the forces were extremely aggressive and brutal […] They beat the hell out of people […] The IRGC intelligence in Orumieh tortures in terrifying ways. If I were to compare them to the IRGC intelligence in Gilan, the ones in Gilan seem more decent, though they are not decent either! The ones in Orumieh are incredibly savage. For example, they grab your head and slam it against a car or a wall and kick you in the mouth with their boots as if you’re not even a person. They don’t care at all. Especially if you’re from another city, they show no mercy.[73]

He was then transferred to Lakan prison to serve his two-year sentence. On March 14, 2024, his deteriorating health condition prompted his release on medical leave. He then left Iran to avoid more persecution.[74]

Suppression of Protests in Rasht-Source social media

E. Milad Zare

On September 20, 2022, Milad Zare, 25, was shot in the back of the head during a protest in Babol, Mazandaran Province.[75] Around 8 PM, his family was informed that he had been shot and was en route to Shahid Beheshti Hospital in Babol. Upon arrival, they discovered him unconscious with a severe bullet wound and no vital signs. Despite this, the medical staff assured them Milad was still alive and advised them to leave. A few hours later, the family was notified of his death.[76] At least one report suggests that inadequate medical attention and delays in his transfer may have contributed to his death.[77]

That same night, authorities pressured Milad Zare’s family at the hospital to remain silent, seized his body, and returned it only after the family consented to a private burial. Security forces then transported the body to a cemetery in a village. Additionally, the family was coerced into deleting all social media posts about Milad and remaining silent regarding the circumstances of his death.[78] Milad Zare’s family faced ongoing intimidation from authorities. On the eve of the first anniversary of the September 2022 protests, his brother, Farhad Zare, was arrested and sentenced to one year in prison. Despite filing a criminal complaint seeking justice and the identification of the perpetrator, no resolution has been reported.[79]

F. Behnam Layeghpour

On September 21, 2022, Behnam Layeghpour, 37, was shot with dozens of metal pellets fired by security forces in Rasht. At approximately 9:30 PM, Layeghpour and his fiancée, Ghazal, were passing through the Sabzeh Meydan area, where a dispersed gathering had taken place, and security forces were pursuing and shooting at protesters. In an attempt to protect themselves, the couple, along with the protesters, began to flee and reached an intersection near Sabzeh Meydan. In a dead-end alley, Layeghpour briefly separated from his fiancée, mistakenly believing she had fallen behind. Upon returning to the alley entrance, he was shot at close range by security forces who were using pellet guns.[80]

Despite attempts by his fiancée and others to assist him and stop the bleeding, security forces intervened, preventing aid and assaulting them. Approximately 45 minutes later, the security forces left, but it took another hour and a half for Behnam to be transported to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead. His body was held for four days and was only released for burial at Behesht Rezvan Cemetery in Rasht after the family signed a statement indicating that he had died of cardiac arrest. The burial was restricted to seven or eight close family members, with security forces present at the site. [81]

After that, persecution continued. His grave was vandalized on multiple occasions.[82] Moreover, on November 16, 2022, his fiancée, Ghazal, was detained by security forces as she was on her way to Rasht Cemetery. She was subsequently transferred to an undisclosed location, where she was subjected to interrogation and physical assault. Following this, she was involuntarily admitted to a mental health facility. Her family were unaware of her whereabouts and conditions for several days, and they were subsequently denied visitation at the mental hospital. After her release, Ghazal revealed that she had been administered unidentified medications during her confinement and was unable to recall the events that transpired while she was hospitalized.[83]

G. Ghazaleh Chalabi

On the evening of September 21, 2022, Ghazaleh Chalabi, 33, was fatally shot in the head during a protest near the local governor’s office in Amol. At the time of the shooting, she was recording the protest on her cellphone, a video that later went viral. She fell into a coma and succumbed to her injuries a few days later in the hospital. During this period, her family was subjected to significant pressure from security forces to refrain from sharing information regarding her condition. After her passing, despite her explicit wishes, security officials prevented the donation of her organs. Her burial was conducted under strict security measures.[84] Months later, a wall was constructed around her grave, making it difficult for the public to access it.[85]

A witness, speaking anonymously to IHRDC, confirmed that the individual who shot Ghazaleh was positioned inside the governor’s office and was reportedly a member of the Iranian Public Security Police. The witness further claimed that the perpetrator has been shielded from accountability due to familial ties with a judiciary official. According to the witness, many people in Amol are aware of the shooter’s identity. However, Ghazaleh’s family chose not to pursue legal action, as her brother had been receiving direct threats to his life from security forces.[86] The authorities have denied any responsibility for her death, attributing it to non-state actors.[87]

H. Mohammad Hassan Torkaman

On September 21, 2022, Mohammad Hassan Torkaman, aged 27, was fatally shot near the local governor’s office in Babol. At approximately 11:00 PM, a friend of Mohammad Hassan received a phone call informing him that Mohammad Hassan had been shot and was dying. This friend immediately alerted Mohammad Hassan’s family, who were in Tehran at the time. Upon arriving at the hospital in Amol and learning of his son’s death, Mohammad Hassan’s father suffered a heart attack.[88]

Subsequently, security forces coerced the family into declaring that Mohammad Hassan had died in an accident, threatening to withhold the body otherwise. His body was subsequently transported by security forces to Shahin Shahr, Isfahan Province, where his family resided, and was buried under strict security measures two days later. Prior to the burial, one of his brothers removed the shroud from Mohammad Hassan’s face and observed a gunshot wound on his forehead. The death certificate for Mohammad Hassan Torkaman states that he was killed by “the impact of a metal projectile (gunshot),” but does not reference the gunshot wound on his forehead.[89]

The IRGC has asserted that Mohammad Hassan Torkaman was killed by the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK).[90] Despite this, the family continued to experience harassment from security forces. His mother, Kamelia Sajadian, has reported that security forces unofficially summoned her on at least one occasion and harassed individuals who intended to visit her son’s grave.[91]

I. Erfan Rezaei

Erfan Rezaei, 21, was fatally shot by live ammunition fired by security forces during protests near the local governor’s office in Amol on September 21, 2021. According to an interview with his mother, Farzaneh Barzekar, on the night of the incident, Erfan’s family made several attempts to reach him by phone but received no response. Concerned about his whereabouts, his mother proceeded to the Ministry of Intelligence Office in Amol, where she was initially informed that Erfan was in custody. Subsequently, she learned from one of his friends that he had been shot and transferred to a hospital. Upon arriving at the hospital, the family was initially informed that no patient with that name had been admitted. Later, the family was notified that Erfan had died at 8:30 PM. His body was released to the family two days later.[92]

In another interview, Farzaneh Barzekar stated that security officials informed the family that Erfan had been killed by members of MEK and pressured them not to publicly speak about his death. The family was also urged to accept the designation of Shahīd for Erfan, which they declined. His death certificate attributes the cause of death to “the use of war weapons outside of combat.”[93] Farzaneh Barzekar, who publicly expressed her views regarding the killing of her son, was later sentenced to two years’ imprisonment, a monetary fine, and a one-year ban from online activities. The prison sentence has been suspended for two years.[94]

J. Abolfazl Mehdipour Roshan

Abolfazl Mehdipour Roushan, aged 18, was fatally shot in the head by security forces on September 21, 2022, after participating in a protest in Qaem Shahr, Mazandaran Province.[95] According to at least one source, authorities demanded payment from his family in exchange for the release of his body and informed them that unless they refrained from stating that he was killed during the protests, he would be officially designated as a Shahīd.[96] His family have publicly asserted that the state is responsible for his death.[97] Despite this, as of now, there is no public report indicating that any criminal proceedings have been initiated in connection with his death.

Suppression of Protests in Qaem Shahr-Source social media

K. Hadi Chaksari and Ali Fazeli

On October 28, 2022, state media released an edited video depicting a passerby being shot while crossing a street in Amol. The individual is seen clutching his side and fleeing. In the same video, multiple shots are fired at other targets.[98]That evening, Rouhollah Solgi, the Deputy to the Provincial Governor of Mazandaran Province, stated in an interview with IRGC-affiliated Ofogh TV that Hadi Chaksari and Ali Fazeli were “shot from behind with a handgun within ten minutes of each other and succumbed to death due to their injuries.” State media reported that both individuals were members of the Basij and victims of a terrorist attack.[99]

Later, the authorities published an interview with Ali Fazeli’s father, who claimed his son was “returning from the gym when he was assassinated and martyred.”[100] The circumstances under which this interview was recorded are unknown. Authorities vowed to impose severe penalties on those deemed responsible for the deaths of the two men, who were interred in the Martyrs’ Section of Amol Cemetery.[101] They were also officially recognized as Shahīd.[102]

The claim that Hadi Chaksari and Ali Fazeli were members of the Basij, however, was later disputed by their associates.[103] A witness, who requested anonymity, reported that although Ali Fazeli and Hadi Chaksari both came from religious backgrounds, they were also involved in protests. The witness noted that their social media accounts, which contained regime-critical content, were erased within 24 hours of their deaths. On the night of Fazeli’s death, the IRGC commander in Amol and senior religious figures visited their home and claimed that Ali had been killed by rioters. Despite Ali’s father remaining silent due to his connections with these figures, his mother openly opposed the regime.[104] In December 2023, an aide to then-President Ebrahim Raisi visited Chaksari’s family, but the details of that visit remain undisclosed.[105]

L. Mohammad Fallah

Mohammad Fallah, a 35-year-old nurse, was fatally shot by security forces during a protest near the governor’s office in Amol on September 21, 2022.[106] In an interview released by state-sponsored media, Mohammad Fallah’s father claimed that his son was killed by “trained” political adversaries, not by security forces of the Islamic Republic.[107] The circumstances under which this video and interview were conducted remain unclear, but they align with a broader pattern of state-directed information suppression targeting the families of individuals killed during protests. He is officially recognized as Shahīd.[108]

M. Mahdis (Mohaddeseh) Hosseini

Mahdis (Mohaddeseh) Hosseini, 17, sustained injuries during the protests in Amol on September 21, 2022.[109]At least one source reported that she went into hiding for several weeks to evade arrest before eventually returning to her home. Two days later, her mother discovered her deceased at home.[110] Initially, authorities classified the cause of her death as suspicious but subsequently pressured her family to declare that Mahdis had committed suicide, threatening to not release her body if they did not comply.[111] On November 9, 2022, the state news agency IRNA published an interview in which Mahdis’s mother appeared to endorse the official narrative.[112] It is reported that her body was released to the family for burial following this interview.[113] The conditions under which the interview was conducted remain unclear, but the situation aligns with a broader pattern of information suppression and concealment regarding the deaths of protesters. A source familiar with the case also confirmed that Mahdis died under suspicious circumstances at home. According to this source, Mahdis had been detained for several days, and her family believes her death resulted from the consequences of her detention.[114]

N. Seyed Farshid Mousavi

Seyed Farshid Mousavi, 24, was injured by gunfire from security forces during the protests in Amol on September 21, 2022. After 50 days in the hospital, he was discharged but was immediately arrested again[115] His family was threatened with the arrest of other members if they did not remain silent. Farshid was released on November 16, 2022, showing signs of torture, including a head injury, and multiple injection marks on his hands. Two days later, he fell into a coma and died on November 20.[116] The medical examiner’s office listed the cause of death as “undetermined.”[117] On November 21, the state news agency IRNA released an interview in which Farshid’s father stated that his death resulted from food poisoning and that his body had been weakened by lung and respiratory issues.[118] The circumstances under which this interview was recorded are unknown, but the situation reflects a consistent pattern of state suppression regarding the deaths of protesters.

Conclusion

As of July 2024, IHRDC has verified 472 fatalities connected to the Woman, Life, Freedom protests.[119] Of those killed, 57 were from Gilan and Mazandaran provinces.[120] Few perpetrators have been held accountable, with impunity remaining a persistent problem.

This report highlights multiple human rights violations in Gilan and Mazandaran provinces in relation to the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, covering the period from September 20, 2022, to September 1, 2023. During this time, the Islamic Republic employed violent methods to suppress protests in these provinces, including the use of live ammunition against unarmed civilians and firing pellet shotguns at close range, among other tactics. In several instances, female protesters were specifically targeted because of their gender, suffering beatings and severe injuries. Dozens of protesters were detained and subjected to torture and mistreatment, including sexual violence. Security forces committed serious violations intended to terrorize people and deter participation in protests, including the deliberate denial of medical care to injured protesters.

The first four case studies in this report are based on interviews conducted by IHRDC, while the remaining case studies rely on open-source information collected by IHRDC. These cases represent a small fraction of the extrajudicial killings and suppression of information in Gilan and Mazandaran. All individuals referenced in the case studies endured multiple human rights violations, including breaches of their rights to freedom of assembly, association, and expression, as well as violations of the prohibitions against gender persecution, arbitrary detention, torture, enforced disappearance, and extrajudicial killings by security forces. Moreover, in most cases, family members were pressured by authorities to conceal the true circumstances of these events.

The actions of the Islamic Republic in Gilan and Mazandaran provinces between September 2022 and September 2023, particularly the excessive and unlawful use of lethal force against unarmed protesters and the systematic suppression of information, should be investigated as potential crimes against humanity.

Appendix I – List of Confirmed Killed Individuals in Gilan Province

Appendix II – List of Confirmed Killed Individuals in Mazandaran Province

[1] See Appendix I – List of Confirmed Killed Individuals in Gilan Province and Appendix II – List of Confirmed Killed Individuals in Mazandaran Province.

[2] IHRDC data and analysis (on file with IHRDC).

[3] See Appendix I – List of Confirmed Killed Individuals in Gilan Province and Appendix II – List of Confirmed Killed Individuals in Mazandaran Province.

[4] IHRDC Interview with Ashkan Soleimani (Apr. 26, 2024) (on file with IHRDC); See also Shūrish Khūnīn Zindānīyān; Dar Zindān Lākān Rasht Chi Guzasht? [Prisoner’s Bloody Riot; What Happened in Rasht’s Lakan Prison?], BBC Persian (Oct. 10, 2022), available at https://www.bbc.com/persian/iran-63190737.

[5] IHRDC Interview with Ashkan Soleimani (Apr. 26, 2024) (on file with IHRDC).

[6] Id. Mohammad (Saeed) Anoushenia, 31, was incarcerated over a minor debt and was scheduled for release the following week but was fatally shot during the riot in Lakan prison. Aref Ashuri, 27, had been imprisoned for failing to pay mehrieh (a financial obligation) to his ex-wife and was similarly nearing release, having arranged to pay the mehrieh in installments, but died under suspicious circumstances during the riot. See Kamyar Zahmatkesh (@Kamyar2966), X (Apr. 19, 2023, 9:25 AM), https://x.com/1500tasvir/status/1673687397500964865; See also Mahih Alinejad (@masih.alinejad), Farāmūshitān Nimīkuinīm (91) [We Never Forget You (91)], Instagram (Apr. 19, 2023), available at https://www.instagram.com/p/CrNrDePoBRU/?img_index=1; See also Kamyar Zahmatkesh (@Kamyar2966), X (Apr. 14, 2023, 9:58 AM), available at https://x.com/Kamyar2966/status/1646875458070368257; See also BBC NEWS فارسی (@bbcpersian), X (Jul. 25, 2023, 9:58 AM), available at https://x.com/bbcpersian/status/1683839037172482048.

[7] Within the ideological framework of the Islamic Republic, the term Shahīd (martyr) is reserved for individuals who have died defending the state and its values. Following the 1979 revolution, the Bonyad Shahid va Omur-e Ithargaran (Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs) was established to provide recognition, financial support, and social programs to the families of those who have died in defense of the regime. Recently, however, the Islamic Republic has broadened its definition of martyrdom to include civilians killed in confrontations with security forces, provided their families remain silent about the circumstances of their deaths. When families of individuals killed by security forces are coerced into accepting the Shahīd designation, it misrepresents their true involvement in protests and falsely portrays them as supporters of the Islamic Republic, thereby reinforcing the state’s misleading narrative regarding their deaths. See Unleashed Violence: Repression of Protests in Kurdish Areas of Iran-September 2022 – December 2022, Iran Human Rights Documentation Center (June 30, 2023), https://iranhrdc.org/protests-in-the-kurdish-areas-of-iran/#_ftnref469; See also Raha Bahreini, “Shahīd Sāzī” Rasmī Az Kushti Shudigān ʿtirāżāt Ābān 98: Sīyāsatī Barāy Takrīm Enfiʿāl [Official Fabrication of ‘Martyr’ of Those Who Were Killed in the November 2019 Protests: a Policy to Honor Passivity], BBC Persian (May 30, 2020), available at https://www.bbc.com/persian/blog-viewpoints-52832253.

[8] IHRDC data and analysis (on file with IHRDC).

[9] State officials have typically identified the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK) and Kurdish political parties as political adversaries, attributing to them responsibility for the killings of protesters in 2022, as evidenced by the cases of Mohammad Hassan Torkamaan and Sasan Ghurbani. See Farzad Seifikaran, Muḥamad Ḥusain Turkamān, Farzandi Asīr Jangi Irān Va Irāgh Ki Dar Eʿtirāz Hā Kushti Shud [Mohammad Hassan Turkman, Son of a Veteran of the Iran-Iraq War Who Was Killed During the Protests], Radio Zamaneh (Oct. 4, 2022), https://www.radiozamaneh.com/734262/; See also Fereshteh Ghazi, Barādari Sāsān Ghurbānī: Barādaram Rā Bā Gulūlih Zadand Va Naguzashtand Risīdigī Pizishkī Shavad [Sasan Ghorbani’s Brother: They Shot My Brother and Did Not Allow Him to Receive Medical Treatment], Radio Farda (Nov. 4, 2022), available at https://www.radiofarda.com/a/iran-protests-victems-rezvanshahr-sasanghorbani-/32115443.html.

[10] IHRDC data and analysis (on file with IHRDC).

[11] Id.

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] Id; See also Farzad Seifikaran, Ravāyati Yīk Manbaʿ Āgāh Az Shikanji Hāayi Rūḥī Va Jismī Ghazal Qāsimī Dar Bīmāristān Aʿṣāb Va Ravān Shafā [The Account of the Psychological and Physical Torture of Ghazal Ghasemi in the Shafa Psychiatric Hospital, Provided by an Informed Source], Radio Zamaneh (Feb. 3, 2023), available at https://www.radiozamaneh.com/751857/.

[15] Detailed findings of the independent international fact-finding mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran, U.N. HRC, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/55/CRP.1, ¶ 1610 (Mar. 19, 2024).

[16] G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 9, ¶ 1, art 19, ¶ 2 (Dec. 16, 1966).

[17] Id. art. 19, ¶ 3 ¶ 22.

[18] U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Comment No. 34, Article 19: Freedoms of expression and opinion, ¶ 3, 21, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011).

[19] G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 21, 22 (Dec. 16, 1966).

[20] U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Comment No. 37 (2020) on the right to peaceful assembly (article 21), ¶ 40, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/37 (Sept. 17, 2020).

[21] G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 21, 22 (Dec. 16, 1966).

[22] U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Comment No. 37 (2020) on the right to peaceful assembly (article 21), ¶ 44-46, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/37 (Sept. 17, 2020).

[23] Id. ¶ 33

[24] Id. ¶ 17.

[25] Id. ¶ 7.

[26] G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 9, ¶ 1 (Dec. 16, 1966).

[27] Id., art. 9.

[28] Id.

[29] U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Comment 35, Article 9 (Liberty and security of person), ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35 (Oct. 23, 2014).

[30] Rep. of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, ¶ 43, 50, U.N. Doc A/HRC/22/44 (Dec. 24, 2012).

[31] G.A. Res. 39/46, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 1, ¶ 1 (Dec. 10, 1984).

[32] Id.

[33] G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 7 (Dec. 16, 1966).

[34] Id., art. 10.

[35] G.A. Res. 66/150, Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Mar. 27, 2012).

[36] INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, POLICY ON THE CRIME OF GENDER PERSECUTION, ¶ 4 (2022).

[37] Id.

[38] Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgement, ¶ 636 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 3, 2006).

[39] G.A. Res. 47/133, Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Dec. 18, 1992).

[40] Id.

[41] Id., art. 2.

[42] Rep. of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, Best Practices on Enforced Disappearances in Domestic Criminal Legislation, at 21, U.N. Doc A/HRC/16/48/Add.3 (Dec. 28, 2010).

[43] Rep. of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/34 (Dec. 13, 1996); See also Rep. of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, Follow-up to the recommendations made by the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances in the report of its visit to Kyrgyzstan from 25 to 30 June 2019, U.N. Doc A/HRC/57/54/Add.2 (Jul. 12, 2024).

[44] Call for Inputs with a View to Issuing a Joint Statement on the Notion of Short-Term Enforced Disappearance (Aug. 16, 2023), https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/2023/call-inputs-view-issuing-joint-statement-notion-short-term-enforced; See also Press Release, Multiple Mechanisms, “Every Minute Counts” – UN Experts Raise Alarm Over Short-Term Enforced Disappearances International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances – Tuesday 30 August 2016, U.N. Press Release (Aug. 26, 2016); See also Rep. of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, at 117, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/49 (Aug. 4, 2014); See also Rep. of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, ¶ 39, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/16/48 (Jan. 16, 2011).

[45] G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2, 6, 7, 9, 14, 16, (Dec. 16, 1966); See also G.A. Res 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 12 (Dec. 16, 1966); See also Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, International Standards on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/wg-disappearances/international-standards-enforced-or-involuntary-disappearances.

[46] G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6 (Dec. 16, 1966).

[47] U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions on a Gender-Sensitive Approach to Arbitrary Killings, ¶ 27-35, U.N. Doc A/HRC/35/23 (June 6, 2017).

[48] Call for Input: The Protection of Dead Persons and Their Human Remains, Including of Victims of Potentially Unlawful Killings (Feb. 19, 2024), https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/2024/call-input-protection-dead-persons-and-their-human-remains-including-victims; See also Call for Inputs with a View to Issuing a Joint Statement on the Notion of Short-Term Enforced Disappearance (Aug. 16, 2023), https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/2023/call-inputs-view-issuing-joint-statement-notion-short-term-enforced.

[49] Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Study on the Right to Truth, Rep. of the OHCHR, at 27, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2006/91 (Feb. 8, 2006); See also U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Truth, https://www.ohchr.org/en/transitional-justice/truth.

[50] Id.

[51] Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Study on the Right to Truth, Rep. of the OHCHR, at 27, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2006/91, ¶ 59 (Feb. 8, 2006).

[52] UN ESCOR, Rep. of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat Impunity, Diane Orentlicher, principle 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (Feb. 8, 2005).

[53] Id.

[54] The IJMES translation guidelines are available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-journal-of-middle-east-studies/information/author-resources/ijmes-translation-and-transliteration-guide.

[55] IHRDC Interview with Ali Delpasand (Aug. 3, 2023) (on file with IHRDC).

[56] Id.

[57] Id.

[58] Id.

[59] IHRDC Interview with the Anonymous Witness No.2 (Apr. 15, 2024) (on file with IHRDC).

[60] Id.

[61] Id.

[62] Id.

[63] Id.

[64] IHRDC Interview with the Yalda Dehghani (Jul. 1, 2024) (on file with IHRDC).

[65] Id.

[66] Id.

[67] Id.

[68] Id.

[69] Id.

[70] IHRDC Interview with Ashkan Soleimani (Apr. 26, 2024) (on file with IHRDC).

[71] Id.

[72] Id.

[73] Id.

[74] Id.

[75] Media Mosavar, Mīlād Zāriʿ; Pisari Ābī Irān Ki Bā Shīlīk Bi Pushti Sarash Kushti Shud [Milad Zare; The Blue Boy of Iran Was Killed After Being Shot in the Head], Instagram (Apr. 18, 2023), https://www.instagram.com/reel/CrL_xcKAKbf/?ref=B8788171U&hl=es.

[76] Maryam Afshang, BBC Persian, Instagram (Oct. 25, 2022), https://www.instagram.com/tv/CkJkOeDK9dn/.

[77] Masih Alinejad (@AlinejadMasih), X (Feb. 14, 2023), https://x.com/AlinejadMasih/status/1625619758379835402.

[78] Id; See also Media Mosavar, Mīlād Zāriʿ; Pisari Ābī Irān Ki Bā Shīlīk Bi Pushti Sarash Kushti Shud [Milad Zare; The Blue Boy of Iran Was Killed After Being Shot in the Head], Instagram (Apr. 18, 2023), available at https://www.instagram.com/reel/CrL_xcKAKbf/?ref=B8788171U&hl=es; See also Maryam Afshang, BBC Persian, Instagram (Oct. 25, 2022), available at https://www.instagram.com/tv/CkJkOeDK9dn/.

[79] Hinīgāv: Bāzdāsht Dasti Kam «70 ʿużvi» Khānivādi Hāay Kushti Shudigān Eʿtirāzāt Ṭiī Panj Māh [Hengaw: At Least “70 Members” of the Families of Those Killed in the Protests Were Arrested in Five Months], Radio Farda (Sept. 1, 2023), https://www.radiofarda.com/a/32573784.html; See also @dadban4, X (June 6, 2024, 11:13 AM), available at https://x.com/dadban4/status/1798734869121372588; See also Media Mosavar, Mīlād Zāriʿ; Pisari Ābī Irān Ki Bā Shīlīk Bi Pushti Sarash Kushti Shud [Milad Zare; The Blue Boy of Iran Was Killed After Being Shot in the Head], Instagram (Apr. 18, 2023), available at https://www.instagram.com/reel/CrL_xcKAKbf/?ref=B8788171U&hl=es.

[80] IHRDC Interview with the Anonymous Witness No.1 (Jul. 1, 2023) (on file with IHRDC); Khāhari Bihnām Lāyīghpūr: Badani Barādaram Pur Az Sāchmih Va Tīr Būd [Sister of Behnam Layeghpour: The Body of My Brother Was Full of Pellets and Bullets], IranWire (Oct. 6, 2022), available at https://iranwire.com/fa/features/108327.

[81] Id.

[82] @ManotoNews, X (Nov. 5, 2022, 2:10 PM), https://x.com/ManotoNews/status/1588957053489680385; See also @dw_persian, X (Mar. 30, 2023, 12:09 PM), available at https://x.com/dw_persian/status/1641472791542214661 (demonstrating that his grave was vandalized on multiple occasions).

[83]Farzad Seifikaran, Ravāyati Yīk Manbaʿ Āgāh Az Shikanji Hāayi Rūḥī Va Jismī Ghazal Qāsimī Dar Bīmāristān Aʿṣāb Va Ravān Shafā [The Account of the Psychological and Physical Torture of Ghazal Ghasemi in the Shafa Psychiatric Hospital, Provided by an Informed Source], Radio Zamaneh (Feb. 3, 2023), https://www.radiozamaneh.com/751857/.

[84] Maryam Fumani, Ghazālih Chalābī, Zanī Ki Mī Khāst Shujāʿatsh Rā Taksīr Kunad [Ghazaleh Chalabi, the Woman Who Wanted to Multiply Her Courage], Asso (Nov. 5, 2022), https://www.aasoo.org/fa/notes/4096; See also Ghazālih Chalābī; Muʿtariżī Ki Az Dākhil Farmāndārī Āmūl Bi Ou Shilīk Shud [Ghazaleh Chalavi; The Protester Who Was Shot at from Inside Amol’s Governorate], VOA Persian (Oct. 21, 2022), available at https://ir.voanews.com/a/amol-woman-killed-reaction-women-protest/6799871.html.

[85] Dīvār Kishī Dūr Mazār Ghazālih Chalābī: Mādari Ghazālih Bi Ḥukūmat: Sanadi Jināyatītān Rā Nimītavānīd Pinhān Kunīd [Building Walls Around Ghazale Chalabi’s Grave; Ghazaleh’s Mother to the Government: You Can Not Hide the Evidence of your Crime], VOA Persian (Jul. 26, 2023), https://ir.voanews.com/a/ghazaleh-chalabi-iran-amol-victim-grave/7198704.html.

[86] IHRDC Interview with the Anonymous Witness No.1 (Jul. 1, 2023) (on file with IHRDC).

[87] Vākunish Pulīs Bi Entishā Yīk Vidīʾū Az Shilīk Minjar Bi Fūt Ghazālih Chalābī dar Tajamuʿ Āmūl [The Police’s Reaction to the Release of a Video of the Fatal Shooting death to Ghazaleh Chalabi in the Amol’s Protest], KhabarOnline (Oct. 23, 2022), https://www.khabaronline.ir/news/1686844.

[88] Farzad Seifikaran, Muḥamad Ḥusain Turkamān, Farzandi Asīr Jangi Irān Va Irāgh Ki Dar Eʿtirāz Hā Kushti Shud [Mohammad Hassan Turkman, Son of a Veteran of the Iran-Iraq War Who Was Killed During the Protests], Radio Zamaneh (oct. 4, 2022), https://www.radiozamaneh.com/734262/.

[89] Id.

[90] Id.

[91] RadioFarda‌|‌راديو فردا (@RadioFarda_), X (Apr. 20, 2023, 4:10 PM), https://x.com/RadioFarda_/status/1649143646703218696; See also kamelia_sajadian, Instagram (Apr. 22, 2023), available at https://www.instagram.com/p/CrWNCSDICLC/?utm_source=ig_embed (discussing phone call from security forces).

[92] Fereshteh Ghazi, Ravāyati Tikān Dahandih Mādari ʿirfān Rizāyī Az Kushtih Shudani Farzandash dar Eʿtirāzāt Shahrīvar 1401 Āmul [A Heart-Wrenching Account by Erfan Rezaei’s Mother on the Killing of Her Son During the September 2022 Protests in Amol], Radio Farda (June 23, 2023), https://www.radiofarda.com/a/iran-protestes-victem-erfan-rezaie-farzaneh-barzekar/32468934.html; See also @VOAfarsi, X (Sept. 13, 2024, 11:19 AM), available at https://x.com/VOAfarsi/status/1834612855360151734.

[93] Milad Pourisa, Juzʾ iyāt Jadīd Az Kushtih Shudan ʿirfan Reżāyī, Muʿtariżī Ki Baniri Rahbari Jumhūrī Eslāmī ra Parih Kard [New Information About the Death of Erfan Rezaei, a Protester Who Tore the Banner of the Supreme Leader], Radio Zamaneh (Nov. 10, 2022), https://www.radiozamaneh.com/740593/.

[94] @IranIntl, X (Jan. 6, 2024, 5:59 AM), https://x.com/IranIntl/status/1743587980248232189.

[95] Farzad Seifi Karan (@FSeifikaran), X (Mar. 12, 2023, 11:49 AM), https://x.com/FSeifikaran/status/1634944708031168515; See also @dw_persian, X (Jul. 25, 2023, 6:36 AM), available at https://x.com/dw_persian/status/1683788222667554817 (discussing that he was shot in the head); See also @IranIntl, X (May 16, 2023, 4:45 AM), available at https://x.com/IranIntl/status/1658393096101711873 (discussing the location of protest and his death).

[96] Pouria Zeraati (@pouriazeraati), X (Sept. 25, 2022, 5:24 AM), https://x.com/pouriazeraati/status/1573966762210721792.

[97] Mādari Abūlfażl Mahdīpūr, Az Kushti Shudigān Khīzish Enghilābī: Na Mībakhsham va Na Farāmūsh Mīkunam [Mother of Abolfazl Mehdipour, One of the Victims of the Revolutionary Uprising: I Neither Forgive Nor Forget], Iran International (Sept. 4, 2023), https://www.iranintl.com/202309048267; See also @IranIntl, X (Jul. 25, 2023, 3:49 AM), https://x.com/IranIntl/status/1683746246962319360 (discussing his mother public statements addressed to authorities).

[98] Laḥẓ ih Tirūr Va Shahādati 2 Javān Dar Shahristan Āmul [The Moment of Assassination and Martyrdom of 2 Young Men in Amol], Aparat, https://www.aparat.com/v/m98ax71 (last visited Sept. 9, 2024).

[99] Ḥukūmati Irān Mīgūyad Hādī Chāksarī Va ʿalī Fāżilī “Basijī Budand;” Nazdikān Ānhā Takzīb Kardand [The Iranian Government Says that Hadi Chaksari and Ali Fazeli “Were Basijis;” Their Relatives Have Denied], BBC Persian (Oct. 30, 2022), https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/c030j5391n5o.

[100] Ṣuḥbat Hāay Pidar Ālī Fāżilī Yīkī Az Shuhadāiyy Ḥamlih Musalaḥānih Āmūl [The statements of Ali Fazeli’s Father, One of the Martyrs of the Armed Attack in Amol], shahraranews (Oct. 28, 2022), https://shahraranews.ir/fa/news/131711.

[101] Ḥukūmati Irān Mīgūyad Hādī Chāksarī Va ʿalī Fāżilī “Basijī Budand;” Nazdikān Ānhā Takzīb Kardand [The Iranian Government Says that Hadi Chaksari and Ali Fazeli “Were Basijis;” Their Relatives Have Denied], BBC Persian (Oct. 30, 2022), https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/c030j5391n5o.

[102] Taṣāvīr Shuhadāy Maẓlūm Eghtishāshāt Sāl 1401 [Pictures of the Oppressed Martyrs of the Riots of 2022], Tafahoseshohada, تصاویر شهدای مظلوم اغتشاشات سال 1401 | کمیته جستجوی مفقودین ستاد کل نیروهای مسلح (tafahoseshohada.ir) (last visited Sept. 9, 2024).

[103] Ḥukūmati Irān Mīgūyad Hādī Chāksarī Va ʿalī Fāżilī “Basijī Budand;” Nazdikān Ānhā Takzīb Kardand [The Iranian Government Says that Hadi Chaksari and Ali Fazeli “Were Basijis;” Their Relatives Have Denied], BBC Persian (Oct. 30, 2022), https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/c030j5391n5o.

[104] IHRDC Interview with the Anonymous Witness No.1 (Jul. 1, 2023) (on file with IHRDC); See also Masih Alinejad, masih.alinejad, Instagram (Mar. 27, 2023), available at https://www.instagram.com/masih.alinejad/p/CqSbserogwu/ (discussing that his mother, without wearing a headscarf, attended a memorial to pay her respects to other individuals who were killed during the protests).

[105] Dīdār Dastyār Raʾyīs Jumhūr Bā Khānivādih Shuhadā Va Jān Bākhtigān Nā Ārāmī Hāay Sāl Guzashtih Dar Māzandarān [The President’s Assistant Met With the Families of the Martyrs and Those Who Lost Their Lives in Last Year’s Riots in Mazandaran], IRNA (Dec. 5, 2023), https://www.irna.ir/news/85312259.

[106] IHRDC Interview with the Anonymous Witness No.1 (Jul. 1, 2023) (on file with IHRDC); See also @ManotoNews, X (Sept. 26, 2022, 7:15 AM), available at https://x.com/ManotoNews/status/1574357043917758466 (discussing the details of his killing).

[107] Mehdi Parastaran (@MParastaran), X (Sept. 27, 2022, 1:27 PM), https://x.com/MParastaran/status/1574812905928884228.

[108] Taṣāvīr Shuhadāy Maẓlūm Eghtishāshāt Sāl 1401 [Pictures of the Oppressed Martyrs of the Riots of 2022], Tafahoseshohada, تصاویر شهدای مظلوم اغتشاشات سال 1401 | کمیته جستجوی مفقودین ستاد کل نیروهای مسلح (tafahoseshohada.ir) (last visited Sept. 9, 2024).

[109] Fishār Nahād Hāay Amnīyatī Bar Khānivādih Hāay Dādkhāh; Tavalūd Mamnūʿ [Pressure from Security Agencies on Justice-Seeking Families; Birthdays Prohibited], IranWire (Jul. 2, 2023), https://iranwire.com/fa/news-1/118093.

[110] @1500tasvir, X (June 27, 2023, 4:59 AM), https://x.com/1500tasvir/status/1673616952730824704.

[111] Id.

[112] Tadāvūm Ṭarḥ Kushti Sāzī Rasāni Hāay Muʿānid / Dukhtari Āmūlī Bar Asari Khūdkūshī Fūt Kard + Fīlm [Continuation of the Oppositional Media’s Fabrication of Killings / Amoli Girl Died by Suicide + Video], IRNA (Nov. 9, 2022), https://www.irna.ir/news/84937540.

[113] @1500tasvir, X (June 27, 2023, 4:59 AM), https://x.com/1500tasvir/status/1673616952730824704.

[114] IHRDC Interview with the Anonymous Witness No.1 (Jul. 1, 2023) (on file with IHRDC).

[115] Masih Alinejad, masih.alinejad, Instagram (May 2, 2023), https://www.instagram.com/p/Crv-Ny_uKa6/?img_index=4.

[116] Farshīd Mūsavī, Muʿtariżī Ki Bā Āsār Shikanji Va Tazrīgh Bar Rūyi Dastash Dar Ḥabs Bi Kumā Raft Va Jān Sipurd [Farshid Mousavi, a Protester Who Fell Into a Coma and Died After Showing Signs of Torture and Injection Marks on His Hands While in Custody], Dadban, https://dadban.info/farshidmosavi/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2024).

[117] Masih Alinejad, masih.alinejad, Instagram (May 2, 2023), https://www.instagram.com/p/Crv-Ny_uKa6/?img_index=4.

[118] Tadāvūm Purūzhih Kushtih Sāzī Muʿānīdīn/ Ḥaghīghat Dar Guzasht Siyīd Farshīd Mūsavī Dar Āmūl Az Zabāni Pidarash [The Ongoing Project of Fabricating Deaths by Opposition/ The Truth About the Death of Seyed Farshid Mousavi in Amol, as Told by His Father], IRNA (Nov. 21, 2022), https://www.irna.ir/news/84949297.

[119] IHRDC data and analysis (on file with IHRDC).

[120] See Appendix I – List of Confirmed Killed Individuals in Gilan Province and Appendix II – List of Confirmed Killed Individuals in Mazandaran Province.