



No Safe Haven

Iran's Global Assassination Campaign



Iran Human Rights Documentation Center

The Iran Human Rights Documentation Center (IHRDC) is an independent and nonpartisan scholarly undertaking to establish a comprehensive and objective historical record of the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran since the 1979 revolution. This evolving historical record includes the collection and analysis of a broad range of documents and testimonies in an archive that is accessible to the public for research and educational purposes. Based on the principle that accounting for past abuses is essential for future social progress and democratic transformation, the IHRDC encourages an informed dialogue on the human rights situation in Iran. The IHRDC collaborates with a wide range of scholars and experts in human rights documentation and various other disciplines and projects.

IHRDC Mission

To investigate and document human rights abuses in Iran;

To raise international awareness of human rights violations in Iran and bring pressure to bear on the Iranian government to end these abuses;

To raise local awareness of human rights violations and international human rights standards inside Iran;

To establish an online archive of human rights documents that can one day be used to develop and support a reckoning process in Iran.

Iran Human Rights Documentation Center

129 Church Street

New Haven, Connecticut 06510, USA

Tel: +1-(203)-772-2218

Fax: +1-(203)-772-1782

Email: info@iranhrdc.org

Web: <http://www.iranhrdc.org>

Photographs:

The front cover photograph was taken at a national convention of the commanders of the Law Enforcement Forces on April 27, 2008, and published on the website of Iranian Student News Agency (ISNA), available at <http://www.isna.ir/Main/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-1120833&Lang=P>. The picture of Ayatollah Mohammadi Reyshahri is taken from his official website, available at <http://www.reyshahri.ir/>.

The photograph of Dr. Shapour Bakhtiar on the back cover was taken from NAMIR's official website, available at <http://www.namir.info/home/lebenslauf.html>.

Photographs used throughout the report were obtained from various websites dedicated to the victims of the Islamic Republic of Iran's assassination campaign.

© 2008 All Rights Reserved.

Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, New Haven, Connecticut

No Safe Haven: Iran's Global Assassination Campaign

Iran Human Rights Documentation
Center

May 2008

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. PREFACE	2
2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	3
3. THE LONG ARM OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC.....	5
3.1. GENERAL MODUS OPERANDI.....	7
3.2. THE SUPREME LEADER	7
3.3. SPECIAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE	8
3.4. MINISTRY OF INTELLIGENCE.....	9
3.5. THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS	11
<i>The Quds Force</i>	13
3.6. LEBANESE HEZBOLLAH	14
4. INDIVIDUAL CASES.....	15
4.1. SHAHRIAR SHAFIQ	16
4.2. ALI AKBAR TABATABAI	18
4.3. GENERAL GHOLAM ALI OVEISI	23
4.4. DR. ABDOL-RAHMAN GHASSEMLOU	25
4.5. KAZEM RAJAVI.....	30
4.6. DR. CYRUS ELAHI.....	33
4.8. MOHAMMAD HOSSEIN NAGHDI	47
4.9. DR. REZA MAZLOUMAN	49
5. CONCLUSION	53
METHODOLOGY	55
APPENDICES	57

1. Preface

The 1979 Iranian Revolution was the result of a broad-based opposition movement that encompassed clerics, Islamists, communists, ethnic nationalists and liberal secularists. Although these groups were able to unite around the common goal of deposing Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, they could not agree on the shape the future republic should take and the triumphant coalition gradually fell apart in mutual acrimony.

Between 1979 and 1982, a struggle for power raged within Iran in which all sides suffered major casualties. The radical clerics who formed the nucleus of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's support gradually gained the upper hand ruthlessly using organs such as the Revolutionary Guards and local Islamic *Komitehs* to squelch dissent. Some political parties sought to reach an accommodation with the clerical establishment, others chose direct confrontation; ultimately all were suppressed.

From the outset, the radical clerics who made up Ayatollah Khomeini's inner circle demonstrated an unwavering commitment to exporting their revolution abroad. In support of this objective, the Islamic Republic established the Ministry of Intelligence (*Vizarat-i Ittila't*) with a global network of intelligence assets. The Revolutionary Guards established the Quds Force to carry out clandestine military operations overseas. Both organizations would establish a close working relationship with emerging Shi'a terrorist organizations inspired by the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran, most notably Lebanese Hezbollah. The Islamic Republic would use these organizations to track down and eliminate opponents of the regime living outside the country's borders.

It is perhaps only fitting that the first of these operations, the assassination of the Shah's nephew, Shahriar Shafiq, in Paris in December 1979 should come only a month after the interim government, led by Mehdi Bazargan, had been replaced by the Revolutionary Council, Ayatollah Khomeini's "government within a government." With the collapse of the Bazargan government, the clerical establishment immediately began to move against potential centers of opposition both at home and abroad. Iranian intelligence agents have since assassinated more than 162 monarchist, nationalist and democratic expatriate activists in countries as diverse as the United States, Austria, Pakistan, France and Turkey.

Inevitably, any investigation of clandestine structures and operations must necessarily be somewhat incomplete. Therefore, this report focuses on nine of the best documented incidents. All of these incidents provide compelling evidence that senior government officials, particularly those within the Ministry of Intelligence and the Revolutionary Guards, were complicit in these extrajudicial killings, and that these killings comprised a widespread and systematic policy. The report complements an earlier IHRDC publication, *Murder at Mykonos: Anatomy of a Political Assassination*.

Iran's global assassination campaign was predicated on the simple principle that for opponents of the Islamic Republic there can be no safe haven anywhere in the world. It flourished in contravention of both international and national legal regimes. It is a campaign for which the organizers and perpetrators within the Islamic Republic of Iran must be held accountable.

2. Executive Summary

Since 1979, high-level officials within the Islamic Republic of Iran, particularly those within the Revolutionary Guards and the Ministry of Intelligence, have been linked to at least 162 extrajudicial killings of the regime's political opponents around the globe. These attacks have been carried out on the authority of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic and have been planned and coordinated at the highest levels of the clerical establishment. The Iranian government has made extensive use of its own intelligence facilities as well as terrorist proxies, such as the Lebanese Hezbollah organization, to mount attacks on foreign soil in contravention of national and international law.

- In the immediate aftermath of the Iranian Revolution the loose coalition of opposition parties that deposed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi began to fragment. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's supporters quickly gained the upper hand and systematically began marginalizing and then eliminating potential challengers to their dominance.
- Many political opponents of the radical clerics were ultimately forced to follow prominent royalists like General Gholam Ali Oveisi into exile. Prime Minister Dr. Shapour Bakhtiar, President Abolhassan Banisadr and *Mujahedin-e Khalq* leader Massoud Rajavi were all ultimately forced to make the same journey to Paris. As the focus of opposition to clerical rule shifted abroad, the clerical establishment responded by seeking to extend its efforts to suppress dissent beyond Iran's borders.
- The first successful overseas political assassination that can be linked to the Islamic Republic of Iran was that of Shahriar Shafiq, the nephew of the deposed Shah of Iran, who was shot dead in Paris in December 1979, only a month after the broad-based National Front government of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan was forced from office by radical clerics and supplanted by the Revolutionary Council. The last political assassination, outside the territory of Iran and Iraq, that can be linked directly to the Islamic Republic was that of Dr. Reza Mazlouman, deputy leader of the Flag of Freedom Organization, who was murdered, also in Paris, in May 1996.
- This report focuses on nine high-profile assassinations, beginning with the murder of Shahriar Shafiq and ending with that of Dr. Mazlouman. The cases also include the killings of Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran leader Dr. Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, former Prime Minister and National Front politician Dr. Shapour Bakhtiar, and Kazem Rajavi, the brother of the *Mujahedin-e Khalq* leader Massoud Rajavi. Each case illustrates different aspects of how this government-directed program operated.
- The government of the Islamic Republic has made little attempt to hide its involvement in these killings. Commenting on the death sentences passed on members of the Shah's family *in absentia*, Ayatollah Sadegh Khalkhali, Head of the Revolutionary Court, told reporters: "If we are not able to arrest them, then we will assassinate them." Daoud Salahuddin, the American-born murderer of Ali Akbar Tabatabai, was accorded a personal meeting with Ayatollah Khomeini after the killing.
- Ali Fallahian, Head of Iran's Ministry of Intelligence under the government of Hashemi Rafsanjani, boasted in a televised interview in August 1992 that his organization had been able "to strike a blow" at many of the opposition groups outside Iran's borders. Fallahian was personally congratulated by Ayatollah Khomeini's successor as Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, for his "great achievements in combating and uprooting the enemies of Islam, inside and outside the country."

- Iran finally abandoned its campaign of overseas assassination in large part because of growing international pressure over its activities. At present, Ali Fallahian is the subject of no less than three international arrest warrants. Since November 2007 he has been the subject of an Interpol Red Notice, making him one of the world's highest profile fugitives from justice. Nonetheless, Fallahian currently serves on the Council of Experts responsible for selecting Iran's Supreme Leader and remains an influential figure in Iranian politics as a security advisor to Ayatollah Khamenei.
- Iran's global campaign of extrajudicial killings violated fundamental principles of international human rights law. Iran is a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which provides in Article 6(1) that: "Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." The UN Human Rights Committee has described the right to life as the "supreme human right" (General Comment 6(16)). In every instance, the Islamic Republic of Iran's targeted killings of political opponents violated both the territorial sovereignty and the domestic criminal law of those countries in which the killings were staged.
- The assassination of political opponents abroad by order of the Islamic Republic reflected a policy of resorting to extrajudicial executions as an alternative to lawful arrests and fair trials before an impartial and independent judiciary. Considering the scale and breadth of these murders, there may be a basis to conclude that such acts were part of a systematic policy of murder and persecution on political or other impermissible grounds, thus constituting crimes against humanity under international law.
- Those within the Iranian state who ordered, instigated, committed, aided and abetted, or otherwise shared the intent of and made a significant contribution to these extrajudicial killings can and should be held individually responsible for international crimes, irrespective of their official capacity.¹

¹ Criminal responsibility also extends to senior officials who had effective authority and control over the perpetrators, knew or had reason to know that the murders were about to be or had been committed, and failed to "take all necessary and reasonable measures within [their] power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution" (*cf.* Articles 25, 27 and 28 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, reflecting international customary law).

3. The Long Arm of the Islamic Republic

Any person who claims that the formation of an Islamic government is not necessary implicitly denies the necessity for the implementation of Islamic law, the universality and comprehensiveness of that law, and the eternal validity of the faith itself.²

As Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his followers consolidated their grip on power in the first months of 1979, they went about their task with a ruthlessness that would become a hallmark of the clerical establishment's response to political opposition. Summary trials of leading figures associated with the Shah's rule took place at the Refah School in Tehran, where Ayatollah Khomeini initially lived after his return from exile.³ A classroom in the school was used by the Extraordinary Islamic Revolutionary Court to hear cases. Ayatollah Sadegh Khalkhali presided over these trials. Those convicted of such crimes as "corruption on earth" were executed on the roof of the school building, starting on February 15, when four leading generals, including the Head of *Sazman-i Ittala't va Amniyat-i Kishvar* (SAVAK), were shot. Ayatollah Khomeini personally approved the sentences handed down by the court.⁴

The summary executions at the school, and throughout the country, continued nonstop for several weeks⁵ and drew protests from Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, most other members of the interim government, and international human rights organizations.⁶ However, Ayatollah Khomeini was dismissive of such concerns:

Criminals should not be tried. The trial of a criminal is against human rights. Human rights demand that we should have killed them in the first place when it became known that they were criminals ... they criticize us because we are executing the brutes. As soon as former SAVAK chief Nasiri's identity was established, he had to be killed. Despite the fact that he deserved summary execution, he was kept for a few days and was tried. Doesn't the human rights lobby think that criminals must be killed for the sake of human rights, in order to ensure the rights of man and those whom these people killed, tortured and destroyed? Nevertheless we are trying

² IMAM KHOMEINI, GOVERNANCE OF THE JURIST (Vilayat-i Faqih): ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT, Translator and Annotator Hamid Algar, at 22, available at <http://www.geocities.com/icpikw/downloads.html> (accessed October 17, 2007).

³ Khomeini set up his temporary headquarters at the Refah School, an Islamic high school for girls close to the parliament building. BAQER MOIN, KHOMEINI: LIFE OF THE AYATOLLAH 202 (1999) [hereinafter LIFE OF THE AYATOLLAH].

⁴ They were Nematollah Nasiri, Head of the Shah's internal security agency (SAVAK), Major General Manuchehr Khosrowdad, Air Force Commander, General Reza Naji, Military Commander of Esfahan, and General Mehdi Rahimi, Military Commander of Tehran and Head of the Police Force. See *Hamdastan-i Shah-i Sabiq Tirbaran Shudand. Avalin Guruh-i Idamshudigan: Nasiri, Khosrowdad, Rahimi, Naji* [Aids of the Former Shah Were Executed by a Firing Squad, the First Group to be Executed: Nasiri, Khosrowdad, Rahimi, Naji], KAYHAN, Special Edition, Friday, 27 Bahman 1357 (February 16, 1979), the newspaper carries a picture of the four men minutes after they were shot. See also *Chigunigiyyih Tirbaran-i Jinayatkarani* [How the Criminals Were Executed by a Firing Squad], KAYHAN, Special Edition, Friday 27 Bahman 1357 (February 16, 1979) that explains Ayatollah Khomeini approved the sentences before they were carried out; *Jukhiyyih Inqilab, Tirbaran-i Yaran-i shah Ra Aqaz Kard* [the Revolutionary Squad Started the Execution of Shah's Collaborators] AYANDIGAN, 28 Bahman 1357 (February 17, 1979) for a full description of the Court and the executions; *Khatirat-i Ayatollah Khalkhali, Avvalin Hakim-i Shar'-i Dadgahhayih Inqilab* [MEMOIRS OF AYATOLLAH KHALKHALI, THE FIRST RELIGIOUS MAGISTRATE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COURTS (Ayatollah Haj Shaykh Sadegh Khalkhali, Sayih Publication, 2004) [hereinafter KHALKHALI'S MEMOIR] at 352-372, where Ayatollah Khalkhali explains his personal memories about the events.

⁵ *Dastgiriyyih Avamil-i Rejim-i Sabiq Idamih Darad* [Arrest of the Agents of the Former Regime Continues], KAYHAN, 5 Esfand 1357 (February 24, 1979); *4 Farmandiyih Artish Tirbaran Shudand* [4 Army Commanders Were Executed by a Firing Squad], KAYHAN, 1 Esfand 1357 (February 20, 1979); *8 Nafar Dar Abadan Tirbaran Shudand* [8 People Were Executed by a Firing Squad in Abadan], ETELLA'AT, 12 Mehr 1358 (October 4, 1979); *Mudir Amil-i Sabigh-i Shir va Khurshid-i Surkh-i Esfahan Tirbaran Shud* [The Former Executive Director of the Red Lion and Sun Office of Esfahan Was Executed by a Firing Squad], ETELLA'AT, 12 Mehr 1358 (October 4, 1979); *Sih Muftid Fil Arz Idam Shudand* [Thirty Corrupter on Earth Were Executed], ETELLA'AT, 12 Mehr 1358 (October 4, 1979). See a March 13, 1980 Amnesty International report. The report lists defendants who were convicted by Revolutionary Courts in the period from their inception until 12 August 1979, available at http://www.abfiran.org/english/document-233-481.php#_ednref1 (accessed October 22, 2007).

⁶ LIFE OF THE AYATOLLAH, *supra* note 3 at 207.

them and we have tried them. Our belief is that criminals should not be tried and must be killed.⁷

The clerical establishment adhered to much the same logic confronting challenges to its newfound authority as it had in eradicating the vestiges of the Shah's regime. Ayatollah Khomeini's supporters moved aggressively against potential rivals within the coalition of forces that had supported the revolution, including secular politicians, proponents of greater regional autonomy and other religious parties such as the *Mujahedin-e Khalq*. Some of these groups fought back. The new regime saw threats wherever it looked. The Shah's supporters in exile pledged to overturn the revolution. Khomeini's refusal to countenance greater autonomy for the province of Kurdistan had provoked a full-scale Kurdish uprising by August 1979. Between November 1979 and January 1981, Iran and the United States were embroiled in the U.S. Embassy hostage crisis. In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded neighboring Afghanistan, further heightening the clerical establishment's distrust of the communist *Tudeh* party. In September 1980, war broke out with Iraq and Iraqi forces crossed into Iranian territory. In 1981, the marginalized members of the *Mujahedin-e Khalq* launched a terrorist campaign that claimed the lives of many prominent members of the clerical establishment, including the President, the Prime Minister and the President of the Supreme Court.⁸ Yet the Islamic Republic was able to weather the storm and ultimately force the majority of its opponents into exile. However, the violence of the

⁷ *Sahifiyih Nur, Majmu'iyih Rahnimudhayih Imam Khomeini* [SAHIFIYIH NUR, THE COMPLETE COLLECTION OF IMAM KHOMEINI'S ADVICES] VOL. 5 (Center for Collection of the Culture Documents of the Islamic Revolution, 1983) at 236

⁸ The *Mujahedin-e Khalq* (MEK) was a leftist Islamic organization that had waged an underground guerrilla war against the Shah's regime and had initially supported Ayatollah Khomeini when he returned to Iran in February 1979. The leader of the *Mujahedin-e Khalq*, Massoud Rajavi, had stood in the January 1980 Presidential election only to have his candidacy effectively disqualified by Ayatollah Khomeini at the last minute. See ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN, *RADICAL ISLAM THE IRANIAN MOJAHEDIN* 198 (1989) [hereinafter IRANIAN MOJAHEDIN]. The party did not fare any better in the elections for the *Majlis*, failing to win a single seat after Ayatollah Khomeini intervened in the election on May 7, 1980, to urge the people not to vote for "subversives" or believers in "anti-Islamic ideologies." See DAVID MENASHRI, *IRAN: A DECADE OF WAR AND REVOLUTION* 187 (1990) [hereinafter MENASHRI] at 126. Having been frustrated in his own quest for office, Rajavi increasingly threw the *Mujahedin-e Khalq*'s support behind the new Iranian President, Abolhassan Banisadr, in his unsuccessful power struggle with the radical clerics. On June 14 Khomeini accused the *Mujahedin-e Khalq* of "bringing disaster on the revolution." See *Sahifiyih Nur, Majmu'iyih Rahnimudhayih Imam Khomeini* [SAHIFIYIH NUR, THE COMPLETE COLLECTION OF IMAM KHOMEINI'S ADVICES] VOL. 15 (Center for Collection of the Cultural Documents of the Islamic Revolution, 1983) at 10-21. On June 21 Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Speaker of the *Majlis*, called *Mujahedin-e Khalq* a group that is *Maharib* – at war with God – and said that they could no longer be tolerated in the spirit of political freedom. See *Ra'is-i Majlis: Ashub-i Mujahidin va Fada'i Aqaliyat Biharin Guvah-i Adam-i Kifayat-i Ra'is Jumhur Ast* [Head of the *Majlis*: the Disturbances Caused by the *Mujahedin* and the *Fada'iyah-i Aqaliyat* is Best Proof of the President's Incompetence], KAYHAN, 31 Khordad 1360 (21 June 1981). Banisadr's successor as President, Mohammad Ali Raja'i, told a London-based magazine: "Since the *Mujahedin* were misguiding the people with their interpretations of Islam, they could not be tolerated in an Islamic Republic." See *The Middle East*, July 1981, at 37. A campaign of violence was unleashed against the *Mujahedin-e Khalq* and its supporters, and the party was forced underground. See IRANIAN MOJAHEDIN at 218-219. The MEK hit back by launching a violent urban guerrilla campaign against the clerical establishment and the supporters of the Islamic Republic Party. On June 27, 1981, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, one of the co-founders of the Islamic Republic Party and Ayatollah Khomeini's eventual successor as Supreme Leader, was seriously injured by a bomb in the Abuzar Mosque. See DILIP HIRO, *IRAN UNDER THE AYATOLLAHS* 190 (1987). Further attacks killed, among many others, President Raja'i, Prime Minister Mohammad Javad Bahonar, President of the Supreme Court Ayatollah Beheshti, Head of the Evin Prison Mohammad Katchu'i, Prosecutor-General Ayatollah Ali Qodusi and the Chief of the Tehran police Houshang Dastgerdi. Ayatollah Khomeini was outspoken in his denunciations of the MEK calling for a severe response against those who raised arms against the Islamic Republic: "When the Prophet Mohammad failed to improve the people with advice, he hit them on the head with a sword until he made them human beings." See MENASHRI at 131. Between June and September 1981, the regime reported the arrest of at least 2,000 *Mujahedin-e Khalq* sympathizers and by December 1981, the authorities had announced the execution of more than 2,500 individuals associated with the unrest. See IRANIAN MOJAHEDIN at 220. The *Mujahedin-e Khalq* began to suffer from a loss of direction and a commensurate decline in morale after its series of spectacular operations in 1981 failed to topple the clerical regime. See MENASHRI at 241. The number of *Mujahedin-e Khalq* attacks reached a high of three incidents a day in July 1981, but had declined to an average of five incidents a week by February 1982. See IRANIAN MOJAHEDIN at 223. In early 1983, the MEK decided to divert resources from its campaign against IRI officials to the guerrilla war in Kurdistan. The MEK campaign and the regime's aggressive response claimed at least 12,250 lives. Approximately three-quarters of those killed were members of the *Mujahedin-e Khalq* or alleged sympathizers detained by the authorities. See IRANIAN MOJAHEDIN at 223.

post-revolutionary period had shaped and hardened the attitudes of many senior figures in the Islamic Republic and the clerical establishment's pursuit of its enemies would not stop at the country's edge.

3.1. General Modus Operandi

Agents of the Islamic Republic have assassinated opposition figures in the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, India, and Pakistan in Asia; Dubai, Iraq, and Turkey in the Middle East; Cyprus, France, Italy, Switzerland, Germany, Austria, Norway, Sweden, and Great Britain in Western Europe; and across the Atlantic in the United States.⁹ To date, at least 162 individuals have been victims of a deliberate program of political assassination directed and coordinated at the highest levels of the Iranian government. Attacks are often planned in such a way as to heighten their psychological impact by grouping attacks in a particular location or on a particular organization together. The IRI has favored close quarter assassinations carried out with firearms or knives over the use of explosives.¹⁰ In support of these operations, the Iranian government has made extensive use of trusted surrogates, most notably the Lebanon-based terrorist group Hezbollah, as well as its own intelligence agents.¹¹

A tactic particularly favored by the IRI is infiltrating an undercover operative into an opposition organization to facilitate attacks. The use of a "Trojan horse" is designed to undermine trust among members of the Iranian dissident community. In its public statements, the IRI has also frequently sought to place the blame for an individual attack on rival opposition organizations or power struggles within a particular group in a further attempt to undermine the cohesion of the opposition movement.¹²

3.2. The Supreme Leader

Until his death in June 1989, the assassinations program operated under Ayatollah Khomeini's personal authority.¹³ In July 1980, as Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini was the *de facto* head of the army and an array of other security organizations – the Revolutionary Guards, the Basij militia, Law Enforcement Forces and intelligence agencies.¹⁴ Ayatollah Khomeini issued *fatwas* calling for the execution of plotters against the regime and lent his personal authority to individuals associated with political assassinations.

In July 1980, Ayatollah Muhammad Beheshti, the President of the Supreme Court and a member of the Revolutionary Council, responded to a reporter's question about the alleged creation of a unit to eliminate 'infidels':

From an Islamic view, there is no problem with this idea but, since we have an Islamic government now, the activities of such groups must be supervised by a branch of the leadership that would explain and oversee their direction. Basically, this matter has to be supervised by the Supreme Leader of the revolution.¹⁵

⁹ See Individuals Assassinated by the Islamic Republic of Iran Outside of Iran. [Attached as Appendix 1].

¹⁰ SHAUL SHAY, THE AXIS OF EVIL: IRAN, HIZBALLAH, AND THE PALESTINIAN TERROR 111 (2005).

¹¹ US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, *Iran's Use of International Terrorism* (1993).

¹² SHAUL SHAY, THE AXIS OF EVIL: IRAN, HIZBALLAH, AND THE PALESTINIAN TERROR 110 (2005).

¹³ See *Rishihhayih Idi' ulujik-i Tirurism-i Vilayat-i Faqih va Asnad-i Mykonos* [THE IDEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF TERRORISM OF THE SUPREME LEADERSHIP AND MYKONOS DOCUMENTS] 56 (Parviz Dastmalchi, 1997), quoting Abolhassan Banisadr's testimony to the Mykonos court.

¹⁴ ICG Middle East Report, *Iran: The Struggle for the Revolution's Soul* ii (2002), available at <http://www.iranwatch.org/privateviews/ICG/perspex-icg-revolutionssoul-080502.pdf> (accessed January 3, 2008).

¹⁵ *Istirdad-i Bakhtiar Az Faransih Taqaza Mishavad* [Extradition of Bakhtiar will be requested from France], ETELLA'AT, 2 Mordad 1359 (July 24, 1980) [Attached as Appendix 2].

Former Iranian Intelligence officer Abolghassem Mesbahi, a witness in the Mykonos murder trial in Germany, told the Court that he had personally seen an operational order signed by Ayatollah Khomeini authorizing an assassination:

I, myself, in another case, saw such an order with Khomeini's signature, although I was not the operational commander. This case regarded Khusru Harandi [Hadi Khursandi].¹⁶ Mohammad Musavizadih, the Deputy of Mohammad Reyshahri, then Minister of Intelligence, came to Dusseldorf with a copy of the order. There, me and him [Musavizadih] met with the head of the hit team and his deputy...I was their interpreter and translated the order from Farsi to French.¹⁷

3.3. Special Affairs Committee

The Special Affairs Committee was established after Ayatollah Khomeini's death to make decisions on important matters of state. The committee's existence is not provided for by the constitution. The fact that the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, is the head of the committee, and that the IRI's "guardianship of the jurist" (*Velayat-i Faqih*) doctrine endows the Supreme Leader with extraordinary powers, effectively places the committee above both the government and the parliament.¹⁸

The other permanent members of the Committee include the President of the Republic, the Speaker of the *Majlis*, the Minister of Intelligence, the Foreign Minister, the Interior Minister, the Defense Minister, the Head of the Judiciary, the Head of the Organization for Budgets and Planning, the Head of the Armed Forces Chiefs of Staff, the Commander of the Revolutionary Guards and the Head of the Republic's Police force.¹⁹ Some individuals with specific skills and experience serve on the committee without a specific portfolio. For example, Hojjatoleslam Mohammad Mohammadi Reyshahri continued to serve on the Committee after he stood down as Minister of Intelligence alongside his successor.²⁰ Several personal representatives of the Supreme Leader also sit on the Committee. In the mid 1990s, these positions were filled by Hassan Rouhani and Ali Larijani, later Iran's chief negotiator with the international community on nuclear issues.

One of the issues handled by the Committee was the suppression and elimination of political opposition to the Islamic Republic. As the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Vice-President Hassan Rouhani, told the Iranian newspaper *Ettela'at* in 1994 "[Iran] will not hesitate to destroy the activities of counterrevolutionary groups abroad."²¹ After Khomeini's death, the responsibility for recommending individual assassinations fell to the Special Affairs Committee. Once the Committee's recommendation was approved by the Supreme Leader, an individual committee member would be charged with implementing the decision with the assistance of the Ministry of Intelligence's²² Special

¹⁶ Hadi Khursandi is an Iranian poet, comedian and satirist who is very critical of the Islamic Republic. He was forced into exile shortly after the Revolution and now lives in London.

¹⁷ Witness statement of Abolghassem Mesbahi (witness C) on September 25, 1996. *SYSTEM-I JINAYATKAR: ASNAD-I DADGAH-I MYKONOS* [The Criminal System: Documents of the Mykonos Trial] 165 (Mihran Payandih et al. trans. 2000).

¹⁸ *Id.* At the time of the Mykonos assassinations, the other permanent members were Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, then President; Ali Fallahian, then Minister of Intelligence; Ali Akbar Velayati, then Foreign Minister; Mohammad Reyshahri, a former Minister of Intelligence; Mohsen Riza'i, then General Commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards; Reza Seyfollahi, then head of the Law Enforcement Forces; and Ayatollah Khaz'ali, a member of the Guardian Council. See generally IRAN HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION CENTER, MURDER AT MYKONOS: ANATOMY OF A POLITICAL ASSASSINATION (MARCH 2007) [hereinafter IHRDC, MURDER AT MYKONOS].

¹⁹ Parliamentary Human Rights Group, Eric Aveybury and Robert Wilkinson, *Iran: State of Terror* 7-8 (1993)

²⁰ See generally IHRDC, MURDER AT MYKONOS, *supra* note 18.


²¹ Thomas Sancton, *The Tehran Connection*, TIME MAGAZINE, March 21, 1994 [hereinafter "the Tehran Connection"].

²² Different documents have referred to this Ministry as MOIS (Ministry of Intelligence and Security), Ministry of Information and Security, or VAVAK (*Vizarat-i Ittila't Va Amniyat-i Kishvar*). IHRDC believes that the name of this entity is the IRI Ministry of Intelligence (*Vizarat-i Ittila't*) but uses the other names whenever quoting from original sources.

Operations Council (*Shurayih Amaliyat-i Vjih*).²³ The council's operational commanders receive a written order signed by the Supreme Leader authorizing an assassination.²⁴ The Quds Force was more likely to be assigned to operations in Iran's neighboring countries such as Iraq or Turkey and the Ministry of Intelligence to operations further afield.²⁵ Sometimes the two organizations worked together on a particularly challenging case.

3.4. Ministry of Intelligence

In the immediate aftermath of the Revolution a number of competing entities in the new republic – militias, political factions and government organs – nurtured their own intelligence capabilities, running networks of informers and conducting disjointed and uncoordinated investigations. The new Republic confronted serious threats to its stability on many fronts and yet its response to these threats was fragmentary and confused.²⁶ On October 1, 1982, the *Mujahedin-e Khalq* planted a bomb near the Ministry of Telecommunications, which killed around seventy people and wounded over 300. Visiting the survivors in hospital, Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi called for the rapid passage of a bill to form a single intelligence agency in Iran to prevent such catastrophes from happening again.²⁷



Lawmakers considered a number of proposals, including awarding an exclusive intelligence function to the Revolutionary Guards, whose intelligence office was the country's preeminent existing intelligence body, subordinating the new intelligence service to the judiciary or placing it under the direct authority of the Office of President. Lawmakers finally opted for the creation of a new Ministry of Intelligence because, under the constitution, ministries fell under the joint supervision of the Prime Minister and the President, as well as the *Majlis*, and it was hoped that such broad oversight would prevent another SAVAK from forming.²⁸

The Code for the Formation of the Ministry of Intelligence was ratified on August 18, 1983, by the *Majlis* and on September 1 by the Council of the Guardians. The code charges the Ministry of Intelligence with the "gathering, procurement, analysis, and classification of necessary information inside and outside the country"²⁹ but only sketches in the broadest terms the tools and legal provisions at the disposal of the new Ministry.³⁰ The Ministry was given the specific responsibility of making anti-opposition measures more efficient.³¹ Since its inception, the Ministry of Intelligence has grown to be

²³ Witness statement of Abolghassem Mesbahi (witness C) on September 25, 1996. *SYSTEM-I JINAYATKAR: ASNAD-I DADGAH-I MYKONOS* [The Criminal System: Documents of the Mykonos Trial] 171-2, 194-5 (Mihran Payandih et al. trans. 2000).

²⁴ *Id.*

²⁵ Interview with Mohsen Sazegara, one of the founders of the Revolutionary Guards, conducted by IHRDC (February 14, 2008) (on file with IHRDC).

²⁶ *Id.*

²⁷ *Khatirihā, Jild-i Sivvom: Ta'sis-i Vizarat-i Ittila't, Muqabilih Ba Shabakihhayih Jasusi va Tiruristi va Ta'sis-i Dadsarayih vijiyih Rawhaniyat* [MEMORIES, VOL. III: ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF INTELLIGENCE, ENCOUNTERING THE ESPIONAGE AND TERRORIST NETWORKS, AND ESTABLISHING THE SPECIAL COURT FOR THE CLERGY], (Mohammad Mohammadi Reyshahri, Islamic Republic Documentation Center, 2006) [hereinafter REYSHAHRI VOL. III] at 37.

²⁸ REYSHAHRI VOL. III, *supra* note 27 at 38.

²⁹ *Id.* at 39 and 273.

³⁰ *Id.* at 39.

³¹ The Law of Formation of Ministry of Intelligence, ratified on 27 Mordad 1362 (August 18, 1983). *See also* MENASHRI, *supra* note 8 at 281.

the largest single government agency in Iran³² and it is the principal operational mechanism through which the regime can extend its reach overseas.³³

On May 19, 1983, the *Majlis* ratified the Code for Determining the Conditions and Specifications of the Head of the Ministry of Intelligence. Only a cleric holding the rank of *Ijtihad* can head this key ministry.³⁴ This requirement ensures that the ministry remains within the province of the clerical establishment, despite the legal requirement that its main targets and priorities must be approved by the cabinet and the President of the Republic.³⁵ The Minister must also be publicly renowned for his sense of “justice and piety” and must not be a member of a political party.³⁶

Originally, Prime Minister Mousavi nominated Mr. Isma’il Firdawsipur for the post of Minister of Intelligence, but failed to win the approval of the *Majlis* for the appointment.³⁷ Mousavi next offered the post to Hojjatoleslam Mohammad Mohammadi Reyshahri. The appointment was endorsed by both Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Meshkini, Reyshahri’s father-in-law and the Chairman of the Assembly of the Experts from 1984-2007. Ayatollah Meshkini also confirmed Reyshahri had obtained the necessary level of *Ijtihad*. Reyshahri accepted the offered post and on August 15, 1984, was introduced to the *Majlis* as the new candidate for Minister of Intelligence. His appointment was confirmed.³⁸

Hojjatoleslam Reyshahri had briefly worked as the religious magistrate of the city of Dezful before being asked to establish the Revolutionary Court of the Armed Forces in early 1980. As Head of the Court, he presided over many of the high-profile trials resulting from the failed Nuzhah coup attempt in July 1980 – perhaps the most significant of the early challenges to the new regime.³⁹ On April 10, 1982, it was also Reyshahri who announced the discovery of the so-called Ghotbzadeh Plot. Sadegh Ghotbzadeh was a former non-clerical aide of Khomeini’s who had been Foreign Minister in Banisadr’s government. He was accused of plotting a coup with a loose coalition of ‘counter-revolutionary’ confederates who had allegedly secured the backing of Saudi Arabia and the United States, as well as the support of Khomeini’s old clerical rival Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari.⁴⁰ Ghotbzadeh was executed on September 15, 1982.⁴¹ In December 1983 and January 1984, Reyshahri also presided over the trials of more than 100 members of the Tudeh Party accused of plotting within the armed forces.⁴² As he noted at the time, his court had previously tried “the servants of the West” and was now judging

³² ICG Middle East Report, *Iran: The Struggle for the Revolution’s Soul* 9 (2002), available at <http://www.iranwatch.org/privateviews/ICG/perspex-icg-revolutionssoul-080502.pdf> (accessed March 13, 2008).

³³ See *The Structure of Power in Iran, An Overview of the Iranian Government and Political System*, Available at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tehran/inside/govt.html> (accessed Jan 4, 2008).

³⁴ The Law on Rules and Conditions Pertaining to the Minister of Intelligence, 29 Ordibehesht 1362 (May 19, 1983). A similar provision pertains to the offices of the Head of the Judiciary, Head of the Supreme Court and General Prosecutor of Iran, see REYSHAHRI VOL. III, *supra* note 27 at 39.

³⁵ The Law of Formation of Ministry of Intelligence, Ratified on 27 Mordad 1362 (August 18, 1983), Article 11.

³⁶ REYSHAHRI VOL. III, *supra* note 27 at 39.

³⁷ *Id.* at 48.

³⁸ *Id.* at 49-50, 58.

³⁹ The Nuzhah Plot reached fruition on July 9-10, 1980, when several hundred active-duty and retired Iranian paratroopers made their way to the Nuzhah air-force base near the city of Hamadan to initiate a coup against the Islamic Republic. The plot was particularly notable because it marked the first major occasion on which monarchists and secular democratic nationalists loyal to Dr. Bakhtiar were able to combine their forces. The Iranian government learned of the plot in advance, and many of the paratroopers were arrested as they arrived at the base. Several hundred alleged participants in the plot were arrested in the following days. Those arrested were soon put on trial, and 144 were executed. Fearing that other military personnel were linked to the plot or sympathized with it, Ayatollah Khomeini issued an execution *fatwa* for anyone involved in the coup and the revolutionary authorities carried out an extensive purge of the armed forces in the following months. See generally Mark Gasiorowski, *The Nuzhah Plot and Iranian Politics*, International Journal of the Middle East Studies, Vol. 34 at 649 (2002) and *Khatirihā, Jild-i Aval* [MEMORIES, VOL. I], (Mohammad Mohammadi Reyshahri, Islamic Republic Documentation Center, 2004) [hereinafter REYSHAHRI VOL. I] at 83-88.

⁴⁰ REYSHAHRI VOL. I, *supra* note 39 at 227-238.

⁴¹ *Id.* at 307.

⁴² MENASHRI, *supra* note 8 at 319.

“the servants of the East.”⁴³ By 1984, there were few members of the clerical establishment who could match his credentials to be head of the Ministry of Intelligence. Reyshahri ran the Ministry from 1984 until 1989.⁴⁴

President Rafsanjani replaced Reyshahri in September 1989 with his deputy, Hojjatoleslam Ali Fallahian. Fallahian ran the Ministry until 1997 and was remarkably frank about the role it played in hunting down opponents of the regime both at home and abroad. In an interview broadcast by the Iranian television (IRIB) on August 30, 1992, Fallahian explained that his Ministry had been successful in disrupting the activities of opposition groups in many ways:

Overall, no opposition groups can be found in this nation at present. They have been forced to flee ... We are currently following them and are constantly watching them outside of this nation. We have infiltrated their central organizations and are informed of their activities. We have been able, thanks to God, to keep their activities under our constant control... Furthermore, we have been able to strike a blow at many of these opposition groups outside or close to our boundaries. As you know, one of these active opposition groups is the Kurdish Democratic Party [of Iran], which through two organs, the main group and the auxiliary department, operates in Kurdistan ... we have been able to strike decisive blows at their cadres. The respective main group and auxiliary department suffered severe blows and their activities shrank.⁴⁵

Fallahian is currently the subject of no less than three international arrest warrants. In addition to his alleged role in the bombing of a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires in July 1994, for which an Interpol Red Notice was posted in November 2007, warrants for his arrest have also been issued by Germany in March 1996 and Switzerland in March 2006 for the leadership role he played in the murder of Iranian dissidents in both countries.⁴⁶ Fallahian currently serves on the Council of Experts responsible for selecting Iran’s Supreme Leader and remains an influential figure in Iranian politics as a security advisor to Ayatollah Khamenei.

The monthly journal *Payam-i Imruz* concluded that Ali Fallahian could be linked to more than eighty assassinations that occurred inside Iran while he was Head of the Ministry, as well as the series of overseas assassinations documented in this report.⁴⁷ In 1999, an official Iranian investigation into Fallahian’s activities as Intelligence Minister was suddenly halted after Fallahian hinted publicly that he would name names if the investigation was allowed to continue.⁴⁸

Fallahian was succeeded by Ayatollah Ghorbanali Dorri Najafabadi who served under President Mohammad Khatami from 1997 to 2000.⁴⁹ Najafabadi was replaced in 2000 by Hojjatoleslam Ali Younesi. Younesi was replaced in 2005 with the accession of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad by Hojjatoleslam Gholam Hossein Mohseni-Ejehei.

3.5. The Revolutionary Guards

In March 1979, the Revolutionary Council, a body comprised of Ayatollah Khomeini’s closest advisers, recommended the creation of a new military force, the Revolutionary Guards (*Sipah-i Pasdaran-i*

⁴³ MENASHRI, *supra* note 8 at 319.

⁴⁴ See generally REYSHAHRI VOL. III, *supra* note 27.

⁴⁵ Memorandum from Bruno Jost, Senior Public Prosecutor, to Kubsch, Vorsitzenden Richter am Kammergericht [Chief Justice, Court of Appeals] (July 4, 1994) (on file with IHRDC).

⁴⁶ For more detail, see IHRDC, MURDER AT MYKONOS, *supra* note 18.

⁴⁷ REZA AFSHARI, HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAN: THE ABUSE OF CULTURAL RELATIVISM 214 (2001).

⁴⁸ *Id.*

⁴⁹ Ayatollah Ghorbanali Dorri Najafabadi was appointed Attorney-General of Iran in 2005.

Inqilab-i Islami). In a public statement, the Council laid out the new force's proposed mission as follows:

Keeping order in cities and provinces, preventing instigations and conspiracies, preventing sabotages in the government and national offices, public places, and embassies, preventing the penetration of opportunist and anti-revolutionary elements in the society, executing the interim government's orders and the verdicts of the Special Islamic Courts.⁵⁰



Ayatollah Khomeini adopted the Revolutionary Council's recommendation in an edict issued in April 1979.⁵¹ Khomeini also invested the Revolutionary Guards with a mission to export the Islamic revolution to oppressed Muslims throughout the world and, as a result, the Guards have been associated with the logistical support and military training of diverse Shi'ite opposition groups from Iraq, Bahrain, Lebanon, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.⁵² Ironically, the Revolutionary Guards established their command center in the old headquarters of the Shah's much feared internal security agency, SAVAK.⁵³

Mohsen Riza'i was appointed Head of the Revolutionary Guards in 1981, and he held this post until June 1997.⁵⁴ In November 2006, the Argentinean authorities issued an international arrest warrant for Riza'i, along with former Intelligence Minister Ali Fallahian and eight other suspects, for the alleged role played by the Revolutionary Guards in the 1994 bombing of the Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires.⁵⁵ Riza'i is currently Secretary of the IRI's Expediency Council.⁵⁶

Ayatollah Khomeini's successor, Ayatollah Khamenei, has also appointed other former Revolutionary Guards commanders to top political posts, including President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Ali Larijani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.⁵⁷ The Revolutionary Guards also currently control the country's strategic missile forces, the public morality force known as the *Basij* and are responsible for securing the Iranian capital.⁵⁸ The Revolutionary Guards exercise a great deal of influence over Iranian society in a manner which goes far beyond their avowed role as the 'guardians of the revolution.' One of the founders of the Revolutionary Guards,

⁵⁰ See *Az Viranihayih Savak Ta Shabakiyih Artishiyih Azim, Bakhsh-i Avval* [From SAVAK's Ruins to a Massive Military Network – Part I], Radio Farda, August 16, 2007 [hereinafter 'From SAVAK to a Military Network'] available at <http://www.radiofarda.com/ArticlePrint.aspx?id=407451> (accessed February 7, 2008).

⁵¹ *Id.*

⁵² ICG Middle East Report, *Iran: The Struggle for the Revolution's Soul* 8-9 (2002), available at <http://www.iranwatch.org/privateviews/ICG/perspex-icg-revolutionssoul-080502.pdf> (accessed March 13, 2008).

⁵³ From SAVAK to a Military Network, *supra* note 50.

⁵⁴ *Id.*

⁵⁵ Interpol Media Release, *INTERPOL General Assembly upholds Executive Committee decision on AMIA Red Notice dispute* (November 7, 2007).

⁵⁶ From SAVAK to a Military Network, *supra* note 50.

⁵⁷ Greg Bruno, *Iran's Revolutionary Guards*, Council on Foreign Relations, October 25, 2007, [hereinafter 'Iran's Revolutionary Guards'] available at <http://www.cfr.org/publication/14324/> (accessed February 13, 2008).

⁵⁸ *Id.*

Mohsen Sazegara, now living in exile in the United States, has described its modern incarnation as being “something like the Communist Party, the KGB, a business complex, and the mafia.”⁵⁹

The Quds Force

The Quds⁶⁰ Force (*Sipah-i Quds*) is a specialized unit of elite members of the Revolutionary Guards – in the words of Abbas Milani, Director of Iranian Studies at Stanford University, “the handpicked elite of an already elite ideological army.”⁶¹ The unit’s title reflects the ideological ambition of the Islamic Republic to force the state of Israel out of Palestinian territory. As an organ of the Revolutionary Guards, the force officially answers to the Supreme Leader, not the President.⁶²

The Quds Force was formed in 1980 during the Iran-Iraq war. As a clandestine unit, details of its size, strength, budget, and mission are classified, and are even withheld from the *Majlis*.⁶³ However, there is wide scholarly consensus that its primary role is to conduct operations outside Iranian territory. Mahan Abedin of the London-based Center for the Study of Terrorism and editor of *Islamism Digest* states:

Its essential function is to conduct special operations outside of Iran, and historically – over the past 25 years or so – it’s been involved in the following theaters: involved in Afghanistan in the 1980s; it had extensive involvement in Lebanon; extensive involvement in Iraq throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, when they were working with Iraqi dissident groups and the Kurdish faction in the north to undermine Saddam [Hussein’s] regime. [The Quds Force] was extensively involved in Bosnia in the early 1990s; it was in charge of supplying arms to the Bosnian Muslims. Their operations – which have rarely received any coverage – [included] their involvement in southern Sudan in the early 1990s, when they worked with the Sudanese army. So it’s been involved in various theaters.⁶⁴

The Quds Force is the main partner used by the Ministry of Intelligence in its overseas operations. Typically, the Quds operates autonomously in the Middle East and Asia but will provide support to missions further afield when required, as in the case of Dr. Abdol Rahman Ghassemlou’s assassination in Vienna.⁶⁵ Indeed, the current commander of the Quds Force Intelligence Directorate, Guards Corps Brigadier General Muhammad-Jafar Sahraroudi, was briefly detained by the Austrian authorities in connection with the Ghassemlou assassination (see 4.4. below). The Quds Force reportedly maintains offices in many Iranian embassies and has a strong operational presence in Lebanon, Turkey, Pakistan, and several North African countries.⁶⁶

On October 25, 2007, the United States government designated the Quds Force and the Revolutionary Guards as supporters of terrorism for “providing material support to the Taliban, Lebanese Hezbollah,

⁵⁹ Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, *supra* note 57.

⁶⁰ *Al-Quds* or Jerusalem.

⁶¹ Scott Shane, *U.S. Has Little Data on Iranian Units under Suspicion*, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, February 17, 2007, [hereinafter ‘Iranian Units under Suspicion’] that quotes from Dr. Milani.

⁶² Scott Shane, *Iranian Force, Focus of U.S., Still a Mystery*, THE NEW YORK TIMES, February 17, 2007. *See also* Interview with Mohsen Sazegara, one of the founders of the Revolutionary Guards, conducted by IHRDC (February 14, 2008) (on file with IHRDC).

⁶³ Iranian Units under Suspicion, *supra* note 61.

⁶⁴ Interview with Mahan Abedin, director of research at the London-based Center for the Study of Terrorism and editor of “Islamism Digest” journal, conducted by Golnaz Esfandiari, Radio Liberty, February 16, 2007, available at <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/02/36B123CE-693B-448E-BF7D-A541E2A7BD12.html> (accessed February 12, 2008).

⁶⁵ Interview with Mohsen Sazegara, one of the founders of the Revolutionary Guards, conducted by IHRDC (February 14, 2008) (on file with IHRDC).

⁶⁶ ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN AND MARTIN KLEIBER, IRAN’S MILITARY FORCES AND WAR FIGHTING CAPABILITIES, 80 (2007).

Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)” and also “providing lethal support in the form of weapons, training, funding, and guidance to select groups of Iraqi Shi’a militants who target and kill Coalition and Iraqi forces and innocent Iraqi civilians.”⁶⁷

3.6. Lebanese Hezbollah

The Islamic Republic of Iran has enjoyed a close relationship with Lebanese Hezbollah since its inception. A small force of approximately 170 Revolutionary Guards was deployed to Lebanon during the summer of 1982 in response to the Israeli incursion.⁶⁸ The Revolutionary Guards initially worked with the Islamic Amal militia, while Ayatollah Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, Iran’s Ambassador to Syria, worked behind the scenes to mediate the merger of Islamic Amal with both Lebanese al-Da’wa and the Association of Muslim Students to create Hezbollah.⁶⁹ In 1985, Ayatollah Ali Akbar Mohtashemi was promoted to Interior Minister in the government of Mir-Hossein Mousavi, a position he held until 1996.⁷⁰ In the words of former U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analyst Kenneth M. Pollack: “Iran was the principal moving force behind Hizballah [sic], providing it with an organizational structure, training, material support, moral guidance, and often operational direction.”⁷¹

The Revolutionary Guards were the conduit through which the Islamic Republic managed its relationship with Hezbollah. In April 1991, the commander of the Revolutionary Guards Forces in Lebanon, Hadi Reza Askari, characterized the relationship thus in an interview with the Voice of Lebanon: “The Guards is not a militia; our mission is to train the people to fight Israel.”⁷² On October 18, 1987, Hezbollah Secretary-General Abbas al-Mussawi asserted that the Revolutionary Guards were not merely seen by Hezbollah as “a normal part of our Islamic body, but as the head.”⁷³ Al-Mussawi had been among the first group of Hezbollah members to receive military training from the Revolutionary Guards in 1982.⁷⁴

Lebanese Hezbollah accepts the concept of *vilayat-i faqih* and acknowledged first Ayatollah Khomeini and then Ayatollah Khamenei as the *faqih*.⁷⁵ Article 5 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran defines the *faqih* as a just and pious jurist who is recognized by the majority of the people as best qualified to lead the nation. The constitution vests supreme authority in the *faqih*. Many devout Shi’as consider the *faqih* to be the divinely ordained and inspired deputy of the Twelfth Imam during his occultation.⁷⁶ Hezbollah first publicly pledged its loyalty to Ayatollah Khomeini in a manifesto issued in February 1985.⁷⁷ This pledge of loyalty was publicly renewed to Ayatollah Khamenei in March

⁶⁷ U.S. Department of State, *Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and Support for Terrorism*, available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/94193.htm> (accessed March 4, 2008).

⁶⁸ MAGNUS RANSTORP, *HIZBA’LLAH IN LEBANON: THE POLITICS OF THE WESTERN HOSTAGE CRISIS* 33 (1997) [hereinafter *HIZBA’LLAH IN LEBANON*].

⁶⁹ *Id.* at 33. See also JAMAL SANKARI, *FADLALLAH: THE MAKING OF A RADICAL SHI’ITE LEADER* 198 (2005).

⁷⁰ *HIZBA’LLAH IN LEBANON*, *supra* note 68 at 33.

⁷¹ KENNETH M. POLLACK, *THE PERSIAN PUZZLE: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND AMERICA* 201 (2004). See also *Ghat’namiyih Kungiriyih Azadiyih Quds* [Declaration of the Congress for Freedom of Quds], *ETTELLA’AT*, 2 Mordad 1359 (July 24, 1980).

⁷² *HIZBA’LLAH IN LEBANON*, *supra* note 68 at 34.

⁷³ AMAL SAAD-GHORAYEB, *HIZBU’LLAH: POLITICS AND RELIGION* 70 (2002), [hereinafter *POLITICS AND RELIGION*]

⁷⁴ H. E. CHEHABI, *DISTANCE RELATIONS: IRAN AND LEBANON IN THE LAST 500 YEARS* 217 (2006).

⁷⁵ KENNETH M. POLLACK, *THE PERSIAN PUZZLE: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND AMERICA* at 201, *POLITICS AND RELIGION*, *supra* note 73 at 65; and DANIEL BYMAN, *DEADLY CONNECTIONS: STATES THAT SPONSOR TERRORISM* 79-110 (2005).

⁷⁶ *POLITICS AND RELIGION*, *supra* note 73 at 64.

⁷⁷ *HIZBA’LLAH IN LEBANON*, *supra* note 68 at 41.

1997.⁷⁸ Speaking during a television interview in May 1996, Hezbollah Secretary General al-Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah⁷⁹ drew an important distinction between the organization's veneration of Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenei as religious authorities and their role as successive heads of the Iranian state.⁸⁰ In this sense, it can be said that Lebanese Hezbollah's special relationship is with the Islamic Republic's conservative clerical establishment, rather than the Iranian government itself.⁸¹ A good example of this special relationship is the instrumental role played by Ayatollah Khomeini's personal envoy, Fazlollah Mahallati, in the establishment of Hezbollah's consultative assembly, the *Majlis al-Shura*.⁸²

4. Individual Cases

From the first overseas assassination in December 1979, senior officials within the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) have demonstrated a commitment to seeking and eliminating sources of opposition to clerical rule, wherever they may be found overseas. Although it is not possible to compose a definitive list of all the victims claimed by this policy,⁸³ the IHRDC has identified 162 cases in which exiled opponents of the regime were murdered in circumstances where the involvement of the Iranian government was either explicit or strongly suspected.⁸⁴

For the purposes of this report, we have selected nine cases that illustrate different aspects of how the Iranian regime's assassination program operated. The victims involved all shared one common characteristic – they were actively opposed to the Islamic Republic of Iran. They come from across the political spectrum and include both boldface names and less well-known activists. Taken together, and in conjunction with the IHRDC's *Murder at Mykonos* report, they provide powerful evidence of a coordinated and extended policy of state-sponsored assassination that showed a complete disregard for national legal regimes across several continents, and was designed with only one objective in mind: the eradication of opposition to clerical rule in Iran.

⁷⁸ HIZBA'LLAH IN LEBANON, *supra* note 68 at 65.

⁷⁹ Nasrallah replaced Abbas al-Mussawi as Secretary-General in 1992 after the latter's assassination.

⁸⁰ HIZBA'LLAH IN LEBANON, *supra* note 68 at 72.

⁸¹ Other terrorist groups supported by the IRI include the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, the Islamic Dawa Party in Kuwait, Bahrain and Lebanon, and the Organization for the Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula, see US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, *Iran's Use of International Terrorism*, at 304. Iran has consistently been listed as one of the most active state sponsors of terrorism by the US since 1984, see US Department of States, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1984-1998*.

⁸² HIZBA'LLAH IN LEBANON, *supra* note 68 at 45. Mohsen Rafiqdust, the first commander of the Revolutionary Guard force in Lebanon, is another example. Rafiqdust was close to Khomeini, driving the car which had carried him from the Mehrabad airport to Tehran on his triumphant return from exile. See H. E. Chehabi, *Distant Relations: Iran and Lebanon in the last 500 years*, at 219.

⁸³ The list of political assassinations sponsored or carried out by the Islamic Republic of Iran outside its territory has been compiled by IHRDC from the following sources: Omid: A Memorial in Defense of Human Rights available at <http://www.abfiran.org/english/memorial-search.php>, Amnesty International, Parliamentary Human Rights Group, Eric Aveybury and Robert Wilkinson, *Iran: State of Terror* 42 (1993); MANOUCHEHR GANJI, *DEFYING THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION: FROM A MINISTER TO THE SHAH TO A LEADER OF RESISTANCE* (2002); National Movement of Iranian Resistance, Report on the Islamic Republic Terrorism Abroad; the PDKI website available at <http://www.pdki.org>, the Iran Terror Database available at <http://www.iranterror.com/content/view/37/55/>, and the Foundation for Democracy in Iran (FDI) available at www.Iran.org.

⁸⁴ See Chronological List of those Killed during the Islamic Republic of Iran's Global Assassination Campaign [Attached as Appendix 1]

4.1. Shahriar Shafiq



Shahriar Shafiq

Shahriar Shafiq,⁸⁵ the Shah's nephew, was assassinated in Paris on December 7, 1979. He was the first opponent of the revolutionary regime living outside Iran to be killed. Like the rest of the Shah's family, Shafiq had been living under a death sentence imposed by Khomeini's Islamic revolutionaries after they had driven the Shah into exile.⁸⁶

From the earliest days of the revolution, Khomeini and his supporters had been apprehensive about the possibility of a counter-coup mounted by elements still loyal to the Shah. The Revolutionary Courts announced the execution of more than 600 people associated with the previous regime, including former Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveida, three successive heads of SAVAK and numerous military and SAVAK officers.⁸⁷ Some former regime figures who had been unable to escape into exile went underground inside Iran, further fueling fears of conspiracy. The regime was particularly concerned by the potential threat posed by the Shah and his extended family:

The wretched Pahlavi Family and their associates, who have an execution verdict issued against them, are being pursued by us inside and outside of the country. If we cannot arrest them, we will assassinate them.⁸⁸

Prince Shahriar Shafiq appeared to represent a particular threat. An energetic thirty-four-year-old former officer captain in the Imperial Iranian Navy, he had been the only member of the Pahlavi dynasty to stay inside Iran after the revolution and continue fighting against the Islamic revolutionaries before being forced into exile. After arriving in Paris he took active steps to start organizing resistance inside Iran.⁸⁹

Prince Shafiq was shot dead twice as he was on his way to visit his mother, Princess Ashraf Pahlavi.⁹⁰ He was hit in the neck and head by two bullets fired by an unidentified man who fled the scene.⁹¹ *Ettella'at*, quoting an eyewitness, stated: "A young man, wearing a motorcycle helmet to cover his face,

⁸⁵ Shafiq was born on March 15, 1945.

⁸⁶ *Yik Sazman-i Makhfiiyih Irani Bih Iqamatghah-i Ashraf Hamlih Kard* [A Secret Iranian Organization Attacked Ashraf's Residence], *ETTELLA'AT*, 1 Tir 1359 (June 22, 1980).

⁸⁷ *KHALKHALI'S MEMOIR*, *supra* note 4 at 291. See also *MENASHRI*, *supra* note 8 at 81; *Hamdastanih Shah-i Sabiq Tirbaran Shudand* [Collaborators of the Former Shah Were Executed By a Firing Squad], *KAYHAN* (Tehran), Special Edition of Friday 27 Bahman 1357 (16 February 1979)

⁸⁸ *Ayatollah Khalkhali: Dar Surat-i Adam-i Dastgiri, Khandan Pahlavi Ra Tirur Mikonim* [Ayatollah Khalkhali: If we cannot arrest them, we will assassinate members of the Pahlavi Family], *KAYHAN*, 18 Azar 1358 (December 9, 1979). [Attached as Appendix 3]

⁸⁹ Cyrus Kadivar, *Dialogue of murder: A cautionary tale that must not be forgotten*, *THE IRANIAN*, January 26, 2003, available at <http://www.iranian.com/CyrusKadivar/2003/January/Murder/1.html> (accessed October 5, 2007)

⁹⁰ On December 8, *Kayhan* newspaper quoted United Press stating that Shahriar Shafiq was shot in front of his sister's home. *Juzi'yat-i Hadisiyih Tirur-i Pesar-i Ashraf-i Pahlavi* [Details on assassination of the son of Ashraf Pahlavi], *ETTELLA'AT*, 17 Azar 1358 (December 8, 1979).

⁹¹ *Id.*

came close to Shafiq and shot him in his neck from a close distance. As Shafiq fell, the gunman leaned over him and fired a second bullet into his head and immediately ran away.⁹² The French Police said that they found two 9mm cartridge casings at the scene.⁹³

According to French reports, an anonymous caller took responsibility for the assassination, declaring that Prince Shahriar had been killed as an enemy of the faith, the revolutionaries and the people of Iran, and for aiding international Zionism, before concluding, “long live Khomeini!”⁹⁴ Meanwhile, in Tehran, Ayatollah Sadegh Khalkhali, the leader of *Fadaiyan-i Islam* [Islam’s Devotees] and the first religious magistrate of the revolutionary courts,⁹⁵ issued a statement published in *Kayhan* that claimed members of *Fadaiyan-i Islam* were responsible for the attack.⁹⁶

Khalkhali stated that Shafiq had been killed because he was preparing a plot against the Islamic Republic to bring the Shah back to power.⁹⁷ Shafiq and his sister Azadeh had been acting as the royal family’s principal spokesmen.⁹⁸ Khalkhali said: “We were lucky ... We were after his mother but we got him instead.”⁹⁹ He later added that his guerrillas would continue to hunt down former regime figures: “This will continue until all these dirty pawns of the decadent system have been purged.”¹⁰⁰ In 2005, Khalkhali was prompted by a French journalist to reflect on his role in ordering the killing of opponents of the Islamic Republic. He responded: “If I had acted wrongly, Imam Khomeini would have told me. I only did what he asked me to do.”¹⁰¹

The Shah’s death in exile on August 27, 1980, took some of the momentum out of the royalist cause. The Shah was ‘succeeded’ by his son Reza Pahlavi who pursued a policy of forging links with the various opposition factions while also trying to remain apart from factional infighting.¹⁰² In his public statements, Pahlavi pledged to return as a constitutional monarch in the event of a restoration: “I am not for the Left, the Right or the past. I am for the future. I believe that I represent a new page in our history, a new message.”¹⁰³

⁹² *Id.* See also *Shah nephew killed in 'purge of pawns'*, Reuters News Agency as reported by The Globe and Mail (December 8, 1979)

⁹³ Jeffrey Ulbrich, *Police Hunt Slayer of Shah's Nephew*, ASSOCIATED PRESS, (April 11, 2007).

⁹⁴ *Shah nephew killed in 'purge of pawns'*, Reuters News Agency as reported by The Globe and Mail (December 8, 1979)

⁹⁵ Khalkhali was appointed by Imam Khomeini to be responsible for all the revolutionary courts in Iran. See generally KHALKHALI’S MEMOIR, *supra* note 4 at 291

⁹⁶ *Fadaiyan-i Islam Masuliyat-i Tirur-i Pesar-i Ashraf Ra Bih U'hdih Giriftand* [Fadaiyan Islam accepted responsibility for the assassination of the son of Ashraf] KAYHAN, 17 Azar 1358 (December 8, 1979); *Fadaiyan-i Islam Masuliyat-i Tirur Ra Bih U'hdih Giriftand* [Fadaiyan Islam accepted responsibility for the assassination], ETTELLA’AT, 17 Azar 1358 (December 8, 1979). According to *Kayhan*, two other groups also claimed responsibility for the assassination: *Jibhiyyih Azadibakhsh-i Musalmanan* [Moslem Liberation Front] and *Furqan* [25th Sura of the Koran meaning “the Criterion”].

⁹⁷ *Fadaiyan-i Islam Masuliyat-i Tirur-i Pesar-i Ashraf Ra Bih U'hdih Giriftand* [Fadaiyan Islam accepted responsibility for the assassination of the son of Ashraf] KAYHAN, 17 Azar 1358 (December 8, 1979)

⁹⁸ MENASHRI, *supra* note 8 at 142.

⁹⁹ Cyrus Kadivar, *Dialogue of murder: A cautionary tale that must not be forgotten*, THE IRANIAN, January 26, 2003, available at <http://www.iranian.com/CyrusKadivar/2003/January/Murder/1.html> (accessed October 5, 2007). See also, *Fadaiyan-i Islam Masuliyat-i Tirur-i Pesar-i Ashraf Ra Bih U'hdih Giriftand* [Fadaiyan Islam accepted responsibility for the assassination of the son of Ashraf] KAYHAN, 17 Azar 1358 (December 8, 1979).

¹⁰⁰ *Shah nephew killed in 'purge of pawns'*, Reuters News Agency as reported by The Globe and Mail (December 8, 1979)

¹⁰¹ *Butcher of the Iranian Revolution*, Le Figaro, July 5, 2005

¹⁰² MENASHRI, *supra* note 8 at 243

¹⁰³ IRAN PRESS DIGEST, NO. 71, May 13, 1982, at 10

4.2. Ali Akbar Tabatabai



Ali Akbar Tabatabai

Ali Akbar Tabatabai was shot dead at his home in Maryland, U.S.A., on July 22, 1980.¹⁰⁴ Tabatabai, a well-known figure in diplomatic circles, had served as a former press attaché for the Iranian Embassy in Washington, D.C.¹⁰⁵ After the revolution, he became a vocal critic of Ayatollah Khomeini and made a number of appearances in the U.S. media.¹⁰⁶ He was the founder and president of the Iran Freedom Foundation, an organization opposed to the Islamic Republic and dedicated to the creation of a secular democracy in Iran.¹⁰⁷ He was assassinated five days before a planned anti-Khomeini demonstration he had been organizing¹⁰⁸ and only an hour before a scheduled radio interview.¹⁰⁹

Tabatabai's assassin, David Belfield, also known as Daoud Salahuddin,¹¹⁰ fled to Tehran where he received a warm welcome. An African-American Muslim convert who became involved with pro-Khomeini activists in the late 1970s, Salahuddin has since repeatedly described the details of the assassination and his relationship with representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran.¹¹¹ In an interview featured in the 2006 documentary *American Fugitive*, Salahuddin nonchalantly recounted, "when [Tabatabai] came to the door for a signature, I shot him. Simple."¹¹²

Salahuddin had been acquainted with pro-Khomeini activists since his conversion to Islam in February 1969.¹¹³ As his local mosque's public relations manager, Salahuddin met a number of Iranians, including World Bank economist Ali Agha, Baylor University Professor Ibrahim Yazdi and

¹⁰⁴ Joyce Howard Price, *Convincing Role in 'Kandahar'; State's attorney identifies actor as killer of Iranian in '80*, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, January 4, 2002.

¹⁰⁵ *Id.* See also THE ASSASSIN – AN AMERICAN WHO KILLED FOR IRAN (ABC 20/20 interview 1996) [hereinafter "AMERICAN WHO KILLED FOR IRAN"] quoting Barbara Walters as stating: "I knew [Tabatabai]...we all knew him." and adding that "[h]e was frequently on television advocating [the overthrow of Khomeini]." Fearing for his safety were he to return to Iran, Tabatabai had received political asylum in the U.S. in May 1979. Also see Karlyn Barker and Sandra Saperstein, *Target for Assassination; Slain Iranian Organized Sunday Rally*, where Tabatabai express his desire for a democratic Iran.

¹⁰⁶ *Tabatabai, Rais-i 'Bunad-i Azadi Iran' Hamkar-i Nazdik-i Bakhtiar Tirur Shud* [Tabatabai, the head of 'Iran Freedom Foundation' and Bakhtiar's close associate was assassinated], ETTILLA'AT, 1 Mordad 1359 (July 23, 1980).

¹⁰⁷ For more information, see the organization's website at <http://www.iffmrt.org> (accessed April 18, 2008). The organization was headquartered at Tabatabai's home. See *Anti-Khomeini Iranian Slain at Bethesda Home*, THE WASHINGTON POST, July 23, 1980. See also, *Idamkunandiyeh Tabatabai, Uzv-i 'Junbish-i Musalmanan-i Siyah-i' Amrikast* [Tabatabai's Executioner Is a Member of "Black Muslim Movement" of US], ETTILLA'AT, 2 Mordad 1359 (July 24, 1980).

¹⁰⁸ See *Slain Iranian is Buried in Falls Church; Slain Anti-Regime Iranian is Interred*, THE WASHINGTON POST, July 26, 1980, that refers to a demonstration led by "anti-Khomeini Iranians" involving a march from the Capitol to Lafayette Park to "protest gross violations of human rights in Iran and [the] taking of the American hostages"; Robert Pear, *Iran Ex-Attaché, Khomeini Foe, Slain in U.S.*, THE NEW YORK TIMES, July 23, 1980. See also, *Tabatabai, Rais-i 'Bunad-i Azadi Iran' Hamkar-i Nazdik-i Bakhtiar Tirur Shud* [Tabatabai, the head of 'Iran Freedom Foundation' and Bakhtiar's close associate was assassinated], ETTILLA'AT, 1 Mordad 1359 (July 23, 1980).

¹⁰⁹ *Anti-Khomeini Iranian Slain at Bethesda Home*, THE WASHINGTON POST, July 23, 1980, and *Anti-Khomeini Iranian Slain at Bethesda Home*, THE WASHINGTON POST, July 23, 1980.

¹¹⁰ David Belfield was born in Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina, on November 10, 1950. He would later describe himself as an "angry and alienated" young African-American man frustrated with social and political inequality in the United States and a "time bomb" whose anger would be put to use by supporters of the IRI. Belfield attended Howard University in 1968, but dropped out after his first semester. He began spending time at the Community Mosque on S Street in Washington D.C. and became increasingly interested in Islam, which he saw as "color-blind". In February 1969, David Belfield formally converted to Islam and changed his name to Daoud Salahuddin. See David B. Ottaway, *The Lone Assassin*, THE WASHINGTON POST, August 25, 1996 [hereinafter 'The Lone Assassin']; Ira Silverman, *An American Terrorist*, THE NEW YORKER, August 5, 2002 [hereinafter 'American Terrorist']

¹¹¹ An example of that is his interview with the 20/20 program, aired on ABC on Friday, January 19, 1996, in which he confessed to his crime in details. See AMERICAN WHO KILLED FOR IRAN, *supra* note 105.

¹¹² AMERICAN FUGITIVE: THE TRUTH ABOUT HASSAN (InformAction Productions 2006) [hereinafter TRUTH ABOUT HASSAN]

¹¹³ *American Terrorist*, *supra* note 110; *The Lone Assassin*, *supra* note 110.

Georgetown rug merchant Bahram Nahidian, all of whom were organizing support for Khomeini among students in the United States.¹¹⁴ Salahuddin began spending time at an Islamic House run by Nahidian, who was said to be one of Ayatollah Khomeini's most active supporters in America.¹¹⁵ The student center was a meeting place and a staging area for demonstrations in support of Ayatollah Khomeini.¹¹⁶ On November 4, 1979 – the same day that Islamic militants stormed the U.S. embassy in Iran and took more than fifty diplomats hostage – Salahuddin joined Nahidian and a group of other Iranians who chained themselves to the crown of the Statue of Liberty, unfurling banners denouncing the Shah of Iran and asking for the Shah's trial and punishment.¹¹⁷

In December 1979, Ali Agha, who had become Chargé d'Affaires at the Iranian Embassy, offered Salahuddin employment as a security guard at the Iranian Embassy.¹¹⁸ Salahuddin accepted the post and also reportedly attended regular 'Islamic discussion sessions' led by the Chargé.¹¹⁹ After the U.S. and Iran severed diplomatic relations in April 1980, Salahuddin was put in charge of the security of the Iranian Interest Section at the Algerian Embassy.¹²⁰

In June 1980, according to Salahuddin, he was approached by an Iranian "student" working at the Iranian Interest Section of the Algerian Embassy¹²¹ who asked him if he would be prepared to carry out an arson attack on the Wisconsin Avenue offices of the *Iran Times*, a publication which had recently accused Khomeini's government of corruption.¹²² Salahuddin assented and, with the help of an American friend and 10 gallons of gasoline, he caused \$50,000 worth of damage to the offices and got away undiscovered.¹²³

Salahuddin's contact next asked him if he was ready to "kill for the Iranian Government" and showed him a list of five individuals the regime in Tehran wanted assassinated.¹²⁴ He was given five weeks and five thousand dollars to accomplish this task.¹²⁵ Ali Akbar Tabatabai's name appeared at the top of the list of potential targets shown to Salahuddin.¹²⁶ Although Salahuddin believed Tabatabai to be the chief liaison between expatriate counterrevolutionary forces and the CIA, and thus a threat to the IRI, he was concerned that the assassination of an Iranian might not attract enough attention. He suggested to his contact that their goals would be better served by targeting prominent Americans.¹²⁷ In an interview with the American television news program *20/20*, Salahuddin described the conversation:

¹¹⁴ The Lone Assassin, *supra* note 110. Media accounts suggest that these individuals over time became less engaged in actively supporting the IRI leadership. Ibrahim Yazdi served as foreign minister under Ayatollah Khomeini and still resides in Iran; however, he is now viewed as a dissident. Ali Agha reportedly became a schoolteacher in Northern Virginia and Bahram Nahidian continued to work in the carpet trade, also in Northern Virginia. See The Lone Assassin, *supra* note 110.

¹¹⁵ See *D.C. Man Sought In Assassination of Iranian Exile*, THE WASHINGTON POST, July 24, 1980.

¹¹⁶ American Terrorist, *supra* note 110.

¹¹⁷ *Danishjuyan-i Irani Dar Amrica Khud Ra Ba Zanjir Bih Mujasamiyih Azadi Bastand* [Iranian Students in the US chained themselves to the Statue of Liberty], ETTILLA'AT, 14 Aban 1358 (November 5, 1979); and The Lone Assassin, *supra* note 110.

¹¹⁸ The Lone Assassin, *supra* note 110.

¹¹⁹ Robert Meyers, *Fourth Suspect Named in Killing of Iranian Here, 4th Suspect Named in Assassination of Iranian July 22*, THE WASHINGTON POST, January 3, 1981

¹²⁰ The Lone Assassin, *supra* note 110. An Iranian interest section was opened in April 1980 to represent Iranian interests in the U.S. Salahuddin was one of four Americans working in the Iranian section; there were also nine Iranians. See A.O. Sulzberger, JR., *Algerians to Allow Interviews by F.B.I.*, THE NEW YORK TIMES, July 27, 1980.

¹²¹ In a different interview Salahuddin said he met his contact at the Iranian Student Center. See American Terrorist, *supra* note 110.

¹²² The Lone Assassin, *supra* note 110.

¹²³ *Id.* For a more detailed description of the incident, see *Arsonists Set Iran Times Offices Ablaze*, THE IRAN TIMES, June 20, 1980 (attributing the fire to "unknown arsonists").

¹²⁴ The Lone Assassin, *supra* note 110.

¹²⁵ American Terrorist, *supra* note 110. Salahuddin claims that he "received no direct payments from the Iranian government aside from the five thousand dollars for killing Tabatabai. 'Some people believe that I am on some special government payroll, but no one has ever given me a sinecure job in Tehran, nor have I ever been subsidized in any meaningful way.'"

¹²⁶ The Lone Assassin, *supra* note 110.

¹²⁷ American Terrorist, *supra* note 110.

Tom Jarriel: How was the decision made then, to carry [the assassination] out?

Daoud Salahuddin: I assume that the decision came from what was the Revolutionary Council in Iran, in Tehran. That's my assumption.

Jarriel: Who told you that this man needed to be killed or was he one of several people who were on a list?

Salahuddin: No, it was an Iranian friend of mine who told me about this order. He just said an order from the Imam [Ayatollah Khomeini]¹²⁸ and that was, that Tabatabai was, had been, chosen. I was presented with other names, too. When they showed me the list, I said that if you really want to make an impression, you should think about a person like [former U.S. Secretary of State] Henry Kissinger.

Jarriel: Kissinger?

Salahuddin: As I explained, why shoot the small dog when you can shoot his master?¹²⁹

Salahuddin's contact, however, insisted "no Americans," fearing the repercussions would be too severe.¹³⁰ Salahuddin has claimed that he was promised that if he carried out the killings, the regime would pay for him to go to Hong Kong to study traditional medicine and martial arts.¹³¹

Although Salahuddin spent five weeks planning the assassination,¹³² he lacked essential information about his target. He had never seen him in person, nor did he know that Ali Akbar Tabatabai had a twin brother who also lived in Bethesda.¹³³ Salahuddin thought that an effective way to get close to a stranger would be to masquerade as a postal worker. To that end, he bribed a mailman friend to lend him his work vehicle¹³⁴ and purchased a uniform from the Postal Service store.¹³⁵

On July 22, 1980, Salahuddin dressed as a mailman and drove a U.S. Postal Service truck toward Tabatabai's house. He stopped at a nearby pay phone to call the residence; when Tabatabai answered, Salahuddin hung up. Within a few minutes, he parked his vehicle in front of Tabatabai's house at 9313 Friars Road, Bethesda, Maryland. He approached the house carrying two parcels, in one of which he had concealed a handgun.¹³⁶ Tabatabai had no security measures in place except for strict orders to aides not to open the front door to strangers.¹³⁷ When Salahuddin arrived at Tabatabai's door dressed as a postal worker, it was opened by an assistant. He told the assistant that he needed Tabatabai's signature for two special delivery packages. The assistant insisted that he could sign for Tabatabai and an argument ensued. The noise prompted Tabatabai to come to the door to see what was happening¹³⁸ and

¹²⁸ Similarly, Salahuddin was told at the time that Khomeini had issued a fatwa against Tabatabai, though he no longer gives this credence. See TRUTH ABOUT HASSAN, *supra* note 112.

¹²⁹ AMERICAN WHO KILLED FOR IRAN, *supra* note 105. Salahuddin also proposed as a target Kermit Roosevelt, former CIA officer, who helped bring the Shah to power after the U.S.-supported coup that toppled elected Prime Minister Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953. See American Terrorist, *supra* note 110.

¹³⁰ The Lone Assassin, *supra* note 110. Salahuddin evidently had few qualms about targeting Tabatabai, explaining that: "When people asked me to ... execute him ... well I didn't have any problem with that because he was certainly willing to you know ... execute people ... on behalf of Uncle Sam ... I wouldn't have any problem killing a person like that." See TRUTH ABOUT HASSAN, *supra* note 112.

¹³¹ The Lone Assassin, *supra* note 110. Salahuddin claims that when he repeatedly raised the issue after he got to Iran, IRI officials displayed "collective amnesia" about this deal. See The Lone Assassin, *supra* note 110.

¹³² *Id.*

¹³³ *Id.*

¹³⁴ Salahuddin paid a postman \$500 for the use of his mail truck. See AMERICAN WHO KILLED FOR IRAN, *supra* note 105; American Terrorist, *supra* note 110.

¹³⁵ The Lone Assassin, *supra* note 110.

¹³⁶ American Terrorist, *supra* note 110.

¹³⁷ The Lone Assassin, *supra* note 110; TRUTH ABOUT HASSAN, *supra* note 112. The media speculated that "with an American man at the door, those inside fearing Iranian opponents let their guard down." See AMERICAN WHO KILLED FOR IRAN, *supra* note 105. Tabatabai's brother noted that Tabatabai had received a number of death threats in the months before his death, which he had reported to the FBI; see *Anti-Khomeini Iranian Slain at Bethesda Home*, THE WASHINGTON POST, July 23, 1980.

¹³⁸ Other accounts describe the aide actually calling Tabatabai to the door. See TRUTH ABOUT HASSAN, *supra* note 112.

Salahuddin shot him three times using a 9mm pistol.¹³⁹ Salahuddin reported that Tabatabai was still standing up – perhaps in a state of shock – when he fled the scene.¹⁴⁰ However, forty-five minutes after the shooting, Tabatabai was pronounced dead at a local hospital.¹⁴¹

Salahuddin had planned on flying out of New York immediately after the assassination, but fearing that that route might be risky, he opted instead to head to an airport in Montreal, Canada.¹⁴² There, he purchased a ticket to Paris, and on this flight he recalls reading about his involvement in the assassination in the *International Herald Tribune*.¹⁴³ He next flew to Geneva, arriving at the Iranian Embassy there forty-eight hours after leaving Montreal. Even after showing the embassy officials a news article recounting the assassination, Salahuddin was not granted a visa to travel on to Iran.¹⁴⁴ Only after calling an Iranian friend, Said Ramadan, who in turn contacted Ayatollah Khomeini's son, was Salahuddin granted a visa.¹⁴⁵

Approximately a week later, he arrived at the Mehrabad Airport in Tehran where he was escorted by Revolutionary Guards through the V.I.P. diplomatic lounge.¹⁴⁶ From there he claims he was taken to what he described as a “strained” meeting with Iran’s foreign minister, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, but the two men did not discuss Tabatabai’s death.¹⁴⁷ Initially thinking he would stay in Iran for only five or six months, Salahuddin spent his first nine months in a safe house under the protection of the Revolutionary Guards.¹⁴⁸ During this period, he also received a private 35-minute meeting with Khomeini where, according to Salahuddin, Khomeini acknowledged “the thing with the gentleman in Bethesda.”¹⁴⁹

While Salahuddin displayed little remorse for the assassination, he expressed regret for his “shoddy planning, which put [his friends] behind bars for years.”¹⁵⁰ Horace Butler, also known as Ahmed Rauf, was convicted of helping Salahuddin obtain a U.S. Postal Service truck and disposing of the murder weapon, a 9mm pistol.¹⁵¹ Al Fletcher Hunter, also known as Abu Bakr Zaid Sharriff, confessed, as part of a plea agreement, to driving Salahuddin to Montreal after the murder.¹⁵² Ali Abdul-Mani, also known as Lee Curtis Manning, was initially convicted of being an accessory to murder for providing the rental car in which Salahuddin was driven to Montreal, although this conviction was overturned on appeal.¹⁵³ In addition, Abdul-Mani was convicted of two counts of lying to a Grand Jury.¹⁵⁴ Tyrone Frazier, a

¹³⁹ The Lone Assassin, *supra* note 110; also see LOUIS R. MIZELL, TARGET USA: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE NEW TERRORIST WAR 50-51 (1998).

¹⁴⁰ AMERICAN WHO KILLED FOR IRAN, *supra* note 105.

¹⁴¹ American Terrorist, *supra* note 110.

¹⁴² TRUTH ABOUT HASSAN, *supra* note 112; Also see Benjamin Weiser, *Witness Says Slayer Visited Tabatabai Home Before Killing*, THE WASHINGTON POST, November 21, 1981.

¹⁴³ TRUTH ABOUT HASSAN, *supra* note 112.

¹⁴⁴ The Lone Assassin, *supra* note 110.

¹⁴⁵ *Id.*

¹⁴⁶ *Id.*

¹⁴⁷ *Id.*

¹⁴⁸ TRUTH ABOUT HASSAN, *supra* note 112.

¹⁴⁹ The Lone Assassin, *supra* note 110. The Report also mentions that “after 5 months [Salahuddin] ran into his ‘handler’ from the Iranian Interest Section in Washington; all the handler said about the killing was ‘nice job’.”

¹⁵⁰ American Terrorist, *supra* note 110. It is unclear how much, if any, those charged as co-conspirators knew about the plot.

¹⁵¹ Eugene Robinson, *Lied Earlier, Tabatabai Witness Says; Exile’s Slaying Witness Admits he Lied Earlier*, WASHINGTON POST, November 22, 1981; and Al Kamen, *2 Convicted in Death of Tabatabai; 3rd Suspect Cleared in Shooting of Exile; 2 are Convicted in Slaying of Tabatabai*, THE WASHINGTON POST, December 4, 1981.

¹⁵² Al Kamen, *Defense Attacks Credibility of Witnesses in Tabatabai Trial*, THE WASHINGTON POST, December 1, 1981; Al Kamen, *2 Convicted in Death of Tabatabai; 3rd Suspect Cleared in Shooting of Exile; 2 are Convicted in Slaying of Tabatabai*, THE WASHINGTON POST, December 4, 1981.

¹⁵³ Ali Abdul-Mani’s conviction was overturned in 1984 after a three-judge panel ruled that evidence had been improperly presented to the jury; see Ed Bruske, *Conviction in Exile’s Slaying Reversed*, Washington Post, July 24, 1984.

¹⁵⁴ Al Kamen, *2 Convicted in Death of Tabatabai; 3rd Suspect Cleared in Shooting of Exile; 2 are Convicted in Slaying of Tabatabai*, THE WASHINGTON POST, December 4, 1981.

former mailman, pleaded guilty to a charge that he had accepted \$500 in return for letting Salahuddin use his postal truck in the slaying.¹⁵⁵

On January 3, 1981, *The Washington Post* reported that an additional suspect had been identified in Tabatabai's assassination: Musa Abdul Majid, a.k.a. Derrick Pritchett, a Washington cabdriver with a conviction for making fraudulent weapons purchases in Virginia. Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) agents searching Majid's apartment discovered spent 9mm cartridges that matched those recovered from the murder scene in Bethesda. The Agents also seized 80 boxes of ammunition, a pistol, a rifle and shotgun from the apartment. Majid had managed to flee the country prior to his sentencing for the weapons violations. Salahuddin and Majid had worked together as security officers at the Iranian Interests Section in Washington D.C.¹⁵⁶

Salahuddin remains an international fugitive to this day. U.S. authorities have charged him with murder, unlawful flight to avoid prosecution and other offenses.¹⁵⁷ While his case has never been tried, he has given interviews in which he has admitted to shooting Tabatabai. His statements have been consistent with the FBI's allegations against him.

After his meeting with Ayatollah Khomeini and his nine-month stay in a Revolutionary Guard safe house, Salahuddin began to enjoy greater freedom of movement. He made trips to the Middle East and Central Asia but spent the majority of his time in Iran. He volunteered to fight for Iran in the Iran-Iraq War, but the authorities did not take him up on the offer.¹⁵⁸ However, he was given a job with Iran's state news agency. He also held jobs as an English teacher for the Revolutionary Guards and as a moderator on an Iranian television show.¹⁵⁹ Salahuddin worked as a war correspondent for an English-language newspaper in Iran.¹⁶⁰ During this period he traveled to Lebanon, Libya and Syria. He was also in Baghdad during the 1991 Gulf war.¹⁶¹

Salahuddin has claimed that in 1985 officials at Iran's Ministry of Intelligence approached him about carrying out assassinations outside of Iran – specifically, assassinating Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and an Afghan drug lord – but nothing came of the proposal.¹⁶² In 1986, he joined the *mujaheddin* forces fighting to expel the Soviets from Afghanistan.¹⁶³

In 2001, Salahuddin appeared in the film *Kandahar*, which was based on a true life episode in which an Afghan exile returned to Afghanistan to rescue a friend.¹⁶⁴ He played one of the supporting characters – an American exile with a Christian background who had worked as a journalist in Tehran and also with the *mujaheddin*.¹⁶⁵ While the director, Mohsen Makhmalbaf, insists that he did not know the actor's past when casting him for the movie, Salahuddin's status as a wanted American fugitive attracted the

¹⁵⁵ *Ex-Mailman Guilty of Role in Slaying of Iranian Exile*, THE NEW YORK TIMES, February 4, 1981.

¹⁵⁶ Robert Meyers, *Fourth Suspect Named in Killing of Iranian Here, 4th Suspect Named in Assassination of Iranian July 22*, THE WASHINGTON POST, January 3, 1981.

¹⁵⁷ Federal Bureau of Investigation Warrant for David Belfield, U.S. Government International Broadcasting Bureau (July 22, 1980). See also *F.B.I. Offering a \$10,000 Reward in Slaying of Anti-Khomeini Exile*, THE NEW YORK TIMES, July 25, 1980.

¹⁵⁸ The Lone Assassin, *supra* note 110.

¹⁵⁹ American Terrorist, *supra* note 110; The Lone Assassin, *supra* note 110.

¹⁶⁰ American Terrorist, *supra* note 110. The Washington Post claims that the newspaper was Kayhan International, see The Lone Assassin, *supra* note 110, while Time magazine reports it to be Iran Daily, see *A Killer in Kandahar?*, TIME, December 19, 2001.

¹⁶¹ The Lone Assassin, *supra* note 110.

¹⁶² *Id.*

¹⁶³ *Id.*

¹⁶⁴ *Kandahar* (alternatively titled *Safar-i Ghandihar* and *The Sun Behind the Moon*) is a film by Iranian director Mohsen Makhmalbaf, set in Afghanistan during the rule of the Taliban. *Kandahar* won the Federico Fellini Prize from UNESCO in 2001.

¹⁶⁵ Joyce Howard Price, *Convincing Role in 'Kandahar'; State's attorney identifies actor as killer of Iranian in '80*, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, January 4, 2002.

movie a great deal of attention.¹⁶⁶ As a result, the Maryland Attorney General's Office also began to reexamine the case against Salahuddin so that, were he to return to the U.S., they would be prepared to prosecute him.¹⁶⁷

In recent years, Salahuddin, although still apparently residing in Iran, has become dissatisfied with the Islamic Republic. In one interview, he complained:

The corruption here among the highest levels of the mullahs is incredible – it includes financial malfeasance, gross human-rights violations, extrajudicial murder, and two systems of justice, one for the mullahs, and one for the citizens.¹⁶⁸

In fact, Salahuddin now dismisses Tabatabai's assassination as "a waste of time and energy," given the ultimate failure of the Islamic Republic to achieve its promised goals.¹⁶⁹ In 1993, he reportedly offered to return to United States to face the charges against him, but only on condition that the Department of Justice would ensure that numerous high-ranking U.S. officials would take the witness stand in his trial and that he was guaranteed certain luxuries, such as a stipend, while awaiting trial.¹⁷⁰ His offer was evidently rejected.¹⁷¹

4.3. General Gholam Ali Oveisi

On February 7, 1984, General Gholam Ali Oveisi and his brother, Gholam Hossein Oveisi, were both shot in the head from close range on a Paris street.¹⁷² They died instantly.¹⁷³ The French Police described the gunmen responsible as professional assassins.¹⁷⁴

General Oveisi was the former Military Governor of Tehran and he had made a name for himself in September 1977 by deploying tanks on the streets of the city to quell popular unrest against the Shah. His actions had earned him the sobriquet "the butcher of Tehran."¹⁷⁵ He also served as Minister of Labor and Social Affairs in the short-lived 1978 military government of Prime Minister Gholam Reza Azhari.¹⁷⁶ He fled the country in January 1979.¹⁷⁷



In exile, Oveisi attracted a number of former royalist army officers to his

¹⁶⁶ TRUTH ABOUT HASSAN, *supra* note 112.

¹⁶⁷ *Id.*

¹⁶⁸ American Terrorist, *supra* note 110.

¹⁶⁹ *Id.*

¹⁷⁰ The Lone Assassin, *supra* note 110.

¹⁷¹ In 1989, The Washington Post reported of a plan to lure Salahuddin out of Iran for arrest by offering him another assassination assignment, this time of an American lawyer. The plan was ultimately abandoned. John Mintz, Rught Marcus, *Hirschfeld and the 'Assassination Lure'*, THE WASHINGTON POST, May 18, 1989. The U.S. and the IRI have no extradition treaty and various other reported attempts to lure Salahuddin out of Iran have failed.

¹⁷² John Vinocur, *Exiled Iranian General is Killed with Brother by Gunmen in Paris*, THE NEW YORK TIMES, February 8, 1984; *Emirates' Ambassador to France Assassinated*, THE WASHINGTON POST, February 9, 1984; and the Obituary section, TIME, February 20, 1984, available at <http://www.time.com/time/printout/0.8816.950022.00.html> (accessed March 31, 2008). Note that the Time magazine Obituary section mentions one gunman, while The New York Times reports of gunmen having killed Oveisi.

¹⁷³ The Obituary Section, TIME, February 20, 1984, available at <http://www.time.com/time/printout/0.8816.950022.00.html> (accessed March 31, 2008).

¹⁷⁴ John Vinocur, *Exiled Iranian General is Killed with Brother by Gunmen in Paris*, THE NEW YORK TIMES, February 8, 1984.

¹⁷⁵ MENASHRI, *supra* note 8 at 142.

¹⁷⁶ *Id.* at 44 and 59.

¹⁷⁷ *Id.* at 69.

banner, including General Javad Mu'inzadih, the Head of *Azadegan* (Free Men), General Bahram Aryana and General Habibollah Palizban, a Kurd with good contacts in his fractious home province. Oveisi received substantial financial backing from the Shah's family and ran an anti-clerical radio station based in Iraq, called the Free Voice of Iran.¹⁷⁸ Writer Cyrus Kadivar also alleges that Oveisi was involved in organizing a "professional army of Iranian counterrevolutionaries" on the Iran-Turkey border for "eventual deployment in a 'liberation drive.'"¹⁷⁹ Oveisi himself claimed to have recruited a cadre of 7,000 retired military officers and 90,000 volunteers to his cause.¹⁸⁰ According to Kadivar, Oveisi's death dealt a major setback to these forces, which were later disbanded.¹⁸¹

Evidence suggests that the revolutionary authorities treated Oveisi as a very real threat. In a press interview recorded in his memoirs, Ayatollah Sadegh Khalkhali, a religious judge and Chairman of the Revolutionary Court, announced the death sentence passed on Oveisi and others who had held prominent positions in the last regime:

The deposed Shah, Farah [the Queen], Farideh Diba [Farah's Mother], Gholamreza Pahlavi, Ashraf [Shah's twin sister], Shapour Bakhtiar, General Azhari, Sharif Emami, General Oveisi ... who in Iran's view are all criminals, are condemned to death. Any Iranian who kills one of these people in foreign countries is considered an agent executing a court order.¹⁸²

Khalkhali, in a speech in Shiraz on July 17, 1979, made it clear that the revolutionary authorities were looking for Oveisi.¹⁸³ In May and June 1980, the Iranian regime claimed to have disrupted two plots linked to Oveisi's network and arrested dozens of serving officers.¹⁸⁴ A newspaper article published in *Ettella'at* on November 16, 1982, reported on the trial of eight Royalists accused of having a "connection with criminal Oveisi."¹⁸⁵

Two groups – Islamic Jihad and another calling itself the Revolutionary Organization for Liberation and Reform – both claimed responsibility for Oveisi's killing.¹⁸⁶ The day after Oveisi's murder, the Government of Iran reportedly characterized the killings as a "revolutionary execution".¹⁸⁷ Spokespersons for several Iranian exile organizations opposing the Islamic Republic publicly accused the Iranian government of ordering the killings in an attempt to intimidate opposition groups.¹⁸⁸

¹⁷⁸ *Id.* at 142.

¹⁷⁹ Cyrus Kadivar, *Dialogue of Murder: A cautionary tale that must not be forgotten*, THE IRANIAN, January 26, 2003.

¹⁸⁰ Mark Gasiorowski, *The Nuzhah Plot and Iranian Politics*, International Journal of the Middle East Studies, Vol. 34 at 649 (2002).

¹⁸¹ Cyrus Kadivar, *Dialogue of murder: A cautionary tale that must not be forgotten*, THE IRANIAN, January 26, 2003.

¹⁸² KHALKHALI'S MEMOIR, *supra* note 4 at 75.

¹⁸³ Ayatollah Khalkhali: *Oveisi Az Tars-i Iraniha Dar Landan Girim Kardih Ast* [Ayatollah Khalkhali: Oveisi wears makeup in London out of his fear of the Iranians], KAYHAN, 26 Tir 1358 (July 17, 1979).

¹⁸⁴ Mark Gasiorowski, *The Nuzhah Plot and Iranian Politics*, International Journal of the Middle East Studies, Vol. 34 at 650 (2002).

¹⁸⁵ *Dadsitan-i Inqilabiyeh Artish, Ittihat-i 8 Saltanat Talab Ra I'lam Kard* [The Revolutionary Prosecutor of the Special Court of the Armed Forces Announced the Accusations of 8 Royalists], ETTILLA'AT, 25 Aban 1361 (November 16, 1982). See also, *Dadghah-i 8 Saltanat Talab Varid-i Shur Shud* [Trial of 8 Royalists Entered the Deliberation Phase], ETTILLA'AT, 29 Aban 1361 (November 20, 1982).

¹⁸⁶ The Obituary section, TIME, February 20, 1984, available at <http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,950022,00.html>.


¹⁸⁷ However, it is not clear which Iranian official body made the statement, see *Emirates' Ambassador to France Assassinated*, THE WASHINGTON POST, February 9, 1984.

¹⁸⁸ John Vinocur, *Exiled Iranian General is Killed with Brother by Gunmen in Paris*, THE NEW YORK TIMES, February 8, 1984.

4.4. Dr. Abdol-Rahman Ghassemlou

On July 13, 1989, Dr. Abdol-Rahman Ghassemlou,¹⁸⁹ Secretary General of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (PDKI),¹⁹⁰ Mr. Abdollah Ghaderi-Azar,¹⁹¹ the PDKI's representative in Europe, and Mr. Fazil Rassoul,¹⁹² an Iraqi Kurd serving as a mediator, were murdered in a Vienna apartment during a confidential meeting with delegates from the Iranian government.¹⁹³

The PDKI had been forced underground in 1979 and the leadership of the party had been driven into exile by a major IRI offensive in July 1984.¹⁹⁴ At the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, Jalal Talibani, leader of the Iraqi Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), informed Dr. Ghassemlou that the Iranian government was ready to reopen talks with the PDKI.¹⁹⁵ Dr. Ghassemlou saw this as a positive development and agreed to meet the IRI negotiators in Vienna.¹⁹⁶ On December 30 and 31, 1988, Dr. Ghassemlou met with an Iranian delegation headed by Mohammad Jafari Sahraroudi, the Head of the Kurdish Affairs Section of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence.¹⁹⁷ Further meetings took place on January 19, 1989,¹⁹⁸ and in March 1989. However, when Dr. Ghassemlou did not attend the



Dr. Abdol-Rahman
Ghassemlou

¹⁸⁹ Born on December 22, 1930, Dr. Ghassemlou grew up with the Kurdish national movement having joined the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (PDKI) at the age of fifteen. See *Eskorte nach Teheran: der Osterreichische Rechtsstaat und die Kurdenmorde* [ESCORT TO TEHRAN: THE AUSTRIAN CONSTITUTIONAL STATE AND THE KURD'S MURDERS] (Peter Pilz, Ibera & Molden, 1997) [hereinafter 'ESKORTE NACH TEHERAN'] at 26. In 1973, Dr. Ghassemlou was elected Secretary General of PDKI. For more information, see Dr. Ghassemlou's biography page on The Encyclopedia of Kurdistan, Available at <http://www.kurdistanica.com/english/politics/personalites/leaders/arQasimlu.html> (accessed March 31, 2008).

¹⁹⁰ Founded in 1945 the PDKI had been forced underground by the Shah's regime but reemerged in March 1979, led by Secretary-General, Dr. Abdol Rahman Ghassemlou, who presented the media with an ambitious eight-point plan for Kurdish autonomy within a federal republic of Iran. See PHILIP G. KREYENBROEK AND STEFAN SPERL (EDS.), *THE KURDS: A CONTEMPORARY OVERVIEW* 190 (1992). The Kurdish desire for autonomy led to armed clashes in Kurdish cities like Sanandaj and Paveh between Revolutionary Guards and PDKI *peshmerga* militia. See NADER ENTessar, *KURDISH ETHNONATIONALISM* 32 (1992). The fact that the Kurds were mostly Sunni and the Revolutionary Guards Shi'a only served to further exacerbate sectarian tensions. Several official attempts at reconciliation between the PDKI and the Interim Government in Tehran failed to find any common ground. See NADER ENTessar, *KURDISH ETHNONATIONALISM* at 32. Finally on August 18, 1979, acting as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, Ayatollah Khomeini ordered units of the Army and the Revolutionary Guards to intervene in the Province of Kurdistan to restore order and re-establish the authority of the central government. See *Farman-i Imam Bih Unvan-i Ra'is-i Kull-i Quva Darbariyyih Havadiisyyih Pavih* [Imam's Order as the Commander in Chief about the Incidents of Paveh], *KAYHAN*, 27 Mordad 1358 (August 18, 1979). Fierce fighting ensued. Khomeini dubbed the PDKI the "Party of Satan." See *Payam-i Imam Bih Mardum-i Kurdistan: Hizb-i Dimokrat Hizb-i Shaytan Ast* [Imam's Message to the People of Kurdistan: The Democrat Party is The Party of Satan], *ETTELA'AT*, 30 Mordad 1358 (August 21, 1979). The regime made membership of the party a crime against the IRI and therefore punishable according to both Islamic and Iranian law. See *Bah Tasvib-i Shurayih Inqilab-i Islami: Hizb-i Dimokrat-i Kurdistan Qayr-i Qanuni l'lam Shud*, [The Islamic Revolutionary Council Announced: Kurdish Democratic Party is Illegal], *KAYHAN*, 28 Mordad 1358 (August 19, 1979). The government called for a cease-fire in November 1979 but peace talks again broke down over continued Kurdish demands, albeit reduced, for a measure of self-government. See DAVID McDOWALL, *THE KURDS: A NATION DENIED* 76 (1992). Fighting resumed with government forces managing to secure most of the urban centers but the PDKI controlling the rural hinterland. See MENASHRI, *supra* note 8 at 201. With the outbreak of the war with Iraq in September 1980, the government in Tehran redoubled its efforts to wrest back control of the province, and in July 1984, the leadership of the PDKI was finally forced to retreat across the border into the Kurdish areas of Iraq. See *ESKORTE NACH TEHERAN supra* note 189 at 28.

¹⁹¹ *ESKORTE NACH TEHERAN supra* note 189 at 37.

¹⁹² Rassoul was a Vienna-based Iraqi Kurd serving as a mediator. See *ESKORTE NACH TEHERAN supra* note 189 at 38.

¹⁹³ See generally *ESKORTE NACH TEHERAN supra* note 189.

¹⁹⁴ *ESKORTE NACH TEHERAN supra* note 189 at 28.

¹⁹⁵ DAVID McDOWALL, *A MODERN HISTORY OF THE KURDS* 276 (2001).

¹⁹⁶ *Id.*

¹⁹⁷ Another member of the PDKI was Mr. Abdollah Ghaderi-Azar, the PDKI's representative in Europe. *ESKORTE NACH TEHERAN supra* note 189 at 58.

¹⁹⁸ At this meeting Amir Mansour Bozorgian joined the IRI team. See *ESKORTE NACH TEHERAN supra* note 189 at 60.

March session, Sahraroudi terminated the negotiations, refusing to continue in the absence of the PDKI Secretary-General.¹⁹⁹

In June 1989, shortly after Ayatollah Khomeini's death,²⁰⁰ Amir Mansour Bozorgian (a.k.a. Ghaffoor Darjazi) informed the PDKI that the IRI was willing to resume negotiations.²⁰¹ Dr. Ghassemlou suggested a meeting in Paris, but the IRI delegation indicated a preference for either Vienna or Berlin.²⁰² Dr. Ghassemlou acquiesced, apparently optimistic that progress could be made in these new sessions.²⁰³ The IRI representatives had informed the Secretary-General that Hojjatoleslam Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was pressing for a speedy resolution of the Kurdish situation.²⁰⁴ As Speaker of the *Majlis*, Rafsanjani was also a highly favored candidate for the Iranian Presidency.²⁰⁵

The venue for these new negotiations was an apartment in a building located at 5 Linke Bahngasse, Vienna, made available by Fazil Rassoul.²⁰⁶ The building door was secured by an intercom system and three security locks. Before the negotiation session began, neither one of the parties knew of the location nor the layout of the building. On July 12, Rassoul separately picked up and delivered both Dr. Ghassemlou and the IRI delegation to this venue. With the first day of negotiations yielding no progress, the parties resolved to meet again the following day at 5:30 p.m.²⁰⁷

On July 13, at the appointed hour, Dr. Ghassemlou and Abdollah Ghaderi-Azar²⁰⁸ arrived at the apartment, having taken no security precautions. Rassoul was also present in his role of facilitator. They were soon joined by the Iranian government delegation, which consisted of Mohammad Jafari Sahraroudi, Mostafa Ajoudi, the Iranian Governor of the Province of Kurdistan, and Amir Mansour Bozorgian.²⁰⁹

An audiotape made of the meeting recorded Rassoul and Dr. Ghassemlou proposing a break and suggesting that negotiations be resumed the next day at 6:00 p.m.²¹⁰ Shortly after this proposal, there was a flurry of gunshots, in which two weapons could distinctly be heard. Dr. Ghassemlou was shot in the forehead, temple and throat; Rassoul was shot three times in the head and twice in the neck; Ghaderi-Azar was hit by one bullet in the back of his head, two bullets in his waist, one bullet in his temple, one bullet in his throat, one bullet in his shoulder and one bullet in the index finger of his right hand. Ghaderi-Azar's injuries suggest that he may have tried to fight back against his attackers. A final shot to the head was delivered to all three victims. Police would later recover blood and tissue samples from the victims on the murder weapons suggesting that these shots were fired at very close range.²¹¹ Jafari Sahraroudi was also wounded. He was hit by one bullet that entered his left arm, exited near his shoulder, reentered his throat and came to rest in his mouth.²¹²

¹⁹⁹ *Id.* at 60.

²⁰⁰ Ayatollah Khomeini died on June 4, 1989.

²⁰¹ ESKORTE NACH TEHERAN *supra* note 189 at 61; See also DAVID MCDOWALL, A MODERN HISTORY OF THE KURDS 277 (2001).

²⁰² ESKORTE NACH TEHERAN *supra* note 189 at 63.

²⁰³ DAVID MCDOWALL, A MODERN HISTORY OF THE KURDS 277 (2001).

²⁰⁴ ESKORTE NACH TEHERAN *supra* note 189 at 62.

²⁰⁵ Hojjatoleslam Rafsanjani was elected president on August 3, 1989.

²⁰⁶ ESKORTE NACH TEHERAN *supra* note 189 at 66-67; See also DAVID MCDOWALL, A MODERN HISTORY OF THE KURDS 277 (2001).

²⁰⁷ This information comes to us almost exclusively from Mr. Pilz book. As a member of government, Mr. Pilz had access to many documents that the IHRDC has yet to acquire.

²⁰⁸ See *Die Kurdische Tragödie: die Kurden, Verfolgt im Eigenen Land* [THE KURDISH TRAGEDY: THE KURDS, PURSUED IN OWN LAND] (Bahman Nirumand, Rowohlt, 1991) at 139.

²⁰⁹ ESKORTE NACH TEHERAN *supra* note 189 at 69.

²¹⁰ *Id.*

²¹¹ *Id.* at 69-70.

²¹² ESKORTE NACH TEHERAN *supra* note 189 at 70.

Sahraroudi staggered from the apartment at approximately 7:20 p.m. and rang the neighbor's doorbell seeking help. The neighbor called the police, who arrived at the scene at 7:37 p.m.²¹³ Sahraroudi remained in the street until the police arrived, while Bozorgian was reported to have briefly left the scene on a motorcycle before returning on foot.²¹⁴ On his return, Bozorgian accompanied two police officers into the apartment where the meeting had occurred.²¹⁵ After the discovery of the bodies, the officers took Bozorgian into custody. Sahraroudi was taken to the hospital. Ajoudi was nowhere to be seen.

Sahraroudi and Bozorgian were interrogated separately by the Austrian authorities, Sahraroudi at the hospital and Bozorgian at the police station.²¹⁶ Sahraroudi told investigators that at the end of the negotiations, two or three assailants entered the room after throwing open the door. He explained that he was injured before being able to look at the men, and once injured pretended to be dead in order to deceive the assailants. Sahraroudi claimed that Bozorgian was in the bathroom at the time of the shootings.²¹⁷ Bozorgian, who was supposedly present at the negotiations to provide security for the Iranian delegation, claimed to have gone to McDonald's and was not even in the building at the time of the shootings.²¹⁸ Once his police interview was completed, Bozorgian insisted on being taken to the Iranian embassy.²¹⁹

Despite the fact that the statements given by Bozorgian and Sahraroudi were contradictory,²²⁰ initial police media statements indicate that the Austrian police may have been taken in by the Iranian delegate's cover story, that the murders had been committed by unknown outsiders who burst into the negotiations,²²¹ shooting all the Kurds and Sahraroudi alike.²²²

Like Bozorgian, Sahraroudi was soon released from police custody. He was given permission to leave the country and the Austrian police actually escorted him to the airport on July 22, 1989, and helped him board the flight to Tehran. The Chief of the Political Division of the Austrian Police informed his opposite number in the Austrian Special Anti-Terrorism Unit that a group of Iranian diplomats had arrived in Vienna the previous day and that they would be accompanying Sahraroudi on his flight back to Tehran.²²³

Bozorgian is believed to have left Austria by air on November 30, 1989.²²⁴ Mostafa Ajoudi was never apprehended. A fourth suspect, Mohammade Magaby, was identified in the media but although Austrian investigators interviewed Magaby, he was released without charge.²²⁵ There have also been repeated media reports linking current Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the Vienna killings and suggesting that he was a member of the team of diplomats sent to Vienna to accompany Sahraroudi

²¹³ ESKORTE NACH TEHERAN *supra* note 189 at 20.

²¹⁴ ESKORTE NACH TEHERAN *supra* note 189 at 70.

²¹⁵ ESKORTE NACH TEHERAN *supra* note 189 at 71.

²¹⁶ ESKORTE NACH TEHERAN *supra* note 189 at 73.

²¹⁷ *Angeklagt* [Suspect], NEWS, September 17, 1997 [hereinafter 'News-September 17, 1997'].

²¹⁸ *Id*; *See also*, ESKORTE NACH TEHERAN *supra* note 189 at 77. Bozorgian explained that he went to buy himself a McFish sandwich and a Coca-Cola.

²¹⁹ Noghrehkar Shirazi, the Islamic Republic's Ambassador in Vienna put tremendous effort into the release and return of Sahraroudi and Bozorgian. *See* News-September 17, 1997, *supra* note 217

²²⁰ ESKORTE NACH TEHERAN *supra* note 189 at 77.

²²¹ Report on the Islamic Republic's Terrorism Abroad, NAMIR, at 26.

²²² *Gunmen Kill Kurdish Exiles Holding a Meeting in Vienna*, THE NEW YORK TIMES, July 15, 1989.

²²³ News-September 17, 1997, *supra* note 217.

²²⁴ *Id*.

²²⁵ Jonathan C. Randal, "The Hostage Drama; Austria Said to 'Kowtow' to Iran in Murder Case; Reprisal Feared in Kurdish Leader's Death", THE WASHINGTON POST, August 2, 1989 [hereinafter "The Hostage Drama"].

back to Tehran, but the IHRDC has found no compelling evidence in the course of its research to support this accusation.²²⁶

Oswald Kessler, the head of the Austrian Special Anti-Terrorism Unit, reached a number of preliminary conclusions after surveying the crime scene and reviewing the initial evidence in the immediate aftermath of the killings: There was no evidence of a forced entry into the apartment where the killings took place; all three Kurdish victims had received *coups de grâce* to ensure death; Dr. Ghassemlou and Rassoul were caught by surprise and killed in the seated position; Ajoudi had fled the scene; the killers were most likely familiar with the layout of the apartment; it appeared that the assassins had succeeded in gaining the victims' trust. Kessler concluded that the killings had the feel of an intelligence operation about them²²⁷ and told reporters:

The Kurds were murdered and the representatives of the Islamic Republic survived. To us [the police], the situation is completely clear. From now on, decisions are in the hands of the politicians.²²⁸

Mr. Kessler's hypothesis was later bolstered by further evidence. Analysis of the shooting determined that the assassins could not have fired at the Kurds from the doorway. The trajectory of the bullets indicated that they had been fired from the direction of the IRI delegation.²²⁹ Furthermore, discarded shell casings were found where the IRI negotiators had been sitting and not near the doorway. A senior Austrian government official told *Time* magazine:

Bozorgian and Sahraroudi told us someone had forced their way into the room and opened fire. They lied. By all appearances, the murderers were inside the room at the time of the crime.²³⁰

Two automatic pistols equipped with silencers and a bloodstained windbreaker were eventually discovered in a garbage dump, along with the key to a Suzuki motorcycle.²³¹ A bill of sale found with the key led the police to a salesman who identified Sahraroudi as having purchased the bike. Sahraroudi had used the pseudonym Mostafa Mostafavi for the transaction.²³²

The Austrian Public Prosecutor finally issued warrants for the arrest of Bozorgian, Sahraroudi and Ajoudi on November 28, 1989, three months after they were escorted by the Austrian Police to the airport.²³³ Mohammad Jafari Sahraroudi was subsequently promoted to the rank of Brigadier General in the Revolutionary Guards and became the Head of the Quds Forces Intelligence Directory.²³⁴

The Austrian government's slow response to the attack created a national outcry in Austria. The Green Party accused the government of "collapsing in the face of terrorism" and the daily newspaper *Der Standard* charged that "the authorities did everything to facilitate the departure of witnesses and suspects to avoid light being shed [on the case]."²³⁵ In response to a Foreign Ministry official's protest that Iran had threatened reprisals if its nationals were taken into custody, the daily newspaper *Arbeiter*

²²⁶ See generally: Ahmadinejad suspected of involvement in 1989 attack in Vienna, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 2, 2005); *Austria Seeks to Interview Journalist over Ahmadinejad Murder Accusations*, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE (July 5, 2005); *Ahmadinejad: Iran wants ties with Europe*, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE (July 7, 2005).

²²⁷ ESKORTE NACH TEHERAN *supra* note 189 at 72.

²²⁸ News-September 17, 1997, *supra* note 217; ESKORTE NACH TEHERAN *supra* note 189 at 73.

²²⁹ ESKORTE NACH TEHERAN *supra* note 189 at 78.

²³⁰ The Tehran Connection, *supra* note 21.

²³¹ *Id.*

²³² ESKORTE NACH TEHERAN *supra* note 189 at 79. The pseudonym was actually Mostafa Ajoudi's real name.

²³³ *Id.* at 74.

²³⁴ In 1996 Mr. Sahraroudi, a senior member of the intelligence branch of the Islamic Republic Revolutionary Guards Corps, traveled to the Iraqi town of Sulaymaniyah, the headquarters of Talabani to inaugurate a Shi'ite mosque built with Iranian government funds." See Kenneth R. Timmerman, *A Wasted Opportunity to Help Iranian Kurds*, WASHINGTON TIMES, 31 July 1996, and The Tehran Connection, *supra* note 21.

²³⁵ The Hostage Drama, *supra* note 226.

Zeitung responded that: “This kowtowing to Iran will protect Austria for a while from the mullahs’ wrath. But it’s an invitation saying, ‘Austria’s pretty; come here to kill.’”²³⁶

Unsatisfied with the results of the investigation, Dr. Ghassemlou’s widow, Ms. Helene Krulich, filed suit against the Republic of Austria on August 2, 1991.²³⁷ She accused the government of refraining from investigating the assassination of Dr. Ghassemlou diligently and allowing the assassins to leave Austria safely. She alleged that the Austrian government willfully barred the police authorities from investigating the case because of pressure from the IRI and illegal arms deals between the state-owned Austrian enterprise “Voest” and the Iranian government during the Iran-Iraq war.²³⁸ She claimed damages of 963,216.48 ATS for the funeral expenses of her husband.

The Austrian court dismissed the case without hearing evidence, ruling that Ms. Krulich had failed to make a *prime facie* case and that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a case against the IRI. This decision was confirmed by the Appellate Court of Vienna (*Oberlandesgericht Wien*) and dismissed on September 15, 1992.²³⁹ A “top-level Vienna bureaucrat” told *Time*:

No country wants to prosecute a terrorist case. It’s a threat to your government, your stability, to your penal system. A convicted terrorist faces a life sentence, which means in Austria at least 15 years. That means 15 years you are at risk.²⁴⁰

In September 1992, in the Mykonos Restaurant in Berlin, Dr. Ghassemlou’s successor, Dr. Sadegh Sharafkandi, and three others were shot and killed (See the IHRDC report *Murder at Mykonos*). Germany arrested, put on trial and convicted several perpetrators. During the trial, testimony from Mr. Ostrawits, a senior officer from the Austrian Police, plainly stated that with regard to the Vienna assassination, the trail led to the highest levels of authority in the IRI. The Court also noted the testimony of Professor Steinbach and a report by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV). The BfV report identified the Iranian delegates in Vienna as agents of the Special Operations Committee (*Shuray-i Amaliyat-i Vijih*)²⁴¹ attached to the Unit of Operations Abroad of the Ministry of Intelligence of the IRI.²⁴²

The German court went on to describe the events leading up to the assassination. It determined that Hadi Judi, Mohammad Jafari Sahraroudi and Mehdi Hadavi Moghaddam²⁴³ prepared and presented a report to the Ministry of Intelligence recommending the assassination of Dr. Ghassemlou. The Special Operations Committee then approved the operation. Further, the court concluded that, due to the successful completion of his mission to assassinate Dr. Ghassemlou, Mehdi Hadavi Moghaddam was assigned the task of preparing a plan for the assassination of Dr. Sharafkandi:

²³⁶ The Hostage Drama, *supra* note 226.

²³⁷ See *Rechtssache von Frau Helen Krulich Gegen die Republik Osterreich, Wien, 8-2-1991* [Lawsuit of Mrs. Helen Kurlich against the republic of Austria, Vienna, August 2, 1991], *LGSt Wien*.

²³⁸ During the Iran-Iraq war, Austria was involved in an arms scandal called “the Noricum Affair.” This affair revolved around the illegal sale of GHN-45 Cannons. Reportedly these transactions were concluded in Athens by Sahraroudi under the alias Rahimi. These facts have led some journalists and opposition politicians to suspect that the behavior of the Austrian authorities with regard to the Ghassemlou assassination was due to their wish to avoid provoking the IRI regime. See News – September 17, 1997, *supra* note 217 and *ESKORTE NACH TEHERAN supra* note 189.

²³⁹ See *Urteil des Oberlanesgerichtes Wien, 15 September 1992* [Vienna Applet Court Judgment, September 15 1992], 10. April 1997, *OLGSt Vienna, 1 Ob 28/92*.

²⁴⁰ The Tehran Connection, *supra* note 21.

²⁴¹ See IHRDC, *MURDER AT MYKONOS, supra* note 18 at 6.

²⁴² See *Mykonos Urteil* [Mykonos Judgment], *Urteil des Kammergerichts Berlin vom 10. April 1997* [Judgement of the Court of Appeal of Berlin on April 10, 1997], *OLGSt Berlin, (1) 2 StE 2/93 (19/93)*.

²⁴³ Mohammad Hadi Hadavi Moghaddam, an agent of the IRI Ministry of Intelligence was responsible for gathering information on Kurdish opposition groups who had contacts among the Kurdish diaspora. See IHRDC, *MURDER AT MYKONOS, supra* note 18 at 7; also see Witness statement of Abolghassem Mesbahi (witness C) on Sept. 26, 1996. *SYSTEM-I JINAYATKAR: ASNAD-I DADGAH-I MIKUNUS* [Criminal System: Documents of the Mykonos Trial] 173 and 178 (Mihran Payandih et al. trans. 2000).

The red line which connects the events in Vienna and Berlin is undeniable. It is inconceivable that [these events] can be traced back to conflicts between the Kurdish opposition groups.²⁴⁴

4.5. Kazem Rajavi



Dr. Kazem Rajavi, a former IRI Ambassador to the United Nations and the brother of the *Mujahedin-e Khalq* (MEK) leader, Massoud Rajavi, was shot dead in his car while driving home on April 24, 1990. He was hit by at least five bullets fired at close range from a machine gun.²⁴⁵

Dr. Rajavi was an active member of the MEK who frequently acted as the organization's representative before international bodies. He had been particularly engaged in the session of the UN Human Rights Commission held in February and March 1990,²⁴⁶ refuting a UN report claiming that the human rights situation in Iran was improving, and that torture and public executions had been halted.²⁴⁷ In January 1990, Iran's Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, Sirous Nasseri, reportedly warned Dr. Rajavi in front of witnesses: "We will kill you."²⁴⁸ He was murdered only a few weeks later.

Dr. Rajavi had moved back to Iran from exile in France in 1968 to campaign against the Shah's regime and put pressure on the Shah to commute the death sentence that had been passed against his brother Massoud, then a political prisoner of SAVAK, into life imprisonment.²⁴⁹ Rajavi also worked with other opposition groups, including those in the circle around Ayatollah Khomeini.

Dr. Rajavi received his appointment as the IRI's first Ambassador to the United Nations headquarters in Geneva in recognition of the role he had played in this period. He soon resigned this post in protest at the repressive policies of the post-revolutionary regime and sought political asylum in Switzerland.²⁵⁰ Rajavi taught at universities in Paris and Geneva and was the author of numerous books, both in Farsi and French, including *The Iranian Revolution and the Mujahedin* (1975), and *The Disintegration of Iranian Society and World Trade* (1987).

Shortly before noon on April 24, 1990, Rajavi was driving to his home in Tannay, a Geneva suburb. In nearby Coppet, his car was suddenly blocked by a Volkswagen Golf. A gunman in the Golf sprayed his windshield with bullets.²⁵¹ A second car drew alongside Rajavi's stationary vehicle and two men with guns jumped out. Rajavi was shot five times in the head and was killed instantly.²⁵²

The Volkswagen Golf used in the attack was soon found by local police abandoned at Geneva's Cointrin airport. The Swiss authorities delayed that afternoon's flight to Tehran for two hours, while

²⁴⁴ See generally Mykonos Urteil [Mykonos Judgment], Urteil des Kammergerichts Berlin vom 10. April 1997 [Judgement of the Court of Appeal of Berlin on April 10, 1997], OLGSt Berlin, (1) 2 StE 2/93 (19/93).

²⁴⁵ The Tehran Connection, *supra* note 21.

²⁴⁶ Farzan Hashemi, *Obituary: Kazem Rajavi*, THE INDEPENDENT, April 28, 1990.

²⁴⁷ Joseph Sobran, *Killings Continue; There are No Iranian Moderates*, TULSA WORLD, June 4, 1990.

²⁴⁸ *Id.*

²⁴⁹ Parliamentary Human Rights Group, Eric Aveybury and Robert Wilkinson, *Iran: State of Terror* 42 (1993).

²⁵⁰ "Ruthless Assassination of Dr. Kazem Rajavi," Remarks by Hon. Jim Bates in the House of Representatives, May 10, 1990, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/1990_cr/h900510-terror.htm (accessed March 24, 2008).

²⁵¹ The Tehran Connection, *supra* note 21.

²⁵² Safa Haeri and Ahmed Vahdatkhah, *Iraqi solution to Dr. Rajavi of Geneva*, THE INDEPENDENT, April 29, 1990. Jean-Patric Voudenay, *Enviados de la Muerte*, EL MUNDO, January 30, 1994, states that a sixth bullet hit his body.

they noted the identity of every passenger.²⁵³ The aircraft was eventually allowed to leave without any of the passengers being detained. The second car associated with the attack was not found immediately by police. American intelligence officers reportedly later relayed information obtained by an eavesdropping device to their Swiss colleagues, which led them to conclude that the second car was hidden somewhere on the premises of the diplomatic mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations in Geneva.²⁵⁴ This was not a lead the Swiss police were ever able to follow up.

News of the assassination was greeted by the clerical establishment in Iran with some satisfaction. The prominent conservative Hojjatolislam Mohsen Qara'ati reaffirmed the regime's duty to pursue its enemies throughout the world in a radio address delivered on April 25, 1990, and he endorsed the use of violence as a means of silencing dissent:

Catch them and execute them, because they are willing neither to become faithful nor to be quiet...This is not easy, of course, for it requires a harsh approach and killings.²⁵⁵

The Swiss investigation quickly identified two men as the suspected killers, Yadollah Samadi and Mohammad Rezvani,²⁵⁶ and concluded that at least eleven additional persons were involved in the planning and execution of the assassination. Two of these suspected co-conspirators were senior Iranian government officials: Hadi Najafabadi, a former ambassador to the United Arab Emirates, and Mehdi Akhundzadeh Basti.²⁵⁷ International arrest warrants were issued for all thirteen men on June 15, 1990.²⁵⁸ In a public statement issued on June 22, 1990, Roland Chatelain, the investigating magistrate, stated that "the police officers in charge of the investigation have collected evidence of various kinds to support the conclusion that one or more Iranian official services [were] directly involved in the assassination of Mr. Kazem Rajavi."²⁵⁹

Yadollah Samadi and Mohammad Rezvani had entered Switzerland on Iranian diplomatic passports and were thought to be affiliated with Iranian embassies in Europe. All thirteen individuals thought to be associated with the plot traveled on newly issued official Iranian government passports and listed the same building – 80 Karimkhan Street in Tehran – as their personal address.²⁶⁰ 80 Karimkhan Street is an office building reportedly used by both the Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry and the Ministry of Intelligence.²⁶¹ All thirteen traveled on sequentially issued Iran Air tickets. Furthermore, several of the suspects had previously visited Switzerland in October 1989 and January 1990. Investigators suspected that these visits were made to lay the groundwork for the attack.²⁶²

Iranian officials responded to the Swiss investigation with blanket denials. The Iranian office of Interpol responded to the international arrest warrant distributed by Chatelain by claiming that the thirteen suspects were most likely MEK members who had traveled to Switzerland from the group's

²⁵³ The Tehran Connection, *supra* note 21.

²⁵⁴ Jean-Patric Voudenay, *Enviados de la Muerte*, EL MUNDO, January 30, 1994.

²⁵⁵ Joseph Sobran, *Killings Continue; There are No Iranian Moderates*, TULSA WORLD (June 4, 1990). In what may have been a sophisticated public relations gambit, Iran helped negotiate the release of an American hostage held in Lebanon, Robert Polhill, immediately prior to the murder of Rajavi, successfully distracting the attention of the international media away from Rajavi's assassination. Instead of worldwide condemnation as a terrorist state, Iran received praise from Washington and elsewhere for its 'moderating' influence in securing the release of the American diplomat. Media attention did not return to Rajavi's death until later that summer. See also Evans and Novak, *Police Identify Suspected Killers of Kazem Rajavi*, MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC DIGEST, May 25, 1990; Jean-Patric Voudenay, *Enviados de la Muerte*, EL MUNDO, January 30, 1994.

²⁵⁶ Evans and Novak, *Police Identify Suspected Killers of Kazem Rajavi*, MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC DIGEST, May 25, 1990.

²⁵⁷ Jean-Patric Voudenay, *Enviados de la Muerte*, EL MUNDO, January 30, 1994.

²⁵⁸ The Tehran Connection, *supra* note 21.

²⁵⁹ Written Statement by the World Confederation of Labor to the UNHCHR, *Justice for Professor Kazem Radjavi* (February 17, 1994); Jean-Patric Voudenay, *Enviados de la Muerte*, EL MUNDO, January 30, 1994.

²⁶⁰ The Tehran Connection, *supra* note 21.

²⁶¹ Jean-Patric Voudenay, *Enviados de la Muerte*, EL MUNDO, January 30, 1994.

²⁶² *Id.*

base in Iraq, a claim met with incredulity by the Swiss Police.²⁶³ In June 1990, Dr. Rajavi's widow, Michelle Rajavi, visited the United States to petition the government to put pressure on Iran to surrender her husband's killers.²⁶⁴ She succeeded in persuading 162 U.S. Congressmen to write a letter to the Iranian government denouncing Dr. Rajavi's murder and stating that the Iranian government's involvement in his death proved that terrorism was still an "indispensable pillar" of Tehran's foreign policy.²⁶⁵ Tehran continued to stonewall inquiries into the murder.

In September 1990, the government of Iran filed charges in the Swiss courts against a staff reporter for *Law Suisse* newspaper, Myriam Gazut Godal, who had written an article published after the Rajavi assassination alleging that Iranian President Rafsanjani had "masterminded" the killing.²⁶⁶ The Iranian government complaint accused Godal of insulting a foreign head of state, an actionable offense under article 296 of the Swiss penal code. In July 1991, the Geneva Palais de Justice found that Ms. Godal had acted in good faith after the Prosecutor in the case confirmed that valid reasons existed to conclude that Tehran had been behind the murder. The Government of Iran was directed to pay the court costs associated with the trial and to contribute SF 5,000 toward Ms. Godal's legal fees.²⁶⁷

On November 15, 1992, two of the thirteen wanted fugitives in the Dr. Rajavi murder, Ahmad Taheri (a.k.a. Mahmoud Sajadian) and Mohsen Sharif Esfahani (a.k.a. Ali Kamali), were apprehended in Paris.²⁶⁸ Switzerland formally requested the extradition of both individuals on November 24. On February 10, 1993, the indictment division of the Court of Appeals in Paris handed down an opinion in favor of their extradition to Switzerland.²⁶⁹ However, on December 29, 1993, France unexpectedly deported the two men back to Iran.²⁷⁰ The decision not to comply with Switzerland's extradition request came from the office of the French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur who cited "reasons connected to our national interests" in justification of his actions.²⁷¹ The French move was widely condemned by western powers including the United States, Britain, and Switzerland. The Swiss charge d'affaires, Christian Dunant, delivered a diplomatic note protesting the deportations to the French Foreign Ministry, commenting to reporters that his government was "astonished at the behavior of France and regrets it very much."²⁷² The former Iranian President Abolhassan Banisadr, living in exile in Paris professed himself "shocked and indignant" over the decision.²⁷³

According to *The Times* of London, "informed sources" had told the newspaper that the French government had treated Iranian threats to launch terrorist attacks against French targets if the extradition went ahead "with great seriousness."²⁷⁴ In an editorial, *Le Monde* observed: "Appearing to cave in to the threat of terrorism is certainly not the best way to fight it."²⁷⁵ *Le Journal du Dimanche* commented similarly:

²⁶³ Jean-Patrick Voudenay, *Enviados de la Muerte*, EL MUNDO, January 30, 1994.

²⁶⁴ Evans and Novak, *Police Identify Suspected Killers of Kazem Rajavi*, MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC DIGEST, May 25, 1990.

²⁶⁵ George Lardner, Jr., *Lawmakers Rebuke Iran for Policy of Terrorism*, THE WASHINGTON POST, July 19, 1990.

²⁶⁶ Parliamentary Human Rights Group, Eric Aveybury and Robert Wilkinson, *Iran: State of Terror* 45 (1993).

²⁶⁷ *Id.* at 46.

²⁶⁸ Interim Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, prepared by the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights in accordance with Commission Resolution 1994/73 and Economic and Social Council Decision 1994/263, A/49/514, October 14, 1994.

²⁶⁹ *Id.*

²⁷⁰ Parliamentary Human Rights Group, Eric Aveybury and Robert Wilkinson, *Iran: State of Terror* 43 (1993).

²⁷¹ *Id.*

²⁷² Alan Riding, *France Sends 2 Murder Suspects Back to Iran, Stirring Wide Protest*, THE NEW YORK TIMES, January 4, 1994.

²⁷³ *Id.*

²⁷⁴ Charles Bremner, *Balladur accused of Appeasing Tehran over Terror Suspects*, THE TIMES, January 3, 1994.

²⁷⁵ Alan Riding, *France Sends 2 Murder Suspects Back to Iran, Stirring Wide Protest*, THE NEW YORK TIMES, January 4, 1994.

In the eyes of the world, France is giving the shameful impression of lying down under the threats of a terrorist state.²⁷⁶

No further judicial action was taken in relation to the case until April 2006, when the Swiss issued an international arrest warrant for the former Iranian Intelligence Minister Ali Fallahian. Jacques Antenen, the examining magistrate of the Canton of Vaud, where the murder took place, signed the document on March 20, 2006, for “worldwide circulation.” According to the newspaper *Le Matin*, the warrant stated that Fallahian “decided on and ordered the execution of” Dr. Rajavi.²⁷⁷

4.6. Dr. Cyrus Elahi

After the 1979 revolution, the Revolutionary Courts condemned Dr. Cyrus Elahi to death for collaborating with the Shah’s regime.²⁷⁸ Dr. Elahi was able to escape from Iran before he could be apprehended by the revolutionary authorities and became active in the Iranian opposition. On October 23, 1990, he was shot dead in the foyer of his residence in Paris.²⁷⁹

Although Dr. Elahi lived much of his life in the United States and was a naturalized American citizen, he had moved back to Iran in 1972 to take up a position as a professor at Tehran’s Melli University. In 1976, Dr. Elahi became an advisor to Iran’s Minister of Education, Dr. Manouchehr Ganji.²⁸⁰ This was the beginning of a long friendship between the two men, which continued into exile. Dr. Ganji has claimed that both their names were included in a list of 200 leading enemies of the Islamic Republic drawn up in 1979²⁸¹ and that religious *fatwas* were issued calling for their death.²⁸²



After fleeing Iran, Dr. Elahi returned to the United States, where he initially took up an academic position at Michigan State University. In 1980, he moved to Dallas to work with Dr. Ganji at the SECURE Foundation,²⁸³ a short-lived N.G.O. that pursued a variety of projects, including the construction of a model school in Bombay and promoting alternate fuel sources in Third World countries.²⁸⁴ In December 1986, he moved to Paris, France, to help Dr. Ganji establish the Flag of Freedom Organization (FFO).²⁸⁵ The FFO was an avowedly political opposition group that made no secret of its mission to “liberate Iran from the clerical regime.”²⁸⁶ Dr. Elahi acted as the organization’s second-in-command,²⁸⁷ and from 1986 until his death in 1990, he traveled the globe promoting the

²⁷⁶ Parliamentary Human Rights Group, Eric Aveybury and Robert Wilkinson, *Iran: State of Terror* 45 (1993).

²⁷⁷ *Switzerland seeks arrest of Iranian ex-minister for political killing*, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, April 9, 2006.

²⁷⁸ Office of the Public Prosecutor V. Mojtaba Mashhady, No. A 99/065888 M.L/E.F.- M.TH.L at 6 (Appellate Court of Paris,

²⁷⁹ Criminal Panel of the Court, February 11, 2000), (unanimous decision of Judges Bruno Waechter, Marguerite Laurent, Luc-Michel Nivose).

²⁸⁰ *Id.*

²⁸¹ *Dariush Elahi v. IRI and the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security*, 124 F. Supp. 2d 97, at 8 (December 20, 2000) [hereinafter ‘Elahi v. IRI’] exhibite 102, résumé of Manouchehr Ganji.

²⁸² Transcript of the Proceedings, at 280-282, *Dariush Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran and the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security*, 124 F. Supp. 2d 97 (DDC Nov 8, 2000) (No1: 99CV-02802) [hereinafter ‘Elahi Proceeding’]. *Also see* Elahi v. IRI, *supra* note 280 ¶ 13.

²⁸³ According to Manouchehr Ganji, *see* Elahi Proceeding, *supra* note 281 at 298.

²⁸⁴ SECURE stands for Socio-Economic and Cultural Upliftment and Rehabilitation. See MANOUCHEHR GANJI, *DEFYING THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION: FROM A MINISTER TO THE SHAH TO A LEADER OF RESISTANCE* 171 (2002).

²⁸⁵ Elahi Proceeding, *supra* note 281 at 289.

²⁸⁶ *Id.* at 293.

²⁸⁷ According to Manouchehr Ganji, *see* Elahi Proceeding, *supra* note 281 at 287.

²⁸⁸ *French free Elahi assassin*, THE IRAN BRIEF, MIDDLE EAST DATA PROJECT, November 8, 1999.

organization's cause and organizing its clandestine activities.²⁸⁸ He was also responsible for much of the group's propaganda campaign within Iran.

In October 1990, the French authorities received intelligence that led them to believe Dr. Ganji's life was in imminent danger.²⁸⁹ At the suggestion of the French authorities, Dr. Ganji left Paris and went into hiding in Egypt. However, Dr. Elahi remained in Paris. He was usually cautious about his personal security and rarely left his house alone²⁹⁰ or without his bulletproof briefcase,²⁹¹ which doubled as a shield.²⁹² But on the morning of October 23, 1990, Dr. Elahi was late for an appointment and he left his apartment without taking his regular security precautions.²⁹³

Dr. Elahi was attacked at about 9:00 a.m. in the entrance hall of his apartment building at 8 Rue Antoine Bourdelle in Paris' 15th arrondissement.²⁹⁴ There are no eyewitnesses to the murder itself but the physical evidence collected from the crime scene and the nature of the injuries suffered by Dr. Elahi led French police to conclude that he had struggled with his killer before succumbing to his injuries.²⁹⁵ The police found flesh and pieces of cloth under Elahi's fingernails²⁹⁶ and one witness mentioned that he saw an individual leaving the apartment building with blood on his jacket.²⁹⁷ Dr. Elahi was shot eight times – six times in the head and twice in the stomach. Ballistic tests identified the murder weapon as a Walther PP 7.65mm automatic pistol.²⁹⁸ The French authorities also concluded that the weapon's silencer was of the type that had been used in other assassinations of Iranian dissidents.²⁹⁹

The identity of Dr. Elahi's assassin has never been established, although French investigators were able to shed substantial light on the origins of the plot. On November 7, 1989, a surveillance operation mounted by the French Security Service, the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST), recorded a meeting between Ali Ghorbanifar,³⁰⁰ Iranian Ambassador to France, Ali Ahani, and Ali Anghuizi, the General Manager of Iran Air³⁰¹ at Paris' Orly Airport.³⁰² Later the same day, Ghorbanifar also met with

²⁸⁸ MANOUCHEHR GANJI, DEFYING THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION: FROM A MINISTER TO THE SHAH TO A LEADER OF RESISTANCE 195 (2002).

²⁸⁹ *Dariush Elahi v. The IRI and the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security*, No. 99-2808, 124 F. Supp. 2d 97, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19793, at 8 (December 20, 2000).

²⁹⁰ *Elahi v. IRI*, *supra* note 280 at 8.

²⁹¹ *Elahi Proceeding*, *supra* note 281 at 206.

²⁹² *Id.*

²⁹³ *Elahi v. IRI*, *supra* note 280 at 8.

²⁹⁴ *Office of the Public Prosecutor v. Mojtaba Mashhady*, No. A 99/065888 M.L/E.F.- M.TH.L. (Appellate Court of Paris, 2nd Criminal Panel of the Court February 11, 2000) at 4 (Unanimous decision of Judges Bruno Waechter, Marguerite Laurent, Luc-Michel Nivose).

²⁹⁵ *Elahi Proceeding*, *supra* note 281 at 139. According to Dariush Elahi, "My memory says it could have been for a period as much as three to four minutes that they were struggling before he was hit in the head twice. I remember that graphically in the police station." *Elahi Proceeding*, *supra* note 281 at 226.

²⁹⁶ *Elahi Proceeding*, *supra* note 281 at 138.

²⁹⁷ *Id.*

²⁹⁸ *Office of the Public Prosecutor v. Mojtaba Mashhady*, No. A 99/065888 M.L/E.F.- M.TH.L at 4 (Appellate Court of Paris, 2nd Criminal Panel of the Court, February 11, 2000), (unanimous decision of Judges Bruno Waechter, Marguerite Laurent, Luc-Michel Nivose).

²⁹⁹ *Elahi Proceeding*, *supra* note 281 at 132.

³⁰⁰ Ghorbanifar's brother, Manouchehr Ghorbanifar, is a well known Iranian arms dealer who was involved in the Iran-Contra scandal of the 1980s.

³⁰¹ The DST believed that Iran Air's General Director of Security in Paris, a man named Seyyed Reza Saberi, was in reality "a senior officer of the Ministry of Security and Intelligence [of Iran] whose specific role covers the assassination of dissidents in exile." The British authorities banned Saberi from the United Kingdom, citing his links to the Ministry of Intelligence. In May 1992, Mashhady approached the DST to see whether DST could find a way to allow Saberi, a former member of the Revolutionary Guard, to stay in France. *Elahi v. IRI*, *supra* note 280. See *Cour d'Appel de Paris, Requisitoire Definitif de Renvoi Devant Le Tribunal Correctionnel de Paris (Paris Applet Court, Public Prosecutor's Referral to the Criminal Court of Paris – Mashhady and Yazdenseta)* (April 5, 1996) [hereinafter *Prosecutor's Referral to the CC of Paris – Mashhady and Yazdenseta*] at 6.

Mojtaba Mashhady and a man known to the French authorities only as Bagher.³⁰³ On November 8, Ghorbanifar informed the DST that he “had been approached by the Iranian Intelligence Service to participate in an act of terrorist nature against the opponents of the Iranian regime.”³⁰⁴

After the November 7 meeting, Mashhady traveled to Tehran, and spent two weeks in Iran before returning to France on either November 21 or 22, 1989. According to Ghorbanifar, while in Iran, Mashhady had had meetings with the Minister of Intelligence, Ali Fallahian, and a man named Karimi. It was during these meetings that Mashhady was reportedly told that Dr. Manouchehr Ganji had been sentenced to death by an Islamic tribunal.³⁰⁵

Farhad Ghiasvand would later testify to the French authorities that he had been approached by Mashhady in Iran and that Mashhady had tried to recruit him to carry out the assassination of Iranian dissidents living in France.³⁰⁶ Mashhady told Ghiasvand about his meeting with Minister Fallahian and identified Dr. Cyrus Elahi as a potential target. He provided Ghiasvand with photographs of Dr. Elahi and with the target’s address in Paris.³⁰⁷ He also offered to provide Ghiasvand with a “gun equipped with a silencer”³⁰⁸ and to pay him \$40,000 to carry out the operation.³⁰⁹ Ghiasvand declined.

Once back in France, Mashhady turned to Ghorbanifar, offering to pay him to participate in the assassination of Dr. Ganji.³¹⁰ The DST learned of this offer and pressured Ghorbanifar to accept so that they could monitor Mashhady’s activities more closely.³¹¹ Ghorbanifar received an initial payment of \$1,000 from Mashhady with the promise of an additional \$100,000-\$200,000 on completion of the assignment.³¹² However, the case was disrupted when Ghorbanifar was incarcerated for an unrelated drug offense and was unable to participate any further in the DST’s operation. In December 1989, the DST received further intelligence identifying Mashhady as an employee of the Ministry of Intelligence but apparently still lacked sufficient grounds for an arrest.³¹³

In the aftermath of Dr. Elahi’s assassination, the DST stepped up its investigation of Mashhady. On February 21, 1991, the DST summoned Mashhady for the first of a series of interviews. During an interview on March 13, 1991, Mashhady denied that he had met Intelligence Minister Ali Fallahian but did admit to being in contact with Karimi and Bagher.³¹⁴ He even provided the DST with Karimi’s telephone number in Tehran.³¹⁵ In an interview conducted on July 2, 1991, Mashhady admitted that Karimi had asked him on two occasions (November 1989 and January 1990) to conduct preliminary investigations on four individuals based in Paris:³¹⁶ Cyrus Elahi, Shoja’eddin Shafa, Manouchehr Ganji, and Princess Ashraf Pahlavi. Although Mashhady initially denied that he had acted on this request,

³⁰² *In Matters: against Mojtaba Mashhady and other, Object: Minutes of the information on the activities and declaration of Mojtaba Mashhady*. Prepared by Jean Fancois Gayraud, Police Inspector attached to the Ministry of Interior’s Intelligence Service, November 14, 1994, [hereinafter *Minutes on the information on the activities and declaration of Mashhady*] at 89.

³⁰³ *Minutes on the information on the activities and declaration of Mashhady*, *supra* note 302 at 89.

³⁰⁴ *Id.*

³⁰⁵ *Id.* at 90. IHRDC recovered a copy of the Decree to Assassinate Manouchehr Ganji, signed by Prosecutor General of Iran, Hojjatolislam Mousavi Tabrizi [**Attached as Appendix 5**].

³⁰⁶ *Minutes on the information on the activities and declaration of Mashhady*, *supra* note 302 at 101.

³⁰⁷ *Prosecutor’s Referral to the CC of Paris – Mashhady and Yazdenseta*, *supra* note 301 at 8.

³⁰⁸ *Minutes on the information on the activities and declaration of Mashhady*, *supra* note 302 at 124.

³⁰⁹ *Minutes of Witness Testimony*, Gen Ref: 902993901/6, Ref. Cab: 1204, January 10, 1994 (Farhad Ghiasvand interviewed by Judge Bruguière) at 124.

³¹⁰ *Minutes on the information on the activities and declaration of Mashhady*, *supra* note 302 at 89.

³¹¹ *Prosecutor’s Referral to the CC of Paris – Mashhady and Yazdenseta*, *supra* note 301 at 7.

³¹² *Id.* at 7.

³¹³ *Minutes on the information on the activities and declaration of Mashhady*, *supra* note 302 at 90.

³¹⁴ *Id.* at 90.

³¹⁵ The phone number was 23 90 98 (a Tehran number). *Id.* at 91.

³¹⁶ *Minutes on the information on the activities and declaration of Mashhady*, *supra* note 302 at 91.

forensic examination of his Minitel terminal³¹⁷ confirmed that he had indeed conducted some research on Cyrus Elahi.³¹⁸ In April and May 1992, Mashhady offered to broker a meeting between the DST and the Ministry of Intelligence, further strengthening the French government's belief that he was indeed an intelligence agent.³¹⁹

The testimonies of Ghiasvand and Ghorbanifer do not stand alone. Six other witnesses – Ali Reza Ghanaee Miandoabad,³²⁰ Mohamed Amir Bakhtiar,³²¹ Emanian Shiraz,³²² Marie Christine Shiraz,³²³ Marine Line Paul,³²⁴ and Hossein Yazdenseta³²⁵ – all testified that Mashhady had told them himself that he was a member of the Iranian secret services.

Ali Miandoabad told French investigators that in December 1992, Mashhady, whom he had known for about thirty years, had asked him whether he would be willing to assassinate Shoja'eddin Shafa and Manouchehr Ganji.³²⁶ Miandoabad further testified that Mashhady had told him that Ali Ghorbanifar had agreed to kill Dr. Elahi but later reneged. This, Mashhady had said to Miandoabad, had forced the Ministry of Intelligence to send Iranian intelligence agents to Paris to carry out the assassination.³²⁷

Hossein Yazdenseta's testimony provided additional information. Under interrogation, Yazdenseta confessed to having been part of a plot to assassinate Iranian political dissidents in Paris. He attributed his involvement to Mashhady, who he said was in the employ of the Iranian secret services and dealt drugs on the side. In his testimony, Yazdenseta stated:

The Iranian service had entrusted to [Mashhady] this mission in Tehran ... What I know – namely what he had told me – is that in Tehran they gave him Elahi's address. I would like to add that he even had this address in his pocket on the day he was arrested in October 1990 ... With respect to Elahi's assassination, I cannot give you any other information than that I already gave to the police and which I had received from Mashhady himself. I know that the Iranians had given Mashhady a pistol equipped with a silencer that was originally in a wooden box. Mashhady would have given the weapon to his contacts, but I am unable to tell you when.³²⁸

On April 5, 1996, the Public Prosecutor's Office in Paris delivered indictments of "association with criminals linked to terrorist activities" against Mojtaba Mashhady and Hossein Yazdenseta.³²⁹ Both men were charged with "having in Paris, during 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, participated in a group or an understanding characterized by one or more concrete occurrences, including attempts to recruit accomplices, research and information gathering and conducting surveillance. The above-mentioned

³¹⁷ The Minitel is a French online service accessible through the telephone lines. It was launched in France in 1982 and is similar in many ways to the Internet.

³¹⁸ *Prosecutor's Referral to the CC of Paris – Mashhady and Yazdenseta*, supra note 301 at 5.

³¹⁹ *Minutes on the information on the activities and declaration of Mashhady*, supra note 304 at 92.

³²⁰ Ali Reza Hanaee Miandoabad interviewed by Loic Garnier, Police Prefecture Criminal Investigation Department Criminal Division Record, December 29, 1994, at 108.

³²¹ *Prosecutor's Referral to the CC of Paris – Mashhady and Yazdenseta*, supra note 301 at 8.

³²² *Id.*

³²³ *Id.*

³²⁴ *Id.*

³²⁵ Minutes of Witness Testimony of Hossein Yazdenseta interviewed by Judge Bruguière, Gen Ref: 902993901/6, Ref. Cab: 1204, December 22, 1994 at 104-105.

³²⁶ Ali Reza Hanaee Miandoabad interviewed by Loic Garnier, Police Prefecture Criminal Investigation Department Criminal Division Record, December 29, 1994, at 109.

³²⁷ *Id.*

³²⁸ Minutes of Witness Testimony of Hossein Yazdenseta (District Court of Paris, Chamber of J. Bruguière, January 21, 1994) at 97.

³²⁹ *Prosecutor's Referral to the CC of Paris – Mashhady and Yazdenseta*, supra note 301 at 1.

understanding was established with the view to participate in several crimes, in addition to which these actions were committed in connection with a terrorist organization.”³³⁰

Mashhady and Yazdenseta were tried before the Paris Supreme Criminal Court, and, in September 1996, they were convicted of conspiracy to commit terrorist acts, including the planned assassinations of Ganji and Elahi. Mashhady was sentenced to seven years imprisonment and Yazdenseta to three years imprisonment. These convictions were upheld by the French appellate courts.³³¹

Yazdenseta died in prison on September 26, 1998.³³² He was 38 years old at the time of his death. Mashhady served three years of his seven year sentence.³³³ He was released under judicial supervision on September 29, 1999.³³⁴ The next day, the Iranian embassy in Paris announced that President Hojjatoleslam Mohammed Khatami would visit France “before the year 2000,” and he did so three weeks later.³³⁵

Five months after Mashhady’s release, Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière, the investigating magistrate who had brought about the original charges against Mashhady, brought new charges against him. This time, on February 11, 2000, Mashhady was indicted and charged with “complicity in assassination in connection with an individual or collective undertaking with the aim of seriously disturbing the public order by intimidation.”³³⁶

This second trial was considerably undermined by the fact that Yazdenseta was no longer alive to testify. The presiding judge also found particular cause for concern in the manner in which the DST had handled the case, demanding of a government witness: “with all the contacts and connections you had, how is that you could not prevent the killings?”³³⁷ The witness responded: “I can’t answer all your questions. I’m an intelligence officer with heavy responsibilities. There are shadows I can’t talk about.” Citing the numerous unanswered questions raised during the trial, on June 29, 2001, the court acquitted Mashhady of these new charges.³³⁸

In addition to the criminal charges brought in France, Dr. Elahi’s brother, Dariush Elahi, filed a civil suit against the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and the Islamic Republic of Iran in the United States. The lawsuit was brought pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, as amended, 28 USC §§ 1602-1611, which grants “jurisdiction over foreign states and their officials and agents” in cases of “personal injury or death to American nationals resulting from state-sponsored terrorism.”³³⁹ The government of Iran was served notice of the case on February 20, 2000, but chose not to respond. Thus, on August 14, 2000, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia entered an order of default against the defendant.

³³⁰ *Id.* at 13-14.

³³¹ Elahi v. IRI, *supra* note 280 ¶ 26.

³³² Mashhady Indictment, No. A 99/06558 M.L./E.F.-M.TH.L., (CA Paris, 2nd ch., February 11, 2000) at 8.

³³³ *French free Elahi assassin*, THE IRAN BRIEF, MIDDLE EAST DATA PROJECT, November 8, 1999.

³³⁴ Mashhady Indictment, No. A 99/06558 M.L./E.F.-M.TH.L., (CA Paris, 2nd ch., February 11, 2000) at 7.

³³⁵ *Khatami to visit France*, Info-Prod Research (Middle East) Ltd., October 5, 1999.

³³⁶ Mashhady Indictment, No. A 99/06558 M.L./E.F.-M.TH.L., (CA Paris, 2nd ch., February 11, 2000) at 1.

³³⁷ Iranj Fatemi, *Confusion and Contradictions marked third session of Dr. Elahi’s court*, IRAN PRESS SERVICE, June 28, 2000, available at http://www.iran-press-service.com/articles_2001/jun_2001/elahi_court_28601.htm (accessed August 2, 2006).

³³⁸ Iranj Fatemi, *Paris Criminal Court cleared Mashhadi of charges in Elahi’s murder*, IRAN PRESS SERVICE, June 29, 2001, available at http://www.iran-press-service.com/articles_2001/jun_2001/elahi_court_ends_29601.htm (accessed August 2, 2006).

³³⁹ Elahi v. IRI, *supra* note 280 at 4.

The Court took note of the fact that “individuals implicated in the killing of Cyrus Elahi confirmed, under oath, to French authorities that the Minister for Intelligence, Ali Fallahian, was involved in ordering the killings of Iranian dissidents in Paris.”³⁴⁰ The Court also noted that, as mentioned above, “under interrogation, Mr. Yazdenseta confessed to having been part of a plot to assassinate Iranian political dissidents in Paris. Mr. Yazdenseta stated under oath to Judge Bruguière that Mr. Mashhady had stated that he had been entrusted in Tehran with the organization of the assassination of Cyrus Elahi.”³⁴¹

The Court further noted that “the evidence gathered by Judge Bruguière strongly indicates that the original plot, as conceived by the Ministry of Intelligence, was to assassinate a number of individuals opposed to the Tehran regime, including Dr. Elahi, Dr. Ganji, and others.”³⁴² The Court declared:

In addition to testimony obtained through the interrogation of Messrs. Mashhady, Yazdenseta, and Ghorbanifar, Judge Bruguière also obtained answers to written questions of a high-ranking Iranian defector, who had been detained by German authorities. This defector, Mr. Mesbahi, confirmed to Judge Bruguière that the assassination of Dr. Elahi was organized and executed by Iranian government officials.³⁴³

Thus, the Court concluded that “the murder of Dr. Elahi was an act of assassination undertaken and directed by agents of defendant Ministry of Intelligence at the behest of defendant Islamic Republic of Iran.”³⁴⁴ Labeling the murder as an “extrajudicial killing,”³⁴⁵ the Court awarded the Estate of Cyrus Elahi \$725,359 for loss of accretion and \$14,676 for funeral expenses.³⁴⁶ It awarded each of Dariush Elahi and Elham Elahi damages of \$5,000,000.³⁴⁷ Finally, the Court awarded the plaintiff \$1,000,000 in survival damages for pain and suffering and \$300,000,000 of punitive damages.³⁴⁸

In 2004, Dariush Elahi attempted to recover part of the damages awarded to him by seeking to attach the proceeds of an arbitration award the Iranian Ministry of Defense won against an American defense contractor, Cubic Defense Systems of San Diego, in a case that dated back to the 1970s. The Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Mr. Elahi’s favor.³⁴⁹ However, Mr. Elahi’s claim was challenged by the Government of Iran, and in 2006 the case was heard before the U.S. Supreme Court.³⁵⁰ The Supreme Court found that the Ninth Circuit had incorrectly defined the defendants (the Iranian Government and the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence) as an “agent or instrumentality” of the state of Iran, “rather than an integral part of the state itself,” which altered how the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act came into play, and thus overturned the ruling of the Ninth Circuit.³⁵¹

³⁴⁰ *Id.* at 6, exhibit 58 at 4, and exhibit 59 at 110.

³⁴¹ *Elahi v. IRI*, *supra* note 280 at ¶ 19.

³⁴² *Id.* at ¶ 24.

³⁴³ *Id.* at ¶ 25.

³⁴⁴ *Id.* at 26.

³⁴⁵ *Id.* at 11.

³⁴⁶ *Id.* at 13.

³⁴⁷ *Id.* at 14.

³⁴⁸ *Id.* at 15-16.

³⁴⁹ Kenneth Ofgang, *Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Rules: Stain Dissident’s Brother Can Attach Award to Iran’s Government*, METROPOLITAN NEWS-ENTERPRISE, October 8, 2004.

³⁵⁰ *Supreme Court of the United States, Ministry of Defense and Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Dariush Elahi on Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit*, No. 04-1095. Decided February 21, 2006.

³⁵¹ *In suit by private citizen to attach Iran’s Swiss arbitration award to satisfy default judgment in tort case against Iran, Supreme Court rules that Ninth Circuit erred in treating Iranian defense ministry as agent or instrumentality of foreign state under FSIA*, INTERNATIONAL LAW UPDATE- SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, VOL. 12, NO. 6, June 2006.

4.7. Dr. Shapour Bakhtiar

On August 8, 1991, Dr. Shapour Bakhtiar,³⁵² former Prime Minister of Iran, and his secretary, Soroush Katibeh,³⁵³ were found murdered in Dr. Bakhtiar's residence outside Paris, France.³⁵⁴ As the Head of the National Movement of the Iranian Resistance (NAMIR), Dr. Bakhtiar was seen as one of the principal rallying points for opposition to the Islamic Republic, and he had already survived two serious attempts on his life. Dr. Bakhtiar had been condemned to death *in absentia* by a Revolutionary Court for "sowing corruption on earth,"³⁵⁵ and the Magistrate of the Court, Ayatollah Sadegh Khalkhali, had publicly announced that any Iranian carrying out this sentence in a foreign country would be considered an agent of the court.³⁵⁶

³⁵² As opposition to Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's rule grew throughout 1978, the Shah finally turned to a moderate opposition figure, Dr. Shapour Bakhtiar, to form a government. Dr. Bakhtiar had been under-secretary of Labor in Prime Minister Mossadegh's government in 1951-53 and was arrested and imprisoned on several occasions in the 1960s by the Shah because of his political activities. He was the leader of the social democratic Iran Party, one of the oldest and most influential parties of the opposition National Front coalition. In October 1978 he had begun to speak out in favor of meeting the Shah halfway with the formation of an interim government. He opposed the decision of other constitutionalist leaders to align themselves publicly with Khomeini. Dr. Bakhtiar assumed the office of Prime Minister on January 3, 1979. Ayatollah Khomeini rejected the new government, declaring it illegal. In a letter read out in the mosques on 6 January, he equated obedience to Bakhtiar with "obedience to false gods." See *Musahibiyyih Imruz-i Doctor Sanjabi* [Dr. Sanjabi's Interview Today], ETELLA'AT, 19 Dey 1357, (January 9, 1979); *Bih Dunbal-i Davat-i Imam Khomeini, Jibhiyyih Milli Farda Ra ham Azayih Umumi Ilam Kard* [Following Imam Khomeini's invitation, The National Front Announced Tomorrow to be a National Mourning Day], ETELLA'AT, 17 Dey 1357 (January 7, 1979). Dr. Bakhtiar was also expelled from the National Front by the organization's Central Council. See MENASHRI *supra* note 8 at 64. On February 5, 1979, Khomeini moved to form a parallel government by appointing Mehdi Bazargan as the Prime Minister of the interim Islamic Revolutionary Government. Dr. Bakhtiar was left with little room for maneuver and few allies. On February 11, his government, and the Shah's regime, collapsed after the Supreme Military Council declared itself "neutral in the current political disputes ... in order to prevent further disorder and bloodshed." See *Artish 'Ilam-i Bitarafī Kard* [The Army Announced its Neutrality], KAYHAN, 22 Bahman 1357 (February 11, 1979). See also *Ingilab va Piruzi, Karnamih va Khatirat-i Salhayih 1357 va 1358* [REVOLUTION AND VICTORY, THE REPORT CARD AND MEMORIES OF 1979 - 1980] (Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Center for Publication of Culture of the Revolution) at 187; ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN, IRAN BETWEEN TWO REVOLUTIONS 529 (1982); LIFE OF THE AYATOLLAH *Supra* note 3 at 206. Dr. Bakhtiar was in the office for just thirty-seven days, during which time he had begun to institute a series of reforms intended to move the country toward a democratic constitutional monarchy. He had dissolved SAVAK, freed political prisoners, reopened the universities, granted freedom of the press and abolished censorship. See MENASHRI *supra* note 8 at 63-64. After his fall from power, Dr. Bakhtiar went into hiding, finally fleeing to France in July 1979. Upon his arrival in Paris, he publicly spoke out against the creation of an Islamic Republic, describing Ayatollah Khomeini as "ignorant, uncultured, narrow-minded and obstinate." See MENASHRI *supra* note 8 at 94. In mid-September 1979, he organized an anti-Khomeini rally in London, at which he declared that he would not abandon his struggle until Khomeini was removed from power. See MENASHRI *supra* note 8 at 94. Dr. Bakhtiar laid early claim to the leadership of the exiled opposition and set up a radio station in Iraq called Radio Iran, which he used to direct a stream of invective against Ayatollah Khomeini. He was careful to avoid being too closely associated with the royalist cause, although he continued to call for the restoration of a "Swedish-style" constitutional monarchy. See MENASHRI, *supra* note 8 at 143. In August 1980, Dr. Bakhtiar founded the National Movement of the Iranian Resistance (NAMIR) described by its members as a "broad-based coalition of Iranian people inside and outside the country, who are working for the end of Khomeini's tyrannical, theocratic regime and its replacement by a democratic government." National Movement of the Iranian Resistance was established in August of 1980 by Shapour Bakhtiar with the help of his friends, most notably Abdorrahman Boroumand. To read more about NAMIR, see About NAMIR, National Movement of the Iranian Resistance, available at <http://impact.users.netlink.co.uk/namir/namir1.htm> (accessed August 15, 2006); see also Dr. Boroumand's comments about NAMIR and its activities in About Abdorrahman Boroumand, available at http://www.abfiran.org/english/about_boroumand.php (accessed August 15, 2006).

³⁵³ No information is available regarding Soroush Katibeh.

³⁵⁴ *Extracts from the instruction relative to the double assassination of Shapour Bakhtiar and Soroush Katibeth*, Plaintiff's Exhibit 68. No. 1:01CV00850, at 3.

³⁵⁵ Also on May 14, 1979, Hojjatolislam Khalkhali in an interview with the Iranian newspaper *Kayhan*, proclaimed his intention to eliminate "the corrupters on earth." Declaring that "those who left Iran after the revolution were considered genuine criminals," and "incurred the death penalty," Ayatollah Khalkhali named Dr. Bakhtiar among the persons for which this remark was intended. [Emphasis from original]. *Extracts from the instruction relative to the double assassination of Shapour Bakhtiar and Soroush Katibeth*, Plaintiff's Exhibit 68. No. 1:01CV00850, at 3. See also KHALKHALI'S MEMOIR *supra* note 4 at 75.

³⁵⁶ KHALKHALI'S MEMOIR *Supra* note 4 at 75.



Dr. Shapour Bakhtiar

The first attempt on Dr. Bakhtiar's life was made on July 18, 1980, at Boulevard d'Inkerman, in Neuilly-Sur-Seine, a suburb of Paris, when a group of armed men attempted to storm the apartment in which he was living.³⁵⁷ The men successfully talked their way past French police officers stationed outside Dr. Bakhtiar's apartment building using forged Press credentials. They then shot dead the police officer on duty inside the building, Jean-Michel Jamme, who was responsible for screening visitors to Dr. Bakhtiar in more detail.³⁵⁸ Once upstairs, the group went first to the wrong apartment and Dr. Bakhtiar's neighbor, Ms. Yvonne Stein, was shot dead as soon as she opened her front door.³⁵⁹ Her sister was also wounded by the gunmen. Realizing their mistake, the men then tried unsuccessfully to force their way into the correct apartment.³⁶⁰ Thwarted in their objective, the gunmen tried to flee the scene but were intercepted by the police outside as they left the building. Another French police officer was severely wounded and paralyzed for life before the gunmen were subdued.³⁶¹

French police arrested five men in connection with the attack: Anis Naccache, Tateh Shadabi, Salahoddin Alkalre, Mohammad Abid and Mohammad Fouzi.³⁶² Tateh Shadabi was the only Iranian in the group; the apparent leader, Anis Naccache, was a Lebanese national from Beirut.³⁶³ The French authorities reportedly believed Naccache to be connected to an unidentified Palestinian intelligence organization³⁶⁴ and he subsequently admitted having been a member of Fatah before leaving in 1978 to set up his own 'resistance group.'³⁶⁵ A group calling itself *Pasdaran-i Islam*, Guardians of Islam, claimed responsibility for the assassination attempt.³⁶⁶

On July 19, 1980, the Iranian Embassy in Paris issued a statement by Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh distancing the government of Iran from the incident. The statement noted that the previously unknown *Pasdaran-i Islam* had no connection with Iran's Revolutionary Guards (*Pasdaran-i Inqilab-i Islamiyyih Iran*), and condemned attempts by the foreign media outlets to associate the Islamic Republic with such conspiracies.³⁶⁷ However, Ayatollah Khalkhali, Head of the Islamic

³⁵⁷ The apartment belonged to Dr. Abdorrahman Boroumand, a former member of the National Front Council who resigned following the expulsion of Bakhtiar, and another prominent critic of the clerical regime. Boroumand was murdered in Paris on April 18, 1991.

³⁵⁸ One Person's Story, *Mr. Jean-Michel Jamme*, OMID – a Memorial in Defense of Human Rights, available at www.abfiran.org/english/person-29125.php (accessed April 1, 2008).

³⁵⁹ One Person's Story, *Ms. Yvonne Stein*, OMID – a Memorial in Defense of Human Rights, available at www.abfiran.org/english/person-29124.php (accessed April 1, 2008).

³⁶⁰ *Id.*

³⁶¹ JEAN-YVES CHAPERON AND JEAN-NOËL TOURNIER, ENQUETE SUR L'ASSASSINAT DE CHAPOUR BAKHTIAR, at 14 (1997).

³⁶² *Izharat-i Ghotbzadeh Dar Rabitih Ba Hamliyyih Musalahanih Bih Bakhtiar* [Ghotbzadeh [Foreign Minister]'s Statement Regarding Armed Attack on Bakhtiar], ETTELLA'AT, 29 Tir 1359 (July 20, 1980).

³⁶³ *Pulis-i Faransih Mushakhasat-i Hamlih Kunadigan Bih Bakhtiyar Ra I'lam Kard* [French Police Release Information About Bakhtiar's Attackers], ETTELLA'AT (Tehran), No. 16194, Tir 29, 1359 (July 20, 1980).

³⁶⁴ *Id.*

³⁶⁵ See Robert Fisk, *Two faces of an unlikely assassin; Robert Fisk talks to a Tehran hitman who tells his story for the first time*, THE INDEPENDENT, October 27, 1991.

³⁶⁶ *Juz'iyat-i Hamliyyih Musalahanih Bih Khaniyyih Bakhtiar* [Details on Armed Attack to Bakhtiar's Home], ETTELLA'AT, 28 Tir 1359 (July 19, 1980). Also see, *Ittila'iyiyih Vizarat-i Umur-i Kharijih: Guruh-i Nashunakhtiyih 'Pasdaran-i Islam' Hich Irtibati Ba Pasdaran-i Inqilab Islamiyyih Iran Nadarad* [Announcement of the Foreign Ministry: The Unknown Group 'Pasdaran-i Islam' has no connection with *Pasdaran-i Inqilab-i Islamiyyih Iran* (Revolutionary Guards)], ETTELLA'AT, 29 Tir 1359 (July 20, 1980).

³⁶⁷ *Ittila'iyiyih Vizarat-i Umur-i Kharijih: Guruh-i Nashunakhtiyih 'Pasdaran-i Islam' Hich Irtibati Ba Pasdaran-i Inqilab Islamiyyih Iran Nadarad* [Announcement of the Foreign Ministry: The Unknown Group 'Pasdaran-i Islam' has no connection with *Pasdaran-i Inqilab-i Islamiyyih Iran* (Revolutionary Guards)], ETTELLA'AT, 29 Tir 1359 (July 20, 1980) and *Izharat-i Ghotbzadeh Dar Rabitih Ba Hamliyyih Musalahanih Bih Bakhtiar* [Ghotbzadeh [Foreign Minister]'s Statement Regarding Armed Attack on Bakhtiar], ETTELLA'AT, 29 Tir 1359 (July 20, 1980).

Revolutionary Tribunal, had previously told the French news magazine *L'Express*, in an interview published in June 1980 that Dr. Bakhtiar was on a blacklist and that a 'commando' unit had been assigned the responsibility of killing him.³⁶⁸ *Pasdarani Islam* issued a communiqué noting that Ayatollah Khomeini had issued a *fatwa* on the day after the Paris attack authorizing the execution of all those involved in the failed Nuzhah coup,³⁶⁹ an event with which Dr. Bakhtiar had been closely associated in Iran. The *fatwa* stated:

Those who followed the corrupt ideology of the Coup, their verdict is execution. There is no exception. No one has the right to pardon or exercise leniency.³⁷⁰

In an interview with the British journalist Robert Fisk in October 1991, Naccache acknowledged his role in the assassination attempt and explained his reasons for attacking Dr. Bakhtiar, which appeared to confirm Ayatollah Khomeini's statement to *L'Express*:³⁷¹

I had no personal feelings against Bakhtiar, it was purely political. He had been sentenced to death by the Iranian Revolutionary Tribunal [sic]. They sent five of us to execute him ... I came to have contacts with the Iranian opponents of the Shah in Beirut and Tyre. That's how I found myself involved in the Iranian revolution ... I became convinced that a revolution had to be safeguarded and protected ... With Bakhtiar, I felt there was a danger of a coup like the one against Mosadeq [sic]. That's why we decided to assassinate him. It was a sentence of death against him, to be carried out as an execution. Bakhtiar was the head of a plot to carry out a coup against the revolution and come back to Iran.³⁷²

Naccache was equally ambiguous in an interview with the French writer Jean-Yves Chaperon. When asked directly if he was officially charged with the mission to kill Dr. Bakhtiar, he replied obliquely:

I am not a soldier who is obeying orders. I wasn't obliged. I am Lebanese, I am a militant, I can say yes or I can say no, I can go back to my country. It was more that I was a volunteer for a mission that was close to my thoughts.³⁷³

Naccache and three of his accomplices were sentenced to life imprisonment on March 10, 1982.³⁷⁴ The fifth member of the group was sentenced to twenty years.³⁷⁵ However, all five men were pardoned by the French government and released on July 28, 1990. Naccache told Jean-Yves Chaperon that their release had been part of a 1988 deal with Iran to secure the release of three French hostages held by Shi'a militia groups in Lebanon:

The deal was made by Jacques Chirac, the then French Prime Minister, and Charles Pasqua, his interior minister. It was to be me and my four comrades in exchange for Kauffmann, Carton and Fontaine. There were both conservatives and socialists in power in France. It was Chirac who made the promise but only [President François] Mitterrand could issue an amnesty for us.

³⁶⁸ One Person's Story, *Mr. Jean-Michel Jamme*, OMID – a Memorial in Defense of Human Rights, available at www.abfiran.org/english/person-29125.php (accessed April 1, 2008).

³⁶⁹ See generally Mark Gasiorowski, *The Nuzhah Plot and Iranian Politics*, *International Journal of the Middle East Studies*, Vol. 34 (2002).

³⁷⁰ *Imam Fitvayih I'dam-i Tamam-i Hamrahan-i Kudita Ra Sadir Kard* [The Imam Issued an Execution Fatwa for Everyone Involved in the Coup], ETTELLA'AT, 29 Tir 1359 (July 20, 1980). [Attached as Appendix 4]

³⁷¹ Partly from *Two faces of an unlikely assassin; Robert Fisk talks to a Tehran hitman who tells his story for the first time*, THE INDEPENDENT, October 27, 1991.

³⁷² See Robert Fisk, *Two faces of an unlikely assassin; Robert Fisk talks to a Tehran hitman who tells his story for the first time*, THE INDEPENDENT, October 27, 1991 at 17; See also *Majarayi-i Tirur-i Bakhtiar Az Zaban-i Anis Naqash* [the Bakhtiar Terror as told by Anis Naccache], the interview with Bayan newspaper quoted by *Payam-i Iran*, November 17, 1991, in which he repeated that the killing of Bakhtiar was necessary for the Iranian revolution.

³⁷³ CHAPERON AND TOURNIER, *ENQUETE SUR L'ASSASSINAT DE CHAPOUR BAKHTIAR*, 17 (1997) [Translation by IHRDC].

³⁷⁴ Parliamentary Human Rights Group, Eric Avedury and Robert Wilkinson, *Iran: State of Terror* 37 (1993).

³⁷⁵ *Id.*

Mitterrand demanded an official request for our release from Chirac, which Chirac did not want to give. Each wanted the other to carry the responsibility.³⁷⁶

Naccache was released into the custody of the Iranian authorities and flown immediately to Tehran in the company of two officials from the Iranian Embassy in Paris.³⁷⁷ Financial reparations were also paid to the families of the two French citizens killed in the attack, but Naccache has refused to reveal whether or not this money came from the government of Iran.³⁷⁸ In 2007, Naccache was reported to be living in Iran and working as a businessman.³⁷⁹

A second attempt to assassinate Dr. Bakhtiar was hatched in 1989. On this occasion, an attempt was made by the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence to recruit one of Dr. Bakhtiar's own protégés, Fariborz Karimi,³⁸⁰ to poison the former Prime Minister. Karimi was approached by a former associate, Manouchehr Akasheh.³⁸¹ Akasheh had worked for NAMIR, first in Kuwait and then in Paris, where he and Karimi became good friends. In the fall of 1989, Akasheh asked Karimi to meet him in Germany.

Karimi discussed the invitation with Dr. Bakhtiar and the two men agreed that Karimi should meet with Akasheh to see what the latter wanted. Karimi traveled to Germany where he met with Akasheh and two other men whom he believes were Iranian Intelligence agents.³⁸² The two men claimed somewhat implausibly to be caviar salesmen.³⁸³ On the first day, Akasheh tried to persuade Karimi to return to Iran and speak out against Dr. Bakhtiar. On the second day, Akasheh suggested (after insisting that Karimi should swear on the Koran not to reveal the content of their conversation) that Karimi kill Dr. Bakhtiar.³⁸⁴ He said: "They are going to kill him. Someone will do it. If you want to make some money, you can do it. They offer \$600,000, a house in Tehran and anything else you want."³⁸⁵

On the third day, Karimi received a telephone call directly from Ali Fallahian, then still Mohammad Reyshahri's deputy at the Ministry of Intelligence, urging him to accept the assignment. Karimi was given a small vial half-filled with white powder and told "to mix it in Bakhtiar's vodka." Karimi told the *Los Angeles Times* in 1994, "[the recruiter] said: 'It is colorless. No one will know. They will think he had a stroke.'"³⁸⁶

Following Dr. Bakhtiar's advice to remain aloof and noncommittal, Karimi did not refuse the proposal outright.³⁸⁷ On his return from Germany, Karimi stayed in Dr. Bakhtiar's home for over a month before finally moving back into his Paris apartment. Shortly thereafter he received an anonymous phone call

³⁷⁶ CHAPERON AND TOURNIER, ENQUETE SUR L'ASSASSINAT DE CHAPOUR BAKHTIAR, 17 (1997) [Translation by IHRDC]. See also Martin Kramer, *Haggling over Hostages*, THE JERUSALEM REPORT, May 30, 1991.

³⁷⁷ Robert Fisk, *Two faces of an unlikely assassin; Robert Fisk talks to a Tehran hitman who tells his story for the first time*, THE INDEPENDENT, Oct. 27, 1991.

³⁷⁸ Robert Fisk, *Two faces of an unlikely assassin; Robert Fisk talks to a Tehran hitman who tells his story for the first time*, THE INDEPENDENT, Oct. 27, 1991.

³⁷⁹ *America's futile war*, SHANGHAI STAR, November 29, 2001, available at <http://app1.chinadaily.com.cn/star/2001/1129/cn8-1.html> (accessed April 17, 2007).

³⁸⁰ Karimi was born in 1961 to a politically active family. He lost his father and his uncle to the Islamic Republic of Iran and was himself arrested twice before fleeing to France. He had joined Mr. Bakhtiar's movement in 1984. Karimi was both director of the National Iranian Resistance Movement's youth organization and a member of its Executive Council. See *Translation of Judge Bruguière's report in the Bakhtiar murder case*, at 39-40 [on file with the IHRDC] and William C. Rempel, *Recruiting a Political Assassin: Iran's KGB-like Spies at Work*, THE LOS ANGELES TIMES, November 25, 1994.

³⁸¹ *Id.* According to pieces of information that could not be confirmed, Manouchehr Akasheh supposedly died of cancer in July or August 1992. See *Translation of Judge Bruguière's report in the Bakhtiar murder case*, at 39-40 [on file with the IHRDC].

³⁸² IHRDC statement of Fariborz Karimi, (July 1, 2006) [on file with IHRDC].

³⁸³ *Id.*

³⁸⁴ William C. Rempel, *Recruiting a Political Assassin: Iran's KGB-like Spies at Work*, LOS ANGELES TIMES, November 25, 1994; also IHRDC statement of Fariborz Karimi (July 1, 2006) [on file with IHRDC].

³⁸⁵ William C. Rempel, *Recruiting a Political Assassin: Iran's KGB-like Spies at Work*, LOS ANGELES TIMES, November 25, 1994; also IHRDC statement of Fariborz Karimi (July 1, 2006) [on file with IHRDC].

³⁸⁶ William C. Rempel, *Recruiting a Political Assassin: Iran's KGB-like Spies at Work*, LOS ANGELES TIMES, November 25, 1994.

³⁸⁷ *Id.* Dr. Bakhtiar advised Karimi that "whatever he proposes, don't say anything positive or negative." See also IHRDC statement of Fariborz Karimi (July 1, 2006) [on file with IHRDC].

instructing him to wait for a call from Hossein at a set time in a public phone near his home. Karimi did as he was instructed and took the call. He recognized Hossein's voice as being that of Hojjatoleslam Ali Fallahian. Fallahian pressed him to finish the job.³⁸⁸

Karimi had no intention of going through with the assassination and, fearing for his life, he publicly denounced Dr. Bakhtiar, and made attempts to distance himself from NAMIR. He then moved to London and attempted to drop out of sight, but Fallahian eventually tracked him down. Karimi fled to Canada and then the United States, where he was granted political asylum.³⁸⁹

The third attempt on Dr. Bakhtiar's life was successful, despite the fact that by 1991 he was protected by substantial security measures. Dr. Bakhtiar's home in Suresnes had been placed under 24-hour guard by France's elite police unit, the *Compagnies Republicaines de Sécurité* (CRS).³⁹⁰ The French police controlled all traffic into and out of Dr. Bakhtiar's house and recorded the names of all his visitors.

On August 6, at 5:00 p.m., Dr. Bakhtiar received an expected visit from Fereydoun Boyerahmadi,³⁹¹ who had arranged the meeting in order to introduce Dr. Bakhtiar to Mohammad Azadi and Ali Vakili Rad,³⁹² under the pretense that the two men had urgent information from Iran.³⁹³ The three men handed over their passports to the police guards and were searched³⁹⁴ before they entered the house. Once inside, they murdered Dr. Bakhtiar and his assistant, Soroush Katibeh.³⁹⁵

Dr. Bakhtiar was killed while Katibeh was making tea in another room.³⁹⁶ He was first stunned with a massive blow to his head that tore his vocal chords and knocked him unconscious.³⁹⁷ One of the killers then proceeded to suffocate him. Once dead, his throat and wrists were cut using a serrated bread knife from Dr. Bakhtiar's own kitchen. One side of Dr. Bakhtiar's throat was ripped completely open and he was stabbed in the chest multiple times. Considering the dullness of the knife and the depth and width of the wounds – in some cases, more than 2 inches long and 7 inches deep – the killers must have exerted a great deal of force.³⁹⁸ One of the killers sat on Dr. Bakhtiar's chest, breaking his rib cage. Soroush Katibeh was attacked as soon as he returned to the room. He was also suffocated and, once dead, was stabbed 13 times. The last thrust pierced his thigh and broke the knife, the tip of which was later found still embedded in his leg.³⁹⁹

³⁸⁸ IHRDC statement of Fariborz Karimi (July 1, 2006) [on file with IHRDC].

³⁸⁹ William C. Rempel, *Recruiting a Political Assassin: Iran's KGB-like Spies at Work*, THE LOS ANGELES TIMES, November 25, 1994.

³⁹⁰ Louise Lief, *Murder, they wrote: Iran's web of terror*, US NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Vol. 111, No. 25 (16 December 1991) [hereinafter *Murder, they wrote*].

³⁹¹ Boyerahmadi joined the National Movement of Iranian Resistance (NAMIR) and became a close associate of Dr. Bakhtiar sometime in 1984 and had been feeding information about him to Iranian intelligence since then. *Translation of Judge Bruguière's report in the Bakhtiar murder case*, at 3, and *Murder, they wrote, supra* note 390.

³⁹² Further investigation by Judge Bruguière established that the Iranian Civil Service allowed Azadi to have two passports under two different names: Mohammad Azadi and Naser Nourian. He had also a Turkish passport with Swiss visa under the name of Kaya. Ali Vakili Rad also had two passports with two different names: Ali Vakili Rad and Amir Kamal Hosseini. He had a Turkish passport with Swiss visa under the name of Kocer. *Translation of Judge Bruguière's report in the Bakhtiar murder case*, at 8 and 14.

³⁹³ *Murder, they wrote, supra* note 390. The CRS visitors' log revealed that the meeting was for one hour (between 5 and 6 p.m.). *Translation of Judge Bruguière's report in the Bakhtiar murder case*, at 1-2.

³⁹⁴ The French officer patted down the visitors and put a package carried by one of the visitors through the metal detector (the package contained a picture frame, a gift for Bakhtiar). *Translation of Judge Bruguière's report in the Bakhtiar murder case*, at 2.

³⁹⁵ See generally Transcript of Trial, *Rafii v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, 2004 U.S. Dist. (D.D.C., Nov. 04, 2002) (CA No. 01-850 CKK).

³⁹⁶ The Tehran Connection, *supra* note 21.

³⁹⁷ *Dar Dadgah-i Bakhtiyar – Procés Bakhtiyar* [IN BAKHTIAR'S COURT], (Pari Sekandari, Edition Pouya, 1995) [hereinafter 'IN BAKHTIAR'S COURT'] at 101.

³⁹⁸ *Id.* at 101.

³⁹⁹ *Id.* at 102.

The three assassins then collected their passports from the police control point without arousing the suspicions of the officers on duty,⁴⁰⁰ and left the crime scene in Boyerahmadi's BMW⁴⁰¹ which was later found abandoned on a Paris street.⁴⁰² The killers then changed out of their bloody clothes and dumped them together with their shredded passports in the Bois de Boulogne, where they were eventually discovered by a prostitute who had heard about the murders on the news.⁴⁰³ The bodies were not found for thirty-six hours, when Guy Bakhtiar (a local police officer and the son of the victim) finally returned home from a trip on August 8,⁴⁰⁴ at which point the bodies were already in the early stages of decomposition.⁴⁰⁵ With the discovery of the bodies, Boyerahmadi, Azadi and Vakili Rad, the last three visitors to enter the house, immediately became the lead suspects in one of the most intensive murder investigations in French history.⁴⁰⁶

Even before the murders had been discovered by Dr. Bakhtiar's son, there were several private inquiries and reports circulating in the Iranian community about the assassinations. On August 7, Davoud Abdollahi, Dr. Bakhtiar's accountant, received a phone call from his hometown of Shiraz, Iran, asking him to confirm rumors circulating in Iran that Dr. Bakhtiar was dead.⁴⁰⁷ Abdollahi replied that he did not think so, but when he tried to call Dr. Bakhtiar, there was no answer. Abdollahi then called Guy Bakhtiar, who replied that he had also had problems getting his father on the phone but thought it more probable that he was simply sick, or that the phone lines had been cut due to non-payment.⁴⁰⁸

The killers had difficulties as they tried to make their escape. While Boyerahmadi went into hiding in Paris, Azadi and Vakili Rad headed for Geneva.⁴⁰⁹ They were turned back from the border when the Swiss immigration police discovered the Swiss visas in the Turkish passports they were now traveling on were false.⁴¹⁰ Wandering through southern and eastern France, they tried to find a way into Switzerland. The killers made several desperate calls to an apartment in Istanbul⁴¹¹ that were intercepted by the U.S. National Security Agency and traced to the Iranian mission to the United Nations in Geneva.⁴¹² Finally, they split up and managed to enter Switzerland separately.⁴¹³ Azadi's wallet was found by police at a phone booth in Annecy,⁴¹⁴ resulting in police locating and arresting

⁴⁰⁰ Boyerahmadi collected the assassins' passports from the guards while the others, spattered with blood, waited in the house. Safa Haeri Paris, *Iranian ministers to face Bakhtiar charges*, SUNDAY TIMES, October 6, 1991.

⁴⁰¹ IN BAKHTIAR'S COURT, *supra* note 397 at 9.

⁴⁰² Erich Inciyan, *Suspected killers run rings round the police*, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WEEKLY, August 25 1991.

⁴⁰³ Terril Jones, *Police Let Go Suspected Assassins of Iranian Ex-Premier*, ASSOCIATED PRESS, August 13, 1991.

⁴⁰⁴ *Murder, they wrote, supra* note 390.

⁴⁰⁵ IN BAKHTIAR'S COURT, *supra* note 397 at 9.

⁴⁰⁶ *Id.* at 9; and *The Tehran Connection, supra* note 21.

⁴⁰⁷ *Witnesses link Bakhtiar murder to Tehran*, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, November 8, 1994.

⁴⁰⁸ CHAPERON AND TOURNIER, *ENQUETE SUR L'ASSASSINAT DE CHAPOUR BAKHTIAR*, 153-154 (1997) [Translation by IHRDC].

⁴⁰⁹ *Murder, they wrote, supra* note 390.

⁴¹⁰ *Id.* The two assassins were turned over to the French police by the Swiss authorities, but they were released soon afterward when it was established that their French visas were valid. Terril Jones, *Police Let Go Suspected Assassins of Iranian Ex-Premier*, ASSOCIATED PRESS, August 13, 1991. According to analysis of the intercepted phone calls made by Vakili Rad and Azadi, it was an Iranian-born Turkish citizen, Mesut Edipsoy, who provided them with false Turkish passports in the names of Ghahreman and Aydin. Before and after the murder of Dr. Bakhtiar, two Iranians involved in the plot called the Telecommunications Ministry several times from Edipsoy's apartment. Edipsoy and the two counterfeiters who had actually prepared the false passports were interrogated in Turkey; but before the French authorities had a chance to question them, they were released by the Turkish Government on September 6, 1991. IN BAKHTIAR'S COURT, *supra* note 397 at 13-25. *See also* One Person's Story, *Shapur Bakhtiar*, OMID – a Memorial in Defense of Human Rights, available at <http://www.abfiran.org/english/person-28402.php> (accessed August 15, 2006), citing *Liberation*, September 20, 1991.

⁴¹¹ Fereshteh Jahanbani (see *infra* note 424) believed that the reason the murderers were not able to get in touch with their contact was because the French police had not released the news of Bakhtiar's death, and so the contacts had not been alerted to the completion of the operation. IN BAKHTIAR'S COURT, *supra* note 397 at 141.

⁴¹² *Murder, they wrote, supra* note 390.

⁴¹³ *Id.*

⁴¹⁴ The wallet also contained a piece of paper with the phone number that Vakili Rad and Azadi had been trying to contact in Istanbul. Annecy is a small French town less than an hour's drive from Geneva.

Vakili Rad in Switzerland on August 21.⁴¹⁵ Azadi managed to escape due to the assistance of “at least two Iranian nationals⁴¹⁶ in Switzerland.”⁴¹⁷ Boyerahmadi also managed to evade arrest.

After a preliminary investigation conducted by the Paris Crime Squad, the Bakhtiar case was referred to Investigative Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière, who immediately began pursuing the killers and their accomplices. In his findings, Judge Bruguière uncovered a plot that had apparently been in development since May 1991. Since that time, various people, including Seyyed Massoud Hendi, Hossein Sheikh Attar, Gholam Hossein Shoorideh Shirazinejad, Zeinolabedine Sarhadi, and Naser Ghaseminejad had been working to enable Vakili Rad and Azadi to enter France and to exit without problem once the murder was committed. From these findings, Judge Bruguière was able to conclude that Iran had initiated the criminal acts that occurred in Suresnes.⁴¹⁸

The French Security Service (DST) established that Seyyed Masoud Hendi – a nephew of Ayatollah Khomeini – and a former representative of Iranian Television in Paris⁴¹⁹ had vouched for both Vakili Rad and Azadi on their French visa applications. Hendi regularly obtained French visas for Iranian agents through the intermediary of a French company called *Syfax*, and this is how he obtained the visas for Bakhtiar’s assassins. Hendi had previously come to the notice of the French authorities during the investigation of the murder of General Oveisi and his brother in 1984⁴²⁰ and during the 1982 trial of Anis Naccache, when he had been ejected from the court for chanting pro-Khomeini and anti-Bakhtiar slogans.⁴²¹ Hendi was arrested on September 17, 1991, at a hotel in Paris where he was staying with his family on vacation; four days later, he was indicted by Judge Bruguière. Following his indictment, Iranian state television issued a statement denouncing Hendi as a French agent, and claiming he was “no relation to Imam Khomeini or to his family.”⁴²² Hendi subsequently told French investigators that he had been instructed to help secure visas for Vakili Rad and Azadi by the Iranian Telecommunications Minister, Mohammad Gharazi.⁴²³

French Police also arrested Fereshteh Jahanbani in October 1991. Jahanbani was renting the apartment where Boyerahmadi hid after the killings and she admitted to collaborating with the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence. The police found codes, a special pen and invisible ink in her apartment. She identified Amirolah Teimoury, Chief of Security at the Iran Air office in Paris’ Orly Airport, as her superior.⁴²⁴ This position had long been associated with the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence by the French authorities (see section 4.6).

Hossein Sheikh Attar, a member of the Iranian Ministry of Telecommunications,⁴²⁵ used his contacts to obtain false visas for Vakili Rad and Azadi to enter France under the aliases Norian and Kamal

⁴¹⁵ *Murder, they wrote*, *supra* note 390. Vakili Rad was subsequently extradited to France.

⁴¹⁶ Zeynolabedine Sarhadi and Naser Ghaseminejad, see *Translation of Judge Bruguière’s report in the Bakhtiar murder case*, at 13.

⁴¹⁷ *Id.* at 10, 12.

⁴¹⁸ *Id.* at 15.

⁴¹⁹ *Iranian Intelligence Killed Bakhtiar*, MEDNEWS – MIDDLE EAST DEFENSE NEWS, September 30, 1991.

⁴²⁰ *Id.*

⁴²¹ *Id.* During Anis Naccache’s trial in 1982, Hendi yelled three times and chanted pro Khomeini and anti-Bakhtiar slogans, until the judge dismissed him from the court. IN BAKHTIAR’S COURT, *supra* note 397 at 52.

⁴²² *Iranian Intelligence Killed Bakhtiar*, MEDNEWS- MIDDLE EAST DEFENSE NEWS, September 30, 1991.

⁴²³ Parliamentary Human Rights Group, Eric Avebury and Robert Wilkinson, *Iran: State of Terror* 36 (1993). Gharazi’s name would also surface in connection with the murder of Mohammad Naghdi (see below).

⁴²⁴ One Person’s Story, *Shapur Bakhtiar*, OMID – a Memorial in Defense of Human Rights, available at <http://www.abfiran.org/english/person-28402.php> (accessed August 15, 2006), citing Liberation, October 25, 1991.

⁴²⁵ Sheikh Attar was the technical adviser for the Satellite Communication Program to the Iranian Ministry of Telecommunications, which is known for its close connections to Iranian Special Services. One Person’s Story, *Shapur Bakhtiar*, OMID – a Memorial in Defense of Human Rights, available at <http://www.abfiran.org/english/person-28402.php> (accessed August 15, 2006), citing Le Figaro, April 22, 1993.

Hosseini.⁴²⁶ On October 22, 1991, Judge Bruguière issued an international arrest warrant for Attar as “an accomplice in murder and criminal conspiracy in connection with a terrorist action.”⁴²⁷

Judge Bruguière also identified Gholam Hossein Shoorideh Shirazinejad and Nasser Ghaseminejad as having facilitated the Swiss end of the operation.⁴²⁸ Shirazinejad had asked Mr. Siegrist, Chairman of the Comatra Company, to request invitations into Switzerland for two people, one of whom was Ghaseminejad.⁴²⁹ Nasser Ghaseminejad was identified by Bruguière as an official of Iranian Intelligence. Ghaseminejad had awaited the assassins in Geneva in order to assist their escape back to Iran. On August 13, 1991, Azadi checked into the same hotel as Ghaseminejad.⁴³⁰

Zeinolabedine Sarhadi, the great-nephew of Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani,⁴³¹ was identified by investigators as having made hotel reservations for Vakili Rad and Azadi in Switzerland. Sarhadi arrived in Switzerland on August 13, 1991, allegedly to work as an archivist in the Iranian embassy in Bern.⁴³² According to Judge Bruguière’s report, his real mission was to help Dr. Bakhtiar’s murderers escape.⁴³³ Sarhadi’s orders were issued on July 16, 1991, on the authority of Ali Akbar Velayati, the Iranian Foreign Minister.⁴³⁴ Sarhadi was arrested in Bern on December 23, 1991, on an international arrest warrant and was subsequently extradited to France.⁴³⁵ At the time of his arrest, Sarhadi was in possession of several incriminating documents, demonstrating his access to and support from Iranian agencies to facilitate logistical arrangements for the Bakhtiar mission.⁴³⁶ He was indicted in connection with the Bakhtiar murder by the French authorities on May 26, 1992.⁴³⁷ On April 21, 1993, Judge Bruguière issued an arrest warrant for Shirazinejad and Ghaseminejad.⁴³⁸

Ali Vakili Rad, Seyed Massoud Hendi and Zeinolabedine Sarhadi were all tried by the Special Criminal Court of Paris (*la Cour d’Assises Speciales*)⁴³⁹ from November 2 through December 6, 1994.⁴⁴⁰ Vakili Rad was sentenced to life imprisonment, without any possibility of conditional release for a period of 18 years, for having murdered Mr. Bakhtiar and Mr. Katibeh together with Mohammad Azadi and Fereydoun Boyerahmadi.⁴⁴¹ Vakili Rad was identified in court as one Kowsari, a senior member of the Ministry of Intelligence, who had previously worked in the Security Office of the Revolutionary Guards and was attached to the Quds Force at the time of the murders.⁴⁴² Seyed Massoud Hendi was sentenced

⁴²⁶ Translation of Judge Bruguière’s report in the Bakhtiar murder case, at 16.

⁴²⁷ U.N. ESCOR, 50th Sess., Item 12, at para 63, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/50 (1995). See also Parliamentary Human Rights Group, Eric Avebury and Robert Wilkinson, *Iran: State of Terror* 38 (1993).

⁴²⁸ Translation of Judge Bruguière’s report in the Bakhtiar murder case, at 31, 32.

⁴²⁹ IN BAKHTIAR’S COURT, *supra* note 397 at 16.

⁴³⁰ *Id.* at 15.

⁴³¹ Alan Riding, *3 Iranians Go on Trial in France in Slaying of Exiled Ex-Premier*, THE NEW YORK TIMES, November 3, 1994

⁴³² One Person’s Story, *Shapur Bakhtiar*, OMID – a Memorial in Defense of Human Rights, available at <http://www.abfiran.org/english/person-28402.php> (accessed August 15, 2006), citing Liberation, October 4, 1991.

⁴³³ Translation of Judge Bruguière’s report in the Bakhtiar murder case, at 37.

⁴³⁴ See *Id.* citing Le Monde, October 26, 1991.

⁴³⁵ Translation of Judge Bruguière’s report in the Bakhtiar murder case, at 32.

⁴³⁶ *Id.* These documents included papers from the Iranian government regarding his trip to Switzerland.

⁴³⁷ *Id.*

⁴³⁸ One Person’s Story, *Shapur Bakhtiar*, OMID – a Memorial in Defense of Human Rights, available at <http://www.abfiran.org/english/person-28402.php> (accessed August 15, 2006), citing Le Figaro, April 22, 1993.

⁴³⁹ The court was chaired by Eve Jacoub, the prominent French Judge and Mr. Jacque Mouton was the Prosecutor. Because the case dealt with a terrorist act, the jury was comprised not of ordinary citizens, but of seven high-ranking professional judges. Two of the accused, Zeinolabedine Sarhadi and Ali Vakili Rad, did not know French, so Dr. Ruhollah Abbasi and Mr. Rezvani acted as translators. IN BAKHTIAR’S COURT, *supra* note 397 at 5.

⁴⁴⁰ One Person’s Story, *Shapur Bakhtiar*, OMID – a Memorial in Defense of Human Rights, available at <http://www.abfiran.org/english/person-28402.php> (accessed August 15, 2006).

⁴⁴¹ U.N. ESCOR, 51st Sess., Item 12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/55 (January, 16 1995), Report on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran prepared by the Special Representative of the Commission, Mr. Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1994/73 and Economic and Social Council decision 1994/263, paragraph 27. See also Translation of Judge Bruguière’s report in the Bakhtiar murder case, at 40.

⁴⁴² IN BAKHTIAR’S COURT, *supra* note 397 at 22.

to ten years imprisonment, without possibility of conditional release for a period equivalent to two-thirds of the sentence (six years, eight months) for assisting Bakhtiar's murderers to enter France.⁴⁴³ Hendi was released in August 1998 having served part of his sentence on remand. Zeinolabedine Sarhadi was acquitted and expelled from France, possibly due to pressure exerted by Iran.⁴⁴⁴

Fereydoun Boyerahmadi and Mohammad Azadi remain at large.⁴⁴⁵ The two men were tried *in absentia* along with Hossein Sheikh Attar, Gholam Hossein Shoorideh Shirazinejad and Nasser Ghaseminejad, found guilty, and sentenced to life imprisonment on June 16, 1995.⁴⁴⁶ Azadi was identified during the 1994 trial as a former high-ranking intelligence officer in the Revolutionary Guards who had later been transferred to the Quds Force and entrusted with terrorist activities outside of Iran. He was also identified as Ali Vakili Rad's superior.⁴⁴⁷ Commenting on the case to the American journalist Thomas Sanction in March 1994, a French official observed:

The whole Iranian state apparatus is at the service of these operations. The government assumes the legitimacy of killing opponents anywhere in the world.⁴⁴⁸

4.8. Mohammad Hossein Naghdi

Mohammad Hossein Naghdi had been appointed as the Islamic Republic's Chargé d'affaires in Rome in the immediate aftermath of the Islamic Revolution but resigned his position in 1981 in protest at the human rights violations committed by the new regime.⁴⁴⁹ Naghdi joined the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) and was appointed as the group's representative in Italy.⁴⁵⁰ He had enjoyed considerable success in raising the profile of the NCRI in Italy, gaining official recognition for the organization and coordinating a statement released by 377 Italian deputies expressing support for the "Iranian resistance."⁴⁵¹

Naghdi had been considered a potential target since the assassination of Dr. Rajavi in Geneva and had been assigned a close protection detail by the Italian authorities.⁴⁵² On March 2, 1993, this protection was upgraded after the Italian Security Service, SISDE, received intelligence suggesting that a specific threat existed.⁴⁵³



At 9:30 a.m. on March 16, 1993, as Naghdi's car slowed to enter the street on which his office was located, a pedestrian fired two shots at Naghdi, wounding him fatally in the neck and head.⁴⁵⁴ Naghdi's

⁴⁴³ U.N. ESCOR, 51st Sess., Item 12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/55 (January, 16 1995).

⁴⁴⁴ Paul Taylor, *Tehran's Shadow Looms Over Bakhtiar Murder Trial*, REUTERS NEWS, November 2, 1994. See also U.N. ESCOR, 51st Sess., Item 12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/55 (January, 16 1995).

⁴⁴⁵ "Findings regarding the Iranian State Terrorism." Excerpts from the German *Bundeskriminalamt* [BKA] (Federal Office of Criminal Investigation) Report at 4-5. (Translated from German) (On file with the IHRDC).

⁴⁴⁶ One Person's Story, *Shapur Bakhtiar*, OMID – a Memorial in Defense of Human Rights, available at <http://www.abfiran.org/english/person-28402.php> (accessed August 15, 2006).

⁴⁴⁷ IN BAKHTIAR'S COURT, *supra* note 397 at 23.

⁴⁴⁸ The Tehran Connection, *supra* note 21.

⁴⁴⁹ Parliamentary Human Rights Group, Eric Aveybury and Robert Wilkinson, *Iran: State of Terror* 25 (1993).

⁴⁵⁰ Final report on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran prepared by the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights, Mr. Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, pursuant to Commission resolution 1993/62 of 10 March 1993 and Economic and Social Council decision 1993/273, E/CN.4/1994/50, February 2, 1994, at 43.

⁴⁵¹ Parliamentary Human Rights Group, Eric Aveybury and Robert Wilkinson, *Iran: State of Terror* 27-28 (1993).

⁴⁵² *Id.* at 26.

⁴⁵³ Final report on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran prepared by the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights, Mr. Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, pursuant to Commission resolution 1993/62 of 10 March 1993 and Economic and Social Council decision 1993/273, E/CN.4/1994/50, February 2, 1994 at 43.

bodyguards, following in the car behind, were powerless to prevent the attack and the assassin was able to escape the scene without being apprehended. The Italian police received an anonymous tip-off on the afternoon of the killing, which led to the recovery of the murder weapon, a *Skorpio* machine pistol, as well as two clips of ammunition and a silencer.⁴⁵⁵

In June 1996, the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group published a transcript of a tape recording of a telephone conversation between Mohammad Karim Nasser Saraf, a senior official in the Iranian Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone, and an unnamed Iranian Foreign Ministry official that took place shortly after Naghdi's assassination:

Saraf: The Haji [Telecoms Minister Mohammad Gharazi] himself was happy with the outcome. He said that they have discovered the right methods. They strike and these guys strike back. Meanwhile the Haji said the man [Naghdi] had gained a lot of prestige over there. He was gradually taking the place of that Kazem [Dr. Kazem Rajavi]...

Foreign Ministry official: ...and concerning what you said on the Haji remarks. I agree with that completely. That is true, he was substituting for Kazem [Dr. Rajavi]. Recently he [was talking about] such issues as the arms sales by a number of these Italian firms. Add to this his meetings in the parliament, etc. You know, some of these parliamentarians have asked this government to recall Italy's ambassador from Iran and to sever relations with Iran.

Saraf: Yes, you heard about it too? Yes, that shows how far they had penetrated in these places.

Foreign Ministry official: If it was not effective they would not have investigated so much?

Saraf: Of course not. By the way, do you know whether the folks who carried out this act have returned or have they remained there?

Foreign Ministry official: That I don't know because the holiday arrived and our people scattered.

Saraf: Had they informed our Majid [presumably Majid Hedayat-Zadeh, the Iranian Ambassador in Rome] before that?

Foreign Ministry official: I have not talked to Majid, I have not reached him yet, but I'll try to... So the Haji said it was Fallahian [Ali Fallahian, Minister of Intelligence] or Rezai [Major General Mohsen Rezai, Commander of the Revolutionary Guards]?

Saraf: Considering my phone conversation with the Haji, I think it was the former. I think Majid knows that well, but perhaps he could not specify that over the phone ...⁴⁵⁶

When asked by reporters about Naghdi's assassination, Iranian Interior Minister Abdollah Nouri commented:

Are these types of people terrorists or not? And if someone takes action against such terrorists, does that mean they are terrorists? I don't think so.⁴⁵⁷

When formally confronted about the Interior Minister's comments by the Special Representative of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Mr. Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, the Iranian government responded with a rather halfhearted retraction:

⁴⁵⁴ Final report on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran prepared by the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights, Mr. Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, pursuant to Commission resolution 1993/62 of 10 March 1993 and Economic and Social Council decision 1993/273, E/CN.4/1994/50, February 2, 1994 at 43.

⁴⁵⁵ *Id.*

⁴⁵⁶ Parliamentary Human Rights Group, Eric Aveybury and Robert Wilkinson, *Iran: State of Terror* 26-27 (1993).

⁴⁵⁷ Chris Hedges, *Isolation and Internal Unrest Trouble Iran*, THE NEW YORK TIMES, 22 June 1993.

Mr. Nouri... states that the sentences quoted are distortions of statements he made. He asserts that even though violence should not be answered with violence, those who have tainted their hands with the blood of innocent people, committed unconscionable crimes and engaged in terrorism, would one day encounter terrorism of their own kind.⁴⁵⁸

The Iranian government went on to suggest that Naghdi had been murdered by elements within the *Mujahedin-e Khalq* with whom he was allegedly at odds over the latter's collaboration with the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein. The official response further speculated that the MEK might have deliberately framed the attack to cast suspicion on the Iranian government and undermine Iran's relations with European countries.⁴⁵⁹

4.9. Dr. Reza Mazlouman

On May 27, 1996, Dr. Reza Mazlouman,⁴⁶⁰ a former professor of criminology at Tehran University who served in the Ministry of Education under the Shah, was shot and killed in his apartment in the Paris suburb of Creteil. Dr. Mazlouman was the deputy leader of the opposition Flag of Freedom Organization (FFO) and the editor of a bimonthly journal called *Payam-i Ma Azadegan* (Message of the Freeman).⁴⁶¹ He was, to the best of the IHRDC's knowledge, the last member of the Iranian opposition to be assassinated outside the territory of Iran and Iraq. According to the French authorities, he had been forced to flee from Iran in 1982 after being "condemned to death by Khomeini's regime."⁴⁶²



On the afternoon of May 27, 1996, Dr. Mazlouman received two unexpected visitors at his Paris apartment: Ahmad Jayhouni and another man identified by Jayhouni as his nephew.⁴⁶³ Jayhouni was an Iranian businessman based in Bonn⁴⁶⁴ who had first contacted Mazlouman three years beforehand, presenting himself as a dissident subscribing to the journal *Payam-i Ma Azadegan*. He had subsequently visited Dr. Mazlouman once or

⁴⁵⁸ Final report on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran prepared by the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights, Mr. Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, pursuant to Commission resolution 1993/62 of 10 March 1993 and Economic and Social Council decision 1993/273, E/CN.4/1994/50, February 2, 1994 at 43.

⁴⁵⁹ *Id.*

⁴⁶⁰ Mazlouman was born in Mashhad, Iran, on January 8, 1936. He received his B.A. in literature from University of Tabriz on 1959, and completed his doctoral degree in criminology in 1969 in Paris, France. His doctoral research on the roots of crime in Muslim countries became the basis of his various books about Islam. In 1974, he became the head of the Financial Department of the Ministry of Higher Education in Iran, and in 1976, he was hired as a deputy to the Minister of Education, Dr. Manouchehr Ganji. Mazlouman kept that position until a month before the Islamic revolution. His biography is available at <http://www.derafsh-kavivani.com/english/aryamanesheng.html> (accessed April 13, 2007). In exile, Dr. Mazlouman frequently used the alias Dr. Kourosch Ariyamanesh. See Iran Press Service, *Alleged Iranian Intelligence Officer sentenced to 17 Years in Paris*, June 23, 2001, available at http://www.iran-press-service.com/articles_2001/jun_2001/jayhooni_sentenced_23601.htm (accessed April 1, 2008).

⁴⁶¹ Press Release, Reporters without Borders, *RSF a demandé à se constituer partie civile dans le procès d'Ahmad Jayhooni* [RSF has requested to be a civil party in the trial of Ahmad Jayhooni] (June 22, 2001), available at <http://www.ifex.org/en/content/view/full/13864> (accessed April 1, 2008); see also Ordonnance, *infra* note 481 at 5.

⁴⁶² Ordonnance de transmission du dossier et des pieces a conviction au procurer general [Order of transmission of file and exhibits to general prosecutor] Tribunal de Grande Instance, Cabinet de Jean-Louis Bruguière, Parquet No. P9615039023, Cabinet No. 1293 [hereinafter 'Ordonnance'] at 7. See also *See also, Dadsitan-i Inqilabiyeh Artish, Ittihat-i 8 Saltanat Talab Ra I'lam Kard* [The Revolutionary Prosecutor of the Special Court of the Armed Forces Announced the Accusations of 8 Royalists], ETELLA'AT, 25 Aban 1361 (November 16, 1982) noting that Mazlouman was anti-Islam and anti-Koran and was against the IRI, so he was subject to prosecution and therefore left Iran illegally.

⁴⁶³ Ordonnance, *supra* note 462 at 8.

⁴⁶⁴ Iran Press Service, *Court Told Iranian Agents Killed Dr. Reza Mazlouman*, available at http://www.iran-press-service.com/articles_2001/jun_2001/jayhooni_trial_20601.htm (accessed July 18, 2005).

twice a year.⁴⁶⁵ Police later found letters from Jayhouni among Dr. Mazlouman's belongings, discussing the possibility of Jayhouni joining the Flag of Freedom Organization (FFO) and the struggle against the Iranian regime.⁴⁶⁶

A witness, Mme. Anne Sourdeau de Beauregard, who was present when the two men called, later commented that Dr. Mazlouman had seemed annoyed by their unexpected arrival,⁴⁶⁷ because he had been hoping to concentrate on his work. Mme. de Beauregard reported that the men asked if they could stay with Dr. Mazlouman for the night and he had agreed. Jayhouni and his companion then left, saying that they would return in half an hour.⁴⁶⁸ Mme. de Beauregard went home to her apartment before they returned.⁴⁶⁹

Dr. Mazlouman's body was discovered by Mme. de Beauregard at around 1:00 p.m. the following day.⁴⁷⁰ Two bullets had been shot from close range into his chest and another into his head.⁴⁷¹ Mme. de Beauregard called the police, and told them about Dr. Mazlouman's house guests. She identified Jayhouni and tried to help a police artist compile a sketch of his "nephew."⁴⁷² Evidence found at the scene of the crime indicated that there had been no forced entry to the apartment and that Dr. Mazlouman had smoked cigarettes and drank alcohol with his guests before he was killed.⁴⁷³

Neighbors who lived down the hall from Mazlouman's apartment described hearing shots around 10 p.m. on the night of May 27. One person stated that he distinctly heard three shots; two close together and the third several seconds later. Another said that after the shots, he heard hurried steps in the stairwell. A third said that after the shots, he heard the rapid footsteps of two people.⁴⁷⁴ One witness recalled seeing a white BMW parked in the basement of the apartment building drive off around 10 p.m., and another reported seeing a young man running out of the building around the same time.⁴⁷⁵

The French police immediately opened an investigation into the murder. The German police, acting on a request from their French counterparts, detained Jayhouni for questioning and he, while denying involvement in the crime, admitted that he had visited Dr. Mazlouman on the day in question.⁴⁷⁶ He was extradited to France on May 30, 1996.⁴⁷⁷

Jayhouni's intention appears to have been to develop a relationship with the Head of the Flag of Freedom Organization, Dr. Manouchehr Ganji.⁴⁷⁸ Jayhouni attempted at first to befriend Dr. Ganji by

⁴⁶⁵ Ordonnance, *supra* note 462 at 7.

⁴⁶⁶ *Id.* at 9.

⁴⁶⁷ Jayhouni's explanation for driving all the way to Mazlouman's house without alerting him first was that he was coming to collect money that Mazlouman owed him, and that each time he informed Mazlouman of his arrival beforehand, Mazlouman would take care to not be at home when he stopped by. Ordonnance, *supra* note 462 at 12.

⁴⁶⁸ *Id.* at 8.

⁴⁶⁹ *Id.* at 3. Jayhouni later denied that he had been asked to stay for the night. *Id.* at 34.

⁴⁷⁰ *Id.* at 8.

⁴⁷¹ *Id.* at 10; Thomas Sancton, *Iran's State of Terror*, Time Europe (11 November 1996).

⁴⁷² *Id.* at 8-9.

⁴⁷³ *Id.* at 2, 10, and 14. Investigators at the scene of the crime noted that: 1) access to the interior of the building was impossible without going through two successive glass doors that opened electronically; 2) Mazlouman's name was not on the intercom buzzer or the front door to his apartment, so the assassin would not have been able to identify which apartment he lived in unless they knew in advance; 3) there were no signs of forced entry into the apartment; 4) remains of cigarettes were found in ashtrays all over the apartment; 5) tests revealed that Mazlouman had drunk alcohol. Ordonnance, *supra* note 462 at 2-3, 10.

⁴⁷⁴ *Id.* at 4-5.

⁴⁷⁵ *Id.* at 19. A 13-year-old schoolgirl said that she had seen a white BMW in the basement parking lot of the apartment building around 9:30 or 10 p.m. Another witness recalled noticing a white vehicle leave the parking lot around 10 p.m. A third witness, a 12-year-old schoolgirl, said that she had seen a young man in his twenties run out of the apartment building at approximately the same time.

⁴⁷⁶ *Id.* at 12. See also *Terrorisme: Un Iranien mis en examen et incarcéré*, [Terrorism: An Iranian interrogated and incarcerated], REUTERS, October 25, 1996.

⁴⁷⁷ Thomas Sancton, *Iran's State of Terror*, Time Europe (11 November 1996). See also *Un "temoin important" interpellé en Allemagne après l'assassinat d'un opposant iranien à Creteil* [An "Important Witness" interrogated in Germany after the assassination of an Iranian dissident at Creteil], LE MONDE, June 1, 1996.

⁴⁷⁸ See Decree to Assassinate Manouchehr Ganji, signed by Prosecutor General of Iran, Hojjatolislam Mousavi Tabrizi, dated 3/17/1993 [Attached as Appendix 5].

writing him letters⁴⁷⁹ offering his services in combating the Iranian regime.⁴⁸⁰ Dr. Ganji, suspicious of his intentions, rebuffed Jayhouni. Dr. Ganji told police investigators that in 1994 he had received confirmation from his sources inside Iran that, as he had suspected, Jayhouni was an agent of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence. Dr. Ganji strongly suspected that Jayhouni was working for Ali Gholami, an intelligence official in the Iranian Embassy in Bonn – a charge he made public in a 1994 interview published by the French magazine *Paris Match*.⁴⁸¹ The French Interior Ministry took the allegations against Jayhouni sufficiently serious that it reportedly issued a “*fiche d’opposition d’entrée*” on November 2, 1994, in an attempt to bar his future entry to France.⁴⁸²

Apparently undeterred, Jayhouni turned his attentions to Dr. Ganji’s close friend and number two, Dr. Mazlouman.⁴⁸³ For three years, Jayhouni worked to ingratiate himself with Mazlouman, providing his office with electronic equipment, such as an answering machine and computer.⁴⁸⁴ Dr. Mazlouman maintained the relationship despite warnings from Dr. Ganji and others that Jayhouni was dangerous.⁴⁸⁵ Dr. Mazlouman even received a cautionary warning from the French Security Service (DST), but he responded that he had complete trust in Jayhouni.⁴⁸⁶

The Mazlouman case was once again prosecuted by Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière and Jayhouni was tried before the *Cour d’assises speciale*, which specializes in terrorism cases, in June 2001. The evidence produced during the trial made a strong case for Jayhouni’s connection with the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence.⁴⁸⁷ Both the French DST and the German BfV confirmed that Jayhouni had maintained contacts with Ali Gholami and the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence since 1992.⁴⁸⁸ In addition, Jayhouni admitted to investigators that he had met with three members of the Iranian Embassy in Bonn – Mohammad Akhavan, Cultural and Consular Affairs Attaché, Seyyed Bolboli, Secretary of Consular Affairs, and Ali Ousouli (alias Masoudi), an Intelligence officer – but maintained that these were simply business contacts.⁴⁸⁹ Investigators found that Jayhouni had Ousouli’s direct number at the

⁴⁷⁹ Ordonnance, *supra* note 462 at 4-5 and 22-24. Ganji provided the French police with some of Jayhouni’s letters and faxes, some signed by Jayhouni and one written from someone under the pseudonym “Pouraya,” indicating that his phone number was 228.36.22.09 (which was found to match the number of Jayhouni’s video store in Bonn). See also, *Atash-e Nahofteh* [THE HIDDEN FIRE], (Manouchehr Ganji, Manouchehr Ganji, 2000) at 574-583, which reproduced copies of the letters in Farsi.

⁴⁸⁰ Information found in relation to the trial of Mojtaba Mashhady for the murder of Cyrus Elahi showed that Dr. Manouchehr Ganji was the primary target of the Iranian regime throughout this period. It is reasonable to assume that Reza Mazlouman, although a potential target himself, was possibly also perceived as a way to approach Ganji in order to eliminate him. Ordonnance, *supra* note 462 at 22.

⁴⁸¹ Olivier Varin, *C’est l’homme le plus menacé de France* [He is the Most Threatened Man in France], PARIS MATCH, October 6, 1994. The article says: “Numerous mysterious characters continue to want to meet Dr. Ganji personally ... for example, a thriving middleman who made a fortune doing business with Tehran, Ahmad Jayhouni, who went so far as to offer his fortune to the resistance ... ‘The more they want to trap me, the more they make me tempting propositions,’ said Ganji. The same sponsor is behind all these seductive attempts, the IRI embassy in Bonn, and more particularly the office of Ali Gholami, the high-level official designated as the contact of the [murdered] singer Farokhzad and the person behind the killings of Sadeq Sharafkandi and his three Kurdish Iranian allies in the back room of the Mykonos restaurant in Berlin.”

⁴⁸² Ordonnance, *supra* note 462 at 4.

⁴⁸³ *Id.* at 9.

⁴⁸⁴ *Id.* at 7.

⁴⁸⁵ *Id.* at 9. Dr. Ganji stated that he had warned Dr. Mazlouman about Jayhouni and alerted French Security Service (DST) about him. Also Dr. Mazlouman’s associate, Sattar Salimi, stated that Jayhouni (to whom he had been introduced by Mazlouman) had expressed the wish to meet those close to Dr. Shapour Bakhtiar, such as Dr. Manouchehr Ganji. Salimi stayed for three days at Jayhouni’s house in Bonn, after which one of his friends warned him about Jayhouni, saying that he was suspected of spying on behalf of the Iranian regime. While this may just have been a rumor, Salimi felt he should warn Dr. Mazlouman, but Mazlouman did not heed this warning. Ordonnance, *supra* note 462 at 5-6. In fact, Cyrus Amouzgar, Dr. Mazlouman’s brother-in-law, recalled that after Dr. Mazlouman’s death, a friend of his in Bonn expressed astonishment that Mazlouman had trusted Jayhouni, “when all the Iranians in Bonn knew of this individual’s relationship with the Iranian secret service.” *Id.* at 28.

⁴⁸⁶ *Id.* at 23, 25.

⁴⁸⁷ *Alleged Iranian Intelligence Officer Sentenced to 17 years in Paris*, IRAN PRESS SERVICES, June 23, 2001, available at http://www.iran-press-service.com/articles_2001/jun_2001/jayhooni_sentenced_23601.htm (accessed on Jul 18, 2005).

⁴⁸⁸ *Id.* at 7. The DST requested that the German authorities search their files for traces on Jayhouni. The Germans responded on March 8, 1994, that there was an Ahmad Jayhouni, residing in Meckenheim, who, in 1992, had been in contact with a member of the Iranian intelligence service posted at the Iranian Embassy in Bonn. They also found that Jayhouni was suspected of “videotaping Iranian dissidents then sending the footage to the Iranian Intelligence Service.”

⁴⁸⁹ *Id.* at 25.

Embassy among his personal papers.⁴⁹⁰ Ousouli was identified by the German authorities as Ali Gholami's replacement in Bonn and he was ultimately declared *persona non grata* for activities incompatible with his diplomatic status and expelled from Germany in August 1995.⁴⁹¹

However, the physical evidence did not place Jayhouni at the crime scene at the time of the murder. Jayhouni's cell phone records, a time-stamped receipt from a gas station in Germany, and the reports of his wife and daughter that he returned to Germany before the murder all led investigators to accept that he was no longer in France at the time Dr. Mazlouman was killed.⁴⁹² Furthermore, crime scene investigators recovered DNA samples of three people from different cigarette stubs left at the crime scene. One sample was determined to be from Dr. Mazlouman himself, but the other two were not identified. By eliminating all the people who might have had the opportunity of having recently smoked a cigarette at Dr. Mazlouman's house, the police concluded that this was the DNA of the people who carried out the murder.⁴⁹³ Neither remaining sample matched Jayhouni's DNA.⁴⁹⁴

The court found that Jayhouni had introduced the killer (or killers) into Dr. Mazlouman's home but had not himself been present when Dr. Mazlouman was killed. The court speculated that the killer (or killers) presumably entered Dr. Mazlouman's apartment with Jayhouni. Having allayed any lingering concerns that Dr. Mazlouman might have, Jayhouni departed. The killer (or killers) then waited long enough for Jayhouni's alibi to be effective before completing their task.⁴⁹⁵ The court concluded in its judgment:

[Jayhouni] consciously aided the murder ... of Reza Mazlouman by one or more unidentified actors, by facilitating the preparation or the commission of this crime through aid or assistance, and in instigating or giving instructions to commit the violation, in particular by gathering information about the victim and in permitting the author(s) of the crime to enter [Mazlouman's house].⁴⁹⁶

Suspicions about the identity of the actual killer (or killers) centered on Jayhouni's "nephew," someone the French police were never able to fully identify. Jayhouni would only give his companion's name as "Mazaheri" and he claimed to know no further personal details about him.⁴⁹⁷ Jayhouni was convicted on June 22, 2001, as an accomplice to the murder and sentenced to 17 years in prison.⁴⁹⁸ Jayhouni's appeal against his conviction, heard on August 22, 2001, by the Paris Appeal Court (*Cour d'appel de Paris*), was denied.

Dr. Mazlouman's assassination was the eighth successful attack mounted against an Iranian opposition figure living in Paris. In his indictment, Judge Bruguière succinctly summarized the lasting consequences of such attacks:

[The attack on Reza Mazlouman] was undoubtedly ... a terrorist act, in the sense that it gravely disturbed the public order in and of itself, but also because it fits into a context of threats, each

⁴⁹⁰ Ordonnance, *supra* note 462 at 25.

⁴⁹¹ *Id.* at 25.

⁴⁹² *Id.* at 15-18. When the police interviewed Jayhouni's family, his wife stated that he had left their home at 5 am and returned around 11:20, after having called her on the phone around 8 p.m. Jayhouni's daughter said he had called her around 8:30 and must have returned around 11:10 p.m. *Id.* at 15.

⁴⁹³ *Id.* at 13.

⁴⁹⁴ *Id.* at 13.

⁴⁹⁵ *Id.* at 37.

⁴⁹⁶ *Id.* at 39.

⁴⁹⁷ *Id.* at 21-24, and *The Tehran Connection*, *supra* note 21.

⁴⁹⁸ Statuant en Premier Ressor: Cour d'assises de Paris, Arret criminal 22 June 2001 (Ruling of the Criminal Court of Paris, Criminal Arrest, June 22, 2001). Jayhouni was convicted in both a civil and a criminal proceeding, both heard before the Special Cour d'assises in Paris on June 22, 2001. His appeal, heard on August 22, 2001 by the Paris Appellate Court was denied. See *Assassinat de M. Reza Mazlouman, ex-Vice Ministre du Shah d'Iran* [Assassination of Mr. Reza Mazlouman, Former Vice Minister of the Shah of Iran], SOS-ATTENTATS, May 27, 1996, available at http://www.sos-attentats.org/justice-liste-attentats.asp?lan_id=fr (accessed April 20, 2006).

crime becoming an act of intimidation for other dissidents. Placed into its context, this crime contributed to a climate of terror that weighs on the Iranian dissident community, obliging those members who want to continue their political or merely intellectual struggle to take significant security measures. This is to say that each of these acts of intimidation or terror carries in it a destabilizing seed for a democratic society, where the protection of free speech still constitutes a fundamental priority of public order.⁴⁹⁹

5. Conclusion

In the early years after the revolution, a plethora of *ad hoc* revolutionary organizations made up the Islamic Republic's intelligence community and they responded to the heated rhetoric of the times by pursuing the regime's enemies overseas. The creation of the Ministry of Intelligence in 1983 ushered in an era of coordinated government action in which Iranian intelligence officers and soldiers of the Revolutionary Guards' elite Quds Force provided the tip of a spear wielded against the opposition by the Special Affairs Committee, an extraparliamentary body comprised of some of the most powerful executive political figures in the country.

Iranian authorities appear to have suspended their seventeen-year-long campaign of international political assassination in 1996, after the murder of Dr. Reza Mazlouman – with the one exception of Iraq, where the killings continued until 1999. One can only speculate as to the reason for this, but it seems likely that a rising tide of international condemnation both at the United Nations and in national courts – as typified by the December 1994 French court judgment in the Bakhtiar case and the international arrest warrant issued by Germany for the Iranian Minister of Intelligence, Hojjatoleslam Ali Fallahian, in March 1996 – had a chilling effect on such operations.

A second crucial factor was undoubtedly the succession of President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani by the reformist Mohammad Khatami in May 1997. The struggle for power between reformist and conservative elements inside the Islamic Republic shifted attention away from opposition activities outside Iran's borders. The Ministry of Intelligence appears to have turned its attention instead to voices of protest inside the Islamic Republic and a series of killings of dissident intellectuals in the late 1990s that have come to be known as the "Chain Murders" have been widely linked to Hojjatoleslam Fallahian and his then deputy Sa'eed Imami.⁵⁰⁰

The nine cases highlighted in this report, along with an attack documented in a companion piece, *Murder at Mykonos*, demonstrate the widespread and systematic nature of the campaign waged directly by the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran against its political opponents across the continents of Asia, Europe and North America. We have chosen the best documented cases that include victims from across the disparate and often fractious opposition movement – monarchists like Shahriar Shafiq and General Gholam Ali Oveisi, secular reformists like Dr. Shapour Bakhtiar, Ali Akbar Tabatabai and Dr. Cyrus Elahi, Islamist dissidents like Dr. Kazem Rajavi and Mohammad Hussein Naghdi, and minority rights activists like Dr. Abdol Rahman Ghassemlou and Dr. Mohammad Sadegh Sharafkandi.⁵⁰¹ We might just as easily have cited examples from the other 162 cases that have so far come to light, such as the kidnapping, torture and subsequent murder of Abbas Gholizadeh in Istanbul, whose killers admitted in 1995 on Turkish television that they had been acting on orders from Tehran,⁵⁰² the murder of Dr.

⁴⁹⁹ Ordonnance, *supra* note 462 at 38.

⁵⁰⁰ See generally Parliamentary Human Rights Group, Eric Avebury, *Fatal Writ: An Account of Murders and Cover-ups* (2000).

⁵⁰¹ See IHRDC, *MURDER AT MYKONOS* *supra* note 18.

⁵⁰² MANOUCHEHR GANJI, *DEFYING THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION: FROM A MINISTER TO THE SHAH TO A LEADER OF RESISTANCE* 203 (2002).

Abdol Rahman Boroumand, who was stabbed to death in Paris in April 1991,⁵⁰³ or the shooting of Mohammad Hassan Arbab, gunned down in Karachi in June 1993.⁵⁰⁴

Our report identifies those most directly responsible for prosecuting this campaign: Intelligence Ministers Hojjatoleslam Mohammad Mohammadi Reyshahri (1984-1989) and Hojjatoleslam Fallahian (1989-1997), and the former Head of the Revolutionary Guards, General Yahya Rahim-Safavi. The current commander of the Quds Force Intelligence Directorate, Guards Corps Brigadier General Muhammad-Jafar Sahraroudi, also merits specific mention because of the personal role he played in the 1989 assassination of Dr. Ghassemlou.

Some of the other senior political and religious figures who have come to particular notice in this report as playing a central role in ordering and facilitating political assassinations are Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Khamenei, former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and Ayatollah Sadegh Khalkhali. Ali Akbar Velayati's Foreign Ministry provided documents and logistical support to assassination teams in the field, and former Telecommunications Minister Mohammad Gharazi has been credibly linked to two of the cases discussed in this report.

In the final analysis, the killings that occurred between 1979 and 1996 violated some of the most fundamental tenets of international human rights law. They were planned, directed and coordinated at the highest levels of the Iranian political and religious establishment by senior regime officials, many of whom remain influential to this day. As German Judge Frithjof Kubsch noted in his final judgment in the Mykonos case:

The evidence makes it clear that the Iranian rulers not only approve of assassinations abroad and that they honor and reward the assassins, but that they themselves plan these kinds of assassinations against people who, for purely political reasons, become undesirable. For the sake of preserving their power, they are willing to liquidate their political opponents.⁵⁰⁵

Those within the Iranian state who ordered, instigated, committed, aided and abetted, or otherwise shared the intent of and made a significant contribution to these extrajudicial killings can, and should, be held individually responsible for their crimes.

⁵⁰³ Testimony Before the US Congress Human Rights Caucus, by Dr. Boroumand's Daughter, Ladan, available at <http://impact.users.netlink.co.uk/namir/tstmnny.htm> (accessed March 2, 2008).

⁵⁰⁴ Parliamentary Human Rights Group, Eric Avebury and Robert Wilkinson, *Iran: State of Terror* 25 (1993).

⁵⁰⁵ Mykonos Judgement, Mykonos Urteil [Mykonos Judgment], Urteil des Kammergerichts Berlin vom 10. April 1997 [Judgement of the Court of Appeal of Berlin on April 10, 1997], OLGSt Berlin, (1) 2 StE 2/93 (19/93), at 368-370 available at http://www.kammergericht.de/entscheidungen/Strafsenate/1_StE_19-93.pdf (accessed June 22, 2007).

Methodology

It is the nature of intelligence services to shroud their actions in secrecy, to dissemble and deceive in their daily operations, and to work through covert organizations and proxies. The Iranian Ministry of Intelligence is no exception to this rule. Little definitive is known about the institutional arrangements governing its operation other than the bare bones laid down by statute. Much of the public commentary surrounding the Ministry's activities is attributed to anonymous sources or is based on simple speculation. In this report, the IHRDC has sought to keep such speculation to a minimum and to rely only on sources who are prepared to stand behind their words.

IHRDC gathered information for this report from the examination of the following sources:

- *Testimony of victims and witnesses.* These included witness statements taken by IHRDC attorneys from survivors of assassination attempts or their family members.
- *Testimony of former regime insiders.* The IHRDC has interviewed several former regime insiders with knowledge of Iran's clandestine services.
- *Government documents.* These include recorded public statements by state officials, court documents, official reports by organs such as the United Nations Commission for Human Rights and the British Parliamentary Human Rights group, statements released by Iranian government agencies and published legal instruments.
- *Documents issued by non-governmental organizations.* These include reports and press releases written by organizations such as Amnesty International and Reporters without Borders.
- *Books and articles written by private individuals.* These include political memoirs, and the published accounts of survivors and eyewitnesses of the incidents described.
- *Political parties.* The IHRDC has approached political parties for documentation and testimony concerning the targeting of their members.
- *Academic articles.* A number of historians and political scientists have written on the assassination campaign against political opponents of the Islamic Republic.
- *Media reporting.* This includes articles published in newspapers inside Iran and foreign media sources in the countries where the events recounted in this report occurred.
- The IHRDC particularly wishes to thank the Library of Congress for its invaluable assistance in researching this project.

We have chosen to refer to the *Vizarat-i Ittila't* as the Ministry of Intelligence, a literal translation of the Persian. Readers should, however, be aware that it is more often referenced in western sources as the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) or by the acronym VEVAK.

All names of places, people, organizations, etc., originally written in Farsi have been transliterated using the system of the International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (IJMES), available at http://assets.cambridge.org/MES/mes_ifc.pdf. Under the IJMES system, names of places with an accepted English spelling and names of prominent cultural or political figures may be spelled according to the English norm.

Where the report cites or relies on information provided by government actors or other involved parties, it specifies the source of such information and evaluates the information in light of the relative reliability of each source. The IHRDC has meticulously cross-checked all the sources of information used to compile this report to ensure their credibility and accuracy.

**No Safe Haven:
Iran's Global Assassination Campaign**

Appendices

APPENDICES TABLE OF CONTENTS

- Appendix 1** – Chronological List of those Killed during the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Global Assassination Campaign – Compiled by IHRDC
- Appendix 2** – Extradition of Bakhtiar Will Be Requested from France, ETELLA’AT, 2 Mordad 1359 (JULY 24, 1980)
- Appendix 3** – Ayatollah Khalkhali: If We Cannot Arrest Them, We Will Assassinate Members of the Phalavi Family, KAYHAN, 18 Azar 1358 (DECEMBER 9, 1979)
- Appendix 4** – The Imam Issued an Execution *Fatwa* for Everyone Involved in the Coup, ETELLA’AT, 29 Tir 1359 (JULY 20, 1980)
- Appendix 5** – Decree to Assassinate Manouchehr Ganji, signed by Prosecutor General of Iran, Hojjatolislam Mousavi Tabrizi, 3/17/1993

Appendix 1

Chronological List of those Killed during the
Islamic Republic of Iran's Global Assassination
Campaign – Compiled by IHRDC

Chronological List of those Killed during the Islamic Republic of Iran's Global Assassination Campaign

This list of political assassinations sponsored or carried out by the Islamic Republic of Iran outside its territory has been compiled by the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center from the following sources: Omid: A Memorial in Defense of Human Rights (<http://www.abfiran.org/english/memorial-search.php>), Amnesty International, *Iran: State of Terror* published by the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group, *Defying the Iranian Revolution* by Manouchehr Ganji, *Report on the Islamic Republic's Terrorism Abroad* published by NAMIR, the PDKI, the Iran Terror Database, and the Foundation for Democracy in Iran (FDI) at www.Iran.org. This list is not intended to be exhaustive – it contains only those names for which credible citations can be found.

	Date (Y/M/D)	Name of Deceased	Political Affiliation	Location	Facts Surrounding the Assassination	Source
1	1979/12/07	Shafiq, Shahriar	M	Paris, France	Nephew of the former Shah (see main report for further details)	NAMIR Report, Iran Terror Database
2	1980/07/18	<i>Jamme, Jean-Michel</i>		Paris, France	French police officer murdered during an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Shapour Bakhtiar (see main report for further details)	Omid: A Memorial in Defense of Human Rights, NAMIR Report, FDI
3	1980/07/18	<i>Stein, Yvonne</i>		Paris, France	Killed during an unsuccessful assassination attempt made on Shapour Bakhtiar; She was a neighbor of the former Iranian Prime Minister (see main report for further details)	Omid: A Memorial in Defense of Human Rights, NAMIR Report, FDI
4	1980/07/22	Tabatabai, Ali Akbar	IFF	Bethesda, USA	Former diplomat under the Shah and founder of the Iraq Freedom Foundation gunned down in his home (see main report for further details)	Iran Terror Database
5	1982/01/14	Missaghi, Shahrokh	PFI	Manila, The Philippines	Murdered by Hezbollah activists during a demonstration	NAMIR Report, Iran Terror Database
6	1982/06/08	Mirani, Shahram	PFI	India	Murdered by Hezbollah activists during a demonstration	NAMIR Report, Iran Terror Database
7	1982/09/05	Zol-Anvar, Ahmad	MEK	Karachi, Pakistan	Attacked on 08/29/82, died in Denmark after surgery	NAMIR Report, Iran Terror Database
8	1982/09/10	Rahdar, Abdolamir	<i>Peykar</i>	India	Murdered by Hezbollah activists during a demonstration	NAMIR Report, Iran Terror Database
9	1983/02/08	Taqanaki, Esfandiar Rahimi	MEK	Manila, The Philippines	Stabbed to death	NAMIR Report, Iran Terror Database
10	1984/02/07	Oveisi, Gholam Ali (Brigadier General)	M	Paris, France	Former military governor of Tehran who ran the Free Voice of Iran radio station; Shot dead alongside his brother (see main report for further details)	NAMIR Report

	Date (Y/M/D)	Name of Deceased	Political Affiliation	Location	Facts Surrounding the Assassination	Source
11	1984/02/07	Oveisi, Gholam Hossein		Paris, France	Shot dead alongside his brother (see main report for further details)	NAMIR Report
12	1985/12/23	Azizmoradi, Hadi (Colonel)	NAMIR	Istanbul, Turkey	Member of NAMIR's Executive Bureau of Movement	NAMIR Report, Iran Terror Database
13	1987/07	Chitgar, Hamid Reza	<i>Toufan</i>	Vienna, Austria	Disappeared in May, found dead in July; Shot to death	NAMIR Report
14	1987/07/08	Aghai, Faramarz	MEK	Karachi, Pakistan	13 refugee homes in Karachi and Quetta were hit in a series of attacks resulting in 2 dead and 33 injured; 9 men identified by police as Revolutionary Guard Corps members were detained at the Iran-Pakistan border in connection with the attacks	NAMIR Report, Iran Terror Database
15	1987/07/08	Sharifzadeh, Alireza Hassanpour	MEK	Karachi, Pakistan	13 refugee homes in Karachi and Quetta were hit in a series of attacks resulting in 2 dead and 33 injured; 9 men identified by police as Revolutionary Guard Corps members were detained at the Iran-Pakistan border in connection with the attacks	NAMIR Report, Iran Terror Database
16	1987/07/25	Mansouri, Mohammad-Hassan	O	Istanbul, Turkey	Shot dead in his home; ballistics show the same murder weapon was used to kill Hadi Azizmoradi (see above)	NAMIR Report, Iran Terror Database, FDI
17	1987/09/10	Talebi, Ahmad Moradi	O	Geneva, Switzerland	Air force officer who had been the private pilot of Ali Akbar Rafsanjani and left Iran to protest against regime; he was gunned down in the street by two men	NAMIR Report, Iran Terror Database, FDI
18	1987/10/03	Tavakoli-Nabavi, Mohammad-Ali	M	Wembley, UK	Shot dead in his home along with his youngest son, Nouredin; The Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed responsibility for the attack	NAMIR Report, Iran Terror Database
19	1987/10/03	Tavakoli-Nabavi, Nouredin		Wembley, UK	Shot dead along with his father, Mohammad-Ali; Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed responsibility for the attack	NAMIR Report, Iran Terror Database
20	1987/10/10	Bagheri, Behrouz	O	Paris, France	Son of Major General Amir Bahman Bagheri, former commander of the Shah's Air Force, killed when his shop was firebombed	Iran Terror Database
21	1987/10/31	Unnamed Iranian refugee		Quetta, Pakistan	Killed by bomb planted in a hotel; Pakistani police blame Iran's Revolutionary Guards for the attack	Iran Terror Database, FDI
22	1987/12/01	Ha'eri, Javad	O	Istanbul, Turkey	Stabbed to death	Iran Terror Database
23	1988/12	Unknown Iranian refugee		Karachi, Pakistan	Killed when gunman opened fire on Iranian refugees in front of the HQ of the UNHCR	<i>Iran: State of Terror</i> , Parliamentary Human Rights Group

	Date (Y/M/D)	Name of Deceased	Political Affiliation	Location	Facts Surrounding the Assassination	Source
24	1989/06/04	Bayahmadi, Ataollah (Colonel)	FFO	Dubai, UAE	Shot dead in his hotel room after he arrived in Dubai for a meeting with an Iran-based contact to negotiate the release of some FFO prisoners held by Tehran	<i>Manouchehr Ganji, Defying the Iranian Revolution</i>
25	1989/07/13	Ghassemloo, Abdol-Rahman	PDKI	Vienna, Austria	Murdered during a negotiation with IRI representatives (see main report for further details)	<i>Iran: State of Terror, Parliamentary Human Rights Group</i>
26	1989/07/13	Ghaderi, Abdollah	PDKI	Vienna, Austria	Murdered during a negotiation with IRI representatives (see main report for further details)	<i>Iran: State of Terror, Parliamentary Human Rights Group</i>
27	1989/07/13	<i>Rassoul, Fazel</i>	PDKI	Vienna, Austria	Murdered during a negotiation with IRI representatives (see main report for further details)	<i>Iran: State of Terror, Parliamentary Human Rights Group</i>
28	1989/08	Keshavarz, Gholam	<i>Komala</i>	Cyprus	Nfd	NAMIR Report
29	1989/08/26	Javadi, Bahman	<i>Komala</i>	Larnaca, Cyprus	Member of the Central Committee of the Iran Communist Party and its <i>Komala</i> Kurdish guerrilla forces; Shot and killed by two young men armed with silenced pistols; His brother-in-law, Yussef Rashidzadeh, was also injured in the attack	<i>Iran: State of Terror, Parliamentary Human Rights Group</i>
30	1989/09/04	Kamangar, Sadigh	<i>Komala</i>	Iraq	Killed at the <i>Komala</i> HQ in Iraq	NAMIR Report, Iran Terror Database
31	1989/09/14	Keshavarz, Hussein		Karachi, Pakistan	Shot by a sniper while riding his motorcycle near the UNHCR office; This was the second fatal attack on an Iranian refugee to take place outside the UNHCR office in Karachi	<i>Iran: State of Terror, Parliamentary Human Rights Group</i>
32	1990/02/16	Baloutch-Khan, Hadj	M	Taftan, Pakistan	Killed by a terrorist commando	NAMIR Report, Iran Terror Database
33	1990/04/24	Rajavi, Kazem	MEK	Coppet, Switzerland	Representative of MEK in Switzerland (see main report for further details)	NAMIR Report
34	1990/07/15	Kashepour, Ali (Ahmed)	PDKI	Turkey	Kidnapped, then killed	NAMIR Report, Iran Terror Database, FDI
35	1990/09/06	Ghazi, Efat	PDKI	Sweden	Killed by a letter bomb intended for her husband, Mohammed Ghazi	NAMIR Report, Iran Terror Database
36	1990/10/01	Nakha'i, Gholam Reza		Turkey	A political refugee killed by a blow to the head	Iran Terror Database
37	1990/10/23	Elahi, Cyrus	FFO	Paris, France	Gunned down (see main report for further details)	NAMIR Report, Iran Terror Database

	Date (Y/M/D)	Name of Deceased	Political Affiliation	Location	Facts Surrounding the Assassination	Source
38	1991	Saghezi, Khaled	<i>Khabat</i>	Raniya, Iraq	Nfd	PDKI, Iran Bulletin
39	1991/01/01	Hosseinpour, Khaled	<i>Khabat</i>	Iraq	Nfd	Iran Terror Database
40	1991/01/01	Unnamed <i>Peshmerga</i>	<i>Komala</i>	Iraq	Killed when a bomb went off in <i>Komala's</i> HQ	Iran Terror Database
41	1991/01/01	Aqa, Ahad	PDKI	Sulaymaniyah, Iraq	Shot dead in the street	Iran Terror Database, NAMIR Report
42	1991/04/18	Boroumand, Abdol-Rahman	NAMIR	Paris, France	Founding member of NAMIR and President of the Executive Bureau of Movement. Stabbed to death	<i>Iran: State of Terror</i> , Parliamentary Human Rights Group
43	1991/07	<i>Igarashi, Hitoshi</i>		Tokyo, Japan	Translated <i>The Satanic Verses</i> by Salman Rushdie. Stabbed to death	NAMIR Report, Iran Terror Database
44	1991/08/06	Bakhtiar, Shapour	NAMIR	Suresnes, France	Former Iranian Prime Minister and the founding leader of NAMIR, stabbed to death (see main report for further details)	NAMIR Report, Iran Terror Database
45	1991/08/06	Katibeh, Soroush	NAMIR	Suresnes, France	Assistant to Shapour Bakhtiar (see main report for further details)	NAMIR Report, Iran Terror Database
46	1991/08/07	Mehrani, Jawad		Paris, France	Arms dealer	FDI
47	1991/09/19	Yazdan-Panah, Said	PDKI	Iraq	Nfd	NAMIR Report, Iran Terror Database
48	1991/10/29	Djalil, Mamaei	PDKI	Andarzi-Bouli, Iraq	Killed in a bus bombing	Iran Terror Database, PDKI
49	1991/10/29	Alipour, Hassan	PDKI	Andarzi-Bouli, Iraq	Killed in a bus bombing	Iran Terror Database, PDKI
50	1991/10/29	Ghardi, Mola Rassoul	PDKI	Andarzi-Bouli, Iraq	Killed in a bus bombing	Iran Terror Database, PDKI
51	1992	Mehrabani, Mohammad	PDKI	Bahraka, Iraq	Nfd	PDKI, Iran Bulletin
52	1992/03/26	Rafi'zadeh, Nareh		New Jersey, USA	Wife and sister-in-law of former Shah's intelligence agents	Iran Terror Database
53	1992/05/01	Seimanpour, Seifollah		Iraq	Shot dead	Iran Terror Database
54	1992/05/31	Firouzi, Shapour	PDKI	Iraq	Shot dead	NAMIR Report
55	1992/06/03	Mansour-Moghadam, Kamran	UIC	Sulaymaniyah, Iraq	Shot dead	NAMIR Report, Iran Terror Database
56	1992/06/04	Ghorbani, Ali-Akbar (aka Mansour Amini)	MEK	Turkey	Turkish extremists admit in February 1993 that they kidnapped, tortured and killed Ghorbani on the IRI's behalf	NAMIR Report, Iran Terror Database, FDI

	Date (Y/M/D)	Name of Deceased	Political Affiliation	Location	Facts Surrounding the Assassination	Source
57	1992/07/07	Mahmoudi, Hadi	PDKI	Iraq	Died after food served in the PDKI's HQ was poisoned on 1992/06/23	Iran Terror Database
58	1992/07/12	Moradi, Fakhroddin	PDKI	Iraq	Died after food served in the PDKI's HQ was poisoned on 1992/06/23	Iran Terror Database
59	1992/07/18	Nanoureh, Ali	PDKI	Iraq	Died after food served in the PDKI's HQ was poisoned on 1992/06/23	Iran Terror Database
60	1992/08/09	Farokhzad, Fereydoun	FFO	Bonn, Germany	Singer who had been threatened for offending IRI in his shows; Stabbed to death	NAMIR Report, Iran Terror Database
61	1992/09/17	Abdoli, Fatah	PDKI	Berlin, Germany	Gunned down during a meeting in a Berlin restaurant (See IHRDC report <i>Murder at Mykonos</i> for further details)	NAMIR Report
62	1992/09/17	Ardalan, Homayoun	PDKI	Berlin, Germany	Gunned down during a meeting in a Berlin restaurant (See IHRDC report <i>Murder at Mykonos</i> for further details)	NAMIR Report
63	1992/09/17	Dehkordi, Nouri	PDKI	Berlin, Germany	Gunned down during a meeting in a Berlin restaurant (See IHRDC report <i>Murder at Mykonos</i> for further details)	NAMIR Report
64	1992/09/17	Sharafkandi, Sadegh (Mohammad)	PDKI	Berlin, Germany	Gunned down during a meeting in a Berlin restaurant (See IHRDC report <i>Murder at Mykonos</i> for further details)	NAMIR Report
65	1992/12/26	Gholizadeh, Abbas	FFO	Istanbul, Turkey	One of the Shah's former bodyguards; Turkish extremists admitted in October 1993 that they had kidnapped, tortured and killed Gholizadeh on the IRI's behalf	NAMIR Report, Iran Terror Database
66	1993/01	Mumcu, Ugur		Ankara, Turkey	Killed by a car bomb	NAMIR Report, FDI
67	1993/01/12	Kazemi, Gholam-Hosseini	MEK / NLA	Iraq	Killed while driving between NLA bases	Iran Terror Database
68	1993/03/09	Narou'i, Delaviz	Narou'i tribe	Pakistan	Tribal leader shot and killed along with Heybatollah Narou'i	Iran Terror Database
69	1993/03/09	Narou'i, Heybatollah	Narou'i tribe	Pakistan	Tribal leader shot and killed along with Delaviz Narou'i	Iran Terror Database
70	1993/03/16	Naghdi, Mohammad-Hosseini	MEK	Rome, Italy	Shot to death (see main report for further details)	NAMIR Report, Iran Terror Database
71	1993/06/06	Arbab, Mohammad-Hassan	MEK	Karachi, Pakistan	Gunned down outside his home	NAMIR Report, Iran Terror Database
72	1993/08	Ghaderi, Mohammad		Turkey	Kidnapped and assassinated	NAMIR Report
73	1993/08/28	Azadfer, Behran	PDKI	Ankara, Turkey	Shot dead in his home by Persian-speaking gunmen	Iran Terror Database
74	1993/10/06	Ibrahimi, Majid-Reza	MEK	Baghdad, Iraq	Killed when gunmen opened fire on him while he was out shopping in Baghdad's As-Sha'ab district; a companion was wounded	Iran Terror Database

	Date (Y/M/D)	Name of Deceased	Political Affiliation	Location	Facts Surrounding the Assassination	Source
75	1993/11/13	Ibrahimi, Anvar		Darbandikhan, Iraq	Nfd	NAMIR Report
76	1993/11/13	Manutchehri, Taher		Darbandikhan, Iraq	Nfd	NAMIR Report
77	1993/11/13	Mohammad Fattah, Karim		Darbandikhan, Iraq	Nfd	NAMIR Report
78	1993/11/13	Moradi, Salah		Darbandikhan, Iraq	Nfd	NAMIR Report
79	1993/11/13	Moradi, Shahrokh		Darbandikhan, Iraq	Nfd	NAMIR Report
80	1993/11/13	Rostami, Rashid		Darbandikhan, Iraq	Nfd	NAMIR Report
81	1993/12/13	Dol, Mahmud		Raniya, Iraq	Nfd	NAMIR Report
82	1994/01/04	Kermanj (Kirmench or Kermanch), Taha	PDKI-RL	Corum, Turkey	Shot dead by three gunmen, one Iranian national arrested	<i>Iran: State of Terror</i> , Parliamentary Human Rights Group
83	1994/01/12	Bokani, Mohammad (a.k.a. Khala Hama)		Kawlokani, Iraq	Nfd	NAMIR Report
84	1994/01/28	Mohammadi, Shafi		Sulaymaniyah, Iraq	Nfd	NAMIR Report
85	1994/04/02	Djahanghiri, Saleh	PDKI	Halabja, Iraq	Nfd	NAMIR Report; PDKI
86	1994/04/23	Saidi, Fattah		Sulaymaniyah, Iraq	Nfd	NAMIR Report
87	1994/06/17	Mohammadpour, Ahmad		Iraq	Nfd	NAMIR Report
88	1994/06/24	Gorgori, Ibrahim		Sulaymaniyah, Iraq	Nfd	NAMIR Report
89	1994/06/24	Osman Amini, Molla		Copenhagen, Denmark	Nfd	NAMIR Report, FDI
90	1994/07/24	Mohammadzadeh, Morad		Basserma, Iraq	Killed by a grenade thrown at his home	NAMIR Report
91	1994/07/31	Ladissani, Abdullah		Darbandikhan, Iraq	Nfd	NAMIR Report
92	1994/08/04	Hamzei'i, Ghafour	PDKI	Baghdad, Iraq	Hamzei'i was the PDKI's representative to Iraq and a member of the PDKI Central Committee; He was shot dead as he left his home	<i>Iran: State of Terror</i> , Parliamentary Human Rights Group
93	1994/11/12	Assadi, Mohammed Ali		Bucharest, Romania	Stabbed to death in his apartment; his wife accused an Iranian embassy staff member of being one of the assailants	FDI

	Date (Y/M/D)	Name of Deceased	Political Affiliation	Location	Facts Surrounding the Assassination	Source
94	1995	Klani, Osman	<i>Komala</i>	Sulaymaniyah, Iraq	Killed along with Osman Farinan; gunned down by Iranian agents	PDKI, FDI
95	1995	Farinan, Osman	<i>Komala</i>	Sulaymaniyah, Iraq	Killed along with Osman Klani; gunned down by Iranian agents	PDKI, FDI
96	1995/05/17	Haddad, Effat	MEK	Baghdad, Iraq	Mother of four killed when the vehicle she was travelling in was ambushed; She was a member of the National Council of Resistance	<i>Iran: State of Terror</i> , Parliamentary Human Rights Group
97	1995/05/17	Esfandiari, Fereshteh	MEK	Baghdad, Iraq	Killed when the vehicle she was traveling in was ambushed; She was an anchorwoman on the National Council of Resistance's media channels	<i>Iran: State of Terror</i> , Parliamentary Human Rights Group
98	1995/07/10	Sadidi, Seyed Hussein	MEK	Baghdad, Iraq	Shot dead when the car he was traveling in was ambushed on a Baghdad highway; the Iraqi government accused the IRI of responsibility	<i>Iran: State of Terror</i> , Parliamentary Human Rights Group
99	1995/07/10	Salimi, Ibrahim	MEK	Baghdad, Iraq	Shot dead when the car he was traveling in was ambushed on a Baghdad highway; the Iraqi government accused the IRI of responsibility	<i>Iran: State of Terror</i> , Parliamentary Human Rights Group
100	1995/07/10	Gartabar-Firouz, Yar Ali	MEK	Baghdad, Iraq	Shot dead when the car he was traveling in was ambushed on a Baghdad highway; the Iraqi government accused the IRI of responsibility	<i>Iran: State of Terror</i> , Parliamentary Human Rights Group
101	1995/09	Tavasoli, Ali	Organization of Iranian People's Fadaian (Majority)	Baku, Azerbaijan	Former leader of the Organization of Iranian People's Fadaian (Majority) who disappeared when he visited Azerbaijan to negotiate a business deal with some Iranian contacts. His body has never been recovered	<i>Amnesty International Index MDE 13/07/96</i>
102	1995/09/17	Abdollahi, Hashem	NAMIR	Paris, France	Shot dead in his father's apartment; His father, Davoud Abdollahi, was a witness in the Bakhtiar murder trial	<i>Iran: State of Terror</i> , Parliamentary Human Rights Group
103	1995/11	Mahmudi, Cheder		Sulaymaniyah, Iraq	Nfd	NAMIR Report
104	1995/12/27	Abdulahi, Saddig		Koya, Iraq	Nfd	NAMIR Report
105	1995/12/27	Amini, Ali		Koya, Iraq	Nfd	NAMIR Report
106	1995/12/27	Mehdizadeh, Ghafour		Koya, Iraq	Nfd	NAMIR Report
107	1995/12/30	Rahimi, Abubaker		Irbil, Iraq	Nfd	NAMIR Report
108	1995/12/30	Ruyan, Usman		Irbil, Iraq	Nfd	NAMIR Report
109	1996	Hakimzadeh, Kaveh	PDKI	Djejnekan, Iraq	16-year-old refugee, abducted by agents of IRI, tortured and forced to swallow acid; Haji Hadi (an alleged IRI agent) is accused of the killing	PDKI, FDI

	Date (Y/M/D)	Name of Deceased	Political Affiliation	Location	Facts Surrounding the Assassination	Source
110	1996	Aklon, Ghader	PDKI	Djejnekan, Iraq	Haji Hadi is accused of the killing	PDKI, FDI
111	1996	Rezapour, Ata	PDKI	Djejnekan, Iraq	Nfd	PDKI, FDI
112	1996	Amini, Rasul	PDKI	Raniya, Iraq	Haji Hadi is accused of the killing	FDI
113	1996/01/02	Abdulah, Ali		Sulaymaniyah, Iraq	Nfd	NAMIR Report
114	1996/01/02	Shabannajad, Rahman		Sulaymaniyah, Iraq	Nfd	NAMIR Report
115	1996/02/20	Rajabi, Zahra	MEK	Istanbul, Turkey	A member of the National Council of Resistance who was gunned down in her apartment; She had survived a 1992 assassination attempt in Germany; Turkish police tied the murder to Iranian diplomats based in Istanbul	<i>Iran: State of Terror</i> , Parliamentary Human Rights Group
116	1996/02/20	Moradi, Abdul Ali	MEK	Istanbul, Turkey	Killed while visiting Zahra Rajabi	<i>Iran: State of Terror</i> , Parliamentary Human Rights Group
117	1996/03/04	Mollazadeh, Ali (Mowlavi Abdul-Malek)	Cleric	Karachi, Pakistan	Son of a prominent Sunni cleric ambushed in his car; He had been imprisoned in Iran in 1982 for protesting the regime's policies	NAMIR Report, <i>Iran: State of Terror</i> , Parliamentary Human Rights Group
118	1996/03/04	Jamshid-Zehi, Abdul-Nasser	Cleric	Karachi, Pakistan	Jamshid-Zehi was an apolitical figure who was traveling with Mollazadeh when his car was attacked (see above)	<i>Iran: State of Terror</i> , Parliamentary Human Rights Group
119	1996/03/07	Rahmani, Hamed Reza	MEK	Baghdad, Iraq	Shot dead in his car while driving in central Baghdad	<i>Iran: State of Terror</i> , Parliamentary Human Rights Group
120	1996/03/13	Rouhani, Taher		Sulaymaniyah, Iraq	Nfd	Iran Terror Database
121	1996/03/24	Azizi, Taher		Bahraka, Iraq	Killed by gunmen while playing football	NAMIR Report
122	1996/03/24	Ebrahimzadeh, Hassan		Bahraka, Iraq	Killed by gunmen while playing football	NAMIR Report
123	1996/03/24	Keshvari, Farmarz		Bahraka, Iraq	Killed by gunmen while playing football	NAMIR Report
124	1996/03/24	Rahimi, Osman		Bahraka, Iraq	Killed by gunmen while playing football	NAMIR Report
125	1996/05	Mazlouman, Reza		Paris, France	Shot dead in his home (see main report for further details)	NAMIR Report
126	1996/11/03	Nanwa, Mohammad	<i>Khabat</i>	Sulaymaniyah, Iraq	Nfd	Iran Terror Database

	Date (Y/M/D)	Name of Deceased	Political Affiliation	Location	Facts Surrounding the Assassination	Source
127	1996/11/04	Garmaei, Ali	<i>Khabat</i>	Halabche, Iraq		Iran Terror Database
128	1996/11/11	Salimi, Hamed	PDKI	Sulaymaniyah, Iraq	Died in attack on a PDKI camp	Iran Terror Database
129	1996/11/12	Mowlaei, Ali		Islamabad, Pakistan	Nfd	Iran Terror Database
130	1996/12/01	Ghaderzadeh, M. Rassoul	PDKI	Koysanjaq, Iraq	Nfd	Iran Terror Database, PDKI
131	1996/12/01	Tchalaki, Kaweh	PDKI	Koysanjaq, Iraq	Nfd	Iran Terror Database, PDKI
132	1996/12/01	Bapiry, Hossein	PDKI	Koysanjaq, Iraq	Nfd	Iran Terror Database, PDKI
133	1996/12/01	Omar Bill, Djafar	PDKI	Koysanjaq, Iraq	Nfd	Iran Terror Database, PDKI
134	1996/12/01	Pirout-Sour, Amandj	PDKI	Koysanjaq, Iraq	Nfd	Iran Terror Database, PDKI
135	1996/12/09	Rahmani, Abbas	<i>Khabat</i>	Sulaymaniyah, Iraq	Nfd	Iran Terror Database
136	1997	Badri, Abasse	PDKI	Sulaymaniyah, Iraq	Killed along with Ataollah Feizi	PDKI, FDI
137	1997	Feizi, Ataollah	PDKI	Sulaymaniyah, Iraq	Killed along with Abasse Badri	PDKI, FDI
138	1997/02/14	Hamzhepour, Mulla Hossein	PDKI	Iraq	Found murdered on road between Qala Diza and Rania	FDI
139	1997/03/02	Pirootzadeh, Abdollah	PDKI	Rwandooz, Iraq	Nfd	Iran Terror Database
140	1997/03/10	Karimzadeh, Salim	PDKI	Kanigherjaleh, Iraq	Former anchorman on Radio Kurdistan shot in front of his home	Iran Terror Database
141	1997/04/06	Khani, Abdollah	PDKI	Khalkan, Iraq	Nfd	Iran Terror Database
142	1997/05/05	Naghshbandi, latif		Irbil, Iraq	Nfd	Iran Terror Database
143	1997/06/08	Abbassi, Khaled		Sulaymaniyah, Iraq	Nfd	Iran Terror Database
144	1997/06/26	Babail, Farhad	PDKI	Sulaymaniyah, Iraq	Killed in an attack on a car	Iran Terror Database
145	1997/08/14	Alizadeh, Qaleb	PDKI	Sulaymaniyah, Iraq	Killed when the house he was living in was attacked	NAMIR Report
146	1997/08/14	Mowlaii, Anjad	PDKI	Sulaymaniyah, Iraq	Killed when the house he was living in was attacked	NAMIR Report
147	1997/08/14	<i>Unknown Iraqi</i>		Sulaymaniyah, Iraq	Killed when the house he was living in was attacked	NAMIR Report
148	1997/08/14	Gagoli, Ebrahim		Panjvein, Iraq	Abducted and killed	Iran Terror Database
149	1997/08/19	Moradi, Saeed	PDKI	Sulaymaniyah, Iraq	Killed when the bus he was traveling in was ambushed by gunmen	NAMIR Report

	Date (Y/M/D)	Name of Deceased	Political Affiliation	Location	Facts Surrounding the Assassination	Source
150	1997/08/19	Namaki, Isma'il	PDKI	Sulaymaniyah, Iraq	Killed when the bus he was traveling in was ambushed by gunmen	NAMIR Report
151	1997/08/19	Zokaleh, Ali	PDKI	Sulaymaniyah, Iraq	Killed when the bus he was traveling in was ambushed by gunmen	NAMIR Report
152	1997/11/15	Zinati, Hassan		Sulaymaniyah, Iraq	Nfd	Iran Terror Database
153	1997/12/08	Nikjouyan, Seyed Jamal	PDKI	Koysanjaq, Iraq	Nfd	Iran Terror Database
154	1997/12/15	Bigzadi, Salah	<i>Khabat</i>	Sulaymaniyah, Iraq	Nfd	Iran Terror Database
155	1998/06/18	Broujerdi, Sheikh Morteza	Cleric	Najaf, Iraq	Nfd	Iran Terror Database
156	1998/08/01	Ghoravi, Ayatollah Agha Mirza Ali	Cleric	Iraq	Nfd	Iran Terror Database
157	1999/06/12	Mouzarmi, Fariba	MEK	Baghdad, Iraq	Killed by a car bomb that wrecked two buses	Iran Terror Database
158	1999/06/12	Goudarzi, Massoumeh	MEK	Baghdad, Iraq	Killed by a car bomb that wrecked two buses	Iran Terror Database
159	1999/06/12	Aghazadeh, Bijan	MEK	Baghdad, Iraq	Killed by a car bomb that wrecked two buses	Iran Terror Database
160	1999/06/12	Rafii, Abbass	MEK	Baghdad, Iraq	Killed by a car bomb that wrecked two buses	Iran Terror Database
161	1999/06/12	Qanbarnezhad, Akbar	MEK	Baghdad, Iraq	Killed by a car bomb that wrecked two buses	Iran Terror Database
162	1999/06/12	Fotouhi, Javad	MEK	Baghdad, Iraq	Killed by a car bomb that wrecked two buses	Iran Terror Database

Acronyms:

FFO – The Flag of Freedom Organization

IFF – Iranian Freedom Foundation

Komala – Labor Party of the Iranian Kurdistan

Khabat – Organization for the National Struggle of Iranian Kurds

MEK – *Mujahedin-e Khalq* (People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran)

M – Monarchist

NLA – National Liberation Army of Iran, the armed wing of the MEK

NAMIR – National Movement of the Iranian Resistance

O – Opponent of the Islamic regime, without political affiliation

PDKI – *Partiyh Democratic-i Kurdistan-i Iran* (Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran also known as the KDPI)

PDKI-RL – Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran – Revolutionary Leadership

Peykar – Or the Marxist Mojahedin, was a splinter group from the *Mujahedin-e Khalq*. *Peykar* is now dissolved.

PFI – People's Fadaian of Iran (*Fadaiyan-i Khalq*) was a non-religious opposition movement to the Islamic Republic with Socialistic tendencies

Ranjbaran – A communist party in Iran

Toufan – Iranian Labor Party

UIC – Union of the Iranian Communists, a Maoist organization

Please note:

- Victim names in italics indicate non-Iranians killed.
- Many of those killed in Iraq may not have been specific targets for assassination but rather victims of indiscriminate attacks on Iranian Kurdish refugees located in Iraqi-Kurdistan by Iranian forces.
- The abbreviation "nfd" stands for "no further details."

Appendix 2

Extradition of Bakhtiar Will Be Requested from
France, ETTELA'AT, 2 Mordad 1359 (JULY 24, 1980)

(Followed by Translation)

In His Weekly Press Conference, Dr. Beheshti Said: Extradition of Bakhtiar Will Be Requested From France.

Ayatollah Dr. Beheshti, Head of the Supreme Court, participated in a press conference with local and foreign media and answered their various questions.

On the subject of the Imam's recent message – regarding the announcement of 128 of the students following the Imam's Path, the relationship of Minachi, Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, *Bamdad* newspaper and the U.S. embassy, and Mr. Ghotbzadeh's recent speeches in France – he said: “As the Imam said before, at this particular moment, we are trying to find new people who can take up these responsibilities. Naturally, we started working with people we knew of, hoping that they would be of service, and they were to an extent. As the Imam said earlier, if we had revolted twice, the first revolution would have revealed the most skilled individuals, and now [after the second] we would not have the problems we are having today. The reality is that the true direction only becomes clear when one can look at a body of work. The Imam's opinion was that had we had genuine revolutionary elements working for us the revolution would have come to fruition better. Hopefully, we won't make further mistakes. The Imam said that if the *Majlis* wants to elect the members of the government, they should take these standards into account. The recent speech of the Foreign Minister regarding the revolutionary execution of Bakhtiar was his personal opinion and was not mentioned prior to his speech in the Revolutionary Council. Hence, it cannot possibly be the opinion of the Revolutionary Council.”

The question was posed: “In your opinion, how is it that the limitation on the Imam's involvement in the administrative affairs of government was only addressed in the context of Islamic dress code and purging? Is this not inconsistent?” The Head of the Supreme Court replied: “It will never be mentioned in those contexts, but these should be considered two firm steps. We decided on fundamental changes a while ago. Before the Imam gave his speech regarding this matter, we had reached this opinion as a result of the research carried out by our friends in the Judiciary. We said that a fundamental change must start as soon as possible. In any case, the changes will be fundamental [sic].”

A reporter asked: “In the recent meeting of the members of the Revolutionary Council with the Imam, he complained about the interim government and its activities. How is it that you did not speak of these shortcomings before?” Ayatollah Beheshti said: “Back when the interim government was complaining about our interference in their work, it was because we believed that we must act forcefully. In the beginning, there were two different ideologies and three groups in the Revolutionary Council.”

In response to the question: “If an Islamic group were to form to eliminate the leaders of infidelity,¹ how could this be done in accordance with Islam?” Dr. Beheshti said: “From an Islamic view, there is no problem with this idea but, since we have an Islamic government now, the activities of such groups must be supervised by a branch of the leadership that would explain and oversee their direction. Basically, this matter has to be supervised by the Supreme Leader of the revolution.”

A reporter asked: “Have you suggested a particular candidate for Prime Minister to the President?” The Head of the Supreme Court said: “Personally, I find Messrs Raja'i, Mirsalim, and Kalantari all suitable for this position. Mr. Farsi was also being considered very seriously, but he has announced

¹ A reference to the Koran, *surah al-tawbah* (9.12): “And if they break their oaths after their agreement and (openly) revile your religion then kill the leaders of the infidels.”

that he is not yet ready to take up executive responsibilities, even though the Islamic Republic Party elected him as their candidate in general session. Mr. Banisadr simply wants to know who is most likely to work well with him. Anyhow, electing the Prime Minister is the job of the President and the *Majlis* and all I can offer are my opinions and suggestions. I hope that our Revolutionary *Majlis* can make a good decision in regards to our Revolutionary future Prime Minister. I also hope that Mr. Banisadr will endorse someone who meets the revolutionary ideals of the Imam, the people and the *Majlis* and that soon - after the selection of the Prime Minister and ministers – our Revolutionary Cabinet can start its work.”

A reporter asked: “How would you assess the Imam’s statement that there has been ‘a revolution within a revolution’ in society?” Ayatollah Beheshti said: “Society is unhappy that the leaders of the revolution do not exercise proper judgment to safeguard the momentum and the achievements of the revolution. Rather I can say that at least a powerful segment of society is unhappy, the same people that were the main force behind the revolution (from 1962 until now). Those who shouldered the heaviest and the most difficult burden in this period have been unhappy at the current direction and have expressed their unhappiness repeatedly. These people feel that at this particular time, when the country is about to enter a new phase, the *Majlis* and those responsible for guiding and moving the revolution forward must exhibit greater revolutionary fervor.”

With regard to the Imam’s cautionary warning to ministers and officials, Dr. Beheshti said: “In the past eighteen years of our struggle, the Imam has always been a leader and someone who would express his discontent through his speeches, his behavior, and through his righteous, revolutionary, Islamic indignation that can cause a nation to erupt. The meaning of the word Imam is someone who moves ahead of the masses. This has been the nature of our revolution. The Imam was stronger and more forceful and more discontented than any of us. He walked the righteous path of revolution and the nation followed him. Of course, different authorities see this differently and some try to deal with the situation as forcefully and revolutionarily as possible before the Imam is forced to intervene and others are weaker and more mediocre.”

Regarding the plans of the Revolutionary Council, Dr. Beheshti said: “The Revolutionary Council members will soon visit the Imam to present a report to both him and the nation that is now being prepared by Dr. Ba Honar on the work carried out by Council over the past twenty months. After that, the report will be placed in the hands of the representatives of the people in the *Majlis*.”

About the situation of Afghanistan, Dr. Beheshti said: “Afghanistan has a complicated situation. In my opinion, the Afghan people are going down the same path as the Iranian nation; I mean they will strive and fight, even if it means sacrificing their lives, until they achieve final victory.”

Beheshti added: “A massive and profound struggle is underway to fundamentally change the Ministry of Justice and its goal is to ensure that the Islamic penal code be enforced. For this reason, we invited a few groups about three months ago to start devising laws based on Islamic jurisprudence to be enforced after they are passed by the *Majlis*.”

A reporter asked: “Since Bakhtiar played a role in the recent doomed coup, should we sever all diplomatic ties with France?” Ayatollah Beheshti said: “The court will try Bakhtiar *in absentia* and issue its verdict. After the verdict is issued, the court will request Bakhtiar’s extradition. Once the current trials [of the other coup conspirators] are concluded and when all of Bakhtiar’s motives and the extent of his crimes has come to light, the court will issue an opinion in this regard.”


Appendix 3

Ayatollah Khalkhali: If We Cannot Arrest Them, We
Will Assassinate Members of the Phalavi Family,
KAYHAN, 18 Azar 1358 (DECEMBER 9, 1979)

(Followed by Translation)

تقدیر ۱۰۰ ساله ۱۳۸۴
روزنامه همگام - شماره ۱۳۸۴
گیمهان

خبریه و فروش ارز بیابال
بسیار تریه بر سر هر دو میلیون دلار در روز...
فروش ارز بیابال...
بسیار تریه بر سر هر دو میلیون دلار در روز...
فروش ارز بیابال...
بسیار تریه بر سر هر دو میلیون دلار در روز...



آب الله خلیجانی: خاندان
پهلوی را ترورمی کنیم
شما را ترورمی کنیم...
آب الله خلیجانی...
پهلوی را ترورمی کنیم...
شما را ترورمی کنیم...

ایستاد رابطه مقدم مرآه ای
بأسفارت آمریکا
ایستاد رابطه مقدم مرآه ای...
بأسفارت آمریکا...
ایستاد رابطه مقدم مرآه ای...
بأسفارت آمریکا...

ایستاد رابطه مقدم مرآه ای
بأسفارت آمریکا
ایستاد رابطه مقدم مرآه ای...
بأسفارت آمریکا...
ایستاد رابطه مقدم مرآه ای...
بأسفارت آمریکا...

ایستاد رابطه مقدم مرآه ای
بأسفارت آمریکا
ایستاد رابطه مقدم مرآه ای...
بأسفارت آمریکا...
ایستاد رابطه مقدم مرآه ای...
بأسفارت آمریکا...

ایستاد رابطه مقدم مرآه ای
بأسفارت آمریکا
ایستاد رابطه مقدم مرآه ای...
بأسفارت آمریکا...
ایستاد رابطه مقدم مرآه ای...
بأسفارت آمریکا...

تنگرام همتی
بازگشت به
آب الله خلیجانی
شیرتنداری
تنگرام همتی...
بازگشت به...
آب الله خلیجانی...
شیرتنداری...

تنگرام همتی
بازگشت به
آب الله خلیجانی
شیرتنداری
تنگرام همتی...
بازگشت به...
آب الله خلیجانی...
شیرتنداری...

تنگرام همتی
بازگشت به
آب الله خلیجانی
شیرتنداری
تنگرام همتی...
بازگشت به...
آب الله خلیجانی...
شیرتنداری...

تنگرام همتی
بازگشت به
آب الله خلیجانی
شیرتنداری
تنگرام همتی...
بازگشت به...
آب الله خلیجانی...
شیرتنداری...

ایران و رادبوهای جهان
تفسیر و تدوین رادبو در راه مینایت شوروی در
قالب جمهوری اسلامی ایران
ایران و رادبوهای جهان...
تفسیر و تدوین رادبو در راه مینایت شوروی در...
قالب جمهوری اسلامی ایران...

ایران و رادبوهای جهان
تفسیر و تدوین رادبو در راه مینایت شوروی در
قالب جمهوری اسلامی ایران
ایران و رادبوهای جهان...
تفسیر و تدوین رادبو در راه مینایت شوروی در...
قالب جمهوری اسلامی ایران...

ایران و رادبوهای جهان
تفسیر و تدوین رادبو در راه مینایت شوروی در
قالب جمهوری اسلامی ایران
ایران و رادبوهای جهان...
تفسیر و تدوین رادبو در راه مینایت شوروی در...
قالب جمهوری اسلامی ایران...

ایران در دوران توقف دارایی خود بصادق
ایران در دوران توقف دارایی خود بصادق...
ایران در دوران توقف دارایی خود بصادق...
ایران در دوران توقف دارایی خود بصادق...

ایران در دوران توقف دارایی خود بصادق
ایران در دوران توقف دارایی خود بصادق...
ایران در دوران توقف دارایی خود بصادق...
ایران در دوران توقف دارایی خود بصادق...

ایران در دوران توقف دارایی خود بصادق
ایران در دوران توقف دارایی خود بصادق...
ایران در دوران توقف دارایی خود بصادق...
ایران در دوران توقف دارایی خود بصادق...

ایران در دوران توقف دارایی خود بصادق
ایران در دوران توقف دارایی خود بصادق...
ایران در دوران توقف دارایی خود بصادق...
ایران در دوران توقف دارایی خود بصادق...

ایران در دوران توقف دارایی خود بصادق
ایران در دوران توقف دارایی خود بصادق...
ایران در دوران توقف دارایی خود بصادق...
ایران در دوران توقف دارایی خود بصادق...

Khalkhali: If We Cannot Arrest Them, We Will Assassinate Members of the Pahlavi Family

The U.S. Embassy was monitoring the work of the Revolutionary Courts.

I follow the Imam's lead. I am ready to be called upon to try the spies.

Ayatollah Khalkhali, the religious magistrate who personally accepted responsibility for the assassination of Ashraf Pahlavi's son [Shahriar Shafiq], shared his opinions regarding this assassination in an interview with Kayhan.

Kayhan: You announced that Shahriar [Shafiq], a member of the filthy Pahlavi family, was assassinated by the *Fadaiyan-i Islam*. At the same time two other groups – the Islamic Liberation Front and the *Forqan* group – also took responsibility for this assassination. How can this be explained?

Khalkhali: I don't know about *Forqan* group, but the Islamic Liberation Front does collaborate with us to the extent needed.

Kayhan: What are your future plans in this regard?

Khalkhali: The wretched Pahlavi Family and their associates who have an execution verdict issued against them are being pursued by us inside and outside of the country. If we cannot arrest them, we will assassinate them.

Kayhan: Some groups claim that you are responsible for the murder of Ayatollah Shariatmadari's guard. What is your response?

Khalkhali: I have to say, regarding the Azerbaijan issue in general, that SAVAK and CIA elements are operating in the guise of 'protecting the faith' with the real aim of fomenting civil war and promoting the cause of international imperialism. However, the brave and awakened people of Azerbaijan will overcome all such conspiracies.

Kayhan: Is there a case file about your revolutionary activities in the spy den of U.S.A.¹?

Khalkhali: Yes, the spy den of U.S.A. has monitored the work of the Revolutionary Court. They have continuously, and with particular interest, reported on what I was responsible for.

Kayhan: If the university students were to invite you to try the spies of imperialism, would you take up the responsibility?

Khalkhali: I follow the Imam's lead. If the Imam gives me this responsibility, I will follow his order.

¹ Referring to the United States Embassy in Tehran

Appendix 4

The Imam Issued an Execution *Fatwa* for Everyone
Involved in the Coup, ETTIELLA'AT, 29 Tir 1359
(JULY 20, 1980)

(Followed by Translation)

هیچکس حق عفو نیاست

امام فتوای اعدام تمام همراهان کودتار صادر کردند

آخرین مهلت معاملات زمین و مسکن اعلام شد

این پروتکل نهایت تعیین شده میسر است
مربوط به زمین و مسکن است

اینجا شبکه با خیال فاسد کودتا همراه بود تا آنکه تمام اینها بجهت ایران حکومتان قتل است. پاک استخوان ندارد، هیچکس حق ندارد در مورد کسی عفو یا مسامحه بکند.
مستوفی شورای عالی انقلاب فرهنگی و هیئت مدیران
۱۱ شهریور ۱۳۵۹



امروز بازار تعطیل است

از سوه سیه و سیمان
چهارشنبه ۱۱ شهریور
بازارهای تهران

امروز عزای عمومی اعلام شد

۱۱ شهریور

مجلس رسماً آغاز بکار کرد

۱۱ شهریور

۱۲ صفحه چاپ دوم

اطلاعات

شماره ۶۹، پیر ۱۳۵۹، شماره ۱۳۹۱، شماره ۱۲، روزنامه

عوامل توطئه بمباران تهران اعدام شدند

کاسترو از کمک آمریکا به نیکاراگوئه تشکر کرد

کوبا ۱۲۲ میلیون دلار
فهرتکا به نیکاراگوئه

کوبا، ۱۱ شهریور (تاس) - فیدل کاسترو، رهبر کوبا، در یک سخنرانی در شهر هوانا، تشکر کرد از کمک آمریکا به نیکاراگوئه. او گفت که این کمکها به نیکاراگوئه اجازه داد تا در برابر حملات آمریکا ایستادگی کند. کاسترو افزود که کوبا نیز آماده است تا در صورت نیاز به نیکاراگوئه کمک کند.

پلیس فرانسه مشخصات حمله کنندگان به اختیار اعلام کرد

حمله به پختیار از سوی
قلب زاده قبیح شد

پاریس، ۱۱ شهریور (تاس) - پلیس فرانسه اعلام کرد که مشخصات حمله کنندگان به پختیار در فرانسه را به اختیار اعلام کرده است. پلیس گفت که حمله کنندگان از گروهی به نام «قلب زاده» بودند که در فرانسه فعالیت می‌کنند.

برای تحویل هلیکوپتر و ۴ نفر از ازی حقوقی به نیکاراگوئه

۱۱ شهریور

تهران، ۱۱ شهریور (تاس) - وزارت امور خارجه اعلام کرد که برای تحویل هلیکوپتر و ۴ نفر از ازی حقوقی به نیکاراگوئه اقدام کرده است. وزارت خارجه گفت که این اقدام در راستای همکاری با دولت نیکاراگوئه است.

پخش سباحت المینیک از امروز در تلویزیون

۱۱ شهریور

تهران، ۱۱ شهریور (تاس) - پخش سباحت المینیک از امروز در تلویزیون آغاز خواهد شد. این مسابقات در چارم تهران برگزار می‌شود.

تقدیرمجلس میشود طرح نظام اداری

۱۱ شهریور

تهران، ۱۱ شهریور (تاس) - طرح نظام اداری که در هیئت وزیران تصویب شده است، در جلسه علنی مجلس تقدیر خواهد شد. این طرح شامل اصلاحات در ساختار اداری و تقویت کارایی است.

ساختمان وزارت کشاورزی تخلیه میشود

ساختمان وزارت کشاورزی تخلیه میشود

تهران، ۱۱ شهریور (تاس) - ساختمان وزارت کشاورزی تخلیه شده است. این ساختمان که در تهران واقع است، به دلیل نیاز به تعمیرات اساسی تخلیه شده است. وزارت کشاورزی اعلام کرد که کارهای تعمیراتی در اسرع وقت انجام خواهد شد.

تقریباً طب زاده در رابطه با حمله مسلحانه به پختیار

۱۱ شهریور

پاریس، ۱۱ شهریور (تاس) - تقریباً طب زاده در رابطه با حمله مسلحانه به پختیار اظهار نظر کرد. او گفت که این حمله یک اقدام تروریستی است و باید محکوم شود.

همکاران ساواک و عوامل سانسور از اطلاعات شدد

۱۱ شهریور

تهران، ۱۱ شهریور (تاس) - همکاران ساواک و عوامل سانسور از اطلاعات شدد. این اقدام در راستای مبارزه با تروریسم و حفظ امنیت ملی است.

یوگه معدنی

۱۱ شهریور

تهران، ۱۱ شهریور (تاس) - یوگه معدنی در تهران افتتاح شد. این معدن به تولید فلزات اساسی می‌پردازد.

اطلاعه

۱۱ شهریور

تهران، ۱۱ شهریور (تاس) - اطلاعاتی در مورد فعالیت‌های تروریستی در تهران منتشر شد.

سخت روز

عوامل کودتا در دستگیر شدند
از ششماه الفقه تا ملک خان
از مرز نجین تا لیبیا

تهران، ۱۱ شهریور (تاس) - عوامل کودتا در دستگیر شدند. از ششماه الفقه تا ملک خان و از مرز نجین تا لیبیا. این افراد در جریان عملیات امنیتی دستگیر شدند.

یوگه معدنی

۱۱ شهریور

تهران، ۱۱ شهریور (تاس) - یوگه معدنی در تهران افتتاح شد. این معدن به تولید فلزات اساسی می‌پردازد.

اطلاعه

۱۱ شهریور

تهران، ۱۱ شهریور (تاس) - اطلاعاتی در مورد فعالیت‌های تروریستی در تهران منتشر شد.

اطلاعه

۱۱ شهریور

تهران، ۱۱ شهریور (تاس) - اطلاعاتی در مورد فعالیت‌های تروریستی در تهران منتشر شد.

اطلاعات

سال بنیاد: چهارم
محل کار: تهران، خیابان ولیعصر
انتشارات: انتشارات اطلاعات
تلفن: ۳۲۸۱
تیراژ: ۱۲۰۰۰ نسخه
قیمت: ۲۰۰ ریال

مجموعه پست و نشر: ۱۳۹۱
پخش در سراسر کشور

کتابخانه سراسر اسو جهان

مجموعه وسیع و متنوع از کتب و مجلات علمی، ادبی، تاریخی، فلسفی، اقتصادی، فنی و هنری در دسترس شماست. برای اطلاع بیشتر و سفارش کتب، با ما تماس بگیرید.

نظام اداری جمهوری اسلامی ایران

پیشینه و تشکیل

پیشینه نظام اداری جمهوری اسلامی ایران به دوران پهلوی بازمیگردد. در دوره پهلوی، ساختار اداری تحت تأثیر مدل غربی قرار داشت. پس از انقلاب، با تأسیس دولت اسلامی، تغییرات اساسی در ساختار اداری صورت گرفت. هدف اصلی از تشکیل این نظام، ایجاد یک ساختار اداری متناسب با ارزش‌های اسلامی و پاسخگو به نیازهای مردم است.

کاسترو با نمایندگان کاخ سفید

فیidel کاسترو رهبر کوبا با نمایندگان کاخ سفید در واشینگتن دیدار کرد. در این دیدار، بحث‌ها در مورد تنش‌های منطقه‌ای و روابط بین‌المللی انجام شد. کاسترو تأکید کرد که کوبا خواهان صلح و همکاری بیشتر است.

بازی‌های المپیک ۱۹۸۰ مسکو

بازی‌های المپیک تابستانی ۱۹۸۰ در مسکو برگزار شد. این دوره المپیک با حضور ورزشکاران از سراسر جهان همراه بود. با وجود تنش‌های بین‌المللی در آن زمان، بازی‌ها با موفقیت برگزار شدند.

تظاهرات مردم بولین، مبارکات

تظاهرات گسترده مردم بولین در روسیه در حمایت از دولت برگزار شد. تظاهرها با شعارهای ملی و حمایت از سیاست‌های جاری همراه بود.

تاچا و افغانی داد!

تاجیکان و افغان‌ها در منطقه‌ای در جنوب آسیا با یکدیگر درگیر شدند. درگیری‌ها منجر به تلفات و خسارت‌های قابل توجهی شد.

مقامات در برابر کودتا در بولیوی

مقامات دولتی بولیوی در برابر کودتای نظامی مقاومت کردند. تلاش‌ها در جهت بازگرداندن نظم و امنیت کشور در جریان است.

روئیس مارجادو

روئیس مارجادو در جریان بحران‌های منطقه‌ای اظهارنظر کرد. او بر اهمیت دیپلماسی و صلح تأکید کرد.

خبرها و احوالات

امام زین الدین با فرمانده جدید سپاه پاسداران

قوای مسلح از هم جدا نشوند، با هم باشند

امام زین الدین با فرمانده جدید سپاه پاسداران دیدار کرد. در این دیدار، بر اهمیت وحدت و همکاری بین قوای مسلح تأکید شد. امام فرموده است: «قوای مسلح ما باید با هم باشند و از هم جدا نشوند. این وحدت، ضامن موفقیت و پایداری نظام است.»

نویسندگان اخلاقی باصلاح

نویسندگان اخلاقی باصلاح در نشست‌های تخصصی شرکت کردند. در این نشست‌ها، دربارهٔ نقش اخلاق در جامعه و روش‌های نوین نویسندگی بحث و تبادل نظر شد.

نویسندگان اخلاقی باصلاح

نویسندگان اخلاقی باصلاح در نشست‌های تخصصی شرکت کردند. در این نشست‌ها، دربارهٔ نقش اخلاق در جامعه و روش‌های نوین نویسندگی بحث و تبادل نظر شد.

نویسندگان اخلاقی باصلاح

نویسندگان اخلاقی باصلاح در نشست‌های تخصصی شرکت کردند. در این نشست‌ها، دربارهٔ نقش اخلاق در جامعه و روش‌های نوین نویسندگی بحث و تبادل نظر شد.

نویسندگان اخلاقی باصلاح

نویسندگان اخلاقی باصلاح در نشست‌های تخصصی شرکت کردند. در این نشست‌ها، دربارهٔ نقش اخلاق در جامعه و روش‌های نوین نویسندگی بحث و تبادل نظر شد.

نویسندگان اخلاقی باصلاح

نویسندگان اخلاقی باصلاح در نشست‌های تخصصی شرکت کردند. در این نشست‌ها، دربارهٔ نقش اخلاق در جامعه و روش‌های نوین نویسندگی بحث و تبادل نظر شد.

بخش مسابقات المپیک

بخش مسابقات المپیک در مسکو در جریان است. ورزشکاران ایرانی در رشته‌های مختلف با عملکرد قابل توجهی شرکت کرده‌اند.

خفاصان يك كم

خفاصان يك كم در زمینه‌های مختلف فعالیت می‌کنند. این گروه با استفاده از مهارت‌های خود، خدمات ارزشمندی ارائه می‌دهد.

انودگی هوای

انودگی هوای در مناطق مختلف گزارش شده است. این موضوع نیازمند توجه و اقدامات پیشگیرانه است.

تیران گاهش

تیران گاهش در جریان تمرینات نظامی شرکت کرده است. این تمرینات با موفقیت انجام شد.

یافت

یافت در زمینه‌های مختلف انجام شده است. این یافته‌ها می‌تواند به بهبود روش‌ها و فرآیندها کمک کند.

هنسولیت امور بیزینسی

هنسولیت امور بیزینسی در زمینه‌های مختلف در جریان است. این امر به توسعه کسب‌وکارها و ایجاد اشتغال کمک می‌کند.

موفقیت‌های علمی

موفقیت‌های علمی در زمینه‌های مختلف به ثبت رسیده است. این دستاوردها نشان‌دهندهٔ توانمندی‌های علمی کشور است.

موفقیت‌های علمی

موفقیت‌های علمی در زمینه‌های مختلف به ثبت رسیده است. این دستاوردها نشان‌دهندهٔ توانمندی‌های علمی کشور است.

موفقیت‌های علمی

موفقیت‌های علمی در زمینه‌های مختلف به ثبت رسیده است. این دستاوردها نشان‌دهندهٔ توانمندی‌های علمی کشور است.

موفقیت‌های علمی

موفقیت‌های علمی در زمینه‌های مختلف به ثبت رسیده است. این دستاوردها نشان‌دهندهٔ توانمندی‌های علمی کشور است.

موفقیت‌های علمی

موفقیت‌های علمی در زمینه‌های مختلف به ثبت رسیده است. این دستاوردها نشان‌دهندهٔ توانمندی‌های علمی کشور است.

موفقیت‌های علمی

موفقیت‌های علمی در زمینه‌های مختلف به ثبت رسیده است. این دستاوردها نشان‌دهندهٔ توانمندی‌های علمی کشور است.

The Imam Issued an Execution *Fatwa* for Everyone Involved in the Coup; No One Has the Right to Pardon or Exercise Leniency.

During the Imam's meeting with the new Head of the Revolutionary Guards, "the Armed Forces must not split, they must stay together."

[Translation of the last column]

About what was said that there is a request for me to intervene; I cannot intervene in all matters. I have people; people must intervene [on my behalf]. For example, if I approve of you to be the Head of the Revolutionary Guards, this is my intervention. What this means is that, if you do anything there [in that office], in effect I have done it. If those who work there want to listen to someone, they must listen to you. It is the same for others, if they obey someone I have appointed, it is obedience to me and [the appointment] is my intervention. These are not separate matters. Assume that I have assigned the President to be the Commander-in-Chief; if one agrees with what I have put in place, that is agreement with me. I cannot individually interfere in every matter. I have to assign people to create order. In any case, it is a country that belongs to all of you. We are all responsible in the matter of protecting the nation. You see what has been done to [the country] as it stands and will be done in the future. We are duty bound by God, the blessed and exalted, to protect what has been entrusted to us, which is this Islamic country, Islam and the Islamic Republic. We should show no weakness in this matter. There should be no personal issues or private motivation. We are all brothers and must [work] together to preserve what God has entrusted to us. And I advise those who speak [in opposition] and write extensively about it, that weakening the Law Enforcement Forces or the Islamic Revolutionary Guards is like weakening Islam. Weakening the Islamic Army is weakening Islam. Weakening the gendarmerie is weakening Islam. Weakening the other armed and law enforcement forces is weakening Islam. Of course, this does not mean that the corrupt ones should not be removed from their posts. Corrupt people must be turned over to the courts. Wherever they are and whatever post they hold. They must be entrusted to the courts. Everyone who is Islamic and is working on the path of Islam must support the writers and preachers, whether they are clergy or not. One word said with the purpose of weakening them is really weakening Islam and is thus *haram* (forbidden) and not allowed. Therefore, I hope that you are all successful and assisted by God, and protect what was entrusted to you. We have another world where we will be all present and questioned. So if we cause a minor harm to the Islamic Republic, tomorrow in the presence of God, the blessed and exalted, we will be questioned and questioned harshly.

One must pay attention to these matters. All men must [pay attention] and those who, God forbid, have certain kinds of deviations, if they can be corrected, must be corrected with preaching, advice and guidance. If they cannot be corrected, then we must purge them. Those who are followers of these [anti-revolutionary] problems, and those who followed the corrupt ideology of the coup, their verdict is execution. There is no exception. No one has the right to pardon or exercise leniency. According to Islam and the Koran, they are corrupted, and corrupting and for such people, there are four punishments in the Koran, the most lenient of which is killing. I hope that, God willing, all of you walk [God's] path with health, honesty and welfare and follow this straight path. May God protect you; God willing.

Appendix 5

Decree to Assassinate Manouchehr Ganji, signed by
Prosecutor General of Iran, Hojjatolislam Mousavi
Tabrizi, 3/17/1993

(Followed by Translation)

دینعلی

دادستانی انقلاب اسلامی



جمهوری اسلامی ایران

شماره ۷۷۱۱/۱۲/۱۳۰۰
تاریخ ۱۳۰۰/۱۲/۱۷
پست

بسمه : وزارت اطلاعات و امنیت جمهوری اسلامی
موضوع: منوچهر گنجی وزیر سابق
محرمانه مستقیم - فوری حائز توجه

درباره نامبرد ه فوق که از بد و انقلاب اسلامی در خارج از کشور مشغول توطئه علیه جمهوری اسلامی و -
اقدام بر ضد اسلام و تحریک و ترغیب امت مسلمان به تبری از دین و مذاهب جمعیتی و مشوب ساختن از هان
جوامع بین المللی در مسود قصاص و احکام مصرحه در کلام ۰۰۰ مجهد و تشویق عوام الناس به همسان
و شورش علیه انقلاب اسلامی و حکومت دین و قرآن و حقانیت روحانیون برای اصلاح جامعه و تحویل آن و
مبارزه با فساد از مرجع عالی مرتبت رهبر جمهوری اسلامی استفتا بعمل آمد معظم له در جواب فرمودند :
شخص مذکور مرتد و فاسد و مهد و رالدم است بغلت د شمنی با خدا میزوجل و حضرت خاتم الانبیا (ص) و
نسخ فرامین و احکام الهی و ترویج فتنه و فساد در مملکت اسلامی و برای صیانت اسلام و مسلمین باید این -
ریشه فاسد سریعاً قطع تا موجب عبرت دیگران نشود .

علیهذا در امثال امر حضرت ولی فقیه مد ظله العالی سابق مشارالیه مشتمل بر بد اراک مضبوطه بدست
آمد و مکاتبات سفرای جمهوری اسلامی و برخی از مقامات خارج از کشور در رهسورای قناباتی اعلم حکام شرع
مطرح و مسود بحث و مذاکره قرار گرفت و با جماع قتل او را واجبید انستند و موضوع الزام اجرای حکم و مسیله
آیت ۰۰۰ محمد یزدی با اطلاع ریاست جمهوری رسید و مقرر شد از طریق آن وزارت به مأموران خارج دستور
و تعلیماتلا نهد اده شود و مأمورانیکهد را انجام فریضه موفق و فسد را بحکم شرع اسلام قصاص نمایند
علاوه بر اجرا خوری از جایزه مادی قابل توجهی نیز برخوردار خواهند شد . من ۰۰۰ التوفیق

دادستان کل انقلاب اسلامی
مسعود تبریزی
۱۳۰۰/۱۲/۱۷

رونوشت وزارت امور خارجه جهت ایجاد تسهیلات و تشریک مسامی و ابلاغ دستوریکباد ید بر بعد در کشور
مسورد نظر و کشورهای همجوار آن و اعلام شرح اقدامات معموله با توجه به اهمیت مسئله .

رونوشت وزارت سپاه پاسداران (اداره اطلاعات) جهت اقدام و انتخاب و معرفی عوامل ورزیده و با
تجربه و کارآمد و ایجاد امکانات و مقدرات با معاضدت وزارتخانه های مذکور فوق با رعایت کلیه جوانب امرو
اعلام شرح اقدامات با توجه به اهمیت موضوع

(تسویه)

بعد از خاتمه عملیات اوراق مکاتباتی را معدوم نمائید

=====

In the name of the Exalted

[Emblem of the Islamic
Republic of Iran and the
Prosecutor's Office]

No. 3472 / [illegible]
Date: 26/12/71 (03/17/93)
Attachment: ----

Prosecutor of the Islamic
Revolution

Islamic Republic of Iran

To: Ministry of Intelligence and Security
of the Islamic Republic
Topic: Manouchehr Ganji, Ex-Minister

Secret Direct – Immediately Process

A *fatwa* was requested from the high ranking *marja'*, the Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, about the aforementioned, who has conspired outside of the country against the Islamic Republic and acted against Islam from the beginning of revolution, as well as instigated and persuaded the Muslim nation to recant their faith and the creed of *Ja'fari* Shi'ism, and tainted the opinion of the international Community about *qisas* and other holy decrees in the holy Koran, and bamboozled the masses to rebel against the Islamic revolution and the religious and Koranic government, and has questioned the sincerity of the religious authorities for reforming our society and combating corruption. The honorable one responded:

Because he is at war with God and God's Seal of the Prophets¹ (Pbuh), and has ignored the divine decrees and orders, and promoted sedition and corruption in an Islamic country, the aforementioned is corrupted and an apostate and spilling his blood is permissible. For the purpose of protecting Islam and the Muslims, this corrupted root must be cut off as soon as possible so that it can serve as an example for others.

To corroborate the order of the Supreme Jurist (May Allah extend his shadow) the records of the aforementioned – including confiscated and recovered documents and the correspondence of the Islamic Republic's ambassadors and certain officials outside the country – were presented at the Judicial Council of the most knowledgeable Religious Magistrates and were discussed and investigated. It was unanimously decided that his execution is necessary. The President was informed by Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi² of the necessity of carrying out the execution order and it was decided that Ministry [of Intelligence] agents outside the country would receive the necessary orders and training to complete the assignment. The agents that successfully discharge this duty and kill the corrupted in accordance with the Islamic *shari'a* decree, will receive a significant monetary sum as a bonus, in addition to rewards in the afterlife. And the victory is with Allah.

Prosecutor General of the Islamic Republic
Mousavi Tabrizi
[signed: Mousavi Tabrizi]
25/12/1371 (03/16/1993)

Copy to be sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to make preparations and communicate the order to the necessary people in the intended country of operations and the neighboring countries, paying due attention to the importance of the issue.

Copy to be sent to the Ministry of the Revolutionary Guards (Office of Intelligence) to act, select and prepare capable, experienced and skilled individuals for the operation and to make the necessary logistical and planning arrangements with the help of the aforementioned Ministries, paying due attention to the importance of the issue.

(Attention)

After finishing the operation destroy all related correspondence

¹ The Prophet Mohammad

² Head of the Judiciary (1989 - 1999)

The Aadel Collection

Aadel is the Persian word for “just.” The Aadel Collection is a growing depository of documents recovered by the IHRDC that relate to human rights issues in Iran. This archive, dedicated to the victims of human rights abuse, promotes accountability by facilitating research on human rights violations in Iran.

The IHRDC accepts documents and multimedia materials relating to human rights in Iran from donors around the world. The IHRDC has a secure storage facility to accommodate more sensitive documents.

The Center takes full responsibility for authenticating all documents archived in the Aadel Collection. We do not archive documents that we cannot authenticate.

Selected material from the Aadel Collection can be accessed through the Center’s online database at www.IranHRDC.org.

To submit materials to the Aadel Collection, please contact the Center at info@IranHRDC.org.



Dr. Shapour Bakhtiar (born 1915) was a prominent opposition figure during the Shah's rule who served briefly as Prime Minister in 1979 before being forced from office by Ayatollah Khomeini and his supporters. In exile, Dr. Bakhtiar led the National Movement of the Iranian Resistance (NAMIR). He was found murdered in his home in Suresnes, France, on August 6, 1991, along with his personal assistant, Soroush Katibeh.