UNIItL )
NATIONS
Economic and Social Distr.
Council
GENERAL
E/CN.4/2006/5 3/Add. 3
24 March 2006
Original: ENGLISH
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Sixty-second session
Item 11(b) of the provisional agenda
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, INCLUDING THE QUESTIONS OF
DISAPPEARANCES AND SUMMARY EXECUTIONS
Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions
Report of the Special Rapporteur, Philip Alston* **
TRANSPARENCY AND THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY
* The summary of this
report is being circulated in all offficial languages. The report itself is
contained in the annex to the summary and is being circulated as received in the language of
submission only.
** The present report was submitted late in order to reflect the most up-to-date information.
C
GE.06-12057 (E) 070406
E/CN.4/2006/53/Add. 3
page 2
Sununary
OEe present report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions analyses a critical area of non-compliance with legal safeguards designed to protect
the right to life. It builds upon the proposition that [ cIountries that have maintained the death
penalty are not prohibited by international law from making that choice, but they have a clear
obligation to disclose the details of their application of the penalty” (E/CN.4/2005/7, para. 59).
OEe report analyses the legal basis of that transparency obligation and examines case studies that
illustrate the major problems that exist in this area.
Transparency is among the fundamental due process safeguards that prevent the
arbitrary deprivation of life. As the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights state, everyone has the right for criminal
charges against him or her to be adjudicated in view of the public. OEe present report looks in
detail at article 14, paragraph 1 of the Covenant, which narrowly limits the scope for secrecy at
trial, and provides a powerful transparency requirement thereaifier. Secrecy throughout the
post-conviction process is also limited by State obligations to ensure due process rights and to
respect the right to freedom from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
Two key conclusions result from this analysis. First, the public is unable to make an
informed evaluation as to the death penalty in the absence of key pieces of information. In
particular, any meaningful public debate must take place in the light of detailed disclosure by the
State of information relating to: (a) the number of persons sentenced to death; (b) the number of
executions actually carried out; (c) the number of death sentences reversed or commuted on
appeal; (d) the number of instances in which clemency has been granted; (e) the number of
persons remaining under sentence of death; and (f) each of the above broken down according to
the oLence for which the condemned person was convicted. Notwithstanding the critical role of
this information in any informed decision-making process, many States choose secrecy over
transparency, but still claim that capital punishment is retained in part because it attracts
widespread public support.
Secondly, condemned persons, their families and their lawyers should be provided with
timely and reliable information on the procedures and timing of appeals, clemency petitions, and
executions. Experience demonstrates that to do otherwise is highly likely to lead to violations of
due process rights and to inhuman and degrading treatment.
OEe case studies demonstrate that non-compliance with these transparency obligations is
of considerable practical relevance. Although the death penalty is not prohibited by international
law, its use is potentially inconsistent with respect for the right to life when its administration is
cloaked in secrecy.
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Annex
TRANSPARENCY AND THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY:
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON EXTRAJUDICIAL
SUMMARY OR ARBITRARY EXECUTIONS, PHILIP ALSTON
CONTENTS
Paragraphs Page
I. INTRODUCTION 1 -6 4
II. THE OBLIGATION TO MAKE PUBLIC INFORMATION
ON THE USE OF THE DEATH PENALTY 7- 25 5
A. Legal framework of public transparency obligations 7 - 13 5
B. Case studies on secrecy and its impact on public
oversight and debate 14- 21 7
C. Case studies on the use of national security” as a basis
for withholding statistics on death sentences and
executions 22 - 25 9
III. THE OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE POST-CONVICTION
TRANSPARENCY FOR CONVICTS AND
THEIR FAMILIES 26- 47 10
A. Legal framework 26 - 27 10
B. Case studies on how secret executions undermine due
process safeguards and lead to the inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment of prisoners
and their families 28 - 37 11
C. Evaluating the privacy rationale for secret executions 38 - 47 13
IV. CONCLUSION 48 15
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I. INTRODUCTION
1. In the previous report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions to the Commission on Human Rights at its sixty-ffirst session, the Special Rapporteur
noted that there is a widespread lack of compliance with the obligation to administer the death
penalty in a transparent manner:
secrecy prevents any informed public debate about capital punishment within the
relevant society ... Countries that have maintained the death penalty are not prohibited
by international law from making that choice, but they have a clear obligation to disclose
the details of their application of the penalty. For a Government to insist on a principled
defence of the death penalty but to refuse to divulge to its own population the extent to
which, and the reasons for which, it is being applied is unacceptable. OEe Commission
should, as a matter of priority, insist that every country that uses capital punishment
undertake full and accurate reporting of all instances thereof, and should publish a
consolidated report prepared on at least an annual basis”.'
2. OEe present follow-up report explores that problem in greater detail, discussing the legal
framework underpinning transparency obligations and providing case studies that may clarify the
issues. Information on actual practices undermining transparency is required to assess both the
dimensions of the problem and the range of reform options. A preliminary observation is that
countries do not fall neatly into transparent” and OEpaque” categories. While there are countries
in which the entire process of capital punishment from trial to execution is cloaked in secrecy,
more oifien some aspects are secret while others are public. For example, in Japan the public is
provided no information regarding individual executions, but detailed aggregate statistics are
provided. In contrast, in China, at least some executions are widely publicized, but all aggregate
information is held in secrecy. OEis diversity of legal and institutional obstacles to transparency
demonstrates that there is no single path to transparency.
3. It should be noted that one consequence of the lack of transparency in the administration
of capital punishment is that reports like this draw on a poor factual base. Today, it would be
impossible to survey current practices in a comprehensive manner; for that reason, the Special
Rapporteur chose to focus on representative incidents and practices. OEe Special Rapporteur
drew on information he had received from various sources. Notes verbales were sent
on 24 August 2005 to those States which seemed to be most pertinent to the inquiry with a
request for their views. Of those, Belarus, China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
Egypt, India, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Viet Nam responded. OEe Special Rapporteur
appreciates the cooperation these Governments have extended and the cases studies in the
present report build on information received by the Special Rapporteur, combined with
responses by the Governments concerned to a preliminary statement of the current situation. OEe
Special Rapporteur regrets that the Governments of Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Japan, and the Syrian Arab Republic did not respond. OEe Special Rapporteur is very grateful to
the secretariat of the Offce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights for its
assistance in obtaining material for this report and to Katrina Gustafson and William Abresch for
superb research and analysis.
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4. The case studies that follow will analyse some of the reasons given for non-disclosure of
information on the death penalty, but it is worthwhile to ffirst highlight one key point: the failure
to comply with transparency obligations lacks any basis related to crime control or the traditional
purposes of punishment. 2 It is, for example, widely believed that the death penalty is a necessary
deterrent. Putting aside the empirical debate on whether capital punishment serves as a
deterrent, is it plausible that secrecy could enhance such a deterrent eLect? It could be argued
that prospective criminals would, lacking information, assume the worst. However, even if we
were to impute this species of fear of uncertainty to criminals, the facts are that secrecy is not
actually utilized by Governments in a way that would exaggerate the use of the death penalty.
Instead, secrecy seems to be universally relied on so as to downplay the actual numbers of death
sentences and executions that take place; thus, secrecy would tend to undermine any deterrence
eLect of capital punishment.
5. Secrecy is also incompatible with a retributive rationale for the death penalty. The
general public and the families of victims alike are provided with a sense of retribution by
punishments that are known not by punishments that are secret. Indeed, any retributive eLect
that might result from the knowledge that the criminal has been put to death will be reduced as
secrecy reduces knowledge of the death sentence and execution.
6. That secret executions and confidential statistics in no way advance crime control and the
traditional purposes of punishment should itself raise serious questions about these practices.
II. THE OBLIGATION TO MAKE PUBLIC INFORMATION
ON THE USE OF THE DEATH PENALTY
A. Legal framework of public transparency obligations
7. Transparency is fundamental to the administration ofjustice; indeed, in the succinct
statement of the right to due process included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
requirement of a public hearing follows only that of a fair hearing. 3 The prominence of the
requirement is no accident: transparency is the surest safeguard of fairness. Why? Over time
punishment imposed by Governments has come to replace private acts of retribution. This has
rationalized the disposition of justice, yet it has also introduced the possibility of more
systematic arbitrariness. The extraordinary power conferred on the State - to take a person's life
using a ffiring squad, hanging, lethal injection, or some other means of killing - poses a dangerous
risk of abuse. OEis power may be safely held in check only by public oversight of public
punishment. It is a commonplace that due process serves to protect defendants. However, due
process is also the mechanism through which society ensures that the punishments inflicted in its
name are just and fair. As the Human Rights Committee has observed with respect to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, transparency is a duty upon the State that
is not dependent on any request, by the interested party”. 4
8. The transparency safeguard for the due process of law is guaranteed by article 14,
paragraph 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 5 That provision lays
down the general rule that everyone shall be entitled to a public hearing. It then clariffies this
general rule with a limitation clause in two parts. OEe ffirst part of the limitation clause provides
that the public may be excluded for one of several reasons: the general interest of a democratic
society in morals, public order, and national security, the privacy interests of the parties, and the
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interests ofjustice. These are thresholds not triggers: that a trial implicates a national security
interest does not automatically justify a wholly secret trial; instead, the courts may exclude the
public from all or part of a trial” as required by the particular rationale by which publicity
would imperil national security in the case at hand.
9. OEe second part of the limitation clause of article 14, paragraph 1, sharply limits the
scope of the ffirst part, specifying that secrecy may never extend beyond the hearing itself OEny
judgement rendered in a criminal case or in a suit at law shall be made public”. To this
requirement there is only the narrowest of exceptions (for a few family law matters). No
limitation whatsoever is permitted for interests of public order, national security, or justice. The
reason for this nearly absolute transparency obligation is not, of course, that the draifiers and
States parties lost sight of these legitimate interests between the penultimate and last clauses of
article 14, paragraph 1; rather, the rule is absolute because it is never the case that a democratic
society has an interest in concealing from the public even this ffinal trace of the judicial process.
10. In its resolution 1989/64 intended to ensure the implementation of the safeguards
guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty, the Economic and Social
Council urged Member States to publish, for each category of oLence for which the death
penalty is authorized, and if possible on an annual basis, information about the use of the death
penalty, including the number of persons sentenced to death, the number of executions actually
carried out, the number of persons under sentence of death, the number of death sentences
reversed or commuted on appeal and the number of instances in which clemency has been
granted, and to include information on the extent to which the safeguards referred to above are
incorporated in national law”. 6 It is impossible to oversee compliance with the human rights law
on capital punishment without this information.
11. Even during a state of emergency, derogation from transparency rights is never permitted
in death penalty cases. It might be noted that the permissible scope of derogation from due
process rights is always tightly circumscribed. While article 14, paragraph 1 is not listed among
the so-called non-derogable rights” (art. 4, para. 2), measures taken in derogation must always
be limited to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation” (art. 4, para. 1).
Moreover, derogations from due process may never go so far as to eviscerate the rule of law,
because to permit such derogation would be to defeat the very purpose of the article 4 derogation
regime: to prohibit states of exception subject solely to executive discretion by accommodating
states of emergency subject to the rule of law. 7 It is not necessary, however, to speculate here on
whether any species of emergency might strictly require derogation from the transparency
requirements of article 14, paragraph 1. With respect to transparency and the death penalty, it is
suffcient to quote the Human Rights Committee's cogent analysis: OEe provisions of the
Covenant relating to procedural safeguards may never be made subject to measures that would
circumvent the protection of non-derogable rights ... . OEus, for example, as article 6 of the
Covenant is non-derogable in its entirety, any trial leading to the imposition of the death penalty
during a state of emergency must conform to the provisions of the Covenant, including all the
requirements of articles 14 and 15. 8
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12. The purpose underpinning article 14, paragraph 1 explains why publicity must be more
than formal. In order for every organ of government and every member of the public to have at
least the opportunity to consider whether punishment is being imposed in a fair and
non-discriminatory manner, the administration of justice must be transparent. It defeats the
purpose of the publicity element of due process for judgements to be made public” by
ffiling them away in courthouses where they can, in theory, be paged through by citizens.
Obscurity can be as harmful to due process as secrecy. Indeed, some of the questions that must
be asked - that citizens must be able to ask - about the application of the death penalty cannot be
answered without a comprehensive view of the decisions and the sentences that have been made
throughout the country. OEe kind of informed public debate about capital punishment that is
contemplated by human rights law is undermined if Governments choose not to inform the
public. It is for this reason that a full and accurate reporting of all executions should be
published, and a consolidated version prepared on at least an annual basis.
13. Neither is the general public alone in having a legitimate interest in comprehensive and
reliable information on the use of the death penalty. At the national level, it might be noted that
the human rights law obligation not to impose capital punishment in an arbitrary or
discriminatory manner does not reside solely in the national executive. Organs in every branch
of government - including the executive, the judicial and the legislative - and at every level, from
the national to the local, will incur international legal responsibility on the State insofar as its
acts lead to arbitrary or discriminatory executions. 9 Without aggregate information on capital
punishment, it is, for example, impossible for any court to evaluate questions of discrimination.
At the international level, States OEave pledged themselves to achieve, in cooperation with the
United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and
fundamental freedoms In recognition of this duty, the Economic and Social Council has,
for example, requested that the Secretary-General survey Member States at ffive-year intervals on
their use of capital punishment, including on the oLences for which the death penalty may be
imposed and on the total number of executions.
B. Case studies on secrecy and its impact on public oversight and debate
14. Capital punishment policies and practices are oifienjustiffied with reference to the state of
public opinion. OEus, the Government of China observed in a reply to the Special Rapporteur
in 2003 that each country should decide whether to retain or abolish the death sentence on the
basis of its own actual circumstances and the aspirations of its people” and the role of public
opinion was also emphasized in a reply to the Special Rapporteur in 2005.11 OEe Government of
Japan responded to a survey by the Secretary-General that the majority of people in Japan
recognize the death penalty as a necessary punishment for grievous crimes. Considering the
number of serious crimes ... it is inevitable to impose the death penalty on oLenders who
commit such crimes”. 12 In many countries, however, non-compliance with transparency
obligations means that the public lacks the information necessary to make these determinations.
15. The public is unable to determine the necessary scope of capital punishment without key
pieces of information. In particular, public opinion must be informed by annual information on:
(a) the number of persons sentenced to death; (b) the number of executions actually carried out;
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(c) the number of death sentences reversed or commuted on appeal; (d) the number of instances
in which clemency has been granted; (e) the number of persons remaining under sentence of
death; and (f) each of the above broken down by the oLence for which the person was convicted.
Many States, however, choose secrecy over transparency, leaving the public without the requisite
information.
16. OEe decision of many States not to respond to the Secretary-General's survey on capital
punishment is indicative. OEe Economic and Social Council has requested that the
Secretary-General conduct this survey of Member States at ffive-year intervals since 1973.13 OEe
response rate has been very low, leading the Council to ask the Secretary-General to draw on all
available data” in future reports, rather than relying solely on Government responses. 14 OEe
Secretary-General's most recent report shows that retentionist countries are especially unlikely to
respond. Of the 62 countries that were retentionist at the time of the survey, 87 per cent did not
respond at all, and only 4 - Bahrain, Japan, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United States of
America - reported on the oLences for which the death penalty may be imposed and on the total
number of executions. 15
17. In some instances, no reason is given for the lack of transparency. Belarus does not
publish annual statistics relevant to the death penalty, nor does it provide the names or case
details of individuals who have already been executed. There has been great inconsistency in
the information on the death penalty that has been provided by the Government. For example,
on 5 October 2004, chief of the Belarusian Ministry of the Interior's Department of Corrections
Vladimir Kovchur reportedly told Interfax that there have been no executions this year, and
nobody is even on death row”. 16 However, on 19 November 2004, the Belarusian newspaper
Sovetskaya Belorussiya reported that the Interior Minister, Uladzimir Navumaw, had stated that
there were then 104 people on death row and that in 2004, 5 people had been sentenced to death
and executed. 17
18. In a note verbale to the Special Rapporteur, the Government stated that two persons were
sentenced to death in 2004; the note verbale did not comment on the size of death row or on the
number of persons executed. 18
19. Singapore does not normally publish statistics on death sentences passed or executions
carried out, and executions are not announced ahead of time and are rarely reported. However,
the Government occasionally makes information available in response to questions from
journalists or Parliament. A signifficant level of information on death sentences and executions
was also released in response to Amnesty International's January 2004 report on the death
penalty in Singapore (Singapore, the death penalty: a hidden toll of executions). In response to
the claim by Amnesty International that the Government kept death penalty statistics secret, the
Government issued a response stating that all trials and appeals are conducted in public, that
Amnesty International itself has monitored certain trials and that the more newsworthy trials are
reported in the media. 19 OEe Government response also revealed that as you have requested for
the ffigures, 19 Singaporeans and foreigners were executed in 2003. Between January and
September 2004, six persons were executed”. 20 In connection with Amnesty International's
estimate that 400 people had been executed in Singapore since 1991, the Government did not
provide a precise ffigure, but the Prisons Department said that this was a fair estimation”. 21
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20. A lack of transparency undermines public discourse on death penalty policy, and
sometimes this may be its purpose. Measures taken by the Government of Singapore suggest
an attempt to suppress public debate about the death penalty in the country. For example, in
April 2005, the Government denied a permit to an Amnesty International off cial to speak at a
conference on the death penalty organized by political opposition leaders and human rights
activists. The reason for the restriction, as stated by the Government, was that a high degree of
control over public debate and the media was necessary in order to maintain law and order. In
another recent example, the Government banned the use of photographs of
Shanmugam Murugesu, who was executed on 13 May 2005, in all publicity and information
relating to a concert organized to protest the death penalty. Posters advertising the concert had
included photographs of Shanmugam Murugesu's face. OEe reason stated for the ban was a
concern that the concert organizers were glorifying” an ex-convict and executed person.
21. Informed public debate about capital punishment is possible only with transparency
regarding its administration. There is an obvious inconsistency when a State invokes public
opinion on the one hand, while on the other hand deliberately withholding relevant information
on the use of the death penalty from the public. How can the public be said to favour a practice
about which it knows next to nothing? Lpublic opinion really is an important consideration for
a country, then it would seem that the Government should facilitate access to the relevant
information so as to make this opinion as informed as possible. It is unacceptable for a
Government to insist on a principled defence of the death penalty but to refuse to divulge to its
own population the extent to which, and the reasons for which, it is being applied.
C. Case studies on the use of nationa1 security” as a basis for
withholding statistics on death sentences and executions
22. The most frequently cited rationale for not disclosing information on the death penalty is
that such information is a State secret” that would imperil national security were it made public.
Thus, for example, in January 2004 the Government of Vietnam declared reports and statistics
on the use of the death penalty to be State secrets”. 22 Article 1, paragraph 1, of the decision
states: The list of State top secrets of the People's Court includes: Documents related to the
trial on national security crimes, reports and statistics on death penalty, clandestine trials that
should not be published under the law.” In the past, the Government has issued annual statistics
on death sentences and executions, but this practice has been discontinued. 23 Today, the courts
do not publish their proceedings, and the Government refuses to disclose any statistical
information on capital punishment.
23. It is also on State secret” grounds that the Government of China refuses to disclose
statistics on death sentences and executions. 24 (Likewise, the Government does not consistently
publicize death sentences in individual cases.) OEis offcial opacity has opened for debate even
the basic facts regarding the death penalty in China. In March 2004, Chen Zhonglin, director of
the law academy at Southwestern University of Politics and Law and a senior national legislative
delegate, stated that China executes nearly 10,000” people every year. When this was reported
in the media, Chen Zhonglin clariffied that this number was not an offcial ffigure, but merely an
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estimate based upon the work of scholars and other senior legislators. OEe Ministry for Foreign
Affairs has declined to explain why China did not release statistics on the number of people
executed each year, 25 and China did not respond to the survey carried out in connection with the
report of the Secretary-General to the Economic and Social Council on capital punishment and
implementation of the safeguards guaranteeing protection of those facing the death penalty. 26
24. India has moved towards greater transparency, but signifficant gaps in information on
past and present death sentences and executions remain. With respect to the present, since 1995
the National Crime Records Bureau has published tables listing the total number, but not the
names or details, of persons executed each year. The situation with respect to pre-1995
executions is more complex. The Home Ministry had claimed that the 2004 execution of
Dhananjoy Chatterjee was the ffifty-ffiifih execution in India since independence. However, the
Indian non-governmental organization (NGO) People's Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR)
subsequently discovered information indicating that in the 10-year period between 1953 and
1963, 1,422 people had been executed in India. This information was found in an appendix to
the thirty-ffiifih Report of the Law Commission of India (1965), which listed the number of
executions carried out in this period in 16 Indian states. To follow up on this information, PUDR
ffiled requests under local government right to information acts, seeking details of all persons
who had been executed since 1947 in both Delhi and Maharashtra. The Maharashtra state
authorities disclosed the data. In contrast, the Delhi authorities refused. In his response, the
Deputy Inspector General (Prisons) stated that the information sought would not serve any
public interest” and that some of the persons who have been executed had been convicted for
various o f fences having prejudicial effect on the sovereignty and integrity of India and security
of NCT (National Capital Territory) of Delhi and international relations and could lead to
incitement of an offence”. 27
25. OEe national security and public order concerns that underpin State secret classiffications
of death penalty information lack legal justiffication. As discussed above, article 14, paragraph 1,
of the Covenant permits secrecy on these grounds only at the trial stage, and no derogation from
this rule whatsoever is permitted in death penalty cases. This OElack-letter” legal conclusion is
not hard to understand. Even restrictions on transparency at the trial stage must be justiffied by
reasons of morals, public order (ordre public) or national security in a democratic society”. 28
Basic information on the administration of justice should never be considered a threat to public
order or national security.
III. THE OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE POST-CONVICTION
TRANSPARENCY FOR CONVICTS AND THEIR
FAMILIES
A. Legal framework
26. A lack of transparency regarding the post-conviction process and timetable for execution
implicates two sets of rights. The ffirst is that the failure to provide notice to the accused of the
timing of his own execution may undermine due process rights. Due process rights and other
safeguards on the right to life remain even aifier a person has been convicted of a crime and
sentenced to death. Most notably, the death row prisoner has the right to his conviction and
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sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal” (article 14, paragraph 5, of the Covenant) and the
right to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence” (article 6, paragraph 4, of the Covenant).
The uncertainty and seclusion inflicted by opaque processes place due process rights at risk, and
there have, unfortunately, been cases in which secrecy in the post-conviction process has led to a
miscarriage ofjustice. In addition, and regardless of the actual due process consequences, to
conceal from someone the facts of their preordained fate will constitute inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. There are, of course, legitimate interests in security and privacy that
necessarily limit access to death row and the publicity accorded to some information. However,
these interests can and must be accommodated without violating rights.
27. For the prisoner and for his or her family, the other issue is that a lack of transparency in
what is already a harrowing experience - waiting for one's execution - can result in inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment” within the meaning of article 7 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. OEe views of the Human Rights Committee in two cases
illustrate the scope of this right. In a recent decision that responded to an individual complaint of
the mother of an executed Belarusian prisoner, the Committee found that OEe complete secrecy
surrounding the date of execution, and the place of burial and the refusal to hand over the body
for burial have the eLect of intimidating or punishing families by intentionally leaving them in a
state of uncertainty and mental distress.” This amounted to inhuman treatment in violation of
article 7 of the Covenant. 29 In Pratt and Morgan v. Jamaica, the Committee found that a delay
of approximately 20 hours before communicating a reprieve to the accused just 45 minutes prior
to his scheduled execution constituted a violation of Article 730 States do not have any interest
that justiffies keeping persons on death row and their families in the dark regarding their fate.
B. Case studies on how secret executions undermine due process safeguards
and lead to the inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of
prisoners and their famifes
28. While convicted persons remain on death row, a number of States withhold from them
and their family members basic information concerning the post-conviction process.
29. In an example from the Islamic Republic of Iran, Afshen Razvany and Meryme Sotodeh
were reportedly arrested on 9 July 2003, sentenced to death shortly aifierwards and executed on
23 January 2004 without a court order and without prior notice being given to their families. 3 '
(In response to these allegations, the Government asserted that it had no record of these
individuals being detained in July 2003.32)
30. The case of Dong Wei illustrates the risks that post-conviction opacity poses to respect
for human rights. Dong Wei was a farmer who was sentenced to death on 21 December 2001 for
killing a man during a ffight outside a dance hall in Yan'an City, Shaanxi Province, China. His
lawyer appealed against the sentence, claiming that Dong had killed the man in self-defence.
Shaanxi Province High People's Court reviewed its own decision, rejected the appeal in a closed
session, and, on 22 April 2002, issued an order for Dong to be executed seven days later.
Dong's lawyer was not informed of the decision, and only found out on 27 April - just two days
before the execution was scheduled - because he happened to visit the high court to ask about the
progress of the appeal. OEe lawyer then travelled to Beijing at his own expense to appeal the
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case at the Supreme People's Court, but he was refused entry and turned away. On the morning
of the execution, the lawyer managed to gain access to the Supreme People's Court under false
pretences and convinced a judge to review the case. OEe judge agreed with the lawyer that
Dong's case needed further review, and the execution was only stopped when the judge
contacted the execution ground with a borrowed mobile phone, reportedly just four minutes
before the execution was scheduled. (Aifier a further review of the case by Shaanxi Province
High People's Court on the orders of the Supreme People's Court, Dong was executed
on 5 September 2002.) Transparency would have prevented this near violation of the right to
life.
31. In many cases, the due process consequences of opacity in the post-conviction process
will remain unknown; however, the consequences of the dignity of the individual and his or her
family are clear.
32. Refusing to provide convicted persons and family members advance notice of the date
and time of execution is a clear human rights violation. In the most extreme instances, prisoners
have learned of their impending executions only moments before dying, and families have been
informed only later, sometimes by coincidence rather than design. OEese practices are inhuman
and degrading and undermine the procedural safeguards surrounding the right to life.
33. In Saudi Arabia, there have been cases in which foreign prisoners were unaware that they
were under sentence of death. OEis has been due, at least in part, to the failure of the
Government to provide translators for defendants who did not speak Arabic. In one instance, it
has been credibly alleged that six Somali nationals spent six years in prison before learning that
they were under sentence of death. 33 When they spoke to their families by telephone on the
morning of 4 April 2005, they remained unaware that they were to be executed. Later that day
they were beheaded.
34. Incidents in which the family has not been informed have occurred in China. In one case,
the families of two Nepalese citizens sentenced to death in Tibet had not heard from the
defendants for four months and read about their death sentences in a Kathmandu newspaper. 34
(OEe Government of China has informed me that their death sentences were subsequently
commuted and that regular contact had been maintained with the Nepalese consulate during the
trial proceedings. 35 ) More generally, the ability of family and lawyers to visit death-row
prisoners is sometimes very limited, and there are many reports of relatives being denied access
to condemned prisoners, or of executions being carried out without relatives being informed of
the failure of ffinal appeals. However, there are encouraging signs of reform. For example, the
Beijing Municipality High People's Court announced in September 2003 that it was urging all
intermediate-level courts in the municipality to set aside rooms for condemned prisoners to meet
for a ffinal time with their family. 36
35. It is more oifien information about the date and time of execution that is withheld than
information about the death sentence itself In some cases notice is provided, but only belatedly.
OEus, in Singapore prisoners and their families are typically given one week's notice, in Egypt
they are typically provided two to three days' notice, and in Japan it appears that they are
provided even less time. In other cases, no advance notice has been provided at all. OEe
execution of Sasan Al-c Kena'n provides an example. He was executed at 4 in the morning
E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.3
page 13
on 19 February 2003 in Kordestan province, Islamic Republic of han. Later that day, his mother
arrived at the prison to visit her son and was told to go the judiciary's local offces. Only then
was she informed that Sasan Al-c Kena'n had been executed earlier that morning. She was told
not to make a fuss” and to bury him quickly.
36. As noted above, the unlawful character of such practices has been previously established
in the case of Belarus. There it has been found that the Government does not provide full
information to the relatives of executed prisoners about the dates and places of execution and
burial; does not ensure that relatives of a prisoner under sentence of death are informed of the
prisoner's place of imprisonment; does not permit regular and private meetings with the prisoner,
not even to say goodbye if the petition for clemency is rejected; and, does not allow family
members to collect the executed prisoner's remains or personal eLects. 37 In a 2003 decision, the
Human Rights Committee found that these practices had put the mother of a condemned prisoner
in a state of anguish and mental stress amounting to inhuman treatment in violation of article 7 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 38
37. There is no justiffication for post-conviction secrecy, and these case studies have
illustrated how a lack of transparency both undermines due process rights and constitutes
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. Persons sentenced to death, their families, and
their lawyers should be provided with timely and reliable information on the procedures and
timing of appeals, clemency petitions, and executions.
C. Evaluating the privacy rationale for secret executions
38. Policies and practices of secret execution are oifien concealed and denied. However, the
secrecy that Japan maintains around its death row and executions is a matter of offcial policy
that is openly held and the legality of which is expressly defended. OEus, for example, in 2004
two people were executed in Japan without advance notice being given to their families or
lawyers. OEe prisoners themselves were informed only a few hours before the executions. And
the Government has refused to conffirm or deny the execution of any particular person.
39. The Government of Japan has defended these practices by arguing that executions must
be kept secret in order to protect the privacy of the prisoner as well as that of his or her family.
The refusal to disclose the names of executed individuals is justiffied by the stigma of the death
penalty: their names had already been made public during their trials; the further public
announcement of their names on the day of execution would be cruel. 39
40. There is, of course, a point at which individual rights to dignity and privacy do outweigh
transparency obligations. 40 OEis point has, for example, already been passed when a person is
executed before the general public. As the Human Rights Committee has observed, carrying out
executions before the public is a practice that is incompatible with human dignity”. The
experience of some countries with public executions clearly illustrates the fundamental
diLerence between revealing the information needed for the public to make informed decisions
about the death penalty and the use of death as a public spectacle. Indeed, exhibitions of
bloodletting are not necessarily informative, and information need not be accompanied by
violent displays.
E/CN.4/2006/53/Add. 3
page 14
41. In China, the Supreme Court has stated that public parading and other actions that
humiliate the person being executed are forbidden. This has not, however, stopped all such
practices. Especially in connection with trials involving drugs, gangs and corruption,
condemned prisoners have been lined up in front of the court's public gallery to hear their
sentence, sometimes with photographers and television cameras focused on their faces to capture
their expression as sentence is passed. Following sentencing, prisoners may be paraded in an
open truck through the streets to the execution ground, with a placard around their neck bearing
their name crossed out in red. However, the Government has informed the Special Rapporteur
that, OEn 24 July 1986 and again on 1 June 1988, the ministries responsible for law, the People's
Procuratorates, public security and justice jointly issued a circular strictly forbidding the public
display of condemned persons, and the pertinent authorities have since then treated this issue
with the utmost gravity. In recent years, the phenomenon has thus been eLectively prohibited”. 4 '
It had also been credibly alleged that executions are carried out in public stadiums or squares in
front of large crowds, but this allegation was denied by the Government.
42. Public executions are also carried out in a number of other countries. In the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, there have been many reports of public executions in front of large
crowds drawn from schools, businesses, and farms that were notiffied in advance. Some
prisoners have reportedly even been executed in front of their families. 42 In Viet Nam, also,
many executions are carried out publicly and the general public is encouraged to attend these
events. And in Saudi Arabia, executions are generally carried out outside crowded mosques
aifier Friday prayer services.
43. It is, thus, only superfficially duff cult to reconcile the prohibition on secret executions
with the prohibition on public executions. On the one hand, it is inhuman treatment to give a
prisoner only moments to prepare for his fate, and it is inhuman treatment to surprise a mother
with news of her child's execution. But these practices can be avoided with advance notification
of the date, time and place of execution, permitting ffinal visits and ffinal personal preparation.
And the due process rights of persons sentenced to death can be protected so long as such
notiffications are made public. There is no legitimate interest served, however, by making
executions public spectacles, and this is itself a most inhuman form of punishment.
44. OEe limitations on transparency imposed by, for example, Japan go beyond what is
necessary to protect individual rights to privacy and human dignity and undermine the
safeguards publicity provides. Some outside access to death row is essential to ensuring the
rights of death-row prisoners. It is problematic, for instance, that in 2002 the international NGO
International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) visited Japan in order to investigate detention
conditions of death-row inmates and was refused access to inmates, death-row cells, the
execution chamber or any of the secure area of the detention house grounds. It becomes
impossible to justify such practices inasmuch as information on death-row prisoners is withheld
regardless of the prisoner's own appreciation of his or her privacy interests. When members of
the Human Rights Commission of the Council of Europe visited Japan in early 2001, they were
not permitted to contact a convict on death row even though the convict had, with the help of his
wife, given his consent. When death-row inmate Masakatsu Nishikawa requested that a
photographer be permitted to take a photograph of him that could be displayed at his funeral, his
request was denied. An Osaka Regional Correction Headquarters offcial said that in
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page 15
considering whether to allow such a photo to be taken, they had to consider the manner in
which it would be distributed as well as the eLect of the photograph on the defendant, his family
and the bereaved family members of the victims”. 43
45. This lack of transparency has grave consequences for the adequacy of public oversight.
The survey carried out in connection with the Secretary-General's 2005 report on capital
punishment (E/2005/3) requested that Japan explain why it had not abolished the death penalty
for ordinary crimes. The response of the Government was that the majority of people in Japan
recognize the death penalty as a necessary punishment for grievous crimes. Considering the
number of serious crimes ... it is inevitable to impose death penalty to the oLenders who commit
such crimes”. 44 However, report of the Secretary-General also takes note of the view of the
Japanese Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA) that one of the main reasons why capital
punishment has not been abolished in Japan is the extraordinary secrecy surrounding the death
penalty system and the consequent lack of proper information to discuss abolition. 45 OEus far,
even parliamentary oversight has been limited. In 2003, two Diet members were allowed to tour
an execution chamber but this was the ffirst time they had been allowed to do so since 1973.
JFBA has recently proposed a bill that would: (a) set up parliamentary study panels on the death
penalty; (b) suspend executions while the study is underway; and (c) require the Government to
disclose information about the death penalty so the panels can conduct full research.
46. Two logical limits to the privacy argument against transparency are apparent. OEe ffirst
such logical limit is that ensuring the right to privacy does not justify the denial of information to
the very person whose privacy rights are being invoked. OEus, the argument that secrecy
protects the privacy of death-row prisoners cannot explain or justify a refusal to reveal the timing
and other details of executions to death-row prisoners themselves or to their families. Indeed,
privacy protections would, if anything, support the claim that a death-row prisoner and his or her
family should be fully informed of the prisoner's fate. It undermines rather than promotes
privacy to forbid families and prisoners the most basic information about the prisoner's own
death.
47. The second such logical limit is that respect for privacy cannot oLset transparency
obligations when the prisoner does not desire his experience on death row or the fact of his
execution to be private. Privacy”, in this context, is merely a by-product of enforced secrecy.
Because prisoners are not aware of when they will die, they have no opportunity to make this
fact public (or alternatively maintain their privacy). Moreover, while on death row they are
prohibited from contacting the media or politicians and any contact they do have with permitted
visitors is strictly controlled and monitored. By stripping death-row inmates of control over their
communications and knowledge of the most crucial aspect of their lives, i.e. the timing of their
own death, the Japanese system undermines rather than protects the privacy of death-row
prisoners.
IV. CONCLUSION
48. The widespread pattern of non-compliance with transparency obligations that the present
report has documented is disappointing. It is reassuring, however, that with the will to reform
the administration of capital punishment, the problems in most countries could be resolved with
little technical diLiculty. It is hoped that this report will lead to continued constructive dialogue
on the measures required to ensure full transparency in the administration of the death penalty.
E/CN.4/2006/53/Add. 3
page 16
Notes
1 E/CN.4/2005/7, paras. 58-59.
2 For instance, in a note verbale to the Special Rapporteur, dated 11 October 2005, the
Government of China stated that the application of the death penalty for crimes of this order has
salutary deterrent and preventative eLects”.
OEe Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 10: Everyone is entitled in full equality to a
fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his
rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.”
Van Meurs v. the Netherlands, Human Rights Committee (HRC), communication
No. 215/1986 (1990), CCPR/C/39/D/215/1986, para. 6.1.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14, para. 1: All persons shall be
equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or
of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. The press and
the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order (ordre
public) or national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of
the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special
circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests ofjustice; but any judgement
rendered in a criminal case or in a suit at law shall be made public except where the interest of
juvenile persons otherwise requires or the proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the
guardianship of children.”
6 ECOSOC resolution 1989/64.
HRC, general comment No. 29(2001) on derogations during a state of emergency, para. 16;
see also Inter-American Court Of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-9/87, Judicial
Guarantees in States of Emergency (arts. 27(2), 25 and 8 American Convention on
Human Rights) (6 October 1987).
8 HRC, general comment No. 29 (2001), para. 15.
HRC, general comment No. 31(2004), para. 4, on the nature of the general legal obligation
imposed on States parties to the Covenant.
10 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, preamble; see also Charter of the
United Nations, Article 1.
See E/CN.4/2005/7, para. 58. In a note verbale to the Special Rapporteur,
dated 11 October 2005, the Government of China explained that the death penalty is applicable
only to extremely serious crimes” and that one of the factors leading to its use in that context is
public opinion. [ EIven though attitudes towards capital punishment and understanding of the
issue have undergone considerable evolution in recent years in the judicial and theoretical flelds,
as well as in society in general, surveys show that retaining the death penalty for the crimes
E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.3
page 17
described above still garners widespread approval. Some 90 per cent of the population demand
application of the death penalty in very serious cases of economic and other non-violent crime ...
We have also taken note of the fact that the questions of whether and when to abolish capital
punishment in China are under discussion in academic circles and among the general public.
The mainstream viewpoint, however, is that the practical conditions for abolition of the death
penalty do not yet exist in China.”
12 See Capital punishment and implementation of the safeguards guaranteeing protection of
those facing the death penalty, Report of the Secretary-General to the Economic and Social
Council, at pp. 8-9, U.N. Doc. E/2005/3 (9 March 2005).
13 ECOSOC resolution 1754 (LIV) (16 May 1973).
14 ECOSOC resolution 1995/57 (28 July 1995), para. 4.
Calculated on the basis of information contained in E/2005/3 (9 March 2005), para. 6;
annex I, table 1; E/2005/3/Add.1 (21 June 2005), paras. 3(d), 8.
16 Interfax News Service, Belarus says nobody on death row now (5 October 2004).
17 BBC Monitoring Ukraine and Baltics, Belarusian InteriorMinister says five people
executed in 2004, 20 November 2004 (citing Sovetskaya Belorussiya, Minsk, in
Russian, 19 November 2004).
18 According to a note verbale sent by the Government of Belarus to the Special Rapporteur
on 15 November 2005, 47 persons were sentenced to death in 1998 (6 of whose sentences
were commuted to deprivation of liberty), 13 persons were sentenced to death in 1999,
4 persons were sentenced to death in 2000 (2 of whose sentences were commuted to life
imprisonment), 7 persons were sentenced to death in 2001, 4 persons were sentenced to death
in 2002, 4 persons were sentenced to death in 2003 (1 of whose sentences was commuted to life
imprisonment), 2 persons were sentenced to death in 2004. All these persons were convicted of
murder in aggravating circumstances (1960 Criminal Code, art. 100; 1999 Criminal Code,
art. 139, para. 2). In the ffirst six months of 2005, the courts did not hand down any death
sentences.
19 Response of Singapore Home Ministry to Reuters responding to Reuters News, Amnesty
challenges Singapore on executions, 19 October 2004 (on ffile with the author).
20 Response of Singapore Home Ministry to Reuters responding to Reuters News, Amnesty
challenges Singapore on executions, 19 October 2004 (on ffile with the author).
21 Reuters News, Singapore says Amnesty execution report absurd” (16 January 2004). OEe
response of the Government also indicated that, although the Government does not as a rule
disclose execution statistics, it nonetheless possesses detailed statistical information on the death
penalty. For example, the Government replied to Amnesty International's claim that most of
those executed were foreigners by stating that 64 per cent of those executed between 1993
and 2003 were Singaporeans and in the previous ffive years, 101 Singaporeans and 37 foreigners
E/CN.4/2006/53/Add. 3
page 18
had been executed. Responding to Amnesty International's claim that the death penalty was
imposed disproportionately on the poorest, least educated and most vulnerable”, the
Government stated that, of those executed between 1993 and last year, 44 per cent had primary
education, 34 per cent had secondary education and 2 per cent had vocational or tertiary
education. Only 20 per cent were unemployed”. Straits Times, Govt points out 12 grave
errors' in Amnesty Report (31 January 2004).
22 Decision of the Prime Minister of Viet Nam on the list of State top secrets of the People's
Court, No. 0 1/2004/QD-TTg (5 January 2004) (on ffile with the author).
23 In a note verbale to the Special Rapporteur dated 26 September 2005, the Government of
Viet Nam noted that, Jii accordance with Article 18 of the Criminal Procedure Law, verdicts
must be made publicly. Article 229 of the Criminal Procedure Law states that within 15 days
aifier the verdict is made, ffirst-trial court shall have to provide the defendant, defender, procuracy
of the same level with the verdict. Viet Nam has so far publicized some of the verdicts by the
Council of Judges of the People's Supreme Court.” The Government did not address the
classiffication of death penalty statistics as State secrets” in its note verbale.
24 In a note verbale to the Special Rapporteur, dated 11 October 2005, the Government of China
stated that, On the statistical tables kept by the People's Courts, executions and death
sentences-with-reprieve are counted among all sentences that exceed ffive years of imprisonment.
OEese ffigures are forwarded in March every year to the President of the Supreme People's Court,
who reports them to the National People's Congress and arranges for their publication in the
People's Daily and the Supreme Court journal.”
25 Agence France-Presse, China defends keeping execution statistics secret, 5 February 2004.
( OEe question you raised is not up to me to answer”, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman
Zhang Qiyue said. But I think with China's improvement and reform and opening, China has
made great improvements in information transparency”.)
26 Capital punishment and implementation of the safeguards guaranteeing protection of those
facing the death penalty, Report of the Secretary-General to the Economic and Social Council,
E/2005/3 (9 March 2005).
27 Letter from the Deputy Inspector General (Prisons) Delhi Prisons to Deepika Tandon, PUDR
(12 May 2005) (on ffile with the author).
28 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights article 14(1) (emphasis added).
29 Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 886/1999: Belarus, para. 10.2,
seventy-seventh session, 28 April 2003, CCPRIC/77/D/886/1999. OEe same conclusion was
reached in a similar case. HRC, Communication No. 887/1999: Belarus, para. 9.2,
seventy-seventh session, 24 April 2003. Article 7 of the Covenant states that No one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no
one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientiffic experimentation.”
E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.3
page 19
30 Pratt and Morgan v. Jamaica, Human Rights Committee, thirty-ffiifih session, para. 13.7,
CCPR/C/35/D/210/1986, 7 April 1989.
31 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,
Addendum - Summary of cases transmitted to Governments and replies received, to the
Commission on Human Rights at its sixty-ffirst session, E/CN.4/2005/7/Add. 1, para. 227.
32 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,
Addendum - Summary of cases transmitted to Governments and replies received, to the
Commission on Human Rights at its sixty-ffirst session, E/CN.4/2005/7/Add. 1, para. 329.
Note verbale of the Government of Saudi Arabia to the Special Rapporteur (dated
30 December 2005): With regard to the Special Rapporteur's reference to Somali nationals,
according to a letter received from the Director-General of Prisons in the Ministry of the Interior
there are no Somali prisoners who have been executed or who are facing the death penalty.
Instead of generalizing and making unfounded and inaccurate accusations, it would have been
more appropriate for the Special Rapporteur to provide full information on this case in order to
enable the competent authority to reply to his allegations.”
Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,
Addendum - Summary of cases transmitted to Governments and replies received, to the
Commission on Human Rights at its sixty-ffirst session, E/CN.4/2005/7/Add. 1, para. 82.
In a note verbale to the Special Rapporteur, dated 11 October 2005, the Government of China
clariffied that:
With respect to the case mentioned in the Report of two Nepalese citizens
sentenced to death in Tibet, in the absence of concrete details of the case, China is unable
to determine which speciffic case is at issue. According to case information at hand,
however, China's judicial organs did try a case in 2004 involving the Nepalese citizens
Ananda, Jiansan and others accused of smuggling arms and munitions, and a case
involving the Nepalese citizen Rebi and others, accused of smuggling narcotics. In all
cases, the proceedings of second instance saw the defendants' death sentences reduced to
death penalties with a two-year reprieve, or to life or ffixed-term imprisonment. During
trial proceedings, the People's High Court of the Tibetan Autonomous Region made
regular reports to the Nepalese Consulate in Lhassa, and Nepalese off cials were
permitted to meet with the Nepalese defendants.”
36 See also the note verbale from the Government of China to the Special Rapporteur,
dated 11 October 2005: Jii China, a condemned prisoner may meet with his or her family prior
to execution, no matter how grave the oLence committed. The rights of the condemned to settle
personal aLairs and to make family farewells are respected and fully protected. In Beijing for
example, in 2004, two Intermediate People's Courts approved all applications by condemned
prisoners for ffinal family visits and made the due arrangements on their behalf In addition, the
Courts also specially arranged for the presence of a physician at these meetings so as to ensure
E/CN.4/2006/53/Add. 3
page 20
that no harm befall the prisoners or their family members due to an excess of emotion. These
actions clearly demonstrate the humanitarian concern of these authorities.”
The Government addressed some of these issues in a note verbale to the Special Rapporteur
dated 15 November 2005. OEe Government did not address the publicity of hearings and
judgements; it did, however, state that decisions to grant clemency to a convicted person under
sentence of death, to turn down such appeals or to commute the death penalty to life
imprisonment, deprivation of liberty or another more lenient sentence, shall take the form of a
presidential decree. The activities of the Pardons Board and presidential decisions on clemency
are regularly reported in the mass media.
With respect to post-conviction transparency, the note verbale stated that article 369 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that, aifier the verdict has been handed down, the
presiding offcer at the trial or the president of the court shall permit the accused's family and
close relatives to visit him in custody, at their request. Where such permission is granted, the
prison administration shall not obstruct meetings between accused persons and their families or
close relatives. Persons under sentence of death have the same obligations and rights as persons
detained in a remand prison on the basis of a pretrial restraining order. Once their sentence has
become enforceable, convicted prisoners under sentence of death shall have, inter alia, the
following rights: to meet with lawyers and other persons entitled to provide legal assistance, for
as oifien and as long as necessary; to receive and send letters without restriction; to one short
meeting with close relatives every month; to receive one parcel or hand-delivered package every
three months under the procedure established by the prison administration; and, the right to be
visited by ministers of religion.
38 HRC, Communication No. 886/1999: Belarus, para. 10.2, seventy-seventh session,
28 April 2003, CCPRIC/77/D/886/1999.
Capital punishment and implementation of the safeguards guaranteeing protection of those
facing the death penalty, Report of the Secretary-General to the Economic and Social Council,
(E/2005/3), p. 43.
40 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, articles 7 and 17.
41 In a note verbale to the Special Rapporteur, dated 11 October 2005, the Government of China
stated that:
With respect to the method of execution, China's 1979 Law of Criminal
Procedure stipulated execution by shooting; this was amended in 1996 to include
execution by lethal injection. OEe implementation and promotion of this latter method
has served to make executions more civilized and humanitarian. Meanwhile, Chinese
law strictly prohibits public executions, and in actual practice, no case of a public
execution has ever occurred.
China's Law of Criminal Procedure stipulates that, Txecutions of death
sentences shall be announced but shall not be held in public'. In the past, individual
E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.3
page 21
cases of condemned persons being paraded in public have occurred in certain regions of
the country. On 24 July 1986 and again on 1 June 1988, the ministries responsible for
law, the People's Procuratorates, public security and justice jointly issued a circular
strictly forbidding the public display of condemned persons, and the pertinent authorities
have since then treated this issue with the utmost gravity. In recent years, the
phenomenon has thus been eLectively prohibited.”
42 In its note verbale to the Special Rapporteur dated 19 September 2005, the Government of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea did not address the particular issues raised by the
Special Rapporteur but stated in general terms that such phenomena as mentioned in your letter
do not exist in reality in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In spite of this, the hostile
forces have been ceaselessly fabricating and spreading the plot information as part of their
pursuit of ill-minded aim to disintegrate and overthrow the state system of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea.”
International Herald Tribune, Only arrest photos available”, 8 June 2005.
Capital punishment and implementation of the safeguards guaranteeing protection of those
facing the death penalty, Report of the Secretary-General to the Economic and Social Council,
E/2005/3, pp. 8-9.
Capital punishment and implementation of the safeguards guaranteeing protection of those
facing the death penalty, Report of the Secretary-General to the Economic and Social Council,
E/2005/3, p. 36.
