United Nations
O General Assembly Distr.: General
8 September 2000
Original: English
Fifty-fifth session
Item 116 (c) of the provisional agenda*
fruman rights questions: human rights situations and
reports of special rapporteurs and representatives
Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran
Note by the Secretary Genera1**
The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the
General Assembly the interim report prepared by Maurice Copithorne, Special
Representative of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human
rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, in accordance with Assembly resolution
54/177 of 17 December 1999.
* A/55/150 and Corr.l and 2.
** In accordance with General Assembly resolution 54/248, sect. C, para. 1, the present report is
being submitted on 8 September 2000 so as to include as much updated information as possible.
00-63698 (E) 091000
AJ55/363
Interim report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission
on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the
Islamic Republic of Iran
Summary
The present interim report covers the period 1 January to 15 August 2000.
Those seven months have been tumultuous ones in the Islamic Republic of Iran
and human rights have been a dominant feature in most of the issues. From one
perspective, it might be said that the Government is paying a high price for the
transparency that the Government itself introduced three years ago.
The most dramatic development was the accelerating attack on the press, which
by the end of the period under review had led to the suppression of the entire
reformist press and the imprisonment of many journalists. At the time of writing,
there were reports that some of the press would be allowed to reopen.
The economic situation of the poor and marginalized worsened during the
period. On a significant number of occasions, Iranians took to the streets to protest
unemployment, inflation and inadequate municipal services, as well as more political
issues, such as the freedom of the press, the treatment of students and other detainees
and government inaction in general. Paramilitary vigilantes often had a role in the
suppression of those demonstrations.
The status of women remained largely unchanged, although there is the
prospect that the new Majilis will tackle some of the systemic issues, such as easier
access to divorce and the minimum age for marriage.
The promised reform of the judiciary has not got off the ground and there are
many indications that it is being hotly debated behind the scenes. Prisons are vastly
overcrowded and executions remain suspiciously high. The evidence of the use of
torture by law enforcement agencies, usually in illegal detention centres, is becoming
a matter of public record.
The murders and disappearances of intellectuals and political dissidents
remains unsolved, with increasing pressure on the Government to expedite the
prosecution of those concerned and to let the full truth come out.
The status of ethnic and religious minorities remains largely unaddressed. The
alienation of some minority ethnic groups by the Government's tacit policy of
assimilation continues to grow.
Electoral democracy continues to grow, although major institutional obstacles
to the exercise of the plenary powers by the legislature are now coming to the fore.
On balance, the Special Representative considers that certain tangible progress
made to date in 2000 has been overshadowed by backsliding in some areas and
stagnation in others.
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Contents
Paragraphs Page
I. Introduction . 1—9 4
II. Special Representative's activities and sources 10—11 4
III. Freedom of expression 12—21 5
A. Media 12—15 5
B. Student protests 16—21 5
IV. Status of women 22—31 6
V. Legal subjects 32—58 7
A. Reform of the judicial system 32—36 7
B. Rules of fair trial and related matters 37—42 8
C. Independent Bar Association 43—46 8
D. Prisons 47—48 8
E. Executions 49—52 9
F. Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 53—58 9
VI. Murders and disappearances of intellectuals and political dissidents 59—62 10
VII. Status of minorities 63—79 10
A. Kurds 63—67 10
B. Azeris 68—70 11
C. Religious minorities: Sunnis and Baha'is 71—76 11
D. Minorities policy 77—79 12
VIII. Other important matters 80—101 13
A. Economic, social and cultural rights 80—86 13
B. Democracy 87—94 14
C. Guardian Council 95—98 15
D. Islamic Human Rights Commission 99—1 01 15
IX. Correspondence with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran 102 15
X. Conclusions 103—113 16
Aime xc s
I. Denial of fair trial and related rights 18
II. Information on the situation of the Baha'is 20
III. Correspondence between the Special Representative and the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, 1 January-i July 2000 21
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I. Introduction
1. The first seven months of 2000 have been
tumultuous ones in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Human rights have been in the forefront, indeed
frequently the core issue involved in events.
2. The most dramatic and far-reaching event was the
accelerating attack on the freedom of press, which led
to the virtual closing down of the entire reformist
press. That event was especially significant because the
establishment of a culture of open discussion centring
on a free press had been at the heart of the President's
declared objective of creating a civil society.
3. A number of economic, social and political
conditions underlie many of the recent developments in
the country. Their nature is perhaps most dramatically
reflected in the surge of efforts by Iranians to migrate.
The brain drain is serious. According to press reports,
80 per cent of the Iranian students who have competed
in international science Olympiads in the last three
years are now studying outside the country Some
150,000 Iranian doctors and engineers now live in the
United States. One government official attributed those
developments mostly to the lack of security at the
social level and the lack of attention to the most basic
rights of those elites. More generally, many foreign
embassies in Tehran report a sharp increase in
immigration enquiries. The press reports that desperate
Iranians are turning up as illegal immigrants in many
parts of the world.
4. Many of the social problems in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, most of which have human rights
dimensions, can be traced to the economic crisis,
particularly in terms of rising unemployment and still
rampant inflation. The poor and the marginalized are
bearing the brunt of a mismanaged economy
5. The governance structure in Iran is still a major
cause of the problems facing society rather than a
mechanism for their solution. Wasteful competition
between the branches of government and the
incoherence and incompetence that characterizes much
of the bureaucracy appear to be standing in the way of
movement towards a culture of human rights.
Personalities and factions have not yet ceded much
ground to the rule of law despite earlier promises of
comprehensive reform. So much needs to be done and
yet so little is being achieved, particularly in
addressing the systemic obstacles to progress.
6. Equality rights have seen little progress. Women
and minorities remain seriously disadvantaged in law
and in practice. Neither the executive nor the
legislature have taken leadership roles in addressing
the legal as well as the social obstacles, although there
are early signs of change on the part of the new Majilis,
at least concerning women.
7. In the present report, the Special Representative
has attempted once again to capture what he believes to
be the high points and the low ones in the effort
to advance the cause of human rights in the Islamic
Republic of Iran.
8. Overall, the Special Representative is reluctantly
compelled by the record to state that in his view, such
progress as there has been to date in 2000 has been
overshadowed by backsliding in some cases and
stagnation in others.
9. Finally, the Special Representative wishes to
note, as he has done many times in the past, that the
Islamic Republic of Iran is a complex, dynamic society
The pace of development, some of it substantive, has
accelerated in recent months. The Special
Representative believes that the country is changing
and will continue to change. Significant improvements
in the enjoyment of human rights are certainly not out
of question, and indeed that climate might change
markedly between the time the present report is being
finalized in mid-August 2000 and the time the debate
on the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic
of Iran gets under way in the Third Committee.
II. Special Representative's activities
and sources
10. In seeking to discharge his mandate, the Special
Representative has used many sources of information,
including the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, other Governments, individuals, non-
governmental organizations and the Iranian and
international media.
11. During the period under review, the Special
Representative received written communications from
the following non-governmental organizations
concerning the Islamic Republic of Iran: Alliance for
Defense of Human Rights in Iran; Amnesty
International; Baha' i International Community;
Committee for Defence of Liberty in Iran; Association
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A/55 63
for IIe Defence of Political Prisoners in han;
Committee to Protect Journalists; Constitutionalist
Movement of Iran; Democratic Party of Iranian
Kurdistan; Human Rights Watch; International PEN
American Center; International PEN Writers in Prison
Committee; Iranian Worker Leifi Unity; National
Council of Resistance of Iran; Organization for
Defending Victims of Violence; Reporters sans
Fronti&es; Social Research; and IIe Society for IIe
Defence of Political Prisoners in Iran.
if. Freedom of expression
A. Media
12. In IIe period under review, IIe closing down of
IIe reformist press has perhaps been IIe biggest story
in IIe Islamic Republic of Iran itself; as well as IIe
most evident mass suppression of a human right. At IIe
time of preparation of IIe present report, some 22
newspapers and journals have been closed, and at least
an equal number of publishers and writers have been
convicted, jafied or fmed, or served wiII a summons by
one of IIe various tribunals now exercising jurisdiction
over IIe press. Six months ago, auIIority over IIe press
was by legislation, in IIe hands of IIe press court,
alIIough oIIer tribunals, including notably IIe
Revolutionary Courts and IIe Special Clerical Courts,
were claiming an inherent jurisdiction and getting away
wiII it.
13. In March 2000, aifier IIe elections for IIe sixII
Majilis, IIe lame duck ffiifih Majfiis passed press law
amendments which gave IIe various tribunals,
including IIe Press Court, sweeping jurisdiction and
extraordinary procedural ffleedom that did away wiII
even IIe limited guarantees of fair trial provided for in
IIe old press law. The result is a truly draconian regime
that has led to IIe silencing of IIe reformist press. In a
matter of a few days in late Aprfi 2000, 14 journals
were closed by order of IIe judiciary, apparently
wiIIout hearings. The press court seems to have
become simply anoIIer control agency dedicated to IIe
suppression of fflee expression raIIer than IIe
protection of that right. It now sometimes acts even in
IIe absence of complaints. One journal noted that in
principle what people expect is IIat IIe accused first be
summoned to IIe court, charged wiII specific crimes,
and defended by a lawyer, and IIat IIe court would
only IIen deliver its verdict
14. In August 2000, IIe new sixII Majfiis made an
eLort to undo IIe damage by preparing a number of
amendments, but IIese were taken oL IIe Majfiis
agenda following an apparently unprecedented
intervention by IIe Supreme Leader. A few Majilis
deputies objected, and IIe chair of IIe Majfiis Culture
Commission tendered his resignation, declaring it was
his religious duty to defend IIe Majfiis. Extrajudicial
groups of demonstrators camped outside IIe Majfiis in
an apparent attempt at intimidation, and IIe state
broadcaster, Iran Broadcasting, a noted proponent of
IIe conservative view, came under fire for spreading
negative propaganda, which led to a brawl on IIe floor
of IIe Majfiis.
15. There does seem to be a feeling in some quarters
that IIe pendulum may have swung too far, and IIere is
evidence IIat some of IIe closed papers wfil be allowed
to reopen. In sum, things may be changing for IIe
better.
B. Student protests
16. In his report to IIe General Assembly a year ago
(see A/54/365, paras. 14-20) IIe Special Representative
reported on IIe student demonstrations of July 1999 in
Tehran and Tabriz. It was clear IIat extensive human
rights violations had taken place at IIe University of
Tehran dormitories in IIe beatings of students by
Iranian security forces and by paramfiitaries. Further
human rights violations took place in IIe arrest of
students and non-students in IIe ensuing street
demonstrations. In his report to IIe Commission on
Human Rights at its fifty-sixII session
(E/CN.4/2000/35), IIe Special Representative reported
on IIe treatment of IIe arrested students as well as
members of IIe Iran Nation Party. Many facets of IIeir
detention were in clear violation of international
standards. Four students were sentenced to death, but
IIeir sentences were subsequently commuted to various
terms of imprisonment About two thirds of IIe 1,500
or so students initially detained seem to have been
released. Some of IIose have now testiffied to IIe harsh
treatment IIey received while in detention. One of IIe
students has been convicted of apostasy, about which
IIe Special Representative has made representations to
IIe Government To IIe Special Representative's
knowledge, IIere is still no fmal accounting of all
persons arrested in connection wiII IIe July 1999
demonstrations.
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17. In IIe case of IIose arrested in connection wiII
similar demonstrations in Tabriz, 21 persons, of whom
12 were students, were sentenced to jafi terms ranging
fflom three months to nine years. Reportedly as a result
of IIe intervention of IIe Speaker of IIe Majilis, IIe
implementation of IIe sentences has been postponed.
The Speaker has said IIat IIe Majilis will be holding an
inquiry into IIe Tabriz incident.
18. The trial of IIose who provoked IIe
demonstrations, that is, IIe instigators of IIe attack on
IIe University of Tehran dormitories, was much slower
in coming. Charges were laid in February 2000 against
20 policemen and senior offcers. A detafied account of
IIe conduct of IIe police and of IIe yet unnamed and
uncharged paramfiitaries came out in IIe trial. The
judge found that IIe incident had taken place on IIe
whole as charged by IIe students and IIat 34 of IIem
should be compensated fflom state funds but he IIen
discharged all but two of IIe accused. That led to an
outcry fflom IIe students, who according to IIe press
have launched an appeal. There have now been calls
for IIe Majilis to enact tougher controls on IIe police
in dealing wiII academic institutions.
19. Meanwhile, IIe first anniversary of IIe July 1999
demonstrations prompted demonstrations in Tehran and
in Tabriz and IIe arrest of more students in boII cities.
In April and again in June 2000, IIere were arrests of
students.
20. A full accounting for IIe July 1999 raid on IIe
student dormitories, which had been promised by
various leaders, remains outstanding. The head of IIe
judiciary repeated that commitment in IIe days aifier
IIe verdict in IIe trial of IIe police involved in IIe raid.
21. There is also an accounting to be made to what
appear to be IIe well-founded and widespread
allegations of IIe torture of student detainees and of IIe
absence of a fair trial for IIose formally charged before
IIe Revolutionary Court (see paras. 53-56 below).
1V Status of women
22. The situation of women in IIe Islamic Republic
of Iran has not noticeably changed in IIe period under
review. In fact, media attention appears to have
signifficantly diminished, due perhaps in part to IIe
suppression of IIe reformist press during IIe period.
23. In IIe February 2000 Majfiis elections, 424
women were candidates. A number of IIem were
reported in IIe press as calling for action, making such
statements as SOur society and women must be ffleed
fflom cultural and social burdens, such as imposed
marriages and inequalities in Islamic laws” and 9Jntil
now, women's rights and sensitivities have been
derided in IIe Islamic Republic of Iran and it is now
our role and obligation to restore IIose rights”. Nine
women were elected, one of whom was subsequently
elected to IIe six-member Majilis Managing
Committee.
24. According to press accounts, in July 2000 Tehran
City Council received a report declaring that
prostitution and drug abuse were widespread among
IIe youII of Tehran. The average age of prostitutes had
fallen fflom 27 to 20 a few years ago. Some 90 per cent
of IIe girls who ran away fflom home fell into
prostitution. The principal cause of prostitution was
said to be economic hardship and social alienation.
25. There continue to be calls for more attention to
IIe condition of women through, for example, IIe
election of women to one third of IIe Majilis seats and
IIe creation of special institutions as distinct fflom
advisory boards to promote women's aLairs. Frequent
mention is made of IIe access that women now have to
education up to IIe highest level. Less fflequently,
mention is made of IIe fact that many women cannot
fmd employment, usually due to patriarchal attitudes in
IIe famfiy and workplace. Women currently make up
just 14 per cent of IIe workforce.
26. During IIe period under review, IIe first woman
was appointed as IIe governor of a district; afatwa was
issued authorizing women to lead members of IIe same
sex in prayers.
27. Attention is beginning to be paid in IIe Islamic
Republic of Iran to IIe deleterious eLect of IIe chador.
It was recently targeted by IIe President of a Women's
University as IIe cause of increasing osteoporosis
among women.
28. In January and again in February 2000, IIere
were large demonstrations by students of IIe pfiot
programme, women-only Fatimeh Medical University,
demanding IIe dismissal of IIe Chancellor and IIe
Board and an improvement in academic standards.
29. Situations sometimes come to IIe attention of IIe
Special Representative which, despite IIeir probable
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infrequency, do in his view call out for urgent action by
the Government, such as a recent story in Resalat on 4
July 2000 reporting the statement by an adviser to the
Ministry of Health that consent for medical treatment
given by a single mother, even for emergency surgery,
does not meet the requirements of Iranian law.
Reportedly, 15 per cent of Iranian households are now
headed by a mother as a single parent. The Special
Representative urges the Government to respond to this
situation promptly in order to head off any denials of
access to health care.
30. On the topic of violence against women, the
Human Development Report of Iran, 1999, declares
that an age-old culture of male domination, coercion
and violence against women, generally regarded as
chastisement, is mostly taken for granted by society.
The existence of discriminatory laws and the ambiguity
of other laws compound that attitude and make women
vulnerable to violence, particularly domestic violence.
It should therefore come as no surprise that apart from
a few measures applied in extreme cases and some
reasonably effective programmes designed to identify
the cultural, social and legal roots of violence against
women, no notable action has been taken to change
prevailing attitudes or reform the pertinent laws and
regulations.
31. That reform of some of the most egregious
examples of discrimination is politically conceivable
came in mid-August 2000, when the Majilis voted by
more than a two-thirds majority to consider a bill that,
in the absence of a court order, would likely raise the
age of marriage to 14 for girls and 17 for boys.
According to the press, in May 2000 an adviser on
women's affairs had said that there were 52,000
married girl students between the ages of 10 and 14
and 617,000 between 15 and 19. According to the same
report, most married girls drop out of school early in
their marriage.
V. Legal subjects
A. Reform of the judicial system
32. In his report to the Commission on Human Rights
(see E/CN.4/2000/35, para. 37), the Special
Representative noted the candid comments of the new
head of the judiciary, Ayatollah Shahroudi, on the
condition of the Iranian judicial system. His call for
reform seemed to be widely welcomed. That theme has
been reiterated on a number of occasions in the period
under review. However, there have been few concrete
proposals for substantive change.
33. In June 2000, Ayatollah Shahroudi was quoted as
saying that judicial development does not mean
accepting models and findings of judicial systems in
the world today that are labelled as human rights. At
the end of July 2000, he declared that the judiciary
system needed to address poverty, discrimination and
corruption in the country.
34. One of the problems faced by the Iranian judicial
system in recent years has been the negative
consequences of a merging of the procuracy into the
judiciary It was aimounced in June 2000 that a
separate procuracy would be re-established as of March
2001. At a meeting in June 2000 of the Tehran Justice
Department, the head of the Department reportedly
called for a new criminal code covering all aspects of
the criminal law system. After that, the structure of
public and revolutionary courts would have to be
revisited.
35. There remain shadows over the process of reform,
one of them being the role of extrajudicial groups. In
December 1999, Ayatollah Shahroudi was quoted in the
Iranian press as declaring that the Basiji had legal
authority to prevent crimes and preserve the security of
the country Such a legitimation of a group that has
been in the forefront of the violent suppression of
peaceful public demonstrations can only run counter to
the evolution of the rule of law. Sooner or later, in the
name of civil society the Islamic Republic of Iran will
have to address the proliferation of tribunals and law
enforcement agencies that often compete in zealotry
and provide a labyrinth for private citizens to traverse
in their daily lives. The Government at least is aware of
the problem. The Minister of the Interior said recently
that no one has the right to hold a demonstration
without a permit, even in support of religion or
religious beliefs.
36. The Special Representative wishes to recall
General Assembly resolution 54/1 63 on human rights
in the administration of justice, in which the Assembly
urges a number of relevant measures upon
Governments.
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B. Rules of fair trial and related matters
37. In his report to the Commission on Human Rights
(see E/CN.4/2000/35, paras. 34 and 35) the Special
Representative set out his understanding of the
elements of a fair trial. By all accounts, these rules
continue to be ignored by the judiciary in the Islamic
Republic of Iran.
38. One of the prominent cases that came to light
during the period under review was the treatment by
the courts of the students and others arrested in
connection with the demonstration of 5 July 1999.
Quite apart from their treatment in pre-trial detention,
they were tried in a closed court without benefit of
counsel.
39. The trial of Jews and Muslims in Shiraz came to a
head in the period under review, with the conviction of
12 persons, who received sentences from 2 to 13 years,
and the acquittal of 5 others. There were some
extraordinary twists in this prolonged and agonizing
process for the Jewish accused and their families. It is
quite clear that despite the statements of Iranian
representatives to the contrary and indeed the lively
defence mounted by one of the defence counsel parties,
those trials were in no way fair. A fuller description of
the deficiencies is set out in annex I.
40. There was also the case of the police general
sentenced to eight months in jail for misconduct in the
treatment of the arrested Tehran mayor and deputy
mayors several years ago. The convicted general has at
last report not yet seen the inside of a jail even though
the findings of the military court were upheld on
appeal.
41. Illegal detentions and persons simply gone
missing in the justice system have begun to attract
public attention. The Islamic Human Rights
Commission is now publicizing its so far unsuccessful
efforts to trace such persons.
42. In a freedom of the press case reported in the
press in June 2000, a newspaper was suspended prior to
a court hearing on the grounds that publishing the
objections of two detained journalists about the food
and hygiene conditions in jail, even though it was
followed by the printing of a denial by officials, was a
basis for closing down the newspaper for disparaging
Islam and the religious elements of the Islamic
revolution.
C. Independent Bar Association
43. Not much has been heard from the Independent
Bar Association (IBA) in the period under review
despite the turmoil regarding freedom of press and the
conduct of the courts, particularly with regard to the
rights of fair trial.
44. The Special Representative notes that the Union
of Iranian Journalists met with the Speaker of the
Majilis to express its concern about the treatment of
journalists by the courts, and he wonders why IBA
apparently did not take similar action over the
detention of three of its members, Mehrangiz Kar,
Shirin Ebadi and Mohsen Rohami. The detention of
lawyers, even for a limited period, is clearly an act of
intimidation towards both the lawyers concerned and
the bar as a whole. The Special Representative recalls
that several years ago, after its first Council election,
IBA expressed itself clearly and publicly on the matter
of law reform, and wonders why it has been apparently
silent on the important current issue of the detention of
lawyers.
45. The Special Representative has recently had
brought to his attention an extract from an issue of the
OLicial Journal of the Islamic Republic of Iran (No.
15985 of 26 November 1998), which records Majilis
approval of a provision giving the judiciary the power
to confirm the competency of law graduates to receive
a license as a lawyer. As the bar cannot be beholden to
the judiciary, that provision clearly offends
international standards for the independence of the bar,
as well as the reputation of the 90-year-old Iranian
institution.
46. Finally, the Special Representative notes
Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/42, in
which the Commission noted the various international
instruments relevant to the independence of the bar.
D. Prisons
47. The Iranian prison system is under severe strain.
According to press reports of statements in the period
under review by the Director General and Deputy
Director General of the Prisons Organization, as well
as a former Deputy Prosecutor General, some 185,000
persons are currently in jail, perhaps two thirds of them
for drug-related offences, and prison camps are being
opened at the rate of five a year. In July 2000, an
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AJ55/363
Iranian newspaper was reported as saying that a prison
population of 2.5 per 1,000 was a catastrophe for a
society which is dedicated to its values.
48. The Special Representative notes that apart from
building new prisons, the only other measure is to
reduce the intake of prisoners. One move to that end is
impending legislation to place women and children on
probation rather than having them serve time in jail.
E. Executions
49. Executions continued at a reportedly high rate in
the period under review. According to information
received by the Special Representative based on press
reports, some 130 executions occurred from January to
the end of July 2000, including the execution of a
woman in front of her two children. Eleven executions
were held in public. In three other cases, individuals
sentenced to death were pardoned ifiom execution by
the family of the victim at the execution site. The
Special Representative finds it hopeful that in March
2000, a Ministry of Justice spokesman was quoted as
saying that some of the hangings envisaged in Iranian
laws were not necessary from a religious point of view
and the system could replace them with other
sentences.
50. The Special Representative notes that a public
debate about the death penalty got under way in 1999
before strong official opposition extinguished it. In
August 2000, the Supreme Court confirmed the
sentence of three and a half years in prison for the
editor-in-chief who had published the story that had set
off the debate. He was convicted of hurting Islam”.
51. The Special Representative notes that the
Commission on Human Rights has regularly called
upon States in which the death penalty has not been
abolished to comply with their obligations in this
regard under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and to keep in mind the safeguards
and guarantees set out in certain Commission on
Human Rights resolutions, such as Commission
resolution 2000/31.
52. The Special Representative wishes to reiterate
that the statistics mentioned above are drawn from
press accounts, with all the margin of error that
implies. He calls upon the Government once again to
make official figures publicly available.
F. Torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment
Torture
53. That torture continues in the Islamic Republic of
Iran and in its most primitive form was
confirmed in the period under review by the personal
testimony of students and others arrested in the
aifiermath of the July 1999 demonstrations and
subsequently released, or on the basis of letters from
convicted students apparently smuggled out of prison,
some of which have been published in the Iranian
press. They make shocking reading. The Special
Representative has sent to the Government the details
of some of the allegations, with a request for
comments. The allegations focus mostly on treatment
in Towheed prison, an institution reportedly belonging
to the so-called Joint Committee Against Subversion,
that is to say, it is outside the official prisons
organization. There have been calls for the head of the
judiciary to address seriously the issue of torture,
particularly in such institutions of doubtful legitimacy
as Towheed. One of the officials of the prison, when
questioned, reportedly told a prisoner that torture was
carried out in the prison on the verdict of the judge and
the court, and was therefore legal.
54. It has now been several years since it began to be
acknowledged that torture did exist in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, notwithstanding article 38 of the
Constitution. In 1999, what is believed to have been
the first indictment for torture was brought against a
police general and 10 colleagues. All were acquitted of
torture but convicted of mistreatment of prisoners.
55. No information has come to the Special
Representative's attention suggesting the Government
is as yet addressing this blight on the international
reputation of the country and the Government. The
Special Representative notes Commission on Human
Rights resolution 2000/43 on the subject of torture; in
which, among many provisions, the Commission calls
upon all Governments to implement fully the
prohibition of torture, to address the need for
investigation and documentation as set out in the
principles annexed to the resolution, and to address the
issue of impunity for those responsible.
56. The Special Representative urges the Government
to comply in full with the above-mentioned
Commission resolution.
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Stoning and amputation
57. Stoning, surely a barbaric punishment, appears
finally to be declining in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Only one such sentence came to the attention of the
Special Representative in the period under review and
that was apparently overturned on review. In March
2000, the press quoted the Ministry of Justice
spokesperson as stating that stoning may not be in the
country's interest, and that the head of the judiciary
believes that it should avoid acts which could insult
and taint the country's image.
58. Amputations appear to continue unabated.
59. One of several issues that appears to have
severely damaged confidence in public security and in
the Government as well has been the string of murders
and disappearances of intellectuals and dissident
political figures during about three months in late 1 998
and early 1 999, which became known as the chain or
serial murders, the implication being that they were all
related. By some reports, the chain stretches much
further back, as an explanation of earlier suspicious
events, such as the murder of three Christian clergy in
1994. Some suggest that it also covers mysterious
deaths and incidents that have occurred since early
1999, including most recently the murder of the doctor
known as the father of vasectomy in the Islamic
Republic of Iran.
60. The central very tragic cases in this matter, the
murders of Daryoush and Parvaneh Forouhar, were
discussed in the Special Representative's last report to
the General Assembly (see A/54/365, paras. 39-43). By
all accounts, their memory remains very much alive for
many Iranians inside and out of the country.
61. The investigation of these cases has been
appallingly slow. At one time, 10 persons were
arrested, 9 of whom were subsequently released on
bail. It seems that the cases have not been pursued. The
sixth Majilis has set up its own Commission to look
into the murders. Another investigation is under way,
reportedly under the direct management of the
President and the head of the judiciary. Since the
Special Representative's last report on the subject,
some fairly certain details as well as much speculation
has been placed in public debate. Yet, some 20 months
aifier these horrendous acts took place, no clear
progress has been made in bringing the perpetrators or
their masterminds to justice.
62. In March 2000, Saeed Hajjarian, a newspaper
editor, adviser to the President and Tehran City
Councillor, escaped an assassination attempt that was
subsequently linked to other recent murders. In May
2000, a revolutionary court sentenced the man alleged
to have shot Hajjarian to 15 years and his accomplices
to shorter sentences. This event was accompanied by
more allegations of torture, and complaints concerning
the court's successful efforts to prevent public
exposure of the masterminds.
A. Kurds
63. Iranian Kurds have traditionally lived in the
north-west of the country. They define turdistan” as
including all or parts of the provinces of Kermanshah,
lyllam, West Azerberijan and Kurdistan proper. The
Kurdish population in this area is said to be in the order
of eight million, with perhaps another two million in
other provinces, such as Khorasan, where Kurds had
been forcibly resettled in earlier centuries.
64. The Kurdish language is an autonomous language
of the Indo-European group. The vast majority of the
Kurds are Muslims, about 75 per cent Sunni and 25 per
cent Shiite.
65. There has been a long history of tension between
the Iranian Kurds and Tehran. Relations since the
Islamic Revolution have been marked by one short
period of unsuccessful negotiations in 1979-1980.
Scholars lay blame for the failure on both sides. They
note the areas of mixed ethnicity that the Kurds
included in their claim, as well as the fact that there
was a reference to the various ethnic minorities in the
draft constitution, and that there was subsequently a
proposal for a clause protecting Sunni religious
practices.
66. Following the breakdown of negotiations,
prolonged periods of violence ensued both in the
Islamic Republic of Iran and abroad. Guerrilla warfare
has continued in spurts, with civilian Kurds suffering
the most in terms of direct casualties as well as
VI. Murders and disappearances of
intellectuals and political dissidents vii. Status of minorities
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economic dislocation. While military action in
Kurdistan appears to be at a low ebb at present,
violence continues on the part of both the law
enforcement agencies and armed Kurdish activists.
67. Iranian Kurdistan is by all accounts a fertile area
and should be prosperous. In fact, according to the
Human Development Report of Iran, 1999, the four
provinces mentioned rank in the lower half of the
provincial scale by the human development index; two
of them, West Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, being among
the very lowest. This now seems to be recognized by
the Government. In the course of a recent visit to
Kurdistan, the President referred to widespread poverty
and unemployment, and declared that more funds
would be made available for development in the area.
The Special Representative has been informed that the
primary demand of the Kurdish people is to be
recognized as Kurds, which implies full recognition of
their cultural rights, including the registration of
Kurdish names. A major complaint is over the
obstacles in the way of Sunni places of worship.
B. Azeris
68. While reliable demographic statistics are hard to
come by in the Islamic Republic of Iran, it seems that
the Azeris are the largest minority in the country, with
estimates of their numbers reaching as high as 25 per
cent of the 60 million total population. The Azeri
language belongs to the Turkic language group and is
thus unrelated to Farsi. In the Islamic Republic of Iran,
the Azeris have traditionally lived in the north-west,
where in many places they mixed with Kurds and
Armenians. That relationship would seem to have been
traditionally tempestuous. Today, Azeris are also found
in most other parts of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
with reportedly as many as a million in Tehran. Many
Azeris have been absorbed into mainstream Persian
society The Azeris are principally Shiite. The Qajar
dynasty of Iran was of Azeri stock, as indeed are
reportedly many of today's Iranian elites.
69. For some time, there has been a demand by some
Azeris for greater cultural autonomy. They speak of a
national and cultural identity. The principal complaint
against Tehran is that Azeris have been denied cultural
recognition, in particular the exercise of basic cultural
rights as set out in article 26 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
70. The arrest of Mahmudali Chehregani, a lecturer at
the University of Tabriz and a prominent Azeri activist,
has drawn attention to the Azeri cause. Dr. Chehregani
has previously demanded for the community the
cultural autonomy rights provided for in article 15 of
the Constitution. He had been elected to the fifth
Majilis but had been disqualified, reportedly because of
his campaign for the exercise of cultural rights by the
Azeris. Following a large demonstration in April 1996,
during which 600 persons were reportedly detained, Dr.
Chehregani and some followers were arrested. It is
alleged that Dr. Chehregani's subsequent arrest in
December 1999 was to prevent him from being
nominated for the sixth Majilis. The Special
Representative has made enquiries of the Government
in this matter.
C. Religious minorities: Sunnis and
Baha'is
Sunnis
71. The Special Representative has written in the past
of the sense of injustice felt by many Sunnis in the
Islamic Republic of Iran over treatment they view as
discriminatory. One of the principle complaints has
been the official and unofficial obstacles put in the way
of building or rebuilding Sunni mosques. The example
most often raised is Tehran itself, where a reported one
million Sunnis have no mosque of their own. This
matter was raised in the Majilis in June 1999; there is
no information as to what if any reply was made by the
Government. The Special Representative has also
received several complaints about transmigration
policies carried out with the acquiescence of the
Government, under which large number of Shiites are
settled in predominantly Sunni areas of the country
with the apparent objective of reducing the etlmic
Sunnis to a minority in their homelands.
Baha'is
72. The concern about the human rights situation of
the Baha'is remains on the agenda of the Special
Representative, with reports on situations of
discrimination and persecution. The Baha'i community
continues to experience discrimination in areas of, inter
alia, education, employment, travel, housing and the
enjoyment of cultural activities.
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73. Eleven Baha'is are imprisoned in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, four of whom are subj ect to the death
sentence (see annex II). The Special Representative
received a letter dated 25 February 2000 from the
Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of
Iran to the United Nations Office at Geneva, stating
that the spokesmen of the judiciary had denied
confirmation of the death sentences against Hidayat
Kashifi Najafabadi and Sirus Dhabihi-Muqaddam. The
Special Representative has received conflicting
information as to the current status of this matter.
74. Acts of intimidation carried out in order to
prevent Baha'is from participating in religious
gatherings or educational activities have also been
reported. According to information reaching the
Special Representative, there seems to have been an
increase in the number of short-term arrests and
OEuspended sentences”, to be applied only if the
accused participate again in those gatherings.
75. A welcome development was the elimination of
questions regarding the religion of spouses at the time
of the registration of a marriage. According to
information submitted by the Permanent
Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the
United Nations Office at Geneva, the Registration
Department has issued a circular in this regard. This
opens up the possibility of registering Baha'i
marriages, a development which will have positive
implications for the rights of Baha'i women and
children, who have until now been exposed to charges
of prostitution and denied the right to inherit. There is
now the prospect that university entrance will be the
next sector in which religious discrimination of this
nature will be removed.
76. The Special Representative wishes to reiterate his
appeal to the Government of the Islamic Republic to
implement his outstanding recommendations (see
A/53/423, para. 45) as well as those of the Special
Rapporteur on religious intolerance (see
E/CN.4/1 996/95/Add.2).
D. Minorities policy
77. The basic international statement of the rights of
a minority is contained in article 27 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which
establishes the rights of ethnic, religious linguistic
minorities to enjoy their own culture, to profess and
practice their own religion or to use their own language
(for a discussion of the term minority”, see
E/CN.4/1998/59, paras. 32-35). In addition, in its
general comments on the guarantee of equality in
article 26 of the Covenant, the Human Rights
Committee has stated that in a State in which the
general conditions of a certain part of the population
prevent or impair their enjoyment of human rights, that
State should take specific action to correct those
conditions. Thus, a State is enjoined to protect certain
rights and to assist disadvantaged groups in certain
circumstances. A proactive policy is clearly required to
discharge those international responsibilities. In the
same context, certain international best practices are
emerging, such as the creation of an ombudsman to
monitor the protection of minority rights (for a more
detailed discussion of international and Iranian norms,
see E/CN.4/1999/32, annex II).
78. In the Special Representative's view, the
articulation of a minorities policy in the Islamic
Republic of Iran is long overdue. Without going over
the uneasy and sometimes violent relationships that
most minorities have had with the central Government
dating from the nineteenth century, it is self-evident
today that certain minorities are among the poorest and
most disadvantaged peoples in the country. It is also
clear that most minorities are not enjoying the rights
set out in article 27 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. The history of such
treatment can perhaps be partly attributed to strategic
circumstances but that cannot today stand as a
justification for disregarding the rights clearly
articulated in article 27 of the Covenant, as well as
indeed to a limited extent in the Iranian Constitution
itself
79. There is talk in the Islamic Republic of Iran today
of the rights of citizenship. It was following a decision
of the Expediency Council to endorse such a concept
that the Registration Department abolished the
requirement for the declaration on religion on
application to register a marriage. The concept was
described in a letter from the Permanent Mission of the
Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations as
applying especially” to people whose religions are not
among the religions recognized by the Constitution.
This would, therefore, seem to apply primarily to the
Baha'is. As a concept however, the rights of citizenship
should be equally applicable to groups seeking to
benefit from provisions of the Constitution, such as
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article 15 on the right to the use of regional and tribal
languages.
VIII. Other important matters
A. Economic, social and cultural rights
Economic conditions of workers
80. A number of conditions, particularly those
affecting workers, have grown sharply worse recently.
The combination of stagnation in some industrial
sectors, the continuing rise in inflation and the growing
unemployment rate have all aggravated the condition
of workers. According to a press report, a senior
official of the Health Ministry stated that 1 2 million
persons now live below the poverty line and 20 per
cent of the population controls 80 per cent of the
wealth, and that by the end of 2010 another 15 million
persons will have migrated from the countryside to the
cities.
81. A senior official in the Labour Ministry informed
the press in July 2000 that 720,000 workers are
entering the job market aimually, 2,800,000 are
currently looking for work and the current
unemployment rate is 16.2 per cent. In the first two
months of 2000, only 20,000 of the required 80,000
new jobs were generated.
82. Research brought to the attention of the Special
Representative records 244 cases of labour unrest in
the period May 1999 to April 2000; 46 per cent of
those cases were protests about unpaid wages, in some
cases for as long as 24 months, while the second most
frequent reason for labour unrest was concern for job
security. It is reported that over 400 factories have been
closed in recent years and that the textile sector alone
is facing the loss of 500,000 jobs, the result primarily
of the lack of reinvestment in an ageing industry.
83. Certain government measures are said to be
aggravating the suffering of workers, including
changes in eligibility for assistance by the social
service organization and hotly debated legislation now
in effect which exempts from the application of the
Labour Act all workshops and businesses with five
employees or less. The prospect of this legislation
being adopted was the subject of widespread worker
demonstrations over the past 18 months and was
opposed by the Ministry of Labour. It is said to affect
2.8 million workers.
84. The deteriorating situation of Iranian workers is
receiving growing recognition in the Iranian press and
elsewhere. The Human Development Report of Iran,
1999, discusses the conditions, including government
policies, that have led to the rising rate of
unemployment. It calls for policies to prevent further
deterioration in people's living standards. However,
nothing has come to the attention of the Special
Representative suggesting that the Government itself
attaches priority to tackling the conditions of workers
other than the urgent attention that is being called for
by all sides to address the economic problems facing
the country. The human rights of workers are at stake.
Social conditions
85. The period under review has been marked by
significant social unrest. In June 2000, the press carried
a report that some 4,000 women burned tyres and
blocked a road in Islamshahr to protest poor living
conditions, including lack of water, gas and electricity.
In early July 2000, there were press reports of violent
demonstrations in Abadan, objecting to the salinity of
local drinking water. The Special Representative has
received reports of rallies that occasionally turned
violent in 10 or 12 other cities. In early July 2000, in
connection with student rallies to mark the July 1999
student demonstrations, a gathering that the press
reported consisted of out-of-work youth, women and
old men swelled to an angry mob of several thousand
who clashed with police and Islamic vigilantes in
several locations in Tehran.
Development and human rights
86. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the areas of
highest development are in general located in the
central regions of the country. Those with the lowest
tend to be towards the frontiers of the country, where
the minority peoples, that is non-Persians, traditionally
and to a significant degree still live. According to the
Human Development Report of Iran, 1999, the three
provinces at the bottom of the human development
index are Kohgilooye and Boyer-Ahmad, Kurdestan,
and Sistan and Baluchistan, three provinces with a high
percentage of minority peoples. It should not be
surprising that according to the same source, these
three provinces rank at or near the bottom in terms of
adult literacy, life expectancy, infant mortality,
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education, consumption expenditure, the gender
empowerment index and the human poverty index. The
correlation between underdevelopment and minority
peoples is clearly recognized by economic plaimers but
the Special Representative is not persuaded that the
Government as a whole understands the importance of
the problem and its connection with the enjoyment of
human rights.
B. Democracy
87. The Special Representative is mindful of the fact
that democracy” is a term that is difficult to define in
normative terms. Certainly it includes free and fair
elections. A useful statement of what constitutes free
and fair elections is the Declaration on the subject by
the Inter-Parliamentary Council dated 26 March 1994.
88. The elections for the sixth Majilis were held in
February 2000. The nomination process was marred by
a sharp exchange between the Interior Ministry on the
one hand and the Guardian Council on the other as to
the role of the Council in the vetting of candidates. The
Council disqualified over 600 candidates, most without
explanation. The widely held view was that many
candidates were disqualified because they were viewed
as reformists, including all 12 members of the Freedom
Party, an unregistered but tolerated political grouping
that has been trying for years without success to be
accepted as a recognized player in the political process.
89. Statements and estimates of the voter turnover
ranged from 57 per cent to 83 per cent. The press
carried a number of stories about voting irregularities.
90. The Iran Nation Party, another unregistered
political grouping and the inheritor of the mantel of
Mohammed Musaddiq as well as the political home of
the murdered Daryoush Forouhar, suffered severely
during the period under review three of their
leaders, Bahram Namazi, Khosrow Sayef and Farzin
Mokhber, were sentenced to 13 to 15 years in prison
for promoting anti-regime propaganda” and OEctivities
against the internal security of the Islamic Republic”.
The charges had arisen out of the participation of the
accused in the second phase of the student
demonstration in July 1999.
91. The Guardian Council's subsequent action of
annulling the results in a number of electoral divisions
without presenting evidence to support their action was
sharply condemned by some officials. According to the
press, the winners in two of those divisions were pro-
reform Sunni personalities. The same response greeted
the Council's action in ordering a recount in a number
of constituencies, particularly Tehran itself, despite the
fact that the Interior Ministry, which has legislated
responsibility for the supervision of elections, had
found no reason to do so.
92. The new Majilis convened in late May 2000, but
much of its time up to early August 2000 was taken up
with procedural matters. In June 2000, the major
groupings among those members generally described
as reformists declared their legislative priorities to be
the reform of the press and electoral laws, the
enactment of authority for the creation of private radio
and television stations, and the enactment of a
guarantee that those charged with political offences
would have the right to trial by jury. Meanwhile, the
view began to be heard, mainly from conservative
quarters, that the Majilis should concentrate on
economic issues, including inflation and
unemployment. In late July 2000, a controversy broke
out between the Majilis and the judiciary as to their
respective authority to carry out investigations. The
insistence of the judiciary on its exclusive jurisdiction
over a recent incident provoked charges that the
exercise of rights of the Majilis, as set out in the
Constitution, was being impeded by the non-
cooperation of the judiciary reflecting the sensitivity of
the system to the activism of the new Majilis in trying
to investigate the complaints it is receiving from many
quarters.
93. At the end of July 2000, the President was
reported by the press as declaring that the Islamic
Republic of Iran accepts democracy in principle but
that it must be based on a respect for the values and
goals of Islam. The following day, a leading reform
member of the Majilis was quoted in the press as
declaring that in the Islamic Republic of Iran, being a
majority does not necessarily bring power. A week
later, the Supreme Leader, in what was described as an
unprecedented move, declared that the press reform
legislation being finalized by the Majilis was not to
proceed.
94. In the Special Representative's view, it is clear
that while the February election of the sixth Majilis had
certain flaws, it was nevertheless another important
step on the road to accountable democratic governance.
Since then and despite efforts to confine the agenda of
the Majilis to economic matters and most importantly
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the intervention of the Supreme Leader to block the
press reform bill in the Majilis, that body has taken a
significant step in re-establishing its own human rights
committee and is pressing ahead with several important
legislative initiatives to improve the human rights
situation in several key areas.
C. Guardian Council
95. On the occasion of the twentieth aimiversary of
the Guardian Council in July 2000, the Supreme
Leader met the members of the Council, and in a public
statement emphasized the importance of the Council in
protecting the form and conduct of the Islamic system
through checking conformity of laws with Islam and
the Constitution. He stated that the Council had the
duty to prevent the infiltration of impure elements into
the pillars of the system.
96. The Special Representative sees many difficulties
with the actual operation of the Council. One is its
trespass into the election process, where its refusal to
approve certain candidates and its annulling of the
results in certain electoral divisions is widely viewed
as an attempt to block the election of persons holding
certain political views, including a number usually
described as reformist as well as members of the
Freedom Party. The Council's refusal or reluctance to
issue clear, legally based reasons for such action has
provided significant credibility to the charges brought
against it.
97. A second problem as seen by the Special
Representative is that some of the members are noted
for the intolerant attitudes they occasionally express.
One member of the Council is in effective control of an
extrajudicial organization, Ansar-i-Hezbollah, noted
for its involvement in a wide variety of violent,
terrorist-like activities against student and other
elements in Iranian society, who are seen by this self-
appointed band as threats to the nation's virtue. The
same person was quoted in the press in early August
2000 as saying that Islam could not be saved with
liberation and tolerance, and declaring that the closure
of the newspapers was the best thing the judiciary had
done since the revolution.
98. In short, without calling for the disbandment of
the Council as it operates at present, the Special
Representative believes it to be a major obstacle to the
further development of democracy in the Islamic
Republic of Iran.
D. Islamic Human Rights Conmiission
99. Little information about the work of the Islamic
Human Rights Commission has come to the attention
of the Special Representative in the period under
review. However, in an important interview with the
press at the beginning of April 2000, the Secretary of
the Commission said it had now been confirmed that
illegal detention centres continued to exist in the
Islamic Republic of Iran. In addition, the Commission
is reportedly trying to investigate illegal detentions and
persons gone missing in the justice system (see
para. 41 above).
100. Internationally, there have been important
developments. The research-oriented International
Council on Human Rights Policy has recently
published a report incorporating several case studies of
national human rights institutions and the conclusions
to be drawn from them. Among the most important are
the need to acquire social legitimacy, the need to
become proactive and programme-oriented rather than
strictly complaints-led, and the need to emphasize
accessibility not only in the widespread location of
offices but also in simplified procedures and the
offering of services in minority languages. The report
contains a number of detailed recommendations, all of
which would seem to be relevant to the Commission.
They provide an excellent series of targets for the
Commission.
101. Finally, the Special Representative notes
Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/76, in
which among other things the Commission reaffirms
the importance of developing national institutions that
are in conformity with the relevant principles adopted
by the General Assembly in 1993.
IX. Correspondence with the
Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran
102. For correspondence between the Special
Representative and the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, please see annex III.
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X. Conclusions
103. The period under review has been disastrous for
the freedom of the press, a freedom that developed in
large part to facilitate the implementation of
government accountability. This freedom is an integral
component of a civil society. The Special
Representative urges the three branches of the Iranian
Government to work together to accomplish this vital
goal.
104. The student demonstrations of July 1999 were a
signal event in the life of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
It should have been an occasion to celebrate the
exercise in freedom of expression. The judiciary moved
quickly against the student leaders, but apart from an
unsatisfactory trial against certain police officers has
apparently done nothing to bring the extrajudicial
vigilantes to justice. In Tabriz as well, students have
paid a heavy price for exercising their right of
expression. The Special Representative calls on the
Government to accelerate its efforts to bring the
provocateurs in both cases to trial.
105. The major systemic impediments to the full
enjoyment by women of their human rights have not
yet been addressed. The Special Representative calls
on the Government to do so.
106. The legal system requires urgent attention. To
begin with, the Special Representative calls on the
judiciary to accelerate the introduction of the reform
programme that was promised a year ago when the
head of the judiciary took office. The Independent Bar
Association has failed to meet the expectations that
were held out for it when its first elected council came
into office. IBA is not yet living up to its name or the
international guidelines for bar associations. The
Special Representative urges the Government, perhaps
the Majilis, to study the re-establishment of the Bar
Association to meet the commitments of the President
to the rule of law, in particular to a truly independent
bar.
107. The number of executions continues to be high.
The Special Representative urges the Government to
comply with existing international standards in this
respect.
108. It is now generally and publicly acknowledged
that torture exists in the Islamic Republic of Iran and
that it is certainly not an isolated phenomenon. The
Special Representative urges the Government as a
whole to commit itself to uphold the ban on torture that
appears in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of
Iran and the various international norms in that regard.
109. The murders and disappearances of intellectuals
and dissident politicians seem no nearer to being
solved, which has given credibility to the widely held
view that an open enquiry or trial would lead to
persons in high places. The Special Representative
calls on the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, in the fulfilment of the commitment to the
protection of human rights as well as its specific
undertaking in the case, to prosecute as soon as
possible those concerned, in open court and without
concern as to where the evidence may lead.
110. The rights of minorities, both ethnic and
religious, remain another area largely neglected by the
Government. The Special Representative urges the
Government to:
(a) Address the concerns of the Sunnis with
regard to the building and/or refurbishment of
dedicated Sunni mosques;
(b) Address the concerns of the Baha'is and
certain Christian groups with new confidence-building
measures, following upon the recent relaxation of
marriage registration requirements, so as to fully and
expeditiously implement the rights of citizenship”
policy approved by the Expediency Council;
(c) Extend to all religious and ethnic minority
groups the cultural rights articulated in the
Constitution.
111. With regard to the fuller enjoyment of civil and
political rights as well as economic, social and cultural
rights, the Special Representative believes it imperative
that the Government address the socio-economic
problems that are causing so much distress to the poor
and the disadvantaged.
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112. The Islamic Republic of Iran continues to make
progress towards democracy, but sooner or later the
arbitrary, untransparent and perhaps even capricious
conduct of the Guardian Council must be addressed. As
it stands now, it is an obstacle to making the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran more
accountable to the Iranian people.
113. Finally, the Special Representative notes with
regret that he continues to be unable to visit the Islamic
Republic of Iran. He calls on the Government to return
to full cooperation with the Commission on Human
Rights in this regard.
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Annex I
Denial of fair trial and related rights
Case of Iranian Jews and Moslems in Shiraz
A. Arbitrary arrest and extended detention without charge
In violation of:
1. Iranian laws:
. Article 32 of the Constitution;
. Article 32 of the Procedure of the Public and Revolutionary Costs in
Criminal Affairs (1999) (Criminal Procedure Code);
. Article 33 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
2. International norms:
. Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
. Article 9.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Accused held for nine months without judicial arrest order or temporary
detention orders. Thereafter, by temporary detention orders but apparently not
in accordance with law.
B. Indictment: failure to specify charges under law
In violation of:
1. Iranian laws:
Article 32 of the Iranian Constitution;
Article 132 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
2. International norms:
Article 92 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Up to the date of judgement, no indictment known to the Penal Code of the
Islamic Republic of Iran was made.
C. Extra-legal confession
In violation of:
1. Iranian laws:
Article 30 of the Constitution;
Article 129 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
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2. International norms:
. Article 14 (3) of the International Convention Civil and Political Rights.
The accused were obliged to testify against themselves without free access to
lawyers or family members.
D. Right to counsel of choice and to presence of counsel
In violation of:
1. Iranian law:
. Article 35 of the Constitution;
Article 128 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
2. International norms:
Article 14 (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Accused allowed to appoint counsel only after one year in detention, and even
then only the four friendly” lawyers assigned by the Court.
Accused denied right to have lawyers present during meeting with judge,
prosecutors and media.
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Annex II
Information on the Situation of the Baha'is
The following is based on information received by the Special Representative.
1. Of the three Baha'is arrested in Isfahan for their involvement with the Baha'i
Institute of Higher Education and who received verdicts on 16 March 1999, only
Ziaullah Mizapanah is still under house arrest. Sina Hakiman, Farrad Khajeh and
Habibullah Ferdosian have been released.
2. Manuchehr Khulusi, a resident of Khurasan who was reportedly arrested on 9
June 1999 and transferred to Mashhad with no clear indication as to the charges
brought against him, has also been released. The status of the verdict against him,
however, is unclear.
3. Baha'is remaining in Iranian prisons include Bihnam Mithaqui and Kayvan
Khalajabadi, arrested on 29 April 1989 for Zionist Baha'i activities” and sentenced
to death; Musa Talibi, arrested on 7 June 1994, charged with apostasy and sentenced
to death but now being processed for commutation of sentence; Dhabihu'llah
Maharami, arrested on 6 September 1995, charged with apostasy and sentenced to
life, following commutation from a death sentence by the Supreme Leader; Mansur
Haddadan, arrested on 29 February 1996, charged with holding a children's art
exposition and sentenced to three years in prison; Sirus Dhabihi-Muquaddam,
Hidayat Kashifi Najafabadih and Ata'u'llah Hamid Nasirizadih, arrested in
October/November 1997, charged with continuing family life” meetings and
sentenced to death in the case of the first two and to 10-year imprisonment in the
case of the third; Sonia Ahmadi and Manuchechr Ziyai, arrested on 1 May 1998,
charged with holding meetings for youth and sentenced to three years'
imprisonment.
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Annex III
Correspondence between the Special Representative and the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1 January-
1 July 2000
1. On 18 February 2000, the Special Representative addressed a letter to the
Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting information on the cases of Hidayat Kashifi
Najafabadi and Sirus Dhabihi-Muqaddam, reportedly arrested for their Baha'i
activities and whose death sentences had allegedly been confirmed. The Special
Representative received a letter dated 25 February 2000 from the Permanent
Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Office at
Geneva, stating that the spokesmen of the judiciary had denied confirmation of the
death sentences. By another letter dated 27 March 2000, the Permanent
Representative further informed the Special Representative of the following:
(a) In accordance with article 23 of the Constitution, no-one is subject to
inquiry simply for holding a certain belief in the Islamic Republic of Iran;
(b) Hidayat Kashifi Najafabadi, Sirus Dhabihi-Muqaddam and Ataollah
Hamed Nasirizadeh were arrested in 1997 on charges of action against national
security and spying and sentenced to death by the primary court;
(c) The Supreme Court rejected the case and sent it back to another primary
court for reconsideration;
(d) The second primary court sentenced the first two persons to death and the
third one to 10 years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court rejected the case because
of some deficiencies and sent it back for rectification.
(For an update on the case, see main report, para. 73.)
2. A letter dated 30 March 2000 from the Permanent Representative contained the
following information in response to the Special Representative's letter dated 21
June 1999 drawing the urgent attention of the Iranian authorities to the reported
arrest in the Islamic Republic of Iran of 13 persons, all said to be Iranian Jews,
suspected of spying for Israel:
(a) In accordance with relevant laws and regulations, accused persons enjoy
the right to be defended by a lawyer of their own choice. A competent court in
Shiraz had announced that no lawyer had been chosen. In the absence of any chosen
lawyer, the court would ask the Bar Association to appoint a lawyer;
(b) The first hearing of the trial would begin on 13 April 2000.
3. On the same case, the Special Representative sent a second letter to the
Permanent Representative on 4 April 2000. In response to this communication, the
Permanent Representative, by a letter dated 4 July 2000, informed the Special
Representative as follows:
Referring to your letter regarding the trial of a group of people
(including Jews and Muslims) on charges of espionage, I would like to inform
you that they were tried by the Court of Shiraz in the presence of lawyers of
their own choice.”
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In accordance with the relevant law, the Court acquitted five persons,
due to insufficient evidence and sentenced 12 persons to imprisonment due to
clear evidence and confession of the accused. The duration of detention would
be included in prison terms. However, the case is still open and the accused
and their lawyers have the right to appeal during 20 days after the issuance of
the verdicts.”
4. The Special Representative joined the Special Rapporteur on the promotion
and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression in sending an
urgent letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning the case of Latif Safari,
Director of the banned daily Neshat, and Akbar Ganji, journalist for the daily Sobh-
e-Emrooz, imprisoned on 26 April 2000. In the letter, a joint appeal was made to the
Government to ensure everyone's right to freedom of opinion and expression. No
response has been received from the Government.
5. The Special Representative addressed two urgent letters to the Minister for
Foreign Affairs concerning a number of Iranian citizens who were reportedly
arrested and held in incommunicado detention in relation to their participation in a
conference in Berlin organized by the Heinrich Boell Institute on 7 and 8 April
2000. In this regard, on 11 May 2000, he joined the Special Rapporteurs on the
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression and on
violence against women and on torture, as well as the Chairman-Rapporteur of the
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, in an urgent appeal concerning two
women's activists, Mehrangiz Kar and Shahla Lahiji, and a representative of the
student organization Office for Strengthening Unity, Ali Afshari. The three were
subsequently released.
6. In this context, the same signatories, except for the Special Rapporteur on
violence against women, sent a second urgent appeal on 30 June 2000 regarding the
cases of Ezzatollah Sahabi, a 70-year-old journalist, and Khalil Rostamkhani, a
translator. No response has been received from the Government. In both letters,
while referring to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1999/32 with regard to
incommunicado detention, the authors of the above-mentioned letters appealed to
the Government to ensure that the rights of the above-named persons to physical and
mental integrity, to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention and to freedom of
opinion and expression be protected.
7. A letter dated 24 March 2000 from the Permanent Representative of the
Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Office at Geneva contained the
following information in response to the Special Representative's letter dated 13
July 1999, written in conjunction with the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of
the right to freedom of opinion and expression, concerning the student
demonstrators who were reportedly attacked by members of the armed forces and
members of the vigilante student group in the University dormitory of Tehran
University:
Considering the students' clashes in Tehran, there is a difference
between those who came to the streets because of their legitimate appeals and
those who rioted. According to our information, the students did not
participate in the riot. There were others who rioted in the streets when the
students' sit-in ended.
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The Islamic Republic of Iran's government policy is to study and
examine the above-mentioned issues. The judiciary, within the framework of
its legal duties, is following it up independently.
During the riots, 50 members of illegal groups were arrested, 30 of
whom were released on bail. The cases of another 20 arrested persons,
including Seyed Djavad Emami, Forough Bahmanpour and Nasiri, were
referred to the Revolutionary Court.
Criminal charges related to the law enforcement forces for entering the
students' dormitory without permission in spite of the rejection of any request
for entering the dormitory by officials in charge were referred to the judiciary
organization of the armed forces.
To date, most of the perpetrators of the illegal actions have been brought
to justice. The trial of the 20 members of the law enforcement forces,
including Brigadier-General Farhad Nazari, former Deputy Chief of Tehran's
law enforcement forces, on charges of illegal entry into the dormitory and
attacking the students, is under way.
With the goal of rooting out the future possibility of any such incident,
the case of any other perpetrators of illegal actions, including any person who
might have plaimed and ordered the attack, is still open.”
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