Iran's minorities are a potent force Staats, David R The Sun (1837-1985); Dec 23, 1979; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: Baltimore Sun, The (183 7-1986) pg. Ki an's minorities are a potent force By DAVID II . STAATS The Kurds of have a a '1ng “A root which has y Implanted Itself cannot hatIng up by a gentle breeze' The roots sunk centuries ago by the Kurds, Azerbaijanis and Iran's other highly ne- tionalisticand numerous ethnic minorities are deep and show no sign of loosenln& even under the strain of storm winds from Tehrao and Qoin. On the contrary, they stir and embed themselves more deeply Howpo ularethemlnorltynalion alitles of who comprise almost half its population? And to what purpose Is their determination? The minority problem of Ia Is not merely a domestic Issue, It Is an mterna- tional one because of the historical, na- tional and cultural links that moat of Iran's major national minorities have to large communities In adjacent countries. Only half of fran's 36 million people are ethnic Persians. The other 18 million area complex mixture 0! overlapping ethnic and reI gIous groups actively seeking au. tonomy for their respective native re- gions. fran'seththc minorities joined In the Is . lamb revolution for both national and re- ligious reasons. However, the issue of re- gional autonomy, which thesemlnorityna- tbonalliles espouse, directly strikes at the fundamental governing principle of the Is. lamb Republic by pitttn g demands for lo- cal seWru le by secular authorities against an increasingly Intransigent centralized theocracy Article V of the new iranian Comtltu lion establishes the exclusive tight of the Seej K2 ,coL I Mr. Stuts,atellow at the Research Instl• tale for Inner MIan Studies at Indiana University, was assisted In the prepara. lion of this article by Tanla A. Jacques, a gradnale student In the Departtneat of UrlicsndMtaIcStadiesatIndIanL Or, 1te y Usa Ann Zock Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
clergy to govern. As the supreme Inter- preter of Islamic law, Ayatollah Rubollah Khomeini is empowered to veto any and all legislation which, in his opinion, does not conform to the Muslim legal code. Growing frustration with the sweeping powers which allow Ayatollah Khomeini to rule virtually by decree was the princi- pal cause behind the resignation of former Iraniaa Prime Minister Mebdi Bazargan, who likened secular government under these conditions to “a knife without a blade?' The eipectations of the Eurds, Aier. baljanls and Iran's other ethnic minorities for a new era of political liberalism, fol- lowing the downfall of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahiavi. were not utopian. However, thestubbom refusal by Ayatollah Khomei- ni even to consider their petitions for re- gional self-rule has created a serious polit- ical Impasse. Until some sort of compro- misc on the autonomy Issue is reached, the ethnic minorities' confidence in Iran's new political system will continue to diminish to the point where, unless dramatic steps are taken to reverse the erosion, the mi- nority nationalities may consider casting their lots with foreign powers in the re- gion to gain Independence from Tebran. At present, however, none of these peo. pies advocates separatism, but all are en- gaged in a determined struggle for region- al national autonomy as well as for ex- panded opportunities in the iranian econo my. As Kurdish leader Sheikh Ezzeedin Rosselni stated: ‘Fundamentally, we ac- cept the role of the central government in foreign and defense policy. But beyond that, we want to run our own show.”' Of the major non -I'ersian nation- alities of the four million iranian- speaking urds, who are Sunni Muslims (and with whom the other eight million Kurds in Iraq, Syria, Turkey and the Sovi. et Union, constitute the fourth-largest eth- nic group In the Middle East), have along history of rebellion against central au- thority. These revolts inevitably have drawn in the major powers of the region, thereby elevating a local uprising by trib- al dissidents to international significance. This is why unrest among Iran's minority nationalities is a serious problem of secu- rity not only for Tehran but also for other world capitals. This history of the Kurdish national lib- eration movement is a classic case study of such manipulation of a local conflict by regional and global powers for their mdi- vidual political advantage. Briefly, the Kurdish national liberation movement be- gan to take a definite political form by the end of the last century Kurdish newspa- per was established in an In 1897, whIch published irregularly until It was sup- pressed by Persian authorities In 1902. Its activities were resumed In 1908, In istan- bul, by a newly formed Kurdish jiolitlcal action party and Its Kurdish cultural soci- ety. During World War! the Kurds pressed their demands for an independent Kurdish homeland from their new headquarters In Cairo. Their efforts were rewarded In 1920 by the Treaty of Sevres, which pro. vided for the creation of an independent Kurdestan; but the treaty was never rati. fled. The Treaty of Lausanne (1923), which formally ended hostilities In the Middle East, made no mention of the Kurds, In fact, the chief Turkish delegate to the Lausannqçonference, lsmetPasha, himself a Kurd declared (wrongly) that because the Kurds are ethnic Turks and Muslims, their national and religious rights could be guaranteed within the Turkish state, and that no independent homeland for the Kurds was necessary. Following World War H, a Kurdish state was created with Soviet backing In Iranian Kurdestan. When the United States and the Western allies forced Mos- cow to withdraw Its troops from the area, the shah's army reestablished Iranian sov- ereignty over thearea. Ia 1961, Kurdlsh leader Muflab Mus- tafa Barrani organized Kurdish tribesmen In Iraq In armed resistance to the Bagh- dad government. After 10 years of pro- tracted guerrilla warfare, the Iraqis in March, 1970, agreed tea plan granting an- tonomytotheKurds fouryearsbence. The shah of Iran drew the Iraqi Kurds under Mr. Barzanl Into his border dispute with the Baathlst government in Baghdad by arranging for them to receive assist- ance from the US. Central Intelligence Agency, which then-Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger engineered In return for the shah's support of the Nixon Doc- trine. When the actual tennsof the autonomy guarantee were delivered to Mr. Barzani In March, 1974, he rejected them as Inade- quate and resumed hostilities with the backing of the shah and the CIA. Within a year the shah bad reached a compromise on the border issue with the Iraqis and withdrew his support of the Kurdlsh reb- els, which left the tribesmen to defend themselves as best they could against Ira- qi armor and aircralL Kurdisb resistance quickly melted, Mr. Barzani took refuge In Tebran. - Unlike the overwhelming majority of the other Turkie-speaking peoples of the world, the five million Azerbaijanis of ‘belong to the Shilte branch of Islam. Their total national territory and popula. tlnn is divided nearly equally between and the Soviet Union. a 1945, a short-lived independent Azerhaljaai state was created by the So- viet lJnloa , As with the case of Soviet. backed Kurdestan, Moscow's post-war In- terference In Iranian Azerbaijan was brought to a quick end by decisive action by the United States and the other West. era powers. The Azerbaljanis are the second-largest ethnic group In and they are concentrated in the coun ry's populous northwestern region where they form the majority population. Like the Kurds and the Azeris, the Ira. alan-speaking, Sunni BeIuchls are divided among several countries of the region— Pakistan and Afghanistan In bran ey number about 700,000, and are more closely related lInguistically to the Push. tu-speaking Afghanls than to the Farsi. speaking Persians. The Baluçhls Inhabit thesoutheastern highlands of B' Another minority elemen( a the Arab population of the oil-rich prov cc of Khuzestan. Like the other Arabs of the Middle East, Ehuzestan Arabs belong to the Sunni sect of Islam. Most of Iran's two million Arabs resent what they feel Is the Inequitable distribution of od revenues from the petroleum industry which Is lo- catedon their territory. Although the fabric of Iranian society is an intricate weave of many colored threads into bold, individualistic patterns, Ayatollah Khomeini Is using his brand of islamic fundameutallsni to bleach out all of these distinctive, and therefore dis' tract lng , patterns. Himself the principal political benefici- ary of last year's rioting In Tabrlz by the Azerbaijani Turks, the ayatollah today re- gards their same unfulfilled aspirations I or regional national autonomy within the iranian Islamic Republic as nothing less than “an insult to Islam. ” And, according to the ayatollah of Tebran, Hussein All Montazerl , the struggle for Kurdish na. ional and religious rights by the Kurdish iDemocratic Party.is being led by “agents of Zionism and corruption.” Ayatollah Khomeini and his supporters are guilty of underestimatIng the volatil- Ity and revolutionary potential of these ethnic minorities, both Individually and collectively. Ills failure to reach a com- promise with the ethnic minorities on the' issue of national autonomy could well forge a coordinated policy of political struggle among these peoples, leading to his overthrow in favor of a more enlight- ened national leadership under someone such as the Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem Shariat-MadarL Further frustration of the ethnic mi- norities' quest for their national rights. could pursuade some to accept the patron- age of a foreign power for the region, As.. has been shown In the case ci the Kurds, such a combination of Interests is the rule rather than the exception. The current head of the Iraqi government, Saddam HusseIn Takrltl, who came to power in • July of this year, announced a program of • naw concessions to the Kurds of his coun- try, including the granting of permission ‘to 1,000 Kurdlab tribesmen to return to their native Kurdestan. In view of recent reports of Incidents along the Iraqi-Iranian frontIer, one can-s not Ignore the possibility that the Iraqi government Is now considering substan- tial material support to the Kurds of iran, just as the shah supported Kurdish Insur- gents In Iraq earlier In the decade. One Interesting question which remains is the attitude of the SovIet Union, Iran's pro-Moscow Communist Party, Tudeh, publicly supports Ayatollah Khomeini on the autonomy question, splitting the coun- try's Ieft-wlng parties.The real problem for Soviet poJ p akers Is whether to try to take all ot'm!br just parts of It. Unlike Ayatollah Khomeini, the Soviets are highly skilled at manipulating the nat- ural political forces within a society, and the current crisis of Iran's ethnic minor!-” ties In the struggle ‘for their national rlglstsoffers Moscow tes ptIng opportuni- ties. As Boris Yerasov, a Soviet specialist. on national liberation movements, corn- ‘meatS: “Arblt aryatteztipts to ignore'the national and cultural heritage are doomed to failure,” . Currently, onjy t cvo governments af- fected directly by the 'utaettled conditions In Fare heeding this adm nltion. These are 1 nd the United States. SAUDI ARABIA Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.