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Iran’s minorities are a potent force

          
          Iran's minorities are a potent force
          Staats, David R
          The Sun (1837-1985); Dec 23, 1979; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: Baltimore Sun, The (183 7-1986)
          pg. Ki
          an's minorities are a potent force
          By DAVID II . STAATS
          The Kurds of have a a '1ng “A
          root which has y Implanted Itself
          cannot hatIng up by a gentle breeze' The
          roots sunk centuries ago by the Kurds,
          Azerbaijanis and Iran's other highly ne-
          tionalisticand numerous ethnic minorities
          are deep and show no sign of loosenln&
          even under the strain of storm winds from
          Tehrao and Qoin. On the contrary, they
          stir and embed themselves more deeply
          Howpo ularethemlnorltynalion
          alitles of who comprise almost half
          its population? And to what purpose Is
          their determination?
          The minority problem of Ia Is not
          merely a domestic Issue, It Is an mterna-
          tional one because of the historical, na-
          tional and cultural links that moat of
          Iran's major national minorities have to
          large communities In adjacent countries.
          Only half of fran's 36 million people are
          ethnic Persians. The other 18 million area
          complex mixture 0! overlapping ethnic
          and reI gIous groups actively seeking au.
          tonomy for their respective native re-
          gions.
          fran'seththc minorities joined In the Is .
          lamb revolution for both national and re-
          ligious reasons. However, the issue of re-
          gional autonomy, which thesemlnorityna-
          tbonalliles espouse, directly strikes at the
          fundamental governing principle of the Is.
          lamb Republic by pitttn g demands for lo-
          cal seWru le by secular authorities against
          an increasingly Intransigent centralized
          theocracy
          Article V of the new iranian Comtltu
          lion establishes the exclusive tight of the
          Seej K2 ,coL I
          Mr. Stuts,atellow at the Research Instl•
          tale for Inner MIan Studies at Indiana
          University, was assisted In the prepara.
          lion of this article by Tanla A. Jacques, a
          gradnale student In the Departtneat of
          UrlicsndMtaIcStadiesatIndIanL
          Or, 1te y Usa Ann Zock
          Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
        
          
          clergy to govern. As the supreme Inter-
          preter of Islamic law, Ayatollah Rubollah
          Khomeini is empowered to veto any and
          all legislation which, in his opinion, does
          not conform to the Muslim legal code.
          Growing frustration with the sweeping
          powers which allow Ayatollah Khomeini
          to rule virtually by decree was the princi-
          pal cause behind the resignation of former
          Iraniaa Prime Minister Mebdi Bazargan,
          who likened secular government under
          these conditions to “a knife without a
          blade?'
          The eipectations of the Eurds, Aier.
          baljanls and Iran's other ethnic minorities
          for a new era of political liberalism, fol-
          lowing the downfall of Shah Mohammad
          Reza Pahiavi. were not utopian. However,
          thestubbom refusal by Ayatollah Khomei-
          ni even to consider their petitions for re-
          gional self-rule has created a serious polit-
          ical Impasse. Until some sort of compro-
          misc on the autonomy Issue is reached, the
          ethnic minorities' confidence in Iran's new
          political system will continue to diminish
          to the point where, unless dramatic steps
          are taken to reverse the erosion, the mi-
          nority nationalities may consider casting
          their lots with foreign powers in the re-
          gion to gain Independence from Tebran.
          At present, however, none of these peo.
          pies advocates separatism, but all are en-
          gaged in a determined struggle for region-
          al national autonomy as well as for ex-
          panded opportunities in the iranian econo
          my. As Kurdish leader Sheikh Ezzeedin
          Rosselni stated: ‘Fundamentally, we ac-
          cept the role of the central government in
          foreign and defense policy. But beyond
          that, we want to run our own show.”'
          Of the major non -I'ersian nation-
          alities of the four million iranian-
          speaking urds, who are Sunni Muslims
          (and with whom the other eight million
          Kurds in Iraq, Syria, Turkey and the Sovi.
          et Union, constitute the fourth-largest eth-
          nic group In the Middle East), have along
          history of rebellion against central au-
          thority. These revolts inevitably have
          drawn in the major powers of the region,
          thereby elevating a local uprising by trib-
          al dissidents to international significance.
          This is why unrest among Iran's minority
          nationalities is a serious problem of secu-
          rity not only for Tehran but also for other
          world capitals.
          This history of the Kurdish national lib-
          eration movement is a classic case study
          of such manipulation of a local conflict by
          regional and global powers for their mdi-
          vidual political advantage. Briefly, the
          Kurdish national liberation movement be-
          gan to take a definite political form by the
          end of the last century Kurdish newspa-
          per was established in an In 1897, whIch
          published irregularly until It was sup-
          pressed by Persian authorities In 1902. Its
          activities were resumed In 1908, In istan-
          bul, by a newly formed Kurdish jiolitlcal
          action party and Its Kurdish cultural soci-
          ety.
          During World War! the Kurds pressed
          their demands for an independent Kurdish
          homeland from their new headquarters In
          Cairo. Their efforts were rewarded In
          1920 by the Treaty of Sevres, which pro.
          vided for the creation of an independent
          Kurdestan; but the treaty was never rati.
          fled. The Treaty of Lausanne (1923),
          which formally ended hostilities In the
          Middle East, made no mention of the
          Kurds, In fact, the chief Turkish delegate
          to the Lausannqçonference, lsmetPasha,
          himself a Kurd declared (wrongly) that
          because the Kurds are ethnic Turks and
          Muslims, their national and religious
          rights could be guaranteed within the
          Turkish state, and that no independent
          homeland for the Kurds was necessary.
          Following World War H, a Kurdish
          state was created with Soviet backing In
          Iranian Kurdestan. When the United
          States and the Western allies forced Mos-
          cow to withdraw Its troops from the area,
          the shah's army reestablished Iranian sov-
          ereignty over thearea.
          Ia 1961, Kurdlsh leader Muflab Mus-
          tafa Barrani organized Kurdish tribesmen
          In Iraq In armed resistance to the Bagh-
          dad government. After 10 years of pro-
          tracted guerrilla warfare, the Iraqis in
          March, 1970, agreed tea plan granting an-
          tonomytotheKurds fouryearsbence.
          The shah of Iran drew the Iraqi Kurds
          under Mr. Barzanl Into his border dispute
          with the Baathlst government in Baghdad
          by arranging for them to receive assist-
          ance from the US. Central Intelligence
          Agency, which then-Secretary of State
          Henry A. Kissinger engineered In return
          for the shah's support of the Nixon Doc-
          trine.
          When the actual tennsof the autonomy
          guarantee were delivered to Mr. Barzani
          In March, 1974, he rejected them as Inade-
          quate and resumed hostilities with the
          backing of the shah and the CIA. Within a
          year the shah bad reached a compromise
          on the border issue with the Iraqis and
          withdrew his support of the Kurdlsh reb-
          els, which left the tribesmen to defend
          themselves as best they could against Ira-
          qi armor and aircralL Kurdisb resistance
          quickly melted, Mr. Barzani took refuge In
          Tebran.
          - Unlike the overwhelming majority of
          the other Turkie-speaking peoples of the
          world, the five million Azerbaijanis of
          ‘belong to the Shilte branch of Islam.
          Their total national territory and popula.
          tlnn is divided nearly equally between
          and the Soviet Union.
          a 1945, a short-lived independent
          Azerhaljaai state was created by the So-
          viet lJnloa , As with the case of Soviet.
          backed Kurdestan, Moscow's post-war In-
          terference In Iranian Azerbaijan was
          brought to a quick end by decisive action
          by the United States and the other West.
          era powers. The Azerbaljanis are
          the second-largest ethnic group In
          and they are concentrated in the coun ry's
          populous northwestern region where they
          form the majority population.
          Like the Kurds and the Azeris, the Ira.
          alan-speaking, Sunni BeIuchls are divided
          among several countries of the region—
          Pakistan and Afghanistan In bran
          ey number about 700,000, and are more
          closely related lInguistically to the Push.
          tu-speaking Afghanls than to the Farsi.
          speaking Persians. The Baluçhls Inhabit
          thesoutheastern highlands of B'
          Another minority elemen( a the
          Arab population of the oil-rich prov cc of
          Khuzestan. Like the other Arabs of the
          Middle East, Ehuzestan Arabs belong to
          the Sunni sect of Islam. Most of Iran's two
          million Arabs resent what they feel Is the
          Inequitable distribution of od revenues
          from the petroleum industry which Is lo-
          catedon their territory.
          Although the fabric of Iranian society
          is an intricate weave of many colored
          threads into bold, individualistic patterns,
          Ayatollah Khomeini Is using his brand of
          islamic fundameutallsni to bleach out all
          of these distinctive, and therefore dis'
          tract lng , patterns.
          Himself the principal political benefici-
          ary of last year's rioting In Tabrlz by the
          Azerbaijani Turks, the ayatollah today re-
          gards their same unfulfilled aspirations
          I or regional national autonomy within the
          iranian Islamic Republic as nothing less
          than “an insult to Islam. ” And, according
          to the ayatollah of Tebran, Hussein All
          Montazerl , the struggle for Kurdish na.
          ional and religious rights by the Kurdish
          iDemocratic Party.is being led by “agents
          of Zionism and corruption.”
          Ayatollah Khomeini and his supporters
          are guilty of underestimatIng the volatil-
          Ity and revolutionary potential of these
          ethnic minorities, both Individually and
          collectively. Ills failure to reach a com-
          promise with the ethnic minorities on the'
          issue of national autonomy could well
          forge a coordinated policy of political
          struggle among these peoples, leading to
          his overthrow in favor of a more enlight-
          ened national leadership under someone
          such as the Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem
          Shariat-MadarL
          Further frustration of the ethnic mi-
          norities' quest for their national rights.
          could pursuade some to accept the patron-
          age of a foreign power for the region, As..
          has been shown In the case ci the Kurds,
          such a combination of Interests is the rule
          rather than the exception. The current
          head of the Iraqi government, Saddam
          HusseIn Takrltl, who came to power in
          • July of this year, announced a program of
          • naw concessions to the Kurds of his coun-
          try, including the granting of permission
          ‘to 1,000 Kurdlab tribesmen to return to
          their native Kurdestan.
          In view of recent reports of Incidents
          along the Iraqi-Iranian frontIer, one can-s
          not Ignore the possibility that the Iraqi
          government Is now considering substan-
          tial material support to the Kurds of iran,
          just as the shah supported Kurdish Insur-
          gents In Iraq earlier In the decade.
          One Interesting question which remains
          is the attitude of the SovIet Union, Iran's
          pro-Moscow Communist Party, Tudeh,
          publicly supports Ayatollah Khomeini on
          the autonomy question, splitting the coun-
          try's Ieft-wlng parties.The real problem
          for Soviet poJ p akers Is whether to try
          to take all ot'm!br just parts of It.
          Unlike Ayatollah Khomeini, the Soviets
          are highly skilled at manipulating the nat-
          ural political forces within a society, and
          the current crisis of Iran's ethnic minor!-”
          ties In the struggle ‘for their national
          rlglstsoffers Moscow tes ptIng opportuni-
          ties. As Boris Yerasov, a Soviet specialist.
          on national liberation movements, corn-
          ‘meatS: “Arblt aryatteztipts to ignore'the
          national and cultural heritage are doomed
          to failure,” .
          Currently, onjy t cvo governments af-
          fected directly by the 'utaettled conditions
          In Fare heeding this adm nltion.
          These are 1 nd the United States.
          SAUDI
          ARABIA
          Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
        

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