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Iran't Ethnic Factions Threaten to Split the States

          
          Iran's Ethnic Factions Threaten to Split the State: The Multiethnic Fabric of Iran Starts to lJnra .
          S ENDERS WTMBUSH
          Los 1,, e1e,s linies (1923 Curreiit Fik ) Dec 16 1979
          ProQuest Historical Nel%spapers Los Angeles Times (1881 1987)
          pg. HI
          Iran ‘s Ethnic Factions Threaten to Split the State
          By K ENDERS USH
          WThule the eyes of the word have been fastened on
          the plight of American hostages in Tebran and on
          the fanatical city mobs that cheer each new pro
          il iiimtimi by Ay 4 vuah Rwiuil Khuw u, Ii , u h b w
          slowly fraying at the edges.
          No facet of the conflict in Iran is likely to affect the
          pos' crisis political environment more fundamentally than
          unrest and militancy among that state's important ethnic
          minorities, The changing political equation is a very simple
          one The dominant Persian majority is rapidly losing its
          ability to control events alorg Iran's periphery, which is
          inhabited primarily by non Persians.
          Ethnic minorities have seized the opportunities resulting
          from chaos at the center to advance a variety of local de
          mands. In its present state of disarray, the Iranian army
          or at least those soldiers and units loyal to Ayatollah
          Khomeini, for It should be remembered that Iran's army is
          a multiethnic one will probably not be able to contain lo-
          cal rebellions for very long, and there is no suggestion that
          this sit .ation will Improve in the future
          Therefore, the Iran that emerges from the continmng
          turmoil will logically contain not one center of power, as in
          the shah's time, but several, thereby confronting policy
          makers with a complex international dilemma that they
          should have addressed long ago and for which they should
          have formulated sensible policies and contingency plans.
          hr other words, fran, like the majority of the world's coun-
          tries, is not an ethnically homogeneous ration but a
          diverse multiethnic state
          The problem of confusing nations and states is a coin
          moo one For example, Americans insistently refer to the
          inhabitants of the Soviet Union as “Russians,” when in fact
          ethnic Russians constitute less than 50% of the population
          and only one of some 140 distinct ethnic groups
          A simi ar confusion exists concerning Iran, which is in
          habited no only by Persians but also by a number of siza-
          ble ‘ninnrities including Azerbaiianis, Kurds, Turkmen,
          Arabs and Baluchis, as well as the less-populous Lurs
          Bakhtiaria Qashqais and others Demographic data about
          these peoples is difficult to find and unreliable.
          Azerbaijanis are the largest minority, estimated to num-
          ber from 4 million to 5 million. They are followed by the
          Kurds, who iiiuiñber between 2½ million and 4 million, the
          Arabs, 1½ million; Baluchis, 800,000 and Turkmen, 500,
          000 Added to the smaller groups, it is probable that ethnic
          minorities comprise as much as one third of the Iranian
          population, perhaps more,
          Importantly, the larger minorities inhabit strategic hoc
          der areas and hence are potentially disruptive of Iran's re
          lations with adjacent states, The Kurds have been the most
          bothersome in this regard, influencing at various times in
          recent history Iran's relations with Iraq, Turkey and Syria.
          The Azerbapams are split almost evenly between Iran and
          the Soviet Union and have been the center of several ccn-
          troversies between those two states in the last five dec-
          ades,
          Turkmen are also split between the Soviet Union and
          Iran, although the great ma only live in the former coun-
          try. Baluchis, in southeast Iran, have historically been a
          restive force in Iranian politics They are divided i rs ever
          charging proportions among Iran, Afghanistan nd Pakis
          tan. Iranian Arabs live primarily in the provinte of Khu-
          zistan bordering Iraq, but are more worrisome to the au-
          thorities because they inhabit and work in Iran's vital oil
          producing areas
          The current crisis in fran is perhaps a classic example of
          a state's multiethnic fabric unraveling under the impact of
          a breakdown of central authority and of the speed with
          which the infection of ethnic self assertiveness is passed
          from group to group.
          It is not surprising that the Kurds were the first to press
          their national demands on the Khomeini regirse, even to
          the point of taking up arms Kurds have long sought a uni
          fled national homeland embracing the Kurdish populations
          of Iran, Iraq, Syria. Turkey and the Soviet Union. Their
          strong historical traditions, distinct language, culture and
          religion were at edds with the Iranian practice, which for
          ably discourages the observance of cultural tradi.ions that
          are not Persian, which requires the teaching of the Persian
          language and Persian history in schools, and which accepts
          Shia Islam Kurds are Sunni Muslims as the state reli-
          gion,
          Baluchis and Turkmen, who have similar grievances
          against Iranian authorities, were rapidly infected by Kur
          dish activities and moved to oppose the reconsolidation of
          an imperial Iranian state. Iranian Arabs, who seek to stem
          the flow of Persians to Khuzistan a migration that has
          relegated the Arabs to a minority in what they consider to
          be their own national region joined in with demands of
          their own. Thus began an epidemiC of minority protest
          which has only this week culminated in an armed rebellion
          of the state's largest minonty, the Azerbaijanis
          In many respects, the Aserbaijams' protests are ironic
          Like the dominant Persians, they are Shia Muslims and,
          therefore, they have escaped the religious discranniation
          dealt to Kurds, Turksnen, Baluchis and other Sunnites
          Moreover, Azerbaijams for many centuries have accept
          ed Persian culture the state culture as their own, even
          though ethnically they are Turklc and speak a dialect of
          Turkish Many of the great Iranian dynasties ;noludnsg
          the greatest, the Safavid dynasty have been Turkic, and
          Azerbaijan nobility have always been accepted at an equal
          level with Persian nobility Today, many prominent Irani-
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          ans are Azerbaijanis. While the Azerbaijanis have had to
          make concessions regarding the use of their distinct lan-
          guage and the teaching of their own history, they are for
          the most part well-integrated into Persian society, and
          most consider themselves Iran ians.
          Since the 1920s, there have been several Azerbaijanln-
          dependence movements.” although one must approach the
          appraisal of these movements with caution. For the most
          part, they were the products of Soviet attempts to in-
          fluence particular Iranian policy decisions by creating a
          specter of internal unrest among Iranian Azerbaijanis,
          which the Soviets then could control This was the general
          pattern of events surrounding Sheik Mohammed Ithia-
          bani's National Democratic Party in 1920, Kuchik Khan's
          Soviet Socialist Republic of Ghilan in 1921 and Ja'far Pish-
          thv ri' D niocrattc Party ot Azethaijan i t t the 1940s.
          There can be no doubt that the participants in these differ-
          ent movements sought more autonomy within the Iranian
          state or outright separation from it, but there is little
          evidence of mass support for the movements.
          Not surprisingly, each movement collapsed when the
          Soviets withdrew support—including military support In
          the case of Pishihvari, the Soviets abandoned him to his
          fate when they successfully exacted oil concessions from
          the Iranian government This long experience suggests
          that the Soviets are not. interested in an Azerbaijani inde-
          pendence movement for its own sake, perhaps from fear
          that what happens in iranian Azerbaijan could be trans-
          mitted across the border to Soviet Azerbaijan.
          There has been no acknowledgement to date of Soviet
          involvement in the current Azerbaijani protest, and, judg-
          ing from the swift escalation of Soviet involvement in Af-
          ghanistan, it is difficult to imagine why the Politburo
          would want to risk destabilizing another part of the Soviet
          b t i T w' th M aby rntrigi it g ii Irat i n AzeTbaijan.
          Rather, the current round of Azerbaijani protests ap-
          pears to have been suggested by the protests of other eth-
          nic minorities—a kind of bandwagon effect—and carried to
          arms by the personal feuding of two old men, AyatollaI
          Khomeini and the religious leader of Iranian Azerbaijan,
          Ayatollah Kazem Shariat-Madari. The Ayatollahs' mutual
          antipathy is clearly based in part on rivalry for leadership
          of the Islamic revolution, a position Shariat-Madari be-
          lieves should be his because he is older than Rhomeini ai d
          assisted the younger man to attain his standing as an aya-
          tollah. That each man should lay claim to a loyal group of
          followers—even to the point of armed conflict—is perfect-
          ly within the Shia tradition of emulation for ayatollahs and
          unquestioning support of them.
          It would seem th matter little that on most of the fun-
          damental issues regarding the establishment of an Islamic
          republic, the two men are reported to be in concert. The
          armed attack on Shariat-Madari's house in Qom several
          days ago by tne ni pa t sans was anunpar onab1e pro-
          vocation to those who follow the Azerbaijan leader, and
          they responded in kind.
          Khomeini's charge that the Azerbaijanis supporting Sha-
          riat-Madari “were opposed to Islam from the very first
          day” is unlikely to cause anything but amusement from
          the objects of the attack, all of whom probably are fer-
          vently committed to Shiism. Nor is his charge that these
          renegades are ‘corrupters of Islam” likely to stir much
          more resentment than if one Catholic accused another of
          being a bad Christian. But similar blasts at Kurds, Baluchis
          or Thrkmen, who are Sunni Muslims, will probably prove
          to be much more serious.
          By accusing Sunnites of undermining his Islamic revolu-
          tion, and by implication of perverting Islam itself,
          Khomeini faces the real danger of forcing open a schism
          that lies at the very heart of Islamic civilization, the Shia-
          Sunni split. To date, Khomeini has judiciously confined
          himself to speaking of the brotherhood of Islam,” benign-
          ly avoiding mention of a subject that every Muslim knows
          lurks just beneath the surface. One slip of his acerbic
          tongue could bring this house of cards down, sending non-
          Shia ethnic minorities into open opposition to participation
          in a new Iranian state and costing Khomeini the moral
          support of most of the world's Muslims, who are Sunni.
          All dissenting ethnic groups have stressed that their im-
          mediate objective is to gain more cultural, linguistic and
          political autonomy within an Iranian state. There have
          been no outright calls for national separatism, although
          same factions of Kurds and Baluchis are known to favor
          this course. For them, demands for broader autonomy
          within an Iranian federation may be tactical moves de-
          signed to secure a forward position in their fight for na-
          t ona1 independence. These may be sound tactics and un-
          doubtedly will produce same permanent concessions from
          whatever government eventually assumes power in Teh-
          ran.
          However, national independence for these groups ap-
          pears no more feasible now than it did before Khomeini
          This would require the concurrence and cooperation of
          many governments, most of which are themselves unsta-
          ble or unwilling to act. Stifi, if conflicts between the re-
          belling minorities and the Persian center continue to esca-
          late, demands for total national independence will undoub-
          tedly be heard, especially from the Kurds.
          The situation could be complicated still further if minor-
          ity ethnic groups were to ally against Khomeini. At the
          present time, it is difficult to imagine any long-term man-
          ority alliances because the minorities are themselves di-
          vided by religion, language, history and geography.
          In the short run, however, the threat of minority alli-
          ain t the Persians may force more significant and
          more rapid concessions from Khomeini and his successors.
          It is probably for this reason that Ayatollah Ezzedin Hos-
          semi, the spiritual and political leader of Iran's Kurds, has
          stated that the revolution must go on until all major ethnic
          groups in Iran win a larger measure of autonomy, implying
          that what is good for one is good for all and that the min-
          orities must be ready to stand together to achieve their in-
          dividual objectives.
          For Iran's ethnic minorities, Khomeini's Islamic revolu-
          tion offers an exceptionally fluid environment in which
          they can press for their own demands with some hope of
          realizing them. Thus the situation should be seen for what
          it is, a chance to achieve political objectives. While most of
          the individuals who compose the different dissenting
          groups are devout Muslims, they are not in sympathy with
          Khomeini's brand of Islam or his concept of an Islamic
          state which would concentrate poler in the hands of a few
          religious figures.
          Whatever their grievances under the shah, the ethnic
          minorities, including the Shia Azerbaijanis, understand
          that they stand t gain nothing from such a political ar-
          rangement. In fact, their rights and privileges might be
          circumscribed even further. Hence their eagerness to
          make their respective cases before Khomeini can consoli-
          date his power and insist on the implementation of his Is-
          lamic constitution.
          Civil war between Persians and non-Persians is a possi-
          bility, but more moderate voices around Khomeini will
          probably not allow the situation to come to that. By now it
          is clear to everyone that the Iranian army is incapable of
          holding the minorities in check; therefore, the Khomeini
          forces will have to accede to some minority demands.
          With the minorities in armed opposition, the state can-
          not be reconstituted. Furthermore, excessive military acti-
          vity in crucial border areas is an invitation for foreign in-
          tervention, most logically from the Soviet Union. If civil
          war does occur, the likely contenders are the political left
          and the devout Muslim right, a conflict that will take place
          largely in the major cities.
          The Iran that emerges from these upheavals will be
          much different from that of the shah's time. If a new state
          can be built, it will be one in which minority ethnic groups
          play a more important role in the governance of their own
          S. Enders Wimbush is a member of the so&l seie,zce de-
          partment of Rand Corp., Santa Monica, and is the author of
          the recently ptthlished “Mulim National Communism in the
          Soviet Un on7 in addiUon to numerous articles on notional-
          üy prob1em. . FIis comments i this ariwle reflect lus own
          opinions, and not those of the Rand Coip, or its research
          spo7 sors.
          The Multiethnic Fabric of Iran Starts to Unravel Along the Borders
          lives and the management of state affairs. Regional power
          centers in Kurdistan, Khuzistan, Azerbaijan and Baluchis-
          tan will be in a better position to demand political, cultural
          and economic concessions of the Iranian state, for, among
          other reasons, the much wider distribution of arms in re-
          cent months gives them the power to do so, or at least to
          cause the government in Tehran serious difficulties.
          International realignments are likely to structure the
          way in which Tehran treats important minorities still
          further. According to some reports, for example, Iraq, long
          the implacable enemy of Kurdish autonomy movements, is
          sending aid to Iran's Kurds. Azerbaijanis in Turkey have
          indicated their support for their brethren in Iran. In the
          east, Baluchis undoubtedly will be affected by the fighting
          in Afghanistan and upheavals in Pakistan. And, of course,
          looming over all of this is the Soviet Union, which shares
          Azerbai aflis, Kurds and Turkmen with han. Should Soviet
          leaders feel inclined to promote internal turmoil in Iran or
          even to intervene militarily, it is safe to assume that they
          will do so through a minority nationality under the guise of
          “restoring peace” or of supporting a “frateriial national
          liberation movement”
          Western statesmen will be forced to come to grips with
          these new realities if they hope to influence events and to
          reassert their own national interests in this region of the
          world.
          Moreover, a comxnitment to become more adept in eth-
          nic politics should not end with iran, as ethnic unrest there
          is symptomatic of the much larger phenomenon of ethnic
          self-assertiveness worldwide. Similar patterns are evident
          in Southeast Asia, Indonesia, Canada, the Philippines,
          Western Europe, the Soviet Union and elsewhere. This is
          not by definition a menacing trend; it will become so if we
          fail to understand it.
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