

PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT
11
CLASS. 99-2802

APRIL 2000



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1999

GLOBAL TERRORISM

PATTERNS OF

Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999

Introduction

The US Government continues its commitment to use all tools necessary—including international diplomacy, law enforcement, intelligence collection and sharing, and military force—to counter current terrorist threats and hold terrorists accountable for past actions. Terrorists seek refuge in “swamps” where government control is weak or governments are sympathetic. We seek to drain these swamps. Through international and domestic legislation and strengthened law enforcement, the United States seeks to limit the room in which terrorists can move, plan, raise funds, and operate. Our goal is to eliminate terrorist safehavens, dry up their sources of revenue, break up their cells, disrupt their movements, and criminalize their behavior. We work closely with other countries to increase international political will to limit all aspects of terrorists’ efforts.

US counterterrorist policies are tailored to combat what we believe to be the shifting trends in terrorism. One trend is the shift from well-organized, localized groups supported by state sponsors to loosely organized, international networks of terrorists. Such a network supported the failed attempt to smuggle explosives material and detonating devices into Seattle in December. With the decrease of state funding, these loosely networked individuals and groups have turned increasingly to other sources of funding, including private sponsorship, narcotrafficking, crime, and illegal trade. This shift parallels a change from primarily politically motivated terrorism to terrorism that is more religiously or ideologically motivated. Another trend is the shift eastward of the locus of terrorism from the Middle East to South Asia, specifically Afghanistan. As most Middle Eastern governments have strengthened their counterterrorist response, terrorists and their organizations have sought safehaven in areas where they can operate with impunity.

US Policy Tenets

Our policy has four main elements:

- **First**, make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals.
- **Second**, bring terrorists to justice for their crimes.
- **Third**, isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force them to change their behavior.
- **Fourth**, bolster the counterterrorist capabilities of those countries that work with the United States and require assistance.

The US Government uses two primary legislative tools—the designations of state sponsors and of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)—as well as bilateral and multilateral efforts to implement these tenets.

State Sponsors

After extensive research and intelligence analysis, the Department of State designates certain states as sponsors of terrorism in order to enlist a series of sanctions against them for providing support for international terrorism. Through these sanctions, the United States seeks to isolate states from the international community, which condemns and rejects the use of terror as a legitimate political tool. This year the Department of State has redesignated the same seven states that have been on the list since 1993: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.

The designation of state sponsors is not permanent, however. In fact, a primary focus of US counterterrorism policy is to move state sponsors off the list by delineating clearly what steps these countries must take to end their support for terrorism and by urging them to take these steps.

As direct state sponsorship has declined, terrorists increasingly have sought refuge wherever they can. Some countries on the list have reduced dramatically their direct support of terrorism over the past years—and this is an encouraging sign. They still are on the list, however, usually for activity in two categories: harboring of past terrorists (some for more than 20 years) and continuing their linkages to designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Cuba is one of the state sponsors that falls in this category.

The harboring of past terrorists, although not an active measure, is still significant in terms of US policy. International terrorists must know unequivocally that they cannot seek haven in states and "wait out" the period until international pressure diminishes. The US Government encourages all state sponsors to terminate all links to terrorism—including harboring old "Cold War terrorists"—and join the international community in observing zero tolerance for terrorism. Of course, if a state sponsor meets the criteria for being dropped from the terrorism list, it will be removed—notwithstanding other differences we may have with a country's other policies and actions.

There have been encouraging signs recently suggesting that some countries are considering taking steps to distance themselves from terrorism. North Korea has made some positive statements condemning terrorism in all its forms. We have outlined clearly to the Government of North Korea the steps it must take to be removed from the list, all of which are consistent with its stated policies. A Middle East peace agreement necessarily would address terrorist issues and would lead to Syria being considered for removal from the list of state sponsors.

In addition to working to move states away from sponsorship, the Department of State constantly monitors other states whose policies and actions increase the threat to US citizens living and working abroad.

Areas of Concern

The primary terrorist threats to the United States emanate from two regions, South Asia and the Middle East. Supported by state sponsors, terrorists live in and operate out of areas in these regions with impunity. They find refuge and support in countries that are sympathetic to their use of violence for political gain, derive mutual benefit

from harboring terrorists, or simply are weakly governed. The United States will continue to use the designations of state sponsors and Foreign Terrorist Organizations, political and economic pressure, and other means as necessary to compel those states that allow terrorists to live, move, and operate with impunity and those who provide financial and political patronage for terrorists to end their direct or indirect support for terrorism.

In South Asia the major terrorist threat comes from Afghanistan, which continues to be the primary safehaven for terrorists. While not directly hostile to the United States, the Taliban, which controls the majority of Afghan territory, continues to harbor Usama Bin Ladin and a host of other terrorists loosely linked to Bin Ladin, who directly threaten the United States and others in the international community. The Taliban is unwilling to take actions against terrorists trained in Afghanistan, many of whom have been linked to numerous international terrorist plots, including the foiled plots in Jordan and Washington State in December 1999. Pakistan continues to send mixed messages on terrorism. Despite significant and material cooperation in some areas—particularly arrests and extraditions—the Pakistani Government also has tolerated terrorists living and moving freely within its territory. Pakistan's government has supported groups that engage in violence in Kashmir, and it has provided indirect support for terrorists in Afghanistan.

In the Middle East, two state sponsors—Iran and Syria—have continued to support regional terrorist groups that seek to destroy the Middle East peace process. The Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) continue to provide training, financial, and political support directly to Lebanese Hizballah, HAMAS, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad operatives who seek to disrupt the peace process. These terrorist organizations, along with others, are based in Damascus, a situation that the Syrian Government made little effort to change in 1999. The Syrian Government—through harboring terrorists, allowing their free movement, and providing resources—continued to be a crucial link in the terrorist threat emanating from this region during the past year. Lebanon also was a key—although different—link in the terrorist equation. The Lebanese Government does not exercise control over many parts of its territory where terrorist groups operate with impunity, often under Syrian protection, thus leaving Lebanon as another key safehaven for Hizballah, HAMAS, and several other groups the United States has designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations.

Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)

Secretary Albright in October designated 28 Foreign Terrorist Organizations, dropping three from the previous list (issued in 1997) and adding one. The removal or addition of groups shows our effort to maintain a current list that accurately reflects those groups that are foreign, engage in terrorist activity, and threaten the security of US citizens or the national security of the United States. The designations make members and representatives of those groups ineligible for US visas and subject to exclusion from the United States. US financial institutions are required to block the funds of those groups and of their agents and to report the blocking action to the US Department of the Treasury. Additionally, it is a criminal offense for US persons or persons within US jurisdiction knowingly to provide material support or resources to such groups.

As in the case of state sponsorship, the goal of US policy is to eliminate the use of terrorism as a policy instrument by those organizations it designates as FTOs. Organizations that cease to engage in terrorist-related activities will be dropped from the list.

A complete list of the designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations is included in Appendix B.

US Diplomatic Efforts

In addition to continuing our cooperation with close allies and friends, such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Israel, and Japan, we made significant progress on our primary policy objectives with other key governments and organizations. In 2000 we began a bilateral counterterrorist working group with India, and we look forward to increasing US-Indian counterterrorist cooperation in the years ahead.

We worked closely with the Group of Eight (G-8) states and reached a common agreement about the threat that Iran's support for terrorist groups poses to the Middle East peace process. In the meeting in November of counterterrorist experts the G-8 representatives agreed that the Iranian Government had increased its activities and support for HAMAS, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hizballah with the aim of undermining the Middle East peace process. We explored with G-8 partners ways to exert influence on the Iranian Government to end its sponsorship of those groups.

In 1999 we also expanded our discussions with Russia and initiated dialogues with key Central Asian states, the Palestinian Authority, and other states eager to cooperate with the United States and strengthen their ability to counter terrorist threats.

The United States worked closely with the Government of Argentina and other hemispheric partners to bring about the creation of CICTE, the Organization of American States' (OAS) Inter-American Commission on Counterterrorism. As the first chair of CICTE, the United States worked with other OAS members to develop new means to diminish the terrorist threat in this hemisphere.

This past summer the United States also hosted an important multilateral conference that brought together senior counterterrorist officials from more than 20 countries, primarily from the Middle East, Central Asia, and Asia. The conference promoted international cooperation against terrorism, the sharing of information on terrorist groups and countermeasures, and the discussion of policy choices.

After President Clinton issued an Executive Order in July levying sanctions against the Taliban for harboring terrorist suspect Usama Bin Ladin, the United Nations in October overwhelmingly passed Security Council Resolution 1267, which imposed a similar set of sanctions against the Taliban.

On 8 December the UN General Assembly also adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which grew out of the G-8's initiative to combat terrorist financing and was drafted and introduced by France. The

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that are not necessarily international terrorism. Furthermore, terrorist acts are part of a larger phenomenon of politically inspired violence, and at times the line between the two can become difficult to draw. To relate terrorist events to the larger context and to give a feel for the conflicts that spawn violence, this report will discuss terrorist acts as well as other violent incidents that are not necessarily international terrorism.

Adverse mention in this report of individual members of any political, social, ethnic, religious, or national group is not meant to imply that all members of that group are terrorists. Indeed, terrorists represent a small minority of dedicated, often fanatical, individuals in most such groups. It is those small groups—and their actions—that are the subject of this report.

Note

All terrorists—even a "cyber terrorist"—must occupy physical space to carry out attacks. The strong political will of states to counter the threat of terrorism remains the crucial variable of our success.

Terrorism will be with us for the foreseeable future. Some terrorists will continue using the most popular form of terrorism—the truck or car bomb—while others will seek alternative means to deliver their deadly message, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or cyber attacks. We must remain vigilant to these new threats, and we are preparing ourselves for them.

The United States continues to make progress in fighting terrorism. The policy and programs of the past 20 years have reduced dramatically the role of state sponsors in directly supporting terrorism. The threat is shifting, and we are responding accordingly. It is our clear policy goal to get all seven countries and 28 FTOs out of the terrorist business completely. We seek to have all state sponsors rejoin the community of nations committed to ending the threat. We must redouble our efforts, however, to "drain the swamp" in other countries—whether hostile to the United States or not—where terrorists seek to find safehaven for their planning and operations.

Summary

convention fills an important gap in international law by expanding the legal framework for international cooperation in the investigation, prosecution, and extradition of persons who engage in terrorist financing. The United States conducts a successful program to train foreign law enforcement personnel in such areas as airport security, bomb detection, maritime security, VIP protection, hostage rescue, and crisis management. To date, we have trained more than 20,000 representatives from over 100 countries. We also conduct an active research and development program to adapt modern technology for use in defeating terrorists.

Legislative Requirements

This report is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(a), which requires the Department of State to provide Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of Section (a)(1) and (2) of the Act. As required by legislation, the report includes detailed assessments of foreign countries where significant terrorist acts occurred and countries about which Congress was notified during the preceding five years pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (the so-called terrorist list countries that repeatedly have provided state support for international terrorism). In addition, the report includes all relevant information about the previous year's activities of individuals, terrorist organizations, or umbrella groups known to be responsible for the kidnapping or death of any US citizen during the preceding five years, and groups known to be financed by state sponsors of terrorism.

In 1996, Congress amended the reporting requirements contained in the above-referenced law. The amended law requires the Department of State to report on the extent to which other countries cooperate with the United States in apprehending, convicting, and punishing terrorists responsible for attacking US citizens or interests. The law also requires that this report describe the extent to which foreign governments are cooperating, or have cooperated during the previous five years, in preventing future acts of terrorism. As permitted in the amended legislation, the Department is submitting such information to Congress in a classified annex to this unclassified report.

Definitions

No one definition of terrorism has gained universal acceptance. For the purposes of this report, however, we have chosen the definition of terrorism contained in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d). That statute contains the following definitions:

- The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant¹ targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.
- The term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country.
- The term "terrorist group" means any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism.

¹ For purposes of this definition, the term "noncombatant" is interpreted to include, in addition to civilians, military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed or not on duty. For example, in past reports we have listed as terrorist incidents the murders of the following US military personnel: Col. James Rowe, killed in Manila in April 1989; Capt. William Nordeen, US defense attache killed in Athens in June 1988; the two servicemen killed in the La Belle discotheque bombing in West Berlin in April 1986; and the four off-duty US Embassy Marine guards killed in a cafe in El Salvador in June 1985. We also consider as acts of terrorist attacks on military installations or on armed military personnel when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the site, such as bombings against US bases in Europe, the Philippines, or elsewhere.

The US Government has employed these definitions of terrorism for statistical and analytical purposes since 1983.

Domestic terrorism is a more widespread phenomenon than international terrorism. Because international terrorism has a direct impact on US interests, it is the primary focus of this report. Nonetheless, the report also describes, but does not provide statistics on, significant developments in domestic terrorism.

Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism

The designation of state sponsors of terrorism by the United States—and the imposition of sanctions—is a mechanism for isolating nations that use terrorism as a means of political expression. US policy is intended to compel state sponsors to renounce the use of terrorism, end support to terrorists, and bring terrorists to justice for past crimes. The United States is committed to holding terrorists and those who harbor them accountable for past attacks, regardless of when the acts occurred. The United States has a long memory and will not simply expunge a terrorist's record because time has passed. The states that choose to harbor terrorists are similar to accomplices who provide shelter for criminals—and the United States will hold them accountable for their "guests'" actions. International terrorists should know before they contemplate a crime that they cannot hunker down afterward in a safehaven and be absolved of their crimes.

The United States is committed firmly to removing countries from the state sponsor list once they have taken necessary steps to end their link to terrorism. In fact, the Department of State is engaged in ongoing discussions with state sponsors interested in being removed from the list.

Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, and Sudan remain the seven governments that the US Secretary of State has designated as state sponsors of international terrorism. Iran continued to support numerous terrorist groups—including the Lebanese Hizballah, HAMAS, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—in their efforts to undermine the Middle East peace process through terrorism. Although there were signs of political change in Iran in 1999, the actions of certain state institutions in support of terrorist groups made Iran the most active state sponsor of terrorism. Iraq continued to provide safehaven and support to a variety of Palestinian rejectionist groups, as well as bases, weapons, and protection to the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), an Iranian terrorist group that opposes the current Iranian regime. Syria continued to provide safehaven and support to several terrorist groups, some of which oppose the Middle East peace process. Libya had yet to fully comply with the requirements of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions related to the trial of those accused of downing

Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. North Korea harbored several hijackers of a Japanese Airlines flight to North Korea in the 1970s and maintained links to Usama Bin Ladin and his network. Cuba continued providing safehaven to several terrorists and US fugitives and maintained ties to other state sponsors and Latin American insurgents. Finally, Sudan continued to serve as a meeting place, safehaven, and training hub for members of Bin Ladin's al-Qaida, Lebanese Hizballah, al-Jihad, al-Gama'at, PIJ, HAMAS, and the Abu Nidal organization (ANO).

State sponsorship has decreased over the past several decades. As it decreases, it becomes increasingly important for all countries to adopt a "zero tolerance" for terrorist activity within their borders. Terrorists will seek safehaven in those areas where they are able to avoid the rule of law and to travel, prepare, raise funds, and operate. In 1999 the United States actively researched and gathered intelligence on other states that will be considered for designation as state sponsors. If the United States deems a country to "repeatedly provide support for acts of international terrorism," it is required by law to add that nation to the list.

In 1999 the United States increasingly was concerned about reports of Pakistani support for terrorist groups and elements active in Kashmir, as well as Pakistani relations with the Taliban, which continued to harbor terrorists such as Usama Bin Ladin. In the Middle East, the United States was concerned that a variety of terrorist groups operated and trained inside Lebanon with relative impunity. Lebanon also was unresponsive to US requests to bring to justice terrorists who attacked US citizens and property in Lebanon in previous years.

Cuba

Cuba continued to provide safehaven to several terrorists and US fugitives in 1999. A number of Basque ETA terrorists who gained sanctuary in Cuba some years ago continued to live on the island, as did several US terrorist fugitives.

Havana also maintained ties to other state sponsors of terrorism and Latin American insurgents. Colombia's two largest terrorist organizations, the Revolutionary

Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army (ELN), both maintained a permanent presence on the island. In late 1999, Cuba hosted a series of meetings between Colombian Government officials and ELN leaders.

Iran

Although there were signs of political change in Iran in 1999, the actions of certain state institutions in support of terrorist groups made Iran the most active sponsor of terrorism. These state institutions, notably the Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, continued to be involved in the planning and execution of terrorist acts and continued to support a variety of groups that use terrorism to pursue their goals.

A variety of public reports indicate Iran's security forces conducted several bombings against Iranian dissidents abroad. Iranian agents, for example, were blamed for a truck bombing in early October of a Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) terrorist base near Basrah, Iraq, that killed several MEK members and non-MEK individuals.

Iran continued encouraging Hizballah and the Palestinian rejectionist groups—including HAMAS, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Ahmad Jibril's FLP-GC—to use violence, especially terrorist attacks, in Israel to undermine the peace process. Iran supported these groups with varying amounts of money, training, and weapons. Despite statements by the Khatami administration that Iran was not working against the peace process, Tehran stepped up its encouragement of, and support for, these groups after the election of Israeli Prime Minister Barak and the resumption of Israel-Syria peace talks. In a gesture of public support, President Khatami met with Damascus-based Palestinian rejectionist leaders during his visit to Syria in May. In addition, Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei reflected Iran's covert actions aimed at scuttling the peace process when he sponsored a major rally in Tehran on 9 November to demonstrate Iran's opposition to Israel and peace. Hizballah and Palestinian rejectionist speakers at the rally reaffirmed their support for violent jihad against Israel. A Palestinian Islamic Jihad representative praised a bombing in Netanyahu that occurred days before and promised more such attacks.

Tehran still provided safehaven to elements of Turkey's separatist PKK that conducted numerous terrorist attacks in Turkey and against Turkish targets in Europe. One of the PKK's most senior at-large leaders, Osman Ocalan, brother of imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, resided at least part-time in Iran. Iran also provided support to terrorist groups in North Africa and South and Central Asia, including financial assistance and training.

Tehran accurately claimed that it also was a victim of terrorism, as the opposition Mujahedin-e-Khalq conducted several terrorist attacks in Iran. On 10 April the group assassinated Brigadier General Ali Sayyad Shirazi, the Iranian Armed Forces Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff.

Iraq continued to plan and sponsor international terrorism in 1999. Although Baghdad focused primarily on the anti-regime opposition both at home and abroad, it continued to provide safehaven and support to various terrorist groups.

Press reports stated that, according to a defecting Iraqi intelligence agent, the Iraqi intelligence service had planned to bomb the offices of Radio Free Europe in Prague. Radio Free Europe offices include Radio Liberty, which began broadcasting news and information to Iraq in October 1998. The plot was foiled when it became public in early 1999.

The Iraqi opposition publicly stated its fears that the Baghdad regime was planning to assassinate those opposed to Saddam Hussein. A spokesman for the Iraqi National Accord in November said that the movement's security organs had obtained information about a plan to assassinate its secretary general, Dr. Iyad Allawi, and a member of the movement's political bureau, as well as another Iraqi opposition leader.

Iraq continued to provide safehaven to a variety of Palestinian rejectionist groups, including the Abu Nidal organization, the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), and the