t&/HRC/14/24/Add.7
Advance Unedited Version
18 May 2010
Original: English
Human Rights Council
Fourteenth session
Agenda item 3
Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights, including
the right to development
Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions, Phillip Alston*
Addendum
Election-related violence and killings* *
Summary
Based on the Special Rapporteur's first-hand experience, and extensive research,
this report examines the widespmad, but under-studied, phenomenon of election-related
killings. On the basis of extensive case studies contained in Annex I, the report adopts a
definition of election-related killings, surveys the limited academic research on election-
related violence, and provides an overview of the perpetrators, victims, timing, motive,
methods, and effects of election killings. It also analyses the most significant types of
election killings, considers the approach of election monitors, and concludes with specific
recommendations.
* Late submission.
* * The summary is being circulated in all official languages. The report itself, contained in the annex to
the summary, is being circulated in English only. Given that it greatly exceeds the page limitations
currently imposed by the relevant General Assembly resolutions, the appendix and the footnotes are
reproduced as received.
AJHRC/14/24/Add.7
Annex
Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary
or arbitrary executions
Addendum
Election-related violence and killings
Contents
Paragraphs Page
I. Introduction 1-5 3
II. Defining election-related killings 6-11 3
III. Review of academic research on election-related violence 12-3 9 5
IV. Typology of election-related killings 40-47 12
V. Analysis of election-related killings 48-82 15
A. Killings by tile security forces during election protests 49-62 15
B. Killings by insurgents 63-69 18
C. Killings of political candidates (assassinations) 70-73 20
D. Killings of supporters of a rival candidate or party 74-76 20
E. Rival party supporter-on-supporter killings 77-81 21
F. Death penalty 82 22
VI. Election monitoring and election-related violence 83-87 23
VII. Conclusion and recommendations 88-101 24
Appendix
Surve of election-related killings around the world 27
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I. Introduction
1. This report examines the widespread, but under-studied, phenomenon of election-
related killings. It draws upon the Special Rapporteur's extensive first-hand experience
investigating and reporting on killings around the world, as well as upon extensive research
undertaken specifically for this purpose.
2. Election-related killings violate not only the right to life but also the right to
participate in the democratic process, and a range of other human rights. They have
featured prominently in the Special Rapporteur' s country fact-finding missions, his
communications to Governments, and his regular monitoring work. Such killings have
occurred on a large scale in many of the countries to which the Special Rapporteur has
carried out fact-finding missions, including Kenya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
the Philippines, Afghanistan, and Nigeria. Prominent recent incidents include the massacre
in the Philippines in November 2009 of 57 relatives and supporters of a gubernatorial
candidate by a rival candidate's private militia, the deaths of at least 1,113 civilians in post-
election December 2007-Janua r y 2008 protests in Kenya, and killings of protesters by
police and militia forces in Iran following contested elections in June 2009.
3. Reports by human rights and election monitors, as well as the Special Rapporteur' s
country reports, provide important analysis of election-related killings in a wide range of
countries. Annex I provides a summary of the most relevant case studies that have arisen,
especially over the past three years. There has, however, been little cross-national research.
Detailed typologies of election-related killings have not been set out, and the dynamics of
the main forms of such killings across the world have not been closely analysed. As a
subject of academic study, “election-related killings” barely exists, although the broader
subject of election-related violence has experienced important recent growth.
4. Part II of this report proposes a working definition of election-related killings. Part
III surveys the limited academic research on election-related violence and reviews the main
areas of focus and findings of the field. Drawing upon the country case studies in Annex I,
Part IV sets out the Special Rapporteur' s general findings on the perpetrators, victims,
timing, motive, methods, and effects of election killings. Part V then analyses the most
significant types of election killings: killings by security forces during election protests;
killings by insurgents; killings of political candidates; killings of supporters of a rival
candidate or party; rival supporter-on-supporter killings; and the state's use of the death
penalty. Part VI examines election monitoring reports and guidelines, which need to be
strengthened in terms of their coverage of election violence. The report concludes with
general findings and recommendations.
5. The Special Rapporteur is grateful to Sarah Knuckey, Director of the Project on
Extrajudicial Executions at the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, New York
University School of Law, for her superb work in the preparation of this report. He is also
grateful for country research prepared by Wade McMullen, Anna de Courcy Wheeler,
Rupert Watters, Hina Shamsi, Nishant Kumar, and Danielle Mourabak.
II. Defining election-related killings
6. There is no accepted definition of “election-related killings”. But closely related
definitions of electoral violence prove useful in analysing the scope of election killings, in
illuminating common elements, and in pointing towards a working definition.
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7. Many definitions of election violence rely strongly on an intent or motive element.
In these definitions, violence is “election violence” if it is carried out with the intent to
influence the election in some way. Hogland, for example, notes that:
In essence, electoral violence is separated from other forms of political violence by a
combination of timing and motive. The time aspect relates to violence carried out
during the election period. The objective of electoral violence is to influence the
electoral process and in extension its outcome.'
Similarly, Laakso writes that:
EIlectoral violence by definition has to be seen as an activity motivated by an
attempt to affect the results of the elections — either by manipulating the electoral
procedures and participation or by contesting the legitimacy of the results.” 2
In one of the most influential and important global studies of electoral violence, Fischer
defines electoral conflict and violence as:
“any random or organized act to intimidate, physically harm, blackmail, or abuse a
political stakeholder in seeking to determine, delay, or to otherwise influence an
electoral process.” 3
8. And Haid concisely writes that electoral violence is “violence employed to affect
electoral outcomes.” 4 A comprehensive 2009 report by UNIDP on elections and conflict,
primarily authored by academic Timothy Sisk, defines election-related violence more
broadly as “ aIcts or threats or coercion, intimidation, or physical harm perpetrated to affect
an electoral process or that arise in the context of electoral competition.” 5
9. Much election-related violence is indeed motivated by a desire to influence the
conduct or outcome of an election in some way, and definitions emphasizing or relying on
intent capture many of the cases of killings that the Special Rapporteur has investigated.
Such definitions would clearly encompass, for example, assassinations of a rival candidate,
killings by insurgents designed to disrupt an election, or killings of citizens to intimidate
voters to vote a particular way. However, the category of electoral killings also goes
beyond those killings motivated by an intention to influence an election. This is
particularly the case with killings in the context of riots or protests. While some protests
may be intended to influence or change electoral outcomes, others are motivated by
indignation, anger or disappointment with a result, and are not necessarily intended to
change that result. This is even more so for killings in the context of protests. Killings
between private citizens in the midst of protests may be better explained, for instance, by
the complex dynamics of crowd behaviour or mob violence. More significantly, many
killings during riots are committed by security forces while attempting to (legitimately or
otherwise) pacify or end a protest. There are many types of such security force killings
(e.g. intentional targeting of perceived enemies of a regime, identified by their presence at
‘Kristine HOglund, “Electoral Violence in Conflict-Ridden Societies: Concepts, Causes, and
Consequences” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol 21, No 3 (2009), p. 417.
2 Liisa Laakso, “Insights into Electoral Violence in Africa”, in Matthias Basedau, Gero Erdmann and
Andreas Mehler (eds.), Votes, Money and Violence: Political Panics and Elections in Sub-S aha ran
Africa (2007), pp. 227-228.
Jeff Fischer, “Electoral Conflict and Violence: A Strategy for Study and Prevention”, IFES White
Paper (2002), p. 1.
Christopher Haid, “Explaining Electoral Violence: Gunmen, Garrisons, and Graft in Jamaican
Politics” (February 2010) (Working Paper), p. 1.
United Nations Development Programme, Elections and Conflict Prevention: A Guide to Analysis,
Planning and Programming (August 2009), p. 4 (emphasis added).
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the protest; excessive use of force caused by failures in training on crowd control), but few
are well captured by definitions that emphasize a motive to affect election results.
10. A focus on the motivation also fails to clearly capture government trials and
executions of individuals for their election-related activities. Following the 2009 elections
in Iran, for example, individuals were charged, tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for
their involvement in post-election protests against the Government. These deaths were
intimately linked to conduct during and after the elections and should thus be considered
election-related killings.
11. Consequently, a more inclusive definition is in order. For the purposes of this
report, election related killings may relate to election processes or outcomes. They include
killings (i) designed to influence, or to prevent attempts to influence, an election outcome,
(ii) that arise in the context of election processes, or (iii) that seek to promote or hinder
election-related activity.
III. Review of academic research on election-related violence
12. Until recently, there has been little academic research on the specific subject of
election violence. While there has been a tremendous amount of writing on elections
generally, and on political violence generally, there has been little on the intersection of
these two fields: election-related violence. 6 Research gaps that have been generally
identified include work on the causes and effects of election violence, cross-national
studies, efforts to understand the specific forms or variations of violence, work that is both
theoretical and case-oriented, and research on the scope, gravity and timing of election
violence. 7
13. Scholarly work on the subject of election violence has grown significantly in recent
years. The analysis that follows maps the concerns and findings of this growing field, in
terms of: the timing of election violence; the perpetrators of violence; the targets and
6 David C Rapoport and Leonard Weinberg, “Elections and Violence”, in David C Rapoport and
Leonard Weinberg, The Democratic Experience and Political Violence (2001), p. 15 (“No subject
attracts political scientists more than elections do. Still, the intimate link with violence has scarcely
been noticed.... Questions concerning why ballots create occasions for bullets and the relationship
between violence-producing and violence-reducing propensities of elections are ignored.”); Fischer,
note 3 above, p. 2 (“Past thinking at stemming electoral conflict and violence has been deficient
because of the lack of a common framework for research and practice.”); Kristine HOglund, note 1
above, p. 413 (“ [ Ut is peculiar to note that electoral violence to a large extent remains an unmapped
research field. . . in terms of research on the causes and effects of electoral violence, much is yet to be
done... electoral violence deserves to be studied as a phenomenon in itself'); Kristine HOglund and
Anton Piyarathne, “Paying the Price for Patronage: Electoral Violence in Sri Lanka” Commonwealth
and Comparative Politics Vol 47, No 3 (2009), p. 287 (“While there is a large literature on elections,
and an almost equally large literature on political violence, there are only a few studies addressing the
election-violence nexus.”); Lindsay Shorr Newman, “Electoral Violence: Whether and How Terrorist
Attacks Trend during the Election Cycle” (2010) (unpublished manuscript), p.1 (“the shadow of
violence that elections cast remains poorly understood. Existing work on electoral violence has been
scarce and almost entirely theoretical ... or case-specific.”); Bekoe, “Managing Electoral Conflict in
Africa” (2010) (manuscript), p. 3 (“Only a few studies address electoral violence directly.”)
7 See e.g. Haid, note 4 above, pp.1-4; Bekoe, note 6 above, p. 3; Newman, note 6 above, p. 1;
Rapoport and Weinberg, note 6 above, p. 15; HOglund, note 1 above, p. 413.
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victims; motives; method, means or form of violence; causes and enabling conditions;
extent; and effects. 8
Timing
14. Election violence has often been classified as occurring in one of three phases: pre-
election, on election-day(s), or post-election. 9 Fischer has proposed a more detailed five
phase typology: during the voter registration process; during the campaign; on election-day;
when results are announced; and in what he calls “representation conflict”.' 0 The UNIDP
study also proposes a more detailed election cycle division: 18 months to three months
prior to election day; three months prior to election day; election day; the period between
voting and the results announcement; and post-election.” Bekoe, in describing where
tensions arise in the election process, notes that they can occur, “when decisions are made
about who possesses the right to vote; when and if one can exercise the right to vote; which
candidates are eligible to represent particular groups; the integrity of the registry; the
credibility of the results; or the process for filing grievances.” 2
15. Many authors note that while significant attention is often paid by election monitors
and the media to election-day, most violence actually occurs either before or after that day,
and that election-day itself “often is remarkably peaceful”.' 3 Many such statements have
not, however, been empirically based. Thus, Bekoe makes an important contribution by
examining fatalities in 110 national elections from 1990-2005 in Africa. She found that
election-day is the “least volatile stage in the three months before and three months
following the election.” 4 She found that 11 percent of fatalities (by stage) occurred on
election-thy, 46 percent pre-election, and 43 percent post-election. She hypothesized that
countries had an interest in keeping election day calm, because of the attention the media
and election monitors paid to it, and the affect that negative publicity could have on foreign
relations and aid.' 5 Importantly, however, she notes that while election-day was not the
most violent stage, it was the “most violent day”.' 6
16. In another detailed study, Newman analysed over 5,000 terrorist attacks between
2000-2005, and found that, in general, “the frequency of terrorist attacks increases closer to
the actual election date. This is true of both pre-election as well as post-election violence
rand attacks arel almost evenly distributed before and after an election.” 7
17. Some recent work has also begun to map the relationship between the stage of the
election and the types and perpetrators of violence. The UNIDP study, for instance, sets out
8 A number of the articles referred to here are works in progress or manuscripts not yet published.
The Special Rapporteur is grateful to the authors for providing drafts of their research to him for the
purposes of this report.
HOglund, note 1 above, p. 416; HOglund and Piyarathne, note 6 above, p. 289.
0 Fischer, note 3 above, p. 10.
“UNDP, note 5 above, pp. 20-22.
12 Bekoe, note 6 above, p. 11.
‘ HOglund, note 1 above, p. 416. Also see: Rapoport and Weinberg, note 6 above, p. 19 (“The
violence often ceases when the voting begins”, and giving two examples from elections in East Timor
and Zimbabwe); Laakso, note 2 above, p. 228 (“the actual polling, which is the mostly keenly
monitored phase of the elections, is often the most peaceful period.”)
Bekoe, note 6 above, p. 10.
‘ Ibid. pp. 10-11.
16 Ibid. p. 10, fn. 20.
‘ Newman, note 6 above, pp. 16-18.
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in general terms the different types of violence that may occur in each of their five election
phases.
18. Country-specific case studies have also addmssed the timing of election violence. In
Patino and Velasco's study of election violence in the Philippines, for example, they found
that most violent incidents and deaths occurred during the campaign period, but that
incidents also occurred before the campaign period, on election day, and in the period
embracing the processes of counting, canvassing, and proclaiming results.' 9
Perpetrators
19. General studies have identified the categories of the perpetrators of election
violence. Hogland has noted that violence can be committed by, “state actors (military and
police), political parties, guerrillalmbel groups, and militia and paramilitary groups.” 2 °
Similarly, Laakso notes that perpetrators might include government forces (notably the
police and army) supporters of either the government or opposition groups, spontaneous
demonstrators and even rebel organizations. 2 ' The UNIDP, in setting out an initial typology
of actors, lists: political parties and candidates, citizens, the state (police, army), non-state
security forces (rebels, militias, vigilantes), and organizations of citizens. 22 Work has also
examined the identity and interests of perpetrators in more detail in specific country case
studies, including on Sri Lanka, 23 Zimbabwe, 24 and the Philippines. 2 5
20. A small amount of work draws broader conclusions about the type and extent of
violence by particular perpetrators. Importantly, a number of writers have noted that much
evidence suggests that political parties are frequently responsible for election violence. 26 In
a largely theoretical study, Chaturvedi hypothesized that the party with “less initial political
support will msort to more political violence.” 27
21. In groundbreaking research on elections in Jamaica, Haid examines the relationships
between politicians and criminal organizations, and how “variation in these organizations
might affect the type, tenor, duration and effects” of election related violence. 28
Targets and victims
22. Hoglund, thawing upon Fischer's analysis, concludes that the targets of election
violence can be: “electoral stakeholders (voters, candidates, election workers, media, and
monitors), electoral information (registration data, vote results, ballots, campaign material),
18 UNI)P, note 5 above, pp.20-22.
19 Patrick Patino and Djorina Velasco, “Election Violence in the Philippines”, Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung, (2004) (finding, for example, in 1998, 7 deaths in the pre-election period, 53 in the
campaign period, 9 on election day, and 8 after election thy).
20 HOglund, note 1 above, p. 416.
21 Laakso, note 2 above, p. 228.
22 UNIW, note 5 above, p. 13.
23 HOglund and Piyarathne, note 6 above.
24 Nomrn Kriger, “ZANIJ(PF) Strategies in General Elections, 1980-2000: Discourse and Coercion”
African Affairs, Vol 104, No 414 (2005).
25 Patino and Velasco, note 19 above.
26 Rapoport and Weinberg, note 6 above, p. 42. See also HOglund, note 1 above, p. 416 (political
parties have been “key organizers of electoral violence”).
27 Ashish Chaturvedi, “Rigging elections with violence” Public Choice, Vol 125 (2005), p. 190.
28 Haid, note 4 above, p. 5.
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electoral facilities (polling and counting stations), and electoral events (campaign rallies,
travelling to a polling station).” 29
23. There is little detailed cross-national analysis of the targets and victims of electoral
violence. With respect to electoral stakeholders or victims specifically, Rapoport and
Weinberg give some cross-national examples of killings of political candidates, voters, and
party-workers. 3 ° Country case studies provide more detail on victims. In a study of post-
election violence in Kenya, de Smedt provides detail on the targets of violence in the
Kibera slum. 3 ' In Hoglund and Piyaratlme's detailed study on Sri Lanka, they found that
many victims had been politically active during the election, and had themselves been
involved in violence. 32 They also found that more victims had supported the opposition
parties, and that “party activists belonging to the lower class — from either party — were
victims of more serious violence than the local elites.” 33 Robinson and Torvik, in a study of
violence in Zimbabwe, hypothesised that much of the violence in elections there “was
aimed not at the core supporters of Mugabe's opposition, but rather at the swing voters.” 34
They reasoned that violence was a more effective strategy than attempting to give the swing
voters “policy favors”. 35
Motive
24. As explained above, “motive” is often one of the key factors differentiating election-
related violence from other violence. Rapoport and Weinberg note that, “IViost of the time,
violence is designed to influence elections by intimidating voters and striking candidates
down. But violence can prevent an election from taking place or a victor from taking
charge of the government.” 36 Similarly, Hoglund and Piyaratlme explain that violence can
be used for a number of reasons: “to hinder people from voting, to prevent candidates from
campaigning, to display discontent with election results, or to overturn the outcome of the
election.” 37 In setting out motives in a different form, Hoglund writes that some “actors
object to elections of any sort... othersI try to prevent or postpone elections ... others
want to influence the outcome of the election.” 38 Violence may be used to “suppress
opposition turnout or disrupt opponents' campaigns.” 39
25. Some research has specifically focused on the relationship between the motives for
violence, and vote buying. Kasara notes that Kenyan politicians may use election “violence
as a substitute for political inducements such as vote buying.” 4 ° She found that politicians
encouraged violence that changed the voter/ethnic composition of an area, to “create
winnable parliamentary seats”. 4 ' In a detailed study of this phenomenon in Jamaica, Haid
hypothesizes that “the violence used to affect electoral outcomes may be viewed by a
29 HOglund, note 1 above, p. 417. See Fischer, note 3 above, p. 9.
30 Rapoport and Weinberg, note 6 above, p. 19.
31 Johan de Smedt, “No Raila, No Peace!' Big Man Politics and Election Violence at the Kibera
Grassroots”, African Affairs, Vol 108 (2009), p. 581.
32 HOglund and Piyarathne, note 6 above, pp. 295-298.
33 Ibid. p. 301.
34 James A Robinson and Ragnar Torvilc, “The Real Swing Voter's Curse”, National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper (2009), p. 1.
35 Ibid.
36 Rapoport and Weinberg, note 6 above, p. 33.
37 HOglund and Piyarathne, note 6 above, p. 287.
38 HOglund, note 1 above, p. 415.
39 Kimuli Kasara, “Electoral Geography and Conflict: Examining the Local-Level Incidence of
Violence in Kenya” (2010) (unpublished manuscript) p. 4.
40 Ibid. p. 4.
41 Ibid. p. 2.
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candidate as either substitutable for or complementary of clientistic vote buying
Sometimes spending on violence is used instead of non-violent activities because it is
believed that violent campaign activities will be more effective in ensuring victory than the
same amount of resources spent on clientistic vote buying and patronage promises.” 42
26. Other work has studied the motives of specific forms of violence, such as riots.
Wilkinson and Haid, for example, in studying ethnic riots in India, found that politicians
used them to “increase the salience of one ethnic dimension, and within that dimension one
particular cleavage and category, so as to build a wimiing political coalition, split the
opposition, and raise the turnout among their party's core supporters.” 43
Method, means, or form
27. The general forms of election violence have often been set out in various typologies:
“riots, demonstrations, civil wars, terrorist campaigns, military coups, and assassinations” 44
Fischer refers to “threats, verbal intimidation, hate speech, disinformation, physical assault,
forced “protection”, blackmail, destruction of property, or assassination” 45 The UNIDP's
study notes that election violence can include “assassination of opponents or spontaneous
fisticuffs between rival groups of supporters — and threats, coercion, and intimidation of
opponents, voters, or election officials.” 46 Haid notes that election-related violence can
“involve rioting (permitted or instigated), looting (spontaneous or orchestrated),
intimidation (of voters or campaigns), assassination (of candithtes or their staffs), or direct
partisan conflict (with irregular or regular forces). 47 In summarizing the types of electoral
violence in Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya, Shwartz sets out the following forms: assault,
murder, attempted murder, beatings, looting, arson, threats of violence, bombings,
disruption of campaign rallies, torture, athitrary detention, abduction, chasing away voters
from polling stations, rape, hate speeches, closure of party offices. 48
28. Country case-studies often provide more detail on specific types of violence. 49 Very
little research focuses on one specific form of election violence and studies it globally.
Newman's paper on terrorist acts is an important exception. 5 °
Extent
29. Several studies have sought to calculate the extent of election violence. In an oft-
cited study, Fischer found that 24.5 percent (14 of 57) of countries that held elections in
2001 experienced electoral violence. 5 ' Bekoe found that, of 110 elections in Africa from
1990-2005, 24.5 percent (27 elections) were accompanied by election-related deaths. 52
42 Haid, note 4 above, p. 3.
43 Steven Wilkinson and Christopher Haid, “Ethnic Violence as Campaign Expenditure: Riots,
Competition, and Vote Swings in India” University of Chicago (2009) (unpublished manuscript), p.3.
44 Rapoport and Weinberg, note 6 above, p. 33.
45 Fischer, note 3 above, p. 8.
46 UNIW, note 5 above, p. 4.
47 Haid, note 4 above, p. 2.
48 Roland Schwartz, “Political and Electoral Violence in East Africa”, Working Papers on Conflict
Management No. 2, Freidrich Ebert Stiftung & Centre for Conflict Research (2001), pp. 8-9.
49 e.g. de Smedt, note 31 above; HOglund and Piyarathne, note 6 above, pp. 294-295.
50 Newman, note 6 above.
51 Fischer, note 3 above, p. 11.
52 Bekoe, note 6 above, p.9 (She notes that this matches Fischer's percentage).
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Causes and enabling conditions
30. Research has addressed causes or conditions of election violence in general terms, as
well as in detail with respect to specific country case studies.
31. The UNIDP study provides the longest list of potential causes, addressing specific
factors mlated to context (e.g. ethnic rivalries), process, mlationship factors, political
factors (e.g. weak governance, lack of political party capacity), media (e.g. biased media),
administrative inadequacies (e.g. inaccurate voter lists), corruption, and security and
policing (they include four factors: “reactionaly policing”, “police inaction to apprehend
culprits”, “lack of capacity to investigate”, and “availability of small arms”). 53 Hoglund
identifies various causes of election violence including clientism and patrimonialism,
elections taking place after conflict and where parties have not yet been fully demobilized,
a culture of violence and impunity, the type of election, the electoral system design, and the
nature of the election administration. 54
32. In Schwartz' work on Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya, he found that causes of
violence included: a lack of faith in the electoral commission or its independence; lack of
awareness of the electoral process; political repression; forced disenfranchisement of
opponents; poverty; lack of funding for the electoral process; and incitement. 55
33. A study of the Philippines found that relevant factors included: the monetary and
other benefits of public office, which cause politicians and their supporters to kill rivals; the
fact that public office allows politicians to “protect” their organized criminal activity
(gambling, drugs, logging); long existing family-political rivalries; the widespread presence
of private militias run by politicians; and the weakness of the state. 56 Work on violence in
Kenya's Kibera slum after the 2007 elections pointed to paternalism and “big man” politics,
in combination with socio-economic factors, and ethnic rivalries. 57 Another study of the
same period found that “more violence occurred in locations that had a greater effect on the
overall electoral competitiveness of a parliamentary constituency”. 58 Similarly, studies of
Gujarat found that Hindu-Muslim riots were a planned element in a larger electoral
strategy, and that they “broke out disproportionately in the most competitive seats.” 59 And
Bekoe's study of elections in Africa found that the largest number of election related deaths
occurred in countries whem ethnicity was politicized. 60
34. Some studies have addressed the relationship between development or poverty and
election violence. One such study noted that while it is generally accepted that electoral
violence is most linked to developing countries, in fact, most states have at some point
experienced varying degrees of election violence. 6 ' In discussing this point further, Laakso
explains the reasons why poverty may be a factor in election violence (e.g. the ease with
which poor youth might be mobilized to violence), but shows that numerous poor countries
have not experienced violence, and that others experiencing growth have had violence. She
53 UNIE P,pp. 15-17.
54 Hoglund, note 1 above, pp. 420-423.
Schwartz, note 48 above, pp. 9-10.
56 Patino and Velasco, note 19 above; see also John Linantud, “Whither Guns, Goons, and gold? The
Decline of Factional Election violence in the Philippines” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol 20, No
3(1998).
‘ de Smedt, note 31 above.
58 Kasara, note 39 above, p. 3.
Wilkinson and Haid, note 43 above, p. 2.
60 Bekoe, note 6 above, p. 12.
61 Rapoport and Weinberg, note 6 above, p. 42.
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concludes that poverty is clearly a relevant factor, but “should not be seen as ... aI
sufficient cause for violence” 62
35. Some work has included analysis of whether the type of election (e.g. national, local,
presidential, parliamentary etc.) affects violence levels. In one study of elections in Africa,
Bekoe did not find a difference in the presence of election-related deaths in different types
of elections (comparing general, parliamentary, non-concurrent presidential and
parliamentary). 63
36. A major topic of analysis has been the relationship between the process of the
election and violence. This includes manipulation or fraud in the electoral process,
particularly in terms of rigging the outcome, and post-election violence. Violence is
common following fraudulent elections in Africa. 64 The UNIDP's study posits that one of
the “common understandings” about election violence is that, “ tIhose elections considered
to be free, fair, and transparent are less likely to experience electoral violence than those
where allegations of mismanagement or deliberate cheating are prevalent”. 65 In contrast,
however, Laakso observes that “the elections that were declared free and fair by election
observers were no less violent than elections that were not declared free and fair.” 66
Effects
37. Election-related violence clearly has immediate effects on individual and community
rights and security, and can result in physical harm or death, and property damage. Beyond
this, a number of studies have attempted to analyse the extent to which violence had
broader affects, especially on democracy and participation in democracy.
38. Election violence can reduce voter turnout, affect voter registration, prevent
candidates from rumiing for office, increase divisions in society, or even prevent or
postpone an election from taking place at all. 67 A detailed study of the consequences of
election violence in Sri Lanka, concluded that, “violence directly influenced political
participation, voter turnout and voters' mobility rand thati fear and frustration linge4ed for
years after the violence occurred”. 68 It found that individuals refrained from voting because
of violence, and that party supporters went into hiding before and after the election. 69 A
similarly detailed study of evidence from Gujarat found that Hindu-Muslim riots led to
notable vote swings in later elections. 7 °
39. The UNIDP study notes that election violence can also hinder economic and other
development: “incidents of violence undermine government legitimacy, scare away
domestic foreign investors, and result in low levels of social trust”. 7 '
62 Laakso, note 2 above, p. 229. Also see Paul Collier, Wars, Guns, and Votes (2009) (discussing the
relationship between poor democracies and violence).
63 Donna Bekoe, note 6 above.
64 Mehler (ed.), note 2 above, pp. 203 and 224.
65 UNIW, note 5 above, p. 3
66 Laakso, note 2 above, p. 224.
67 HOglund, note 1 above, pp. 417-419.
68 HOglund and Piyarathne, note 6 above, p. 287.
69 Ibid., p.299.
70 Wilkinson and Haid, note 43 above, p. 2.
71 UNIW, note 5 above, , p. 5.
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IV. Typology of election-related killings
40. The country studies in Annex I provide a basis for broader conclusions about the
characteristics and features of election-related killings. The most common types of
election-related killings are examined in detail below in Part V. This section sets out
typologies of election-related killings, providing cross-national detail on perpetrators,
victims, motives, methods, locations, timing, and effects.
Identity of the perpetrator
41. The country case studies indicate that the perpetrators of election-related killings
include:
• State security forces, including: the mgular police, specialized police units, army,
intelligence, or mpublican or presidential guards.
• Armed non-state pro-government actors, including: paramilitaries, militias, gangs.
• Armed non-state actors linked to or controlled by politicians or political parties,
including: militias, civilian armed forces, private armies, bodyguards, gangs.
• Armed non-state anti-government actors, including: insurgents, terrorist groups,
rebel groups, anti-government elements, or separatists.
• Criminal gangs, especially groups involved in the trafficking of weapons or drugs,
and that often have a degree of territorial control.
• Political leaders or political candidates, generally acting through armed state or non-
state actors; and
• Civilian supporters of a political candidate or party.
Identity of the victim
42. The victims of election-related killings include:
• Political leaders or candidates.
• Members or supporters of a political candidate or party.
• Family members of political candidate or member of political party.
• Potential or actual voters for a rival party.
• Political activists.
• Protestors, demonstrators.
• Journalists.
• Human rights defenders.
• Bystanders.
• Witnesses to an election-related killing.
• State security force members, police or military (domestic, foreign, or international);
and
• Bodyguards or private armed forces of a political leader or candidate.
Motive for the killing
43. The following motives can be identified:
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• To spread fear through the electorate to inhibit voting generally and thereby disrupt
or discredit the electoral process.
• To spread fear amongst political candidates generally, to prevent them from running
for office.
• To neutralize the political threat of a particular rival candidate.
• To neutralize the threat of a rival party.
• To spmad fear amongst election officials to disrupt the electoral process.
• To prevent potential voters from registering to vote.
• To prevent supporters of a candidate or party from hanging political posters,
distributing leaflets or participating in other political campaigning.
• To pressure voters to vote for a particular candithte or party.
• To punish perceived supporters or voters of a particular candidate or a party, or to
punish them for voting at all.
• To quell a public protest or prevent public political expression.
• To physically steal ballots or disrupt ballot counting.
• To force voters to leave a particular area.
• To prevent a potential coup.
• To punish a citizen for having participated in a political protest.
• To strengthen organized criminal influence over political candidates or parties.
• To prevent information about a fraudulent process or violence from being
publicized.
• To prevent election-related human rights fact-finding or advocacy.
• To prevent a witness to violence from testifying.
Method or means of killing
44. Diverse means were employed, often depending on both the perpetrator and the
motive:
• Most incidents involved victims being shot to death by security forces, militias or
others with firearms, including handguns, rifles, shotguns, and automatic weapons.
• In countries experiencing armed conflict or where there is an active insurgency or
terrorist group, victims were often killed by the detonation of various explosive
devices. Insurgents generally used improvised explosive devices (TEDs), whether
suicide IEDs, vehicle-borne TEDs, or roadside TEDs; and there was some use of
grenades and landmines.
• In other incidents, especially involving clashes between rival party supporters,
victims were beaten, hacked, stabbed, or burnt to death.
Location of killing
45. Election-related killings occur especially at election-related events or sites:
• Political rallies.
• Public or street demonstrations.
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• Homes or offices of political candidates or party members.
• Political party offices.
• Sites of voter registration.
• Polling sites.
• On transport (cars, buses) to polling sites, voter registration sites, political rallies.
• Government buildings; and
• Public places where citizens gather (e.g., markets).
Stage of the election
46. Killings occuntd at all stages of the election cycle:
• Pre-election. Some killings occur even before an election date has been announced
(e.g. when an election has been postponed, or during attempts to force a government
to hold an elections). Killings also occur during voter mgistration and the political
campaign period. The most common types of killings pre-election are: killings of
political rivals, killings by insurgents to disrupt the election process, or killings of
protestors by state forces.
• Election-day. While numerous authors have noted that election-day itself can often
be calm, this observation should not be overstated. The Special Rapporteur has
recorded election-day killings in mcent elections in Afghanistan, India, Indonesia,
Nepal, Pakistan, and Iraq. Election-day killings were especially experienced by
countries experiencing an armed insurgency, and often occurred near voting sites.
• Election mn-off Killings have been documented in the period between an initial
election, and a run-off to determine the winner in an allegedly close race. Such
killings were often carried out to intimidate voters to affect voter preferences.
• Post-election. Killings were committed before and after the announcement of
election results, while votes are being counted, and in some cases, many months
after the election. Common types of killings in this period include: killings by state
forces of post-election protestors, killings of voters by state forces, militias or
insurgents to punish them for having voted for a rival or at all, killings of witnesses
to prevent them from testifying.
Effect
47. The effects of the killings documented in the country case studies are difficult to
analyse in detail due to a lack of compmhensive country information. In addition to the
obvious loss of life, the consequent harm to victims' families and community, and
generalized insecurity, the following effects were observed:
• Withdrawal of candidacy by political candidates.
• Difficulty in recruiting election or polling staff
• The closure of polling stations.
• Suspension of political party campaign rallies.
• Prevented or impeded political campaigning in certain areas.
• The postponement of elections.
• Reduced political activism.
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• Reduced voter turnout, generally due to voter fear of retaliation. Women voters have
sometimes been especially affected.
• Change in voter preferences or voting patterns; and
• Population displacement.
V. Analysis of detention-related killings
48. This section provides detailed analysis of the most significant and common types of
election related killings. 72
A. Killings by the security forces during election protests
49. The experience of the Special Rapporteur indicates that one of the most frequent and
important types of election killings are those by state security forces (generally police, but
sometimes military) against demonstrators and bystanders in the context of an election-
related public demonstrations or protests.
50. Election-related protests generally occur shortly after the day of voting, or after the
election results are announced. Citizens are often protesting perceived electoral fraud and
the announced election results. Such protests occuntd in early 2007 in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, December 2007-January 2008 in Kenya, March 2008 in Armenia,
November 2008 in Nigeria, July 2009 in Mongolia, and from June-December 2009 in Iran.
In some cases, protests have been directed at a government that refused or postponed
elections, or that broke pm-election promises, as occurred in February 2009 in Cote
d'Ivoire (whem an anti-Government protest was held after the Government again postponed
elections delayed since 2005), and in September 2009 in Guinea (where a protest was held
against the military junta, including against indications that the junta leader would break his
pledge not to run in presidential elections). Through early 2010 in Thailand, protests were
held in an attempt to force the Government to hold early elections.
51. Some protests are planned or strongly instigated by opposition politicians or
political parties, others are a relatively spontaneous reaction by voters to anger at electoral
processes and outcomes. In most cases, protests were a combination of spontaneous citizen
protest and organized political activity. In nearly all cases surveyed, the protestors were
supporters of the party or leader not in government or that lost an election. In some cases,
supporters of both the government and of the opposition protested and rioted, as occurmd in
Kenya and Nigeria.
52. Election protestors may be unarmed and peaceful, or they may be engaged in street
riots involving significant property damage, or even violence against other civilians or
security forces. In those cases where supporters of both the Government and opposition
protested, there were high levels of civilian-on-civilian violence, often linked not only to
political differences, but also to existing religious or ethnic cleavages. Such killings are
discussed in section E below.
53. The circumstances in which the lethal use of force by security forces is permitted are
strictly circumscribed by international human rights law — the force must be necessary and
proportionate to the threat posed, and intentional lethal force is only permitted where it is
72 Each of the country examples or incidents referred to below come from the country survey,
summarised in Annex I.
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necessary to protect life. 73 Killings by security forces during a protest may be lawful
responses to a violent individual or group in a crowd or protest. Where, for example,
protestors are armed and threatening or involved in violence, it may be entirely appropriate
for the police to respond with force to protect other citizens or themselves.
54. However, the Special Rapporteur's experience indicates that there have been many
instances of excessive or indiscriminate force by the security forces in violation of
international law during their policing of an election-related protest. It is also clear that
when such killings occur, they can often take place in large numbers: Kenya (at least 400
killed by police); DRC (at least 100 killed by police and army); Guinea (an estimated 150
killed by security forces, including by the Presidential Guard); Nigeria (at least 90 killed by
security forces); Iran (between 30-70 killed by police, Revolutionary Guard and Basij
militia).
55. In almost all cases surveyed, victims were killed by being shot by the security
forces; in a smaller number of cases they were beaten or stabbed to death by the authorities.
Many of the shootings were in circumstances where police “opened fire” on a crowd, and
protestors were killed relatively indiscriminately. In some incidents, victims were
individually targeted and shot at close range, or executed immediately following being
detained.
56. Pre-election violence or election-day violence does not appear to be a good predictor
of post-election violence of this type. In fact, in a number of the incidents studied, the pre-
election and election-day stages were relatively calm (e.g. Kenya, Mongolia, Armenia).
57. The causes and motives of the lethal shootings vary from case to case. In some
cases, it is likely that the police lacked the appropriate use of force guidelines, training,
experience and equipment to lawfully and appropriately control a crowd. Poor and violent
policing of protests or riots is not limited to the election context, and is a common problem
around the world, often caused by legal, technical, planiiing, and training deficiencies. In
such cases, the killings might be the result of excessive and unlawful force, but not
necessarily politically motivated, nor part of a broader attempt to suppress political
opposition and restrict freedom of expression. In these circumstances, the government,
should immediately make clear public statements against the killings, and commit to a full
investigation. The government, with international assistance where appropriate, should
undertake an independent review of the events to determine the causes of the violence and
necessary reforms. Investigations in such cases should aim to review the individual and
structural causes or conditions for the killings in full, including: whether the police use of
force guidelines comply with the international law on the use of force; whether the police
have any and appropriate plans for crowd control situations; whether police have equipment
and weapons appropriate for crowd control; the role of police intelligence; whether there
were failures in the police command and control; what orders were given to police, etc.
The Waki Commission in Kenya is a notable example of such an investigation, which
carried out an in-depth inquiry of killings by police during Kenya's post-election violence,
and proposed a range of reforms to improve the ability of police to lawfully respond.
Inquiries like the Waki Commission are unfortunately an all too rare occurrence. 74
58. It is especially important in such cases that individual perpetrators, as well as any
responsible commanding officers, are investigated and prosecuted. Police are often not held
to account for unlawful killings during protests, because of accountability deficiencies that
affect investigations or prosecutions generally, such as a lack of independence in police
See A/61/311 paras. 33-45.
See A/HRCI8I3.
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internal affairs, poor policing oversight or corruption or resource issues the criminal justice
system. 75 The country may need to take special steps following security force killings
during a protest to ensure that responsible police are investigated, such as creating a special
taskforce or requesting the assistance of international investigators. Countering impunity
for police abuses is a key step in deterring and reducing future abuses.
59. In other cases, as in the incidents examined in Guinea, the DRC and Iran, the
killings are politically motivated: the security forces are closely controlled by political
leaders, and are used to unlawfully suppress opposition movements or political expression.
The security forces may be deployed, for example, to shut down even a peaceful political
protest, and may use violence to do so. In extreme cases, the protests provide an
opportunity for leaders to use the security forces to intentionally kill members or supporters
of the political opposition. Particularly important in the context of politically motivated
security force killings are those forces (especially elite units, or Presidential or Republican
Guards) which are either composed of individuals personally loyal to a leader, or whose
command structure is politicized. As a result, they can easily be used for personal or
political purposes. It is very unlikely in these cases that training or technical reforms will,
without significantly more, effectively reduce abuses by the security forces.
60. Reducing killings of this form depends almost entirely on whether external actors
(e.g. donor countries, diplomats, the UN, regional organizations, international civil society)
or internal actors (e.g. opposition leaders or parties, domestic civil society, the public) can
successfully influence the political will of leaders in the short-term (to inhibit their violent
deployment of government forces) and long-term (to institute reforms to depoliticize the
countly's security forces). Depoliticisation may require structural changes to recruitment
processes for the particular security force, to encourage the development of a force that is
broadly representative, and not composed solely of those personally loyal to a leader.
Often, the command structure of the force may need to be reformed so that the force
(particularly where it is a Republican Guard) is integrated into the regular command
structure of the army, and not subject to the personal control of a political leader.
61. Where the killings are politically motivated, the Government should also be
encouraged by the international community to set up an independent commission to review
the incident. However, if there is political control over the security forces, it will generally
be unlikely that an independent commission will be created by the Government, or that its
findings will be released or followed-up by the Government. The international community
may be able to push for its own independent commission, as occurred in Guinea following
the “Bloody Monday” massacre.
62. In general terms, warning signs that killings by security forces of protestors may
occur in the post-election period include:
• evidence or history of electoral fraud.
• the lack of viable electoral fraud dispute mechanisms.
• history of police unlawful force, especially in crowd control situations or against
suspected “criminals”.
• the lack of specific crowd control police training, planiiing, and appropriate
weaponry.
• impunity for past police abuses and ineffective police accountability mechanisms.
• informal or formal control of the security forces by political leaders.
See A/HRC/14/24/Add.8.
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• an active membership or supporter base for the candithte or party that lost the
election due to alleged fraud.
• candidate or party mobilization of public protests; and
• a tradition or culture of public political demonstrations.
B. Killings by insurgents
63. Election-related killings by insurgents or other rebel groups present an entirely
different set of problems. A rebel group's broad aims are to fundamentally change the
structure of the state or the type of government, or to oust the present government, or to
create an autonomous region or separate state. In choosing to seek these outcomes through
violence, rather than through non-violent political means, they are generally opposed to
elections as such. They do not view the elections as a legitimate means to determine state
authority, and they use the election period to undermine the government and democratic
processes. Thus, their election-related actions are often directed towards spreading fear
amongst voters, candidates, party supporters and election officials, disrupting and
discrediting the electoral process or election-thy, and punishing voters. Before March 2010
elections in Iraq, for instance, al Qaeda in Iraq released a statement that the elections were
“illicit” and that they would attempt to “prevent these elections” using “primarily military
means”.
64. While violence by rebel groups occurs regardless of the presence of elections, their
violence often increases during the election cycle. Afghanistan's August 2009 elections,
for example, saw a marked increase in attacks by Anti-Government Elements; and suicide
bombings and other attacks also increased in both Iraq and Pakistan before elections.
Election-day was generally not peaceful in those countries studied with insurgent activity:
for example, in Afghanistan, 31 civilians, including 11 election officials, as well as 29
security force members, were killed on the day of voting (20 August 2009); killings
occurred on each of India's five election days in April-May 2009; killings occurred in
Papua, Indonesia on its 9 April 2009 voting day; and at least 40 were killed on election-day
in Iraq's 2010 elections.
65. Because the insurgent group's intent is essentially to spread fear through the
electorate, random and unpredictable election violence during the election cycle might
often be expected. The case studies above do provide examples of what appear to be
random or entirely indiscriminate insurgent killings during the election cycle, and these are
difficult to distinguish from insurgent violence more generally (e.g. roadside bombs killing
civilians on their way to a wedding in Helmand, Afghanistan). But the case studies indicate
that election-related insurgent attacks often aim at particular election-related locations or
categories of victim. Thus, for example, strikes have often taken place at polling stations,
political rallies, or while individuals have traveled to or from election-related locations or
events. They have often targeted political candidates, election officials, and party members
or candidate campaigners. In Afghanistan, for example, candidates and their staff were
especially targeted in the pre-election period — they were subjected to widespread
intimidation, and attacks at their homes, or attacks while travelling to or from election
events. In Colombia also, approximately half of the election-related killings were of
political candidates, and before Pakistan's February 2008 elections, attacks aimed at
politicians and their campaign events were responsible for many deaths. Before
Indonesia's 9 April 2009 parliamentary elections, 5 politicians were assassinated, most
likely by separatists.
66. Insurgents have also targeted voters, or potential voters. Insurgents or rebel groups
have often called for voters to boycott elections, as they did in Afghanistan, Iraq, India,
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Indonesia, Colombia, and Spain. In nnmerons cases, citizens were warned of reprisals for
voting. In Afghanistan, for example, the Taliban issued a letter to the public the week
before the August 2009 elections, warning of reprisals for anyone who voted. Similarly, in
Iraq, a militant group issued written warnings that they would kill voters; and before India's
April-May 2009 elections, the Naxalite insurgents threatened potential voters. There is not
sufficient detail in many country reports to determine the extent to which voters were in
fact subsequently killed for having voted, although on election-day in Afghanistan, the
Taliban hung at least 2 people who had voted (indicated by their ink-stained fingers), and in
West Bengal, India, in a presumed attack on voters, shortly after voting, a bomb attack
resulted in 1 death.
67. Those working at polling sites, including election officials and security officials, are
also prime targets of insurgent thwats and violence. In India's April-May 2009 elections,
Naxalites launched a number of attacks on polling places and officials, and 11 election
officials were killed on election-day in Afghanistan.
68. The methods employed by insurgents to attack (e.g. grenade attacks in the
Philippines, a variety of IEDs in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and landmines and other
explosives in India) are often indiscriminate. Thus, while the attack may be nominally
targeted at certain officials or certain locations, many civilians and bystanders have also
been killed. Numerous explosions in Pakistan's pre-election period resulted in extensive
civilian casualties. Suicide bombers targeting Benazir Bhutto's convoy on the night of her
return to Pakistan on 18 October 2007 missed her, but killed over 140 people, and an attack
aimed at another candidate on 21 December 2007 killed at least 50 people worshipping at a
mosque.
69. These types of election-killings, because they occur in the context of broader
conflict, are extraordinarily difficult to address specifically. However, given the often
notable increase in insurgent killings during elections and their effects on candidates and
voter turnout, significantly more attention needs to be given to how to minimize insurgent
violence during election periods. In addition to the general counter-insurgency, peace-
process, and security promoting measures taken in an attempt to resolve the underlying
causes of conflict, or to mduce insurgency-related violence, some measures taken by
governments and the international community might include the following:
Insurgent election-related killings are often targeted at places or individuals.
Especially vulnerable are political candidates, election officials, and election
locations, including political rallies and polling sites. As the UN Commission into
Bhutto's murder in Pakistan indicates, many deaths could be prevented if security
measures were improved. Incmased security should especially be focused on
candidates and polling sites. Increased security should be planned not just for
election-day, but also especially in the pre-election period, and should continue into
the post-election period where necessary..
• UN and civil society groups should, where appropriate and feasible, maintain
contact with insurgent groups through the election period, to discourage them from
unlawfully targeting civilians and civilian locations.
• Insurgent threats, intimidation and violence towards potential voters can msult in
significant reductions in voter turnout, with grave negative effects on election
legitimacy, and on the development of democratic processes. In countries or areas
where insurgents have called for boycotts and threatened violence against voters,
more attention should be devoted to considering how voters can vote while
minimizing retaliation. Voting practices that, for example, result in voters having
semi-permanent marks on their bodies (e.g. ink stained fingers) allow insurgents to
identify voters for punishment, and may be inappropriate in some contexts.
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Election monitors in countries experiencing insurgency operate in very difficult
conditions. Special measures may need to be developed to allow them to safely (and
anonymously) undertake their essential work during insurgencies or armed conflict,
including by using informal networks of monitors and developing technology-based
reporting.
C. Killings of political candidates (assassinations)
70. Political candidates at all levels have been killed during election cycles, and
particularly during the pre-election stage, for a range of reasons.
Candidate killings have taken place as part of a general attempt to dismpt elections (e.g.
assassinations by insurgents, discussed above, which form a large proportion of the number
of candidate assassinations).
71. They have been carried out as part of an attempt to reduce the threat of a particular
political party or to neutralize the threat of a specific rival candidate. Many killings of this
type took place before 2007 state and federal elections in Nigeria. The killings were
generally carried out by rival politicians' own armed groups, composed mainly of
unemployed youth. Such private gangs or militias tend to be created and maintained a long
time before the election itself Many political parties and candidates mobilized such armed
groups in Nigeria, especially the larger parties who had more available funding. Both
before and during the election cycle, Governments should undertake concerted efforts to
dismantle private armed groups and prosecute those responsible for participating in or
forming them. State forces should also protect citizens from armed groups. While private
militias carried out the killings in Nigeria, Nigerian police were often blamed for failing to
protect victims from violence, and for failing to hold to account perpetrators. Killings of
political rivals also occurred before Guatemala's 2007 elections, during Nepal's 2008
elections, and were suspected to have occurred before Iraq's March 2010 elections
(although analysts found it difficult to verify motives). Where there is a history of violent
political animosity between parties, some efforts to reduce violence have included codes of
conduct negotiated and agreed to by the political parties. The state may also need to
provide heightened security to candidates or key officials.
72. While killings of candidates are often carried out by rival candidates' private forces
(militias, gangs, bodyguards or hired killers), state security forces have also been
responsible for killings. After April 2005 elections in Togo, the security forces targeted a
number of opposition leaders; in 2008 in Zimbabwe, security forces and Government-
aligned militias together killed rival candidates in an attempt to “dismantle” the opposition.
The issues and reforms relevant to this type are similar to those discussed above with
respect to political killings of protestors.
73. In some cases, the killings were part of an attempt by criminal organizations to
exercise influence over candidates and policies. In Guatemala, for example, over 50
candidates and activists were killed in the mn-up to Guatemala's 2007 elections, many of
whom seem likely to have been killed by organized criminal groups to increase their
political influence.
D. Killings of supporters of a rival candidate or party
74. The supporters of a particular candidate or party have been frequent targets of
election-violence, carried out generally by state security forces or the private armed groups
of political leaders. Such killings generally take place in an environment of intimidation of
supporters and potential voters of a rival party or candidate, and are generally carried out to
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encourage supporters to change political allegiances, or to intimidate voters into voting for
the party supported by the perpetrator.
75. State security forces have been responsible for large numbers of such killings. In the
DRC, for example, in March 2007, the army, Republican Guard and other security forces
were deployed to target presumed opposition supporters, and they arrested and killed many.
The killings occurred after the President was elected and the opposition leader refused to
give up his own security force. Similarly motivated killings occurred in Febmary 2008,
when the Government launched a heavily armed police operation against a rival political-
religious group, killing 100-200 people. In April 2005 in Togo, State security forces,
together with militias, killed hundreds of individuals beginning on election-day and in the
days following. The killings were carried out as part of an attempt to rig the election
results. In Zimbabwe's March and June 2008 elections, the Government used its security
forces to kill hundreds of opposition voters, in an attempt to force them to change their
votes and to punish them for voting for the opposition party. These killings occur because
the security forces are heavily politicized and are thus very similar to politically motivated
killings by security forces in response to street demonstrations, discussed above. Security
force training, and other reforms aimed at professionalizing the forces are necessary, but
will be to little effect if the forces are not made independent from political leaders and if
leaders are not pressured to stop violent deployments.
76. Killings of rival supporters have also been carried out by a candidate or party's
private armed forces or hired killers. As well as killing rival candidates, politicians' private
armed groups in Nigeria killed many rival party supporters. In an especially egregious
example, in the Philippines in November 2009, an incumbent politician's private militia
massacred 57 civilians who were going to witness a candidate's registration. In one
incident in Sri Lanka, gunmen on motorbikes opened fire on a bus of opposition candidate
supporters on their way to a rally, killing a 60 year old woman and injuring 4 others. In
Guatemala, some activists were shot while distributing party leaflets, and other party
members were found dead with campaign posters covering them. The country examples
studied by the Special Rapporteur indicate that the circumstances that result in the highest
levels of intimidation and killings by private actors of voters are where politicians or
candidates control permanent or semi-permanent armed groups. As indicated above, the
Government should take measures to dismantle these groups, and significant further
research is needed on the most effective ways to do so.
E. Rival party supporter-on-supporter killings
77. The Special Rapporteur's experience and the country case studies indicate that rival
supporters have also killed each other during elections. There are two broad types of
supporter killings: small fights between rival supporters, usually at an election-related site
and that result in one or a small number of deaths; and large-scale clashes between rival
supporters, generally following the release of disputed election results.
78. Small fights resulting in killings have occurred with some frequency in a range of
election contexts, but supporter-on-supporter incidents generally result in a low number of
killings. They are essentially one on one fights, or fights between small groups of rival
supporters. Many do not appear to have been pre-planned, but appear to be the result of an
argument or dispute that escalated to murder. These incidents have often occurred on
voting day, at a polling site, and they have also occurred at other election locations (e.g.
campaign rallies). In Sri Lanka, for example, before the 26 January 2010 elections, on 16
January, a Rajapaksa supporter was shot dead in a clash with Fonseka supporters. On 18
January, a Fonseka supporter was beaten to death while putting up Fonseka posters. In the
third phase of India's April-May 2009 elections, rival supporters fought in West Bengal,
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leaving 11 dead; in the fonrth phase, 12 people were killed in fighting between rival parties
(each party accused the other of inciting violence to prevent voting); in the fifth phase,
fighting between rival parties led to 1 death in Tamil Nadu and another in West Bengal. On
election-day in Nepal on 10 April 2008, one person was killed after fighting broke out
between rival parties in Sunsari. Small-scale clashes resulting in deaths between rival party
supporters were also reported in Pakistan.
79. When such killings occur, political leaders should immediately and publicly
condenm them, and the perpetrators should be prosecuted. Where there is a history of such
killings in a country, the security arrangements at key election sites should be reviewed,
and where necessary, strengthened. Long-term measures to reduce supporter violence
should be developed in countries with repeated violence.
80. Large-scale clashes between rivals are a very different phenomenon. Two of the
most significant incidents occurred in Nigeria and Kenya. In Nigeria, the perception that a
local election in November 2008 was rigged triggered clashes between the largely Christian
supporters of one party, and the largely Muslim supporters of another party, resulting in the
deaths of at least 700, most of whom were beaten to death by armed mobs. In Kenya,
allegations of electoral fraud after the 2007 elections led to violence and riots resulting in at
least 1,113 deaths. As indicated above, police were responsible for an estimated 405
deaths, but the remaining 700 plus victims were killed by fellow citizens. In the short-term,
violence of this order must be countered by the immediate deployment of well-trained
police, and sometimes military, forces. Deployments are often slow to arrive, and the forces
ill-equipped to deal with the violence. When such clashes occur, they may be triggered by
perceptions of election fraud, but they have deep long-term causes, generally linked with
religious-ethnic rivalries and perceptions of unfair distribution of resources. Addressing
election violence in these contexts must thus be conceived as a part of long-term efforts
with respect to, for example, land disputes, institution-building, civic education and conflict
resolution.
81. While the violence may at first glance appear to be by private actors, the state may
nevertheless play an important role. The violence may have been instigated or planned by
senior officials, as the Kenya example indicates. In addition, the police, due to resource or
training deficiencies, may be unable to meet to their international due diligence obligations
to effectively prevent violence. Or political or other bias by the police may result in
failures to protect civilians from violence (by, for example, not intervening to prevent
physical attacks, or by failing to arrest perpetrators). Kenya's Waki Commission, for
example, found that officials failed to act on intelligence regarding violence, failed to
respond adequately to violence, and that police lacked discipline and impartiality.
F. Death penalty
82. In one country studied (Iran), evidence suggests that the death penalty was used in
such a way that it should be classified as a form of election-related killing. At least ten
death sentences have been handed down so far against post-election protestors, on vague
charges of “moharabeh”. In the months before and after the June 2009 elections, the
Government executed significantly higher numbers of people than usual, in an apparent
attempt to intimidate voters and protestors. International law is clear that the death penalty
may only be applied as a penalty for the crime of intentional murder, and it can only be
applied following a trial that observes all fair trial guarantees. 76
76 A/Ji-1RC14120; A/HRC/1 1/2/Add s.
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VI. Election monitoring and election-related violence
83. Monitoring and reporting on election-related violence often takes place as part of a
much broader assessment undertaken b election monitoring organizations. Election
monitoring reports provide infonimtion on whether an election was genuinely free and
fair and thus t/ picalh address issues related to for example w hether tile state s election
law complies with international standards the conduct of the national election coniniission
candidate and voter registration processes whether political parties could freely campaigw
media freedom ballot design and whether the voting process was fair and the vote
counting process.
84. Country election monitoring reports cover election-related violence to widely
varying degrees, and reporting on violence is sometimes very poor. Some reports
significantly under-report violence incidents, especially violence in the pre- and post-
election periods 78 others provide general infonimtion but without the detail necessary to
understand incidents or work towards their prevention. Other reports provide detailed
charts or annexes of election violence incidents the better reports analyse the raw data to
provide general conclusions on perpetrators, causes, and the like.
85. Poor coverage of violence in election-monitoring reports may be due in part to a
lack of detailed guidance in election monitoring guidelines and handbooks. While most
handbooks point to the importance of monitoring and reporting on election violence, little
guidance is generally given on what infonimtion should be reported. The OS's Election
Observation Handbook ( 5 tu7 ed) (2007), for example, sets out to provide a thorough
overview of election-monitoring. It provides a number of references to the importance of
violence-free elections, and requires observers to report incidents of violence, but does not
provide further guidance. Similarly, the European Commission's Handbook for European
Uiiion Election Observation ( 2 h7d ed) (2008) provides detailed guidance on election
monitoring, and repeatedly stresses the need for the mission to investigate and report on
election violence, but it provides almost no guidance on how to do so. The Electoral
Institute of Southern Africa's Principles for Election Monitoring, Management and
Observation in the SADC Region (2003) refer to the undesirability of election violence, but
impose no specific reporting obligations. The Organization of American States' Methoi f
Election Observation: A Manual for OAS Electoral Observation Missions (2007) refers in
general teni s to monitoring incidents of violence. The African Union's Election
Observation and Monitoring Guidelines sets out that intimidation” and human rights
violations” should be monitored.
86. Where reporting on violence is poor, the effects of the violence, including on
election legitimacy, election processes (e.g. voter participation, voting patterns, candidate
behaviour), and election outcomes are ver difficult to assess. Poor reporting also makes it
difficult to understand the causes of the violence, which inhibits the ability of advocates,
officials or the Government to propose and implement refoni s to reduce violence at future
elections.
77 For the international standards for a fair election, see: European Union, Compendium of
International Standards for Elections (2nd ed, 2008).
78 In one empirical study, Judith Kelley found that “pre-election violence is associated with greater
levels of [ election monitorl endorsements.” Kelley explains that pre-election violence actually
incentivizes monitors to dampen their criticism in the hopes of lessening post-election conflict: Judith
Kelley, “D-Minus Elections: The Politics and Nornis of International Election Observation”,
International Organization 63 (2009).
23
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87. Election monitoring reports shonld, where appropriate and feasible, cover election-
related violence in detail. Ideally, each incident would be recorded and reported with
information gathered on the circumstances, location, perpetrators, victims, and motives.
Reports should also provide general analysis of incidents or patterns across the country.
Detailed guidance on violence reporting could usefully be provided in election monitoring
guidelines or handbook documents. Election monitoring organizations, together with other
key actors involved in addressing election violence, should consider developing common
criteria and standards for collecting and reporting on election violence.
VII. Conclusions and recommendations
88. Election-related violence, including killing, is a widespread phenomenon that
does not receive sufficient direct attention. The Human Rights Council should request
the High Commissioner for Human Rights to present an annual report documenting
such cases and the measures taken in response to protect human rights.
89. While election killings take place at the hands of a diverse array of actors, State
responsibility remains central in many cases, such as when: (a) state security forces
themselves carry out the killings, which have often occurred at public demonstrations,
or of rival party candidates, supporters or voters; (b) government officials plan,
direct, or order private groups or militias to carry out killings; or (c) the government
fails to adequately protect citizens from non-state violence (e.g. the government fails to
disarm a candidate's private militia; the security forces fail to plan for post-election
violence).
90. In countries with a track record of election violence, governments should draw
up plans for dealing with such violence in the future in ways that are consistent with
their human rights obligations. Too often, governments respond as if they had no
inkling that relatively predictable violence would in fact occur. While some of the
details of such contingency planning will need to remain confidential, it is also
essential for the authorities to release enough detailed information in order to make it
clear that serious planning has been undertaken as well as to discourage those
potentially violent forces who might otherwise assume there will be few obstacles to,
and no consequences flowing from, their actions.
91. Impunity for election-related violence is widespread. Investigations and
prosecutions are essential to reduce future violence. In countries with recurring
election violence, the Government should consider setting up special police and
prosecutor taskforces to focus specifically on election-related murders and other
crimes. Following extensive election violence, the Government, with international
assistance where appropriate, should set up an independent commission with the
mandate to comprehensively study the violence and propose the necessary reforms.
92. The international community must be prepared to offer more support in post-
violence situations. Ideally, there would be a unit within the UN structure which
would automatically offer assistance in all such cases. And the progress and outcomes
of national commissions should be closely followed by the international community.
79 Guidance may usefully be developed in consultation with The International Foundation for
Electoral Systems (IFES), which maintains the Election Violence and Education and Resolution
Project (EVER). IFES/EVER has developed methodologies to gather, record, monitor, map, and
analyse election violence in the 11 countries it has thus far been active in, and maintains detailed
databases.
24
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93. But the reality is that iu the majority of situations in which heavily challenged
election practices are followed by serious violence, the government will be deeply
implicated and unwilling under any circumstances to commission any sort of
independent inquiry. The Secretary-General and the High Commissioner for Human
Rights have a major responsibility to take appropriate action in such cases. The
International Criminal Court may also have an important role to play in some
situations.
94. Post-election demonstrations are one of the most frequent contexts of election
killings. Before elections, police should receive crowd and riot control training, and
be equipped with the appropriate equipment. The security forces should prepare
plans in advance for policing the post-election period. In some cases, international
police assistance may be appropriate.
95. Many killings of candidates or voters are the result of politicized security
forces, controlled by political leaders and used for unlawful political purposes. In
these cases, the international community should undertake to assist the government to
depoliticize its forces through long-term restructuring and training efforts.
96. Further research should examine the role played by Presidential Guards or
equivalent forces whose loyalty is defacto to the President rather than the State and
whose role in the context of elections seems generally unlikely to be conducive to the
enjoyment of electoral and democratic freedoms. There is a legitimate question as to
how a leader in an unstable society can legitimately protect himself and his
Government short of achieving comprehensive reform of the entire armed forces. But
the electoral implications of such arrangements need to be better understood and
measures put in place to diminish the likelihood of the Presidential Guard playing an
abusive role.
97. In countries where candidates or political leaders control private armed
groups, significant efforts need to be taken to researching those links and to
dismantling the groups before and during elections.
98. It is important that election monitoring include detailed information on election
violence, including violence that occurs in the pre- and post-election phases. Accurate
and comprehensive reporting is essential to prevent the recurrence of violence during
an election, permits rapid responses to violent incidents, promotes accountability, and
aids in understanding election dynamics.
99. Common criteria and standards should be developed to guide election violence
monitoring and reporting.
100. There is a great need for focused in-depth research in the area of election-
related violence. This includes research on the various types of human rights abuses
committed during election periods, including killings, torture, arbitrary detention,
sexual violence, and forced displacement. Research is also especially needed on the
causes and effects of election violence, which are significantly under-studied.
101. Election monitoring is a relatively recent phenomenon which came of age only
at the end of the Cold War. Although it has gained a remarkable degree of
acceptance, it inevitably remains a highly sensitive issue for governments struggling to
stay in power. Assertions of interference in sovereignty are thus never far beneath the
surface. Nevertheless, it is essential for election monitors to move systematically
beyond a focus on the formal structures of elections and election-day monitoring. It
should be understood that an election is not free or fair unless the authorities can
show that they have done all within their power to minimize and respond to election-
related violence. For its part, the human rights community also needs to pay more
25
AJHRC/14/24/Add.7
attention to elections per se, rather than focnsing primarily on specific incidents of
violence.
26
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Appendix
Survey of election-related killings around the world
1. In order to understand and analyse the phenomenon of election-related killings, the
Special Rapporteur carried out detailed research on selected countries that experienced
election violence during the last five years, with a particular focus on the period since
2007.80 In 2008, reports of killings were documented in nearly 20% of countries that held
elections that year. 8 '
2. The results of the case study research are summarized below, and include detail on
election killings in: Afghanistan, Armenia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Colombia, Cote
d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Dominican Republic, Ethiopia,
Guatemala, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal,
Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Spain, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Togo, and Zimbabwe.
Afghanistan
3. Leading up to Afghanistan's 20 August 2009 elections, the country saw a marked
increase in violent attacks by Anti Government Elements (AGEs) in what analysts have
described as an attempt to dismpt the elections by creating a climate of fear and insecurity
by intimidating voters, candidates and election officials. 82
4. Killings were one of several tactics employed by insurgents, including kidnappings,
threats, and setting up illegal checkpoints. 83 Two weeks before the election, there were on
average 32 violent attacks per day, rising to 48 attacks per day in the four days before
election-thy. 84 Examples of attacks include a 5 August roadside bomb in Helmand
province, which killed five civilians on their way to a wedding, and a 6 August explosion
which killed five policemen. 85 The Taliban issued a letter to the public on 18 August,
explicitly warning of reprisals for those who voted.
80 The research was based on UN reports, human rights and election monitoring organization reports,
Govenmient accounts, and media reports. For some countries, including Kenya and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, infomiation is also based on the Special Rapporteur's on-site field
investigations. The survey summarised here includes most, but not all, of the countries that
experienced election-related killings in 2008, 2009, and 2010.
81 63 countries held elections in 2008. The Special Rapporteur's research documented election-
related killings in 11 countries (17.4%): Amienia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, the Dominican Republic,
Guinea-Bissau, Macedonia, Mongolia, Pakistan, Spain, and Zimbabwe.
82 Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) — United Nations Assistance Mission to
Afghanistan (UNAMA), “Joint Monitoring of Political Rights, Presidential and Provincial Council
Elections, Third Report,” (1 August—21 October 2009); National Democratic Institute, “Preliminary
Statement of the NIX Election Observer Delegation to Afghanistan's 2009 Presidential and Provincial
Council Elections” (22 August 2009); Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan, “2009
Presidential and Provincial Council Elections - Final Observation Report” (January 2009), pp. 59-6 1.
83 Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) — United Nations Assistance Mission to
Afghanistan (UNAMA), “Joint Monitoring of Political Rights, Presidential and Provincial Council
Elections, Third Report,” (1 August—21 October 2009).
84 Canadian Broadcasting Centre News, “Insurgent attacks spike in mn-up to Afghan vote” (18
August 2009).
85 Agence France-Presse, “Afghan attacks kill 17 including wedding-goers” (5 August 2009).
27
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5. Candidates and their campaign staff bore the brunt of direct attacks leading np to
election-day. On 1 August, a Provincial Council candidate was attacked in Laghman
province, and three improvised explosive devices (TEDs) were detected and defused by
Afghan forces close to two Provincial Council candidates' houses in Logar province. 86 On
the same day, in Ghazni province, the provincial campaign manager for President Karzai
and members of the Provincial Council candidates' convoy were attacked by AGEs while
they were returning from an election gathering in Badghis province. Two people were
killed. 87 On 14 August, in Kapisa province, AGEs killed one person and injured two others
who were returning from campaigning for President Karzai. On 16 August 2009, a roadside
bomb hit a convoy of President Karzai's campaigners in Jawzjan province, and AGEs
killed one of President Karzai's campaigners and injured two others in Kapisa province.
The following day, a Jawzjan Provincial Council candidate was shot and killed by two
unidentified armed motorcyclists. 88
6. On election-day (20 August) itself, 31 civilians were killed, including 11 election
officials, as well as 18 Afghan National Police (ANP), 8 Afghan National Army (ANA)
personnel, and 3 foreign military troops. 89 In Kandahar, a bomb killed 6, and the Taliban
hung 2 people who had ink-stained fingers (indicating that they had voted). 90 In BagMan
province, insurgent attacks closed 14 polling sites and several police officers were killed. 9 '
The district chief of police of BagMan was killed during a fight with AGEs and the deputy
district chief of police of in Nangarhar province was killed during an attack by AGEs. 92
Violence also affected the international forces — August and July of 2009 resulted in the
highest and second highest amount of US and foreign troop deaths since the US invasion in
200 On 15 August, a suicide car bomb exploded outside NATO headquarters in Kabul,
killing at least seven people, and on 18 August a suicide bomber detonated a device in a car
close to a colunm of NATO forces on the main road out of Kabul to Jalalabad, killing 8
people. 94
7. A few hours after the preliminary election results were released on 25 August, a
bomb blast killed 43 people in Kandahar city. (The Taliban were suspected but denied
responsibility). On 12 September, as the first full results were being announced by the
election committee, a wave of attacks across the country resulted in 66 deaths.
8. Govenm ent officials and other observers attributed the low voter turnout in some
areas to Taliban threats ahead of voting day, and attacks on the day itself. 95 They also noted
86 Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) — United Nations Assistance Mission to
Afghanistan (UNAMA), “Joint Monitoring of Political Rights, Presidential and Provincial Council
Elections, Third Report” (1 August—21 October 2009).
87
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Carlotta Gall and Stephen Farrell, “Afghan Election Called a Success Despite Attacks” The New
York Times, (20 August 2009).
9 Jon Boon, Haroon Siddique and Julian Borger, “Afghanistan vote count begins after election day of
sporadic violence” The Guardian (20 August 2009).
92 AIHRC-UNAMA, “Joint Monitoring of Political Rights, Presidential and Provincial Council
Elections, Third Report” (1 August—21 October 2009).
George Cagnon, “Afghanistan: Was the Women's Vote Counted?” The Daily Beast (12 September
2009).
‘ Jon Boon, “Afghanistan suicide attack kills eight as Taliban target Kabul” The Guardian (18
August 2009).
Associated Press, “Fraud commission excludes ballots in Afghan vote” The Guardian (10
September 2009). See also National Democratic Institute, “Preliminary Statement of the NIX Election
Observer Delegation to Afghanistan's 2009 Presidential and Provincial Council Elections” (22
28
A/HRC/1 4/24/Add. 7
that women voters especially were deterred from voting, that there was a decrease in the
number of provincial council candidates, and that the violence made it difficult to recruit
election polling staff in some areas. 96
Armenia
9. The 19 February 2008 presidential elections were marked by various reports of
violence at the polling stations. 97 Following accusations by the rmmer-up, Levon Ter-
Petrossian, of widespread electoral fraud, demonstrations took place in Yerevan. 98
However, on 1 March 2008, the police reportedly used excessive force against protestors,
and at least 8 protestors were killed. 99
Bangladesh
10. General elections were held, for the first time in seven years, on 29 December
2008.100 Eighteen people were reportedly injured in election day violence.' 0 ' On 30
December 2008, two people died and more than a dozen were injured as a result of post-
election violence in a town outside of the country's capital.'° 2
11. Violent clashes between security forces and demonstrators opposing the ruling party
h a l resulted in tens of deaths and hundreds wounded in the lead-up to the previous general
election, between October 2006 and January 2007.'° The sustained violence and unrest
eventually led to a cancellation of general elections to be held in January 2007 and caused
the military to call for the implementation of emergency rule.'° 4 Accordingly, at the time of
the 2008 election, “Authorities h4dI deployed 650,000 police officers and soldiers across
the country to prevent violence and vote fraud.”° 5
Cambodia
12. On 27 July 2008, Cambodia held national elections which returned the incumbent
Cambodian People's Party (CPP) to power. The EU Election Observation Mission reported
that, though election violence was markedly reduced in comparison to previous elections,
instances of threats and intimidation remained, directed in particular against journalists and
August 2009); Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan, “2009 Presidential and Provincial
Council Elections - Final Observation Report” (January 2009); Asia Network for Free Elections,
“Report of the International Election Observation Mission” (December 2009).
96 See National Democratic Institute, “Preliminary Statement of the NDI Election Observer
Delegation to Afghanistan's 2009 Presidential and Provincial Council Elections” (22 August 2009).
See also: Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan, “2009 Presidential and Provincial
Council Elections - Final Observation Report” (January 2009).
Human Rights Watch, “Armenia: Violence at Polling Stations Mars Elections” (20 February 2008).
98 Transparency International, “Presidential Elections 2008” (available at
http://www.transparency.amlelections_2008.php).
Human Rights Watch, “Armenia: Skewed Prosecution Over 2008 Clashes” (25 February 2009).
See also Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), “OSCE/ODIHR Election
Observation Mission Report: Republic of Armenia Presidential Election” (19 February 2008).
100 “Bangladesh holds first election in 7 years,” N.Y. Times (29 December 2008) (article mis-dated to
29 November 2008).
“18 hurt in historic Bangladesh election violence,” USA Today (29 December 2008).
102 “2 people killed in post-election violence in W Bangladesh,” Xinhua Daily (30 December 2008).
103 “18 hurt in historic Bangladesh election violence,” USA Today (29 December 2008).
104 “Pre-election violence shuts down much of Bangladesh,” International Herald Tribune (8 January
2007), “18 hurt in historic Bangladesh election violence,” USA Today (29 December 2008).
105 “18 hurt in historic Bangladesh election violence,” USA Today (29 December 2008).
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AJHRC/14/24/Add.7
opposition party members.'° 6 On 11 July 2008, Khim Sambo, a journalist working for the
K1m er Conscience newspaper (Moneaksekar Khmer), and his 21 year old son, Khat
Sarinpheata, were killed in a drive-by shooting.'° 7 The Khmer Conscience is linked to the
Sam Rainsy Party, who opposed the CPP in the national elections. No-one has been
arrested in connection with the shooting.'° 8 Civil society groups documented five cases of
politically motivated killings between January 2008 and May 2008, noting that most of the
perpetrators of killings and other acts of violence and intimidation related to political
activities had not been prosecuted.'° 9
Colombia
13. Electoral violence in the context of 2007 local elections was widespread, and the
Public Advocate's office estimated that over half of the country's municipalities were at
risk.” 0 At least 20-27 political candidates were killed, including mayoral and municipal
council candidates.” Overall, there were reports of at least 50 election-related deaths.” 2
Observers tended to state that candidates were not targeted for their individual political
affiliations, but that attacks represented opposition to the election process and the
Government in general.” 3 While the FARC rebel group was responsible for many of the
killings, criminal gangs and former paramilitaries are also reported to be responsible for
some deaths.” 4
14. The Organisation of American States election report notes that the killings and
intimidation led to approximately 10 percent of candidates giving up their nominations.” 5
The report also notes that some voters reported being warned that they would be killed if
they voted. In some areas, the FARC urged boycotts of the elections, in others, they
threatened violence if citizens voted for certain parties.” 6
Cote d'Ivoire
15. Presidential elections have been postponed numerous times since 2005 in Cote
d'Ivoire.” 7 On 19 February 2010, after President Gbagbo dissolved the electoral
commission and the Government again postponed elections, protestors took to the streets
106 European Union Election Observation Mission, Preliniinaty Statement: Cambodian elections
2008 show some progress but still fall short of key international standards (29 July 2008) p. 8.
107 Human Rights Watch, “Cambodia: Murder of Journalist Jolts Run-up to Election” (16 July 2008).
108 Human Rights Watch, “Cambodia: Threats, Intimidation Mar Campaign” (26 July 2008).
109 Asian Fomm for Human Rights and Development, “Cambodian civil society concerned over
violence during election campaigns” (11 June 2008).
110 Hugh Bronstein, “Election Violence Rises in Colombia vs 2003 vote” Reuters (19 October 2007).
111 OrganizaciOn D c Los Estados Americanos, “Infornie D c La MisiOn D c ObservaciOn Electoral
Elecciones Locales En La Repüblica D c Colombia 28 D c Octubre D c 2007” p. 8, (reporting 20
election-related killings of political candidates); see also Amnesty International, “Colombia: Killing
of election candidates must stop” (17 October 2007) (placing the number of election-related killings
at 27 as of October 17, 2007, 11 days before the election); see also Hugh Bronstein, “Election
Violence Rises in Colombia vs 2003 vote” Reuters (19 October 2007) (stating that the number of
election-related killings stood at 25 as of October 19, 2007).
112 Transparency International, “In Focus: 2007, Latin American Democracies” (11 November
2007).
113 Hugh Bronstein, “Election Violence Rises in Colombia vs 2003 vote” Reuters (19 October 2007).
114 Amnesty International, “Colombia: Killing of election candidates must stop” (17 October 2007).
115 Organization of American States Pernrnnent Council, “Report of the Electoral Observation
Mission: Local Elections in the Republic of Colombia” (28 October 2007), p. 1.
116 Ibid., pp. 8-11.
117 Associated Press, “5 Killed in Ivory Coast Anti-Govenmient Protests” (19 February 2010).
30
AI IIRC/14/24/Add.7
calling for the election process to continue.” 8 Police fired on the demonstrators, killing 5
people (including a 15 year old boy) and wounding 9119 Tensions in Cote d'Ivoire are high
due to disputes over voter eligibility rules that have disqualified millions of people from
participating in the electoral process.' 2 °
Democratic Republic of the Congo
16. The Special Rapporteur visited the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in
October 2009 and investigated the extensive election-related killings in the west of the
country steniming from the aftermath of the 2006 presidential elections in Kinshasa and the
2007 legislative elections in Bas Congo.' 2 ' After President Kabila won the election runoff,
and opposition leader Bemba refused to integrate his 400 personal soldiers into the
command of the Congolese army, a street battle broke out between Bemba's guards and the
anny in March 2007. Hundreds of deaths resulted, including of many civilians. Following
these initial clashes, the anny, the Republican Guard and other Government security forces
carried out targeted killings of actual or presumed Bemba supporters, including killing
those who had been (unlawfully) detained.
17. Additionally, the Special Rapporteur investigated Government security force killings
of members of the political-religious group Bunda c /ia Kongo (BDK) in Bas Congo
following legislative elections in early 2007. In response to alleged election fraud, the
BDK organized general strikes. The army was called in, and police and soldiers killed over
100 people, mostly BDK supporters. An additional 100-200 people were killed the
following February when the Government launched a three-week, heavily armed police
operation against the BDK. Most observers described this operation as an attempt to
neutralize the political threat of the BDK.
Dominican Republic
18. On 16 May 2008, the Dominican Republic held presidential elections. Incumbent
President Leonel Fernandez was re-elected with a clear majority.' 22 The election saw
isolated incidents of violence, including the killing of four people.' 23 Three men were killed
in a clash between members of the main opposition Revolutionaiy Party (PRD) and the
ruling Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) when the two campaign vehicles they were
travelling in crossed paths in the town of Villa Vásquez in the Northeast of the country the
night before balloting.' 24 The men killed were identified as Carlos Polanco, 43, of the PLD,
Isidro Polanco Tavarez, 47, of the PRD, and the Antonio Fernandez, 50, the former
deputy.' 25 Antonio Fernandez had previously been a PRD member, but had left to join the
PLD.' 26 Five people were arrested in connection with the shootings, including a local PRD
fl8 Al Jazeera, “Protestors Riot in Ivory Coast” (20 February 2010).
“ “Ivory Coast violence PICS”, available at http://picsfromafrica.bloglines.co.za120l0/02/22/ivory-
coast-violence-pies!.
120 See, e.g., The Carter Center, “International Election Observation Mission to Côte d'Ivoire Report
#2: Observation of Identification and Voter Registration” (8 May 2009).
121 AIHRC/l4/24/Add.3. and sources cited therein.
122 BBC, “Dominican leader wins third term” (17 May 2008).
123 USA Today, “Incumbent wins Dominican presidential election” (17 May 2008).
124 Dominican Today, “Political violence claims 3 hours prior to Dominican presidential election” (15
May 2008).
125 Dominican Today, “Political violence claims 3 hours prior to Dominican presidential election” (15
May 2008).
126 Dominican Today, “Political violence claims 3 hours prior to Dominican presidential election” (15
May 2008).
31
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leader and Bernardo Alemen, an ex-PRD senator whose house reportedly contained a
number of weapons that police believed were used during the clash.' 27 Legislative elections
are scheduled for 16 May 2010. So far the campaign has seen a number of acts of violence,
but no killings. On 10 May 2010 two men and one woman were injured in shootings that
broke out between PLD and PRD supporters in San Pedro.' 28 Two legislative candidates -
Cesar Augusto Matlas and Edwin Ferreira — have also reported that their houses have been
fired at.' 29
Ethiopia
19. During opposition-led demonstrations over alleged election fraud in Ethiopia's 2005
parliamentary elections, security forces responded to incidents of rock-throwing and looting
by indiscriminately firing live ammunition into large crowds of opposition supporters,
killing 36 and wounding more than ioo.' 3 °
Guatemala
20. Over 50 political candidates and political activists were killed in the mn-up to
Guatemala's 2007 presidential, congressional and municipal elections, making it the
country's most violent election since the end of Guatemala's civil war in 1996.' '
Individuals from parties across the political spectrum were subjected to bombing and
machete attacks, as well as shootings, although more killings targeted parties on the left,
and candidates at the municipal level. In April 2007, a Unity for Hope party congressman
was shot in front of party headquarters.' 32 A number of Encuentro por Guatemala party
members were found dead with campaign posters covering them.' 33 The son of Amilcar
Mendez, a human rights activist with links to Alvaro Colom, one of the presidential
candidates, was shot as he left work. It was believed his death was linked to his work with
his father in informing American human rights groups of the thwats and violence against
candidates in the election.' 34 Some activists were shot while distributing party leaflets.' 35
21. Various reasons have been given for the high levels of election-related violence. The
EU's election monitoring report notes that motives were difficult to discern, because police
and prosecutor investigations were very poor.' 36 Some analysts have suggested that the
127 Manuel Jimenez, “Three killed as violence mars Dominican election” Reuters (15 May 2008).
128 Dominican Today, “Political campaign violence claims its first victims” (11 May 2010).
129 Dominican Today, “Incidents mar a ‘most peaceful' campaign” (10 May 2010).
130 Human Rights Watch, “Ethiopia: Crackdown Spreads Beyond Capital” (14 June 2005).
131 European Union Election Observation Mission, “Guatemala 2007 - Final Report on the General Elections”. See
also Manuel Roig-Franzia, “Killings on the campaign Trail” The Washington Post (9 September 2007); Transparency
International, “In Focus: 2007, Latin American Democracies” (11 November 2007); BBC, “Guatemala campaign
deaths mount” (14 August 2007) (as of 14 August 2007 BBC reported over 40 election-related killings); Human
Rights Watch, “Universal Periodic Review of Guatemala: Human Rights Watch's Submission to the Human Rights
Council” (4 May 2008).
132 Reuters, “Bloodshed Hits Guatemalan Election Campaign” The Epoch Times (10 August 2007).
133 Manuel Roig-Franzia, “Killings on the campaign Trail” The Washington Post (9 September
2007).
134 Mica Rosenberg, “Violence Darkens the Guatemalan Election Campaign” Reuters (6 September
2007).
135 Ibid.
136 European Union Election Observation Mission, “Guatemala 2007 - Final Report on the General Elections”, pp.
33-34. The report recommended that the Government should create a specialized police task force to investigate
election-related violence, and recommended that the prosecutor's office also create specialized units to prosecute
32
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attacks were carried out by organised criminal groups to iucrease their political influence,
to punish politicians for attempting to reduce organized crime influence, or in an attempt to
get their favoured candidate into office.' 37 Other attacks were likely ordered by political
rivals.' 38
Guinea
22. In what has been called “Bloody Monday”, tens of thousands of opposition
supporters gathered in Conakry stadium on 28 September 2009 to protest the rule of the
military junta, including the indication that junta leader Captain Moussa Dadis Camara
would break his pledge not to run in the upcoming January 2010 presidential elections.
23. Clashes between demonstrators and security forces began in the morning as
demonstrators began to force their way through barricades to get to the stadium. In some
instances demonstrators threw rocks and security forces retaliated with tear gas, chasing
demonstrators down and beating them with batons.' 39 During this time a police officer shot
a young man 300 meters from the stadium, and two others were shot and killed by
gendarmes from Thégboro's Anti-Drug and Organized Crime Unit, in the presence of their
commander.' 4 ° Thégboro's gendarme also stopped a busload of demonstrators on their way
to the stadium and forced them outside the vehicle where at least two demonstrators were
shot dead.' 4 ' Security forces eventually withdrew allowing the crowds and political leaders
to enter the stadium, where they peacefully prayed, danced and sang and the political
leaders gave interviews to journalists in the absence of a public address system.' 42 The
presidential security battalion of the Guinean army, signified by their red berets, then
descended on the stadium firing shots upon entering, while riot police (CMIS) shot tear gas
inside.' 43 Once inside, the security battalion killed dozens by opening fire on the crowd.' 44
As their ammunition ran out, witnesses say the red berets then resorted to stabbing and
beating other demonstrators to death.' 45 Women were raped and summarily executed.' 46 As
demonstrators attempted to escape more were fired upon and killed, while others were
trampled by the crowds or electrocuted by wires placed in front of the exits by security
forces.' 47 After the massacre at the stadium, several other survivors were executed as they
returned home.' 48 While the UN' s Commission of Inquiry into the killings confirmed 156
individuals who were killed or disappeared' 49 , the Government's own inquiry into the
violence allegedly reports on 59 deaths.' 5 °
election-related crimes. OAS Permanent Council, “Report of the Electoral Observation Mission: General Elections (9
September 2007) and Second Round Presidential Election of Guatemala (4 November 2007)” (12 Febmary 2009).
137 BBC, “Guatemala Campaign Deaths Mount” (14 August 2007).
138 Manuel Roig-Franzia, “Killings on the campaign Trail” The Washington Post (9 September
2007).
139 S/2009/693, para. 54.
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid., para. 55.
142 Ibid., paras. 56-60.
143 Ibid. para. 61.
144 Ibid. para. 77.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid. paras. 79-80.
147 Ibid., paras. 79, 81, 84.
148 Ibid., para. 83.
149 S/2009/693. See also Human Rights Watch, “Bloody Monday: The September28 Massacre and
Rapes by Security Forces in Guinea” (17 December 2009).
150 Turtle Bay, “Guinea's junta hires ex-war crimes prosecutors — and gets a favorable report”
Foreign Policy (24 February 2010).
33
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India
24. India held a parliamentary election between April and May 2009 that had five
phases to accommodate its 714 million eligible voters. The election was marked by
violence during all of the phases, and attacks by Maoist insurgents and clashes between
political rivals resulted in a number of deaths.' 5 '
25. In the first phase, on 16 April, at least 17 people, including 5 election officials and
security personnel, were killed when the Naxalites, a Maoist insurgent group, attacked
polling places and election workers in the states of Bihar, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and
Orissa.' 52 Before the elections, the Naxalites called for citizens to boycott them, stated that
they would use violence to disrupt voting, and warned that they would cut off the hands of
those who voted.' 53 In Bihar, the Naxalites attacked a polling station and shot and killed a
policeman and a guard.' 54 In Chhattisgarh, the Naxalites reportedly killed five poll officials
by blowing up the car in which they were traveling, and also attacked polling booths in two
other areas in the state, killing at least one member of the Indian security forces.' 55 In
Jharkhand, the Naxalites reportedly killed seven security personnel and two civilians with a
landmine.' 56 The Indian Election Commission announced that families of poll workers and
security officials who were killed in the Naxalite violence would each receive Rs.
ioo,ooo.' 57
26. In the second phase, on 23 April, approximately 7 people were reported killed in
separate attacks by Naxalites in Bihar and West Bengal in further attempts to disrupt the
Indian electoral process.' 58 In Bihar, Naxalites used a landmine to blow up a jeep carrying
poll officials and killed four police and an election worker, while in West Bengal, they shot
two members of the Communist Party.' 59
27. There did not appear to be any deaths leading up to and during the third phase (7
May), but in post-polling violence, supporters of the Communist Party and Trinamool
Congress party fought in several districts of West Bengal using bombs, firearms and other
weapons, and reportedly caused up to 11 deaths.' 6 ° In more post-polling violence, another
person was reported killed by a bomb on 9 May in the West Bengali area of
Udaynarayanpur area; the Communist Party claimed that the victim was a Communist Party
member who had earned the enmity of the Trinamool Congress party by campaigning in the
area. 161
28. In the fourth phase, on 10 May, at least two people were reported killed in election-
related violence. In West Bengal, a Communist Party member was killed in a bomb attack
after voting, while in Rajasthan, one person was killed by security personnel when a
reported mob attacked a polling booth.' 62 After voting day, approximately 12 people were
151 Tim Sullivan, “India's Monthlong Election Ends” The Guardian (13 May 2009).
152 The Hindu, “Naxal Violence Rocks First Phase of Lok Sabha Polls, 17 Killed” (16 April 2009);
BBC, “Millions of Indians Go to Polls” (16 April2009).
153 Gethin Chamberlain, “How Maoist guerrillas threaten Indian polls from their jungle lair” The
Guardian (29 March 2009).
154 The Hindu, “58-62% turnout in Phase I polls; Naxalites kill 19” (17 April 2009).
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid.
157 The Times of India, “Rs 10 lakh compensation to officials who die in poll duty” (17 April 2009).
158 South Asia News, “Maoist rebels kill seven in India election violence” (24 April 2009).
159 Ibid.
160 Thaindian News, “West Bengal Post-Poll Clashes Toll Rises to 11” (9 May 2009).
161 Press Trust of India, “Poll Related Violence Kills One in Eastern India” (9 May 2009).
162 India Today, “Phase IV Records 57% Turnout, 5 Killed” (14 April 2009).
34
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mported killed in clashes between Trinamool Congress and Communist Party supporters.' 63
The killings appeared to be part of on-going disputes over the state government's plans for
development, which the Communist Party opposed, and each party accused the other of
inciting the violence to prevent voting.' 64
29. In the fifth and final phase, on 13 May, there were reports of at least two deaths. In
Tamil Nadu one person was reported killed in fighting between rival political parties.' 65 In
West Bengal, a clash between Trinamool Congress and Communist Party of India
supporters before polling began resulted in another death.' 66
Indonesia
30. In the four months before 9 April 2009 parliamentary elections, 5 politicians from
the Aceh Party (PA), the political party for the Free Aceh Movement, were killed in a string
of assassinations.' 67 Some of the killings were carried out by individuals shooting from
motorbikes, others appear to have been shot in their homes.' 68 The motives for the killings
are not entirely clear, but appear to be linked to the “Razak Group,” a network of separatists
against the 2005 peace agreement between Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement.' 69
31. Elsewhem, in Nabire in Papua, three days before the election, Indonesian police shot
and wounded 11 people at a pro-independence rally.' 7 ° This was followed by a series of
killings on election-day throughout the province of Papua, where separatists - believed to
be responsible for the killings — had been calling for a boycott of the elections.' 7 ' In
Wamena, separatists were reported to be responsible for stabbing to death S motorcycle taxi
drivers, in an apparent attempt to create a climate of fear and instability surrounding the
election.' 72 In another incident, a crowd of 50-100 individuals attacked a police post with
homemade bombs and spears, and the police opened fire, killing one person, and injuring
Iran
32. Tens of thousands of Iranians participated in post-election protests in favor of
opposition candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi, and against alleged election fraud leading to
the re-election of incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, following 12 June 2009 presidential
elections.
33. On 14 June, 5-10 students were killed by state security forces during a crackdown on
university campuses and student protests.' 74 Unidentified plain-clothed security forces
163 Dean Nelson, “The Terrible Cost of Voting in India” Daily Telegraph (13 May 2009).
164 Ibid.
165 Press Trust of India, “Indian General Election Ends, Counting on 16 May” (13 May 2009).
166 Ibid.
167 Human Rights Watch, “Indonesia: Release Election Critics, Investigate Violence” (8 April 2009).
l68World Bank, “Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update: 1st December 2008 — 28th February 2009”; see
also World Bank, “Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update: 1st March — 30th June”.
169 See Jakarta Globe, “Another Three Aceh Tenor Suspects to be Sent to National Police HQ” (28
April 2009); see also World Bank, “Aceh Peace Monitoring Update: 1st March — 30th June 2009”,
pp. 2-3.
170 Reuters, “Pre-election violence hits Indonesia's Papua” (9 April2009).
171 Ibid.
172 Jakarta Post, “Papua calm after deadly incidents” (11 April2009).
173 Ibid.
174 Amnesty International, “Iran: election contested, repression compounded” (1 December 2009), p.
17; see also International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, “Accelerating Slide into Dictatorship”
(21 September 2009).
35
AJHRC/14/24/Add.7
believed to be the Basij militia and police stormed the dormitory at Tehran University,
setting fire to the property, and arresting dozens of students.' 75 Similar attacks on students
were carried out at Esfahan and possibly Tabriz that same day.' 76
34. Violence escalated after the decree of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on 19 June that
further protests would be met with force. The next thy, fewer protestors, but whose
numbers were still in the thousands, continued to march in the streets and they were met
with gunfire from security forces. On 20 June, Neda Agha Soltan was killed; her death was
captured on camera and infamously captivated audiences around the world.
35. By September 2009, Iranian officials had estimated that around 30 people were
killed in the immediate post-election period, but opposition supporters alleged that the
number was closer to 70 and attributed the deaths mostly to police, Revolutionary Guard
and Basij militia.' 77 The actual number has been impossible to determine, as the
Government has restricted investigations by journalists and NGOs.' 78 In addition to killings
during street protests, a number of cases were reported in which individuals were allegedly
detained, tortured, and killed.' 79
36. Election protests again flared in November and December 2009. Security forces
opened fire on protestors and drove trucks into crowds on 27 December, the Shia religious
festival of Ashura, killing another 15 protestors, including Mousavi's nephew.' 8 °
37. In addition to the killings of protestors by security forces, the Government appears
to have used the death penalty to counter election-related political activism. At the time of
writing, reports indicated that Iran had handed down at least 10 death sentences against
post-election protestors, charging them with “moharebeh,” (“waging war against” or
“defiance of' God).' 8 ' Those sentenced to death include one student who thww stones at
security forces during the Ashura protests.' 82 The number of detained individuals awaiting
trial in coimection with the election protests remains in the thousands.' 83 There was a
significant surge in the number of death sentences carried out by the Government
immediately before and after the election. Iran carried out more executions in May (50),
the month prior to the elections, and July (94), the month after the elections, than in any
other months in 2009.' In 2009, at least 388 people were executed, “the largest number
recorded by Anmesty International in recent years.” 85 Many experts have suggested that
175 Amnesty International, “Iran: election contested, repression compounded” (1 December 2009), p.
17; see also Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iranian Speaker Condemns Attack on University
Students” (16 June 2009).
176 Amnesty International, “Iran: election contested, repression compounded” (1 December 2009), p.
17; see also International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, “Accelerating Slide into Dictatorship”
(21 September 2009).
177 International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, “Accelerating Slide into Dictatorship” (21
September 2009).
178 See e.g. Ibid.
179 Ibid.
180 Ulrike Putz, “Iranian Demonstrators Put the Regime on the Defensive” Spiegel Online
International (28 December 2009).
181 Brian Murphy, “Iran call political opponents enemies of Islam” Associated Press (10 March
2010); Reuters, “U.S. deplores death sentence for Iranian protestor”, (5 March 2010).
182 Brian Murphy, “Iran call political opponents enemies of Islam” Associated Press (10 March
2010); see also Iran Human Rights, “Annual Report on the Death Penalty in Iran 2009” (9 March
2010); Agence France-Presse, “Iran upholds student protestor death penalty: report” (2 March 2010).
183 Ibid.
184 Iran Human Rights, “Annual Report on the Death Penalty in Iran 2009” (9 March 2010).
185 Amnesty International, “Iran Executions Send Chilling Message” (30 March 2010).
36
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the Government used the death penalty to intimidate voters pre-election, and protestors
post-election.
Iraq
38. Iraq saw an increase in suicide bombings and other attacks before its most recent
parliamentary elections in March 2010. Reports indicate that at least 40 individuals were
killed on election-day itself' 86 On 12 February 2010, an audio recording attributed to Omar
al-Baghthdi (purported leader of al Qaeda in Iraq) was released, stating that the elections
were “illicit” and an attempt by the Shiite majority to repress the Sunni minority.' 87 The
audio recording warned that the group would attempt to “prevent these elections” using
“primarily military means.” 88 The Islamic State of Iraq, an umbmlla militant group that
includes al Qaeda in Iraq, also distributed fliers in Sumii dominated areas thmatening to kill
anyone who voted.' 89
39. While the perpetrators of some attacks are mlatively clear, officials have expressed
uncertainty about the perpetrators of many other election killings and attacks, indicating
that attacks could be by insurgents or motivated by tribal, religious, or political interests.' 90
Examples of killings during the recent election cycle include a 18 February suicide
bombing in Ramadi, the capital of the predominantly Sunni province of Anbar, where an
unidentified bomber targeted an Iraqi government compound and killed 13 people and
wounded dozens more.' 9 ' On 3 March at least 33 people were killed in a triple suicide
bombing attack in Baqouba, the provincial capital of Diyala.' 92 In Baqouba, the first suicide
bomber targeted an Iraqi government building, while the second bomber detonated in a
neathy crowded intersection, and the third bomber attacked the hospital where those injumd
from the first two blasts were being taken.' 93
40. Some preliminary evidence suggests that Baghdad, the site of the majority of
election day blasts, had a markedly lower voter turnout (53%) than the nation's average
Kenya
41. The Special Rapporteur visited Kenya in February 2009 and investigated the
widespread violence that followed the general elections held in December 2007.' Violence
erupted amidst allegations of electoral fraud, and anger at the announced election results.
The Waki Commission, a national commission of inquiry chaired by Justice Waki,
produced a comprehensive report detailing the circumstances and causes of 1,113 killings
186 Ned Parker, “Iraq elections marred by violence” Los Angeles Times (8 March 2010).
187 Al Jazeera, “Iraq coalition halts poll campaign” (14 Febmary 2010); Steven Lee Myers, “Iraq
Suicide Bomber Strikes in Anbar” New York Times (18 February 2010).
188 Ibid.
189 Ned Parker, “Iraq elections marred by violence” Los Angeles Times (8 March 2010).
190 See Michael Hastings, “Secular political party under attack in Iraq” True/Slant (17 February
20 10); see also Charles Levinson, “Suicide Bombs Rock Iraq Before Vote” Wall Street Journal (4
March 2010); see also Steven Lee Myers, “Iraq Suicide Bomber Strikes in Anbar” New York Times
(18 February 2010).
191 Steven Lee Myers, “Iraq Suicide Bomber Strikes in Anbar” New York Times (18 February
2010).
192 Charles Levinson, “Suicide Bombs Rock Iraq Before Vote” Wall Street Journal (4 March 2010).
193 Ibid.
194 Ernesto Londoflo, “After playing down election violence in Iraq, U.S. military reassesses”
Washington Post (11 March 2010).
195 A/HRC/1 1/2/Add.6, and see sources cited therein.
37
AJHRC/14/24/Add.7
that occuned in that period. The report identifies both spontaneous and organized violence
msulting in high numbers of election-related killings.
42. One of the first sites of post-election violence was the town of Eldoret in the Rift
Valley where attackers formed groups of fifteen plus individuals and targeted Kikuyu
populations, intending to push them out of the province. In one incident, a mob burned a
church where families were taking shelter form the violence, killing 35 people. In some
areas, up to 2,000 armed individuals carried out large-scale attacks against perceived ethnic
or political enemies.
43. In terms of state responsibility, the Waki Commission found that officials failed to
act on intelligence regarding potential violence; failed to respond adequately to violence;
and that police lacked discipline and impartiality, and used unjustified force in responding
to post-election demonstrations and violence.
44. Police were responsible for 405 deaths (3 5.7% of the total). In some cases, the police
indiscriminately used live ammunition, and over half of the gunshot victims had wounds
from the back. Additionally, the Waki Commission identified specific senior officials and
individuals from political parties who should be prosecuted for their role in planning or
instigating the post-election violence. However, many perpetrators continue to enjoy
immunity for the election-related killings including police force members and officials. In
light of the Kenyan Government's failure to establish a local tribunal to try those most
responsible, their names were handed over to the ICC, which has initiated an investigation
into some 20 suspects.' 96 According to the ICC prosecutor, these individuals, “utilised their
personal, government, business and tribal networks to commit the crimes. They
implemented their policy with the involvement of a number of State officers and public and
private institutions such as Members of Parliament, senior government officers, the police
force and youth gangs.”
Moldova
45. Following 5 April 2009 elections in Moldova, tens of thousands of protestors
gathered in the country's capital to demonstrate against allegedly rigged election results
which had resulted in the victory of the ruling Communist party.' 97 A report by the Election
Observation Delegation of the European Parliament found:
46. During the anti-Communist demonstrations, a young girl died on the morning of 7
April and 2 other casualties of other 2 youngsters resulted (at least one of them appeared to
have died as a result of the police brutality against the young demonstrators on the night of
7-8 April). More than 200 young people who had demonstrated against the Communists
leadership were mportedly taken into police custody. The Moldovan Communist leadership
has imposed tenor, torture, murder, kidnappings, intimidation and threats against the
Moldovan population, trying to pmvent future protests against the Communist leadership.' 98
47. Four months after the April elections, the communists lost early mpeat elections
after the Parliament was unable to elect a new president, and the cunent government is led
196 The Guardian, “Annan hands ICC list of perpetrators of post-election violence in Kenya” (9 July
2009); see also, AP, “Prosecutor has 20 suspects in 2007 Kenya violence” (3 March 2010).
197 “Moldova police face bmtality allegations,” BBC News (20 April2009); “Fomier Moldovan
President Accused of Abuse of Power,” Radio Free Europe, (8 May 2010).
198 Election Observation Delegation, April 3-7, 2009, European Parliament, Parliamentary Elections
in Republic of Moldova (2009), p. 7.
38
A/HRC/1 4/24/Add. 7
by a liberal-democratic coalition.' 99 A special committee set up by the current parliament
recently found evidence suggesting that “agents” acting for the Communist authorities at
the time “could have infiltrated the peaceful protesters last spring to provoke the
violence.” 200 According to the latest reports, one police officer has been arrested for
allegedly killing a protestor in the April 2009 demonstrations, while the former head of the
Interior ministry and other former officials are under investigation for abuse of power. 20 '
Mongolia
48. Mongolia declared its first ever state of emergency since transitioning to a
democracy in 1990, following post-election rioting after its 29 June 2009 legislative
election. 202 In a protest of alleged election fraud on 1 July 2009, thousands of protestors set
fire to the ruling Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MRPR) headquarters in
Ulaannbaatar and then clashed with police, who shot nine individuals, four fatally. 203
Nepal
49. The Report of the UN Secretary General following 10 April 2008 parliamentary
elections in Nepal identified several election-related killings occurring in the pre-election
phase, as well as on election-day. A detailed report by the Democracy and Elections
Alliance Nepal, a Nepali elections-monitoring organization, recorded 50 deaths. 204
50. Though many different parties were responsible for violent acts, Communist Party
of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) supporters were reported to be most widely involved in election-
related violence. The CPN-M also suffered large numbers of fatalities in the weeks
preceding the election. In the month before the election, 12 CPN-M supporters were killed,
9 of them as a result of police fire. 205 In Dang district on 8 April, police officers “providing
security for a Nepali Congress candidate shot dead seven apparently unarmed CPN-M
supportersi and injured 12 others”. 206 Other serious incidents included the killing of two
candidates, as well as the bombing of a mosque in Biratnagar by the armed Hindu
nationalist group, the Nepal Defence Group, causing two deaths. 207 On polling day there
were four reported deaths, including the death of an independent candidate and the death of
an activist resulting from fighting that broke out between rival parties in the southern
district of Sunsari. 208
51. Reporting noted that polling was cancelled in at least 33 locations “due to
irregularities including killings”, 209 and that violence and intimidation “undermined the
199 “Fomier Moldovan President Accused of Abuse of Power,” Radio Free Europe (8 May 2010);
“Moldova's ex-president accused of power abuse,” Hurriyet Daily News, (10 May 2010).
200 “Fomier Moldovan President Accused of Abuse of Power,” Radio Free Europe (8 May 2010).
201 “Fomier Moldovan President Accused of Abuse of Power,” Radio Free Europe (8 May 2010).
202 Reuters, “Five dead in Mongolia post-election violence” (2 July 2008).
203 Amnesty International, “Where Should I Go From Here?: The Legacy of the 1 July 2008 Riot in
Mongolia” (December 2009) , p. 4.
204 The Democracy and Elections Alliance Nepal, “Constituent Assembly Election Observation — 10
April 2008 — Final Report” (July 2008). The report also goes into great detail on perpetrators,
victims, and methods.
205 S/2008/313, para. 59.
206 Ibid., para. 60.
207 Ibid., para. 9; see also CNN, “Mosque bombing in Nepal kills 2” (30 March 2008).
208 S/2008/3 13, para. 9; see also Al Jazeera, “Nepal poll ‘largely peaceful” (11 April 2008).
209 The Democracy and Elections Alliance Nepal (DEAN), “DEAN overview of the April 10
Constituent Assembly Elections Conduct” (April2008).
39
AJHRC/14/24/Add.7
right to campaign freely”. 2 '° Post-election violence included “clashes between parties...
attacks on losing candidates/parties by activists from wimiing parties... acts of retaliation
against voters who did not vote for a certain party.” 21 '
Nigeria
52. The Special Rapporteur visited Nigeria in June-July 2005, and in his January 2006
report, noted that the de facto impunity enjoyed by perpetrators of political assassinations
risked undermining Nigerian democracy, and warned that there would likely be more
killings during the 2007 election year. 2 ' 2
53. The 2007 state and federal elections were accompanied by widespread violence,
with levels of violence rising as election thys approached. 2 ' 3 According to reliable
estimates, there were approximately 200 election related killings. 2 ' 4 One report found 40-50
deaths on the day of state elections itself. 2 ' 5 In summarizing the general types of violence,
the National Democratic Institute reported that there were: “assassinations of candidates for
party nominations and for the general elections; armed attacks against campaign meetings
and rallies; ... attacks against polling stations, polling officials and rival party agents.” 2 ' 6
Some reports noted that the general tone was set by senior officials, including the President,
who referred to the elections as a “do or die affair,” fueling “tension at the grassroots
level.” 217
54. Many killings targeted political candidates and their supporters, as well as
Independent National Electoral Campaign (INEC) officials, and were carried out by
politicians' armed groups. These groups — composed mostly of unemployed and poor
youth — were used by candidates from many parties, but especially the larger parties with
more significant funds. 2 ' 8 The thys shortly before the state election were especially violent
for political candidates — on 12 and 13 April, four People's Democratic Party members
were shot to death. 2 ' 9 Across the country, police were accused of failing to adequately
protect voters and party supporters from violence. 220 A number of reports noted that the
state elections had increased security over the earlier federal elections, and was violence
210 European Union Election Observation Mission, “Nepal — Final Report — Constituent Assembly
Election, 10 April 2008” (September 2008).
211 The Democracy and Elections Alliance Nepal, “Constituent Assembly Election Observation — 10
April 2008 — Final Report” (July 2008), p. 7.
212 E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.4, p. 20.
213 European Union Election Observation Mission, Nigeria 2007, “Final Report: Presidential, National
Assembly, Gubernatorial, and State House of Assembly Elections” (April 2007), p. 20.
214 Ibid., p.20; see also Human Rights Watch, “Criminal Politics: Violence, ‘Godfathers' and
Corruption in Nigeria” (October 2007); see also Amnesty International, “Nigeria: Impunity for
political violence in the run-up to the 2007 elections” (April2007) (report includes many detailed
accounts of election-related killings leading up to the elections).
215 The International Republican Institute, “Federal Republic of Nigeria State and National Elections
April 14 and 21, 2007- Election Observation Mission Final Report” (2007), p. 20.
216 National Democratic Institute, “Final NIX Report on Nigeria's 2007 Elections” (April 2008).
217 Commonwealth Secretariat, Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group, “Nigeria State and
Federal Elections” (April 2007), p. 36.
218 European Union Election Observation Mission, Nigeria 2007, “Final Report: Presidential, National
Assembly, Gubernatorial, and State House of Assembly Elections” (April 2007), p. 21.
219 Amnesty International, “Nigeria elections: Failure to protect human rights raises death toll” (17
April 2007).
220 See Human Rights Watch, “Nigeria: Presidential Election Marred by Fraud, Violence” (25 April
2007).
40
A/HRC/1 4/24/Add. 7
reduced as a result. 22 ' Police were also the victims of election violence — for example, 9
police were killed while they were transporting election materials. 222
55. Killings also occurred during election-related riots. In Daura, supporters of one
party rioted when they “discovered that electoral officials had delivered only half of the
ballot papers that should have arrived.” 223 Two people were killed.
56. Impunity for killings was widespread, and reports indicate political bias by the
police in investigations. 224
57. In November 2008, claims that a local election was rigged in Jos triggered riots and
violent clashes between (mostly Christian) supporters of the People's Democratic Party and
(mostly Muslim) supporters of the All Nigeria People's Party. The violence resulted in the
deaths of at least 700 people. Victims were generally attacked by armed mobs (from both
sides), who “beat, burned, or bludgeoned” them to death. 225 In the initial stages of the
violence, the security forces were accused of failing to appropriately respond. When they
did, they helped to quell the violence, but the state security forces were also responsible for
over 130 unlawful killings. 226 Most of these security force killings occurred after the state
Governor issued a “shoot on sight” order. Many civilian victims were shot at close range,
or arrested and executed. There has been no accountability for these killings. A state
Government commission of inquiry into the events did “not investigate alleged abuses by
security forces” and “has not been made public”. 227 Large-scale ethnic-religious violence in
Jos has occurred previously (2001, at least 1,000 dead), and erupted again recently (2010, at
least 200 dead).
Pakistan
58. Pakistan's tenuous security situation became even more violent in the period leading
up to national and provincial assembly elections that took place in February 2008. The
political backdrop to the elections was intense domestic pressure for President General
Pervez Musharraf to end eight years of military rule, and the rivalry among Musharraf and
his two main opponents, Benazir Bhutto, leader of the Pakistani People's Party (PPP), and
Nawaz Sharif, leader of the PJVIL-N party, both of whom returned from exile to contest the
parliamentary elections. 228
59. The entire pre-election period was marked by violence and bombings caused by a
number of factors and actors: a larger conflict between government forces and extremists
fought primarily in the north, but with spillover effects in other parts of the country; attacks
221 See e.g. Commonwealth Secretariat, Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group, “Nigeria State
and Federal Elections” (April 2007), p. 54; European Union Election Observation Mission, Nigeria
2007, “Final Report: Presidential, National Assembly, Gubernatorial, and State House of Assembly
Elections” (April 2007).
222 National Democratic Institute, “Final NIX Report on Nigeria's 2007 Elections” (April 2008), p.
36.
223 Human Rights Watch, “Nigeria: Presidential Election Marred by Fraud, Violence” (25 April
2007).
224 Amnesty International, “Nigeria: Impunity for political violence in the mn-up to the April 2007
elections” (April 2007).
225 Human Rights Watch, “Nigeria: Arbitrary Killings by Security Forces in Jos” (December 2008).
226 Human Rights Watch, “Arbitrary Killings by the Security Forces” (July 2009); Human Rights
Watch, “Nigeria: Arbitrary Killings by Security Forces in Jos” (19 December 2008).
227 Human Rights Watch, “Nigeria: Use Restraint in Curbing Jos Violence” (19 January 2010).
228 See generally, International Crisis Group, “Winding Back Martial Law in Pakistan” (12
November 2007); International Crisis Group, “After Bhutto's Murder: A Way Forward for Pakistan”
(2 January 2008).
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AJHRC/14/24/Add.7
by extremists on political parties; government violence to snppress political campaigners
and civil society; and, to a lesser degree, violence amongst political party activists
themselves. 229
60. Islamic militants had threatened all political parties in an attempt to disrupt the
elections. 23 ° Bomb attacks by militants, sometimes by suicide bombers, targeted at
politicians and campaign events, appear responsible for most election-related deaths. 23 ' For
example, on 18 October 2007, the night Bhutto returned to Pakistan, her convoy was
attacked by suicide bombers. The attackers missed Bhutto, but over 140 people were
killed, including members of her political party and her guards, and hundreds more were
injured. The Government blamed the bombing on extremists, while Bhutto blamed
unnamed former government officials and said she had been warned also that the Taliban,
al-Qaeda and unnamed groups were plamiing attacks on her. 232
61. On 21 December, at least 50 people were killed in a suicide attack apparently
targeted at a former Interior Minister and candidate in the parliamentary elections, while he
was worshipping at a mosque near Peshawar. 233 A week later, on 27 December, a suicide
bomber killed Bhutto and at least 24 others as she was leaving a political rally. 234 The
election was postponed for six weeks and in the wake of Bhutto's assassination, there were
protests and riots country-wide, resulting in at least 58 deaths. 235 A UN Commission of
Inquiry completed an investigation into Bhutto's death, and found that her assassination
“could have been prevented if adequate security measures had been taken” and that the
Pakistani investigation into her death “lacked direction, was ineffective and suffered from a
lack of commitment to identify and bring all of the perpetrators to justice.” 236 It found that
the failure to effectively investigate by domestic authorities was “deliberate”. 237
62. Media and non-governmental organizations reported that, in addition to Bhutto,
three other candidates and “at least 130 others were killed in the pre-election period in
politically-motivated attacks.” 238 On 9 February 2008, a suicide bomber killed 27 people at
a political rally in Charsadda for the opposition Awami National Party (ANP), 239 which was
seen as a rival by religious extremists. On 11 February, another suicide bomber killed six
supporters of an ANP candidate during a roadside campaign meeting. 24 ° On 16 February, a
suicide bomber rammed a car filled with explosives into the election office of a PPP-backed
229 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, “State of Human Rights in 2007” (March 2008), pp. 55-
58, 60-68, 102.
230 Agence France-Presse, “Pakistan election rally death toll rises to 25: minister” (9 Febmary 2008).
231 Statistics on the number of deaths and their causes vary, but according to media accounts, there
were approximately 71 suicide attacks in 2007, with over 971 people killed. See Human Rights
Commission of Pakistan, “State of Human Rights in 2007” (March 2008), p. 65.
232 Carlotta Gall and Salman Masood, “Bomb Attack Kills Scores in Pakistan as Bhutto Arrives” New
York Times (19 October 2007); BBC, “Bhutto Points Fingers Over Blast” (19 October 2007).
233 BBC, “Pakistan Suicide Blast Kills 50” (21 December 2007).
234 International Crisis Group, “After Bhutto's Murder: A Way Forward For Pakistan” (January
2008), p. 3.
235 Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) Newshour, “Pakistan postpones elections” (2 January 2008);
see also Dawn, “Countrywide protests, killings and arson” (29 December 2007).
236 Report of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry into the facts and circumstances of the
assassination of fornier Pakistani Prime Minister Mohtarnrn Benazir Bhutto (15 April 2010), p. 2.
237 Ibid., p. 3.
238 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, “State of Human Rights in 2008” (March 2009), pp. 89,
103.
239 CNN, “Pakistani Blast Toll Rises to 27” (15 Febmary 2008).
240 The Guardian, “Six Killed in Pakistan Suicide Bomb Blast” (11 February 2008).
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ALHIRC/14/24/Add.7
candidate in Parachinar, killing 47 and wonnding approximately 150 people. 24 ' On election
day itself, there was less violence that many had anticipated, but there were numerous
attacks on polling sites, and the Government confinned at least 24 people were killed and
200 injured in election related violence. 242
63. European Union election monitoring noted that election violence had restricted voter
turnout and affected polling in some areas. 243
The Philippines
64. Most elections in the Philippines have had high numbers of election-related
killings. 244 The massacre on 23 November 2009 of 57 people, including the relatives of a
gubernatorial candidate and 30 journalists, carried out by an incumbent ruling family and
their private militia, constitutes the starkest recent incident in the country. In the aftermath
of the massacre, the Special Rapporteur noted that elections in the Philippines have
traditionally become occasions for widespread extrajudicial executions of political
opponents. 245 The convoy of relatives and journalists was on its way to file papers for
Esmail “Toto” Mangudadatu's candidacy for the governorship of Manguindanao. 246
Mangudadatu's attempted candidacy was seen as a direct threat to the expected
gubernatorial succession from Andal Ampatuan, Sr. to Andal Ampatuan, Jr. The
Ampatuans had amassed significant influence in the region as well as a private armed
militia of over 2,000 armed guards. On 23 November, 100 of these guards blocked the
convoy's passage and massacred all those in the convoy, including innocent bystanders
travelling on the same road. A number of members of the Ampatuan family, as well as the
armed guards were subsequently arrested, and their trials were ongoing at the time of this
report. Two family members of a witness to the massacre were shot dead a few weeks after
the witness testified about the massacre in court. He had reportedly refused an offer of 25
million pesos (over US$500,000) to recant his witness statement. 247 In Febrnary, reports
warned that candidates continued to employ personal security forces, despite Government
pledges to eradicate such forces by election-day. 248
65. The November massacre came just a month after a grenade blast at Marawi City
Hall in Western Mindanao killed 3 people and injured 26 who were registering to vote for
the 2010 elections. 249 No individual or group claimed responsibility for the attack, but
officials stated that it was likely connected to other recent bombings by rebel groups
(including the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Abu Sayyaf).
241 Daily Times, “Blast Toll Reaches 47” (18 February 2008); Zeeshan Haider, “Bomb kills 37 on last
day of Pakistan vote campaign” Reuters (16 February 2008).
242 Daily Times, “24 killed in poll violence” (19 February 2008).
243 European Union Election Observation Mission, “Islamic Republic of Pakistan — Final Report —
National and Provincial Assembly Elections, 18 February 2008” (16 April 2008), p. 57.
244 Patino and Velasco, note 19 above (recording killings in elections since 1986, based on media
reports, they found: 1986 (153 deaths); 1988 (188); 1992 (89); 1995 (108); 1998 (77); 2001 (98)).
245 Philip Alston and Frank LaRue, “UN Experts: Maguindanao massacre must be the start of a
major reform process”, Press Release (2 December 2009).
246 Intemational Crisis Group, “The Philippines: After the Manguindanao Massacre”, Asia Briefing
No. 98(21 December2009).
247 Human Rights Watch, “Philippines: Protect Witnesses to Maguindanao Massacre” (8 March
2010).
248 Norimitsu Onishi, “Filipino Politicians Wield Private Armies, Despite Ban” New York Times (20
February 2010).
249 Manila Times, “Separate blasts kill 3” (21 October 2009).
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66. In December 2009, attacks on election candidates in Northem Luzon and Eastem
Mindanao left 4 dead. 25 ° On 31 January 2010, two local Mindanao officials were killed. 25 '
On 15 April 2010, another grenade attack killed two people in Maguindanao. 252 According
to reports, the attack occuntd during a meeting of political candidates, and the targets were
the candidates for mayor and deputy mayor. Police reports indicated that from January-
April 2010, at least 33 people had been killed in election-related violence. 253
Spain
67. Two days before 9 March 2008 general elections in Spain, an Euskadi Ta
Askatasuna (ETA) gunman killed Isalas Carrasco, the former Mondragón town councilor. 254
Following the killing, both the governing Socialist Party and the opposition Popular Party
(PP) suspended final campaign rallies. The ETA had put up posters calling for the elections
to be boycotted, and engaged in intimidation in the pre-election period in the Basque
region, which restricted the political activities of parties. 255 Over the last 4 decades, the
ETA has killed an estimated 800 people, 20 of whom were killed during pm-election
periods. 256 Most commentators explain the pre-election killings as attempts to dismpt
elections, and to opportunistically raise ETA's profile.
Sri Lanka
68. The lead-up to Sri Lanka's 26 January 2010 presidential elections saw hundreds of
incidents of violence. During the campaigning period there were S reported election-related
killings and S attempted killings. 257 A number of these killings were of supporters of one
party, by identified supporters of another. In others, the attackers were unknown. In one
incident, on 12 Januaiy, gunmen on motorbikes opened fire on a bus of opposition
candidate supporters on their way to a rally, killing a 60 year old woman and injuring 4
others. 258 On 16 January, a Rajapaksa supporter was shot dead in clash with Fonseka
supporters. 259 On 18 January, a Fonseka supporter was beaten to death while hanging
Fonseka posters, and a grenade attack on an office of Rajapaksa's party resulted in one
death. An additional 2 killings were reported in the week after the election. 2 6 °
250 International Crisis Group, “Crisis Watch” No. 77 (4 January 2010), p. 7.
251 International Crisis Group, “Crisis Watch” No. 78 (1 February 2010), p. 7.
252 Carlos H. Conde, “2 Philippine Candidates Killed in Election Violence” The New York Times
(15 April 2010).
253 See Carlos H. Conde, “2 Philippine Candidates Killed in Election Violence” The New York
Times (15 April 2010).
254 The Guardian, “Spain cancels election rallies after murder” (8 March 2008).
255 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, “Spain — 9 March 2008 — Election
Assessment Mission Report” (28 August 2008).
256 Id.; see also Amnesty International, “Spain: Amnesty International condemns ETA's campaign of
threats and deliberate killings of representatives of political parties” (3 April 2008).
257 Centre for Monitoring Election Violence, “Presidential Election 2010: Interim Report I” (25
January 2010).
258 BBC, “Sri Lanka pre-election attack leaves one person dead” (12 January 2010).
259 Centre for Monitoring Election Violence, “Media Communiqué No. 13” (16 January 2010).
260 Centre for Monitoring Election Violence, “Presidential Election 2010 (Post Violence)” (31
January 2010); see also People's Action For Free and Fair Elections (PAFFREL), “Presidential
Elections 2010 — Interim Report on Pre Election, Election Day, and on Post Election Period Ending
3rd Feb 2010” (4 Febmary 2010).
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Thailand
69. From early March 2010, crowds of protestors gathered in downtown Bangkok to
demand that the current Government step down early and for elections to be held. The anti-
Government protests are organized by the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship
(UDD) (the “red shirts”), and are composed of supporters of former Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra, as well as the mral and urban poor. 261
70. On 10 April, an attempt by State security forces to disperse red shirt protestors in
Bangkok led to a clash which has been characterised as “the bloodiest political violence in
two decades in Thailand l “262 Subsequent reports indicated that “15 civilians and 5
soldiers were killed by gunshots, explosions from grenades and improvised explosive
devices, and beatings during the clash.” 263 Also, “at least 569 civilians, 265 soldiers, and 8
police officers were injured from teargas inhalation, assaults, and gunshot and shrapnel
wounds.” 264 At the time of this report, the exact circumstances of the deaths were unclear,
and responsibility not yet determined, although it appears that both protestors and security
forces were responsible for deaths.
71. Subsequently, on 22 April, a series of blasts, reported to have been caused by
grenade launchers similar to those used against soldiers on 10 April, killed 3 people and
wounded at least 87 others. 265
Togo
72. Togo's 24 April 2005 presidential elections followed the death of President
Gnassingbé Eyadéma, who had ruled the country for 37 years. 266 The former President's
son, Faure Gnassingbé, emerged as the winner, amongst widespread irregularities at the
polls, intimidation before election-day, and extreme violence on election-day and in the
days following. 267 One NGO counted at least 150 dead; the UN estimated that at least 400-
500 individuals were killed. 268 As vote counting began, state security forces, backed by
militias close to the ruling party, attacked polling stations to steal ballot boxes. For
instance, at the Be Plage district polling center in Lomé, members of the Presidential
Guard's commando unit fired tear gas and live rounds into the room where votes were
being counted, and made off with the ballots. 269 One survivor of the Be Plage incident
described having to step over 30 bodies in order to escape. 27 ° Security forces also targeted
and killed opposition supporters and their leaders. 27 ' When the results were announced on
261 Human Rights Watch, “Thailand: End Political Violence, Bring Offenders to Justice” (12 April
2010); Seth Mydans, “Government of Thailand is Promised Support” New York Times (18 April
2010).
262 Human Rights Watch, “Thailand: End Political Violence, Bring Offenders to Justice” (12 April
2010).
263 Ibid.
264 Ibid. A later news report stated there were 25 people killed, including 5 soldiers, and at least 900
others injured. See Seth Mydans, “Month of Unrest Hits Thai Economy” New York Times (19 April
2010).
265 Thomas Fuller, “Travelers are Warned to Steer Clear of Bangkok” New York Times (23 April
2010); Jason Szep and Martin Petty, “Grenade blasts kill 3, wound 75 in Bangkok” Reuters (22 April
2010).
266 Amnesty International, “Togo: Will History Repeat Itself?” (July 2005), p. 1.
267 Ibid.
268 Ibid, p. 17; UN, “Hundreds Die in Togolese Unrest” (26 September 2005).
269 Amnesty International, “Togo: Will History Repeat Itself?” (July 2005), p. 6.
270 Ibid.
271 Ibid., p. 1.
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26 April and Faure Gnassingbé was declared the winner, opposition snpporters took to the
streets in protest. 272 Security forces met protestors in the streets and responded with
disproportionate force, firing live ammunition into the crowds, including from helicopters,
killing many. 273 Most of the protestors were unarmed. 274 The security forces also raided the
homes of presumed opposition supporters, beating and killing msidents. 275
Zimbabwe
73. The 29 March 2008 elections and June 2008 presidential mn-off in Zimbabwe were
marred by widespread violence, including at least 180 election-related killings and
thousands of abductions and cases of beatings and torture. 276
74. Most of the killings occurred after the March elections, during which a majority of
voters had voted for the opposition MDC party over the ruling ZANTJ-PF party of President
Mugabe. Before the June 2008 mn-off, the security forces and ZANU-PF militias,
“unleashed a campaign of intimidation, torture and murder against opposition activists,
journalists, polling agents, public servants, civic leaders and ordinary citizens suspected of
voting for the MDC.” 277 They launched “Operation Makavhoterapapi” to “punish those
who supported the MDC on 29 March and intimidate them to vote for ZANTJ-PF in the run-
off' and to “dismantle JvIDC structures by targeting party leaders and mid-level
activists”. 278 The JVIDC stated that at least 43 of its members were killed and thousands
displaced in the violence surrounding the run-off 279
75. Most of the survivors of ZANU-PF violence reported that they were attacked
because they were accused of voting for the wrong party. 28 ° This type of organized election
violence by ZANU(PF) has been a feature of Zimbabwe's general elections since 1980.281
272 Ibid., p. 7.
273 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
274 Ibid.
275 Ibid., pp. 5-7.
276 International Foundation for Electoral Systems, “Mitigating Election Violence” (October 2009);
Amnesty International, “Zimbabwe: Time for Accountability” (October 2008); see also Elections
Institute of Southern Africa, “Election Observer Mission Report — Zimbabwe” (2008).
277 International Crisis Group, “Negotiating Zimbabwe's Transition”, Africa Briefmg No. 51 (May
2008), p. 6.
278 Ibid.
279 Ibid.
280 Amnesty International, “Zimbabwe: Time for Accountability” (October 2008), pp. 6-7.
281 See Norma Kruger, ZANIJ(PF) Strategies in General Elections, 1980-2000: Discourse and
Coercion, African Affairs Vol 104, No 414 (2005).
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