UNITED
NATIONS E
Economic and Social Distr.
Council GENERAL
E/CN.4/2002/42
16 January 2002
Original: ENGLISH
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Fifty-eighth session
Item 9 of the provisional agenda
QUESTION OF THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL
FREEDOMS IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD
Report on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
prepared by the Special Representative of the Commission on
Human Rights, Mr. Maurice Danby Copithorne, pursuant to
Commission resolution 2001/17
CONTENTS
Paragraphs Page
Executive summary 3
I. iNTRODUCTION 1 -9 4
II. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 10-13 5
III. THE STATUS OF WOMEN 14-20 6
IV. LEGAL SUBJECTS 21 -40 7
A. Reform of the legal process 21 - 22 7
B. The prisons 23 -24 7
C. Punishments 25 - 37 8
D. Lawyers andjudges 38-40 10
GE.02-10126 (E)
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CONTENTS ( continued)
Paragraphs Page
V. STATUS OF iNTELLECTUALS AND OF STUDENT,
RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL DISSIDENTS 41 -60 11
A. Student unrest 41 - 44 11
B. Religious dissidents 45 - 48 11
C. The serial murders trial 49 - 51 12
D. The Berlin Conference trial 52 - 53 12
E. Detention of religious-nationalist and Freedom
Movement of Iran activists 54 - 60 13
VI. DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 61 -64 14
VII. STATUS OF MTh1ORITIES 65 -90 15
A. Introduction 65 - 70 15
B. Religious minorities 71 - 84 16
C. Ethnic minorities 85 - 90 18
VIII. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 91 -93 20
IX. OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES 94 - 104 20
A. National human rights bodies 94 - 95 20
B. The status of children 96 - 100 20
C. Drugs 101 - 104 21
X. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 105- 108 22
Annexes
I. The concept of Dihay 23
II. Information on the situation of the Baha'is 24
III. Representations concerning the status of the Azeris 25
IV. Representations concerning the status of the Kurds 26
V. Imprisoned students 27
VI. Correspondence between the Special Representative
and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
June 2001-December 2001
29
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Executive summary
In the past year the demand by the Iranian people for reform has continued to grow despite
a variety of obstacles. A cornerstone of this reform has been the gradual emergence of an
intolerance of violations of human rights, both those recognized internationally and those
articulated in the Iranian Constitution.
Among the obstacles has been the continuing, sweeping suppression of the mainly
reformist press, including the imprisonment ofjournalists. This has had a serious negative
impact on the promotion of human rights in the country.
The status of women has improved only in the sense that the demands of women and their
supporters are now out in the open. Legislated discrimination remains in the statutes and
regulations, and the current legislature's efforts to change this have been blocked by
conservative political elites. Patriarchal attitudes remain very much in evidence in such areas as
domestic violence and in the resistance to women achieving leadership roles in the public and
private sectors.
Change in the legal system remains excruciatingly slow. The abuse of persons in pre-trial
detention in matters deemed to be of a political nature appears still to be widespread. The
accepted norms of fair trial are frequently ignored. Many of the punishments are gross violations
of international human rights norms, including in particular the use of stoning.
The treatment of intellectuals and dissidents, particularly by the security forces and the
Judiciary, reveals a fearful intolerance of alternative views. The treatment of many of these
persons is in violation of the Iranian Constitution and of generally accepted international
standards, and in some cases is little short of vicious.
There would appear to have been little change in the official and societal discrimination
faced by the religious and ethnic minorities. From time to time this treatment escalates into
active persecution of some groups. For their part, the minorities are becoming more outspoken
in their demands for reform.
In the economic sphere, inflation, unemployment and poverty are among the causes of the
deteriorating social and economic condition of many Iranians. Iranian leaders seem to
acknowledge the gravity of the problem but have been slow to address it as an urgent matter in
economic as well as social terms.
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I. INTRODUCTION
1. As this is the Special Representative's last report, he may perhaps be allowed to be more
expansive, particularly in this Introduction. Iran is a country in transition. That process is
strongly contested by a minority group of elites who believe that the sanctities of the revolution,
which by definition includes religious ones, are in danger. Those advocating change believe that
a system of government must change with the times or perish, and that the status quo is simply
untenable. This of course is a classic contest between those who believe in constancy, that is in
absolutism of values, and those who believe that values have to reflect time and place.
2. In the case of Iran this contest is in part a struggle of philosophy and the role of religion
in government. Increasing numbers of Iranian intellectuals, including clerics at all levels, are
arguing with persistence for what amounts to a separation of religion and State as the only way
in which constancy can be maintained in matters of religion and change can be effected in
secular matters. In the words of one young activist, “we do not want democracy to put aside
religion, but we do not want democracy to be trampled on by people in religious clothing”.
3. The transition process in Iran, which the Special Representative believes is inevitable, is
made painful and costly by the absence of a tradition of peaceful consensus building. In the
words of one Iranian scholar, “the political culture of Iranians is still under the influence of
beliefs and norms of the era of kings - despotism and tyranny”.
4. Added to this is the use of violence among some elements of society and its social cost.
The Special Representative has earlier expressed the view that violence in Iranian society is
deeply debilitating (E/CN.4/2001/39 of 16 January 2001, paras. 122-127). He deplores the use
of religion as ajustification of otherwise immoral acts, acts which trample on the human rights
of other human beings. The resort to violence, whatever the cause, is deeply destructive of law
and order, of the credibility of governance and of a budding civil society.
5. The emergence of the latter in Iran is long overdue. In the Special Representative's view,
it's emergence has been pushed aside by the ongoing political struggle, by the uncertainty over
whether Iran is a theocracy or a republic, and by a populace that is as yet too immature
politically to have set up effective institutions that are independent of the State. The debate over
the enactment of political rights legislation reflects these constraints. The objective was to
define political offences and to establish rules for the treatment of political offenders. The bill
was rejected by the Guardian Council on the grounds it was in conflict with Islamic law and with
the Constitution.
6. Moreover, in the view of a number of commentators inside and outside the country, Iran
must move to a post-revolutionary era, that is, it must address its political and economic
problems as basically internal ones. It must abandon the rhetoric of the revolution and, in
particular, stop blaming outsiders for its woes. Twenty-two years later, revolutionary truths are
simply not adequate tools to meet Iran's many problems, not least of which is the need for a
tolerant, diverse society.
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7. Meanwhile, the mood of people appears to be despondent. One senior figure has
declared, “people feel frustrated and disillusioned”. This certainly seems to have been reflected
in the disturbances in August in Sabzevar and in October in Tehran. The treatment of the mainly
youthful offenders will suggest whether lessons have been learned.
8. On the other hand, it is clear that the human rights discourse in Iran is changing. In the
last six years it has certainly become much more open in the media, in the Majilis and on the
campuses. It is now possible to talk openly of interests of the individual as distinct from those of
the State and of the need for institutionalized, truly independent machinery to protect the
individual's interests in the face of an oppressive government.
9. It seems very clear to the Special Representative that the principal obstacle to reform,
to the introduction and nourishment of a culture of human rights, is the Judiciary, its patrons
and its supporters. By any estimate, this is a very small group in a country of 65 million
people. It is a group that bears a heavy responsibility for the ongoing violations of human rights
in Iran.
II. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
10. The suppression of various types of expression continued in the period under review.
More newspapers and journals were banned or temporarily suspended; more journalists
were detained. One such case is that of Reza Alijani, former editor-in-chief of the now banned
Iran-e-Faida, who was reportedly held for 200 days in solitary confinement and permitted only
one visit from his wife. His lawyer had access neither to him nor his dossier. On 29 November,
Siamak Pourzand, a 73 -year-old journalist and intellectual, and currently manager of the
Tehran Cultural Centre, disappeared outside his home and is widely presumed to be
detained by one of the security agencies. According to one usually reliable source, an
estimated 17 journalists were in prison as of 28 November 2001. In addition, the press reports
that a number of student journalists were arrested for such offences as blasphemy.
11. The banning of the press and the imprisonment ofjournalists continues to be effected by
the official press court, often presided over by the notorious Said Mortazari (see para. 40), by the
Special Court for the Clergy and by regular civil courts. In short, since the spring of 2000, it has
been open season on journalists.
12. With regard to other sources of information, it is reported that 1,000 satellite dishes
were seized in October 2001. In the first instance of its kind for some years, a film director,
Tahmineh Milani, was charged recently by the Tehran Revolutionary Court with promoting
counter-revolutionary objectives, that is, in the words of an official press release, “she has
abused the arts as a tool for actions which will suit the taste of counter-revolutionary groups”.
The film concerned apparently had all the necessary bureaucratic approvals and had been
publicly released. It had been financed by the relatively conservative Islamic Propagation
Office.
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13. It will be evident that the freedom of expression atmosphere in Iran has not improved
since the Special Representative last reported to the Commission. Indeed, in the present
circumstances, it is perhaps surprising how fearless the public discourse generally is. The
Special Representative deplores the present situation and urges the Government to take steps to
restore freedom of expression in the country.
III. THE STATUS OF WOMEN
14. Over the years, the Special Representative has frequently expressed his concern over the
status of women in Iran. He has called upon the Government to tackle both the discriminatory
norms in Iranian law and the patriarchal attitudes in society, the latter expressed perhaps most
obviously in violence against women and in the difficulty faced by women in entering the work
force in positions commensurate with their training. There has been little evident progress in
either of these areas in the last six years.
15. With regard to the former, the social and political pressure for change in the law has been
steadily growing. Women themselves have become more outspoken, as have reformists among
the clerics, including at least one Grand Ayatollah. More broadly, the populace has spoken
through those it has elected to the Majilis. Resistance seems to rest largely with a relatively
small group of non-elected, male, political elites. In the year under review, this group has,
among other things, refused to approve any of the female candidates nominated to run in the
presidential election and refused to approve draft legislation to raise the minimum age of
marriage, notably that of girls, which remains at nine years of age, in clear violation of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Special Representative has characterized the
situation with regard to the marriage of girl children as a black spot on the reputation of the
Islamic Republic and has called upon all branches of the Government to work together to bring
new legislation into effect as quickly as possible (see A!56/278 of 10 August 2001, para. 19).
16. In July, a female member of the Majilis called for a major overhaul of legislation to give
women the same rights as men. According to the press, she noted “A mother whose child needs
an emergency operation in a hospital does not have the right to authorize it” even in the case of
the father's absence or death. She also asked “why give the custody of a child to an 80-year-old
grandfather and not to the young mother who has lost her husband?” Why indeed?
17. With regard to the physical and verbal abuse of women, particularly in the family setting,
the Special Representative has frequently called on the Government to take firmer action to
address what is generally regarded as a widespread problem. In the Special Representative's
opinion it is not enough for the Government simply to condemn the situation or to encourage
women's NGOs to tackle it, or to write it off as a cultural issue that only time will cure. The
establishment of crisis hot lines may help some of the women concerned but does nothing to cure
the problem. The objective must be to make Iranian society as a whole intolerant of such
conduct (see A!56/278, para. 18).
18. Another area in need of attention is the empowerment of women, specifically including
them in senior management and professional positions in government and in the private sector.
In the year under review, the touchstone issue was perhaps the widely expected appointment of
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women to the second Khatami Government. The 12 women members of the Majilis prepared
their own list of three women candidates for the cabinet. This was not to happen and, according
to one press report, the President's plan to appoint women as education minister and as
cooperatives minister was overruled by higher authority.
19. During the period under review, there were two events that could clearly be seen as
efforts to constrain women who were advocating change. One was the arrest of a prominent
female film maker, Tahmineh Milani, some of whose films deal with male chauvinism in the
Iranian family, and who has been quoted in the press as declaring that feminism was a way of
“salvation for women who are deprived of equal rights” (see also para. 12). The other case
was the imposition of a 22-month prison sentence on a female member of the Majilis,
Fatemeh Haqqiqatju. According to the press, she was found guilty of having, in a statement
on the floor of the Majilis, misinterpreted the words of the founder of the republic, “propagated”
against the establishment, and insulted the Guardian Council and the head of the Tehran
Revolutionary Court.
20. The Special Representative is confident that pressure for change in the treatment of
women from within the country will only increase and that for this reason alone the Government
would be wise to act now.
IV. LEGAL SUBJECTS
A. Reform of the legal process
21. The Special Representative wishes to record that the long awaited bill on the reform of
the Judiciary has finally reached the Majilis. At the time of preparation of this report, he has not
seen a detailed description of the bill. However, according to press reports, it stipulates that
exceptional tribunals like the revolutionary courts will be able to deal only with cases explicitly
referred to them by law. Officials and military personnel will be tried only by Tehran's Criminal
Courts. If this works out to be the case in practice, it will be a major improvement.
22. Meanwhile some judges continue to ignore a circular directive from the Head of the
Judiciary on the treatment of detainees in pre-trial detention, the details of which were set out in
last year's report to the Commission (E/CN.4/2001/39 of 16 January, para. 31). In the case of
journalist Taqi Rahman, for example, his family reports he had been in solitary confinement for
six months up to 26 August 2001, with only one family visit and no telephone contact. Similar
treatment was accorded to a number of the Religious Nationalist/Freedom Movement detainees
(see paras. 54-55). The Special Representative chooses not to question the good faith of the
Head of the Judiciary in issuing his circular instruction, but does question his willingness or else
his ability to enforce it.
B. The prisons
23. Prisons in Iran continue to be a subject of concern and controversy. The press
reported a statement by the head of the National Prisons Organization that there were
about 160,000 inmates of whom about two thirds were in prison for drug-related offences, that
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most of the inmates were aged between 22 and 38, and that 5,000 were women. Moreover, the
prison population had increased over 40 per cent in the previous year, and the prisons were now
housing more than 100,000 inmates beyond their capacity. Some commentators have questioned
whether the figure of 160,000 includes the inmates of the detention centres run by many of the
security agencies which were supposed to have been integrated with the National Prisons
Organization; this has not yet been effected according to the evidence reaching the Special
Representative.
24. The dominant feature of Iranian prisons is their overcrowding and in the period under
review this seems to have had the inevitable results of prison disturbances on the one hand and
breakouts on the other. The Special Representative has reported in the past on some of the
prescriptions for overcrowding. The main thrust of current plans seems to be a parallel system
of camps for drug related offences, to be located in remote parts of the country. The Director of
the Prisons Organization reports that eight such camps are now in existence. The abuse of
persons in detention is referred to in other sections of this report (paras. 43 and 56). The Special
Representative wishes to draw the attention of the Government and particularly the Judiciary
and the National Prisons Organization to the provisions of the Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners” (adopted in 1955 by the First United Nations Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders), the Body of Principles for the
Protection of All Prisons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (General Assembly
resolution 43/173 of 9 December 1988) and the Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners
(General Assembly resolution 45/11 of 14 December 1990).
C. Punishments
Public punishment
25. In late July 2001, a drive was begun by the law enforcement agencies against what was
seen to be immoral behaviour. The target groups were chiefly young people in Tehran, the
most often declared offence being the consumption of alcohol. The punishment was
typically 70 or 80 lashes administered in public. The Interior Minister for his part condemned
the public flogging of young people, noting that public whipping in this day and age has serious
political and social consequences. The Tehran Security Council attempted to limit the use of
public punishment by declaring that all court orders to this effect would have to be reviewed
by it. A spokesman said that the Council believed that public punishment not only failed to
contribute to the prevention of crime but in fact had negative social consequences in that it
created a sense of melancholy in people and promoted the idea that laws were opposed to the
interests of the people.
26. The Head of the Judiciary defended the use of public punishment, arguing that people
should have the right to see those violating the laws and Islamic sanctities being punished before
their eyes. This provoked a major public controversy, in the course of which the President
condemned such action.
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27. Among the arguments used by the proponents of public punishment was that it would
“boost security”, that it was a means of deterring rising criminality and breaches of Islamic
teaching, that “it would teach a lesson to the public”, that “it would be a deterrent” and that
“pressure is needed for keeping order in a society”. However, some critics pointed out that it
terrified only ordinary citizens, not criminals. One young bystander was quoted in the press as
declaring he had “seen things which make me want to leave this country”.
28. Towards mid-September the use of public floggings in Tehran appeared to die down
somewhat but reports of public floggings in the provinces continued at least until the end of
October. An international NGO recorded some 270 floggings to 22 October 2001, with some of
the victims being as young as 14.
29. The same NGO had recorded 125 executions to 29 October 2001. The best information
available to the Special Representative is that close to 20 public executions occurred in the
two months to the end of August. One of these, very unusually, was of a woman convicted of
murder.
30. The Special Representative has expressed to the Government his concern over the
apparent rise in flogging and execution, over the public application of such punishments and
over their apparent application in some cases to minors (see annex VI, para. 11).
Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
31. With regard to the use of torture in the prison system, the Special Representative notes
what could become the first serious step to deal with this black spot on the Iranian legal system
and, incidentally, to enforce the constitutional ban on such action. According to the press, in late
November a substantial majority of Majilis members signed a petition identifying a number of
acts of torture that occur during the interrogation of prisoners, calling for the creation of a
council of representatives of the judiciary, the legislature and the executive to supervise the
treatment of prisoners, with the right to visit places of detention at any time and the duty to
report any act of torture to the heads of the three branches of Government. Finally, the
Special Representative would remind the Government of Commission resolution 200 1/62
of 25 April 2001 on the subject of torture.
32. The Special Representative has made several representations concerning the apparent
recommencing of stoning after several years without reports of such punishment. There was also
a report in the press of the public decapitation of an Afghan for armed robbery, multiple rape and
kidnapping.
33. The Special Representative condemns the use of these punishments. He recommends
that the death penalty be used only in accordance with the conditions laid down in article 6 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and by the Commission on Human Rights in
its resolution 2001/68 of 25 April 2001, that flogging, a punishment, generally recognized to be
cruel, inhuman or degrading, be discontinued, and that public punishment generally recognized
to be at the least a process that demeans and humiliates the victim, be discontinued.
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Diyah
34. The concept of diyah is a complex one and the Special Representative treads in this area
with reluctance. His attention is attracted to two features of diyah as it is practised in Iran. The
first is that murder appears to fall under qasas or retribution (lex tal/onis), which seems to be in
effect as Islamic private criminal law. It is understood that the relatives of the victim can pardon
the murderer or demand the payment of diyah (blood money) instead. However, where the
perpetrator is a male and the victim was a female, it is the relatives of the victim that have to pay
to the perpetrator half the appropriate diyah for the offence before exacting revenge, that is
before the murderer is executed. If this is a correct understanding of diyah, the Special
Representative finds it very strange indeed.
35. It is noted that qasas openly discriminates between men and women (arts. 209, 210
and 300, Third and Fourth Books, the Islamic Punishment Code). In addition, the Special
Representative is informed that, in practice, where the victim is a non-Muslim, there is no diyah.
36. The Special Representative understands that while the practice of diyah is widespread in
Muslim societies, not all of them discriminate on the basis of sex or religion (see annex I). In
Iran, some senior clerics such as Ayatollah Saanee are reported to be arguing now that there
should be no distinction in diyah between men and women.
37. The Special Representative urges the Government to abolish discrimination on the basis
of sex or religion.
D. Lawyers and judges
38. Lawyers in Iran continue to be under pressure if they defend clients unpopular with some
of the elite. During the period under review, several more were summoned by the Judiciary,
apparently for remarks they had made, typically remarks critical of the Judiciary. For example,
Mohmoud Alizadeh Tabatabai, whose clients had accused the police of torture, was sentenced to
eight months in prison for “defaming” a former police chief. Nasser Zarafchan, a lawyer for
family members in the serial murders case, is being sued for “revealing” flaws in the verdict of
that trial.
39. In this context, the Special Representative recalls Commission resolution 200 1/39
of 23 April 2000, and the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers adopted by the
Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders
and welcomed by the General Assembly in resolution 45/166 of 18 December 1990. The
Special Representative urges the Government to respect international standards with regard
to the status of lawyers.
40. Some judges continue to violate the human rights of detainees, particularly in the pre-trial
stage (see the Special Representative's interim report to the General Assembly A!56/278,
para. 25). The Special Representative notes that the name of Said Mortazari continues to show
up in press stories about the most egregious conduct of the Judiciary (see para. 11). The
Special Representative recalls being told by a senior Judiciary official that Mortazari was one
of 40 judges being investigated by the Disciplinary Court for Judges. Meanwhile, however, he
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continues to wreak havoc with such rights as freedom of expression. The Special Representative
recommends that Judge Mortazari be immediately suspended from the bench, pending a decision
on his case by the Disciplinary Court for Judges.
V. STATUS OF INTELLECTUALS AND OF STUDENT,
RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL DISSIDENTS
A. Student unrest
41. Campus political activism grew in the run-up to the June presidential election. There
was an evident tone of anger and despondency. This continued up to the second anniversary,
on 9 July, of the 1999 student disturbances. For that occasion, the law enforcement agencies and
the vigilante Ansar-i Hizbullah were out in force. The press reported that 85 persons had been
arrested.
42. In the period since then other student arrests have been reported in the press. In August
new charges were reportedly brought against Ali Afshari, a student activist who had attended
the Berlin Conference (see paras. 52-53) and who since his arrest in December 2000, and
notwithstanding his purported confession on television, had reportedly been held in solitary
confinement until his recent release on bail.
43. Also during this period, two accounts of gross mistreatment of students in prison became
public. One reached the Special Representative in the form of a “public letter” and the other is
reportedly posted on the web. The former is yet another account of prolonged torture in Towhid
and other prisons.
44. In mid-November the Special Representative received a list of 19 imprisoned
students, 9 of whom have been detained since the July 1999 student disturbances. Only in some
of the cases is the place of detention known. In other cases the students are listed as “abducted”,
“whereabouts unknown” (see annex V). Four of them in Evin are reported to have begun a
hunger strike.
B. Religious dissidents
45. One of the most awkward groups of dissidents for the Government to handle are
members of the ulema, that is Islamic clerics. The treatment of one of the most visible of these,
Hassan Yousefi-Eshkevari, was covered in the Special Representative's interim report to the
General Assembly (A!56/278, para. 51). He is apparently still in prison.
46. The most eminent of the dissenters, Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri, was very
much present, in spirit at least, throughout the year. Despite being under house arrest, he
managed to make public his memoirs in December 2000, which confirmed important details of
some of the blackest events in the history of the Islamic Republic, such as the mass executions of
political prisoners. Shortly after their publication, Mortazeri's eldest son was detained and as of
July, while no charges had been laid he was still in custody.
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47. In an interview with a foreign journal in July, Montazeri reiterated his opposition to the
present form of government. “The concentration of powers in the hands of a single person is not
acceptable and must not be accepted. If the leadership does not change its behaviour radically,
there is no future for the religious Government.” Shortly after that, Montazeri's son-in-law and
three of his associates were picked up by agents of the Special Clerical Court and, according to a
member of the family, the following day agents welded shut the doors of Montazeri's office.
There continue to be public calls for his rehabilitation.
48. Clearly, there is little appetite to recognize freedom of expression when the subject
matter is the nature of government in the Islamic Republic, and the critics are clerics.
C. The serial murders trial
49. The Special Representative has been reporting these grisly events of late 1998 and
early 1999 because they constituted a vicious violation of the rights of a group of political
activists and intellectuals whose views were apparently not to the taste of important persons.
The convictions of 15 persons, the so-called rogue elements in the Ministry of Information
(Intelligence), as well as the apparent tone ofthejudgement were described in the Special
Representative's interim report to the General Assembly (A!56/278, paras. 48-50). In that report
he also noted the apparently widespread view that the trial was a cover-up and that the real
motives behind the killings, as well as the likely knowledge of them of senior figures, had yet to
be revealed.
50. In August 2001, the Supreme Court ordered a new trial for those convicted, apparently
without giving reasons for its action. This came after the Minister of Information (Intelligence)
was quoted in the press as characterizing these murders as “insignificant mistakes”, adding that
“the people have forgiven” those concerned. In the view of the Special Representative, taking
anyone's life, not least when the act is politically motivated, can never be characterized as
insignificant. The Minister's comments are surely an insult to the memory of the victims and to
their family members. They also reflect an appalling disrespect for the most basic of human
rights, the right to life, and by a member of the Government at that.
51. The families for their part have been profoundly dissatisfied with the legal process up to
now. Their lawyer is quoted in the press as stating he would participate in the new trial only if
he and his colleagues were given complete access to all the relevant files. The Special
Representative urges the Government to ensure that the retrial is an open one and that the
lawyers for the families are given complete access to the files.
D. The Berlin Conference trial
52. The Special Representative has reported extensively on this matter, which is the
trial of 15 Iranian participants in what essentially was an academic conference in Berlin in
April 2000. See, in particular, his report to the Commission at its 2001 session
(E/CN.4/2001/39, paras. 88-94) and his interim report to the General Assembly at its latest
session (A!56/278, paras. 53-57). In the latter report, the Special Representative recorded an
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unequivocal undertaking given to him by a senior Judiciary official that action would be taken
to vacate all 13 ofthejudgements rendered in this case. To the Special Representative's
knowledge, this has not happened. Indeed, two of the defendants, Said Sadr and
Khalil Rostamkhani, apparently facing other charges as well, have had their sentences upheld
in one case and reduced by one year in the other. Both are reportedly now in Evin prison.
Another defendant in this case, Ezzatollah Sahabi, a 70-year-old journalist, also remains in
prison, according to his family in solitary confinement despite failing health.
53. While acknowledging that the reduction on appeal of the prison sentences of
Akbar Ganji, Ezzatollah Sahabi and Ali Afshari, as well as the commutation of the prison terms
of Mehrgangiz Kar and Shahla Lahidji to fines, are steps in the right direction, the Special
Representative again calls on the Government to respect the commitment made to him that all
sentences rendered in this case will be vacated and those in jail will be released.
E. Detention of religious-nationalist and Freedom Movement of Iran activists
54. In his interim report to the General Assembly (A/S 6/278, paras. 5 8-64), the Special
Representative reported on this matter in some detail. In summary, some 60 members of
two groups, generally described as the religious-nationalist and Freedom Movement activists,
were detained in March and April 2001. Some were immediately released, some were
gradually released on bail and some were denied bail, and of those, some were kept in solitary
confinement. The Special Representative has made a number of representations with regard to
this group, in particular that some were elderly, that some required urgent medical treatment
and that those in solitary confinement should be returned to ordinary cells. The Special
Representative received a commitment in early July that all those still in prison would be
released on bail within several weeks. In fact, as of the preparation of this report in early
December 2001, some are still in jail and in solitary confinement.
55. The Special Representative has already made clear his view that the treatment of these
individuals has been scandalous and a violation both of the Head of the Judiciary's instruction to
judges concerning the treatment of persons in pre-trial detention and of the United Nations
guidelines for the treatment of such persons. The Special Representative renews this
condemnation, particularly as it applies to detaining persons without bail for more than 30 days,
holding these persons in solitary confinement for some eight months, failing to allow ailing
detainees to have medical attention and, in some cases, to denying them the prescribed medicines
for pre-existing medical regimes, refusing regular access from the date of detention to the
detainees by family members and lawyers, and for refusing to allow the presence of lawyers
during interrogation. The Special Representative deeply deplores the unwillingness or inability
of Iranian leaders to ameliorate the circumstances under which these persons were and in some
cases are still being held.
56. Three other persons were arrested in August and September 2001 apparently because of
their connections with the Freedom Movement and some of its members. Another individual, a
journalist, was sentenced to six months in jail and 50 lashes, seemingly for publishing an account
of an interview she had had with the head of the Freedom Movement.
E/CN.4/2002/42
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57. On 12 November 2001 the trial began in the Revolutionary Court of some 30 of these
persons, primarily it would seem members of the Freedom Movement. The trial is being held
behind closed doors with even family members being barred. The ostensible reasons are that:
The charges concern national security;
Publicizing the hearings would “disrupt security and public order”;
Remarks concerning senior leaders “would hurt religious feelings”.
58. The Special Representative has made representations about the fairness of the procedure,
focusing in particular on the closed nature of the trial and the lack of access of lawyers to those
not on bail and to the files of all those on trial.
59. In early December 2001, the Majilis condemned the trial, particularly targeting the
conditions of detention, the fact that the trial was being held behind closed doors and what were
described as “the unjust and unconventional conditions surrounding the hearings”. Neither
specificities of the acts complained of nor the offences alleged on the basis of those acts have
been made public as of early December, eight months after the arrest of the defendants.
60. The Special Representative considers himself obliged to note the embarrassment faced by
the President, who has openly denounced these trials, as well as, hopefully, by the Head of
Judiciary who, in the view of the Special Representative, must take responsibility for the
integrity of the judicial system.
VI. DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
61. In the period under review, tension between the elected and unelected branches of
government increased. At least four members of the Majilis were sentenced to prison, in one
case for “libelling and slandering Iran's judicial system” in a speech in the Majilis. According to
the press, some 60 members of the Majilis have been summoned by the Judiciary, mostly to
answer for critical public remarks. The President intervened in the matter of the members
sentenced to prison with a letter to the Head of the Judiciary pointing out that, according to the
Constitution, members were immune from prosecution for remarks made in the Majilis. In
response to a fairly dismissive response by the Head of the Judiciary, the President declared he
had a constitutional right to warn the Judiciary to respect freedom of expression.
62. Also in this period, there was a change in the composition of the Guardian Council,
which vets legislation put forward by the Majilis as well as vetting candidates for election to the
major elected bodies such as the Majilis. The appointment of 6 of the 12 members of the
Guardian Council is subject to Majilis approval. The Majilis attempted to impose conditions that
the candidates would have to meet and to establish the right of the Majilis to reject the
Judiciary's nominees. In the event, through what the press described as a voting “manoeuvre”,
the Judiciary's nominees were approved. This attempt to make one of the important centres of
power somewhat accountable thus failed.
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63. In August 2001, the Majilis committee looking into the treatment of detainees reported
that the Judiciary had committed “multiple violations of the most basic rights of prisoners”. In
particular, the report criticized “the conditions of detention, the isolation of prisoners in
individual cells”, and the lack of access to lawyers and families.
64. In short, Iran's road to democratic governance continued to be a rocky one, with
powerful forces working to constrain the will of the people.
VII. STATUS OF MINORITIES
A. Introduction
65. In his last several reports the Special Representative has been urging the Government to
establish a national minorities policy. In this report he wishes to place this initiative within the
international context. To begin with, the Special Representative would refer to Commission
resolution 2001/55 of 24 April 2001,which “reaffirms the obligation of States to ensure that
persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities may exercise fully and
effectively all human rights and fundamental freedoms without any discrimination and in full
equality before the law in accordance with the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities”. The Special Representative notes that
this resolution was adopted without a vote. In this regard, he would also draw attention to the
UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, adopted by the General Conference of
UNESCO on 2 November 2001.
66. The Special Representative believes there can be no doubt that the treatment of minorities
in Iran does not meet the norms set out in the Declaration on Minorities or in article 27 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See in this regard the concluding
observation of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, following its
examination of the initial report of Iran, that the treatment of minorities in Iran is one of its
“principal subjects of concern” (E/C.12/1993/7 of 9 June 1993). The Special Representative
takes note of the writings on this subject of one distinguished Iranian legal scholar that the
Iranian Constitution, in articles 15, 19 and 20 and elsewhere, in part expressly, in part implicitly
clearly establishes the right of all Iranians to equality and fair treatment, and that this right has
not been implemented in practice. The Government must commit itself to addressing urgently
the status of minorities in Iran as a whole and to bringing the conduct of Iran in this regard into
line with recognized international standards, as well as with the Iranian Constitution.
67. The Special Representative hears frequent reference to what is described as the
Government's implicit policy of assimilation. It is asserted that such a policy was introduced
first by Reza Shah, prior to which time Iran had been in practice a multicultural society. The
Special Representative has earlier observed that the original draft of the 1979 Constitution did
acknowledge that Iran was a multicultural nation in naming the main ethnic groups that made up
the country. He would also note that as seen in the 1995 Copenhagen Declaration of the World
Summit for Social Development, the right to be free from attempts at assimilation is emerging as
an international norm.
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68. The Special Representative believes that at the first level the rights of minorities consist
not only in the right to be free from discrimination but, put more positively, that there is now an
obligation upon Governments to protect minorities against discrimination and procedural
unfairness. At a second level are certain positive rights, such as the use of minority languages in
education and the media, and basic civil and political rights such as fair trial, freedom of
expression and freedom of assembly and of association. The Special Representative draws
particular attention to the provisions of the Declaration on Minorities in this regard.
69. Information reaching the Special Representative suggests that very little meaningful
action is being undertaken by the Government to this end. The use of minority languages in the
media is sporadic rather than substantive; the use of minority languages in the educational
system seems minimal.
70. Finally, the Special Representative has referred to the need to involve the minorities
themselves in the preparation of a national minority policy, a right articulated in the Declaration
on Minorities. Whether or not it is accurate to characterize the prevailing atmosphere as one of
Persian chauvinism, as some minority activists suggest, it is clear that the situation is
discriminatory in many respects, as well as being incompatible with existing and emerging
international norms. The Government necessarily bears heavy responsibilities in this regard and
needs to make an urgent start on a national minority policy. For his part, the President is quoted
as declaring that “Iran belongs to all Iranians”.
B. Religious minorities
71. In recent reports (for example A!56/278 of 10 August 2001) the Special Representative
has noted the establishment of the National Committee for the Promotion of the Rights of
Religious Minorities. There are many issues this Committee needs to address, including that of
diyah (see paras. 34-3 7) and the refusal to accept the devolution of property by inheritance to
non-Muslims, where there are Muslim beneficiaries. The Special Representative awaits a report
that this Committee is in fact functioning.
Sunnis
72. In earlier reports, the Special Representative has described the complaints of the Sunnis
about the discrimination they face (see for example his interim report to the General Assembly
A!56/278, paras. 74-75). He would recall his earlier comment that underdevelopment seems to
coincide with those areas of the country in which Sunnis are in the majority.
73. The Special Representative has now received an allegation of Government control over
Sunni theological teaching in Kurdistan through an organization called “Great Islamic Centre in
the West”, located in Sanandaj. All Sunni students reportedly have to register with the Centre
and the Government determines the place of teaching, the subjects, the number of students and
the salaries of the teachers. Such matters should clearly be in the hands of the Sunnis
themselves.
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Baha' is
74. It has been possible in the past year or so to discern some hopeful signs concerning the
treatment of the unrecognized minorities, especially the Baha'is. These signs have included the
commutation of death sentences (see annex II), the release of prisoners and the 1999 decision of
the Expediency Council declaring that “all Iranians enjoy the rights of citizenship irrespective of
their belief', followed by measures removing the requirement of declaring one's religious
affiliation when registering a marriage or the birth of a child or applying for a passport overseas.
The Special Representative also welcomes the statements by Iranian representatives in
international forums (the International Labour Organization, June 2000, and the Committee on
the Rights of the Child, May 2000), that their Government is concerned to provide for the rights
of all citizens, including those who are members of non-recognized minorities.
75. However, no further progress has come to the Special Representative's attention. He
understands that the Baha'i community continues to be subject to harassment and discrimination
in the areas of, inter alia, education, employment, travel, housing and the enjoyment of cultural
activities. Seven members of the Baha'i community remain in prison, apparently because of
their faith, and Baha'i property continues to be subject to confiscation (see annex II).
76. In his interim report to the General Assembly (A/S 6/278, paras. 76-78), the Special
Representative reported that, as a complex has been built over the old Baha'i cemetery in
Tehran, the Iranian authorities had allotted other land for this purpose. It is now reported that the
land offered is in fact wasteland, with no access to water. Further, the community has been
denied permission to mark individual graves or to construct mortuary facilities.
77. Also of concern is the sentence issued by a judge of the Supreme Office of Control and
Review, Hamzih Khalili, on 15 September 2001, in the context of an appeal by the Muslim
owners of property rented to the Baha'is that was confiscated in 1998. According to an
unofficial translation to which the Special Representative has had access, the verdict declares
that the “seizure and confiscation of the properties belonging to the misguided sect of Baha'ism
is legally and religiously justifiable” and states that “the cultural activities of the misguided sect
of Baha'ism - as prescribed by the order of His Excellency the Supreme Leader - do need to be
seriously opposed”. This would seem to indicate that the 1991 memorandum on “The Baha'i
Question”, issued by the Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council and approved by the Supreme
Leader, is still in force and therefore that discrimination against Baha'is continues to be official
practice, a situation the Special Representative deeply deplores.
78. The Special Representative wishes to reiterate his appeal to the Government of Iran to
implement his outstanding recommendations (A /53/423 of 23 September 1998, para. 45), as well
as those of the Special Rapporteur on religious intolerance (see E/CN.4/1996/95/Add.2
of 9 February 1996).
Christians
79. It is difficult to obtain a reliable estimate of the number of Christians in Iran. A major
complication is the mixing of ethnicity with religious affiliation. Estimates of the non-ethnic
Christians, that is, leaving aside the Armenians and Assyrians, vary from several thousand to as
E/CN.4/2002/42
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high as 15,000. The Armenians and Assyrians are recognized as official religious minorities,
that is, as Christians. It is a status that assigns them, along with the Jews and the Zoroastrians,
second-class citizenship.
80. However, their lot is considerably better than that of the unrecognized, that is, the
non-ethnic Christians. These are those groups of Christians who are for the most part ethnic
Persians. Evangelical Christians such as members of the Assemblies of God have been harshly
persecuted over the years, apparently on the grounds that they have been or might be
proselytizing. Some of them are said to have been convicted of apostasy. Some have been
sentenced to death and a few have been executed. The Special Representative has been informed
that only three small Persian-speaking churches may remain in operation and that they have had
to agree not to evangelize Muslims. The printing of Christian literature is prohibited and
Christian bookstores are banned. A number of Christian activists have reportedly fled the
country.
81. In the Special Representative's opinion, the situation of the Christians, particularly the
non-ethnic Christians, does not seem to have improved since the 1996 report of the Special
Rapporteur on religious intolerance on his visit to Iran (E/CN.4/1996/95/Add.2). The Special
Representative again calls on the Government to implement the recommendations of the Special
Rapporteur on religious intolerance.
Yaresan
82. In the south of the area inhabited by the Kurds, there is a little known community called
variously the Yaresan or “Al Haq”. According to one scholarly writer, the Yaresan are Kurds
who practise an apparent form of Zoroastrianism or Yezidism (the only uniquely Kurdish
religion), but are labelled Muslems because they adopted several superficial features, including
veneration of Ali, the fourth Caliph.
83. The Special Representative has received representations from members of this
community concerning local discrimination, both official and social, apparently based on their
religion.
84. The Special Representative has received only limited first-hand evidence of the treatment
of this community. However, its existence seems to be widely accepted and its treatment to be
consistent with the evidence he has received from other non-Shi'ah communities. The Special
Representative urges the Government to recognize the existence of the Yaresan, to prevent
discriminatory practices against them and to include their representatives in the National
Religious Minorities Commission.
C. Ethnic minorities
The Azeris
85. The Azerbaijan Turkic-speaking people of Iran (the Azeris) are recognized as the largest
ethnic minority and may indeed be the largest ethnic group in the country. It appears to be
accepted that about 12 million of them live in the north-west and that in the country as a whole
E/CN.4/2002/42
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there may be as many as 30 million. It is asserted that the Azeris have lived on the Iranian
plateau for thousands of years and that they predate the entry of Persian tribes to the area.
86. The complaints brought to the Special Representative concern the use of the Azeri
language and that the unwelcome prospect of Azeri cultural assimilation is accelerating
(see annex III). More particularly, Azeris are asking for the teaching of “proper” Azerbaijani
Turkish along side Persian in schools in regions predominantly inhabited by Azeris, production
in and the broadcasting of “proper” Azerbaijani Turkish on radio and television, the allocation of
one television channel for Turkish language broadcasting, the creation of schools of Azerbaijan
Turkish language and literature at universities throughout Iran (it is noted that while Azerbaijani
Turkish is not taught at the University of Tabriz, seven other languages are taught) and the
facilitation of the creation of Azerbaij ani Turkish cultural centres.
87. The representations reaching the Special Representative also refer to harassment and
imprisonment of Azeri cultural activists, such as Dr. Mehmud Ali Chehregani, whose
circumstances were described by the Special Representative in earlier reports and whose
imprisonment was the subject of urgent representations by the Special Representative to the
Government. He has since been released. The Special Representative has received copies of
open letters to the President signed by various groups of Azeri personalities, such as members of
the Majilis and writers and poets, demanding fair treatment for Azeri culture. Their letters have
taken the President to task for unimplemented campaign promises on cultural freedom, they
complain of “cultural and ethnic insults and humiliation” from government media sources and
they invoke article 15 and article 19 of the Constitution.
The Kurds
88. The Special Representative has in several reports discussed the status of the Kurds. He
recognizes the difficulty of capturing the real situation in such matters as the treatment of
minorities without access to the regions concerned. The challenge of distinguishing local
incidents from broader trends may be also more formidable in this context.
89. In his interim report to the General Assembly (A/S 6/278, paras. 82-84), the Special
Representative identified a number of indictors that conditions may be improving for the Kurds.
More recent information suggests that on balance, discrimination and repression continue to
exist. A number of specific allegations are set out in annex W.
90. In the political sphere, perhaps the most dramatic event was the attempted, and in the
event withdrawn, collective resignation in October 2001 of all six members of the Majilis from
the province of Kurdistan. In a letter to the Interior Minister, the six said “unfortunately,
Kurdistan province and the Kurds, especially Sunnis, are denied their legitimate rights, and
executive officials are turning their backs to calls for justice on the political, economic, cultural
and social issues they have brought out”. Late in 2000, a Kurdish member of the Majilis had
publicly alleged the existence of”a campaign of repression and serial killings” against the
Kurdish community.
E/CN.4/2002/42
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VIII. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
Employment
91. In the period under review the scarcity ofjobs and the treatment of workers continued to
draw public attention. While a senior government official declared that unemployment had
declined to 13.7 per cent between March and July 2001, the press was sceptical. In June, one
paper declared that, given the immense number of hidden, seasonal or unregistered jobless
people, “independent experts believe the unemployment rate to be over 25 per cent.” The press
continues to carry frequent stories of unpaid salaries, sometimes stretching over many months.
Other stories report workers being laid off, in some cases in very large numbers, and sometimes
being replaced by workers from contract companies. There were also reports that some
employers were resorting to short-term contracts in order to avoid making worker insurance
payments. In October, the press carried a report of a demonstration of some 10,000 unpaid
textile workers in Isfahan worried that a recent bill passed by the Majilis would reduce the
number of textile enterprises and thus the need for textile workers.
92. ILO is planning to conduct an assessment mission in February 2002 to develop a project
in the area of employment creation for women.
93. The President, for his part, continues to express concern about the employment situation.
In October 2001 he told the Majilis that 42 per cent of the mostly young people seeking jobs
could not find them. The Special Representative is concerned at the Government's generally
modest efforts to address what is one of Iran's most serious economic problems, one that carries
a devastating social and human cost.
IX. OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES
A. National human rights bodies
94. In November 2001, UNDP/Tehran signed a project document with the Islamic Human
Rights Commission (IHIRC) of Iran to strengthen the human resources and infrastructural
capacities of the institution. TJNDP will support 14 courses on promotion and protection of
human rights for 1,600 human rights defenders in different cities of the country. The project will
also support the Commission's capacity to build networks through the development of a
computerized roster of contacts.
95. The Special Representative has received no recent reports on the Commission's
activities. Accordingly, his latest comments are those contained in his interim report to the
General Assembly (A!56/278, paras. 99-102).
B. The status of children
96. In his previous report to the Commission (E/CN.4/2001/39, paras. 108-116), the Special
Representative devoted a section to the rights of the child and reported on the recommendations
made by the Committee on the Rights of the Child (see CRC/C/15/Add.123) after its
examination of the initial report of Iran in May 2000.
E/CN.4/2002/42
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97. There continue to be positive developments in the area ofjuvenile justice. The Special
Representative is informed that a committee was established in February 2001 to draft a new
juvenile justice legislation. Over the past two years, all juvenile judges have been given training
on the Convention on the Rights of the Child and on the relevant international instruments on
juvenile justice. Social workers from the National Prisons Organization have participated in
such courses. There are now examples of alternative sentences being issued by juvenile judges
in some provinces.
98. The Special Representative would note that there reportedly remain on the books two
invidious provisions concerning children and the criminal law. One sets the age of penal
responsibility at the age of puberty, 9 years for girls and 15 years for boys, which means that
young people can face adult punishments. The second is that an adult who kills a minor is
subject to the death penalty unless the accused is the father or grandfather of the victim, in which
case the accused is subject only to the payment of diyah. The Special Representative trusts that
the promised new Juvenile Justice Act will amend both of these provisions.
99. According to Iranian press reports, a representative of the State Welfare Organization
stated in November 2001 that “one hundred and fifty children end up in Iranian courts every day
for being harassed by their families”. According to the same report, statistics would seem to
indicate that child harassment is on the rise in the country. It is reported that the drafting of a
Child Protection Act is under way. This follows the recent submission to the Majilis by the State
Welfare Organization of a plan for the protection of abused children. The Special Representative
welcomes these measures, which he deems urgent.
100. There continue to be reports of important numbers of Iranian children working illegally
in workshops and factories. In October 2001, the Majilis adopted a law which calls for the
punishment of those who violate the provisions of the Convention concerning the Prohibition
and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst forms of Child Labour (ILO No. 182).
The law has now been approved by the Guardian Council.
C. Drugs
101. The Government of Iran is now openly recognizing the extent of the social problem
generated by drugs in the country. Official estimates are that 2 million persons out of a
population of 65 million are now addicts. Press reports suggest that over 100,000 persons in
prison are there for drug-related reasons (see para. 23).
102. Iran also remains a major transit point for narcotics. The extent of smuggling has
reportedly made soft drugs as accessible as cigarettes, especially in border cities. The efforts of
the Iranian authorities to stop this traffic have been internationally recognized, but Iran is paying
a high price in terms of human life and budgetary resources in this struggle. The Iranian
authorities have sought regional and international cooperation, cooperation which, according to
the experts, is fundamental if real success is to be achieved.
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103. As pointed out by the Special Representative in earlier reports, poverty and
unemployment are major factors in the rise of drug trafficking and abuse. Sistan va Baluchistan,
a major transit area, is one of Iran's poorest provinces. As stated by one Tehran academic, those
in the narcotics trade have few economic alternatives to smuggling. The best job for local
residents in some areas is working as a guard on a drug-smuggling caravan.
104. From the demand side, addiction is increasingly seen as an illness. It is reported that this
year a new Outpatient Clinic for the Treatment of Addictive Behaviour at the Zahedan
Psychiatric Hospital has started experimenting with methadone treatment.
X. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
105. The Special Representative's conclusions and recommendations are given in each section
of the report. In short, the Special Representative believes that Iranian society is becoming more
sensitive to the moral and practical need to move at a faster pace than heretofore towards a
tolerant, diverse future that, at its core, attributes the highest value to the essential dignity of the
individual.
106. In the Special Representative's view, human rights need not necessarily be seen as a
system of absolute values. Instead, they can be viewed as a template for change, an engagement
in a dynamic, forward-looking process. Some of the crucial elements are a benevolence of
leadership, a recognition of the dignity of the individual in the political culture of the society,
and the acceptance of government as just another actor before the Constitution and the courts.
107. Among many contradictions in contemporary Iran is the clearly-expressed will of the
people on the one hand and the tenacious resistance to that will on the other. The Special
Representative believes that Iranian society has been evolving over many years and that this
momentum cannot now be turned aside. Change is inevitable. The current intransigence, which
if anything has become more pronounced since the body of this report was completed, is a costly
distraction but cannot be allowed to cloud the goal or the path to it.
108. The Special Representative regrets that this final report could not tell a different story,
one more reflective of the President's aspirations for his country. The people of Iran certainly
deserve to see, and indeed may require, the day to come when a human rights culture will
flourish in this ancient soil which has contributed so much to the history of world civilization.
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Annex I
THE CONCEPT OF D1YAH
“The Islamic law of personal injuries is based on the institution of diyah i.e. the Shariah
compensation for death and personal injury. Diyah is a specified amount of money or goods due
in cases of homicide or other injuries to physical health unjustly committed upon the person of
another. Corresponding to the notion of wergeld of the ancient Roman and Germanic laws it is a
substitute for the law of private vengeance .... The historical origin of the institution lies in
pre-Islamic customary practice, where it was closely bound up with the tribal-based social
organization of Arabia. Rested upon a tribal system, the pre-Islamic Arabia lacked any political
authority, even within the individual tribe. Thus a system of private justice, based on retribution,
prevailed in criminal and tort law. The system was tempered only partially by the practice of
voluntary submission to arbitration. a
“The Islamic criminal law is for the most part based on the law of retribution ... [ Crimes
against the persons are] affected by the decision of the individual victim who may wish to
exercise his right to retribution or alternatively decide to accept blood-money, or waive his right
to either of the two penalties.”
“In the absence of a country agreement between the parties there is a fixed tariff for the
amount of diyah. e The full amount of diyah is due “only where the victim is a Muslim, of the
male sex and of freeborn status. The diyah of a woman is half that of a man”. The diyah of a
non-Muslim is at the rate of one third or one half '
However, different groups seem to have different rules relating to the rate at which
women or non-Muslims are compensated. For example, among certain groups the diyah of a
woman even reaches four times or eight times the amount of a man's diyah.e “A difference of
religion, however, did not bar retaliation, as Muslims and non-Muslim subjects had an equal
right of self-protection. And according to the Hidaya, there is no difference between the fine for
death of a Muslim and that of a non-Muslim subject.”
Notes
a S.H. Amin, Islamic Law and its Imnplicati nsforModern World (Glasgow, Royston Ltd.,
1989) p. 309.
b S.H. Amin, Islamic Law in the Contemporary World (Glasgow, Royston Ltd.,1985), p. 28.
Implications, p. 3 12.
‘ Implications, p. 3 14.
Imi licatioii s , p. 3 19.
M. Abu-Hassan, “Islamic criminal law” in G.E. Lampe, ed., Justice and Human Rights in
Islamic Law (Washington, D.C., International Law Institute, 1997) p. 88.
E/CN.4/2002/42
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Annex II
INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION OF THE BAHA'IS
The following is based on information received by the Special Representative:
1. Mansur Haddadan (arrested on 29 February 1996 and sentenced to three years in
prison), Manuchechr Ziyai (arrested on 1 May 1998) and Ziaullah Mizapanah (convicted
on 16 March 1999) have now reportedly been released.
2. The death sentence of Musa Talibi, arrested on 7 June 1994 and charged with apostasy,
has now been revised to life imprisonment. He has reportedly been transferred to a prison in
Isfahan.
3. Other Baha'is remaining in Iranian prisons include Bihnam Mithaqui and
Kayvan Khalajabadi (arrested on 29 April 1989 and sentenced to death), Dhabihu'llah Mahrami
(arrested on 6 September 1995, charged with apostasy and sentenced to life imprisonment,
following commutation of a death sentence by the President), Sims Dhabihi-Muquaddam,
Hidayat Kashifi Najafabadih and Ata'u'llah Hamid Nasirizadih (arrested in November 1997,
sentenced to seven, five and four years' imprisonment, respectively, following commutation of
death sentences in the case of the first two).
4. If the number of Baha'is imprisoned has decreased over the years, there seems to be a
pattern of short-term detentions of Baha'i individuals presumably as a harassment measure.
According to information received, 70 Baha'is have been arrested in various parts of the country
since 1998, for periods of from five days to three months.
5. It is reported that since September 2001 in the city of Yazd three Baha'is were evicted
from their properties while 13 others received court orders to vacate; one Baha'i was evicted in
Isfahan and four in Tehran.
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Annex III
REPRESENTATIONS CONCERNING THE STATUS OF THE AZERIS
The following is a list of specific complaints received by the Special Representative:
Denial of cultural autonomy;
Harassment and imprisonment of cultural activists;
The banning of the use of the Azeri language in schools;
The use of Farsi-Azeri hybrid, rather than pure Azeri, on television and radio;
Teaching in schools that the birth of the Iranian people came with the arrival of the
Persian tribes and that the Azeri people are Iranian Aryans, forced to change their
language upon the arrival of the Mongolians;
Changing or distorting Azeri geographical names;
Refusal to register a child with an Azeri name.
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Annex IV
REPRESENTATIONS CONCERNING THE STATUS OF THE KLJRDS
The following is a list of specific complaints received by the Special Representative:
Violent deaths of individual Kurds, apparently the result of reckless or intentional acts of
the law enforcement forces;
The recent kidnapping and death of a popular local cultural figure;
Death sentences imposed and in most cases carried out against Kurdish activists;
The continuing refusal of the authorities to allow Kurdish to be taught at any level in
schools in Kurdistan;
The limited use of Kurdish in the print and electronic media and, even then, usually a
translation of Farsi material; the air time for Kurdish programming is “drastically
shorter” than it was before 1979;
Various forms of economic discrimination, including access to jobs in general; in the
case of the Piranshehr Sugar Company, the discharge in May 2001 of 80 per cent of the
Kurdish employees by a non-Kurdish president and their replacement by workers of other
ethnicities, “and those who collaborate with the Pasdaran”;
The use of Kurdish territory, particularly Kermanshah province, as a “resting place” for
drug addicts, criminals and other difficult groups from around the country;
A Kurd activist in Sardasht who ran for the municipal council on a platform of improving
the conditions of the Kurdish community found himself in jail four months after his
election, denounced as an enemy of the Islamic Republic;
The disallowance of the election to the Majilis of two Kurds representing Orumieh and
Naghade districts;
The gross underrepresentation of Kurdish districts in the Majilis, as also perhaps other
districts dominated by other ethnic groups, as seen for example in the failure to add any
new seats for Kurdish districts in the latest 5th Majilis redistribution.
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Annex V
IMPRISONED STUDENTS
Based on information received by the Special Representative, the following students
were arrested during the student demonstrations of July 1999 and continue in prison:
Mehran Abdolbaghi: a member of Iran's National Front. He is charged with acting
against national security.
Ahmad Batebi: a member of the United Student Front. Charged with acting against
national security for holding up the bloody shirt of a fellow student. He was first
sentenced to death, but the sentence was later commuted to 10-years' imprisonment.
He has allegedly been tortured and is suffering from severe backache.
Hossein Deldar: a member of the United Student Front. He has been sentenced to
a 15-year term of imprisonment and is currently held at Evin.
Bahiyeh Jilani (a medical student): she has allegedly been tortured and requires urgent
medical attention.
Manuchehr Mohammadi: head of the National Union of University Students and
Alumni. He is charged with “acting against national security”. He has been allegedly
tortured and held in solitary confinement. He suffers from gum and kidney disease.
Akbar Mohammadi: brother of the above-named and a member of the National Union
of University Students and Alumni. He was originally sentenced to death, but his
sentence was then commuted to five years' imprisonment. He has allegedly been
tortured and suffers from kidney disease and loss of hearing.
Farrokh Shaflee: a member of the United Student Front. He was sentenced to a
two-year term of imprisonment.
Behrouz Javid Tehrani: currently held at Karaj prison.
Hossein Yekta: a member of the United Student Front. Currently held at Evin prison.
According to the information received by the Special Representative the following
student activists have been arrested in the past two years:
Amir Abbashgholi Nejad: arrested in November 2000 and at present imprisoned at
Evin.
Hassan Ghadimi and Ali Akbar Rahimi Far: members of the Democratic Front of
Iranian People, arrested in April 2001.
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Siavosh Haji Hassan: a member of the United Student Front; arrested in April 2001 and
held in an unknown location.
Mahmoud Shoshtari: a member of the United Student Front. Under arrest since
June 2000.
Rahim Ramezani: a Member of the Democratic Front of Iranian People, detained since
April 2001 in an unknown location.
Mohammad Reza Kasrai: a member of the United Student Front, reportedly arrested in
June 2000.
Kourosh Sehati and Saeed Kashiloo: members of the United Student Front, allegedly
abducted in March 2001. Their whereabouts are unknown.
E/CN.4/2002/42
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Annex VI
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
June 2001-December 2001
1. By letter dated 27 June 2001, the Special Representative joined the Special Rapporteur
on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions in drawing the urgent attention of the Iranian
authorities to the sentencing to death of Azizullah Shenwari, a 14-year-old Pakistani. Reference
was also made to a report in the Iranian press on 29 May 2001 regarding the hanging of
an 18-year old boy, Mehrdad Yusefi, in a prison in the south-western region of 11am. According
to the press report, he was convicted for a crime which he had committed when he was 16 years
old. In the letter the signatories appealed to the Government of Iran to refrain from executing the
above-mentioned person.
2. The Special Representative joined the Chairman-Rapporteur of the Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention in sending an urgent appeal on 13 July 2001 on behalf of Mr. Akbar Ganji,
reportedly held in detention in contravention of article 33 of the Iranian law regarding the
procedure of public and revolutionary courts, which states that detention orders can be
challenged within 10 days and that, under any circumstances, the position of the defendants shall
be settled within one month. The signatories requested the Iranian authorities to respect the right
of Ganji to a fair trial and to take the necessary measures to guarantee his physical and
psychological integrity and his right not to be deprived arbitrarily of his liberty (for previous
urgent actions on this case see A!56/278, annex III, para. 3).
3. In a letter dated 24 July 2001, the Special Representative drew the urgent attention of the
Iranian authorities regarding the continued detention of approximately 20 members of the
so-called “religious-nationalist” group, many of them associated with the Iran Freedom
Movement, who were arrested on 11 March and 7 April 2001. Specific reference was made to
the cases of Mohammad Maleki, Hossein Raflee, Reza Reiss-Tousi, Habibollah Peyman,
Alireza Rajai, Mohammad Basteh-negar, Massoud Pedram, Mahmoud Emrani, Taqi Rahmani,
Saeed Madani, Morteza Kazemian and Mohammad Mohammadi Ardahali. Reference was also
made to other intellectuals affiliated to the group who were arrested earlier, namely,
Hossan Yousefi-Eshkevari, Ezzatollah Sahabi, Hoda Saber and Reza Alijani (for previous urgent
actions on this case see A!56/278, annex III, para. 12). In this letter the Special Representative
referred to reports that:
No concrete evidence had been presented in support of the charges brought against the
defendants and the files had not been put at the disposal of their lawyers;
Temporary detention orders had been issued in disregard of the articles of the
Constitution which limit the cases in which judges can resort to this measure;
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The defendants had been held in continued incommunicado detention in unknown
locations and had been exposed to psychological and physical pressure, including the use
of drugs, to extract “confessions”;
The defendants had been denied the right to the presence of legal counsel, including
during and after prolonged interrogation.
4. The Special Representative expressed his deep concern over the treatment of the
above-mentioned persons and urged the Iranian authorities to use all resources at their disposal
to have them released. In this context, the Special Representative referred to the information
provided to him on 9 July 2001, according to which Mr. Alizadeh, Chief of the Tehran Justice
District had said that all the detainees were about to be released on bail. The Special
Representative conveyed his urgent appeal that the commitment be honoured.
5. On the same case, the Special Representative joined the Special Rapporteur on torture
in a new urgent appeal sent on 29 October 2001. The signatories expressed their deep concern
over alleged denial of access to medical treatment for some of the detainees of the so-called
“religious-nationalist” group. Special reference was made to the cases of Habibollah Peyman,
Hashem Sabaghiyan, Hossan Yousefi-Eshkevari, Reza Alijani, Reza Reiss-Tousi,
Abolfazl Bazergan and Ezzatollah Sahabi. The signatories reiterated their urgent request to the
Iranian authorities to use all resources at their disposal to have these persons released
immediately.
6. As the trials of the members of the “religious-nationalist” group started
on 10 November 2001, the Special Representative sent a new urgent appeal on their behalf,
dated 28 November 2001, in which the Special Representative expressed his concern that the
trials were being held in camera and over reports that the defendants' lawyers had not had access
to the files. The Special Representative urged the Iranian authorities to take all necessary steps
to guarantee a fair trial to the offenders, reiterated his deep concern over the treatment they
received during pre-trial detention and urged the Government to use all resources at its disposal
to have the 10 detainees reportedly still being held in prison released immediately.
7. On the same case, by letter dated 27 November 2001, the Permanent Representative
transmitted the following information:
“The following individuals have been released:
Mohammad Bestehnegar
Massoud Behnoud
Ahmad Sadr Haj Seyed Javadi
Morteza Kazemian
Mohammad Maleki
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Mohammad Mohammadi Ardehali
Taher Ahmad Zadeh
Masoud Pedram
Hossein Raflee
Mahmoud Emrani
Au Reza Raj ai
Other cases, including that of Mr. Ezzatollah Sahabi, are currently subject to review in the
relevant court.”
8. In a letter dated 9 August 2001, the Special Representative joined the Special Rapporteur
on violence against women in requesting information from the Iranian authorities concerning the
case of Soraya Dalaian who, according to her personal testimony, was repeatedly raped by two
men during her stay in Evin prison in 1997. According to her report, women were systematically
subject to rape by judges and high-ranking officials of Evin prison.
9. In the same letter, the signatories expressed their deepest distress over the execution by
stoning of Maryam Ayoubi on 11 July 2001 and urged the Iranian authorities to undertake a
policy of actively suppressing recourse to stoning throughout the country (see A!56/278,
annex III, para. 6).
10. By letter dated 9 November 2001, the Permanent Representative transmitted the
following information regarding the case of Soraya Dalaian:
“The aforementioned person was arrested and sentenced to imprisonment
on 10 November 1997 for illegally standing financial bail and was released
on 8 January 1998. Once again she was sentenced to imprisonment for buying and
selling property belonging to others on 28 April and was released on 3 May 1998. She
was also sentenced to imprisonment on 2 August 1998 on the charges of drawing a
dishonoured cheque and presenting forged documents to the police of the Passport
Division. She was released on 23 September 1998 on bail.
“Therefore her conviction has no political overtones whatsoever in any of the cases
mentioned.”
11. The Special Representative joined the Special Rapporteurs on torture and on
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions in sending an urgent appeal on 3 September 2001
regarding the wave of public hangings and street floggings. The signatories appealed to the
Iranian authorities to exercise their authority so that the cases of all persons under sentence of
death were reviewed in order to ensure strict compliance with international human rights
standards. They expressed their concern regarding the application of corporal punishments
E/CN.4/2002/42
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which entail torture, such as flogging, and which are incompatible with international instruments.
They also expressed their view that public application of such punishments was incompatible
with human dignity and condemned this practice as a means of public education.
12. In a letter dated 30 September 2001, the Special Representative and the Special
Rapporteur on torture further referred to the reported public flogging of five young males, aged
between 14 and 25, on 7 September 2001 in the town of Shandiz and reiterated the concerns
expressed in their previous letter.
13. In a letter dated 18 September 2001, the Special Representative joined the Special
Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression in drawing the Iranian authorities' attention
to the verdict issued on 27 August by the Supreme Court upholding the sentences of
Khalil Rostam-Khani and Saeed Sadr. Both translators were arrested and imprisoned for
eight years in connection with their participation in a conference in Berlin in April 2000.
The signatories appealed to the Iranian authorities to provide the assurance that the right of
Khalil Rostam-Khani and Saeed Sadr to freedom of opinion and expression, and their right not
to be detained for seeking to exercise that right would be respected.
14. The letter referred to the fact that the Special Representative was informed in April 2001
by a senior Iranian judge that no one was being tried merely for attending the Berlin Conference,
but on other pending charges. He was later assured by a senior Iranian Judiciary official that
legal action was under way to vacate all the convictions concerning participation in the Berlin
Conference (see A!56/278, annex III, para. 3).
15. In a letter dated 25 September 2001, the Special Representative joined the Special
Rapporteur on torture in drawing the Iranian authorities' attention to the case of Abbas Amir
Entezam, who had been diagnosed with a severe prostate infection and scrotal oedema and was
reportedly denied urgent medical treatment. Mr. Entezam was given a one-month temporary
release from Evin prison shortly after, but was transferred back to the prison on 21 October
despite a recommendation from the State physician that he should continue to receive medical
treatment at home. Consequently, the Special Representative sent a new urgent appeal
on 28 November 2001 appealing to the Iranian authorities to ensure that the right to physical
and mental integrity of Mr. Entezam was protected.
16. On 18 October 2001, the Special Representative joined the Special Representative on
human rights defenders and the Special Rapporteur on the independence of the judiciary in
sending an urgent letter concerning the arrest and trial of Mr. Nasser Zarafchan, a human rights
defender and a lawyer who was reportedly accused of having revealed irregularities in the
sentence issued by a military tribunal in January 2001 concerning the murders of intellectuals in
1998, whose families he represented. The signatories referred to the Basic Principles on the Role
of Lawyers and requested further information (see A!56/278, annex III, para. 5).
17. By letter dated 28 November 2001, the Special Representative drew the urgent attention
of the Iranian authorities to the case of Akbar Mohammadi and Manuchehr Mohammadi. Both
were arrested during the student demonstrations in Tehran in 1999 and according to the
information received had started a hunger strike to protest their imprisonment and inhumane
E/CN.4/2002/42
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treatment. The Special Representative expressed his concern that Manuchehr Mohammadi had
been transferred to solitary confinement over the threats he had received from his jailer, and
appealed to the Iranian authorities to ensure that his right to physical and mental integrity was
protected.
18. On 4 December 2001, the Special Representative drew the urgent attention of the Iranian
authorities to the reported disappearance of Siamak Pourzand on 24 November 2001. The
Special Representative appealed to the Iranian authorities to seek clarification of the
circumstances, with a view to ensuring that the right to physical and mental integrity of
Mr. Pourzand was protected.
19. On the same date, the Special Representative referred to the cases of
Mr. Kayvan Khalajabadi and Mr. Bihnam Mithaqi, two members of the Baha'i community
who were arrested in April 1989 and sentenced to death on 8 December 1993 by the Islamic
Revolutionary Court of Tehran. On humanitarian grounds, he appealed to the Iranian authorities
to use all the means at their disposal to release the above-mentioned persons, who were
convicted solely for their membership in the Baha'i faith and who had been in prison for the
last 12 years.
