

The Complete Text of the Indictment of the Second Group of Accused in the Velvet Coup

According to the report of Fars News Agency, the following is the complete text of the indictment of the second group of accused in the failed velvet coup:

"My Lord, for the favor You bestowed upon me, I will never be an assistant to the criminals."

Respected Head of Branch 15 of the Islamic Revolutionary Court of Tehran,

As you are aware, subsequent to participation of the majority of God-loving and proud people of the Islamic Iran in the 10th presidential election and their response to the call of the Supreme Leader (may his shadow extend) to renew the covenant with the ideals of the Late Imam (may God's grace be upon his soul) on this 30th year since the victory of the Islamic Revolution, which turned a golden page for religious democracy and set an unprecedented world record in people's participation, a hostile movement from both within and outside the country, contrary to the proud achievements of the Islamic regime, engaged in plotting sedition so as to cast a shadow on this mighty triumph by creating public insecurity and disorder and causing confusion amongst the masses. Furthermore, by utilizing opposition media, opportunistic individuals, connections with foreigners, and exploiting the full capacity of anti-revolutionary groups—who have waited years for an opportunity to harm the national security of our Islamic homeland—devised conspiracies and deceitfully created a scenario to make allegations of fraud and forgery against the election process. In order to transform one of the greatest political prides of the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran to a security challenge and propaganda weapon to overthrow the regime.

At the opening of the last session, the public prosecutor of Tehran presented the indictment and evidence concerning the pre-meditated character of these upheavals and submitted documented evidence to prove the organized and pre-planned nature of the recent crime. In today's session, the plotting of the foreign nations who oppose the Islamic Republic of Iran, with the intention of destroying and soft overthrowing of the regime from within the country and their role in the events following the presidential election, and the activities of anti-revolutionary and terrorist groups and their role in events following the elections and recent unrest will be presented to you in two parts:

A) Plotting and planning of foreign nations who oppose the Islamic Republic of Iran with the intention of destruction and soft overthrow of the regime inside the country and their role in the events following the presidential election.

The victory of the Islamic revolution jeopardized the interests of foreign imperialists in the country, as well as their interests in the strategic region of the Persian Gulf, which in turn led to heightened hostility of the West towards the Islamic Republic of Iran. For this reason, their policy has periodically been to devise various political and intelligence strategies in order to confront the Islamic regime.

On the other hand, the troubles of the West—spearheaded by America—which has led them into quagmires in Iraq and Afghanistan, and their defeat of the Zionist regime in the 33-day war with *Hizbollah*, and the 22-day war with Gaza, minimized the possibility and option of taking military action against the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is on such basis that the West opted instead to impose a structural change in the holy regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran by devising innovative intelligence action and exploiting clandestine and soft measures. Along the same lines, cyberspace, media, satellite networks, etc. were used by the foreign forces as innovative tools of operation to influence opinions, which in accordance with the culture of foreign espionage, would manipulate and alter public opinion and behavior, and ultimately result in a structural change in the country. The new

policies adopted by the West, particularly the United States and Britain, to confront the Islamic Republic are based on three principles:

1. To democratize (democracy in line with the aims and interests of the West);
2. To keep the regime preoccupied domestically by creating domestic insecurities and heightening [internal] conflicts;
3. To rein in the regional power of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

It was to this end that the media, public diplomacy, populist organizations, oppositional networks and organizations were efficiently used to create civil disobedience and organize a non-violent movement—to which enormous budget and innovative communication tools were also allocated. Meanwhile, Western spy agencies did not lose the opportunity to take advantage of the internal opposition and avail themselves of these groups as their operational and executive arms. Therefore, the aforementioned groups, such as the illegal group ‘Freedom Movement,’ played a role to instigate, create insecurity, and challenge the regime through becoming pawns and acting as the enemy’s fifth column.

In the same vein, with the aid and assistance of foreign forces, *Munafiqin* group [Mojahedin-e Khalq], *Tundar*, as well as separatists and ethnocentric groups engaged in planting bombs, terrorizing and causing political and ethnic clashes and crisis through counter-security activities during the period of the presidential election. The incident of an assassination attempt against one of the presidential candidates and blaming it on the regime, thereby heightening clashes and creating confusion among different strands of society is only one example of such measures.

Methods of destroying the Islamic Republic of Iran:

To advance the said political schemes, the enemies of the regime (of the sacred Islamic Republic) devised plots and planned methods of execution and made them available to intelligence agencies and associated organizations. Below is a sample of such machinations:

1. Propaganda ploys and spreading word concerning a need for political change in the regime;
2. International support of labor unions, trade unions, and so called ‘human rights’ groups and civil organizations against the regime;
3. Actions to support economic sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran;
4. Secretly providing financial support to opposition forces within the system;
5. Identifying and strengthening centers, recruiting manpower, and engaging influential strands of society such as women, youth, NGOs, etc. to achieve specific goals.

Given that the time-table for the presidential election of 1388 [2009] was marked on national calendars, the execution of the above schemes was planned by foreigners availing themselves to the existing liberties and opportunities to attempt a soft overthrow of the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran through ‘public diplomacy’ and ‘covert action’ projects.

Soft overthrow and covert action:

The soft overthrow, which was groomed and presented to the public as ‘public diplomacy,’ has the following definitions:

From the viewpoint of one of the Western intelligence agencies:

“The aim of ‘public diplomacy’ is to safeguard our national security and interests through understanding and awareness of people of other countries and by maintaining influence thereof through discourse between our citizens and their associations and groups outside the country.”

From Western perspective, soft overthrow means imposing western values and mental frameworks on other societies thereby automatically aligning the policies of the target country with that of the dominating regime.

By ‘public diplomacy’ the West targets ‘nations’ with the ultimate aim of facilitating policies conducive to its covert actions to overthrow [the existing government]. As such, in the context of public diplomacy, covert actions would require devising the most intricate psychologically aggressive operations. According to experts, the most vital goals of this project include:

1. Forcing the government through public pressure to take sides;
2. Creating an atmosphere of mistrust towards government officials and upsetting the decision-making process;
3. Distorting public opinion with respect to the interests and policies of the regime, and promoting schemes in society by creating doubts concerning the values of the regime;
4. Creating crisis in various strands of society and causing division and separation between the people and the government through making allegations against government leaders and falsely accusing the officials;
5. Causing division in various intellectual, ethnic, religious, and other groups with the aim of causing national disunity.

To stress the importance of covert actions, a Western foreign minister stated: “At the present time, our efforts in engaging in public diplomacy takes precedence over all other initiatives, inasmuch as these efforts are an integral part of our foreign policies with respect to opposing governments.”

Given the international volatility subsequent to the fall of the former Soviet Union, the West updated its strategies and reconfigured its tactics to protect its national security. In doing so, it created and defined certain responsibilities for its various security and intelligence agencies to efficiently execute such strategies. It was in this vein that it created its security policies reports.

What is worth noting in the guidelines of the said reports is that they have adopted the line of ‘covert action’ and have overruled military action. Concerning the Islamic Republic, they have recommended ‘soft war’ and ‘collapse from within.’

Adoption of such policies with respect to Iran is an indication of western strategy against the Islamic Republic under the framework of public diplomacy. These notions are so significant that the said reports could very well be referred to as a Western “Manifesto on Covert Action” against the Islamic Republic.

In expressing the importance of employing public diplomacy strategies against Iran, a Western senior security official stated: “Iran, owing to the vastness of its territory, size of its population, quality of its human resources, military capabilities, abundance of natural resources, and its unique geographical position in the Middle East and heartland region, has become an unparalleled power which can no longer be overthrown through military action.”

The key points highlighted in reports that emphasize on adopting the public diplomacy strategy, which are indicative of the intention of the western political masterminds to use public diplomacy against the Islamic Republic are:

1. Exploiting the existing internal differences in Iran;
2. Using soft overthrow instead of military action;
3. Inciting civil disobedience through student associations, NGOs, and trade unions as important tools to put pressure on Iran;
4. Emphasizing the need for international supervision over the election;
5. Demagogic support of human rights and democracy in Iran;
6. Establishing and supporting various radio and television networks with the aim of denigrating the regime and deceiving the public;
7. Supporting internal oppositions;
8. Facilitating the activities of the NGOs aligned with the West;
9. Facilitating the granting of visas for people who are likely to support western goals;
10. Inviting Iranian youth activists to participate in seminars outside the country to tendentiously recruit and train them, as was the case in Serbia, Philippines, Indonesia, Chile, Ukraine, etc.

Furthermore, part of their security doctrine includes:

“It is unlikely that we would confront any challenge more serious than Iran. We have other concerns that are equally important as the nuclear issue. Our concerns will only be satisfied when the Iranian government decides to adopt alternative ways and change its policies to open up its political system so as to give its people freedom. This is our ultimate goal. Our policy is to foster our interaction with the people of Iran. In an effort to eradicate dictatorship, and promote democracy, we will utilize every means, be it political, economic, diplomatic, and any other means at our disposal, including:

- Exposing incidents of human rights violation;
- Supporting reformists through meetings and gatherings at our Foreign Offices and Embassies;
- Allocating budgets to financially support the activities favored by the West in Iran;
- Imposing sanctions with the intention of causing friction between people and government.[”]

On the basis of such evidence and given the Islamic Republic’s internal, regional, and international situation, the project of soft overthrow, or as they call it ‘public diplomacy,’ is very much on the agenda of the western political masterminds. Most important examples are:

1. Providing aid and assistance to NGOs and publishing Persian-language materials about the values of democracy and supporting civil activities;

2. Training journalists and reporters in order to establish news services with the aim of gathering and analyzing information;
3. Training and mobilizing human rights activists in Iran in order to depict a grim picture of the regime;
4. Creating websites and trainings about the election and providing complete information on the 1388 [2009] presidential candidates;
5. Dispatching students, artists and people in trade outside the country in order to form a cadre of potential individuals for key positions in the future.

Subsequent to establishing the Iranian Affairs Office in Dubai (located inside the American Consulate) by the US State Department—modeled after the base in Riga, Lithuania, aimed at collapsing the former Soviet Union during the Cold War, the Office is mandated to actively engage the best of Iranian minds and influence their thinking and understanding with the intention of turning them against the interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It was in this regard that the former spokesman of the Department of State declared: “The American government will collaborate with NGOs and Iranian media through its Embassies in countries along the Persian Gulf and other countries neighboring Iran. We will increase the number of travel agencies and will allocate a \$5,000,000 budget for professors, teachers and people of other trades to visit the United States.”

It is on such basis that in the past two years, the Iranian Affairs Office in Dubai has organized training courses to which a number of individuals from various strands of society including the best of Iranian minds to the United States are invited and dispatched. Those who are invited are easily offered visas, with the assistance of those in charge of Iranian Affairs at the US Consulate in Dubai, namely Ms. Jillian Burns, Mr. Ramin Asgard, Mr. Timothy Richardson, and are sent to the US without having to undergo the routine process. These individuals are thus influenced and subsequent to their return are put in charge of forming new groups for the purpose of dispatching others to the United States.

Defeat of this project due to the arrest of a number of US pawns within the country caused the Americans to devise and execute a new plan called the ‘Exchange Project’ (exchange of people and groups.) Within the framework of the project, individuals and groups were sent to the United States with a great deal of expenditure through the bases established in Dubai, Istanbul, Baku, London and Frankfurt under the supervision of Dubai.

The steps taken by the United States in Iran under the framework of public diplomacy are as follows:

1. Implementing the Soros Foundation’s regional initiative;
2. Exchange Project;
3. Bilateral exchange.

This project facilitated travels of the best of Iranian minds from various strata of society in groups of 15 to different States in America. The process of obtaining visas, and the entire cost of the trips (including airfare, hotel, visits, and purchases), and plans while in the U.S. and etc, were covered and executed under the leadership and management of that country’s State Department through various organizations such as Meridian, Peace, Aspen, etc. (It is noteworthy that this project was aborted as a result of the exposure of its agents by the Ministry of Intelligence in 87 [2008]).

Among the desirable characteristics based on which individuals were chosen for this program were that they had to: “be youth,” “be effective,” “return to Iran,” “ have high education,” “have

connections with governmental organizations and institutions in Iran,” “have no previous negative political records,” etc.

The political and intelligence objectives of the US exchange project included:

1. Building relations with individuals from various strata of society and establishing effective relationships with specialists and experts;
2. Influencing and altering the views of participants to a favorable one of the United States;
3. Influencing and altering public opinion to make them believe that it is necessary for Iran to build relationships with America through pressures from the lower levels of the society;
4. Obtaining analytical information and viewpoints from the participants of the exchange project;
5. Influencing various layers of society and implementing ways to restore lost interests of America in Iran;
6. Pressuring the government to change its policies;
7. Weakening the structures of the government with the ultimate goal of its collapse;
8. Regarding the US as Iran’s only savior;
9. Widening the gap between people and the government;
10. Disrupting the regime’s decision making process;
11. Streamlining and influencing opinions through meetings and protests;
12. Taking advantage of the society’s best minds to jeopardize national security;
13. Provoking ethnic movements;
14. Influencing legal and judicial processes to fit the Western system;
15. Altering the national election process with the excuse of the need for international supervision over the election.

By comparing Iran with countries such as Ukraine and Georgia, the Western governments find election time the best opportunity to advance their corrupt goals and to instigate changes to their own advantage. By abusing people’s potentials without direct foreign interference or outside pressures, through non-violent means and transforming social demands to political ones, and [by using] cyberspace and the internet sites as the most important and seemingly legal tools they attempt to execute their plans.

Based on the results of the investigations and according to the admissions made by the accused persons, the main activities of the foreigners, especially those of the United States and Britain, against the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran are based upon the following strategies:

1. Organizing training courses outside the country;
2. Increased activities of internet sites and media with the aim of influencing opinions towards a specific direction (it was for this purpose that the US Department of State created the long range digital system by which it could gain access to chat rooms and blogs to make direct contact with people; in other words, this system augmented and coordinated a direct relationship between

people of Iran and the US government. Therefore, the US political groups, by taking advantage of the interests of the Iranian youth, used 'internet diplomacy' to advance their own interests and instigate conflict between the people of Iran and the government.)

3. Increased activities of satellite networks (especially Persian-language channels);
4. Selecting groups from various fields and layers of society (such as legal and medical, artists and students, professors and clergymen, etc.) to dispatch to the United States to participate in various educational and professional programs;
5. Planning schemes to influence opinions and alter attitudes with the aim of changing the structure of the holy regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran;
6. Generating negative views to increase hopelessness towards the future and the nation's direction and promoting attraction towards America;
7. Increased activities of European research institutes in order to build relationships with specific individuals and create connections with associations within the country under the pretext of foundation building projects;
8. Offering scholarships to specific individuals and having them return to the country after having influenced their thoughts;
9. Activating Britain for identifying and engaging Iran's best minds through creating NGOs and bringing certain individuals to the country;
10. Organizing training courses for journalists in Holland and England;
11. Exploiting local staff to establish unofficial relations;
12. Exchanging information and collaborating with other spy agencies to benefit from additional information;
13. Instigating and providing guidance to people with the purpose of exacerbating the protests.

Efforts and approaches of the foreign intelligence during the 10th presidential election:

1. Evaluating and assessing existing conditions in the country in order to create disturbance between them and the Supreme Leader and *Velyat-e Faqih*;
2. Efforts towards diminishing people's support of the sacred regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran (domestically and abroad), and undermining the popularity and distinction of the Islamic Republic with the aim of preventing Iran from becoming a model of success among other nations;
3. Exploiting people's potential in order to achieve goals such as: creating mistrust and exacerbating the protests; strengthening ethnic conflicts and domestic opposition; executing the democratization plot in Iran with the aim of altering public views and attitudes; and, ultimately, altering the structure of the regime;
4. Efforts towards widening the gap between the people and the government; exploiting the existing domestic conflicts and potential differences, especially those existing within political parties, political on-goings, the authorities, and different ethnic and religious groups;

5. Encouraging a sector of Iranians living abroad to engage in activities against the Islamic Republic of Iran, and using their gatherings and protests for propaganda purposes;
6. Organizing, guiding, and providing financial, political and media support to terrorist groups and creating alliances between opposition groups within the country and abroad as well as between oppositions within the country and discontented citizens;
7. Creating bases to assist the execution of a quiet revolution by organizing training courses in various countries (such as in the Emirates and Holland) under such themes as human rights and non-violent conflicts;
8. Providing financial and moral support to NGOs with the aim of systematically influencing different strata of society and taking advantage of the opportunities that exist within these layers when appropriate;
9. Implementing the plot of creating domestic unrest (especially within the public), and pursuing plans to apply pressures from outside the country, for change within;
10. Focusing on psychological efforts, spreading rumors, systematically undermining and propagate the incompetence of the regime via internet sites, Persian-language satellite networks—especially VOA, BBC Persian, and other fugitive anti-revolution news networks, including the Royalists and *Munafiqin*, and through other communication methods;
11. Providing guidance to NGOs and anti-regime movements concerning supervision over the election process on behalf of the United States;
12. Insisting on the issue of fraud and questioning the integrity of the Iranian election (approximately 10 days prior to the election day) and efforts to publicize this issue through sites associated with the Department of State (raising issues such as blocking Twitter, reducing internet speed, problems arising with respect to the presence of public and presidential candidates at the election polling sites, etc.); it is noteworthy that a week prior to the election (Friday 15/3/88 [5 June 2009]), the member of the Committee to Protect the Votes from Mr. Mousavi's Office talked about the above issues and referred to them as evidence of fraud in the election;
13. Provoking and laying the groundwork for a violent movement and civil disobedience and setting the stage for street riots, public insecurity, destruction and chaos;
14. Exerting efforts towards making accusations and psychological warfare against the Islamic Republic of Iran, particularly on the issue of violation of human rights, with the intention of exacerbating the isolation of the Islamic Republic of Iran within the international arena.

Efforts and approaches by the Western countries and their spy agencies administered through related embassies and media prior to the election in support of the above-mentioned goals included:

1. Efforts exerted by the British Embassy to make close connections with political parties in Iran. The first contact was made in Azar 1387 [Nov./Dec. 2008] with one of the well-known figures and he was told that the Embassy intends to make connections with some of the political parties in Iran. He was told then, "After you, we will approach these parties." (Through tactful intelligence means, this effort was promptly defeated.)
2. Towards the end of 1387 [March 2009], the British government issued a guidance containing 18 points concerning the election in Iran. While outlining specific tasks pertaining to the 10th

presidential election, the guidance provided information about the roles of each election unit. The guidance also provided instructions with respect to gathering news and intelligence.

3. Travel of British diplomats to different cities in Iran, including Qom; contacting the election offices of some of the candidates in various regions, the presence of British diplomats on the day of the election at different polling units, and ... speaking of the active involvement of the Embassy with respect to the election.
4. Widespread involvement of local staff of the British Embassy in gathering information within the city, with respect to political activists and on the general social conditions. Towards this goal, the Embassy hired and used highly educated (PhDs) and politically savvy local personnel for the purpose of making contacts with people who have access to inside information, thus accessing intelligence with expert analysis during the election.
5. Vast efforts in information and intelligence gathering by the British during the unrest following the election; to the point that almost at all times the local staff were in the centre of the riots trying to gather information—not to mention that the local staff were given instructions to make contact with political parties and collect their analysis and views for the purpose of reporting/broadcasting them.
6. Spotlight reporting of the election process in Iran by BBC Persian service in the period leading up to the election, with insinuating comments such as: lack of enthusiasm, the fraudulent nature of the election, concentrated negative comments on the government's foreign policies, distorting the government's image, etc.
7. Announcement by British diplomats that they expect unforeseen events and bloodshed.
8. Relations between the Cultural-Educational Council (BC) [British Council] and the public with the aim of creating useful connections through efforts such as scholarships, language training institutes, etc. The British identified this as a way to circumvent the Iranian government and use these means during this period of unrest to identify and select capable individuals, at minimum cost, who might be useful to them in the future.
9. Identifying knowledgeable individuals through the English language test ILETS. The British Embassy actively identified capable and effective individuals so it could exploit them during critical times.
10. Creating a VIP department at the visa office in order to attract people with influence in various fields to use this opportunity to make connections with such people under the pretext of interviews for granting visas.
11. Efforts made by the diplomats at the Embassy to make connections with ethnic and cultural elite in order to identify and engage them for the purpose of advancing their own interests.
12. The presence of the British diplomats in various parts of the country and making connections with local people under the pretext of studying the Persian language.
13. Creating ways to attract socio-politically savvy individuals to England with the aim of advancing England's interests (i.e., Ata'ollah Mohajerani).
14. Connections between British study and research institutes with study and research centers in the country with the aim of influencing and altering [their views] (i.e., Chatham House and IISS)

15. The British acting as the intelligence arm for the United States and Israel, so as to compensate for the absence of the U.S.A. and Israel in Iran.
16. Establishing relations with a number of elite political parties and political figures for the purpose of gathering intelligence and recruiting them as collaborators.
17. Building connections with broadcast and print media executives with the ultimate aim of influencing public opinion.
18. In the latter part of Farvardin [early April], a training course was held in Germany with participation of 5 members from the Lawyers' Association on the theme of Citizens' Rights and Cyber Crimes. Subsequent to their return to the country, these individuals began to form working groups to watch for election fraud.
19. Planning to dispatch a group of journalists to America for the purpose of providing them with necessary training for the purpose of overseeing the process of the election on behalf of the United States.
20. Statements made by representatives of foreign agencies in Iran expecting unforeseen events in Iran following the presidential election.
21. Spreading rumors about Iran's capabilities of monitoring mobile phones. On this issue, the Nokia Siemens Networks which sold the monitoring system to Iran provided false information about Iran's monitoring capabilities.

Efforts and approaches of foreigners against the Islamic Republic of Iran subsequent to the glorious 22 Khordad [12 June] election included:

1. Weakening the position of the Supreme Leadership. These efforts were on the priority list of the foreigners against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Lack of attention to the statements and guidance provided by the Supreme Leader by some political groups (notably after the historic sermon of the Friday prayer on 29/3/88 [19 June 2009]) which in turn provided the pretext for the foreigners to use the opportunity to exacerbate the matter in question. Similarly, futile efforts were made by foreign propagandists to create a gap between the views of the Supreme Leader and those of the Late Imam (may God's grace be upon his soul);
2. Creating divisions within the nation's unified views and weakening people's support of the principles and aspirations of the Islamic revolution;
3. Expanding the grounds of conflict among various movements, political parties, and political figures.
4. Challenging the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic regime of Iran and falsely making claims about the nation's lack of support for the government and the authorities;
5. Efforts to prove the regime incompetent in creating democracy, organizing a healthy election, handling the recent unrest, and respecting human rights;
6. Insisting on the need for foreign presence and supervision over the Islamic Republic's presidential election to ensure a healthy process (in the recent years, this issue has been a priority item on the agenda of many countries such as the United States, Britain and their associated groups such as the Freedom Movement.)

Some of the interventionist post-election declarations made by political and intelligence figures include:

1. The former head of CIA commented that ‘goons and thugs,’ and ‘socio-political challenges’ are indications of a potential for fomenting internal crisis;
2. Insisting on annulling the election results under the pretext of “need for paying attention to the protestors and respecting the democratic guidelines and principles in the election;”
3. Subtle persuasion to model the role of the youth in the victory of the Islamic revolution in 1979 and recreate the conditions so as to use such potential to confront the regime;
4. Importing and empowering their own agents under the pretext of freelance journalists subsequent to the return of foreign journalists;
5. Teaching civil disobedience through internet sites (such as Gozaar, associated with Freedom House and the CIA);
6. Support of the street unrests by some European and American officials;
7. Issuance of a statement by the American Congress in support of protestors and placing them opposed to the regime;
8. Establishing media and internet networks and creating cyberspace in order to broadcast their own desirable stories, instigating people to attend illegal gatherings and riots, and publicizing unreal statistics on the number of deaths;
9. Insisting on presenting ‘subversive rioters’ as ‘discontented people,’ and placing them opposed to the regime;
10. Relations between one of the active elements of Office 88 (accused: Mr. Reza Rafi’i) with the special Office for Iranian Affairs in Dubai and Mrs. Jillian Burns, an American intelligence officer. Dispatching news and reports of the unrest through internet sites, and collaboration with an intelligence service in one of the Arab countries in the region. The aforementioned, while making connections with the American media, attempted to receive analysis in line with the foreign approaches and contrary to the principles of the revolution from some former government officials. In turn he provided information regarding the impact of sanctions—imposed as a result of the recent elections—to Ms. Nazi Beglari of VOA.
11. Subsequent to limiting satellite access, intelligence efforts were directed to the internet, and in order to allow easy access to online information, advanced English into Persian and vice versa translation tools were made available to Iranian users and the public. This software allowed users to translate information from English into Persian. The objective of this initiative was to maximize the access of Iranian users to information in English (particularly that on BBC sites) related to the prearranged crisis, despite its serious inadequacies.
12. Offering the most advanced software technology to allow watching of video-clips by computer through landline, modem, and low-speed internet with the aim of engaging users with minimum technical capability to watch their selective video-clips concerning the crisis.
13. Hacking sites of both movements in the country, and also sites belonging to the regime authorities, some candidates, etc. Such activities by foreigners were aimed at heightening

domestic tensions. To this end, at times they engaged internal channels (such as Shatel Co.) to do the hacking so as to cover up the involvement of external elements, and to fully make it an internal conflict.

14. Strengthening the activities of the American company Facebook in order to facilitate access between Iranian users and those in other countries concerning Iran. Claiming that many people around the world use Facebook to exchange information about the fate of the Iranian election, this company launched its trial program in the Persian language so as to allow Persian speaking users to take advantage of it in their mother tongue.
15. During the crisis, some foreign-associated internet sites provided users with phone numbers, users' names, and passwords at no cost so that in the event of a complete shut down of the internet in Iran, people could connect through internet dial-up.
16. In an effort to increase training on 'violent conflicts' and 'non-violent conflicts,' massive amount of training material was made available on line in Persian during the crisis. With respect to such material, two types of information were available:
 - a. Training material concerning violent conflicts: instructions for remote control and time bombs; methods to confront counter-revolutionary forces; strategies to strike the police; instructions for making homemade tear-gas sprays; collecting and publishing information about members of the Basij;
 - b. Training material concerning non-violent conflicts: efforts to produce CDs and Bluetooth containing selective images of splashing green paint on pictures and government advertisements, turning on headlights at dusk as a show of protest, encouraging the chanting of slogans from rooftops.
17. Presence of a German lawyer connected to the Lawyer's Association in the country and his stay in one of the hotels that was at the center of the unrest.
18. Presence of some diplomats in illegal street assemblies (including some European and British ambassadors), gathering of information by embassy liaisons/informers through participation in illegal assemblies and gatherings, and the presence of the French deputy ambassador at election polling units in disguise—related documents are on file.
19. Providing financial aid and support to agitators and anti-revolutionary groups by some European countries, including Britain, and granting visas and refugee status to key rioters.
20. Exploiting local staff by some European embassies for the purpose of gathering information and reporting selective news.
21. Active involvement of two local personnel of the German Embassy to gather signatures for the UN Secretary General to visit Iran.
22. Efforts to promote strikes in Iran.
23. Special news-gathering training provided to the local personnel, in Germany.
24. Exchanging intelligence about the crisis within networks by the accused Ms. Clotilde Reiss (French citizen), and implying the necessity of strikes—according to her confession on 10/4/88 [1 July 2009].

25. Supporting the demonstrations outside the country by some European countries.
26. Threatening to recall European ambassadors from Iran for the purpose of exerting pressure on the government and affecting public opinion.
27. Threatening to increase sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran.
28. Imposing limitations on granting visas to Iranian authorities/statesmen.
29. During the crisis, the intelligence agencies of the Zionist regime called on its resources to discuss the issue of the election with them. In addition to this, during the crisis two individuals associated with the Israeli intelligence agency were actively involved in the upheavals and participated in burning buses. Furthermore, two other influential individuals were present in the upheavals every night until late hours of the evening, gathering information.
30. Foreign political efforts, particularly those by the U.S., Britain and some other European countries were directly intended to intensify and exaggerate the unrest, thereby creating hope, and encouraging the continuation and the intensity of the riots and demonstrations. To this end, on the diplomatic front, noteworthy unsettling efforts were made, most noteworthy of which are as follows:
 - Taking positions and issuing interventionist statements by the United States, Britain, and the Zionist regime regarding post-election circumstances in Iran. Such statements included: expressing concern about unlawful process of election, and pressures exerted by the government on rioters, sympathizing with those involved in demonstrations, condemning waves of arrests and confrontation with rioters, need for recounting ballots, and extending their assistance to demonstrators.
 - Granting permits for marches and demonstrations against the Islamic Republic of Iran in front of Iranian governmental agencies in various countries.
 - Blatant support of the rioters by some European countries announcing that the doors of their embassies are open to key elements of the riots.
 - Issuing declarations and mobilizing the riots by some European political parties and their efforts towards the unification of the protests against the Islamic Republic of Iran.
 - Role of British political organizations, intelligence agencies, and media in events following the 10th presidential election:

Subsequent to the victory of the Islamic revolution, the British were severely struck—having had inside knowledge of the new structure and being aware of the attitudes of the newly-appointed political statesmen. This new development, which resulted in their intelligence defeat, forced them to try their hardest during the last thirty years to gather new intelligence. They, who consider themselves heirs of the British Empire, after the decline of the golden age, adopted a new identity not as a superpower but as a pivotal power in international politics with a new role. Considering the new approaches adopted by the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs and their keen attention to the Middle East, Iran in particular, they vastly spread their espionage activities to gain full knowledge of socio-political conditions and to extend their influence thereof.

Even though the relationship between the two countries since before the revolution was fundamentally altered, the British continued their efforts to have presence and penetrate various levels

of the Islamic Republic of Iran as a significant and influential country in the Middle East to pursue their own political, social and economic interest.

Britain officially and seemingly rejects the idea of a hard change in the regime. However, it clandestinely fosters favorable ties and connections with various levels of the society in order to create strategies for a soft overthrow. There is no doubt that elections in Iran are one of the most important events which Britain wants to have full knowledge of every detail of, to take advantage of its shortcomings and internal differences when appropriate, in order to interfere and devise plans to alter public opinion and advance its own political interests.

The British Cultural-Educational Council, which was a cultural section of the British Embassy in Iran, established prior to the Islamic revolution—under the name of Iran-Britain Association—restarted its operation in Iran in 2000-2001 as the British Cultural-Educational Council. The British Cultural Council is an independent organization and has over 100 branches world wide, with its central office in London. In Iran, however, it operates as the cultural section of the British Embassy.

Among many activities of the British Council (BC) one can name the following: administering general and specialized English language tests; educational consulting; offering scholarships during various stages of higher education to the elite, researchers, university professors and other higher education institutes, staff and personnel of various organizations, journalists, etc. Furthermore, this Council leads academic, educational, research and artistic projects in conjunction with Iranian-British centers. Among other undertakings of this Council were to conducting inter-university academic projects and other such initiatives.

Even though on their own these initiatives seem harmless and ordinary, the important point is that this British centre pursued its own objectives and interests under the guise of these projects. Objectives such as: identifying and engaging the best academic minds, gaining insight into plans and projects of the country's institutes of higher education and research centers, gathering intelligence under the pretext of comments and evaluations from visitors, organizing private and public consulting sessions for those who were considering to study abroad or immigrate, etc.

In collaboration with British Embassy in Tehran, this Council annually offered 'Chewing Scholarships' under the pretext of which the British Foreign Office identified and recruited a number of the best students and university graduates in Iran and invited them to undergo an interview in order to send them abroad to continue their education, on various levels, or for sabbaticals or research purposes. As a result of such undertakings, many of these individuals, subsequent to completing their programs abroad, did not wish to return to Iran.

With respect to other types of scholarships offered by the British Cultural Council, we can mention short-term scholarships and educational grants exclusively available to some university professors and individuals from various organizations. When in England, these individuals have the benefit of using the Council's central office in London.

Subsequent to return of these individuals to the country, the British Cultural Council tries its utmost to continue its association with them in order to have them at its disposal to advance its own interests. In other words, these individuals become liaisons of the Cultural Council in various domestic organizations. Furthermore, these individuals are invited by the British Embassy and the Cultural Council to participate in various celebrations and occasions, during which high-ranking diplomats suspicious of espionage activities for Britain introduce topics of discussions of their own interest to collect detailed information with respect to the positions and ranks of these individuals in governmental organizations.

In any event, the way the British operate generally, and the Cultural Council specifically, is based on identifying and engaging individuals from various governmental organizations in order to exploit them to advance their own goals of gathering intelligence in the country.

It is during such courses and seminars supported by the British Council and in collaboration with other British-Iranian centers in the country that representative of the British Council get to know Iranian researchers and invite them to complete the final stages of their research projects in Britain, while fully covering their cost of travel, accommodation, studies, etc. It is important to note that some of these projects, due to their importance, are considered national projects, which the researchers, as a result of their collaboration with the Educational-Cultural Council and/or other British organizations, made them susceptible to foreign exploitation.

As the time drew closer to the election and the presidential candidates became active in their campaigns, the political section of the Embassy became well groomed and visible with a cadre of trained local staff that from late Farvardin 88 [April 2009] set out in an organized manner to divide tasks for gathering information and news on: the views and positions of the officials in the regime, Friday prayers, IRIB, *Sepah*, *Basij*, views of high-ranking commanders, mosques, political circles, publications, newspapers, internet sites, economic indicators, Bazaar, trade and commerce, and presence in towns and villages. To this end, the political section met twice a week with the head of the department and Mr. Thomas Bern to collect and summarize this information and produce a final report.

In the same vein, some of the activities of this country [Britain] with respect to tracking and encouraging the recent riots included:

1. In months leading to the election, the British Embassy organized a collective effort to follow the daily events across the country and monitor the news from various news services, websites, weblogs, people's views, students, religious leaders, IRIB's executives, *Sepah*, and *Basij*. Closer to the election, the British diplomats and local staff began traveling to various provinces, paying particular attention to the views of different ethnic groups in Iran about each candidate.
2. Extended intelligence activities by the British in gathering information during the post-election crisis, to the point where their local personnel were always present at the scene of the conflicts collecting information. Furthermore, the local staff had been instructed to contact political parties and gather information and analyses provided by them, and report their findings thereafter.
3. Subsequent to the announcement of the election result, the British Embassy began its actions to spread rumors and allegations of fraud in the election, claiming the existence of fabricated and fraudulent ballots thereby encouraging chaos and illegal protest assemblies under the pretext of citizens' rights.

Moreover, following the commence of the crisis, a meeting was organized in London by the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs in which opposition groups (including the *Munafiqin*) were present. In that meeting, the following guidelines were adopted as a strategy for the rioters and opposition:

- a. Continuation of riots and illegal assemblies (particularly after the Friday prayer of 29/3/88 [19 June 2009]);

- b. Lack of obvious presence of opposition groups;
 - c. Distinguishing ‘protests’ from ‘violent struggles’ (in the form of civil disobedience);
4. Participation of all British diplomats at street marches and illegal assemblies subsequent to the election;
 5. During the interrogations, one of the accused in the recent events made confessions with respect to:
 - His presence, and that of his spouse, in an illegal gathering in support of Mr. Karroubi in Sa’adatabad as well as in an illegal gathering in support of Mir-Hussein Mousavi in both Sa’adatabad and Gisha;
 - The presence of Alex Penfield, First Secretary and Thomas Bern, Deputy Secretary (who has left the country since the recent crisis);
 - The presence of a British diplomat, on 24/3/88 [14 June 2009] on Sana’ie Street in the midst of the chaos in an illegal gathering after the election;
 - The participation of Samuel Morgan, diplomat from the Public Relations Office, on 25/3/88 [15 June 2009] on and about Motahari and Shariati Streets in the midst of chaos and the arrests of some of the protestors;
 - The presence of Thomas Bern on 28/3/88 [17 June 2009] on Enghelab Street during an illegal march;
 - The participation of Paul Blami, deputy of the Visa Office (now expelled from the country), on 28/3/88 [17 June 2009] on Ferdowsi Square taking photographs of that day’s gathering;
 - The presence of Samuel Morgan, on 27/3/88 [16 June 2009] on Karimkhan Street during the illegal march; (Hussein Rassam: interrogation of 6/4/88 [27 June 2009]—pages 12 & 13.)

Furthermore, a number of the accused have made direct admissions to the fact that during the illegal assemblies of Mr. Mousavi’s supporters in Baharestan, Alex Penfield, First Secretary of the Embassy, asked them to go to Baharestan square and report their observations. (Arash Momenian, Hussein Rassam)

The British Ambassador also instructed his local staff to assess and report their observations from other cities.

Prior to the election, Alex Penfield and a local person from the political section held a meeting with members of the headquarters of one of the protesting candidates. He also held meetings with some individuals associated with other parties and officials from some NGOs. Moreover, subsequent to the election, on 4/4/88 [25 June 2009], at the VIP section of the Embassy, Mr. Penfield met with a well-known reformist political figure (while obtaining a visa) and discussed the candidacies, the recent events, and the historic Friday Prayer sermon of 29/3/88 [18 June 2009]. (Hussein Rassam: interrogation of 9/4/88 [30 June 2009]—pages 17 & 18.)

Allocation of a £300,000 budget to domestic NGOs. Assisting these NGOs could have streamlined collaborative efforts between non-governmental sectors to take advantage of the recent crisis;

Identifying sources with connections through administering the ILET test. In this manner the British Embassy tried to identify effective people in order to prepare for using them in times of need.

Efforts towards screening of unlicensed films at the Embassy with the aim of attracting filmmakers and producers to exploit them when necessary;

Establishment of the VIP section at the visa office with the aim of exploiting relationships with individuals who have influence in various sectors under the pretext of visa interviews;

Efforts made by Embassy diplomats to engage with the ethnic and cultural elites to build relationships with them for the purpose of advancing their own interests;

Presence of Embassy diplomats in various parts of the country and making connections with locals under the pretext of studying the Persian language;

Providing opportunities to attract and engage political and cultural figures in England towards advancing their own interests (i.e., Ata'ollah Mohajerani);

Collaborations between British academic and research institutes with domestic academic and research centers with the aim of influencing views and opinions (i.e., Chatham House, IISS);

Extended intelligence efforts by Britain to cover the lack of presence of the US and Israel in Iran;

Contacting and building relationships with the elite, political parties, and political figures for the purpose of gathering intelligence and to engage them in collaborating with their agencies;

Making connections with newspapers and media with the ultimate aim of influencing public opinion;

Role of BBC State News Service in the events following the election:

The BBC State News Service which operates under the umbrella of World Service receives its budget from the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since two years ago, [the BBC News Service] has recruited and dispatched journalists and ordinary individuals in groups under the guise of the Trust Foundation to Turkey and Dubai in order to give them specialized training to establish and expand efforts known as “citizen’s journalism.” By selecting and hiring talented individuals from within these groups, it staffed other sections of the BBC thus creating a vast network of human resources in the country for the purpose of exploiting opportunities.

The budget allocated to this Trust Foundation is provided by the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other European countries in the amount of \$30M.

Subsequent to commencing their initiative to implement massive restructuring, the BBC established its Persian language television station, which was launched last Dey (1387) [Jan. 2009]. Most staff members in this network have completed the Trust training courses, and are among those who worked for networks that criticized the regime.

From the outset, BBC Persian began its operation with a particular aim; it made a wide-range of relationships with some documentary filmmakers in the country and collected their unlicensed works

that were banned from being screened in Iran. Later on, in its program entitled ‘Your Turn’—the main person behind which is an individual who had been arrested during the 18-Tir [July 9] riots, also a key individual behind ‘Trust,’ and who spent some time in prison—provoked strife within the country and attempted to exacerbate and exaggerate domestic disagreements and political challenges.

In the period leading to the election, BBC Persian made special plans to cover the anniversary of 18-Tir [July 9] so as to instigate and provoke students and the general population to start riots. Furthermore, prior to the presidential election, by inviting a number of dissidents and problematic figures and by covering the cost of their stay in London for a month and also covering the expenses of round-table political discussions, BBC Persian sowed the seeds of sedition and the idea of election fraud.

Before the election, even prior to the establishment of BBC Persian, many a times the question was posed by the rumor-spreading network if it could send journalists and reporters to Iran? What are the coverage criteria? And ... The results of all these efforts on one hand, and pre-election conditions of the country on the other prepared the arena for BBC to engage in an interventionist endeavor against the Islamic Republic.

The BBC Persian station made a massive effort to prepare for 24-hour coverage on Election Day. It arranged interviews with problematic individuals/dissidents within the country to transmit minute-by-minute reporting of the news and events.

Instructions provided by foreigners with respect to the continuation of protests in dispute of the results of the 10th presidential election:

1. Insisting on continuation of protests and rejection of the election results until a favorable outcome;
2. Identifying *Sepah* and *Basij* as elements of a military coup, and demanding removal of the said forces from the scene. (It is noteworthy that declarations made by various countries under the pretext of violation of human rights, and the need for international supervision [for the election], etc. were assessed in light of this issue. The elimination of the people’s [volunteer] force of *Basij* from the scene was urged by the United States’ intelligence and security agencies);
3. Creating distinction between religious and non-religious spheres;
4. Aggrandizing the gaps in various levels of society, and emphasizing the lack of support of certain leaders of the election results;
5. Emphasizing the support of certain leaders and well-known figures of opposition groups and rioters;
6. Intensifying pressures with the goal of forcing the president to resign.

B) Efforts made by anti-revolutionary and terrorist groups and their role in the events following the presidential election and recent disturbances.

Even though as a result of the historic letter issued by His Eminence the Imam (may God’s grace be upon his soul), the Freedom Movement group was tossed out to the margins of political arena and the cry of its threat against the pillars of the Islamic revolution became faint, this group has relentlessly held fast to its destructive position and against various ebbs and tides has exerted its utmost to quash the fruits of the blood of thousands upon thousands of martyrs and sacrificial souls. In the past two

years, more active than ever, the said group has again entered the country's political scene and has tried to present itself to foreign countries and the opposition within as the choice replacement of the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran. To this end, the Secretary General of the group has made various visits to the United States, Germany, etc. Following is a sample of the positions taken and the initiatives made by the Freedom Movement in the last two years:

1. Subsequent to Mr. Ebrahim Yazdi's (leader of this illegal group) three month-long trip to America (from 30/11/86 to 5/3/87 [19 February to 5 May 2008]), the positioning of the Freedom Movement became fiercer, such that after many years, at political meetings held by the group, "the strategy to overthrow the regime ... ," was blatantly suggested by Yazdi and with the addition of the word "peaceful"—hence the attempt for a soft overthrow—it was approved by the group.
2. Subsequent to his return from America, Mr. Yazdi, boldly and bombastically targeted the pillars of the regime and adopted the strategy of attacking the "Supreme Leader," with the aim of striking the core of the sacred principles of the regime.

In an interview dated 23/3/87 [23 May 2008] with Rooz News Service stated: "Now is the time to evaluate the functioning of the regime based on the structure of 'Supreme Leadership.' We believe that the fundamental problem in Iran is the system of 'Supreme Leadership.'

Last Mordad [July-August], the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution Organization invited the leaders of the Freedom Movement to participate and speak at its 12th Congress. At the weekly meeting of his organization, Mr. Ebrahim Yazdi said: "I was invited to the Congress and I sent a message which was read at the session. We have to learn from the past so as to be able to succeed in advancing changes."

With regards to the alliance between the Freedom Movement, the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution Organization, and *Mosharekat* Party [Participation Front], Mr. Ebrahim Yazdi has stated: "We are pleased to see that political parties are gradually becoming more realistic. Groups that 10 years ago had drawn lines between friends and foes have come to realize that creating such borders are not realistic. Leaders of today are different than those 10 years ago ... There was a time when the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution were not at the stage that they could sit together with the Freedom Movement, but this year they invited us to the congress and we participated."

Furthermore, in a message to the congress of the *Mosharekat* Party, [Mr. Yazdi] declared 'purposeful political engagement' and 'growth and expansion of political parties and organizations' as prerequisites for the process of democratization in the country, and stated: "... interwoven and multi-layered schemes of totalitarians can succeed only when there is no dialogue and alliance between political parties ... "

Also, the youth branch of the *Mosharekat* Party invited Mohammad Tavassoli (Director of the Political Office of Freedom Movement) to speak at the Party's gathering hall. In 86 [2007] Tavassoli stated: "... more work must be done on political movements. For instance, *Mosharekat* is worth investing in; it could become influential due to its widespread membership."

3. At a collaborative meeting of the opposition movement held in Azar 86 [Nov.-Dec. 2007] hosted by the Freedom Movement group with the presence of representatives from other illegal groups such as *Advar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat*, *Daftar-e Tahkim*, influential anti-revolutionaries, and well-known political leaders, such as: Abdollah Nuri, Ansari Rad, etc., it was said that "the problem

with the country today is not (Mr.) Ahmadinejad, but in fact it is the foundation of Supreme Leadership, therefore our target must be towards that.” Also in this meeting there were discussions around involving leaders from the current regime towards this aim.

4. Unlike previous years, Freedom Movement group actively took part in the recent election and by supporting Misters Mousavi and Karroubi, conveyed its expectation for fundamental change in the country.

To this end, the Freedom Movement held meetings with those in charge of Misters Mousavi and Karroubi’s headquarters and, in agreement of collaborative efforts, it volunteered a number of its members in Tehran and other cities to stay at the offices of Mr. Mousavi, an example of which is the presence of Emad Bahavar, the director of the youth branch of the group, at Office 88 of Mr. Mousavi. The mentioned individual also brought with him a number of youth members to volunteer at this unit.

In addition to the Freedom Movement, other anti-revolutionary phantoms and gatekeepers of human rights in alliance with the West began their activities paving the ground for the expansion of post-election chaos.

Statements of a number of anti-revolutionary group leaders during election campaign:

During the course of the election campaign, by insinuatingly suggesting fraud and election coup, a number of eclectic anti-revolutionary group leaders tried to become catalysts for creating post-election chaos, among whom the leader of Freedom Movement and Kayvan Samimi (member and founder of a self-proclaimed Committee for Free, Healthy and Fair Election) can be mentioned.

On the military front, armed anti-revolutionary groups, anywhere from communist leftist and socialist groups to eclectic movements, the inwardly blind *Munafiqin*, separatist ethnic movements with the leadership of their Western superiors caused the bloodshed of thousands of innocent souls.

What is noteworthy concerning the *Munafiqin* group is that this group, through a measured move and as a result of agreements made with Western governments and support thereof, was removed from the list of terrorist groups. This move is indeed an endorsement of this group and gave it power to maneuver for the purpose of instigating measures towards an overthrow during the 10th presidential election in Iran. An important point in this regard is that the first country that removed the *Munafiqin* group from the list of terrorist groups was Britain, whose footprints are all over the recent disturbances.

Just as in previous years, prior to the 10th presidential election, the *Munafiqin* group, due to their animosity with the sacred Islamic regime and lack of knowledge of domestic matters, again made grave mistakes in its analysis. Prior to the election, the said group made great efforts to penetrate in campaign headquarters of Misters Mousavi and Karroubi (supporting classified files 570/85/88.)

Furthermore, from months before, it [Mojahedin-e Khalq] paved the grounds to support and organize unionized protests in competing campaigns and planned ways to intensify the rivalries between supporters of different candidates. However, with the awe-inspiring %85 participation of the insightful people of the Islamic Iran in the election, all their efforts and plans came to naught. With all their might, by dispatching teams of trained members to create strife, the elements of the *Munafiqin* group tried to change the direction of the protests to a violent, menacing, and terroristic struggle. By issuing consecutive manifestoes from their leaders and their vast distribution through satellite networks and the internet, they made efforts to heighten the crisis and extend the riots.

Following are excerpts from the 27 Khordad [17 June] and 18 Tir 1388 [9 July 2009] messages of the group leaders:

“Indeed in this day, you are the men and women of war, who rise in every city and town just as instructed by Maryam Rajavi. We must strongly support the annulment of this regime’s election. Fair elections must be conducted under the supervision of the United Nations, based on people’s leadership ... 27 Khordad 1388 [17 June 2009].”

“Spontaneous demonstrations must permeate at any time and any place, particularly in weak and susceptible regions of the enemy’s suppressive forces. Even in places that there are no opportunities for gathering, resisting nucleuses comprised of 9, 5 or even 3 young revolutionaries would eventually exhaust and defeat the suppressive forces of the enemy. Small nucleuses are the moving engines and initiators of larger gatherings. Also, do not forget additional nucleuses of transportation, paramedics, and communication teams ... 18 Tir 1388 [9 July 2009].”

Furthermore, the said group gave instructions to its connections, which they had previously trained at Camp Ashraf in Iraq and planted within the country, to engage in menacing and terrorist activities such as burning buses, banks and telephone booths as well as attacking military and security centers of Basij. In the same vein, one of the main camps of the terrorist *Munafiqin* group located in Britain (phone number 00442032398487) took a leading position in domestic terrorist activities and uprisings, and while promoting an armed struggle and creating chaos in the country, stimulated the crowds to shout sharp slogans against the leaders and the pillars of the regime. By insinuating that people mistrust the government, they paved the ground for creating a gap between the people and the government, and to this end did not leave any stone unturned.

Following is the confession of the accused, reference number T/88/11597, on the above subject:

“I became engaged with this group (*Munafiqin*) in Mehr 86 [Sept.-Oct. 2007] through one of its supporters. In Dey of that same year [Dec. 2007-Jan. 2008], with the assistance of a liaison smuggler, I was illegally sent to Iraq, where I received various trainings for three months at their Camp in the areas of computer, propaganda activities, recruiting manpower, ideological classes, gathering of intelligence, and training for menacing combative activities. I was then smuggled into the country in order to carry out missions according to the instructions given to me. To compensate me for my initiatives, they wired a sum of 1,400,000 Tomans [US\$1,400] to my account and that of my liaison. The sphere of my responsibilities during the election period included: gathering information and intelligence from electoral units, and taking photographs and footage and sending them to the *Munafiqin*. After the outbreak of riots, my mission was to be present in the scenes of struggles. On 27/3/88 [17 June 2009] I received a call from my liaison Zohreh, phone number 00442032398487, who said: “Everyone in Iran has a personal problem ... but what is the main cause of the problem? ... The main cause has to be eliminated ... I think this is the time ... time is of the essence ... we have come to help you, therefore the armed struggle of today is our voice ... go with your friends and burn something ... where the *Basijis* are. Get together in groups of 5 or 6 and sneak into one of their centers and burn it. Take fuel ([Molotov] cocktail) and throw it at them. Burn gas stations. Get hold of public buses, get the people out, ... and then burn [the buses] in the middle of the road ... ”

As a result of such activities, a number of individuals connected with this group, who were instructed by the *Munafiqin* to be present at the scene to create chaos and disorder, were killed or injured during these struggles. The *Munafiqin* in turn, in their own hypocritical manner, and in an effort to take advantage of the riots for their own interests, erected a memorial structure in their name in Camp Ashraf on 3/5/88 [25 July 2009].

It is noteworthy that for the purpose of gathering intelligence and inside information, the elements of sedition paid monthly wages to a number of individuals to deceive them and use them to contact agencies such as: Homa News Service, Iran News Agency, and also so called Committees for Defense of Human Rights and Political Prisoners ...

Through the kindness and favors of the Almighty and by the indefatigable efforts of the Unknown Soldiers of Lord of the Age (may God hasten His return), a number of these key liaisons who had an active role in the street riots were identified and arrested, rendering their terrorist and seditious efforts useless.

Furthermore, the separatist and ethnocentric groups who for years have been relentlessly involved in subversive activities to destroy this land through guidance from the enemy, were not sitting idle during the course of the presidential election, and were plying out another part of the scenario.

According to the existing documented evidence and the accused, these movements were guided by the enemies' intelligence agencies who devised various machinations for creating chaos and heightening crisis, which were caught by the Ministry of Intelligence before they were carried out. Following is a sample of such activities and machinations:

They penetrated the campaign headquarters of Mr. Karroubi with the aim of gathering information and influencing their thoughts and views so as to instigate conflict among different candidates and cause chaos. They also planned to blast a bomb during Mr. Mir Hussein Mousavi's speech in Tabriz Stadium.

It should be noted that two firearms and 20 bombs were confiscated from these accused.

On the cultural front, by using the imperialist media, the agents of the enemy's cultural attacks made efforts to concoct plans and tactics for an overthrow. In this regard, efforts of Western media towards overthrowing the Islamic Republic of Iran by exploiting the volatile conditions and the unrest following the 10th presidential election of the Islamic Republic can be mentioned. The following are noteworthy examples:

Through media efforts and psychological manipulation, Britain and America exerted their utmost to broaden the range of chaos; to this end, Britain was more influential and played a more active role. It can be said with confidence that indeed the BBC Persian station was the most active element and the greatest instigator of the agitations, and its psychological manipulations were far greater than that of other satellite networks. In reviewing the efforts and operation of this channel in days leading to the election and subsequent riots, two very different images of BBC Persian emerge. In days prior to the unrest and during the election campaigns, and in an effort to increase viewership, this channel concentrated its programs on showing the excitement about the election in Iran and presented different political view points that existed in the country. In so doing, this channel paved the ground for executing the next phase of its plan.

In the next phase, after the outbreak of the riots, this channel transformed into being the voice of the rioters, and while embellishing the news, footages, reports, interviews, etc. with regards to the protests, entered into psychological warfare against the Islamic Republic of Iran. During this phase of psychological manipulation, BBC Persian tried to insinuate the issue of fraud into the elections and reported it in an epic-making sensationalizing method to its audience encouraging their participation in the protests.

By continuing to broadcast archival or any new footages of the riots, this network still tries to depict the atmosphere of the country as volatile.

Likewise, among American networks, VOA (Voice of America) was most active in spreading the unrest. This network—albeit at a lower standard and less professional than BBC, adopted a destructive approach prior to the election campaigns with two particular objectives:

- 1) To destroy the validity and legitimacy of the presidential election of the Islamic Republic of Iran by describing it as undemocratic;
- 2) To damage and destroy the image and credibility of the President.

After the election and at the outbreak of the riots, by reporting the news through its own lens and conducting interviews with fugitive anti-revolutionary elements, this network tried to depict the chaos as a movement by people overthrowing the Islamic regime.

In addition to the said networks, tens of other networks related to anti-revolutionary groups, who are supported both financially and technically by Western countries, played a supporting role to the BBC and VOA networks.

Moreover, in addition to television networks, Western countries provided venues for the rioters on the internet, a sample of which is mentioned here below:

- 1) Offering a Persian-English vice versa translation tool for public use;
- 2) Offering advanced software for viewing clips of the riots with low-speed internet;
- 3) Offering anti-filter programs suitable to Iran's network;
- 4) Providing service on Twitter for Iranian users (on 20/6/2009 this American company delayed its planned update, which would require shut-down of its services for a few days, in the interest of supporting and offering service to the rioters);
- 5) Activating Facebook, an American company, to ease communication between users in Iran and other countries. At the time of the demonstrations, this company launched its Persian language trial program to provide easy access to the rioters.

Among other active movements confronting the theocratic regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran were those of royalist groups, who have, since the collapse of the tyrant royalist regime on 22 Bahman 1357 [11 February 1979] to date, been opposing the Islamic revolution with the guidance and support of international governments, spearheaded by the imperialist America and the bloodsucking Zionist regime, and to this end, they have not fallen short of committing any crime. These groups that nurture the thought of bringing back the royalist and monarchist regime, have exploited, under the guidance of their Western superiors, every means available to them, be it propaganda, media, political, military, and cultural in order to exert efforts to eradicate the country's religious values and replace them with archaic royalist beliefs.

Among groups that have been active in the past two years in this process through the financial, intelligence, military, training, and media/communication support of the West is a group called "The Royalist Society."

This group which has adopted the policy of overthrowing the Islamic Republic of Iran through terrorist activities supported by the American, British and Zionist intelligence agencies has devised extended plots with the objective of overthrowing the Islamic Regime. Through the kindness of the Almighty and the efforts of the Unknown Soldiers of the Lord of the Age (may God hasten His return), however, all their machinations were aborted at embryonic stages and came to naught.

Internet sites operated by the terrorist Royalist Society for the purpose of realizing their overthrow plots are as follows:

1. Expansion of the groups' communication networks through the use of internet and satellite televisions;
2. Efforts to promote anti-religious sentiments to its audience, viewers and associates with the aim of creating opposing forces against the theocratic state of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the form of training foot soldiers for the enemy in their efforts to overthrow the sacred regime of the Islamic Republic;
3. Providing military and intelligence training to its recruits for the purpose of extending its operational capabilities against the Islamic Republic of Iran;
4. Exploiting its associates to carry out intelligence activities and espionage towards the goals of the enemy's intelligence agencies and those of the group;
5. Intelligence activities and identification of key pro-regime figures with the aim of assassinating them;
6. Plotting terrorist activities;
7. Creating fear and fright in the country through terrorist activities, i.e., massacre with the aim of maximum death toll to create irrepressible crisis in the country;
8. Plotting the assassination of statesmen and political figures, etc.

Based on the above policies, in Farvardin 1387 [March-April 2008], the Royalist Society group attempted to plant a bomb at the *Husseiniyyih Seyyedu'l Shuhada* in Shiraz. During this terrorist operation, 14 mourners were martyred—including women and children, and over 200 injured.

Subsequent to this bestial act, the elements behind which were identified and hung, the said group devised other such terrorist plots with the aim of overthrowing the regime. However, every time their agents were identified and arrested through the efforts of the Unknown Soldiers of the Lord of the Age (may God hasten His return).

Included in the machinations of this group, known as the Royalist Society, were efforts to exploit the mood of the election towards advancing its plans of 'overthrow' in the framework of the American, British and Israeli policies. In this regard, the following action plans were transmitted by the enemy's intelligence agencies and the group leaders to their agents within the country:

1. Gathering information/intelligence with respect to the mood of the 10th presidential election;
2. Gathering information/intelligence with respect to *Sepah-e Pasdaran* and *Basij*;
3. Identifying and targeting crowded voting sites with the aim of planting bombs;

4. Plotting and organizing bomb attacks and terrorist activities in two crowded voting sites of *Husseiniyyih Irshad* in Tehran and Al-Nabi Mosque in Narmak;
5. Planting bombs in crowded locations, including *Imamzadeh Hazrat-e Ali Akbar*, Chizar and *Imamzadeh Zayd* located in the central Bazaar in Tehran;
6. Planting a bomb in *Husseiniyyih Fatimiyun* on Mojahedin Street;
7. Using chemical and poisonous bombs in crowded locations;
8. Identifying sensitive governmental centers for the purpose of bombing;
9. Identifying strategic fuel and food warehouses;
10. Planning to contaminate Tehran's drinking water with highly poisonous substances;
11. Providing the following training programs to rioters for the purpose of expanding the protests:
 - Training combative nucleuses;
 - Training information/intelligence protection skills;
 - Training to make homemade bombs and grenades;
 - Training to confront anti-riot police;
 - Training to conduct partisan combat;
 - Training to make electric shock devices;
 - Training to make tear gases and ways to fight against it;
 - Training to monitor conversations and to avoid being monitored;
 - Training to break through filters and avoid being identified online;
 - Training to break through distorted transmission;
 - Training to conduct surveillance and ways to avert being followed;
 - Training to use firearms.

The above-mentioned points indicate that the terrorist group, Royalist Society, has been actively involved in the past two years in efforts towards overthrowing the sacred Islamic Regime of Iran, and that the group members, fully aware of the implications of their actions, have streamlined their activities towards advancing the goals of the enemy's intelligence agencies and group leaders.

The existing evidence also indicates that this group was a piece of the puzzle with respect to the post-election crisis created as a result of the machinations of the enemies of the Islamic Republic of Iran in an attempt at a velvet overthrow. Furthermore, it indicates that this group was a combative arm in the movement towards challenging the authority of the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran and that it came into the field with the goal of expanding the crisis beyond control and to embolden the actions

of the rioters. An example of such undertaking is the attempt of a bomb attack at the Holy Shrine of the Late Imam on 30/3/88 [20 June 2009] by a certain Bijan Abbassi—who himself was killed as a result of the explosion of the bomb before he came close to the tomb—due to the alertness of the local authorities.

The accused in the Royalist Society file who reside outside the country are:

1. Jamshid Sharmahd: a group leader, resident of Los Angeles, United States. The accused is a liaison between CIA and the Royalist Society, and plays a main role within the group;
2. Emanuel Afar: of Jewish descent, intelligence officer for Mossad, and resides in both United States and Israel;
3. Dordaneh Manouchehri: resident of London, England, and a liaison between the group and the British intelligence agencies;

It is noteworthy that after the bombing incident at *Seyyedu'l Shuhada Husseiniyyih* in Shiraz, a “Red-Wanted” [*sic*] warrant was issued by the judiciary and sent to Interpol. It is unfortunate, however, that the US and British police did not collaborate with their arrest and extradition (despite the terrorist activities of the accused and verification thereof by the media).

The accused on the first line of the said file who reside within the country are:

1. Mohammad Reza Ali Zamani, son of Esmail;
2. Ahmad Karimi, son of Mahmood;
3. Hamed Rouhinejad, son of Mohammad Reza;
4. Arash Rahmanipour, son of Davood;
5. Amir Reza Arefi, son of Ahmad

Detailed charges against each accused is contained in the file, and reasons for their convictions and the degree of each of their involvements in the recent uproar is noted in their indictments which will be declared in due course.

Deputy Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Tehran