The Case of the Rahá'I Minority in Iran
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The Case of the Bah a ‘ 1 Minority in Iran
Moral Douglas Martin reviews the history of the persecution of Bahá'Is in Iran and the success
Development the community has had in using the U.N. system in their defense. This article first
Human Rights appeared in the 1992-93 edition of The Bahá'I World, pp. 24 7-271.
The experience of the Bahá'Is of Iran is a classic case of the violation of human rights,
produced by religious intolerance. Prior to the Islamic revolution a deep-seated prejudice
against the Bahá'Is and their religion characterized not only Iran's Islamic clergy and the
illiterate masses, but also many among the country's educated elite and middle class. The
prejudice was widespread and communicated itself to many Western observers. Michael
Fischer, a generally sympathetic commentator on the revolution notes, for example, that
even the exercise of routine civil functions by Bahá'Is was seen as proof of a “Bahá'I
conspiracy”. 1 - Richard W. Cottam, author of Nationalism in Iran, pointed out the problem of
even discussing the subject of the Bahá'I Faith in a country in which the word “BábI” has
long been freely used as an epithet, along with such words as “infidel”, to describe anyone
to whom the speaker is strongly opposed. This prejudice is probably the most important
point to grasp for an observer wishing to understand the situation of the Bahá'Is in modern
Iran.
The second point is that, in the land of the Bahá'I Faith's origin, the prejudice is,
paradoxically, combined with an almost universal ignorance of the religion's nature,
teachings, and history. For over a century a curtain of silence has surrounded the subject.
The Bahá'I community has consistently been denied the use of any means of
communication with the general public: radio, television, newspapers, films, the distribution
of literature, or public lectures. The academic community in Iran has studiously ignored the
existence of the worldwide Faith founded there; the subject has never been treated in any
university courses or textbooks. Indeed, census figures which provided statistics on all of
SEARCH the other religious and ethnic minorities in Iran have consistently been omitted for the
Bahá'I community, the largest religious minority of aIl. Coupled with this calculated
Contacting the Bahá 'Is general neglect, the public mind has been subjected, for decades, to abusive propaganda
from the ShFih Muslim clergy, in which the role of the Bahá'I community in Iran, its size, its
beliefs, and its objectives have been grossly misrepresented.
Both the ignorance and the prejudice are connected with the tragic events that surrounded
the beginning of the BábI and Bahá'I Faiths in nineteenth-century Persia. It may help in
clarifying the events of the past decade if this background is briefly reviewed.
Historical Background
The Bahá'I Faith came into existence through the teachings of two successive Founders.
The first, a young Persian merchant known to history as the Bãb , announced in Shiráz, in
May 1844, that He was the bearer of a Revelation from God, whom the Shi'ih branch of
Islam had long expected under the title “the Twelfth Imám”. The world stood, He said, on
the threshold of an era that would witness the restructuring of all aspects of life. The
challenge to humanity was to embrace these changes by undertaking a transformation of
its moral and spiritual character. Central to the Báb's teaching was the announcement of
the imminent appearance of yet a second Divine Messenger, one who would address all
the peoples of the world. During the course of widespread attacks on His followers,
incited by the Muslim clergy, the Báb was executed in the city of TabrIz, in 1850. There
followed throughout Persia a horrific series of massacres of followers of the new religion.
These pogroms aroused the revulsion of Western diplomats and scholars, and deeply
scarred the Persian psyche, inspiring an effort to justify the killing of thousands of innocent
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Social and
Economic
Development
Advancement of
Women
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people by excoriating the victims' beliefs and intentions.
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In 1863, however, one of the Báb's leading disciples,
who had survived the pogroms, a Persian nobleman,
Bahá'u'llãh , announced that He was the Messenger
for whom the Bâb had come to prepare the way. Partly
because of the force of His own person and teaching,
and partly because of unusual marks of distinction
conferred upon Him by the Báb, Bahá'u'llãh quickly
attracted the allegiance of virtually all the BabEs. From
exile in the neighboring Ottoman Empire, He began a
thirty-year mission which brought into existence the
worldwide religion and community that today bear His
name and that are distinct from the BábI religion out of
which the Bahá'I Faith emerged. Bahá'u'lláh's
teachings are contained in a vast body of writings, in
both Persian and Arabic, regarded by Bahá'Is as the
source of authority in their Faith.
At the heart of Bahá'u'lláh's teachings is the concept of the oneness of mankind: “The
earth is but one country, and mankind its citizens”.Z Strong emphasis is placed on the
abolition of prejudices of all kinds, on full equality between men and women, and on the
responsibility of each individual to investigate truth for himself. The great religious systems
of humanity are seen as equally valid stages in the progressive revelation of the Divine
Will, a process that will continue as long as the world endures. Bahá'Is are encouraged to
apply the scientific principle to the study of all reality, including spiritual issues. Although
forbidden by their beliefs to involve themselves in any form of partisan political activity,
members of the Faith are urged to give all possible support to developments that conduce
to global unification. Some of Bahá'u'lláh's most important writings call upon the rulers of
the world to create an “International Tribunal” to which nations will surrender whatever
degree of sovereignty is necessary for the establishment of world peace and
disarmament.
There is hardly a tenet of this credo that is not in conflict with some dogma promulgated by
the clerics of Shi'ih Islam, the dominant religion of Iran. Muslim opposition was sharpened
by Bahá'u'Iláh's insistence that humanity has entered the age of its maturity, in which
neither clergy nor rituals are any longer required. The central principle of the age, He says,
is the process of consultation and group decision-making, the key to well-being for both
the individual and society. To the clerics of Shi'ih Islam it seemed certain that the
promotion of such ideas in Iran would bring to an end the system of tithes, endowments,
social precedence, and political power which they have always regarded as their religious
right. To religious bigotry was early added, therefore, the force of personal investment in
the prevailing scheme of things.
Outside the Muslim world, however, the new religion began to attract a growing body of
adherents. Communities sprang up across North America and Western Europe, as well as
in India, and lands in the East and Far East. While Bahá'u'Iláh's teachings forbid
proselytism as an infringement on the spiritual integrity of the individual, great
encouragement is given to activities that promote public awareness of the Faith and that
attract new members. Large scale enrollments began in the 1950s and 60s, particularly in
Latin America and Africa. Today, the worldwide Bahá'I community numbers over five
million members, representative of virtually all of the world's racial, religious, and cultural
diversity. National administrative structures have been erected in 165 countries on a
foundation of over 25,000 locally elected councils or “Spiritual Assemblies”. Beginning in
1963, acting on provisions laid down in Bahâ'u'Iláh's writings, the membership of the
National Assemblies have elected regularly at five-year intervals the Faith's international
governing body, the Universal House of Justice.
Members of the Iranian army participating
in the destruction of the National Bahá 'I
Center, Teheran, Iran, May 1955.
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As a consequence of this expansion, Iranian Bahá'Is now represent considerably less than
ten percent of the world's total Bahá'I population. It is this highly diverse global community
that sees itself as the target of an entirely unjustified attack on its members in the land of
the Faith's birth.
The Pahiavi Period, 1925-1 979
With the rise of the Pahlavi Shahs in 1925, a number of important developments occurred
in Iran which were to have major repercussions on the welfare of the country's Bahá'I
community. Central to these developments was the policy which Reza Shah and later his
son, Muhammad Reza Shah, adopted toward the Muslim clergy. Their objective was to
transform their country, then known in the West by its historic name Persia, into a modern
secular state. In pursuing this goal Iran's new rulers sought to exclude the clergy from all
major areas of social and cultural influence, while continuing to pay lip-service to ShI'ih
Islam as the country's state religion and to provide funding for religious institutions. The
tensions which this policy engendered were managed by the regime's alternating
suppression and appeasement of Islamic interests.
Since the Bahá'I minority represented a major pool of educated people, they had, of
necessity, been employed in the many branches of the civil service, while continuing to be
denied formal constitutional rights. The intensity of clerical opposition to the “Bahá'I
heresy”, however, made of the issue an irresistible means of placating the mullahs.
Repeatedly, during the rule of both of the Pahiavi Shahs, eminent mullahs were allowed to
incite mob attacks on Bahá'I holy places and other properties. The ensuing loss of life,
however, inevitably attracted foreign protest. In 1955, a particularly flagrant involvement of
the government in one of the pogroms resulted in interventions at the United Nations.-
The Shah was embarrassed when international pressure forced him to curtail the worst of
the excesses.
The Islamic Revolution
The collapse of the Pahlavi regime in February 1979 appeared to free the Shi'ih clergy
from the restraints which international considerations had forced the Shahs to place on
their political and social influence. After ecclesiastical pressure had led also to the
overthrow of two interim revolutionary administrations, the mullahs assumed the civil
power they today exercise as cabinet ministers, justices of the Supreme Court, members
of Parliament, heads of government departments, revolutionary judges, military
commissars, and block wardens whose control extends to the details of daily life. Even the
offices of President and Prime Minister were eventually filled by clergy. The media became
organs of religious propaganda. Ration cards and other crucial permits were distributed at
mosques. New legislation imposed rigid rules from the Islamic Sharia, the code of laws
based on Islamic tradition, on day-to-day life, and used the courts and police to enforce
these ordinances.
This theocratic regime confirmed the status of non-Muslims as second-class citizens.
Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians were admitted to certain limited civil rights as
“protected minorities” but were denied equality under the law with the Muslim majority. For
the Bahâ'I community, however, there was not even this protection. As early as December
1978, shortly before his return to Teheran, the Ayatollah Khomeini had made it clear that,
in Islamic Iran, Bahá'I citizens would have no rights whatever. - While the Islamic
Constitution, adopted in 1979, makes a general reference to the enjoyment of “equal
rights” by all citizens, clauses assign the enjoyment of such civil rights to persons who
belonged either to the state religion or to one of the tolerated minority faiths specifically
named: Judaism, Christianity, and Zoroastrianism.
Persecution Intensifies
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Encouraged by this formal exclusion of Bahá'Is from the protections of citizenship,
fanatical elements in the society began a full-scale assault on the community. Prominent
Shi'ih clergymen launched attacks on Bahá'Is from the pulpit and in the media,
denouncing them as “enemies of Islam”, “corrupt on earth”, and persons “whose blood
deserves to be shed”. The effect was to unleash waves of violence. Members of the Faith
were beaten, many businesses were confiscated or destroyed, hundreds of houses
burned, and efforts began with a view to forcing Bahá'Is to recant their faith. By early 1980
this campaign had begun to enlist key organs of the government. Bahá'Is were hunted out
and discharged from all forms of government employment. Prominent members of the
community were dragged before revolutionary tribunals and, in June of 1980, after
summary mock trials, a series of executions began.
With the assumption of full power by the
mullahs that same month, horrors multiplied
daily: Bahá'I girls kidnapped from their
families and raped, the bodies of
highly-respected Bahá'Is dragged through the
streets, cemeteries bulldozed, their
tombstones auctioned, widows forced to pay
the price of the bullets which had been used
to execute their husbands, and appalling
tortures practiced on prisoners in the
unending attempt to force the Bahá'Is to
recant their faith.
-. It — . -
-, -. .
The background of these outrages was a . .---- —- - 4
The House of the Báb in Sh,raz, one of the holiest
daily life in which Iranian Baha is had become shrines in the Bahá'I world, was demolished by
social outcasts with no recourse against Iranian authorities soon after the Islamic revolution in
whatever abuse the ill-disposed chose to 1979. Its destruction stands as an ominous symbol of
commit. Bahá'I marriages, regardless of the Iranian Governments attempts to destroy the
duration, were declared null and void, Bahá'I Bahá', community of Iran.
marital life was deemed prostitution (itself
punishable by death), and Bahá'i children were judged illegitimate. A “Law of Retaliation”
exempted crimes against Bahâ'Is from any punishment under the law. Bahá'I holy places
were seized and publicly desecrated, Bahá'I children were expelled from schools
throughout Iran, and retired Bahá'Is were summoned to repay not only the pensions to
which they had contributed during government service but also the salaries that had been
paid to them during their years of employment.
International Protest
Initially, during the Bazargan ministry, the first of the two revolutionary regimes which
replaced Muhammad Reza Shah, the Iranian Bahá'I community limited its protests to
representations to the new government. Efforts were made to overcome the prevailing
prejudice against the Bahá'I community and to reassure the government that Iranian
Bahâ'Is were loyal citizens of their country.
When these initiatives received no response from the civil authorities, Bahá'I communities
around the world sought the intervention of their own governments in the hope that quiet
representations might induce Iran to halt at least the worst of the abuses. The
governments of Australia, Canada, and of several European nations were particularly
supportive. The hostage crisis which began in the fall of 1979, sharply limited the role the
United States could play in these initiatives.
By the time the Bazargan ministry fell, in November 1979, however, it was apparent that
such efforts were meeting with very limited success. As violence increased, Bahá'I
communities began to intensify efforts to bring the situation to the attention of the world's
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media. Supporting documents exposed the growing implication of Iranian government
officials in the persecutions, as well as the absence of any evidence for the charges on
which Bahá'Is were being condemned by revolutionary tribunals. Newspaper stories and
radio news reports on the subject began to appear in a great many Western countries. 1 -
Television networks soon took up the case, several of them doing feature stories.
As attention given to the situation by the media increased, foreign protest became open.
As early as September 1979 the Human Rights Commission of the Federation of
Protestant Churches in Switzerland undertook an independent investigation which led it to
denounce the treatment of the Iranian Bahá'Is as a clear example of a campaign of
religious persecution. On 16 July 1980, the Canadian Parliament passed a unanimous
resolution urging that the United Nations Commission on Human Rights should intervene.
Two months later, on 19 September the European Parliament went on record as
describing the attacks on Iran's Bahá'Is as “a systematic campaign of persecution”, and
urged member nations of the European community to bring pressure to bear on the
Iranian regime to halt the abuses.
With political turmoil in Iran increasing, the accusations which were being made against
the victims underwent a shift. For decades, the clerical leadership and their agents had
focused on the dangers that “false religion” posed to the integrity of Islam and the purity of
Islamic life. The growth of radical political rhetoric now led the mullahs to emphasize a
second theme: the Bahá'I community was said to have been a clandestine ally of the
Pahlavi regime and to have benefited from this alleged behind-the-scenes support. In the
absence of any evidence for such accusations, the Muslim clergy argued that, under even
the old Constitution, the Bahá'Is should have had no civil rights; the limited freedom they
had to exercise civil functions, therefore, was proof that they had enjoyed a “privileged
position”. Significantly, these quasi-political charges were soon included in the efforts of
Iranian embassies overseas to respond to press criticism of the persecution.
Abstention from Violence
Meanwhile, the government itself was becoming the target of violent opposition. It became
apparent that the religious leadership was bent on establishing a theocratic regime in
which its own members would hold all of the positions of power. Its political allies,
particularly those on the left, considered this a betrayal of the trust they had placed in the
Ayatollah Khomeini and the sacrifices they had made for the revolution. Their reaction was
to launch a campaign to overthrow those whose rise they had assisted. Since all of the
principal organs of the State were in the hands of the mullahs, the opposition turned to
political assassination. Hundreds of members of the new regime and several thousand of
the revolutionary guards who supported them were killed by bombs, bullets, knives, and
dynamite in a campaign of terrorism which quickly turned government offices into virtual
prison-fortresses. 1 --
The Bahá'I community remained entirely aloof from these controversies. Among the
principles strongly emphasized by Bahá'u'llâh are obedience to government and the
avoidance of involvement in partisan political activity of any kind. Although not pacifists in
the more technical sense of the term, Bahâ'Is are guided by Bahâ'u'lIáh's injunction that “it
is better to be killed than to kill”. - It is significant that, despite the extreme hostility of the
regime to Bahá'Is, and the superstitions which had been carefully cultivated with respect to
them, no suggestion has ever been made in any quarter that the community was
implicated in assassinations or other terrorist acts.
The reason was the historical record that the community had established. While the early
BábIs had believed they had the right to take up arms in self-defense against religious
persecution, Bahá'u'lláh had called on Bahá'Is to refrain from armed resistance against
attacks. Successive outbreaks of persecution during both the Qajar and Pahlavi periods
had been met by appeals for the intervention of the civil authorities and, increasingly, of
the international community. When the Islamic revolution occurred, therefore, although
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members of the community were regarded with superstitious fear and suspicion by the
general population, they were also seen as non-violent.
Viewed superficially, this record of non-involvement in partisan politics or civil violence had
only seemed to weaken the position of Iran's Bahá'Is. In the words of Hamid Algar, a
contemporary Shi'ih scholar whose writings reflect an attitude generally hostile to Bahá'Is,
the minority group: . . .came to occupy something of a position between the State and the
Ulama (mullahs), not one enabling them to balance the two sides, but rather exposing
them to blows which each side aimed at the other. The government, interested in
maintaining order, would resist the persecution of the Bahá'Is by the Ulama, but would
equally, when occasion demanded, permit action against the Bahá'Is.
When the crisis provoked by the new Islamic revolutionary regime arose, however, the
historical record which the Iranian Bahá'I community had scrupulously established for over
a century was to prove a key element in the successful international campaign for its
defense.
Appeal to the United Nations
As it became increasingly apparent that leading circles in the new regime were bent on the
destruction of the Bahá'I community, and that other means of deflecting the campaign had
failed, the Bahá'I International Community turned to the United Nations. The appeal
began in September 1980, and coincided with representations from a number of other
sources about a range of alleged human rights violations in Iran. The work of the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights is assisted by a sub-commission which deals with
a range of concerns at the preliminary level. Responding to the representations of the
Bahá'I International Community, the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities adopted a resolution addressing the Bahá'I concern and asked the
Iranian authorities to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of this religious minority.
There was no response from the Iranian government to this appeal.
The following year, with the encouragement of certain governments, including those of the
European Community, Bahã'I representatives expressed their concerns to the 37th
Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, which met in Geneva from 2
February to 13 March 1981. Later that same year a number of governments raised the
matter of the human rights situation in Iran, specifically the persecution of the Bahá'Is, at
the 36th Session of the United Nations General Assembly itself.
Within Iran the persecution intensified. Accordingly, the Bahá'I International Community
now made a direct appeal to the Commission on Human Rights. On 24 February 1982, the
Commission had before it the report of the Secretary-General containing many serious
allegations about human rights abuses in Iran, including the treatment of the Bahá'Is. The
request for the submission of this information come from the Sub-Commission's resolution
adopted at its 34th seminar, August/September 1981. In the face of determined efforts by
the Iranian representatives, who argued that the report was motivated only by the desire of
what they termed “United States imperialism and her European criminal friends” to
interfere with the Iranian revolution, the Commission reviewed the Bahá'I submission. The
latter included reproductions of official documents in which virtually every department of
the Islamic Republic's government referred to the adherence of the victims to “the
depraved Bahá'I religion” as its sole and sufficient reason for seizing property, discharging
employees, revoking pensions, expelling schoolchildren, confiscating bank accounts,
prohibiting business dealings, and passing death sentences. Copies of articles from major
Iranian newspapers were provided, in which the details of the condemnations had been
openly celebrated.
Following this presentation the Commission adopted a resolution, 5 March 1982: the
Secretary-General was directed to begin an investigation of the human rights situation in
Iran, and the Iranian government was asked to cooperate.
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The Iranian Response
The discussions at the Commission on Human Rights had begun to reveal a certain
unease among Third World nations with respect to Iran's human rights record. Some of
these had earlier spoken out at Geneva and had expressed solidarity with the revolution.
Pressure from such smaller and disadvantaged countries, however, had an equal
potentiality to become a serious embarrassment to Iran's revolutionary government.
Atrocities against law-abiding citizens could not be justified even on those grounds of
necessity which might be advanced to explain efforts to protect the revolution from its
political opponents.
An interesting feature of the debate at the 1982 Commission on Human Rights, therefore,
was the development by representatives of the Iranian government of a new rationale for
its treatment of the Bahá'I minority. The argument was to become the foundation for the
regime's attempts to counter all criticism of its attitude toward its Bahá'I citizens.
For many years Bahá'Is had been identified by fundamentalist Iranian Muslims as among
the elements in Iranian society which were “Westernizing” the country. The charge owed
its origin to the popular tendency in fundamentalist circles to regard such principles of
social development as the equality of men and women, reliance on democratic
decision-making processes, and freedom in scientific investigation as “satanic” influences
originating in Western lands. Such ideals were widely associated with the beliefs of the
Bahá'I minority.
This prejudice was seized upon and elaborated into a conspiracy theory in which Iran's
Bahá'Is were pictured as secret agents serving foreign governments. Foreign control of
the community had much earlier been attributed to Tsarist Russia. Subsequently it
passed, in a manner never explained, to the British Foreign Office. Now, however, the
Bahá'I Faith was transformed, again through a process not revealed by those making the
allegations, into an extension of “international zionism.” At the meeting of the U.N. General
Assembly's Third Committee, in November 1982, Iran's Permanent Mission distributed
copies of a booklet entitled Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, in which these
political accusations against the Bahá'I minority were explained in detail.
With international attention growing, the Iranian authorities also undertook elaborate
efforts to conceal the continuing executions of prominent Bahâ'Is. Between 30 December
1981 and 9 January 1982, however, Le Monde carried a series of stories exposing the
secret executions of the members of the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahâ'I
community in Iran. The stories eventually forced the Chief Justice of Iran, Ayatollah
Moussavi-Ardibili into an embarrassing public retreat from earlier denials.
The Bahá'I Faith Formally Banned
Initially, it appeared that the intervention of the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights would have no more effect on the situation of Iran's Bahá'Is than had that of
individual governments. Persecutions continued and, in some local cases, became
particularly flagrant. On the night of 18 June 1983 the Islamic revolutionary authorities in
ShIrãz hanged ten Bahâ'I women and teenage girls who had refused to recant their Faith
and convert to Islam. Three days earlier the same authorities had hanged six men,
including the husbands, fathers, and sons of four of the women. The Islamic judge who
presided at the trials, Hujjatu'l-Islám Qazâ'i, was quoted in the government-controlled
newspaper Khabar-i-Junub as warning that, if Bahã'Is did not recant their Faith, “the day
will soon come when the Islamic Nation will...God willing fulfill the prayer of Noah: ‘Lord
leave not one single family of infidels upon the earth'.. .“
In August of that year, Iran's Prosecutor-General announced the formal banning of all
Bahá'I religious institutions in the country, and declared membership in them and service
to them to be criminal offences. In accordance with the Bahá'I principle of obedience to
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government, the Iranian community immediately complied, dissolving both its National
Spiritual Assembly and all of its local Assemblies throughout the country. In an open letter
to the government, some two thousand copies of which were audaciously distributed by
hand to the ministries, the press, and other public agencies, the community announced its
complete submission, protested the treatment accorded to their Faith, and called on the
government to fulfill the promise made by the Prosecutor-General that Bahá'Is would at
least be permitted, as individuals, to practice their religion in the privacy of their own
homes.
The worthlessness of this promise was quickly demonstrated when a new wave of Bahá'I
arrests followed immediately on the heels of the ban. The majority of the victims were
people who had formerly been members of the now dissolved institutions, It was clear that
the authorities were making use of the ban as a legal device to sweep up large numbers of
prominent Bahá'Is and charge them, retroactively, with crimes against the State.
The United Nations Appoints a Special Representative
The Iranian government may have been counting on the case eventually losing
momentum in the United Nations system, simply because of the difficulties and complexity
of maintaining international concern. If so, it was disappointed. At the meeting of the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights in 1984, a new resolution was adopted calling on the
Chairman to appoint a Special Representative to undertake a thorough study of the human
rights situation in Iran, including that of the Bahã'Is. Subsequently, the Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC) endorsed the Commission's decision. The report of the Special
Representative, Mr. Andres Aguilar, expressed great concern at the number and gravity of
the reported human rights violations in Iran. In endorsing these observations, the
Commission extended the Representative's mandate and requested him to present an
interim report to the General Assembly at its 40th Session, including in its resolution “the
situation of minority groups such as the Bahá'Is.” Again, the Economic and Social Council
endorsed the decision.
In consequence of these initiatives the General Assembly of the United Nations itself went
on record, in Resolution 40/141, as expressing “its deep concern over the specific and
detailed allegations of violations of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” outlining
in its statement some of the specific reported violations. The General Assembly decided
“to continue its examination of the situation,” by taking up the matter at its 41st Session,
with the assistance of further reports submitted by the Special Representative of the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights.
By 1986 Mr. Aguilar had submitted his resignation. The Commission on Human Rights
appointed Mr. Reynaldo Galindo PohI to serve as the new Special Representative of the
Commission, and had called on the Iranian government to extend its cooperation in his
investigation by inviting him to visit Iran. For two years the Iranian government resisted this
pressure to cooperate, insisting that the mission represented improper influence exerted
on the Commission by various Western governments. With the assistance of one or two
other delegations, Iran was able to secure the introduction at successive sessions of the
Human Rights Commission, of procedural motions which would have had the effect of
sidetracking the case and freeing Iran from accountability. All of these efforts failed,
however, and the Human Rights Commission continued to renew the mandate of the
Special Representative and to press Iran on the issue.
By this time, political developments in Iran and the country's deteriorating economic
condition produced a change in strategy on the part of the Iranian authorities. In 1988 it
was announced that Iran would accept the visit of Mr. Galindo PohI and lend its assistance
to his investigation. After further delays the visit of the Special Representative took place
from 21 to 29 January 1990.
The First Visit by the UN's Special Representative
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The change in Iranian strategy included a number of steps to reduce some of those
abuses of Iranian Bahá'Is which had attracted particular international protest. Beginning a
year prior to the Galindo PohI visit, the government began a systematic release of Bahá'Is
from the prisons and jails where over 700 of them had been confined. While some new
arrests would be made from time to time, the general effect was to reduce sharply the
number of Bahá'I prisoners. At the same time, most Bahá'I parents were permitted to
re-enroll their children in the school system without having to comply with regulations
which had earlier made such re-admission dependent on the child's recantation of his
Faith. Again, the new policy was hedged about with significant limitations: university
students, for example, were not included in the permission.
Executions, which had aroused particularly sharp criticism in the international media and
had been the object of vehement condemnation by foreign governments, came to a halt.
The last two Bahá'I victims in Iran prior to the first visit of the Special Representative were
lraj Afshin and Bihnam Pashá, both executed in 1988.
In commenting on the situation in various public statements, the Bahá'I International
Community acknowledged the improvements that had taken place in the situations of
various of its members in Iran. The Community pointed out, however, that these
improvements did not affect the status of the Bahá'I community in general, nor did they
include any form of religious tolerance. The Bahá'I Faith remained a proscribed religion, its
shrines and other properties confiscated, its members denied any right to practice their
Faith, and the community excluded from all constitutional rights and protections.
The report submitted by Mr. Galindo Pohl after his visit, while candidly acknowledging the
continued disabilities and abuses experienced by Iranian Bahá'Is, expressed the hope that
the situation in Iran might be moving toward a kind of general “tolerance” of the
community. This view was presumably based on statements made to the Special
Representative by Iranian authorities, since only one Bahá'i witness was able eventually,
and with enormous difficulty, to gain access to the building where the hearings were taking
place.
The Representative's Second Visit
Encouraged by the willingness of the Iranian government to permit the Representative's
visit to take place at all, and by a number of human rights improvements which Mr.
Galindo PohI felt he had observed, the group of nations which had taken the lead in
framing the succession of resolutions over the past several years likewise adopted a
change of strategy. After behind-the-scenes negotiation with the Iranian delegation, the
Western group drafted a relatively mildly worded resolution, renewing the Galindo PohI
mandate and inviting Iran to continue its cooperative stance by welcoming a second visit
by the Special Representative. The resolution was carried unanimously, the Iranian
delegation having indicated before the vote that it would not oppose adoption. The
willingness of the Iranian delegation to give tacit consent to direct investigation of the
situation, even where the Bahá'I concerns were specifically singled out for mention,
marked an important turning point.
The second visit occurred 9 to 15 October 1990. The subsequent report was, however,
considerably more critical of the human rights situation in Iran than the first, concluding
that “The enormous quantity and variety of allegations and complaints received from very
diverse sources, even allowing for the fact that they may contain errors or exaggerations,
provide a credible factual basis for the belief that human rights violations occur
frequently...” For this reason, the report urged continued “international monitoring by the
competent United Nations organs, with a view to insuring compliance with international
human rights instruments in the Islamic Republic of Iran...” With respect to the situation of
the Bahá'I minority, the Special Representative said: “Many documents signed by
administrative authorities have been received, providing evidence of discrimination,
confiscation, rejection by universities, suspension of pensions, demands for the return of
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pensions earned and paid, denial of passports and other irregularities . ..This keeps the
Bahá'is in a perpetual state of uncertainty about their activities. The Government should
therefore be requested to take effective action to ensure that these Iranian citizens enjoy
the same civil and political rights as the rest of the population.”
Despite this rather somber evaluation, the delegations which had sponsored the previous
year's resolution on Iran appear to have concluded that the consensus strategy still offered
the greatest promise of maintaining pressure on the Iranian government and encouraging
an amelioration of the human rights situation in the country. Accordingly, after
considerable negotiation, they set aside their own proposed text of a new resolution, in
favor of a compromise draft prepared in the name of the Commission's chairman. This
resolution, which again passed without a vote, continued the mandate of the Special
Representative to investigate the “allegations of human rights violations in the Islamic
Republic of Iran” and once again called upon the government of Iran “to comply with
international instruments of human rights.” Significantly, this consensus text continued to
single out “the situation of the Bahá'Is” for particular attention, a clear signal to Iran of the
seriousness with which a large number of delegations continue to view the Bahá'I issue.
The Representative's Third Visit
When the Commission again took up the human rights situation in Iran, in February 1992,
this pressure markedly increased. The new interim report submitted by the Special
Representative after his third visit in December 1991 was still more severe in its criticism
of Iran, including its references to the Bahá'I case, and much more explicit in endorsing
the evidence for the charges being made by the Bahá'I International Community. — 1 While
noting that there had apparently been no further executions of Bahâ'Is and that the
number of arrests had significantly fallen, the Special Representative reported that
“harassment and discrimination” had persisted. He concluded that “the documentation
gathered is reliable evidence of unfair and discriminatory treatment toward Bahã'Is”, and
made specific reference to property confiscations, denial of university education, refusal of
permits to establish businesses, confiscation of cemeteries and places of worship,
discrimination in matters of employment, access to public services, etc. The Commission's
attention was particularly drawn to “harassment.. .aimed at forcing them [ Bahá'Is] to recant
their faith.”
Against this background, the 48th session of the Commission received from a group of
eighteen nations the text of a draft resolution much firmer than those of the preceding two
years, noting the Special Representative's view that “no tangible progress occurred in the
Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the better implementation of human rights,” expressing
its concern about certain specific problems, including “discriminatory treatment of certain
groups of citizens for reasons of their religious beliefs, notably the Bahá'Is,” and endorsing
the view of the Special Representative that “the international monitoring of the human
rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran should be continued.” Several other
delegations associated themselves with the draft after it had been tabled.
In the face of a Commission climate which was increasingly favoring the adoption of
consensus resolutions, Iran rather unwisely pressed the matter to a vote. The resulting
Resolution, which reproduced precisely the text of the draft, was carried by twenty-two
votes to twelve, with fifteen abstentions. The mandate of the Special Representative
was extended for a further year, and he was asked to present an interim report to the
General Assembly at its forthcoming 47th session. Consideration of the situation in Iran
would be maintained “as a matter of priority” at the following year's Commission session.
On 18 March 1992, for the first time since 1988, a Bahá'I prisoner was executed. Three
months later another Bahá'I was murdered by members of Iran's Disciplinary Forces, and
in September 1992, two more death sentences were passed. On 27 August 1992, the 44th
session of the Sub-Commission of Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities passed a resolution drawing attention to the renewed persecution of religious
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minorities and summary killings of Bahá'Is.
On 23 November 1992, the Special Representative's report to the United Nations General
Assembly was released and, in relation to the Bahá'Is, was the strongest one to date. On
18 December 1992, the United Nations General Assembly passed a strong resolution (88
votes in favor to 16 against, with 38 abstentions) making special reference to the
treatment of the Bahá'I community and expressing regret that “the Islamic Republic of Iran
has not given adequate follow-up to many of the recommendations contained in the
previous reports.” The examination of the human rights situation in Iran would continue
during the General Assembly's 48th session in 1993.
Mr. Galindo PohI's annual report to the Commission on Human Rights in February 1993
revealed the existence of a circular, issued on 25 February 1991 by the Supreme
Revolutionary Cultural Council and signed by President Khamenei, outlining the
government's unpublicized policy towards the Bahá'I community. According to the Special
Representative, the “guidelines have some slightly positive elements, in particular when
they refer to the general status of this group and the granting of work permits, ration books
and passports. But it must be observed that one rule limits all the others, namely, that
which provides that the progress and development of the Bahá'Is shall be blocked.”
While the intention to oppress the Bahá'I community is clear, the contrast with the regime's
earlier practices is dramatic. That those actions against the Bahá'Is which embarrassed
the government in international fora would have to be curbed was made clear in the
statement made by Ayatollah Khamenei, spiritual leader of the regime, as quoted in the
preamble of the document: “in this regard, a specific policy should be devised in such a
way that everyone will understand what should or should not be done.” The original of the
document carried an endorsement of the proposals in the handwriting of Mr. Khamenei
himself. The key change, embodied in the government's circular, was that actions taken
against the Bahá'Is would have to be controlled, and the most flagrant types of persecution
restrained, in order to minimize the response of the international community.
On 10 March 1993 a further strong resolution was passed at the 49th Session of the
Commission on Human Rights by a margin of 22 votes to 11, with 14 abstentions, noting
“that there was no appreciable progress in the Islamic Republic of Iran towards improved
compliance with human rights standards in conformity with international instruments.”
Once again, the mandate of the Special Representative was renewed for a year and the
matter would continue to be on the agenda of the General Assembly as a matter of
priority. The stance of the Government of Iran continued to be one of maintaining that it
respects human rights, and attributing the pressure of the Commission to the influence of
Western governments hostile to the Iranian government.
Despite the repeated protestations by various representatives of the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran that the Bahá'I community is not being persecuted, the evidence
seems to indicate that the intentions of the regime remain the same: to suffocate the
Bahâ'I community while trying to minimize negative reaction from the international
community.
Conclusion
When the case of Iran's Bahá'I minority was first introduced in the United Nations human
rights system ten years ago, the community in Bahâ'u'lláh's native land faced the threat of
eventual extinction. Influential voices in the revolutionary regime had made clear their
belief that the Bahá'I Faith was a “satanic” influence, that the Bahã'I community had no
place in Iran's future, and that its members were “apostates” subject to the death penalty if
they did not recant their beliefs and convert to Islam. The energy of the pogrom thus
launched, together with the overwhelming resources available to those who inspired it,
made the threat fully credible to anyone familiar with the situation.
Today, while Iran's Bahá'I community is still excluded from the protection which the
Constitution and the laws assure to other segments of the society, and while its members
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suffer various forms of discrimination, the threat to its existence has been effectively lifted.
Until the 1992 execution of Mr. Bahman Samandarl, there had been no executions for four
years. As of April 1993, only 7 members of the Faith remain in prison, most Bahá'I children
have been re-enrolled in school, the prevailing economic discrimination is beginning to
give way, and a small number of Bahá'Is have even been permitted to travel out of the
country. Bahá'Is continue to suffer major deprivations in the areas of employment,
retirement pensions, and access to university as well as a renewed threat to their personal
property.
The most serious disabilities under which the community still labors are the denial of any
form of freedom to practice its religion and the refusal of the authorities to return its
desecrated shrines and other properties. It is these communal, as well as individual,
human rights that are the focus of the continuing efforts of the Bahâ'I International
Community in the United Nations human rights system.
The United Nations human rights system is slow and admittedly cumbersome. Its
requirements do not accord easily, if at all, with simultaneous recourse to the familiar
weapons of political partisanship. As the case of Iran's Bahá'I minority convincingly
demonstrates, however, it constitutes an enormous leap forward in the world's efforts to
protect the human rights of oppressed people. In the view of Bahâ'Is everywhere it
represents humanity's best hope in this vital field of concern.
1. Michael M.J. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1980), 281.
2.
Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979), 88.
3.
Prior to the Islamic revolution there were an estimated 400,000 Bahá'Is in Iran. The
most recent (1978) census figures indicate that Iran has about 300,000 Christians,
80,000 Jews, and 30,000 Zoroastrians: Europa Year Book, 1989, 425-453.
4.
The Bâb (lit., “Door” or “Gate”, i.e., of the expected universal revelation) was born
‘AlI-Muammad, in ShIrázon 20 October 1819.
5.
The Bâb referred to this figure as “He Whom God will make manifest”.
6.
Bahá'u'IIáh (lit., “Glory of God”) was born Husayn-'AII, a member of a noble family, in
Teheran on 12 November 1817. It was the Báb who first formally addressed him as
“Bahá'u'IIãh.”
7.
Bahá'u' Iáh, Gleanings from the Writings of Bahá'u'lláh, (Wilmette: Bahá'I Publishing
Trust, 1976), 250.
8.
Bahá'Is regard the League of Nations and the United Nations Organization as initial
stages in the gradual establishment of world government.
9.
The Six Year Plan 1986-1992: Summary of Achievements (Haifa: Bahâ'I World
Centre, 1993), 111-114.
10.
Britannica Yearbook, 1988, shows the Bahá'I Faith, despite its relatively small
membership, as one of the most widely diffused religions on earth, second only to
Christianity.
11.
For a more detailed treatment of the subject see Douglas Martin, The Persecution of
the Bahâ'Is of Iran, 1844-1984 (Association for Bahã'I Studies, Ottawa, 1984), 1 5-29.
12.
The two administrations referred to are those of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan,
appointed by the Ayatollah Khomeini immediately following the revolution, and
President Abol-Hassan Bani-Sadr, elected at the beginning of 1980, but overthrown
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and forced to flee in June, 1981.
13.
In an interview with Professor James Cockroft of Rutgers University, published in
Seven Days, 23 February 1979.
14.
Yusuf Subhani, a highly regarded member of the Teheran Bahá'I community, was
executed on 27 June 1980. To date, a total of 162 Iranian Bahá'Is have been
executed, an additional 27 have been killed while in government custody, and 26
have been killed by mobs. The great majority of the victims were members of the
national or local Spiritual Assemblies, clearly chosen in a campaign intended to
destroy the community's elected leadership. The Bahá'I Faith has no clergy.
15.
For detailed documentation of these abuses see the successive submissions made
by the Bahá'I International Community to United Nations human rights agencies. See
also a detailed study of the persecutions in Douglas Martin, Persecution, 31-66.
16.
See New York Times, 21 July 1980; The Times, London, July 15 and 30 August
1980; Le Monde, 29 August 1980; The Sunday Statesman, New Delhi, 20 July 1980;
Newsweek, 24 March 1980.
17.
See for example, statements of the Iranian embassy in Buenos Aires (26 September
1979), and the Iranian consulate in Manchester, England (21 September 1979).
Similar charges were made on PBS's “McNeil-Lehrer Report”, 12 February 1980, by
Mansour Farhang, the regime's spokesman and later representative at the United
Nations. Farhang subsequently rebroke with the regime and repudiated his
allegations against the Iranian Bahá'I community (The Nation, 27 February 1982),
claiming that he had been misled by what he now regarded as a “fascist totalitarian
ideology” that had seized control of his country.
18.
The organization that took the lead in this campaign was the Mujahhidin-Khalq
(Islamic Marxists).
19.
Nabil's Narrative, xxxv.
20.
Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran: 1785-1906 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1969), 151.
21.
“The Bahá'I International Community” is a Non-Governmental Organization holding
consultative status with ECOSOC and UNICEF. It collaborates with a range of other
United Nations agencies in various social and economic development projects
throughout the world.
22.
“Note by the Secretary-General”, No. E/CN.4/1 517, 31 December 1981, and
“Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1982/27 on the Situation of Human
Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran”, 11 March 1982.
23.
See series of articles in Le Monde, 30 December 1981, 1,5, 8, 9 January 1982.
24.
Khabar-i-JunUb, ShIráz, 22 February 1983.
25.
After announcing the ban, the statement of the Attorney-General goes on to say: “If a
Bahá'I himself performs his religious acts in accordance with his own beliefs, such a
man will not be bothered by us, provided he does not invite others to the Bahá'I
Faith, does not teach, does not form assemblies, does not give news to others, and
has nothing to do with the administration.” (Kayhan, 21 September 1983).
26.
“Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1984/54 on the Situation of Human
Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran”, 14 March 1984.
27.
“Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran by Special
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Representative of the Commission on Human Rights... pursuant to Commission
resolution 1989/66” No. E/CN.4/1990/24, 12 February 1990.
28.
“Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1990/79 on the Situation of Human
Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran”, 7 March 1990.
29.
“Report of the Economic and Social Council, Situation of Human Rights in the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Note by the Secretary-General”, No. N45/697, 6 November
1990, 17.
30.
“Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1991/82 on the Situation of Human
Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran”.
31.
“Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran by Special
Representative of the Commission on Human Rights ... pursuant to Commission
Resolution 1991”, No. E/CN.4/1992/34, 2 January 1992.
32.
Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1992, on the Situation of Human Rights in
the Islamic Republic of Iran, 3 March 1992.
33.
Resolution No. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/1 992/1 5, 27 August 1992.
34.
Resolution 47/1 46 of the United Nations General Assembly, 18 December 1992.
35.
“Final Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran by the
Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights, Mr. Reynaldo Galindo
PohI, pursuant to Commission Resolution 1992/67 of 4 March 1992”, No.
E/CN.4/1993/41, 28 January 1993.
36.
Resolution E/CN.4/RES/1992/62 of the Commission on Human Rights, 10 March
1993.
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