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The Rise oc
the Pasdaran
Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
Frederic Wehrey, Jerrold D. Green, Brian Nichiporuk,
Alireza Nader, Lydia Hansell, Rasool Nafisi, S. R. Bohandy
Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense
Approved For public releose; distribution unlimited
NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE
The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted in the RAND
National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and
development center sponsored by the OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified
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the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under
Contract W74V8H-06-C-0002.
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Preface
The purpose of this research is to assess the broad-ranging domes-
tic roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), also
known as the Pasdaran (Persian for “Guards”), to determine the full
scope of its influence over Iran's political culture, economy, and soci-
ety. The study analyzed the institution's ideological outreach to the
Iranian populace through education, training, and media; its ascen-
dancy in Iran's strategic business sectors; and its role in Iran's factional-
ized political landscape. The research team paid particular attention to
instances in which the IRGC's ascendancy has provoked dissent from
certain population segments, as well as cases in which it has mobilized
and broadened its circle of constituents. This monograph concludes by
offering potential trajectories for the IRGC's involvement in Iranian
politics, as well as its own institutional evolution, which appears to be
increasingly beset by factionalism. In addition, the document outlines
a future research agenda for the study of the IRGC that draws com-
parative insights from analyses of the Pakistani and Chinese militaries.
This research should be of interest to analysts and policymakers con-
cerned with Iranian domestic politics and strategic behavior, as well as
those interested, more broadly, in comparative studies of civil-military
relations.
This research was conducted within the Intelligence Policy Center
of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded
research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secre-
tary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands,
iv Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies,
and the defense Intelligence Community.
For more information on RAND's Intelligence Policy Center,
contact the Director, John Parachini. He can be reached by email at
John_Parachini @rand.org; by phone at 703-413-1100, extension 5579;
or by mail at the RAND Corporation, 1200 South Hayes Street,
Arlington, Virginia 22202-5050. More information about RAND is
available at www.rand.org.
Contents
Prerace 111
Figures ix
Summary xi
Acknowledgments xix
Abbreviations xxi
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction 1
CHAPTER TWO
The IRGC in Context: Iran's Security and Political Landscape 7
The IRGC in Iran's Security Hierarchy 8
Iran's Factional Landscape 13
CHAPTER THREE
The IRGC's Diverse Domestic Roles: Origins and Evolution 19
Postrevolutionary Developments: Consolidating Internal Control 20
The Sacred Defense: The IRGC in the Iran-Iraq War 23
“Popularizing” the IRCC: The Development of the Basij Resistance
Force 25
The Guardians of the Revolution: The IRGC's Domestic Intelligence
and Security Roles 29
The Merger of Basij and IRGC: A Sign of the Regime's Growing
Entrenchment 32
V
vi Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
CHAPTER FOUR
Militarizing Civil Society: The IRGC's Indoctrination, Training,
and Media Activities 35
The IRGC's Ideological Activism: Origins and Development 35
The IRGC Presence in Iran's Education System 38
The “Ten-Million-Man Army”: The IRGC's Role in Popular
Paramilitary Training 44
Increasing the Basij's Capability to Conduct Asymmetric Homeland
Defense 45
Disaster-Relief Training 47
Protection Against Soft Coups 47
Additional Cultural Education 48
The IRGC Media Apparatus: Formal and Informal Influences 49
Censorship of Independent Media Outlets 53
CHAPTER FIVE
Economic Expansion: The IRGC's Business Conglomerate and
Public Works 55
Origins of the IRGC's Economic Activities 56
Foundations (Bonyads) 57
Construction, Engineering, and Manufacturing Companies 59
Illicit and Black Market Activities 64
Public Works 66
The Dilemmas of Economic Expansion 70
CHAPTER SIX
The IRGC in Politics 77
The Origins of the IRGC as a Political Force 77
Ideological Factionalism Inside the IRGC 81
Possible Future Scenarios for the IRGC 89
Scenario 1: The Evolving Role of the Supreme Leader and the
Eventual Succession to Khamenei 89
Scenario 2: The “Muslim Reza Khan” 90
Scenario 3: The Religious Turkish Option, or a “Coup by
Memorandum” 91
Contents vii
CHAPTER SEVEN
Conclusion: Toward a More Strategic Understanding of the IRGC . . .93
The Utility of a Comparative Approach: Pakistan and China 94
APPENDIXES
A. Business Organizations Affiliated with the IRGC or Influenced
by IRGC Personnel 99
B. Current and Former IRGC Personnel 103
C. Evolution of the Islamic Republic and the IRGC 109
D. Provincial Map of Iran 113
E. Glossary of Persian Terms 115
Bibliography 117
Figures
2.1. Iran's National Security Establishment 9
C.1. Timeline of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IRGC 110
D.1. ProvincialMapof lran 113
ix
Summary
Founded by a decree from Ayatollah Khomeini shortly after the vic-
tory of the 1978—1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran's Islamic Revolution-
ary Guards Corps (IRGC) has evolved well beyond its original foun-
dations as an ideological guard for the nascent revolutionary regime.
Today, the IRGC functions as an expansive socio-political-economic
conglomerate whose influence extends into virtually every corner of
Iranian political life and society. Bound together by the shared experi-
ence of war and the socialization of military service, the Pasdaran have
articulated a populist, authoritarian, and assertive vision for the Islamic
Republic of Iran that they maintain is a more faithful reflection of the
revolution's early ideals.
The IRGC's presence is particularly powerful in Iran's highly fac-
tionalized political system, in which the president, much of the cabinet,
many members of parliament, and a range of other provincial and local
administrators hail from the ranks of the IRGC. Outside the political
realm, the IRGC oversees a robust apparatus of media resources, train-
ing activities, and education programs designed to bolster loyalty to
the regime, prepare the citizenry for homeland defense, and burnish its
own institutional credibility vis-à-vis other factional actors. It is in the
economic sphere, however, that the IRGC has seen the greatest growth
and diversification—strategic industries and commercial services rang-
ing from dam and pipeline construction to automobile manufacturing
and laser eye surgery have fallen under its sway, along with a number
of illicit smuggling and black-market enterprises.
xi
xii Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran 's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
Taken in sum, these attributes argue for a reexamination of the
IRGC, less as a traditional military entity wielding a navy, ground
forces, air force, and a clandestine paramilitary wing (the Qods Force)
and more as a domestic actor, albeit one that is not monolithic and is
itself beset by internal differences and factionalism. Certainly, elements
of Iran's military forces present worrisome threats to U.S. strategy, most
notably in the areas of asymmetric naval tactics, intermediate-range
ballistic missiles, and support for terrorism. But to policymakers and
analysts concerned with the broader trajectory of the Islamic Republic
of Iran—the internal roots of its external behavior and the sources of
its durability and weakness—the IRGC may be more profitably viewed
as a deeply entrenched domestic institution. Arguably, this internal role
overshadows its significance as a purely military force.
With this in mind, this monograph assesses the extent of the
IRGC's penetration into Iran's society, economy, and politics. We begin
by situating the IRGC within the context of Iran's factional landscape
and security bureaucracy, highlighting the origins and early develop-
ment of its domestic roles. Next, we cover the IRGC's role in popular
paramilitary training, higher education, the indoctrination of youth,
and its influence over Iran's domestic media. This extensive apparatus
serves both the regime's interests—mobilizing the population into a
“10 million—man army” for the defense of the homeland and coun-
tering reform activism, particularly on university campuses—and the
more parochial goal of blunting any criticism of Pasdaran nepotism
and economic corruption. We then discuss the IRGC's economic role.
We survey its broad-ranging business interests in numerous Iranian
market sectors, as well as its role in public works, highlighting how
these activities lend the institution a multidimensional quality. Finally,
we conclude with an assessment of the IRGC as a political actor, paying
special attention to emerging factionalism within its ranks and high-
lighting instances in which these fissures have surfaced in the past.
From these lines of inquiry, the following conclusions emerge and
have implications for future U.S. analysis and policy toward the IRGC
and the Islamic Republic of Iran writ large.
Summary xiii
The IRGC is but one actor in Iran's security and factional
landscape whose influence is exerted informally. Within Iran's secu-
rity hierarchy, the IRGC frequently vies with other security organs,
such as the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), Minis-
try of the Interior, and Law Enforcement Forces (LEF), for visibility,
power, and influence. This rivalry may shed light on IRGC actions
that appear at first glance to be detrimental to the larger interests of the
state. Moreover, much of the IRGC's ascendancy has been facilitated
by the complex structure of the Iranian political system, which results
in a default drift toward informality in decisionmaking. At the same
time, the IRGC's informal influence is subject to the same factional fis-
sures that define the broader political spectrum—among conservative
traditionalists, conservative pragmatists, radicals, and reformists. Simi-
larly, although other security organs and institutions of power may be
staffed by former Pasdaran, it does not follow that these individuals act
in lockstep with the corporate interests of the IRGC—office-holding
tends to generate its own set of priorities that can offset even the power-
ful social bonds and ideology imparted by military service.
The IRGC has attempted to cultivate legitimacy today by bur-
nishing its role in the Iran-Iraq War and the postwar reconstruc-
tion; this early history has been a matter of factional contention
and public ambivalence. Understanding the IRGC's early history
and, particularly, its expansion and deviation from the role envisioned
for it by the Islamic Republic's founders is critical to discerning its
future trajectory. Much of the institution's rise to prominence over
competing militias and paramilitaries in the postrevolutionary period
was due to its effectiveness in suppressing internal dissent. Similarly,
many in the IRGC's leadership saw the Iran-Iraq War as a mechanism
to consolidate their internal position and marginalize the regular forces
politically—goals that may have taken precedence over matters of mili-
tary strategy.
Today, the IRGC is attempting to trumpet its role in the “sacred
defense” of the Islamic Republic of Iran during the “imposed war.” Its
current mobilization of the populace against both internal and external
enemies is, in some sense, a reenactment of this period. Similarly, IRGC
leaders frequently point to their service in Iran's postwar reconstruc-
xiv Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
tion to justify the IRGC's current expansion into new business sectors.
These themes are being contested by competing factions and the public
alike. Anecdotal reports suggest that many in the Iranian public offer a
radically different interpretation of the IRGC's wartime performance,
believing that the IRGC's excessive zealotry and nadanan kari (inexpe-
rience) prevented the complete battlefield defeat of Iraqi forces.
Although well developed and extensive, the IRGC's efforts
at popular mobilization and indoctrination have met with mixed
results. There appears to be an urban-rural split in public views
toward the IRGC. Part of its foundational mandate, the IRGC's role in
indoctrination and ideological outreach to the Iranian public has taken
on a new urgency, given the regime's heightened threat perception—
particularly from a U.S.-sponsored “velvet revolution,” i.e., the erosion
of revolutionary ideals via civil-society organizations and ethnic dissent.
To combat this, the IRGC relies extensively on its poorly trained pop-
ular auxiliary, the Basij Resistance Force, whose command structure
was formally merged with the IRGC's in 2007. The Basij's role in the
Iran-Iraq War—characterized by sheer numbers, youth, and ideologi-
cal fervor—set the template for the regime's homeland defense strategy
today, which relies on partisan warfare against an invading force by a
populace that has been mobilized and indoctrinated by the IRGC. The
key unknown is the populace's receptivity to this training and even the
commitment of the Basij itself, as monthly training is often a prerequi-
site for societal benefits, such as loans and scholarships.
In tandem with this paramilitary training, the IRGC exerts its
ideological influence through its own media outlets, including Web
sites and periodicals that highlight its positive contributions to Ira-
nian society, which include disaster relief, drug interdiction, and rural
infrastructure development. Similarly, the IRGC has a presence in Ira-
nian higher education—both through its own affiliate universities and
through campus organizations, such as the Lecturers' Basij Organiza-
tion (LBO) and the Student Basij Organization (SBO). The latter is
particularly focused on mitigating student reform activism, although it
has been only partly successful in this effort.
Finally, public perceptions of the IRGC appear split between
urban areas, where it is seen as the regime's shock-troop force for quell-
Summary xv
ing dissent and enforcing strict social mores, and rural areas, where its
construction projects and promises of upward mobility through train-
ing have induced a more favorable view among certain marginalized
population segments.
By expanding its business interests and control of the “shadow
economy,” the IRGC runs the risk of provoking a backlash or
diluting its own cohesion. From laser eye surgery and construction
to automobile manufacturing and real estate, the IRGC has extended
its influence into virtually every sector of the Iranian market. More
than any other aspect of its domestic involvement, the IRGC's business
activities embody the institution's multidimensional nature. The com-
mercialization of the IRGC has the potential to broaden its circle of
constituents by co-opting financial elites into its constellation of sub-
sidiary companies and subcontractors. At the same time, the monopo-
lization of key sectors has displaced competitors. The key IRGC affili-
ate in both dynamics is the engineering firm Khatam al-Anbia, which
has been awarded more than 750 contracts in various construction,
infrastructure, oil, and gas projects. Outside of its declared enterprises,
the IRGC is reported to control an underground shadow economy of
black-market goods, smuggled into Iran via illegal jetties and other
entry points that it alone controls. Reports of dissent against the IRGC's
institutional aggrandizement and the personal enrichment of its offi-
cers remain fragmentary. According to one Western diplomat resident
in Iran from 2003 to 2006,
There is no bazaari backlash at this point. The general population
doesn't know about the IRGC's illegal jetties, the Caspian Sea
villas, and their Swiss bank accounts.'
What is indisputable is that the IRGC's growing economic might
has increased its sense of political privilege and entitlement. Nowhere
is this more apparent than in its abrupt closure of the newly opened
Imam Khomeini Airport in May 2004 and its ejection of a Turk-
ish firm that had been contracted to administer the airport's opera-
1 Authors' discussion with a Western diplomat based in Tehran from 2003 to
2006, Los Angeles, California, July 18, 2007.
xvi Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
tions, reportedly because the IRGC's own firm had lost the contract.
Similarly, the IRGC's elite appeared to ignore an injunction from the
Supreme Leader to privatize their holdings—a significant development
that could portend the IRGC moving closer to becoming an effective
counterauthority to the Supreme Leader. At the same time, its expan-
sion into the business sector runs the risk of spurring internal fraction-
alization and a dilution of its profession identity.
As a political actor, the IRGC is susceptible to factional
debates—between dogmatic and more pragmatic currents and
over the opportunity costs inflicted by Iran's isolation. The issue of
the politicization of the IRGC has been hotly contested, with oppos-
ing voices marshaling the authority of Ayatollah Khomeini, who, in
many respects, appeared to emulate the views of the former shah in his
wariness of the army's interference in politics. Generally marginalized
during the Rafsanjani era, the IRGC emerged as political force during
the Khatami era when they forged a de facto alliance with conservatives
seeking to displace the reformists. Today, the IRGC's political muscle
manifests itself in diverse ways—from Basij intimidation of voters to
the presence of an ex-IRGC officer as the Deputy Minister of the Inte-
rior, responsible for ballot validation and counting in the March 2008
Majles (parliamentary) elections. Nonetheless, as mentioned previously,
the IRGC itself is beset with political factionalism, which surfaced
even in the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose real constitu-
ents were lower-ranking Basij rather than the IRGC writ large. Earlier
incidents revealed fissures along different lines; for example, the 1994
Qazvin riots, in which locally garrisoned IRGC commanders refused
to fire on protestors, revealed that the parochial identities of ethnicity
and locale still pervade the IRGC's institutional culture. The Khatami
era highlighted the lack of ideological uniformity between the IRGC
senior leadership, which supported the conservatives, and the rank-
and-file, who were more sympathetic to the reformists.
Most recently, splits have emerged over the economic opportunity
costs and hardships incurred by Ahmadinejad's administration, with
retired IRGC Brigadier General Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf emerging
as a prominent voice by appearing to articulate a more pragmatic path
that tries to reconcile ideological steadfastness with economic progress.
Summary xvii
Qalibaf's 2005 presidential slogan was “Iranians have a right to the
good life,” and he has openly made the startling assertion that Iran
needs an “Islamist Mohammad Reza Khan.” Other IRGC figures who
might be termed “pragmatic conservatives” include former Supreme
National Security Council (SNSC) chief Ali Larijani and ex-IRGC
commander Mohsen Rezai, whose Web site, Tabnak, showcased strong
critiques of Ahmadinejad.
Despite this risk of fractionalization, there are several poten-
tial scenarios for the IRGC's elite to consolidate their control over
a post-Khamenei Iran. The death of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei will present an opportunity for the Pasdaran elite to buttress
their institutional primacy and erode the position of rivals. One path to
accomplish this would be to influence the appointment of a pliant, fig-
urehead Supreme Leader who would grant a broad berth to the IRGC
without any evident breaching of the constitution. Another scenario
for the IRGC's consolidation includes the installation of a non-clerical
military leader who, while not completely abandoning the precepts of
Islamism, would place a greater emphasis on technocratic competence
and economic progress. A variant of this trajectory and one that would
harness the populace's growing weariness with the regime's top-down
religiosity and clerical mismanagement is an overt assumption of power
by the IRGC—what might be termed the “religious Turkish model.”
The focus here would be on the IRGC's promises to clean up politics,
fight corruption, and improve Iran's economy.
The IRGC's domestic ascendancy is not unique, nor is its
future trajectory immutable; in both respects, the IRGC can be
profitably compared with the militaries of Pakistan and China. As
its history has shown, the IRGC is subject to the same worldly pitfalls
and evolutionary mutations that affect other bureaucracies—and this
will only intensify as the IRGC delves deeper into profit-making finan-
cial activities. Indeed, from this observation, there is benefit in com-
paring the IRGC's past and future with the evolution of the Pakistani
military and Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA).
The parallels to Pakistan are particularly striking. The Pakistani
military runs the country's largest construction consortium, which
undertakes rural infrastructure projects and is also heavily involved in
xviii Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran 's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
such diverse subsidiary enterprises as gas stations, commercial plazas,
and poultry farms. There are also a number of military-owned “chari-
table foundations” that oversee 100 companies involved in banking,
insurance, education, and information technology. This expansion has
reached such proportions that one scholar has coined the term “Milbus”
(military-business) to describe it. One important conclusion emerging
from the Pakistani case that has implications for Iran is that the largest
supporters of the Pakistani military's economic preeminence are those
who might intuitively be assumed to oppose it in favor of a more lib-
eral, free-market approach—the middle classes.
The case of the PLA, however, provides the clearest model for
exploring the tensions between economic aggrandizement and mili-
tary professionalism that are certain to accompany the IRGC's future
evolution. Although the PLA, since its origins in the 1920s, had always
enjoyed a degree of economic self-sufficiency, by the late 1980s its
profit-making enterprises had grown considerably: PLA-owned com-
panies dominated the farming, transportation, information technol-
ogy, and entertainment sectors. Responding to this, in 1998 the gov-
ernment of Jiang Zemin made the remarkable decision to force the
divestiture of the PLA from all of its business activities. The reasons
for this move stemmed principally from the civilian leadership's per-
ception that the corruption and black-marketeering that had accom-
panied the PLA's economic rise had reached intolerable levels, to the
point that they were negatively affecting popular perceptions of the
Chinese Communist Party. Similarly, the civilian leadership perceived
that the military's financial pursuits were proving deleterious to its pro-
fessionalism, morale, meritocracy, and ability to modernize. Finally,
the PLA's businesses had become increasingly decentralized and pro-
vincially based, raising fears in the central government of a return to
the regional autonomy that defined the prerevolutionary warlord era.
All of this suggests that, in the case of Iran, the expansion and
primacy of the IRGC as a political-economic actor will not go unchal-
lenged and that there are inherent limits to whatever symbiosis occurs
between civilian elites and military-run business ventures, particularly
when these financial activities are perceived to be detrimental to the
state's larger national security interests.
Acknowledgments
We are grateful to our project sponsor for the opportunity to pursue this
research and for his supportive and constructive feedback throughout
the effort. Numerous RAND colleagues aided our understanding of the
IRGC as a domestic actor within the Islamic Republic of Iran, and we
thank them for their insights: David Thaler, David Ochmanek, Bruce
Pirnie, Derek Eaton, James Dobbins, and Dalia Dassa Kaye. Others
provided useful comparative insights, drawing from their expertise in
civil-military relations in China, Pakistan, the former Soviet Union,
and Turkey. These include Peter A. Wilson, Theodore Karasik, Stephen
Larrabee, and Roger Cliff. We owe particular thanks to Lauren Skra-
bala, Donna Mead, Pamela Orient, Judy Bearer, Tern Perkins, Mary
Wrazen, and Sandy Petitjean for their help and efficiency in the final
editing and production of this monograph.
Outside RAND, we thank Mark Gorwitz, whose research identi-
fied a multitude of extremely helpful sources. During various RAND
conferences on Iran, a number of non-U.S. scholars provided us with
fresh and illuminating perspectives on the IRGC. And finally, we
thank our numerous Iranian interlocutors—both inside and outside
the Islamic Republic—who must go unnamed.
xix
Abbreviations
AJO Agricultural Jihad Organization
IRGC Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
IRIB Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting
IRNA Islamic Republic of Iran News Agency
IRP Islamic Republic Party
LBO Lecturers' Basij Organization
LEF Law Enforcement Forces
MEK Mujahideen—e Khalq
MJF Mostazafan and Janbazan Foundation
MOIS Ministry of Intelligence and Security
OCD Office for Consolidating Democracy
PLA People's Liberation Army (Chinese)
SBO Student Basij Organization
SNSC Supreme National Security Council
xxi
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
Never solely a military organization in the traditional sense, Iran's
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)—also known as the
Pasdaran (Persian for “guards”)—has seen a significant expansion and
diversification of its domestic roles since the election of President Mah—
moud Ahmadinejad in 2005. Today in Iran, a significant portion of the
leadership consists of IRGC veterans, including Ahmadinejad, mem-
bers of parliament, and most of the cabinet.' Bound together by the
shared experience of war and the socialization of military service, the
IRGC and its veterans have articulated a vision for the Islamic Republic
of Iran that can be roughly described as technocratic, populist, authori-
tarian, highly nationalistic, and—in some cases—anticlerical. These
tenets have informed the institution's increasingly assertive influence
over Iranian political life—exerted through both formal and informal
channels—as well as its administration of a vast network of indoctrina-
tion, training, and media activities. Moreover, current and former Pas-
daran are present in virtually every sector of the Iranian market, con-
trolling strategic industries and commercial services ranging from dam
construction and automobile manufacturing to real estate and laser eye
Jamshid Asadi, “Eghtesad-e Rantkhari Dar Iran” (Rent-seeking economy in Iran),
Talashonline, no date; Behrouz Khaligh, “Mogheiyate Sepah Pasdaran va Rohaniyat dar
sakht-e Chodrat: Taghyirat dar sakhtar-e siasi-e jomhouri-e eslami, gozar as eligareshi
rohaniyat be eligareshi rohaniyat va sepah” (IRCC's position in the power structure of the
Islamic Republic: From power of clerics to power of clerics and military), Akhbar-Rooz, July
11, 2006b; Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Cabinet ofMahmoudAhmadinejad,
2007.
2 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
surgery. 2 Taken in sum, these attributes have apparently empowered
the IRGC to become what one longtime analyst has described as “the
only institution in Iran capable of both enforcing and breaching any
red lines.
Despite this domestic ascendancy, most of the attention currently
being paid to the Pasdaran in the West is focused squarely on the
IRGC's external, international activities. For example, much has been
written in the open press about the involvement of the IRGC's clan-
destine wing, the Qods Force, in fomenting unrest in southern Iraq, its
training of Hezbollah cadres in Lebanon, and its planning of terrorist
attacks on Western interests from Beirut to Buenos Aires. Some com-
mentators have also tried to highlight the IRGC's involvement with
and alleged control over Iran's nuclear research and weapons program.
More recently, the spotlight has been cast on the IRGC's confronta-
tional naval posture toward coalition and U.S. vessels in the Persian
Gull Observers who do address the IRGC's domestic functions often
do so with the implicit assumption that its seemingly hegemonic pres-
ence in Iranian political life, along with its rapidly expanding business
enterprises and control of Iran's shadow economy, lend it a mafia-like
quality that is unique in the world today. As noted by Iranian dissident
Mohsen Sazegara, also one of the IRGC's founders, “I don't know of
any other organization in any country like the Revolutionary Guards.
It's something like the Communist Party, the KGB, a business com-
plex, and the mafia.” 4
To date, these characterizations have not been grounded in
any solid, empirical framework. This study did not begin with prior
assumptions about the monolithic nature and immutability of the
IRGC's domestic power. Instead, this monograph assesses the extent
of the IRGC's penetration into Iran's society, economy, and politi-
cal landscape; it frames the IRGC as an ultimately multidimensional
2 Gharargah-e Sazandegiye Khatam al-Anbia (Ghorb), homepage, February 20, 2007.
‘ Comments by an Iranian-born scholar at a RAND-sponsored conference, Rome, Italy,
October 29, 2007.
‘ Quoted in Greg Bruno, “Backgrounder: The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
(IRGC),” Council on Foreign Relations, October 25, 2007.
Introduction 3
institution that is certainly capable of provoking dissent and opposi-
tion through its oligarchic tendencies and domination of key economic
sectors but that has built networks of constituents as well, co-opting
various segments of the Iranian populace into its orbit via indoctrina-
tion or more tangible expressions of financial patronage. 5 By offering a
comprehensive examination of the IRGC's domestic levers, we aim to
illuminate the ways in which it portrays itself to the Iranian populace
and the ways in which its future will be shaped by forces that it may or
may not control.
One outcome of this analysis is the conclusion that the IRGC's
omnipresence in Iran does not necessarily guarantee its omnipotence.
Both internal and external threats to the organization's future remain
present and viable, with factionalism being a particular concern. As
one actor among many within Iran's factionalized political system, the
IRGC's leadership, rank and file, and veterans are not immune to the
debates over pragmatism and dogmatism that characterize the broader
political spectrum. 6 Therefore, another challenge to the IRGC is the
dilution of its corporate cohesion—as it delves more and more deeply
into business ventures, there is a risk that corruption and economic
self-interest may erode its professionalism and military capabilities. In
this respect, the rise of the Pasdaran may be usefully compared to the
trajectory of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the early
and mid-1990s, raising further questions about the supposed unique-
ness of the IRGC within the international system.
To fully illuminate these issues, this study shifted the methodol-
ogy employed by previous studies, which have tended toward threat
In this respect, our study built on and drew from a previous RAND report on the Iranian
military and IRGC as domestic political actors: Nikola B. Schahgaldian and Gina Barkhord-
arian, The Iranian Military Under the Islamic Republic, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corpo-
ration, R-3473-USDP, 1987. For another look at the IRGC as a domestic political actor, see
Kenneth R. Katzman, “The Pasdaran: Institutionalization of Revolutionary Armed Force,”
Iranian Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3—4, Summer 1993, pp. 389—402; and Kenneth Katzman, The
Warriors of Islam: Iran's Revolutionary Guards, Boulder, Cob.: Westview Press, 1993.
6 Alireza Alavitabar, “Nezamian and gozar be Democracy” (The military and the path
toward democracy), Web page , 2005.
4 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
assessments of the IRGC as a more traditional military organization. 7
In this monograph, we treat the IRGC as a deeply entrenched socio-
political-economic entity that has both influenced and been influenced
by the larger trajectory of the Islamic Republic of Iran. To do this,
we draw from sources not normally incorporated in similar Western
research, particularly indigenous Persian-language material, often from
the IRGC's own media outlets and those of its companies, and field
insights of scholars with access to Iranians from a broad societal and
geographic spectrum. We also pay particular attention to the historical
precedents for each of the IRGC's various internal roles, showing their
origins and ebb and flow through the Islamic Republic's development.
This historical inquiry is not simply background. Within the factional
debates that characterize Iran's political landscape, the IRGC leader-
ship appears to believe that its legitimacy is dependent on reviving and
burnishing its role in the foundational myths of the Islamic Republic of
Iran—the suppression of internal enemies during the revolution's early
days, a role in the “sacred defense” during the Iran-Iraq War, and the
postwar economic reconstruction. The latter has become particularly
important as a current justification for the IRGC's deepening involve-
ment in Iran's business sectors. For their part, domestic opponents of
the IRGC's ascendancy have also attempted to revise the story of the
institution's role in the Islamic Republic's early history. 8
With these dynamics in mind, this monograph is structured as
follows:
For important studies on the IRGC's military missions and capabilities , see Anthony H.
Cordesman, Iran 's Developing Military Capabilities, Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic
and International Studies, 2005, and Michael Eisenstadt, “The Armed Forces of the Islamic
Republic of Iran,” Middle East Review of InternationalAffairs , Vol. 5, No. 1, March 2001, pp.
13—30.
8 The best example of this appeared in October 2007, when Chairman of the Assembly of
Experts Ali Akbar Rafsanjani disclosed the existence of a previously secret correspondence
between IRGC commander Mobsen Rczai and Khomeini in 1988, in which Rczai advised
that the Iran-Iraq War could not be won. With this letter, Rafsanjani effectively neutralized
timeworn accusations by the IRGC that he alone was the sole proponent of the Iran-Iraq
ccascfirc and burnished his nationalist credentials while tempering those of the Guards. Sec
Rasool Nafisi, “The Khomeini Letter: Is Rafsanjani Warning the Hardliners ?” Iranian.com,
October 11, 2006.
Introduction 5
• Chapter Two situates the IRGC within the context of Iran's larger
security bureaucracy and factional landscape, showing how inter-
nal competition, both formal and informal, has impacted the evo-
lution of the IRGC and defining what is meant by ideological
groupings, such as “reformist” and “conservative.”
• In Chapter Three, we cover the origins and development of the
IRGC's internal roles, exploring how the organization consoli-
dated its control and expanded its domestic presence in the con-
tentious postrevolutionary period and during the Iran-Iraq War.
We also highlight the impetus behind the formation of its para-
military “peoples' militia,” the Basij Resistance Force, and the sig-
nificance of that group's recent formal merger with the IRGC.
• Having set this foundation, Chapter Four canvases the IRGC's
broad ideological outreach to the Iranian populace—its indoc-
trination, training, and media activities—which are intended to
bolster loyalty to the regime, inculcate future and current mem-
bers with a shared identity, and perhaps distract from the Pas-
daran's corruption and monopolization of key economic sectors.
Although it is difficult to discern the populace's receptivity to this
ideological activism, we argue that any cynicism and resentment
may be balanced by the financial benefits and promises of social
mobility offered by IRGC training, which are likely appealing to
certain marginalized population segments.
• Chapter Five examines the IRGC's economic and commercial
activities. It is here that the institution's multidimensional nature
becomes most apparent—the Pasdaran's expansion into the busi-
ness realm has the potential to both displace and co-opt tradi-
tional financial elites. Similarly, its economic nepotism is accom-
panied by a broad range of public works initiatives in the rural
periphery that have indisputably improved the economies of these
regions.
• Chapter Six treats the IRGC as a political actor, arguing that,
given its indoctrination efforts and economic presence, the IRGC
is well positioned to become Iran's preeminent political force.
Yet whether or not it currently functions as an effective counter-
authority to the Supreme Leader is uncertain; the IRGC's power
6 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
is ultimately circumscribed by the system of checks and balances
inherent in the Iranian political system, as well as factional dis-
putes that both surround and permeate the institution and its
network of veterans. This chapter covers instances in which these
factional differences have risen to the surface and, based on this,
postulates potential scenarios for the IRGC's future.
• Chapter Seven summarizes our conclusions and offers a research
agenda for a deeper understanding of the Pasdaran that draws on
initial comparative insights from the trajectories of the Pakistani
military and Chinese PLA, which have also functioned as power-
ful and expansive political-economic actors but have evolved in
different and unexpected ways.
• Five appendixes present additional background on IRGC-affiliated
companies (Appendix A), background on key IRGC personnel
(active and former; Appendix B), a timeline comparing key events
in the development of the Islamic Republic with the evolution of
the IRGC (Appendix C), a map of Iran (Appendix D), and a glos-
sary of Persian terms (Appendix E).
CHAPTER TVVO
The IRGC in Context: Iran's Security and Political
Landscape
Before exploring the IRGC's varied domestic roles, it is first necessary
to situate it within the larger framework of Iran's security bureaucracy
and political landscape. Setting this context is important for two rea-
sons. First, the IRGC operates within a system that is highly factional-
ized along both informal and formal lines. Despite its dominance, the
IRGC by no means has a total monopoly on internal security or mili-
tary force, and it frequently vies with other institutions for visibility,
power, and resources. This rivalry often sheds light on IRGC actions
that may appear at first glance to be detrimental to the larger interests
of the state.
In many cases, these other security organs are staffed by ex-TRGC
officers. Yet it does not follow automatically that these individuals con-
tinue to act in lockstep with the corporate interests of the IRGC—
office-holding tends to generate its own specific set of imperatives and
priorities that can challenge or even completely offset the powerful
social bonds created by shared war experiences or military indoctrina-
tion. A good example is ex-IRGC Brigadier General Mohammad Baqer
Qalibaf, who, while serving as the commander of the Law Enforce-
ment Forces (LEF) during the latter half of the Khatami administra-
tion, clamped down on the street violence of the hardline vigilante
group Ansar-e Hezbollah—itself loosely linked to the Basij and IRGC
veterans—in apparent support for the reformists' cause.
The system's ideological factionalism has also permeated the
IRGC. Certainly, current and former Pasdaran are bound by a corpo-
7
8 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
rate outlook that is broadly opportunistic, authoritarian, and populist.
Yet they are also susceptible to the same debates and dilemmas that
dominate Iranian political life: balancing dogmatism and pragmatism,
reconciling modernity with fidelity to the revolution's ideals, and inte-
grating economic progress with cultural authenticity. Exploring where
Iran's various ideological factions stand on these issues and defining
what exactly is meant by “reformist” or “conservative” are critical to
discerning future trajectories for the IRGC.
The IRGC in Iran's Security Hierarchy
As a military institution, the IRGC has an estimated 120,000 serving
personnel who fulfill a number of functions related to internal security,
external defense, and regime survival, and it fields an army, air force,
and navy. Reflecting its original charter of defending the revolution,
there are IRGC installations in all of Iran's major cities, organized into
quick-reaction groups that serve as a reserve against unrest. Aside from
urban areas, the IRGC operates in rural regions with other security
forces in missions that include border control, counternarcotics, and
disaster relief. The IRGC has primacy over Iranian unconventional
warfare options, it maintains tight control over the development and
deployment of Iran's ballistic missiles, and it wields an external terror-
ism capability through its elite Qods Force.' Were Iran to develop and
field nuclear weapons, oversight of their storage, training, and deploy-
ment infrastructure would likely fall to the IRGC.
Within Iran's defense and security establishment, a complex web
of bureaucracy regulates the IRGC's authority and power—at least
on paper. These formal structures were originally intended to foster
interservice coordination with the regular military, or Artesh, mitigat-
ing the severe problems of battlefield coordination that arose between
the regular forces and the IRGC during the latter stages of the Iran-Iraq
War. In 1988, the regime created the Joint Armed Forces General Staff,
which brought together the leading officers from the regular army and
Cordesman (2005, pp. 45—48).
The IRGC in Context: Iran's Security and Political Landscape 9
the IRGC. In addition, postwar reforms—such as the 1989 creation of
the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics—helped reduce
the autonomy of the IRGC. Today, the IRGC is under an integrated
command with Iran's professional armed forces at the General Staff
level.
Parallel to this military chain of command, major national secu-
rity issues are decided in the Supreme National Security Council
(SNSC), which includes the president, the defense and foreign minis-
ters, the commander of the Revolutionary Guards, and several appoin-
tees or “representatives” of the Supreme Leader (see Figure 2.1). This
council is broadly reflective of the elite. Secretary of the SNSC Saeed
Jalili, who replaced Ali Larijani in October 2007, is roughly the equiva-
lent of the U.S. National Security Adviser. Within this structure, it is
important to observe above all else that current President Ahmadine-
Figure 2.1
Iran's National Security Establishment
Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (Pasdaran)
—120,000
Army
Navy
Air Force
Law
Enforcement
___________________ Forces (LEF)
Army of the Islamic - 120,000
Republic (Artesh)
—350,000 _____________
Army
Navy Prominent
Air Force clerics,
others
Commander-in-chief
Supreme Leader
Ministry of Intelligence
and Security
1W Wb 1 '; 4 • • • President chairman
Joint Armed Forces General Staff
Ministry of
the Interior
I
I
Jerusalem Force (Qods)
Basij Militia
Other paramilitary groups
—1000 elite soldiers?
—90 ,000— 1M
Numbers unknown
RAND M6821-2.1
10 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
jad, despite his chairmanship of the SNSC and his headline-grabbing
bravado, actually wields little authority over matters of defense. It is
the Supreme Leader—currently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei—who wields
constitutional authority as commander-in-chief and, perhaps more
importantly, exercises vast influence through his mediating role, per-
sonal relationships with top commanders, and the presence of his cleri-
cal representatives throughout the security institutions. In addition,
individuals appear to matter more than institutions when considering
national security decisionmaking. The Supreme Leader has special rep-
resentatives in the SNSC (Rowhani and Larijani) and special advis-
ers, such as former Foreign Minister Akbar Velayati and former IRGC
commander in chief Rahim Safavi, on his Strategic Council for For-
eign Relations. All of these former officials and others are likely to be
consulted by him when they do not participate in important sessions
of the SNSC.
There are two other security agencies with which the IRGC both
cooperates and competes: the Ministry of Intelligence and Security
(MOIS) and the LEF. Comprising an estimated 30,000 personnel, the
MOIS is responsible under the constitution for both foreign intelli-
gence collection and domestic countersubversion. Prior to 1999, the
organization was widely feared for its assassination of dissident activists
abroad and in Iran. During the presidency of Mohammad Khatami,
however, the MOIS was purged of many hardliners and has largely
abandoned its policy of assassination. 2 Overseas, the MOIS reportedly
liaises with several foreign Shi'a militant groups and insurgent organi-
zations. These relationships probably bring the MOIS into competition
with the Qods Force. 3
Subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior, the LEF is Iran's
national gendarmerie and includes roughly 120,000 personnel. This
institution's diverse responsibilities include counternarcotics, riot con-
trol, border protection, morals enforcement, and anticorruption. In the
event of an attack on the homeland, the LEF could be expected to aug-
2 Wilfried Buchta, “Iran's Security Sector: An Overview,” paper presented at Challenges to
Security Sector Governance in the Middle East, Geneva, July 12, 2004, pp. 13—16.
‘ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, RFEIRL Iran Report, Vol. 8, No. 31, August 9, 2005a.
The IRGC in Context: Iran 's Security and Political Landscape 11
ment IRGC and Basij paramilitaries, adding marginal capability as a
light mechanized force. It is unclear, however, if Tehran's defense doc-
trine has incorporated the LEF into this role.
The LEF has been widely criticized for its inefficiency and poor
discipline, including its facilitation of vigilante attacks on student dem-
onstrators during the 1999 riots. Yet after the June 2000 appointment
of Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, a former IRGC Air Force commander,
as its new chief, the force gradually improved its equipment inventory,
policing capability, and professionalism. 4 And, as noted earlier, Qalibaf
brought the force into occasional conflict with the ultraconservative
“pressure groups.” 5
It is important to note that Figure 2.1, which portrays the IRGC
as submerged beneath a web of oversight and coordinating bodies and
as seemingly co-equal to the MOIS, LEF, and regular forces, is an
inadequate representation of its true political influence. This is primar-
ily due to the importance of informal power networks and a process
of negotiation and consensus among competing factions in Iranian
decisionmaking. These networks transcend, and in some cases sup-
plant, the official bureaucratic structures—and much of their relative
power may reside in their access and proximity to the Supreme Leader.
As noted by scholar William Samii, Iran's factional landscape
cannot easily be understood through a systems or organizational
approach. Individuals in and out of government are connected
through kinship, marriage, and place of origin. An individual's
service branch during the Iran -Iraq War (e.g. IRGC, Basij, Army
‘ See the editorial in a reformist daily praising the LEF for its conduct during student
protests and for confronting Ansar-e Hezhollah members: Towse'eh (Persian), “Iran: Report
Views Positive Change of LEF Towards Students,” FBIS 1AP20030627000013, June 16,
2003.
A. William Samii, “Factionalism in Iran's Domestic Security Forces,” Middle East Intel-
ligence Bulletin, Vol. 4, No. 2, February 2002. On June 10, 2003, for example, the LEF
arrested the head of the Ansar-e Hezbollah and three other members in Mashhad. Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, RFE/RL Iran Report, Vol. 6, No. 25, June 16, 2003; see also,
Yas-e Now (Persian) “Iran: Political Figures Comment on Violent Groups, Elections, Other
Issues,” FBIS 1AP2003121600005, December 8, 2005.
12 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran 's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
ground forces) and education, whether in a seminary or a military
academy, also affect the connections he is likely to have. 6
Taking these dynamics into account, we argue that much of the
IRGC's domestic ascendancy has been encouraged by the inherently
complex structure of the Iranian political system. Because this system
has built-in redundancy and multiple centers of power, and because it
relies on a ponderous process of checks and balances among different
organizations, there is a default drift toward “behind-the-scenes” bar-
gaining and informal networking.
Thus, when we refer to the IRGC in this monograph, we mean
not only the formal institution of active military personnel but also the
networks of IRGC veterans and former members whose ascension has
been facilitated by the informality of Iranian political life. Such influ-
ential figures as Ali Larijani (until recently, secretary of the SNSC),
Ezzatolah Zarghami (head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcast-
ing), Mohsen Rezai (secretary of the Expediency Council), and assorted
heads of economic foundations, or bonyads, are all part of the IRGC's
networks. And behind these personal networks lie robust intellectual
resources: two IRGC-run universities, two think tanks, and assorted
policy journals and media outlets.
Many analyses and commentaries have imparted a certain ideo-
logical homogeneity to these networks and the IRGC writ large that
can best be described as authoritarian, populist, and, in some cases,
anticlerical. Much of this may stem from the similar age cohort of
many members, which has often been termed the “war generation”—
referring to the searing, formative experience of the Iran-Iraq War.
Certainly, this experience shaped political outlooks and forged endur-
ing social bonds among individuals who fought in the same battle or
served under the same commander. At least one Iranian scholar asserted
to a RAND researcher in 2005 that, with the election ofAhmadinejad
and the insertion of his ex-IRGC coterie into key positions of power,
6 Samii (2002).
The IRGC in Context: Iran's Security and Political Landscape 13
this shared outlook would be strong enough to “mitigate the fractious
policy infighting that defined the Khatami era.” 7
As our analysis reveals throughout this report, this has not been the
case. Ahmadinejad's tenure—and even his electoral campaign itself—
has not gone unchallenged by the IRGC. Factionalism remains a fea-
ture of the Iranian system and, as we argue in this monograph, could
become an increasing challenge to the IRGC itself Moreover, like any
elite organization, the IRGC's corporate identity has not been able to
completely and irrevocably subsume the attachments of locale, class,
familial ties, ethnicity, or sect among its members. As we discuss in
Chapter Five, these unofficial identities have surfaced at key junctures
in the evolution of the IRGC and the trajectory of the Islamic Republic
of Iran. The removal or ascendancy of a key figure, an instance of inter-
nal unrest, an election, or a critical policy debate have provoked dissent
and will continue to do so.
As the network of guards and ex-guards continues to expand
and diversify its domestic roles, particularly on economic matters,
the IRGC's ability to resolve these internal tensions may become fur-
ther jeopardized. Arguably, its membership will become responsive
to a widening set of constituencies and interests that may bear little
resemblance to the original, foundational values of an elite military
organization. 8
Iran's Factional Landscape
To better illuminate these current and potential fissures, discussed later
in this monograph, it is helpful to first situate the IRGC within the
factional landscape of Iranian politics. It is difficult to neatly label indi-
viduals, factions, or parties in the Iranian system as reformist or con-
servative. Any useful categorizations are often quite elastic and divide
Authors' telephone conversation with a Tehran-based political scientist, December 12,
2005.
8 It is regarding these dynamics that we see great value in a comparative approach that
draws from studies of the PLA and the Pakistani military.
14 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran 's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
further, often depending on the specific issue in question. Moreover,
the factions often divide into subgroups, depending on the domestic
or foreign policy issue. Understanding how these groups interact and
the stakes in their rivalry is important in assessing the IRGC's political
future. Instead of acting as a unified factional force itself, the IRGC
can be better conceived as an institution over which the various ideo-
logical factions may compete for control and influence. This is consis-
tent with the broader processes at work in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
As noted by one observer,
Rather than serve as an autonomous regulator and arbiter of (rival-
ries), the state is the principal arena in which the competition
takes place. Rival claims over parts of the state and its resources
are constantly played out, at times with considerable acrimony. 9
Taking these dynamics into account, we have adopted the fol-
lowing broad typology that draws from a 2008 RAND study and is
based on the insights of a scholar with extensive field experience in the
Islamic Republic.' 0 These rough fissures began to surface soon after
the success of the revolution but arguably reached their full apogee at
the end of the Iran-Iraq War and, especially, during the administra-
International Crisis Group, “Iran: Ahmadi-Nejad's Tumultuous Presidency,” Interna-
tional Crisis Group, Middle East Briefing, No. 21, Tehran and Brussels, February 6, 2007,
p. 2 .
10 Jerrold D. Green, Frederic Wehrey, and Charles Wolf, Jr., Understanding Iran, Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-771-SRF, 2008. Our typology also draws from
Mehran Kamrava, “Iranian National-Security Debates: Factionalism and Lost Opportuni-
ties,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 2007, pp. 84—100, and Wilfried Buchta,
Who Rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic, Washington, D.C.: Wash-
ington Institute for Near East Policy and the KonradAdenauer Stiftung, 2000, pp. 11—21.
We have also drawn from Iranian sources on political factionalism: Hossein Bashiriyeh,
Dibachei bar jamee shenasiy-e Iran (An introduction to the sociology of polities in Iran), 2nd
ed., Tehran: Nashr-e Negah-e Moaser Publications, 2002; Said Hajjarian,Jomhuriyat:Afsun-
zodai az Ghodrat (Republicanism: Rubbing off charm from power), 2nd ed., Tehran: Tarh-e
No Publications, 2000; Sadegh Zibakalam, Veda ha dovvom-e Khordad (Farewell with 2nd
of Khordad), 1st ed., Tehran: Rouzane Publications, 2003; Mohammad Chouchani, “Etelaf-
haye rangi: Moghadamei bar etelafhaye siasi dar Iran” (Colorful coalitions: An introduction
to the political coalitions in Iran), Nameh, No. 50, May 2006.
The IRGC in Context: Iran's Security and Political Landscape 15
tion of President Mohammad Khatami (1997—2005), whose efforts to
promote a more open political culture had the unintended effect of
encouraging elite factionalism.
Conservative Traditionalists. This current can be best described
as the main and largest faction, advocating a patriarchal Islamic
government, consolidation of the revolution's gains, preservation
of a traditional lifestyle, promotion of self-sufficiency with no
dependence on the outside world, and cultural purity. Among its
constituents, this trend counts the lower-middle classes, lower-
ranking clerics, and bazaari merchants (some bazaaris also sup-
port other factions, such as the reformists). Its reach extends into
nearly all the major institutions of the state, from the Office of
the Supreme Leader on down. Key formal groupings include the
Association of Qom Seminary Teachers and the Association of
Militant Clergy (Jameeh Rowhaniyyat-e Mobarez).
Reformist Cluster. From the mid-to-late 1980s onward, the con-
servative trend was subjected to fissures over questions of prag-
matism, doctrinal purity, and Iran's relationship with the world.
From these debates emerged a group of more moderate clerics in
1988, which split from the Association of Militant Clergy and
formed the Society for Militant Clerics (Majma-e Rowhaniyoun-e
Mobarez). Clustered around Mehdi Karrubi and Mohammad
Khatami, this trend argued for the promotion of civil society, a
relaxation of political and social controls, economic openness, a
cultural renaissance, and more interaction with the outside world.
In this sense, they drew inspiration from a tradition of Iranian
thinkers, including Ali Shariati and, later, Abdul Karim Soroush,
who synthesized Islamic moral concepts with modern Enlighten-
ment political philosophy to argue that there was no inherent ten-
sion between democracy and Islamic society. This broad cluster-
ing became ascendant in the mid-1990s, first inserting supporters
into the Majles (Iran's national parliament) and then having its
candidate, Mohammad Khatami, elected to the presidency in
1997. The popularity of this current was strongest among the
intelligentsia, writers, and students, though it never succeeded in
16 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran 's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
marshaling the approval of the Supreme Leader—a fatal flaw that
facilitated the political interference of the IRGC and defeat of the
reformists.
Pragmatic Conservatives. Situated somewhere between the first
and the second factions is a cluster of what have been termed the
“pragmatic conservatives.” This trend has organized itself within
two parties: the Executives of Construction Party (Hezbe Kar-
gozaran Sazandegi), which supported the reformists' approach to
culture, and the Justice and Development Party (Hezbe E'tedal va
Tose'eh), which leaned toward the conservative traditionalists on
cultural issues. The camp as a whole was inspired by the intellec-
tual work of a number of economic theorists who believed in eco-
nomic modernization from above (the so-called “China model”)
and argued for increased technical and financial cooperation with
the West (including the United States); but, unlike the reformists,
they showed little interest in the democratization of politics. This
current has often reversed its position on critical domestic issues,
spurring charges of opportunism from its rivals among the conser-
vative traditionalist and the new conservative clusters, who depict
themselves quite literally and self-righteously as “principlists” who
have remained steadfast to the revolution's ideals. The pragma-
tists have traditionally derived support from the bazaari merchant
class, students, the urban middle classes, and technocrats.
Radicals. This is the grouping that has been most closely identified
with the “rise” of the IRGC as a political force, beginning with
its assumption of provincial administration posts in 2003 and
leading up to the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
in 2005. The political group encapsulating this current was the
Abadgaran-e Iran-e Islami (Developers of Islamic Iran), which
was composed of IRGC and Basij war veterans. Many of them
rose to mid- and senior-level positions but were subsequently mar-
ginalized during the Rafsanjani era. During the 2005 elections,
the “new conservatives” appealed principally to the urban poor
and provincial classes.
The IRGC in Context: Iran's Security and Political Landscape 17
Although the Office of the Supreme Leader and other key institu-
tions have generally remained squarely the purview of the conservative
traditionalists, each of the other currents has also had its heyday, enjoy-
ing a period of formal political power through control of the Majles
and the presidency.
• 19 89—1997: Rafsanjani and the pragmatists presided over Iran's
postwar reconstruction. During this period, the IRGC and ex-
IRGC personnel were largely marginalized from political power.
• 1997—2005: Khatami and the reformist cluster emphasized the
growth of civil society and the so-called “dialogue of civiliza-
tions.” Here, the IRGC began its political ascendancy, allying
with conservatives to challenge Khatami's reforms.
• 2005—present: Ahmadinejad, the radical, and the Revolution-
ary Guards came to power. Some have labeled this Iran's “Third
Revolution.”
As we discuss more fully in Chapter Seven, the “rise” of the IRGC
has been met with its own set of factional debates over the very same
questions of pragmatism versus dogmatism and, especially, over the
economic opportunity costs inflicted by Iran's isolation and the stri-
dency of the Ahmadinejad presidency. These factional currents con-
tinue to permeate and shape the diverse domestic roles of the IRGC,
whose origins and evolution are discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER THREE
The IRGC's Diverse Domestic Roles: Origins and
Evolution
The IRGC's expansive reach into Iran's economy, politics, and society
has far exceeded its original, rather modest mandate. Understanding
the degree of this divergence from its formal charter and, especially,
from the vision outlined for it by Ayatollah Khomeini is critical to
understanding how it is received by the Iranian public and by Iran's
ideological factions. In attempting to curry legitimacy with various
segments of the Iranian populace, the IRGC frequently marshals the
authority of Ayatollah Khomeini as well as its role in reconstructing
the country after the “imposed war” or the “sacred defense,” i.e., the
Iran-Iraq War.
Speaking to the Islamic Republic of Iran News Agency (IRNA)
in August 2007, then IRGC commander Major General Rahim Safavi
argued that, since the termination of the Iran-Iraq War,
the IRGC has assumed three major and two peripheral missions.
The major missions of the IRGC involve defense, security, and
cultural issues and its peripheral missions are related to the con-
struction of the country and carrying out relief and rescue opera-
tions during natural disasters.'
While grounding its current missions in the revolutionary and
postwar past, the IRGC is also careful to present itself as continually
IRNA, “Iran: Guards Commander Says Change in Guards Strategy Necessary,” FBIS
1AP20070817950094, August 17, 2007c.
19
20 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
adapting to new strategic circumstances. This is especially true regard-
ing what Safavi termed the recent intensification of a “cultural war”
being waged by the United States against the Iranian populace. To
mobilize the population against this perceived challenge, the IRGC
has expanded its ideological, training, and education roles. According
to Safavi,
The IRGC does not intervene in the cultural activities of other
government organizations and bodies. However, based on the
nature of the IRGC, which is intertwined with belief and mil-
itary activities, the organization's orientation is to enhance the
forces' Islamic and ideological beliefs; and this is a part of the
duties vested with the IRGC. 2
Of course, the hidden subtext of this “cultural defense” is the IRGC's
interest in bolstering its own institutional credibility and shoring up
the revolution's sagging appeal in the eyes of the populace. The IRGC's
commanders and ideologues appear to perceive that much of this effort
is contingent on aligning their institution's current activities with the
original intent and vision of the Islamic Republic's founders.
Postrevolutionary Developments: Consolidating Internal
Control
The IRGC was originally conceptualized by its founders as a popular
militia force to monitor the remainders of the shah's military and pro-
tect the state from possible counterrevolutionary activity. On May 5,
1979, roughly one month after declaring the Islamic Republic, Ayatol-
lah Khomeini issued a decree ordering the Revolutionary Council to
establish the Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Islami (literally, Army of
the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution). 3 This new force differed from
2 IRNA(2007c).
? The idea of creating a parallel military structure enriched by and imbued with Islamic
ideology in fact preceded the 1979 revolution. While still in exile in Paris, some of the mem-
bers of the Freedom Movement, a moderate political group opposed to the shah, introduced
The IRGC's Diverse Domestic Roles: Origins and Evolution 21
the shah's imperial army in its mission in that it accorded primacy to
an internal role against potential counterrevolutionaries while at the
same time pushing for the export of the revolution. The Revolutionary
Council enumerated the duties of the IRGC in eight categories: 4
• assisting police and security forces in the apprehension or liquida-
tion of counterrevolutionary elements
battling armed counterrevolutionaries
defending against attacks and the activities of foreign forces inside
the country
• coordinating and cooperating with the country's armed forces
• training subordinate IRGC personnel in moral, ideological, and
politico-military matters
• assisting the Islamic Republic in the implementation of the Islamic
Revolution
• supporting liberation movements and their call for justice of the
oppressed people of the world under the tutelage of the leader of
the Revolution of the Islamic Republic
• utilizing the human resources and expertise of the IRGC to deal
with national calamities and unexpected catastrophes and sup-
porting the developmental plans of the Islamic Republic to com-
pletely maximize the IRGC's resources.
The IRGC's domestic roles were further delineated in the Islamic
Republic of Iran's constitution, ratified on November 15, 1979. Article
150 of the document defines the role and functions of the IRGC:
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, organized in the early
days of the triumph of the Revolution, is to be maintained so
that it may continue in its role of guarding the Revolution and
the idea of creating a revolutionary army much like that of Algeria's freedom fighters. The
idea originated with Ayatollah Khomeini, and, after his approval, the early founders of what
was to become the IRGC started to accept volunteers who were eventually sent to Syria and
Lebanon for military training.
‘ Petrochemical Research and Technology Company, Event List, Web page , October 7,
1997.
22 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
its achievements. The scope of duties of the Corps, and its areas
of responsibility, in relation to the duties and areas of responsibil-
ity of the other armed forces, are to be determined by law, with
emphasis on brotherly cooperation and harmony among them. 5
Article 151 seems to augur the formation of the Basij and indi-
cates its formal mission:
The government is oblige [ d] to provide a program of military
training, with all requisite facilities, for all its citizens, in accor-
dance with the Islamic criteria, in such a way that all citizens
will always be able to engage in the armed defense of the Islamic
Republic of Iran. The possession of arms, however, requires the
granting of permission by the competent authorities. 6
It is important to note, however, that despite the constitutional
primacy accorded to it by the revolution, the IRGC's domestic ascen-
dancy over other security institutions was not preordained. In the cha-
otic aftermath of the Islamic Revolution, the IRGC was just one of
several security instruments used by the leaders of the new state against
existential threats and, at times, wildly exaggerated challenges posed by
an array of armed groups—both leftists (the communist Tudeh party
and the Marxist Mujahideen-e Khalq [ MEK]), ethnic insurgents such
as the Kurds, and monarchists.' The TRGC generally operated outside
of the sphere and jurisdiction of the regular police and army forces
controlled by the short-lived provisional government headed by Prime
Minister Mehdi Bazargan. The new government's security organs
worked to extirpate the leftists but were far less effective in this task
than were the Islamist paramilitary organizations, whose proficiency
“Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” English translation, Iranian Embassy,
Ottawa, Canada, 1979.
6 “Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran” (1979).
See various publications by opposition groups, such as “Rah e Azadi” and “Mojahed.” See
also Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran andAmerica, New
York: Random House, 2004, pp. 149—150.
The IRGC's Diverse Domestic Roles: Origins and Evolution 23
in street violence and the forcible silencing of dissent were to become
enduring features of Iranian political life.
In the realm of Islamist paramilitary groups, the IRGC was not
without its fair share of competitors in enforcing revolutionary ideals,
particularly from the komitehs (committees). These were freelance
bands of local Islamists who arrogated to themselves the power of jus-
tice and administration over assorted neighborhoods in major cities
throughout the Islamic Republic.8 Roughly 1,000 komitehs operated in
Tehran alone in the months after the fall of the shah, arbitrarily arrest-
ing anyone they deemed a threat to the republic's new sociopolitical
order. Although the komitebs and the IRGC often drew from the same
pool of volunteers, there was often friction between them.
Another variant of these local-level organizations were the “revo-
lutionary tribunals” that operated de facto courts across the country.
These virtual “kangaroo courts” tried and summarily executed thou-
sands of people who were suspected of counterrevolutionary crimes.
Finally, the pro-Khomeini Islamic Republic Party (IRP), which was
the home of the most doctrinaire Islamist figures in Iran, may have had
its own paramilitary groups as it waged a struggle to indoctrinate the
country and the provisional government.
The triumph of the IRGC over these other groups was ultimately
achieved by demonstrating its superior effectiveness as a guard for the
nascent revolutionary regime during the Iran-Iraq War.
The Sacred Defense: The IRGC in the Iran-Iraq War
As the new regime fought for its survival, the IRGC was the principal
institution responsible for suppressing uprisings by separatist Kurds,
Baluchs, and Turkmen, as well as confronting the MEK after it openly
broke with Khomeini in June 1981. Yet despite these successes, it never
completely achieved a monopoly over the regime's internal policing
functions. Indeed, the fractious rivalry among the informal paramili-
8 Pollack (2004, p. 150).
Buchta (2000, p. 67).
24 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
taries that marked the revolution's early days has, in a sense, been insti-
tutionalized into a domestic security establishment that is character-
ized by parallelism, redundancy, and competition for resources.
Today, the IRGC attempts to strengthen its legitimacy by empha-
sizing its role in the “sacred defense” of the Islamic Republic against Iraq
and, simultaneously, challenges originating from inside the country.
This theme informs much of its larger societal, economic, and political
outreach, as discussed later on in this monograph. For example, much
of its construction and public-works activities are framed as a sort of
reenactment or a continuation of its vaunted role in the aftermath of
the Iran-Iraq War. Of course, whether or not this actually resonates
with Iranian society remains an open question. As one Iranian-born
scholar and frequent visitor to the Islamic Republic has observed:
The bravery of the IRGC (during the Iran-Iraq War) is mostly
an idea propagated by the government with no particular appeal
or currency within Iran itself In fact, many Iranians blame the
IRGC for an excessively long and futile eight-year war against
Iraq. Many believe that Iran, with a population two times larger
than that of Iraq, could not defeat its forces because of the
Guards' nadanam kari (inexperience), emotionality, and ideologi-
cal zealotry.' 0
However, the above statement may not apply to a significant por-
tions of Iran's population. Iranians whose sons and husbands became
shahids, or martyrs, may view the IRGC more reverentially. These Ira-
nians tend to be supportive of the Islamic Republic and the IRGC as
political institutions.
What has not been widely recognized outside of Iran is the fact
that many, if not most, IRGC commanders, along with revolutionary
leaders such as Khomeini, viewed the war not just as a struggle for the
territorial integrity of the Iranian state but instead as an opportunity
to further consolidate and institutionalize the revolution, purging it
10 Authors' correspondence with an Iranian-born scholar, October 24, 2007.
The IRGC's Diverse Domestic Roles: Origins and Evolution 25
of known and potential opponents.” Arguably, this prerogative some-
times took precedence over matters of strategy and military expedi-
ency. This is perhaps demonstrated by the IRGC's efforts to politically
marginalize the regular army by prolonging the war. As long as the reg-
ular army was stretched thin and fully deployed on the western border,
it could not mount any sort of a coup d'etat against Khomeini and his
cohorts. This was not an inconsequential concern for the IRGC leaders
and their IRP patrons, as the professional army had mounted several
coup attempts in the summer of 1980 just before the Iraqi invasion.
Thus, the immediate postrevolutionary period and the Iran-Iraq
War revealed several important themes that continue to define the
development of the IRGC's domestic roles: competition with other
security institutions, the tension between ideological doctrine and
strategic expediency, and the consolidation of domestic institutional
control by mobilizing for external defense. On this latter imperative,
the IRGC's leadership has relied extensively on the Basij Resistance
Forces, its paramilitary affiliate of lightly armed, often poorly trained
auxiliaries whose command structure was formally merged with that
of the IRGC in 2007.12 More than any other IRGC entity, the Basij
has evolved to become the institution's most visible, omnipresent face
to the Iranian population and has seen its domestic functions expand
significantly since its early role in the Iran-Iraq War.
“Popularizing” the IRGC: The Development of the Basij
Resistance Force
Many revolutionary regimes have relied on “popular militias” or a
“people's army,” in which sheer numbers and ideological fervor are
believed to compensate for a deficit in military competence and equip-
ment. In many cases, these organizations' military role is subordinated
Ervand Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin , New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press,
1992, PP. 63—64, 259.
12 Mehr News Agency “IRGC Commander Takes Charge of Basij Forces,” September 29,
2007.
26 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
to their function of indoctrinating the populace and suppressing inter-
nal dissent.
Formed less than a year after the IRGC, the Basij's early devel-
opment certainly seemed to embody these features—when Ayatollah
Khomeini directed its creation, he appealed for a “20 million—man
militia” to defend the republic from both external aggression from the
United States and from the revolution's internal enemies. 13 As in the
case of the IRGC, the formation of the Basij was at least partially a
response to the revolutionary competition that defined the political
scene after the fall of the Bazargan government on November 11, 1979.
Leftist organizations aligned with Khomeini had pressed for some sort
of “popular” force that, once created, would allow for the disbandment
of the ex-shah's forces. As noted earlier, many of these leftist groups
already had their own armed wings, hence the strong impetus for a
broad-based Islamist people's militia.1 4
At a gathering of Basij members in 2006, Basij commander Hus-
sein Hamadani summarized the early history of the Basij, or at least
the IRGC's version of it, enumerating its services to the revolution as
follows:
• The Basij maintained security in the absence of an effective police
force in the early years of the revolution.
• It purged government offices of antirevolutionary elements and
old-regime loyalists.
• It formed a network of information gathering on the opposition.
This network was nicknamed “the 36 million [ member] informa-
tion network.”
• It suppressed a communist uprising in the northern Caspian city
of Amol and protected oil pipelines from terrorist activities in the
13 The original name of the Basij was Sazman Basij Melli, or the National Mobilization
Organization. It was changed a decade later to Vahed.-e Basij Mostaza'feen, or Mobilization
of the Oppressed Unit, and eventually to Sazman-e Moghavemat-e Basij, or the National
Resistance Mobilization.
14 Schahgaldian and Barkhordarian (1987, p. 88).
The IRGC's Diverse Domestic Roles: Origins and Evolution 27
south. The Kurdistan uprising in the city of Paveh also was sup-
pressed by the Basij forces.
• In the July 1980 Nojeh coup attempt by former members of the
shah's forces, a Basij member was planted inside the conspirators'
group and kept the revolutionary regime informed of the activi-
ties of the counterrevolutionaries. Afterward, he was martyred.
• For the first year of the war against Iraq, the Basij was not allowed
to interfere because of its lack of expertise; however, when it was
allowed to enter the war, the defensive position of Iran turned
into an offensive one.' 5
Battlefield conditions in the Iran-Iraq War and early political
turmoil inside Iran aided the domestic ascendancy of the Basij. Con-
fronted with the Iraqi army's static armor defenses and minefields, and
bereft of substantial mechanized forces, Iranian commanders came to
initially rely on human-wave assaults as a highly effective countermea-
sure. Many of these offensives were conducted by Basij units, com-
posed of young boys recruited from mosques in poor neighborhoods
and, in some cases, forcibly conscripted from schools. Instilled with
religious and nationalist fervor, the Basij militia became a formidable
challenge to Iraq's more traditional and disciplined military.' 6 These
early successes were important as a vehicle for the IRGC to bolster
its legitimacy in the “sacred defense,” particularly vis-à-vis the regular
forces. Moreover, the early reliance on superior morale, sheer num-
bers, indoctrination, and youth, necessitated by Iran's conventional
military weaknesses, set the template for the Islamic Republic's current
“asymmetric” strategy of homeland defense—the conduct of partisan
warfare, defense-in-depth, and scorched-earth tactics by lightly armed
popular forces against a militarily superior opponent.
While the actual battlefield validity of this concept is open to
debate, it does afford the IRGC a useful pretext for conducting wide-
Yaletharat, Vol. 402, November 29, 2006.
16 Shaul Bakhash, The Rez n of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution, New York:
Basic Books, 1984, pp. 63, 118—119; Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran -Iraq Military
Conflict, New York: Routledge, 1991.
28 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
spread indoctrination and training of the populace using the Basij
Resistance Force as a vehicle. According to Iran's Mo'in (Auxiliary)
Defense Plan, local Basij units, under the supervision of IRGC com-
manders, would play a prominent role in training and mobilizing
the Iranian population for countrywide partisan warfare.' 7 For this
strategy to be effective, however, the populace must be receptive to
Basij guidance and direction—hence the intensive focus on cultivat-
ing a favorable popular image of the Basij and the IRGC writ large via
media outreach and by highlighting its public-works projects in the
rural periphery.
Today, the Basij are present in virtually all sectors of Iranian soci-
ety; there are specially organized Basij units for university students,
local tribes, factory workers, and so forth. There is a strong ideologi-
cal component to this omnipresence. As stated by a local IRGC com-
mander in 2001,
In the next decade, our problem will be the cultural onslaught
and the Basij must block its progress. . . instead of creating mili-
tary bases, our policy today is to create cultural societies.' 8
Despite these lofty intentions, however, there are some indica-
tions that the Basij—many of whom are drawn from the ranks of Iran's
disaffected youth and elderly pensioners—hold cynical or ambivalent
views of this ideological training. Basij training is frequently neces-
sary for certain social benefits—loans, university scholarships, welfare
subsidies, and the like. As stated by one 24-year-old member in a 2005
interview, “The only reason I stay in the Basij is for the money.
many of my friends in the Basij are unhappy with the government.” 9
‘ Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network (Persian), “Iran Revolution Guards Hold
‘Asymmetric Warfare' Ashura-5 Exercises,” FBIS TAP 1AP20040913000110, September 13,
2004; Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network (Persian), “IRGC Ground Force Com-
mander Speaks on Reorganization, Combat Plans” FBIS TAP 20050309000087, March 9,
2005.
18 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, RFE/RL Iran Report, Vol. 4, No. 6, February 12,
2001.
‘ International Crisis Group, “What Does Ahmadi-Ncjad's Victory Mean?” Middle East
Briefing, No. 18, Tehran and Brussels, August 2005, p. 6.
The IRGC's Diverse Domestic Roles: Origins and Evolution 29
Compounding this reported cynicism, there appears to be a rural-
urban split in public perceptions of the Basij, noted in a previous
RAND study20 and reinforced to us in 2006 by a longtime visitor to
the Islamic Republic. In the provinces, the Basij present a more benign
face through construction projects and disaster relief, while in urban
areas, they are more apt to be seen quite negatively, quashing civil soci-
ety activities, arresting dissidents, and confronting reformist student
groups on campuses. 2 '
Urban sentiments may be, moreover, affected by the Basij's affilia-
tion with the “pressure groups” or hardline vigilantes, of which Ansar-e
Hezbollah is the most widely known. Although not formally attached
to the IRGC, it is reportedly staffed by Basij and IRGC veterans of
the Iran-Iraq War. In the minds of the populace, therefore, it may be
associated with the IRGC and thus have a direct impact on popular
perceptions of its societal and political legitimacy.
The role of the Ansar also raises the important function of the
IRGC as an internal security and domestic intelligence arm of the
regime.
The Guardians of the Revolution: The IRGC's Domestic
Intelligence and Security Roles
As noted earlier, the suppression of internal dissent and domestic intel-
ligence collection were among the IRGC's first mandated roles. Indeed,
the guardian nature of the IRGC was embedded in its duties from its
earliest days, when it liquidated political opponents of the revolution-
ary state, separatists, and other “morally corrupt” individuals. Today,
20 Schahgaldian and Barkhordarian (1987, p. 37).
21 At the same time, there have been instances in which Basij incompetence or inefficiency
as emergency relief forces responding to natural disasters has provoked the ire of rural popu-
lations. As an example of Basij's urban enforcement role, on August 20, 2005, Tehran's
deputy prosecutor took the remarkable step of deputizing Basij paramilitary units as police
officers, giving them powers of arrest and other judicial functions. See, “Paramilitaries to Get
Police Powers,” in Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, RFE/RL Iran Report, Vol. 8, No. 34,
August 29, 2005b.
30 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
the IRGC still performs these functions, though its relationship with
other domestic and law enforcement entities, the LEF and the MOIS
in particular, is frequently marked by a lack of coordination or even
open rivalry.22
For many of the Islamic Republic of Iran's early years, the IRGC
was responsible for both internal and external intelligence and secu-
rity, which was carried out in conjunction with the prime minister's
office. Relying on the remnants of the shah's deeply feared intelligence
agency, the SAVAK, the IRGC successfully eliminated the terrorist
Islamic group Forghan and the Communist Tudeh Party, and it was
able to dismantle the vast networks of the MEK. The mobile units of the
IRGC, alghare'eh, proved particularly effective in destroying counter-
revolutionary opposition groups. Yet with the formation of the MOIS
in 1983, the IRGC ceded much of its internal intelligence role. 3
It was not until the election of reformist President Mohammad
Khatami in 1997 and the years following that the IRGC actually regained
its domestic surveillance responsibilities, albeit more informally and as
a “shadow intelligence” agency. 24 Khatami's newly appointed Minister
for Intelligence and Security, Hojatolislam Ali Younessi, began to set
the MOTS on a path that was more cautiously tolerant of Khatami's
reformist agenda for civil society, intellectual freedom, and political
openness. 25 The net effect was that, as the MOIS was increasingly per-
ceived by powerful conservatives—namely, the Supreme Leader—as
a more reform-dominated entity, the IRGC steadily resumed many of
its former internal security activities. This new conservative-dominated
informal intelligence network, nicknamed “the parallel intelligence
and security organization” by its critics, was modeled after the intel-
ligence section of the IRGC's ground force.2 6
22 Samii (2002). See also Eisenstadt (2001).
23 Khaligh (2006b).
24 Kha ligh (2006b).
25 Iranian Students News Agency, “Report on Ministry of Intelligence Press Conference.”
Gooya News, August 31, 2004.
26 Kha ligh (2006b).
The IRGC's Diverse Domestic Roles: Origins and Evolution 31
The balance among the various security and intelligence forces
changed once again after the defeat of the reformists and the rise of the
radicals under President Ahmadinejad in 2005. The MOIS regained
some of its authority under Hojatolislam Gholamhussein Mohseni-
Ejehi, who has since sought to “prove” his ministry's conservative
bona fides through the widespread suppression of intellectual freedoms
and civil society, spurred in large measure by the regime's fear that
the United States is attempting to foment a “velvet revolution” (i.e.,
the erosion of revolutionary ideals via civil-society organizations and
ethnic dissent) inside Iran. 27
At present, the security division, or Sazman-e Harassat, of the
IRGC functions much like a regular internal security and intelli-
gence office.28 It collects information on the opposition and separat-
ists, arrests individuals, and imprisons them in sections of the Evin
and other prisons controlled exclusively by the IRGC. Much of this
activity may be conducted through the IRGC's Political and Ideologi-
cal Directorate, probably under the direction of Hojattolislam Saeedi,
the representative of the Supreme Leader, and his subordinate clerics.
Supreme Leader Khamenei himself likely exerts a key role, as he is well
known for his detailed attention to management issues, particularly
on the day-to-day functioning of the IRGC. Supreme Leader Khame-
nei's office (Daftar-e Rabbar) is able to bypass the senior IRGC leader-
ship and thus is able to directly supervise the security and intelligence
activities of the IRGC.
27 Farideh Farhi, “Iran's Security Outlook,” Middle East Report Online, July 9, 2007. For
information on the arrest of Western think-tank scholars, most notably Iranian-Ameri-
can Haleh Esfandiari, see Islamic Republic of Iran Network Television (Tehran), “OSC:
Iranian TV Describes Detained Iranian-American Esfandiari as ‘Mosad Spy,” FBIS
1AP20070512011017, May 12, 2007a. For information on the broader cultural and political
crackdown, see Open Source Center, “Iran: Ahmadinezhad Government Reverses Civil Soci-
ety Gains,” Open Source Center Analysis, FBIS 1AF20070620564001, June 20, 2007b.
28 Khaligh (2006b).
32 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
The Merger of Basij and IRGC: A Sign of the Regime's
Growing Entrenchment
The prior section introduced the TRGC's domestic roles byway of a his-
torical inquiry into its origins and early development. Factional rivalry
with other militias early in the postrevolutionary period and, later,
with other security institutions initially facilitated the IRGC's domestic
involvement, particularly in the areas of intelligence and law enforce-
ment. The very nature of the revolutionary regime, which conflated
external plots with internal consolidation, meant that the IRGC would
continue to act as a guardian of the revolution even as it expanded
its role in Iran's external defense. Yet the waxing and waning of the
IRGC's internal security role is often contingent on whether powerful
conservative figures and clerics perceive that other security institutions,
such as the MOIS or LEF, are under their control or have fallen to
other factional actors. Perhaps more importantly, however, the degree
of the TRGC's domestic interference is also a function of the regime's
broader threat perception of internal subversion by the enemies of the
revolution—namely, the United States.
Since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, this perception has
risen in a steady crescendo. Recent statements by the IRGC and other
regime officials make clear their fixation on “psychological warfare”
and the “cultural onslaught” of the United States, even if the fear of a
direct attack has subsided. Whether through ethnic subversion or its
support for civil society and academic exchanges, the United States is
perceived to be steadily eroding the ideological foundations of the revo-
lution. Of course, the utility of an external menace to keep the coun-
try on war footing and distract the populace from the regime's own
administrative and economic failings has long been a feature of the
Islamic Republic of Iran's official discourse—but this is largely a moot
point. Whether real or exaggerated, this threat perception has had the
effect of deepening and broadening the IRGC's populist and mobiliz-
ing outreach—often termed the promotion of “Basij culture”—into
virtually every geographic, economic, and societal sector of Iran.
This dynamic was ultimately reflected in the formal merger of the
command structure of the IRGC with the Basij—a move that was cal-
The IRGC's Diverse Domestic Roles: Origins and Evolution 33
culated to make the IRGC “more Basij-like” and to formally enshrine
their respective increased domestic roles. In commenting on this merger
in September 2007, the new IRGC commander, Mohammad Ali Jafari,
confirmed the total participation of the IRGC in Iranian domestic life,
with its principal focus on combating internal enemies:
The new strategic guidelines of the IRGC have been changed
by the directives of the leader of the revolution [ Supreme Leader
Khamenei]. The main mission of the IRGC from now on is to
deal with the threats from the internal enemies. [ The number-
two priority of the corps] is to help the military in case of foreign
threats 29,30
To some of the more idealistic founders of the IRGC, the shift
toward a primary focus on internal intelligence and security has been
an unwelcome deviation from the original goals of the institution.
According to such critics as Mohsen Sazegara, the metamorphosis of
the IRGC is the result of the influence ofMohammad Bagher Zolghadr
(former deputy commander of the IRGC), Hojatolislam Rasti-Kashani
(the personal representative of Ayatollah Khomeini to the Pasdaran),
and Mohsen Rezai. Rezai was appointed as the chief of the intelligence
division of the IRGC, which spread its reach into other branches of the
IRGC as well as other parallel security organizations. 3 '
One important result of this turn toward a domestic role in com-
bating internal dissent has been an intensified focus on indoctrination,
training, and education. This focus is the subject of the next chapter.
29 Mehrnews, “Farmandehi niruye moghavemate basij be sardar Jafari mohavval shod”
(The command of Basij was assigned to Jafari), October 2007.
30 M. A. Jafari, “The main mission of the IRGC is to deal with the internal enemies,” Mizan
News, September 29, 2007.
Mohsen Sazcgara, “Sepah va seh enherof” (The IRGC and three aberrations), July 23,
2006. He adds that Mohscn Rczai proposed that the IRGC should organize new branches
to deal with internal opposition; Sazcgara disagreed, saying that it will generate an organiza-
tion similar to the Brown Shirts organization in Nazi Germany. Rezai laughed, saying that
it would not happen, because the Brown Shirts were (at least) educated!
CHAPTER FOUR
Militarizing Civil Society: The IRGC's
Indoctrination, Training, and Media Activities
From Basij university student groups and paramilitary training to
monthly bulletins and newspapers, the TRGC administers a vast net-
work of outlets for propagating a sense of corporatism, cultivating loy-
alty to the regime, and burnishing its own institutional image.
What remains largely unknown, however, is the population's
receptivity to this mobilization. As in the case of dissent against its
economic expansion, discussed at length in the next chapter , there is
scattered reporting of cynicism, exhaustion, and resistance toward the
IRGC's ideological outreach. Yet given the breadth of its indoctrina-
tion efforts, as well as the fact that this indoctrination is frequently
accompanied by more tangible benefits, such as scholarships, loans,
technical job training, and societal mobility via officer commissions, it
is logical to presume that the IRGC has been at least partially success-
ful in broadening its range of constituents and supporters. The most
profitable approach, therefore, is to survey the range of its ideologi-
cal activism, noting potential beneficiaries and instances of support or
dissent.
The IRGC's Ideological Activism: Origins and
Development
The IRGC's function of ideological outreach is not new; one of its clear
responsibilities at its inception was self-indoctrination, e.g., “training
35
36 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
the Sepah (Revolutionary Guards) in moral, ideological, and polit-
ico-military matters.” 1 To inculcate emerging elite cadres with a new
Islamic ideology, the “Political Bureau” was among the first units to
be formed.2 After its founding, the bureau published secret bulletins
circulated internally within the IRGC, offering frank strategic assess-
ments about the progress of the Iran-Iraq War.
The Political Bureau began evolving toward a more explicitly ide-
ological role when the IRGC invited two philosophy professors from
Tehran University, Ahmad Fardid and Reza Davari-Ardakani, to teach
at the bureau. The main themes enumerated in the early teachings of
these two individuals were antihumanistic, antitechnological, anti-
Western, populist, insular, and at times highly nationalistic. Although
these tenets probably played a role in inspiring the initial revolutionary
fervor of the IRGC and Basij, it is questionable whether they continue
to dominate the wor ldview of many current and former IRGC officials,
who pride themselves on their technocratic know-how and present the
IRGC as a force for modernizing the state. If anything, these tenets
show that the IRGC's ideological outlook is not immutable, mono-
lithic, or static; while remaining broadly faithful to the revolution's
ideals, the institution is capable of evolving in diverse and unexpected
ways.
Aside from the Political Bureau, the Office of the Representative
of the Supreme Leader in the IRGC is a major channel for indoctrina-
tion and is responsible for propagating the theory of velayat-e faghih
(rule of the supreme jurist). This office has emerged as a permanent
fixture in the IRGC organization and is now responsible for the Web
site and monthly magazine Sobhe-e Sadegh. Following the creation
of the IRGC, the office played a major role in bolstering battlefield
morale among both regular Army soldiers and Pasdaran. It deployed
over 18,000 clerics and mada!ahs (cantors) to indoctrinate fighters with
1 Article 5 from Khomeini/Revolutionary Council's original decree.
2 Today, Shariatmadari is the editor of the conservative newspaper Keyhan.
The IRGC's Indoctrination, Training, and Media Activities 37
the concepts of velayat-efaghih, glorification of Ashura, and the value
of martyrdom. 4
From this nucleus, the IRGC's ideological arm evolved into a
broad network of cultural activities, institutes, think tanks, and youth
camps. Many of these are conducted in tandem with the activities of
other entities, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB),
the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, and the Islamic Propa-
gation Organization. As noted earlier, some of these institutions, most
notably the IRIB, have been led or staffed by former IRGC officers,
with the effect that even training outlets not formally attached to the
IRGC may be explicitly sympathetic to its institutional interests and
wor ldview.
Among the most important ideological courses administered
solely by the IRGC are those dedicated to indoctrinating young Basijis.
The subject matter of these courses spans a broad gamut, from meth-
ods for organizing counter-reformist Basij student movements to voca-
tional training and courses on speaking. Underpinning many of these
efforts is a focus on the family members of young Basijis as being criti-
cal pillars in the promotion of a “Basiji culture.”6
Summer camps appear to be a key vehicle for propagating these
values—and for preparing young Iranians to eventually assume the
duties of armed auxiliaries to the IRGC in the regime's homeland
defense strategy. 7 Commenting on these venues, the IRGC's com-
mander for Gilan province, Colonel Sekhavatmand Davudi, noted
that one of their goals is
‘ The day ofAshura is the pinnacle of the rituals of mourning in the holy month of Muhar-
ram for the martyrdom of Hussein, the third Shi'ite Imam and the grandson of the prophet.
It is used as a rallying point for promoting ideology of martyrdom for the just cause.
Interview with a cleric who had served as an ideological officer at war against Iraq.
Ardabil Provincial TV, “Iranian Official Praises Student Basij Activity,” transcript, FBIS
IAP20070831950039, August 30, 2007d.
6 IRNA(2007c).
Teacher's Basij Organization, “Danestanihaye morabiane tarbiati dar tarh-c misaq
(Information for “cultural” instructors in the Misaq plan), no date.
38 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
to attract the youths to the 20-million-strong army. We are
responsible for doing our duty and obeying the founder of the
revolution in this regard. Another one of the purposes of this
plan is to give depth to religious, moral, and social orders of the
youths, and we hope that with the execution of this plan we will
be able to train the youths the way the revolution wants. 8
Administered by Basij, the summer camps focus on providing
young students with activities designed to inculcate them with a con-
servative, insular worldview, fortifying them against foreign cultural
influences, such as satellite television and Internet Web sites. 9 Many are
held in rural provinces, with campsites set up in several small towns.
Colonel Davudi stated that, in 2007, there were 160 camps set up in
Gilan province alone, with 20,000 students expected to enroll. The
average age of camp participants is between 13 and 15 years.
It is important to note that the camps are not strictly ideological;
they offer a social setting for sports, recreation, and the acquisition of
technical skills that may be extremely appealing in remote rural prov-
inces. According to Davudi, the summer program includes “Koranic
activities, aid and relief, technical activities, book reading, sports, and
camping,” as well as courses in Arabic, English, chemistry, physics, and
mathematics.10 Although the camps are geared toward young Basijis,
anyone who wishes to participate can enroll in the summer program.
The IRGC Presence in Iran's Education System
Aside from running its own cultural outreach and indoctrination
efforts, the IRGC and the Basij have become deeply entrenched in the
Iranian education system at both the university and the high school
level. Its presence in these arenas serves a twofold function. First, it fos-
8 “Rasht IRGC Commander Comments on Basij Goals in Misaq Program,” RashtMo'in,
FBIS 1AP20070712011010, June 19, 2007.
“Persian Press: Grand Ayatollah Makarem-Shirazi Urges Exporting Basiji Ideology,”
Javan, 1AP20070718011009, July 16, 2007.
10 “Rasht IRGC Commander Comments on Basij Goals in Misaq Program” (2007).
The IRGC's Indoctrination, Training, and Media Activities 39
ters the same socialization and ideological affinity it attempts to instill
through its own training activities. Secondly, it serves as a reserve
countermobilization force against reform-oriented student activists.
Much of this activism in academia appears to have been facili-
tated by the IRGC's interference in university hiring and administra-
tion practices. In a policy reminiscent of the university purges of the
early 1980s, numerous university professors and administrators have
been removed from their positions and replaced with IRGC officials.
Over the past few years, and especially since Ahmadinejad's election
as president, academics from Tehran University, Allameh Tabataba'i
University, and the Teacher Training University have been suspended
or presented with early retirement letters.”
In the wake of these dismissals and arrests, Basij officials have
begun to exert increasing influence over university life by filling the
vacant professorial posts. In a statement supportive of this trend, a
member of the Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution, Hojjat ol
Eslam Mohammadian, explained,
[ W]e currently have 11,000 Basiji lecturers at the country's uni-
versities. . . . [ A]round 20 years ago, there were only a handful
of pious and religious lecturers at the country's universities. But
today, the presence of a large number of such lecturers is a success
for our Islamic Revolution.' 2
The Basij created the Lecturers' Basij Organization (LBO) as a means
to consolidate the power of Basij academics in the field of education.
The LBO reportedly has more than 15,000 members, and, according
to the claims of its chief, 25 percent of Iranian lecturers are mem-
bers of the LBO.' Besides offering career guidance to its members, the
LBO provides a mechanism by which the IRGC can shape the design
and implementation of university curricula—mostly to counter the
“Iran: Daily Says Anti-Government University Teachers Increasingly Purged,” Kargo-
zaran [ Executives], FBIS 1AP20070826950116, August 25, 2007.
12 “Iran: Daily Says Anti-Government University Teachers Increasingly Purged” (2007).
“Iran: A Fourth of Iranian University Lecturers are Basij Members,” Javan, FBIS
1AP20070727011008, July 23, 2007.
40 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
flagging religiosity and ideological fervor of university students. Illus-
trating this, Iran's education minister recently appealed to the LBO
to expand its focus on religion and Islamic culture in the academic
courses of its members. Citing statistics that suggested a drop in reli-
gious convictions after graduation, he argued that the LBO's “main
investment” should be on religious education while young people are
still in school.' 4
While the LBO is tasked with maintaining morality and enhanc-
ing the institutional credibility of the IRGC in the upper echelons of
university life, the Student Basij Organization (SBO) is the IRGC's
arm for mobilizing student populations. The SBO serves as a sort of
umbrella grouping for the approximately 650,000 university students
throughout Iran who are Basij members, and the body is present in
700 universities.' 5 The SBO enjoys a unique position on campus—
what Supreme Leader Khamenei has described as a liaison between the
IRGC and the university environment. During a May 2007 meeting
with SBO representatives, he stated,
The specification of this student organization is that, on the one
hand, it is connected to the student environment. On the other
hand, it depends on the IRGC, which is the symbol of revolution-
ary and brave resistance. This relationship and dependence does
not mean the military nature or the restriction of this student
movement; on the contrary, it joins it to a treasury of experimen-
tal, military, and disciplinary achievements gained by the IRGC
that is to the benefit of the student Basij.' 6
The SBO's role as a conservative vanguard on university campuses
takes two forms. First, the organization confronts reformist activists.
By way of illustration, a young Basij member at Tehran University
explained,
“Persian Press: Education Minister Reveals Plans to Make Universities ‘Islamic,” Sharq,
FBIS 1AP20070803011002, July 29, 2007.
Ardabil Provincial TV (2007d).
16 “Commentary Urges Student Basij to Support Ahmadinezhad Government,” Resalat,
FBIS 1AP20070531011001, May 23, 2007.
The IRGC's Indoctrination, Training, and Media Activities 41
We first do it through eye contact. We let the offenders know they
are doing something wrong. If they understand, it's all right. If
they don't, we give a verbal warning. If that doesn't work, then
we go into action. . . . We beat them so that it will have an effect
on the offenders, and we beat them in a way that there will be no
physical traces on the body. 17
Second, the SBO members frequently shift their attacks from the
student body to the university administration itself, particularly on
social, moral, and political matters that it deems contrary to its institu-
tional vision and that of the TRGC. For example, members of the SBO
at Esfahan Medical University wrote an open letter to the university's
president criticizing the lack of morality in student study-abroad pro-
grams. The letter stated,
Giving prizes for studying in a university of a non-Iranian country
means permitting Iranian families to give their youths the chance
to tend to corruption. This young boy or girl returns from his or
her university with a lot of irregular and unacceptable morals and
sits beside the pure and innocent youths of our country whose
best art is studying.' 8
At times, the SBO moves beyond the university campus to level
soft criticism at the regime and its bureaucracy. For example, Moham-
mad Mehdi Zahedi, head of the SBO at the Science and Industry Uni-
versity, has criticized the science ministry's crackdown on anti-regime
groups while neglecting to offer increased support and funding to
pro-regime organizations.' 9 He also argued that student organizations
should be allowed more decisionmaking power in university adminis-
tration. At Imam Sadeq University, the SBO issued a statement criticiz-
Thomas Omestad, “Iran's Culture War,” US. News and World Report, July 27, 1998, pp.
33—51. The interviewee explained that beatings are conducted with “an open hand.”
18 “Persian Press: University Student Basij Urge President Act Over Studying Abroad,”
Nesf-eJahan, FBIS 1AP20070708 011007, June 16, 2007.
“Iran Press: Student Associations Must Share in University Policies and Decision-Mak-
ing,” Kargoza ran, September 16, 2007.
42 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
ing increasing levels of economic corruption among state officials and
the lack of countermeasures on the part of the administration. 20 SBO
members from 162 universities released a joint statement in March
2007 insisting that Iran sever relations with the International Atomic
Energy Agency. 2 '
SBO members also participate in media interviews portraying
a sense of revolutionary unity and support for the government. Here
again, the apparent targets are student reformists; these gestures are
likely intended to remind campus activists of the seeming omnipresence
of Basij forces and the Basij willingness to actively confront any form
of cultural or political dissent. In a 2007 opinion piece in the Tehran
newspaper Resalat, a student Basiji argued in favor of Ahmadinejad's
policies by stating, “It is the task of the Basiji student to support the
government. The ninth government is a Basiji government and, just
like Basij, to date it has taken brave steps to improve the conditions
of the country and tangible services.”22 Similarly, student Basijis at
Tehran University frequently participate in pro-government rallies and
have pledged to defend Ahmadinejad's position and policies during his
visits to the university. 23
Despite the visibility and the tenor of Basij student activism, the
university campuses by no means have fallen completely under their
sway. Indeed, a broad spectrum of student groups continue to vie with
the SBO, illustrating that certain sectors in Iranian intellectual and
societal life remain contested arenas, despite the extensive reach of the
IRGC's indoctrination efforts. A September 2007 article in the Iranian
daily E'temad-e MeW . which was founded by the prominent reform-
ist and former Parliamentary Speaker Mehdi Karrubi, describes the
20 Open Source Center, “Highlights: Iran Economic Sanctions, Government Corruption
25—31 Oct 07,” FBIS 1AP20071116306003, OSC Summary in Persian, October 25—31,
2007c.
21 “Mobilization Force Demands Halt of Cooperation with IAEA,” Fars News Agency
(Internet Version), FBIS 1AP20070327950047, March 27, 2007.
22 “Commentary Urges Student Basij to Support Ahmadinezhad Government” (2007).
23 “Student Unrest Marks Iran President's University Lecture,” BBC World Monitoring,
FEA20071008352786-OSC Feature, October 8, 2007.
The IRGC's Indoctrination, Training, and Media Activities 43
three other major university student unions present on the country's
campuses: 24
• The Islamic Association of Students. This group represents the tradi-
tional conservatives in Iranian politics (as distinguished from the
radical ideology that appears to be more present among members
of the SBO).
• The Office for Consolidating Unity. This organization has a tradi-
tional leftist ideology and is said to work for a “freedom-centered
concept” in the universities.
• The Office for Consolidating Democracy (OCD). The OCD has a
“new left” ideology and seeks to promote civil society in Iran.
The third of these, the OCD, is currently the main competitor to
the SBO on Iranian campuses. The Islamic Association of Students and
the Office for Consolidating Unity are both plagued by internal divi-
sions and dissension that weaken their ability to expand their support
base. The OCD's strength is probably of greatest concern to the IRGC
and SBO because its ideology is completely antithetical to the ideals
of the revolution as interpreted by the Basij. A number of pro-regime
commentators in the Iranian press have indeed warned their readers
that a dangerous “new left” ideology in Iranian universities poses a seri-
ous threat to revolutionary ideals.
Recently, senior Basij officials have called for the expansion of
SBO offices outside of the university setting. A representative from
Hormozgan province stated in February 2007, “The student branch
of the Basij Force must be founded in all high schools, especially in
boarding schools. We must reach the point that the branches of Basij
Force are opened in high schools as immediately as the high schools are
opened.” 25 Commander of the Basij in Hormozgan, General Dehqan,
emphasized the importance of the Basij in high schools by stating,
24 “Paper Analyses Activities of Political Student Organizations in Iran,” E'temad-e M d li
(‘T'ehran), FBIS 1AP20070905950036, September 4, 2007.
25 “Persian Press: Official Says High Schools Should Have Basij Force Branches,” Marjan,
FBIS 1AP20070319005010, February 24, 2007.
44 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran 's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
“Basijis do miracles in every field they are involved. Without the Basij
Force our Islamic system has not been able to survive.” 26
The “Ten-Million-Man Army”: The IRGC's Role in Popular
Paramilitary Training
As noted previously, one of the goals of this youth-oriented outreach is
to foster social networks, esprit de corps, and a reverence for the state
that eventually compels them to enroll in military training—either in
the Basij itself or through the professional IRGC. The youth socializa-
tion process also holds the promise of upward mobility, offering the
prospect of an officer commission, the acquisition of technical skills,
and increased marketability.27 This function appears particularly impor-
tant in co-opting groups from the rural periphery into the “center”—
unlike the militaries of certain Arab states, the IRGC's demographic
composition is geographically diverse, incorporating nearly all of Iran's
provinces.
Today, the IRGC and Basij conduct regular paramilitary training
throughout Iran for both active and potential members, drawn from
a broad spectrum of Iranian society—ranging from the rural classes
and provincial tribes to students and factory workers. About 600,000
of the 3 million active members of the Basij are part of armed para-
military units that regularly take part in this military training, which
includes military exercises and drills. 28 This paramilitary wing is made
up of a mix of male ashura battalions and female zahra battalions, as
well as karbala and zolfaqar special combat groups. 29 Accounts in the
26 “Persian Press: Official Says High Schools Should Have Basij Force Branches” (2007).
27 Comments of an Iranian-horn scholar at a RAND-sponsored conference, Rome, Italy,
October 29, 2007.
28 Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Sistan-Baluchestan Provincial TV (2007a); “Iran:
Commander Says Militia Has More Than 12 Million Forces,” Open Source Center, FBIS
1AP20070523950 091, May 23, 2007a.
29 Open Source Center, “Iran: Iranian TV Features Basij Parades Across Iran,” OSC Report
in Persian, 1AP20071 210598001, November 26, 2007h.
The IRGC's Indoctrination, Training, and Media Activities 45
contemporary Iranian press suggest that the IRGC has four purposes
in mind when it carries out its military training exercises and drills
for Basij volunteers throughout Iran: equipping Basij members to par-
ticipate in the regime's homeland defense strategy; training them for
disaster-relief operations; preparing them to defend the regime against
a so-called “soft coup,” i.e., U.S. efforts to erode revolutionary values
through the promotion of civil society and the fostering of ethnic dis-
sent; and providing an additional venue for inculcating the populace
with the IRGC's institutional values.
Increasing the Basij's Capability to Conduct Asymmetric Homeland
Defense
Based on available open-source reporting, Iran's national defense strat-
egy rests on its ability to inflict an exorbitant cost on an invader as a
deterrent and, if an invasion comes, to draw out the campaign to the
extent that the invader loses the mettle to pursue its objectives to their
conclusion. The Basij are critical pillars of this strategy, responsible for
implementing Iranian such doctrinal concepts as “mosaic defense” and
“spontaneous battle.”30 According to these concepts, partisan and irreg-
ular units, recruited from the population by the Basij, would fall back
behind an advancing army, harassing its rear area, attacking its lines
of communication, and essentially rendering an occupation untenable
through extended attrition.
Much of this strategy hinges on indoctrinating Basij and partisan
units with superior morale or “strategic patience,” which the IRGC
leadership sees as the ultimate center of gravity on the battlefield. 3 ' The
lessons of the 2006 Lebanon war appear to have shaped this thinking:
The IRGC often paints the Basij as roughly analogous to the Lebanese
Hizballah in their ability to mobilize popular sympathy and wage a
sophisticated guerrilla campaign against a better-equipped adversary. 32
30 Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network (2005).
31 “Iran: A Fourth of Iranian University Lecturers are Basij Members” (2007).
32 Iran's possible strategy of “passive defense,” which aims to maintain military communi-
cations and government authority over Iran's territory, may have been tested and/or inspired
by Hczbollah's guerrilla war against Israel in 2006. Hezbollah units, drawn from local vil-
46 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
According to the commander of the Basij Resistance Force of the IRGC
in Sistan-Baluchestan Province, “the victory of Lebanon's Hezbollah in
the 33-day war against Israeli troops was a result of passive defense,” a
strategy which the Basij appears to be pursuing in individual Iranian
provinces.
This comparison appears to be misplaced, exaggerating the Basij's
cohesion and competence as a paramilitary force, as well as its ability
to sustain long-term support from a populace whose views toward the
organization seem unevenly split between urban and rural sectors. Sev-
eral other events and developments raise further questions about the
ideological fortitude and combat capacity within the Basij ranks:
• In 2004, the regime instituted a constitutional amendment to the
draft law, allowing young men wishing to avoid active military
service to fulfill their obligations in the Basij. The net effect of this
development may be to erode the unit cohesion of Basij units and
their collective morale as their ranks become swelled with those
seeking a “way out” from conscription in the regular forces.
• Anecdotal reporting suggests that some Basijis attend periodic
military training and indoctrination simply to obtain economic
benefits, such as scholarships and loans. Whether or not these
perks are sufficient to sustain the morale of the force throughout
an extended campaign is an open question.
• Basij units are lightly armed, and most Basij personnel do not get
significant military training.
Despite these shortcomings, the Basij still provide a large pool
of manpower that is at least nominally familiar with the use of light
infantry weapons that can form the nucleus of regional resistance move-
ments. If only a fraction of the individuals on the Basij payroll remain
lages , fought Israeli forces without much apparent central oversight. In the ease of an inva-
sion, Iran's Basij forces and the IRGC may fight in a similar fashion in order to withstand
possible U.S. attempts to destroy Iran's command and control capabilities. See Vision of the
Islamic Republic of Iran Sistan-Baluchestan Provincial TV, “Iran: ‘Passive Defense' Con-
tract Held in Southeast,” Open Source Center, 1AP20080102950084, January 1, 2008.
The IRGC's Indoctrination, Training, and Media Activities 47
loyal to the Iranian clerical regime and take up arms, there would be a
significant post-conflict resistance movement in Iran. 33
Disaster-Relief Training
Aside from this military function, the Basij are trained in disaster-
relief operations. Press coverage of several 2007 Basij training exercises
describes disaster-relief and humanitarian assistance as principal foci of
these drills. Maintaining social order in disaster zones and distributing
relief and medical supplies are among the tasks that the Basij volun-
teers practiced. There is an important regime-stability component to
this training: Natural disasters are often opportunities for marginal-
ized Iranian rural groups to express their frustrations with the failings
of the central government in other areas. It is imperative, therefore,
that as the first responders of the regime, the Basij are seen as well
trained, proficient, rapid, and sympathetic to local sensitivities. Perhaps
more than any other function, the emergency-relief role is an opportu-
nity for the IRGC, via the Basij, to present a benign and sympathetic
face to the Iranian populace.
Protection Against Soft Coups
A third function of Basij popular training is to deter and defeat “soft-
coup” attempts within Iran—meaning the formation of dissident intel-
lectual groupings, civil society, and reform-oriented student organiza-
tions. As noted earlier, there is an explicit fear among conservative
regime figures that reformist press outlets, Western-supported non-
governmental organizations, and liberal intellectuals are conspiring
to erode and dismantle the foundations of the Islamic Republic in a
manner akin to the “color revolutions” that swept parts of the former
Soviet Union in 2003—2005. Basij battalions are seen as a counter-
mobilizing force against this effort, both through their expansive cul-
tural education and indoctrination and also in the form of a visible
street presence.
“Persian Press: Education Minister Reveals Plans to Make Universities ‘Islamic”
(2007).
48 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
Additional Cultural Education
Along these lines, the IRGC intends for Basij popular military training
to serve as the principle medium for instilling ideological conformity
and loyalty to the regime in Iran's rapidly growing youth population.
In addition to instruction in weapon handling and small-unit tactics,
Basij military training exercises include ideological and religious lec-
tures. As noted earlier, these lectures, in the minds of the Basij leaders,
offer a means of counteracting harmful foreign cultural influences that
are viewed as a threat to the ideals of the revolution. Foreign Web sites
and DVDs are seen as special threats to Iranian youth. It is important
to note the opportunity costs associated with this focus on ideological
conformity; in the Basij's monthly training cycle, time devoted to reli-
gious classes and ideological lectures means time not spent developing
individual small-arms proficiency, exercising in unit formations, and
other basic combat skills.
A survey of recent reporting on Basij exercises in the open press
sheds light on the diverse roles of this paramilitary force, as well as
the inherent tension between indoctrination and combat readiness that
characterizes its training. In 2007, the Basij conducted a number of
large-scale popular training exercises:
• In late July, the Basij units of the West Azerbaijan province par-
ticipated in a four-day training course that included instruction
on asymmetric warfare, direction finding, night combat tactics,
and politics and ideology. 4
• In early August, the Basij of Tehran's Meqdad region conducted
a large 40-battalion exercise called ‘Appointment of the Prophet
Mohammad Desert Maneuver” that included work in “combat,
ambush, logistics, operations, and reconnaissance.”
Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran West Azarbayjan Provincial TV, “Pararnilitaries
in Iranian West Azarbayjan Province Attend Training Courses,” Open Source Center, FBIS
lAP 20070726950056, July 25, 2007.
?‘ IRNA, “Iran: Forty Battalions of Basij Force Carry Out Exercise in Tehran Region,”
Open Source Center, FBIS IAP2O 070809950102, August 9, 2007b.
The IRGC's Indoctrination, Training, and Media Activities 49
• Also early in August, the Basij forces of East Azerbaijan province
undertook four days of drills that focused on civil defense train-
ing and rescue operations during natural disasters. 6
• In mid-August , the Basij Resistance Forces of Ardabil province
conducted a four-day military exercise code-named “Unity,”
during which ashura and zahra personnel from the area practiced
“troop call up, organization of the forces, operations, and prepa-
ration for deterrence operations.” 37
The IRGC Media Apparatus: Formal and Informal
Influences
In tandem with its education and paramilitary training, the IRGC has
built a vast media apparatus that allows it to propagate its vision of the
Islamic Republic of Iran and highlight its institutional legitimacy to
multiple sectors of the population.
Chief among its various outlets is its Web site and weekly maga-
zine, Sobh-e Sadegh , sponsored by the Supreme Leader's representative
to the IRGC. The weekly is a conservative source that reports on cur-
rent news and political issues, but its principle focus is on highlighting
the IRGC's positive contributions to bettering the nation and the lives
of its citizens.
The magazine has 16 sections: “First News,” “Second News,”
“IRGC,” “Basij,” “Second Look at the Media,” “Moral Issues,” “Ana-
lytical Reports,” “News Reports,” “International Issues,” “Weekly
Debate,” “Political Workshop,” “History,” “Art,” “Viewers,” “Social
Issues,” and a “Special Issues” section composed of a series of short
reports dealing with military, cultural, and religious subjects, includ-
ing the IRGC's engineering achievements and news coverage of Basij
activities throughout the country. A November 2007 edition of the
36 IRNA, “Iranian Paramilitaries Start Drills in East Azarbayjan,” Open Source Center,
FBIS 1AP20070809950061, August 8, 2007a.
Ardabil Provincial TV, “Iran: Volunteer Forcc to Hold Military Drills in Northwestern
Border Province,” Open Source Center, FBIS 1AP20070812950082, August 10, 2007c.
50 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
magazine covered a variety of topics, including a memorial for war
martyrs, budget management of IRGC-related foundations, the role of
the Basij in the media, and a general discussion of international politi-
cal issues. 38 Sobh-e Sadegh also has a link to the Web site Ofogh (Hori-
zon), which maintains ties to IRGC-affiliated construction companies,
such as Khatam al-Anbia (discussed at length later).
Former and current IRGC officials also operate a number of pop-
ular news outlets and specialized Web sites:
• In 2002, former IRGC commander and current Secretary of the
Expediency Council Mohsen Rezai launched the conservative
Baztab Web site (currently known as Tabnak) in response to a
proliferation of reformist sites. 4 °
• The influential Keyhan newspaper is directed by former IRGC
member Hossein Shariatmadari. Keyhan distributes several weekly
publications, as well as Arabic and English editions, while Shari-
atmadari himself enjoys media exposure through the Sharif News
Web site run by the Sharif Industrial University SBO. The site fre-
quently highlights his articles in conjunction with news reports. 4 '
Although Shariatmadari and Rezai are rivals, they are neverthe-
less part of the broad (and non-monolothic) IRGC network.
• Former IRGC commander Ezatollah Zarghami directs IRIB,
the state's official broadcasting service. Like his predecessor Ali
Larijani, also a former IRGC officer, Zarghami has claimed that
confronting the foreign cultural onslaught is a key component
of IRIB's mission. The IRIB currently controls five nationwide
38 Sobh—e Sadegh, weekly magazine, November 17, 2007.
“Iran: Profile of IRGC—Linked Website, Sobhe-Sadegh ,” OSC Media Aid in English ,
GMF20060427388002, April 27, 2006.
40 “Website Forecasts Central Bank Chief as Next Victim of Iran's Cabinet Reshuffle,”
Tchran Baztab, FBIS 1AP20070818950092, August 17, 2007.
‘ ‘ “BBC Monitoring: Iran Media Guide,” Cavcrsham BBC Monitoring in English, FBIS
1AP20070327950024, March 27, 2007. See also “Iran: Profile of IRGC-Linked Website,
Sobhc-Sadegh” (2006).
The IRGC's Indoctrination, Training, and Media Activities 51
television channels, including a 24-hour news service and several
provincial stations. 42
• In addition, the IRGC maintains a Web site called Farhang-e
Isaar (Culture of Self-Sacrifice), which is aimed at the promotion
of the culture of martyrdom and self-sacrifice. The Web site is
controlled by the Council of Coordination and Supervision of the
Promotion of the Culture of Martyrdom and Self-Sacrifice. 4
• The Basij News Agency also maintains a Web site to publicize
news about ongoing activities. In September 2007, a Basij public
relations official said that a weekly publication is also being
developed. 44
In areas where they lack direct media control, IRGC and Basij
officials heavily publicize the need for media cooperation in reporting
on public-service activities, as well as in propagating the “culture of
sacred defense” throughout Iranian society, particularly in Iran's rural
areas. Highlighting this point, former IRGC commander-in-chief
Rahim Safavi has urged various non-IRGC news outlets to focus on
disseminating the message of the IRGC and the Islamic Revolution.
For example, in an interview with Esfahan provincial television station
Voice and Vision, he said,
I hope that all our media sources will understand properly the
new conditions that we are facing both inside and outside our
borders, carry out their information-dissemination duties well,
warm the hearts of our nation, and create happiness and enthusi-
asm in the general public, particularly the youth. 45
Colonel Karim Qanbarnezhad of the Ardabil Basij recently called
on the media to focus on the propagation of Islamic culture and dis-
42 “BBC Monitoring: Iran Media Guide” (2007).
‘ ‘ Farhang—c Isaar, homepage.
“Iranian Official Heralds New Basij News Agency, Weekly,” Keyhan (Tehran), FBIS
1AP20070903950076, September 3, 2007.
‘ Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Sistan-Baluchestan Provincial TV (2007a).
52 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
seminate information on the Iran-Iraq War and the role of the IRGC
and Basij in defending the country. He asked Iranian journalists to
document the IRGC's current work and insisted that the IRGC is will-
ing to accept media criticism and recommendations regarding its role
as a guardian of Islamic culture. 46
Basij commander Mehdi Sa'adati of Khuzestan province echoed
similar sentiments during a provincial conference of Basij officials and
local media outlets. Sa'adati alleged that Iran's enemies are engaged
in a “media war” to weaken the Islamic Republic and emphasized the
importance of the Iranian press in protecting the country's religious and
cultural values. He stressed the need for “bilateral relations” between
the media and the Basij to promote Basij culture and public service. 47
Similarly, IRGC General Bahman Reyhani of the Kermanshah region
recently called on media outlets to play a more effective role in counter-
ing the “cultural war” provoked by Western influences. 48
Even IRGC commander Jafari has been active in requesting
enhanced collaboration between media sources and local Basij rep-
resentatives. During an October 2007 conference on media and the
Basij held in Khorasan province, he advanced the Islamic principle of
“enjoining virtue, proscribing vice” and said,
The mass media must enjoy the spirit and culture of the Basij, and
on that basis, they should embark on fulfilling their important
role to promote and spread these Islamic Revolutionary ideals and
aspirations across the society. 49
46 IRNA, “Iranian Provincial Commander Calls for More Coopcration with Mcdia,” FBIS
1AP20070926950125, September 25, 2007d.
‘ Ahvaz Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Khuzestan Provincial TV, “Iranian Khuz-
estan Basij Commandcr Meets Media, Press,” FBIS 1AP20071122950059, November 21,
2007.
48 Open Source Center, “Selcction List—Persian Press Mcnu 17 Nov 07,” OSC Summary
in Pcrsian, 1AP20071117011005, November 17, 2007f.
“9 “Iran: Guards Commander Praises Government's Focus on Islamic Values,” Iran
(Tebran), FBIS 1AP20071102950012, October 27, 2007.
The IRGC's Indoctrination, Training, and Media Activities 53
To improve collaboration between journalists and rural IRGC
and Basij representatives, the IRGC and Basij sponsor a number of
media workshops. To consolidate participation in these workshops, the
Basij established the Correspondents' Club for writers and reporters
affiliated with the IRGC and/or Basij. In November 2007, more than
150 journalists attended one such workshop in Ardabil province that
offered training and guidance on reporting techniques. During the
proceedings, an official from the Office of the Representative of the
Supreme Leader to the Ardabil IRGC called for increased cooperation
between the local media and the Basij Correspondents' Club to pub-
lish “round-the-clock” updates on the activities of the Basij and IRGC
in Ardabil province. 50 Other IRGC speakers utilized the workshop as
an opportunity to express the belief that safeguarding Islamic values
requires media attentiveness to the prominent role of the IRGC and
Basij in society.
A similar workshop was sponsored by the IRGC's Political Bureau
at around the same time. Approximately 25 reporters attended the
weeklong training, which covered techniques for collecting and dis-
seminating news stories, as well as interviewing techniques.51
Censorship of Independent Media Outlets
Where it cannot actively solicit media cooperation and favorable cover-
age, the IRGC and Basij are well equipped for and frequently predis-
posed toward censorship. This is particularly the case concerning Inter-
net usage. For example, the IRGC plays a role in monitoring Internet
communications to mitigate the influx of corrupting foreign ideals and
antiregime material.52 In this effort, it coordinates closely with other
security entities. In a 2007 interview, the head of the Internet section
50 IRNA, “Workshop in Ardabil on Reporting About Paramilitary Forces' Activities,” FBIS
1AP20071114950125, November 14, 2007e.
51 Open Source Center, “Highlights: Iranian Media Developments, November 2007,” OSC
Summary in Persian, IAP20071205584001, December 5, 2007i.
52 “BBC Monitoring: Iran Media Guide” (2007).
54 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
of the Tehran Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor's office explained,
“On the whole, filtering is being carried out between . . . the govern-
ment, the judiciary, the officials of the law-enforcement forces and the
Basij.” A five-person committee whose members are appointed by the
Islamic Propaganda Organization and a representative of the Supreme
Cultural Revolution Council act as the final authority in deciding
which Web sites contain illicit material. Filtered content is mostly com-
prised of “key scientific terms” used on Web sites unaffiliated with the
scientific research community and material indicative of illicit telecom-
munication services.
Taken in sum, the IRGC's training, indoctrination, and media
outreach form an important pillar of its outreach to the Iranian popu-
lace. It is ultimately difficult, however, to assess the degree to which
population segments embrace its ideology or whether its communica-
tion efforts have affected positive shifts in public opinion about IRGC.
On this issue, popular sentiment may be more favorably predisposed
toward the Pasdaran on the basis of its economic activities and the
co-option of various business sectors into its constellation of affili-
ated companies, which present more tangible benefits than ideology.
At the same time, this economic expansion presents a double-edged
sword with the capacity to antagonize traditional business and mer-
chant elites, thereby mitigating whatever favorable views were accu-
mulated during its indoctrination activities. It is to this dynamic that
we now turn.
“Official Provides Details About Internet Filtering,” E'ternad (Internet Version), FBIS
1AP20070414950102, April 14, 2007.
CHAPTER FIVE
Economic Expansion: The IRGC's Business
Conglomerate and Public Works
From laser eye surgery and Construction tO automobile manufacturing
and real estate, the IRGC has extended its influence into virtually every
sector of the Iranian market. Perhaps more than any other area of its
domestic involvement, its business activities represent the multidimen-
sional nature of the institution. The commercialization of the IRGC has
the potential to broaden the circle of its popular support by co-opting
existing financial elites into its constellation of subsidiary companies
and subcontractors. Similarly, through the socialization and recruit-
ment of rural and lower-class populations into the Basij—frequently
accompanied by technical job training, scholarships, and other finan-
cial benefits—the IRGC offers the promise of societal mobility to those
who would otherwise be denied it. Added to this image of egalitarian-
ism is the IRGC's role in building up the rural economy through the
numerous public-works projects carried out by the Basij.
The subtext of this apparent economic populism is, of course, the
IRGC's control of Iran's shadow economy—the illicit smuggling net-
works, kickbacks, no-bid contracts, and the accumulation of wealth by
its senior officials that remains largely unseen by the Iranian popula-
tion. Added to this is the inevitable displacement of traditional busi-
ness elites by its monopolization of key financial sectors. Yet reports of
opposition to this growing dominance remain largely at the anecdotal
level. To determine how and in what form the IRGC's economic expan-
sion can both cultivate legitimacy and provoke dissent, it is necessary
to canvass the full sweep of its business interests and public works.
55
56 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
Origins of the IRGC's Economic Activities
The roots of the IRGC's entry into the economic realm lie in the wake
of the Iran-Iraq War, when Supreme Leader Khamenei instituted a
formal ranking system into what had been a flat IRGC organization.
The introduction of a genuine hierarchy began the process of incul-
cating the notion of perquisites, privileges, and status for the senior
leadership of the IRGC into its institutional culture. The profit motive
became even more pronounced in the 1992—1993 period, when busi-
ness-savvy President Rafsanjani initiated the idea of involving govern-
ment organizations in business transactions as a way to generate inde-
pendent income.' By the late 199Us, the process of economic expansion
had begun in earnest, and it has accelerated even more during the
Ahmadinejad presidency, which has favored the IRGC by offering it
numerous lucrative no-bid contracts, especially in the areas of oil and
natural gas extraction, pipeline construction, and large-scale infra-
structure development.2
It is important to note that the IRGC's expansion into the busi-
ness sector harnessed the informal social networks that had devel-
oped among veterans and former officials. Thus, when we describe the
IRGC's economic influence, we use a very broad definition that cap-
tures the informality of its reach. Moreover, the model of a shadow
economy and the creation of networks of patronage and clientage are
roughly analogous to an institution that has long been a feature of
Iran 's postrevolutionary landscape—the bonyads , or parastatal, revolu-
1 Sazegara (2006).
2 Gharargah-c Sazandcgiyc Khatam al-Anbia (Ghorb) (2007); National Iranian Gas Com-
pany, “Ba hozur-c vazir-e naft va farmandeyc kolle sepah-c pasdaran: cmza-c moghavelenam-
eye projeye ehdas-e khat lute-c haftom-e sarasari-e gas” (The seventh national gas pipeline
contract was signed in presence of the minister of oil and the head of IRGC), June 7, 2007;
Technology Development of Iranian Oil Industry, Negahi be amalkard—e sherkat—e melli naft
dar sal-e 1385 (National Iranian Oil Company outlook 2006), 2006; Iran Economic News
Agency, “Tarh-c LNG 2 va 3 cmza shod” (LNG 2 and 3 plans were signed), no date; Minis-
try of Oil News Agency, “Ernza-c Gharardad-c Shirinsaziy-c Gas projcy-e Iran LNG” (The
contract of gas sweetening of Iran's LNG project was signed), Novcmbct 4, 2007; BBC News
Persian, “Gharardad-c jadid-e tosee-ye meidan-e gazi-e pars-c jonoubi” (Pars Jonoubi new
gas contract), May 1, 2005.
Economic Expansion: The IRGC's Business Conglomerate and Public Works 57
tionary foundations that constitute vast reservoirs of wealth controlled
by key clerics, ostensibly for charitable purposes. Indeed, one scholar
remarked that the IRGC's affiliated companies were effectively “mili-
tarized bonyads.”
Foundations (Bonyads)
The bonyads under the Islamic Republic are not necessarily a new phe-
nonmenon, but rather are a continuation of informal and extralegal
economic networks from the shah's reign. The Pahlavi Foundation
under the shah, for example, was direct predecessor of such Islamic
bonyads as the Mostazafan Foundation. 4 After the shah's overthrow,
the Pah lavi Foundation's assets were taken over by the newly created
Mostazafan Foundation.
Two important bonyads, which are not directly controlled by the
IRGC but are indirectly influenced by it, are the Bonyad Mostazafan
(Foundation of the Oppressed or The Mostazafan Foundation) and the
Bonyad Shahid va Omur-e Janbazan (Foundation of Martyrs and Vet-
erans Affairs). The Bonyad Mostazafan is the largest foundation in Iran
and is also well integrated into the Iranian economy. It officially oper-
ates as a nongovernmental organization, though it is directly super-
vised by the Supreme Leader, who appoints its director. The current
director of Mostazafan is Mohammad Forouzandeh, the former head
of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics and a former
IRGC officer. 6
According to one of the foundation's former directors, Mohsen
Rafiqdust, Mostazafan allocates 50 percent of its profits to providing
Comments by an Iranian-born scholar at a RAND—sponsored conference, Rome, Italy,
October 29, 2007.
“ “Nobody Influences Me!” Time Magazine, December 10, 1979.
“Bonyads Ripe for Restructuring,” Middle East Data Project, Inc., Iran Brief 8, Decem-
ber 1999.
6 Mehdi Khalaji, “Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, Inc.,” Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, PolicyWatch, No. 1273, August 17, 2007.
58 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
aid to the needy in the form of low-interest loans or monthly pensions,
while it invests the remaining 50 percent in its various subsidiaries. 7 It
owns and operates approximately 350 subsidiary and affiliate compa-
nies in numerous industries including agriculture, industry, transpor-
tation, and tourism. 8 Mostazafan's largest subsidiary is the Agricultural
and Food Industries Organization (AF IO), which owns more than 115
additional companies. Some of the foundation's contract work also
includes large engineering projects, such as the construction of Termi-
nal One of the Imam Khomeini International Airport. 9
Mostazafan also has a history of soliciting contract work abroad.
It currently maintains economic connections with countries in the
Middle East, Europe, Africa, and South Asia, as well as in Russia
and other former states of the Soviet Union. Mostazafan subsidiaries
pursued contracts in the late 1990s to construct a railway system and
urban rail system and to manage a livestock project in Libya.'° More
recently, the General Mechanic Civil and Housing Organization,
another Mostazafan subsidiary, began work in 2004 on a $30 million,
36-month contract to build a 37-km road into the Hajar mountains in
the United Arab Emirates. The road was one of multiple phases in the
construction of the Jebel Jais mountain resort. 1 '
Some reports allege that Mostazafan facilitated the development
of psuedosecret organizations, such as the Nur Foundation, which was
reportedly established in 1999 to import sugar, construction materials,
and pharmaceuticals. It is also said to maintain an office near a sus-
pected nuclear research laboratory in Tehran.12
Robert Fisk, “War Wounded Find Comfort from Billion-Dollar Man,” The Independent,
May26, 1995.
8 Mostazafan Foundation, homepage, 2008.
“Turkish Firm Signs up for Tehran Airport,” Middle East Economic Digest, April 30,
2004.
“Iran Clinches Cement Contract,” Middle East Economic Digest, January 10, 1997.
“RAK Unveils Multi-Billion Dollar Plans,” Middle East EconomicDigest, June 3, 2005.
12 Open Source Center, “Iran: Mostazafan va Janbazan Supports Veterans, Covert Activi-
ties,” May 2, 2006.
Economic Expansion: The IRGC's Business Conglomerate and Public Works 59
In addition to Bonyad Mostazafan, the Bonyad Shahid maintains
a strong link to the IRGC, with former IRGC Air Force commander
Hossein Dehghan acting as its president. Shahid gives home loans
to thousands of Basijis and the families of martyrs. It has reportedly
loaned 120 million rials to urban families and 150 million rials to rural
families.' 3 Shahid is also involved in numerous economic endeavors,
including participation in a joint venture with the Industrial Develop-
ment and Renovation Organization and Defense Ministry subsidiary,
the Iran Electronic Development Company. In March 2004, this com-
pany was part of a consortium that won a mobile-phone license from
the Iranian government, but the deal fell through because of political
objections.1 4
Construction, Engineering, and Manufacturing
Companies
The IRGC's industrial activities began not long after the Iran-Iraq War,
when President Rafsanjani's government encouraged the IRGC to use
economic activities to bolster its budget.' The corps took control of
several confiscated factories and established the moavenat khodkafaee
(headquarters of self-sufficiency) and moavenat bassazi (headquarters of
reconstruction). These two headquarters established various companies
active in the agriculture, industrial, mining, transportation, road con-
struction, import, and export sectors.' 6 Shortly thereafter, the IRGC
established a reconstruction headquarters, which operated within the
IRGC's air force, navy, ground force, and Basij. In 1990, the headquar-
ters became gharargah sazandegi khatam alanbia, abbreviated as Ghorb.
Ghorb, also known as Khatam al-Anbia, established several companies
“Iran: Profile of IRGC-Linked Website, Sobhe-Sadegh” (2006).
“ “Special Report: Iran,” Middle East Economic Digest, August 24—30, 2007.
‘ Sazegara (2006).
16 Behrouz Khaligh, “Changes in the Political Structure of the Islamic Republic: From
the Clerical Oligarchy to the Oligarchy of the Clerics and Guards,” Akhbar e Rouz, July 4,
2006a.
60 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
active in agriculture, industry, mining, road building, transportation,
import, export, education, and culture.'
Khatam al-Anbia has since become one of Iran's largest contrac-
tors in industrial and development projects, and today is considered
the IRGC's major engineering arm,' 8 not unlike the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers. IRGC commander Sattar Vafaei stated in an interview
that about 25,000 engineers and staff work for Khatam al-Anbia. Ten
percent of these personnel are IRGC members and the rest are con-
tractors. The company has launched an official Web site, as well as an
internal journal called Road and Tunnel Magazine, though neither has
published numbers reflecting the company's assets.
According to the Khatam al-Anbia Web site, the company
• has been awarded more than 750 contracts in different construc-
tion fields, including dams; water diversion systems; highways;
tunnels; buildings; heavy-duty structures; three-dimensional
trusses; offshore construction; water supply systems; and water,
gas, and oil main pipelines
• has completed 150 projects involving technical consulting and
supervision
• is currently implementing 21 new projects, many of which are
slated for rural areas.' 9
The Ministry of Oil, Transportation, and Energy and the mayor of
Tehran have signed several contracts with the IRGC through Khatam
al-Anbia. These projects are contracted to Khatam al-Anbia and are per-
formed either by its subsidiaries or by private companies contracted by
Khatam al-Anbia. The Khatam Web site lists some of these companies,
as well as the nature of their work. Two of the most prominent Khatam
subsidiaries are Sepasad and Hara; the former is currently construct-
‘ ‘ Gharargah—e Sazandegiye Khatam al-Anbia (Ghorb) homepage±
18 Pars Special Economic Energy Zone, “Didar-c Jami az maghamat-c arshad-c scpah pas-
daran as tasisat-c parse jonubi” (Visit of IRGC top rank officials from Pars Jonoubi establish-
ments), May 29, 2007.
‘ Gharargah-c Sazandegiye Khatam al-Anbia (Ghorb), homcpagc.
Economic Expansion: The IRGC's Business Conglomerate and Public Works 61
ing Line Seven of the Tehran Metro, 2 ° while the latter directs tunnel
construction and excavation operations throughout the country. Other
projects performed by Khatam subsidiaries include the construction of
part of the Tehran-Tabriz railway,21 the Karkheh dam,22 reserve pack-
ages and a jetty in the Pars Jonoubi Gas field, 23 and a 900-km gas pipe-
line from Asaluye to Iranshahr. 24 Subsidiaries are also engaged in sev-
eral hydroelectric and dam-construction projects in West Azarbaijan,
Kordestan, Kermanshah, 11am, Lorestan, and Khuzestan.25
Khatam al-Anbia is highly active in the oil sector and is said to
be operating as the sole contractor for Iran's gas industry.26 The agen-
cy's deputy director for reconstruction, IRGC Brigadier Abdolreza
Abedzadeh, said that the company had 247 ongoing “industrial and
mining” projects and had completed 1,220 projects since 1990.27 Iran's
oil ministry has signed a number of no-bid contracts with the com-
pany worth billions of dollars. Government officials claim that these
contracts were awarded because of the lower cost offered by the IRGC,
its skilled corps of engineers, its experience with large projects, and its
20 International Crisis Group (2007). See also “Haftomin khate metroye Iran ra sepah mis-
azad” (7th line of Tehran Metro to be built by IRGC), Keyhan, April 20, 2006.
21 Tehran City Hall Information Management Organization, “Bakhsi az khat-e ahane
Tehran Tabriz be zire zamin montaghel mishavad,” February 13, 2007.
22 “Dam Project Goes to Revolutionary Guards,” Middle East Economic Digest, October 7,
1994.
23 “Gharardad-e Shirinsaziye gase faze 12 parse jonuhi emza shod” (The Agreement on the
Sweetening of Gas from South Pars Phase 12 Has Been Signed), Shana, November 4, 2007.
24 BBC News Persian, “Gharardad-e 1.3 milliard dollari sepah ba vezarat-e naft” (The $1.3
Billion Agreement Between the Guards and the Oil Ministry), May 8, 2006. See also Shahr-
gone, “Vagozari-e chdas-e khat-e lule-e gaz be sepah bedune anjame tashrifat-e monaghesc,”
no date.
25 Gharargah-e Sazandegiye Khatam al-Anbia (Ghorb), homepage
26 Open Source Center (2007c).
27 Khalaji (2007). See also Matthew Levitt, “Make Iran Feel the Pain,” Wall Street Jour-
nal Europe, July 2, 2007; AlirezaJafarzadeh, “Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC):
Control Over All Aspects of the Iranian Regime,” Strategic Policy Consulting, statement
National Press Club meeting, August 22, 2007; and Kim Murphy, “Iran's Guard Builds a
Fiscal Empire,” Los Angeles Times, August 26, 2007.
62 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
access to heavy machinery and sizable assets. 28 In one such contract,
the ministry awarded Khatam $1.3 billion to build the aforementioned
900-km natural gas pipeline to transfer 5 million cubic meters of gas
from Asaluyeh in the province of Bushehr to Iranshahr in the prov-
ince of Sistan and Baluchestan. When pressed as to why the minis-
try waived the bidding requirement for Khatam al-Anbia, a ministry
representative claimed that providing gas to underprivileged regions
was an urgent necessity and that a formal bidding process would have
taken more than a year to complete. 29 An additional $2.5 billion con-
tract was awarded to Khatam al-Anbia without a bid to finish phases
15 and 16 of the Pars Jonoubi (South Pars) oil field. 3 °
Khatam al-Anbia deputy director Abdolreza Abedzadeh recently
told the Iranian press that 70 percent of Khatam's business is military
related. However, employees are often less forthcoming. When ques-
tioned as to the nature of the work, company employee and civil engi-
neer Mohammadreza Rajabalinejad informed the Wall Street Journal,
“I'm not allowed to tell you anything.” ' Other employees are typically
unwilling to discuss the nature of Khatam's contracts as well.3 Mem-
bers of the Iranian press have complained that reporters “have repeat-
edly asked this company to provide more detailed information on the
company and the exact figures for completed projects, the number of
personnel, and the problems facing this major contractor, but the com-
pany has refused to comply.” 33
28 “Namayandeye vali faghi dar sepah-e padaran: sepah nabayad abzar-e tashakkolhaye
siasi shaved” (Representative of the Supreme Leader to the IRGC: The IRGC should not get
involved in polities), Sharq, July 2006.
29 National Iranian Gas Company (2006).
30 Ministry of Oil News Agency (2007). See also Pars Special Economic Energy Zone
(2007) and BBC News Persian (2005).
31 Andrew Higgins , “As Hard-Liners Rise, Shadowy Revolutionary Guard Muscles in on
Airport and Nabs Energy Deals; Dawn Clash Over a Drilling Rig in the Persian Gulf,” Wall
Street Journal, October 14, 2006.
32 Higgins (2006).
Open Source Center (2007c).
Economic Expansion: The IRGC's Business Conglomerate and Public Works 63
In an interview with the newspaper Sharq, Abedzadeh answered
questions regarding the company's funding and employment and also
responded to allegations that the company had accepted certain gov-
ernment contracts without engaging in a formal bidding process. He
also admitted to receiving a no-bid contract for the Asaluyeh-Iranshahr
pipeline project and justified the process by claiming that “ [ the govern-
ment has] seen our work. We must have done something for them to be
willing to award us the contract without bidding.” 34 He also acknowl-
edged winning the no-bid contract for phases 15 and 16 of the South
Pars oil field, explaining that Pars Oil and Gas had “promised the proj-
ect” to Khatam even before a foreign partner had pulled out of the
contract for which Khatam had bid and subsequently won. Abedzadeh
went on to explain,
So the foreign company withdrew from the consortium. What
were we supposed to do? . . . We spoke with Pars Oil and Gas
officials. We asked whether they wanted to repeat the tender. Was
there enough time? We said we had worked on our documents.
We said you have our bid. Then they said they intended to award
the contract without the formalities. 35
When pressed as to the nature of Khatam's employment and
funding, Abedzadeh emphasized that the IRGC's military activities
and Khatam's construction activities are kept “completely separate”
and that only 10 percent of Khatam's labor is derived from IRGC
ranks, and the rest consists of subcontractors. As for Khatam's fund-
ing, Abedzadeh asserted that the majority comes from Iran's foreign
currency reserve. In response to the interviewer's question as to how the
company obtained these funds if “the foreign currency reserve account
was established so 50 percent would be reserved and 50 percent would
be loaned to the private sector, not to the government,” Abedzadeh
stated, “Others obtain those funds as well. . . . The government does
? “ “Iran Press: General Discusses IRGC Role in Engineering, Economic Contracts,” Sharq,
August 13, 2006.
? ‘ “Iran Press: General Discusses IRGC Role in Engineering, Economic Contracts”
(2006).
64 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
not do us any favors. We are paid to do our work. We are fined if
we do not. Our difference with private companies is that we do not
get to spend our profits.” However, when asked whether profits from
Khatam's construction projects are used to fund defense initiatives, he
admitted, “It does help. It helps the development funding the govern-
ment provides for the armed forces.”
Illicit and Black Market Activities
Parallel to these overt construction activities, the IRGC also con-
trols a vast shadow economy of illicit enterprises that are hidden from
public view. Accusations of the IRGC's black-marketeering, like dis-
sent against its monopolization of key business sectors, remains frag-
mentary and anecdotal. Among the first to level these charges was the
reformist cleric Mehdi Karrubi, who, as Speaker of the Sixth Maj les
under President Khatami, indirectly accused the IRGC of operating
60 illegal jetties in the country without government supervision. Ali
Ghanbari, another Maj les member, followed suit, arguing that
unfortunately one third of the imported goods are delivered
through the black market, underground economy, and illegal jet-
ties. Appointed institutions [ by Supreme Leader Khamenei] that
don't obey the [ rules of] the government and have control over
the means of power [ violence]; institutions that are mainly mili-
tary, are responsible [ for those illegal activities]. 36
The abundant availability of banned commodities in Iran, includ-
ing alcoholic beverages and narcotics, has led to allegations of IRGC
involvement in illegal smuggling activities. While there are no inde-
pendent means of substantiating such allegations, the IRGC is the only
organization, it is argued, that could engage in such large-scale traf-
ficking, due to its vast networks and access to countless jetties unsu-
36 Radiofarda, “Sepah, Terrorism, and Militarism Irani dar meidan-e Jahani” (IRGC, Ter—
rorism and Iranian Militarism in the globe), August 15, 2007b; Sazegara (2006).
Economic Expansion: The IRGC's Business Conglomerate and Public Works 65
pervised by the government. 37 Facilities such as the Martyr Rajai Port
Complex in Hormuzgan province are reportedly used to export state
subsidized gasoline outside the country.
The IRGC is estimated to yield a 200—300 percent profit on such
illegal sales. One Majles member recently stated that IRGC black-mar-
ket activities might account for $12 billion per year. Another parlia-
mentarian suggested that “invisible jetties . . . and the invisible hand
of the mafia control 68 percent of Iran's entire exports.” 38 Others claim
that a high volume of contraband goods enter the country via “illegal
and unofficial channels, such as invisible jetties supervised by strong-
men and men of wealth.” 39 There are also claims that the IRGC facili-
tates the transfer of alcohol, cigarettes, and satellite dishes across por-
tions of the Iran-Iraq border that it controls. 4 0
Yet at the same time, IRGC and Basij forces have been com-
mended for their positive role in fighting illegal smuggling—a further
illustration of the institution's multidimensional and frequently contra-
dictory nature. LEF commander Geravand in Kermanshah province
thanked the Basij and the IRGC for their cooperation in the recent
initiative to step up security, which has resulted in the seizure of over
200 types of weapons, 75,000 “indecent” CDs, 900 satellite dishes,
more than 200 kg of various drugs, and more than 44,000 bottles of
foreign liquor. 4 '
Our canvasing of available open sources and interviews leaves
open the question of where the IRGC's profits are going. It is logical to
presume, however, that the funds are used for the following:
personal enrichment of senior officers
Radiofarda (2007b); Sazegara (2006).
38 Open Source Center, “Iran Economic Sanctions, Government Corruption 1-7 Nov 07,”
OSCSumma y in Persian, 1AP20071119306005, November 1—7, 2007d.
Open Source Center (2007d).
40 Radiofarda (2007b). See also Sazegara (2006) and Murphy (2007).
41 Open Source Center, “Iran: Kermanshah Province Highlights, 9—21 Jun,” OSC Sum-
mary in Persian, IAP2O 070705434001, June 9—July 5, 2007a.
66 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
• funding the acquisition of weapon systems, training, and opera-
tional and maintenance costs
• development of Iran 's non-Persian peripheral provinces
• bribing powerful political and clerical figures so that they do not
oppose increases in IRGC political power
• supporting covert activities abroad
• supporting the Iranian nuclear research program, which is super-
vised by the IRGC
• providing financial support to IRGC veterans and their families,
as well as to the families of IRGC personnel killed in the line of
duty
• supporting the ongoing enlargement of the Basij by offering sti-
pends and housing allowances to new recruits.
Public Works
The IRGC may calculate that any dissent or blowback over its growing
business profile and illicit profiteering will be offset by the networks of
patronage and clientage that it has built with a myriad of companies.
Similarly, the Pasdaran's role in spurring rural economic development
through public-works projects affords it a clear opportunity to build a
base of rural popular support that can counterbalance any opposition
from more urban, entrepreneurial classes.
With these imperatives in mind, the IRGC has two objectives
in its rural public-works programs. First, the presence of the IRGC
or Basij in these areas acts as a preventative security measure and a
bulwark against popular uprisings against the state. At the same time,
IRGC officials are able to claim that the presence of Basijis provides
increased security for villagers in these areas. 42 Second, construction
activities help to create a positive image for the Basij and for the IRGC.
As mentioned earlier, our interviews with visitors to Iran suggest that
this outreach is, in fact, shaping perceptions; in contrast to the favor-
able views in the provinces, urban Basij are more frequently viewed
42 TRNA(2007c).
Economic Expansion: The IRGC's Business Conglomerate and Public Works 67
negatively, as enforcers of strict social mores and as the regime's anti-
reformist shock troops.
The IRGC often touts its rural projects as the core of its effort to
achieve Islamic unity in line with principles of the revolution. Senior
Basij officers hold frequent press conferences to praise the efforts of
young Basijis in assisting disadvantaged populations. A recent news
report commending the IRGC for its work in rural development stated,
“Construction is not possible but through cooperation and like-mind-
edness. Just as they stood shoulder to shoulder with each other during
the war, so in peace too, they have to stand shoulder to shoulder.” 4
The IRGC has initiated several large-scale development proj-
ects throughout the country in recent years. One such project is the
900-km “peace pipeline” originating in Asaluyeh, Bushehr province,
and extending to Hormozgan province and Iranshahr. 44 Not only does
the IRGC recruit local individuals from these provinces to work on the
pipeline, thus providing local employment, it also generates other proj-
ects along the pipeline route, such as road and school building in adja-
cent villages. 4 Other IRGC-sponsored rural projects, managed under
the auspices of the Khatam al-Anbia, include the Kerman-Zahedan
railway system, the construction of the Chabahar port in Sistan-Bal-
uchistan, and the development of a system to transfer natural gas from
Asaluyeh. 46
It appears that, since its inception in 2000, the role of the con-
struction Basij has become increasingly important. The majority of
smaller rural development operations are generally carried out by the
construction Basij in ethnic-minority regions such as the provinces of
Sistan-Baluchestan, Ardabil, Zanjan, and East Azarbaijan. In 2001,
Supreme Leader Khamenei recommended the formation of the Hejrat
Islamic Republic of Iran Nctwork Television (Tchran), “Iran War Experience at Service
of Agriculturc and Construction,” BBC World Monitoring, August 8, 2007b.
‘ ‘ IRNA(2007c).
‘ IRNA(2007c).
46 Vision of thc Islamic Republic of Iran Sistan—Baluchestan Provincial Tclcvision, “Iranian
Militia Chief Names Commander in Sistan-Baluchestan,” FBIS 1AP20070524950023, May
23, 2007b.
68 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
Plan (Cultural and Constructive Movement) of the construction Basij,
a program with a two-pronged approach to development. On the
one hand, the program aims to bolster the economic development of
impoverished areas by improving infrastructure and local services. At
the same time, it is intended to be an indirect vehicle for indoctrina-
tion and resisting corrosive foreign influences. 47 Basij commanders in
rural provinces have made an effort to extol the virtues of the program
and its popularity among young people. Colonel Dezham Khoy, head
of the Ardabil Construction Basij, for example, asserted that approxi-
mately 8,500 students and other residents had joined the region's Basij
unit in 2007 alone. He stated that these numbers correspond to a 50
percent increase in recruitment from the previous year. 48
According to Basij sources, in just the two months of August and
September 2006, the construction Basij managed to establish 1,800
small manufacturing and training units in rural areas of Iran. 49 Briga-
dier General Mohammad Hejazi has observed that the group became
truly effective in 2006, with an estimated 3.2 million recruits. 5 ° He
stated that 14 billion tomans (almost $15 million) had been allocated
in the 2007 national budget for increased development activities, as
Supreme Leader Khamenei expected more vigorous efforts both in
infrastructure and human capital development.51 Hejazi has expressed
optimism that the Basij will continue to enjoy strong governmental
support: “Fortunately, the ninth government's position toward the
Basij is most favorable and many members of government are active
Basij members. We hope that these favorable points of view will help
enhance the Basij and its standing in society.” 52
Open Source Center (2007a).
48 Ardabil Provincial TV, “Paramilitary Force Works on Construction Projects in Iran's
Ardabil,” FBIS 1AP20070802950066, August 1, 2007b.
“ IRNA, “More Than Thirty-Six Percent of Working Women Have a College Education,”
April 8, 2008.
50 Vision of thc Islamic Republic of Iran Nctwork 1, “FYI—Commandcr of Iran's Basij
Interviewed on Development Basij Day,” FBIS 1AP20070510950001, May 9, 2007a.
51 Vision of thc Islamic Republic of Iran Nctwork 1 (2007a).
52 “Commander Says Basij Not to Allow Intimidation by Tcrrorists,” Javan, FBIS
1AP20070601011003, May 27, 2007.
Economic Expansion: The IRGC's Business Conglomerate and Public Works 69
Increased government funding and support has indeed stimulated
the growth of construction Basij activities. Colonel Firuz Jahantigh,
head of the construction Basij in Sistan-Baluchistan, recently said that,
in addition to the Asaluyeh-Iranshahr gas pipeline and the Zahedan-
Bam railway project, the rural Basijis are working with Khatam al-
Anbia to complete major projects such as the Chahnimey-e Chahar-
rom (a fourth water reservoir) and a roadway between Chabahar and
Milak (Zabol). 53 Hejazi has estimated that, by the end of 2007, the con-
struction Basij will have volunteered approximately 20 million hours of
labor in the form of services and construction projects throughout the
country. 54 Many of these activities involve small-scale projects, such as
painting school buildings and repairing tables and chairs. Other, more
widespread operations include relief efforts in areas affected by natural
disasters 56 and health campaigns to inoculate young children. 57
Government support has also increased efforts to form partner-
ships with other government and provincial organizations. The local
Endowment and Relief Organization in Ardabil allocated 50 million
rials ($5,400) to build an Islamic school and 100 million rials ($11,000)
to build a potable water pipeline.58 Other projects, such as the renova-
tion of dilapidated school buildings, are performed in conjunction with
the Ministry of Education. In Zanjan province alone, the Basij had
slated 202 schools for renovation, as well as a number of recreational
facilities. 6 0 More recently, emphasis has been placed on coordination
Sistan-Baluchistan Provincial TV Zahedan Vision of the Islamic Republic in Open
Source Center, “Iran: Highlights: Iranian Military Developments 23—29 November 2007,”
OSC Summary in English, 1AP20071203397002, November 23—29, 200 7g.
“ Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Sistan-Baluchestan Provincial TV (2007a).
IRNA(2007c).
56 Open Source Center (2007a).
Omestad (1998).
58 Ardabil Provincial TV, “Ardabil Officials Inaugurate Basij Work Plan,” FBIS
1AP20070627950072, June 25, 2007a.
Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1 (2007a).
60 “Zanjan Islamic Guards Chief Notes Importance of Basij Training Camps,” Iranian
Labor News Agency, FBIS IAP2O 070626950077, June 25, 2007.
70 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
with provincial offices of the Agricultural Jihad Organization (AJO)
to improve the self-sufficiency of rural areas. Commander of the East
Azarbaijan province Basij Mohammad Yusef Shaken stated that Basij
work in the agricultural sphere has increased by almost 180 percent
since 2006.61 The head of the province's AJO, Salman Shefa'at, con-
firmed that Basij assistance in the farming sector was significant, with
approximately 40 percent of Basij activities in the province related to
agricultural development. 6 2
The Dilemmas of Economic Expansion
Despite the apparent beneficence of its public-works initiatives, the
IRGC's economic expansion is fraught with dilemmas. Among the
various areas of its domestic ascendancy, its widening business profile
probably has the greatest potential to buffet its future trajectory. As we
note in our concluding remarks, a comparative inquiry into the develop-
ment of similar politico-economic military conglomerates in Pakistan
and China suggests the potential for internal dilution of the IRGC's
corporate cohesion—if not open fractionalization. According to one
Iranian-born observer, there are growing tensions within the IRGC
about the institution's corporate narrative of a return to the “golden
age,” e.g., the ideological purity, militancy, stridency, and insularity
that marked the postrevolutionary period. 6 Those within the IRGC
who critique this perspective, which they undoubtedly regard as anti-
quated, argue that such traditionalism is fundamentally incompatible
with the imperatives of globalization and economic development and
integration. In addition, Iran's possible acceptance of globalization and
adoption of a liberalized economy may work against the IRGC's busi-
61 “Iranian Resistance Force Involved in Development of East Azarbayjan,” Fars News
Agency, FBIS 1AP20070621950059, June 21, 2007.
62 “Iran: East Azabayjan Takes Lead in Construction Basij Plan,” Fars News Agency, FBIS
1AP20070702950129, July 2, 2007.
63 Comments of an Iranian -born scholar of Iran at a conference sponsored by RAND,
October 29, 2007.
Economic Expansion: The IRGC's Business Conglomerate and Public Works 71
ness interests. As an economic organization more interested in monop-
oly rather than open competition, the IRGC may wish to keep Iran's
economy closed off and under its tight control. If this is the case, U.S.
and international sanctions may not weaken the IRGC, but instead
enhance its formal and illicit economic capabilities.
Certainly, the lack of financial transparency and accountability
into Iran's inner economic workings empowers and supports the IRGC's
many illicit activities, as well as its control of a shadow economy. But
there are also arguments that the IRGC should harness, rather than
resist, globalization, with the question of World Trade Organization
accession emerging as a key point of debate in Iran.
Another potential risk—one that has not currently manifested
itself in a visible way—is increasing backlash by certain sectors of the
population, such as traditional merchant elites, companies that lose on
bids for contracts, and the like. On this issue, it is important to note
that the IGRC's ascendancy to political power, via the 2005 presiden-
tial elections and earlier in its assumption of provincial administration
posts, was predicated on a platform of populism, personal modesty,
and technocratic proficiency. These virtues stood in stark contrast to
the perceived corruption, excesses, and oligarchic tendencies of cer-
tain clerical factions—particularly those clustered around Ali Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani and his so-called “oil mafia.” As noted by French
analyst Frederic Tellier,
The (Islamic) revolution spawned its own ruling class and its own
tribe of oligarchs with no connection to the real population.
To the Pasdaran, the people ignored by the shah are now the same
people groaning beneath the feet of the mullahs. 64
As the IRGC moves closer to resembling the economic oligar-
chy it sought to displace, it ultimately loses much of the initial appeal
that ushered it into power. To what degree are segments of the Iranian
population aware of this? And have they linked the IRGC's control of
the expansive shadow economy with their own worsening economic
64 Frederic Tellier, The Iranian Moment, Washington , D.C.: Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, February 2006, p. 52.
72 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
situation? According to a Western diplomat resident in Iran from 2003
to 2006, this dissent has not transpired:
There is no bazaari backlash at this point. The general population
doesn't know about the IRGC's illegal jetties, the Caspian Sea
villas and their Swiss bank accounts. 65
Part of this ignorance may stem from the IRGC's secretive con-
duct of business transactions. In other cases, it may result from the
broad-based clientage it has cultivated, co-opting private companies as
subsidiaries of its umbrella consortiums. Similarly, by mobilizing and
militarizing Iranian civil society through the aforementioned levers
of indoctrination and training, the IRGC may have achieved some
consensus from business elites and citizens seeking upward financial
mobility. As noted by Tellier,
Through its recruitment, selection and socialization process, the
Pasdaran now acts as a kind of ideological filter for future con-
servative leaders in the Islamic Republic. It offers a way to co-opt
and become initiated into the financial mysteries of the Iranian
regime, which any person of consequence in the system must
know in order to defend his or her financial interests. 66
For their part, IRGC commanders have justified their institu-
tion's economic expansion, deploying a diverse set of themes ranging
from the memory of the IRGC's role in the vaunted “sacred defense,”
to its efforts in the postwar reconstruction, to the cost-efficiency of its
commercial services, which ultimately benefit the average Iranian. The
Iranian constitution is also frequently cited. The deputy director of
Khatam al-Anbia, Abdo lreza Abedzadeh, for example, clarified in an
interview that Iran's constitution allows for the military to operate eco-
nomic ventures during peacetime. 67 Echoing this, IRGC commander
65 Authors' discussion with a Wcstcrn diplomat, hascd in Tchran from 2003 to 2006, Los
Angeles, California, July 18, 2007.
66 Tellier (2006, p. 17).
67 International Crisis Croup (2007).
Economic Expansion: The IRGC's Business Conglomerate and Public Works 73
Safavi defended the economic activities of the IRGC, citing Article
147 of the constitution. He argued that the nation's military forces
are required to participate in development and reconstruction activities
during peacetime, a task that they are now performing by the direct
order of the Supreme Leader. Khamenei's former representative in the
IRGC, Ali Saeedi, has also stated that the engineering and construc-
tion capabilities the IRGC acquired during the Iran-Iraq War should
be used for peacetime development activities:
The armed forces need a large number of equipment, machinery,
and devices during the war efforts that become idle at the peace
time. It is normal for countries to use those assets for civilian pur-
poses. Based on this, we have decided that some of the IRGC's
engineering capabilities should be used for civilian purposes. 68
Despite these attempts to justify its economic and business omni-
presence, instances of popular dissent against the IRGC have appeared.
As an illustrative example, a businessman who lost a bid on a con-
struction project to an IRGC-affiliated company stated to a Western
reporter in 2007,
How can we compete? Why can they offer such an inexpensive
price for a civil project like this? A, they have access to cheap
assets and equipment owned by the IRGC. B, for unskilled work-
ers they can use the drafted soldier, though we have to pay. C,
they are confident that once they win the tender, they can ignore
the overruns. 69
Echoing this theme, in a letter to the government, 29 private con-
tractors protested the seemingly boundless economic activities of the
IRGC, writing,
68 “Namayandeye vail faghi dar sepah-e padaran: sepah nabayad abzar-e tashakkoihaye
siasi shaved” (Representative of the Supreme Leader to the IRGC: The IRGC should not get
involved in poiities) (2006).
69 Murphy (2007).
74 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran 's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
Responsibilities [ of the military and civilian institutions] are well
defined in the Constitution. [ Moreover] the goal of the “Next 20
Years' Economic Projection,” is to make the government smaller.
[ We ask the question] whether it makes sense economically and
technically, to award [ all the] large scale projects to the military
or paramilitary organizations? 7 °
The most visible instance of criticism against the IRGC's growing
business profile occurred when it forced the expulsion in May 2004
of a Turkish company, Tepe-Akfen-Vie, which was under contract to
operate the newly opened Tmam Khomeini Airport. To do this, the
IRGC's air force abruptly shut down the new airport on its first day of
operations, embarrassing Iran internationally as incoming flights were
diverted, straining Iranian-Turkish relations, and hastening the grow-
ing impotence of the Khatami administration by forcing the impeach-
ment of his transportation minister. One of the IRGC's reported
motives for closing the airport was that its own engineering firm had
lost out on the airport contract to the Turkish company. 7 ' In addition,
the IRGC may have sought total oversight over the airport's operations
as a key transportation hub in its illicit smuggling activities. 72
Perhaps more than any other instance, the IRGC's closure of the
Imam Khomeini Airport illustrates the way in which its economic
interests, along with its expansive indoctrination efforts, can empower
and impel it toward a more explicitly political role. While it has not
quite reached the stage of a political “counterauthority” to other insti-
tutions, such as the Office of the Supreme Leader, its power is indis-
70 Behrouz Khaligh, “Tagheerat dar sakhtar jomhouri eslami: gozar az oligarshi rowhaniat
be oligarshi rowhniat va sepsh” (Transformation in the political structure of the Islamic
Republic: A passage from the clerical oligarchy to the oligarchy of the clcrgy and the IRCC),
July 20, 2006c.
“Iranian Paper Says Airport Controversy Takes Iran's Internal Divisions ‘Sky-High,”
Iran Daily (Tehran), FBIS 1AP200405122, May 10, 2004; “Iranian Paper Says
Iran's Prestige Damaged By ‘Embarrassing' Airport Closure,” Iran News (Tehran), FBIS
1AP200405131, May 10, 2004; IRNA, “Iranian Transportation Ministry Denies
Blaming IRGC For Closure of New Airport,” FBIS 1AP200408314, August 31,
2004.
72 Murphy (2007).
Economic Expansion: The IRGC's Business Conglomerate and Public Works 75
putably rising. At the same time, it growing politicization could force
increased pressures on its internal cohesion similar to those resulting
from its economic expansion. We will discuss these dynamics in the
next chapter.
CHAPTER SIX
The IRGC in Politics
Beginning first with its episodic confrontations against reform activists
during the Khatami era, networks of active and former IRGC officers
began to take on an increasingly political role that enabled the IRGC—
by design or by accident—to emerge as a sort of “guardian” for conser-
vatives seeking to displace Khatami supporters from political power. In
2003, former IRGC members or associates took control of numerous
city and town councils, paving the way for their entry into legislative
politics during the 2004 parliamentary elections. Of 152 new members
elected to the Maj les in February 2004, 91 had IRGC backgrounds,
and a further 34 former IRGC officers now hold senior—level posts in
the government. During the June 2005 presidential elections, besides
Ahmadinejad, there were three other candidates associated with the
IRGC. However, the IRGC is a club of shared experiences, rather than
a definition of a particular person's political inclinations and policies.
Larijani and Ahmadinejad were both in the IRGC, yet they have very
different viewpoints and political “styles.”
The Origins of the IRGC as a Political Force
The IRGC's political involvement, even if at an informal level, seems
very much to be an expansion of its original mandate. Ayatollah
Khomeini's perception of the political role of the IRGC and the Basij
was effectively a continuation of the policies of the shah. At their for-
mation in the early 20th century, the modern military forces of Iran
were banned from political participation by Reza Shah Pahlavi. A con-
77
78 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
stitutional ban prohibited military suffrage. This helps to explain the
absence of military coup d'etat activities during the 57 years of Pahlavi
rule.
The new revolutionary regime used the old military as a base on
which to establish itself, and by creating the IRGC, it tried to ensure the
loyalty of the armed forces by relying on gradual but ruthless purges.
Although Khomeini did allow the military to vote, its political rights
and role went no farther than this. According to his official chronicler,
Hamid Ansari, Khomeini was clearly opposed to the politicization of
the armed forces. On the eve of formally organizing the IRGC, he
went so far as to admonish the Pasdaran against taking sides and acting
politically: “You must try to prevent political orientation from entering
into the ranks of the IRGC, if it did, it would undermine their military
orientation.” Khomeini also advised all of the country's military forces
against politicization:
I insist that the armed forces obey the laws regarding the preven-
tion of the military forces from entering into politics, and stay
away from political parties, groups and [ political] fronts. The
armed forces [ consisting of] the military, the police force, the
guards, and the Basij should not enter into any [ political] party or
groups, and steer clear from political games. 2
Whether or not Khomeini favored an engaged or an apolitical
military force, one can argue that the constitutional role of the IRGC is
purely, and even uniquely, political in its essence. The IRGC is defined
as the “guardian of the Revolution and of its achievements” (Article
150)—a political as well as military mission. Section 5 of the charter
provided by the Revolutionary Council also presaged training of the
IRGC in “politico-military” and “ideological” matters.
Today, as the IRGC becomes ever more involved in internal Ira-
nian politics, Ayatollah Khomeini's original views have become the
subject of intense debate. Indeed, the issue of whether or not Khomeini
‘ Hamid Ansari, “Framin va vassaya ye saereeh Imam be niroohay ye mossallah” (Imam
Khomeini's direct order and testaments to the armed forces), November 26, 2007.
2 Ansari (2007).
The IRGC in Politics 79
ordered the IRGC and the Basij to stay out of politics has been a source
of controversy since the end of the Khatami era. Illustrating this, a
speech to members of the Basij by the Friday prayer leader in Mashhad,
the second-largest city in Iran, prompted a broad-ranging debate in late
2007 with the assertion that
Khomeini did not mean that they should stay out of politics, but
rather, the Basijis should be active in politics, and to fend off the
external and the internal enemies. Imam Reza [ the eighth Imam
of the Shi'ites, and one of the most revered and the only Imam
buried in Iran] was a Basiji himself ‘
In response to this assertion, reformists and moderates who were
apprehensive about the increasing militarization of the political system
responded with a salvo of essays, replete with numerous quotes from
no less an authority than the late Ayatollah Khomeini. Mohammad
Salamti, secretary general of the Sazman-e Mujahedin-e Enghelab-e
Islami (the Organization of the Islamic Revolution Mujahedin) party,
echoed Khomeini's injunctions, warning sternly against the politici-
zation of the armed forces, stating that this was a betrayal of their
original purpose. 4 Even the grandson of the late Ayatollah Khomeini,
Hassan Khomeini, entered the debate, arguing that the armed forces
and the Basij should stay out of politics.
For its part, the IRGC has also marshaled the authority of
Khomeini to buttress its argument. For example, Mohsen Rezai, the
primary architect of the IRGC and its central commander for 16 years,
wrote,
‘ Raadmanesh, Maaziar, “Imam Reza Was the First Basij,” Roozonline.com, November
23, 2007.
‘ Aftab News, “Officials Should Prevent the Politicization of the Basij,” December 1,
2007.
Hassan Khomeini, “Control-c gheire rasmiye jamee nesbat be khod bozorgtarin amel-e
control-c jamee ast” (Indirect group controls the main instrument for group control), August
20, 2007.
80 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
Once someone had asked Imam [ Khomeini] as to why he lends
so much support to the IRGC. The Imam had answered “why
not?” and the interlocutor had warned him that it may result in
staging a coup [ if the IRGC became too strong]. The Imam had
answered, “It doesn't matter; it stays in the family [ if they stage a
coup]; as they are our own guys.” 6
The role of the IRGC as a major factor in political affairs increased
dramatically since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, but, as mentioned
earlier, it was marked by a period of marginalization and setback during
the Rafsanjani era. During this period, the IRGC was compelled to
enter a period of forced military professionalization and ideological
deradicalization—and this was accompanied by a clear diminution in
its political role. The entire process was intended to help the image of
Iran's armed forces, enhance the position of pragmatists within the
ranks of the military forces, remove the radicals from command posi-
tions, and prepare the country for its “Thermidor” period.
By the time Ayatollah Ali Khamenei ascended to the position
of Supreme Leader, Iran's internal balance of power began to change.
Former allies and the clerical establishment did not appear to be reli-
able legitimating sources for the new leader, who was originally a junior
cleric from the city of Mashhad, bereft of significant theological cre-
dentials. Possibly to compensate for this, the new Supreme Leader cul-
tivated a long-term relationship with the armed forces from the earliest
days of the revolution, and the IRGC was the greatest beneficiary of
the change in leadership. When reformists during the Khatami era
appeared to be a threat to Khamenei, the TRGC and, particularly, its
Basij force proved to be natural and indispensable allies.
6 Mohsen Rezai, “Zendeguinameh” (Autobiography).
In the comparative study of revolutions, “Thermidor” refers to the period of relative prag-
matism and realism that followed the French Revolution, specifically the coup d'etat of July
27, 1794; the end of the Reign of Terror; and the execution of Maximilian Robcspicrrc.
The IRGC in Politics 81
Ideological Factionalism Inside the IRGC
Contrary to some analyses, our inquiry into the IRGC suggests that it
has never been a monolithic body in terms of its ideological and politi-
cal outlook. As in any elite military organization, the TRGC's lead-
ership has been adept at enforcing a measure of uniformity among
its members that has subsumed more parochial ethnic and geographi-
cal types of identity and loyalty. Within the leadership, these unify-
ing tenets can be generally described as corporatist, authoritarian, and
populist—all reinforced by significant revolutionary and Islamic con-
tent. Where splits do emerge is not so much over the degree of revolu-
tionary fervor or fidelity to the Islamic Republic's ideals, but rather over
the opportunity costs to Iran's economy, standing, and progress that this
approach has inflicted.
The earliest factionalism in the IRGC emerged when Mohsen
Rezai succeeded in moving the IRGC's command from the provi-
sional government to the Revolutionary Council's supervision. Mem-
bers of the Freedom Movement, including Ebrahim Yazdi, Asghar
Sabbaghian, and Mohsen Sazegara, simply resigned. Most members
of the Sazman-e Mujahidin-e Enghelab-e Islami, including Morteza
Elavairi, also broke away from the IRGC. Other radical leaders, such as
Abu Sharif, resigned later, simply because they believed that the IRGC
was abandoning its ideals. A number of founding members, such as
Mohammad Montazeri, were assassinated by the opposition or killed
during the war, while in other instances, planeloads of IRGC and regu-
lar military leaders crashed mysteriously.
Reassignment or discharge of individuals from leadership posi-
tions also could cause friction within the system. For example, the
selection of Morteza Rezai as commander of the IRGC by former Pres-
ident Abolhassan Bani-Sadr was rejected out of hand by IRGC top
cadres. On another occasion, when a war commander named Abdol-
wahhab was discharged by Mohsen Rezai, the rank and file nearly
revolted against his decision. 8
8 A u Akbar Hasherni-Rafsanjani, Besooyye Sarnevesht [ Towards Destiny], 3rd ed., Tehran:
2007, pp. 383 and 387.
82 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
These early instances of sporadic and uncontrolled factional-
ism established a pattern within the IRGC that continues to this day.
Factional rivalries both within the IRGC and between the IRGC and
competing political and security organs are currently one of the Islamic
Republic's major weak points in the realm of governance. Although
they remain frequently subsumed beneath the IRGC's exterior face of
ideological uniformity, these tensions have surfaced periodically, often
prompted by a key political event that exposes the IRGC's internal
fissures—between different factions and between the rank and file and
the leadership. Some of these events include the following:
The reszgnation of Ayatollah Hossein Montazeri as the successor to
Khomeini. Arguably the most respected and credentialed cleric
in Iran, Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri was one of the
leaders of the Islamic Revolution and was designated in 1985 by
the Assembly of Experts to be Khomeini's successor as Supreme
Leader. Yet Montazeri increasingly came into conflict with
Khomeini over Iran's export of the revolution, the execution of
dissidents, the fatwa calling for the death of Salman Rushdie,
and freedom of speech. In 1989, Khomeini forced the resigna-
tion of Montazeri as his successor-designate. 9 To many devoted
IRGC members, particularly those from the lower and middle
classes, Montazeri was their marja tagh leed (source of emulation),
and his departure from the political scene was widely interpreted
as the effective end of the revolutionary era. According to a cler-
ical source close the IRGC, numerous lower-ranking members
resigned after this momentous event. Many of them went back to
their former professions as ironsmiths, cab drivers, or construc-
tion workers.b0
The 1994 Qazvin riots. In August 1994, violent rioting broke out
in the city of Qazvin, the result of ethnic tensions. Locally garri-
For background, scc Said Arjomand, “Authority in Shiism and Constitutional Dcvcl-
opmcnts in thc Islamic Rcpublic of Iran,” in Rainicr Brunncr and Wcrncr Endc, cds., The
TwelverShia in Modern Times, Leiden: Brill, 2001, pp. 301—332.
10 Tclcphonc intcrvicw with an Iranian—born scholar living in Iran, Dcccmbcr 20, 2007.
The IRGC in Politics 83
soned Pasdaran were dispatched to quell the unrest, but their com-
manders, as well as the rank and file, refused to fire on unarmed
protestors. This forced the regime to airlift other Basij and IRGC
units from outside the region, raising questions about the IRGC's
internal security reliability as a territorial army, i.e., a force that
draws recruits from the communities where it is garrisoned. Ulti-
mately, the incident emphasized that strongly held attachments
based on local identity still pervade the IRGC, despite its self-
professed tenets of Islamic universalism, not to mention military
professionalism.
The rise of the reformists under the Khatami presidency. The ascen-
dancy of the reformists under President Mohammad Khatami
after the 1997 presidential elections revealed significant schisms
between the rank and file and the IRGC senior leadership, who
supported more authoritarian and pro-establishment figures. The
IRGC's leadership, siding with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei, invoked the fear of an upheaval, using the student
uprisings of the late 199 Os as its justification. The momentum of
the anti-authoritarian movement and the extent of youth frustra-
tion with the clerical establishment that became apparent at the
ballot boxes and in the universities were significant and of deep
concern to Iran's more conservative elements, including those
within the circle of the Supreme Leader. As a consequence, these
concerns brought the Supreme Leader and the IRGC command-
ers to the conclusion that a counteroffensive was necessary for
regime survival. Twenty-four commanders of the IRGC wrote an
open letter to Khatami and threatened him with action if he did
not maintain stability and peace in the country. Among the sig-
natories were the former and present commanders of the IRGC,
Yahya Rahim-Safavi and Mohammad Ali Jafari.” On the other
side, prominent reformists were also ex-Pasdaran, such as Ali
Rabi'ei and Alireza Alavitabar, further highlighting ideological
splits in the institution and among its veterans.
Gharargah—e Sazandegiye Khatam al—Anbia (Ghorb), homepage.
84 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
The election ofMahmoudAhmadinejad to the presidency. As noted
earlier, the election of Ahmdinejad was accompanied by a cor-
responding expansion of the IRGC into Iran's political and eco-
nomic sphere. But it does not follow that factionalism within
the IRGC subsided; in fact, just the opposite was true. First, the
June 2005 presidential elections were themselves an early expres-
sion of factional splits that had recently intensified. Aside from
Ahmadinejad, numerous other former IRGC members ran for
office, most notably Ali Larijani, Mohsen Rezai, and Mohammad
Baqer Qalibaf. Although they can hardly be termed moderate,
they have nonetheless emerged as more pragmatic and concilia-
tory voices. According to some analyses, these candidates may
have actually been able to claim greater support from within the
IRGC during the election than did Ahmadinejad. Exacerbating
these divisions were notable fissures between the IRGC and the
Basij that marked the election. Indeed, as noted by one observer
interviewed by the International Crisis Group, “Had Mohsen
Rezai won, the IRGC would have won. Had Mohammad Baqer
Qalibaf won, parts of the IRGC would have won. Ahmadinejad's
supporters chiefly come from the less well-off Basij.” 12
Since ascending to the presidency, Ahmadinejad's administration
has generated more tension within the IRGC over the opportunity
costs of his militancy, provocative statements and behavior, and fond-
ness for brinksmanship. A succession of recent personnel shifts further
reveals what appear to be competing constellations of former IRGC
and Basij commanders. These shifts also reflect an effort by the IRGC
to deflect pressure from other bureaucratic competitors inside Iran's
defense establishment. They include the following:
• The dismissal of the longtime commander of the IRGC, Yahya Rahim
Safavi. Safavi was replaced on August 31, 2007, by Mohammad
Ali Jafari, reportedly because he failed to take seriously the threat
of attack from the United States. Safavi, moreover, endured criti-
12 International Crisis Croup (2007).
The IRGC in Politics 85
cism for the arrest of five IRGC officials in Irbil, Iraq, on Janu-
ary 11, 2007, and the defection of a high-ranking IRGC general,
Reza Ali Ashgari, who was also one of the founders of Lebanese
Hizballah. Some Iranian analysts have interpreted the move as
an intra-IRGC power play, quietly sanctioned by the Supreme
Leader. Jafari is reputed to be close to Mohsen Rezai and Moham-
mad Baqer Qalibaf, while Safavi's openly partisan support for
Ahmadinejad was causing dissent within the Pasdaran's ranks.'
The resignation of All Larijani. The resignation of Ali Larijani, a
former IRGC commander, from his post as Iran's lead nuclear
negotiator and secretary of the SNSC brought into public view his
long-standing disagreement with Ahmadinejad about the course
of Iran's nuclear negotiations. What is significant here is that
the choice of his successor was likely an attempt by the Supreme
Leader to reduce potentially embarrassing public bickering over
the nuclear issue among IRGC veterans, even if that meant install-
ing someone closer to Ahmadinejad's outlook. Larijani's replace-
ment, Saeed Jalili, was a longtime Ahmadinejad advisor who had
accompanied the Iranian president on his trip to New York. He
is also reputed to be a protégé of Mojtaba Khamenei.' 4 In nuclear
negotiations, he seemed to closely shadow Larijani, with one U.S.
observer noting that he was acting as Larijani's “minder.” Jalili's
views on foreign policy are decidedly closer to those of President
Ahmadinejad. In an interview with the hardline Ansar News, he
argued against “sacrificing principles in the name of pragmatism”
and advocated an “aggressive” and “strong” position on foreign
policy coupled with reliance on divine assistance.' 6 Organization-
13 Radiofarda, “Taghyir-e farmandeye sepah pasdaran: manshae khareji angizeye dakheli”
(Change in IRGC command structure: Foreign force, inside incentive), August 2, 2007a. See
also, Vahid Sepehri, “Iran: New Commander Takes Over Revolutionary Guards,” RFE/RL
Iran Report, Vol. 10, No. 28, September 5, 2007.
14 Authors' interviews in Tehran, 2007.
Open Source Center, “Analysis: Iranian National Security Adviser Stresses Revolution's
Ideals,” OSC Feature: Iran, FFA20071 106398147, November 5, 2007e.
16 Open Source Center (2007e).
86 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
ally, it is important to note that Jalili comes from the ranks of
the Basiji commanders, not from the IRGC, further highlighting
what appears to be a “Basiji-centric” cast to Ahmadinejad's coterie
of advisors.'
These replacements, although partially a function of normal
bureaucratic infighting and politics, as well as a response to the percep-
tion of mounting U.S. pressure on Iran, may also reflect and presage
emerging circles of power within the IRGC. Within these new group-
ings, three former senior IRGC members bear special attention: Rezai,
Qalibaf, and Larijani. As an indication of this trio's influence, emerg-
ing coalitions of conservative “principlists” who jockeyed for position
in the March 2008 Maj les election have referred to them as an almost
bloc-like triumvirate, with each political party trying to solicit their
endorsement and support.' 8
As the former commander of the IRGC over a 1 4 -year period
and the current secretary of the Expediency Council, Mohsen Rezai
has become a voice of relative moderation. He has long advocated a
modest reconciliation with the United States—he served as a negotia-
tor at track two talks in Cyprus—while also critiquing the Khatami
administration's diplomacy. His Web site, Baztab, showcased some of
the strongest critiques of Ahmadinejad, before it was closed down by
order of the government in September 2007. In 2005, Rezai went so
far as to challenge the authority of the Supreme Leader, arguing that
‘ It is also significant that the new deputy interior minister, Alireza Afshar, appointed in
August 2007, is the former commander of the Basij. In this position, Afshar will oversee the
administration of the 2008 parliamentary elections, including the validation and count-
ing of ballots (Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1, “Iran: Military Official
Replaces President's Advisor as Deputy Interior Minister,” IAP20070826950 057, August 26,
2007b).
For example, see “Secretary of Conservative Front on Preparations for Election,” Resalat
(Tehran), FBIS IAP20071227011022, December 20, 2007, p. 3, commentary by Dr. Sadr:
“The United Front Had Constructive Talks with Larijani, Rezaei and Qalibaaf.” See also,
“Prominent Iranian Conservatives Meet to Discuss Election Ties, Unity,” Tehran E'temad,
FBIS IAP20071225950074, December 24, 2007.
The IRGC in Politics 87
“some of the authority” of the Office of the Supreme Leader had been
“relegated” to the Expediency Council in 1997.19
Similarly, former IRGC officer, SNSC secretary, and lead nuclear
negotiator Ali Larijani has been described as comparatively more prag-
matic and moderate than Ahmadinejad, with one Iranian commen-
tator praising his entire family—many of whom occupy key politi-
cal posts—as possessing an “aggressive” but “tolerant and bargaining
character.”20 Yet here again, the concept of pragmatism is relative at
best. As the head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting from
1994 to 2004, Larijani waged a relentless campaign against Khatami
supporters. 21 As Iran's nuclear pointman, he famously declared in a
March 9, 2007, speech that “any concession on nuclear technology is
tantamount to treason.”22 Nevertheless, some sources have reported
that his relative moderation—along with that of his political siblings--
has recently provoked opposition from more hardline members of the
IRGC. A noted instance occurred prior to the May 2007 U.S.-Iran
talks in Baghdad, when IRGC opposition reportedly forced the last-
minute cancellation of Larijani's brother's participation in the talks
with the United States.
Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, a former TRGC Air Force commander
who went on to serve as the mayor ofTehran, also claims an orientation
to a more moderate, pragmatic wing of the IRGC. Qalibaf's credentials
include war service in the IRGC Air Force and a stint as commander
of the LEF, where his popularity grew as a result of his curtailing the
19 “A Stronger Expediency Council?” Rooz Online, October 2, 2005, quoted in Walter
Posch, “Iran's Domestic Politics: The ‘Circles of Influence': Ahmadinejad's Enigmatic Nct
works,” European Union Institute for Security Studies, October 19, 2005.
20 Larijani's father is the prominent cleric Ayatollah Mirza Hashem Amoli, his brother
Mohammad Javad is an advisor in the Ministry of Justice, and his brother Sadeq is a cleric
and member of the Guardians Council. Since leaving his post as SNSC secretary, Larijani has
served as the Supreme Leader's representative to the SNSC (“Commentary: Larijani's Resig-
nation Is a Sign of Decline of Conservatives,” Tehran E'temad, FBIS 1AP20071023950111,
October 22, 2007).
21 “State Broadcasting Manipulates Opinion,” in Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, REEl
RL Iran Report, Vol. 3, No. 18, May 8, 2000.
22 “Iran's Man for All Crises Bows Out,” Agence France Presse, October 20, 2007.
88 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
excesses of the vigilante “pressure groups” (such as Ansar-e Hezbollah).
His opposition to the radical vigilantes was significant enough to pro-
voke a rare public rebuke from the vigilantes' commander in Mashhad,
who attacked what he perceived as Qalibaf's partisanship with student
protestors in 2003:
Mr. Qalibaf, who speaks of security in speeches, had better pre-
vent illegal death anniversary marches in place of confronting the
Hezbollah. The path of these people who talk about democracy is
apart from ours. They oppose Islam and we are their enemies. 23
This incident is significant for two reasons. First, it reveals con-
tinuing tensions between the IRGC and the vigilante paramilitaries
that, while not directly linked to the IRGC, are staffed by former Pas-
daran and Basij personnel. Furthermore, it demonstrates that ascent to
high political office can, at times, push the occupant toward the politi-
cal center, a phenomenon not uncommon in other political settings
outside Iran. Thus, the ascent of IRGC leaders to civilian office may
not be as deleterious as many have thought, as it appears that it can lead
to moderating the more extreme ideological and corporatist views of at
least some IRGC veterans.
Since leaving his post as LEF commander, Qalibaf fared well in
the 2005 presidential elections. His presidential slogan (“Iranians have
a right to the good life”) may be indicative of his desire to reconcile
ideological steadfastness with economic progress, and he has elsewhere
made the ideologically startling assertion that Iran needs an Islamist
variant of Reza Khan—a reference to the first shah of Iran, who over-
threw the Qajar dynasty and implemented a series of broad-ranging
socioeconomic reforms. 24 Aside from his relative political moderation,
23 “Iran: Political Figures Comment on Violent Groups, Elections, Other Issues,” Tehran
Yas-e Now, FBIS 1AP20031216000015, December 8, 2003.
24 Iran Press Service, “Iranians Cool to the Presidential Election,” Safa Haeri, May 17,
2005. In this interview, Qalibaf declared, “I have no program. I had no time for that. But
I shall call for accountability by everyone. Go and see what people say in the taxis or at
sandwich stands, saying they want a Reza Khan. I shall be a Reza Khan, but of a Hezbollah
type.”
The IRGC in Politics 89
Qalibaf appears to be an advocate of the IRGC's participation in the
global economic order. For example, he reportedly traveled to Zurich at
the invitation of a Swiss cement company to explore a business partner-
ship. Underpinning this pragmatism is his well-known desire to miti-
gate the opportunity costs of the doctrinal rigidity that has informed
Ahmadinejad's policies. In late November 2007, for example, Qalibaf
was reported to have stated,
We could achieve our goals at less cost. There is no need to impose
extra cost on society, because there are certain methods to respond
to the reasonable demands of the people. 25
However, this does not mean that Qalibaf is a “moderate” in the
Western mold. His comments may not only be a result of pragmatism
and moderation, but also a way to differentiate him from Ahmadienjad
during Iran's 2009 presidential election.
Possible Future Scenarios for the IRGC
Public pressures resulting from the opportunity costs noted by Qalibaf
could conceivably have a significant impact on the future development
of the IRGC. Furthermore, broader changes within Iran, far beyond
the immediate control of the IRGC, may well force it to evolve in ways
that are not immediately self-evident. Given our study's exploration
of the various facets of the IRGC's character and performance and its
previous roles, we conclude this chapter with three possible scenarios
for its future.
Scenario 1: The Evolving Role of the Supreme Leader and the
Eventual Succession to Khamenei
This first scenario forecasts a temptation by segments of the IRGC lead-
ership to influence the appointment of a figurehead Supreme Leader
after the demise of Ali Khamenei. With this watershed event, the con-
25 “Persian Press: Tehran Mayor Said to Criticize Government Policies,” Mardom Salari
(Tchran), FBIS 1AP20071121004006, November 17, 2007.
90 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
trolling and mediating power of Khamenei will be removed, and the
elite may clash among themselves over his successor, with no clear favor-
ite emerging. Of the main contenders, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani
is himself elderly and unlikely to have a long tenure in office. More
importantly, he is deeply unpopular with the IRGC and conservatives
such as Ahmadinejad. For their part, younger leaders, such as Hassan
Khomeini (Ayatollah Khomeini's grandson) or Mohammad Khatami,
the former president, are too moderate for the taste of conservatives
within the IRGC and the Qom establishment.
Having no powerful clerical leader capable of achieving the nec-
essary consensus, the IRGC may step in, selecting a pliant figurehead
ayatollah as Khamenei's successor. The benefits of such a move to the
IRGC are several. It would require no significant shift in the elite struc-
ture, and the IRGC would likely calculate that this figurehead leader
would continue to support its primacy in Iran's economic sphere and
political life. This would give even more leverage to the IRGC than
it enjoyed under Khamenei, at the expense of the civilian-controlled
institutions and without evident breaching of the constitution.
This scenario is made more plausible by the observation that the
next Supreme Leader could be significantly less powerful than Khame-
nei, whose power has increased since his appointment not because of
religious standing or personal charisma, but rather as a result of the vast
bureaucracy under his command. However, as the number of contend-
ers (including the IRGC) for power and influence grow, the mediating
role of the future Supreme Leader becomes increasingly more complex
and potentially untenable.
Scenario 2: The “Muslim Reza Khan”
Another way for the IRGC to maintain its preeminence in a situation
of political turbulence and uncertainty would be to set the stage for the
emergence of a leader in a military uniform who would be known for
his Islamist zeal and piety and, therefore, acceptable to broad sections
of the clergy while at the same time being controlled by the IRGC
itself. This process would echo the rise of former Pakistani dictator
General Zia ul-Haq. Such a candidate would promise progress, placing
less emphasis on Islamism but not completely abandoning it. As noted
The IRGC in Politics 91
earlier, this vision has informed the 2005 electoral platform of former
IRGC commander and current mayor of Tehran, Mohammad Qali-
baf, who came in third after Ahmadinejad and Hashemi-Rafsanjani.
The benefit of this approach for the IRGC is that it would continue to
hold the reins of power without giving the appearance of having for-
saken the values of the Islamic Revolution.
Scenario 3: The Religious Turkish Option, or a “Coup by
Memorandum”
Another possible scenario would be for the IRGC to attempt to run
the country without great input from the clergy. If economic depri-
vation and fatigue with the regime's top-down religiosity and social
strictures worsen, the Iranian people might well support a significant
course correction in the form of a non-clerical leader. The IRGC at this
juncture could step in and, in a manner similar to that of the Turkish
military in the past, quietly announce its intention to clean up politics;
to eliminate corruption, bribery, graft, and ineptitude—particularly by
the clerics; and to end Iran's international isolation. After this de facto
takeover, it could initiate a creeping militarization meant to appease
the discontented youth, who are a source of great potential instability.
The IRGC could launch this from within by gradually relaxing the
religious regulations for its members while enforcing greater adherence
to military professionalism. Our goal here in postulating these sce-
narios for the IRGC's future is not so much to offer a prediction, but
rather to highlight the range and diversity of tools it can use to both
influence political developments in the Islamic Republic of Iran and
adapt to changing international and local circumstances.
CHAPTER SEVEN
Conclusion: Toward a More Strategic
Understanding of the IRGC
Rather than framing the IRGC as a purely military organization
marked by mafia-type economic tendencies and a homogeneous ideo-
logical outlook, this monograph has surveyed its broad-ranging roles in
Iranian society and its emerging internal divisions. Our analysis under-
scores that the twin poles of commonly held assumptions about the
IRGC are both incorrect. The IRGC is neither a corrupt gang nor is
it a firebrand revolutionary vanguard with the aim of exporting Iran's
revolution across the region. Rather, its vested and increasing interests
in the country's economy make it an increasingly conservative force
rather than a radical one.
This study has also challenged the Pasdaran's own self-professed
mythology of the “sacred defense” of Islamic Republic during the Iran-
Iraq War and its unquestioned function as a modernizing force for
progress. The IRGC is at its core a multidimensional institution capable
of simultaneously cultivating both legitimacy and dissent among vari-
ous segments of the population. In emphasizing its benevolent, pro-
gressive, and technocratic side, the IRGC can point to drug interdic-
tion, rural construction, laser eye surgery, automobile manufacturing,
and sports among its many services to Iran. Moreover, its indoctrina-
tion efforts and economic expansion can co-opt a range of population
segments into its orbit—ranging from business elites to marginalized
rural classes seeking upward social mobility. Yet the Pasdaran have also
functioned as the repressive shock troops of the revolution, enforcing
the government's strict authoritarianism through its paramilitary wing,
93
94 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
censorship, and other mechanisms. Moreover, the institution's widen-
ing economic activities, which its officials claim are merely an exten-
sion of its postwar reconstruction efforts, have displaced the traditional
merchant classes and other financial elites.
What the future holds for the IRGC remains to be seen. The
IRGC's influence will probably continue to grow as it continues to be a
main contender for power after the death of Supreme Leader Khame-
nei. There appear to be no significant challengers to the IRGC's bid for
a position of dominance within Iran's bureaucratic establishment. Yet
in evaluating this growing influence, our study yielded an important
caveat that holds true for the broader political trajectory of the Islamic
Republic. Despite the IRGC's idealized portrait of itself to both its
members and to Iranian society at large, the IRGC is hardly immune
to the same worldly pitfalls, temptations, challenges, and bureaucratic
mutations that seem to undermine revolutionary entities everywhere.
This observation speaks to the larger issue of the questionable
exceptionalism and uniqueness of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the
international state system. From this, we conclude that the Islamic
Republic and the IRGC, in particular, can be profitably compared to
similar revolutionary political orders elsewhere and specifically to their
military establishments.
The Utility of a Comparative Approach: Pakistan and
China
As a military organization with substantial and growing interests in
the civilian commercial and economic sphere, the IRGC is not unique.
Even in the era of the modern nation-state, there are few governments
that can fully subsidize their armed forces. In many countries, militar-
ies are encouraged or even required to pursue self-sustaining economic
activities to alleviate the resource burden on the general population
and excessive funding demands on the central government. Further-
more, the inherent allure of militaries as engines of domestic economic
and technical progress is well known and has been studied extensively.
This is particularly the case in the context of the Middle East, where
Conclusion: Toward a More Strategic Understanding of the IRGC 95
the populist image of the “man on horseback” helped to underwrite
the anti—status quo legitimacy of the Free Officers in Egypt, the rise
of Kamal Ataturk in Turkey, the ascent to power of Mohammad Reza
Shah Pah lavi in Iran, the nationalist regime ofAbd al-Karim Qasim in
Iraq, and others.'
The question of time however, provides a significant challenge to
the IRGC. As the institution grows in power and influence, so too do
its concomitant resource demands. Thus, the IRGC will undoubtedly
have to confront the timeless question that has bedeviled its compatri-
ots in other settings: How long can it sustain its populist image before
it is seen as having subsumed the corrupt and oligarchic tendencies of
the old elite that it replaced? Is there a way in which it can chart an
alternative course that balances institutional enrichment with the per-
ception of national progress and modernization? Similarly, what effect,
if any, will its expanding and increasingly diverse domestic roles, illicit
activities, and commercial enterprises have on order and discipline, not
to mention meritocracy and traditional military competence? To gain
insight into these issues, we suggest undertaking a deeper comparative
study that would compare and contrast the economic dimensions of
Iran's Revolutionary Guards with comparable militaries in two major
powers to Iran's east—Pakistan and China.
In the case of Pakistan, the militarization of the economy (or the
economization of the military) has reached such proportions that Paki-
stani scholar Ayesha Siddiqa has coined the term “Milbus” (military
business) to describe the armed forces' expansive reach into the agricul-
ture, manufacturing, construction, and service sectors and the result-
ing networks of patronage and clientage that attach it to the civilian
1 A concise discussion is found in Fuad Khuri, “The Study of Civil-Military Relations in
Modernizing Societies in the Middle East: A Critical Assessment,” in R. Kolkowitz and A.
Korbonski, eds., Soldiers, Peasants and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist
and Modernizing Societies, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982, pp. 9—27. For a useful
summary of contemporary analyses in the Arab contezr, see Elizabeth Picard, “Arab Mili-
tary in Polities: from Revolutionary Plot to Authoritarian State,” in Albert Hourani, Philip
S. Khoury, Mary C. Wilson, eds., The Modern Middle East, Berkeley and Los Angeles: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1993. Also, Mehran Kamrava, “Military Professionalization and
Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 115, No. 1,
Spring 2000, pp. 67—92.
96 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
elite.2 Although they should not be overstated, the similarities between
Pakistan's Milbus and the IRGC are striking:
• The Pakistani military runs the National Logistics Cell, the larg-
est freight-transportation company in Pakistan. Although tech-
nically part of the Ministry of Planning and Development, its
operations are managed by serving army personnel.
• The military oversees and staffs the Frontier Works Organization,
the country's largest contractor, responsible for the construction
of roads and toll collection. Under this umbrella organization,
there is a vast array of subsidiary companies covering enterprises
as diverse as poultry farms, gas stations, bakeries, and commercial
plazas.
• The Pakistani military oversees a number of ostensibly charita-
ble “foundations,” including the triservice Fauji Foundation, the
Army Welfare Trust, the air force's Shaheen Foundation, and the
navy's Bahria Foundation. Overall, these foundations oversee more
than 100 companies involved in cement and fertilizer production,
banking, education, insurance, and information technology. To
attract business, these subsidiary companies make no secret of
their associations to the military and, indeed, promote them as an
advantage and attraction—the military linkage reportedly brings
with it a reputation for efficiency.
According to Siddiqa, the principal supporters and constituents of
Milbus in Pakistan are precisely those who might logically be assumed
to be the strongest proponents of a more liberal, democratic, and free-
market political economy—Pakistan's middle classes. This dynamic
may be instructive to those who predict a burgeoning popular backlash
in Iran against the TRGC's mafia-like empire.
2 Indonesia, Chile, Turkey, and Thailand are other places where a similar symbiotic rela-
tionship prevails. On Pakistan, see Siddiqa, Military , Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy,
London: Oxford University Press, 2007. It is significant that the Musharraf government has
banned this book and that the author left Pakistan in mid-2007. We thank RAND col-
league Peter A. Wilson for the reference to this work. See also “Military, Inc.: The Political
Economy of Militarixation in Pakistan” (2005).
Conclusion: Toward a More Strategic Understanding of the IRGC 97
The PLA offers another potentially fruitful area of comparison,
particularly for exploring the trade-offs and tension between the mili-
tary's financial aggrandizement and its professionalism. Specifically,
the decision by the government of Jiang Zemin to force the divestiture
of the PLA from all commercial activities in 1998 suggests that the eco-
nomic symbiosis between civilian elites and military-run business has
its limits—particularly when these financial activities are perceived to
inflict deleterious and intolerable costs to military competence, mod-
ernization, and readiness.
Although the PLA has enjoyed a degree of economic self-suffi-
ciency since its origins in the 1920s and Mao's “Doctrine of Self-Reli-
ance,” its actual commercial and business profits underwent a sevenfold
expansion between 1985 and 1990. By the late 1980s, its affiliated busi-
ness firms—numbering roughly 20,000—were dominant in the farm-
ing, transportation, information technology, services, and entertain-
ment sectors. In manufacturing, it produced such popular consumer
items as bicycles, refrigerators, and televisions.
Yet this expansion was not without consequences, which may
hold lessons for anticipating and understanding the future course of
the TRGC. Those same factors that ultimately impelled the civilian
leadership to curtail the PLA's commercial footprint in China may well
be just over the horizon for the IRGC in Iran. They can briefly be sum-
marized as follows:
Intolerable levels of corruption. As noted by David Shambaugh,
James Mulvenon, and others, the PLA's expansion into the illicit
economy was marked by a corresponding rise in corruption, black-
market enterprises such as prostitution, and favoritism to the
‘ These comparative insights are drawn from the following works: Evan S. Medeiros, Roger
Cliff, Keith Crane, James C. Mulvenon, A New Direction for China's Deft nse Industry, Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MC-334-AF, 2005; Swaran Singh, “The Rise and Fall
of the PLA's Business Empire: Implications for China's Military Relations,” Strategic Analy-
sis, Vol. 23, No. 2, May 1999; James Mulvenon, Soldiers of Fortune: The Rise and Fall of
the Chinese Military-Business Complex: 1978—1998, Armonk, New York, and London: M.
E. Sharpe, 2001; Dongmin Lee, “Chinese Civil Military Relations: The Divestiture of the
People's Liberation Army Business Holdings,” Armed Forces and Soci ety, Vol. 32, No. 3, April
2006, pp. 437—453.
98 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
point that “the whole national economy was placed in jeopardy.” 4
This had important consequences for the civilian leadership, as
these developments had the collateral effect of tarnishing popu-
lar images of the Chinese Communist Party, which in the early
1990s, was trying to enhance its legitimacy based on a platform
of anticorruption.
• The growing regionalization of the economy. The military's business
ventures were becoming increasingly decentralized and provin-
cially based, raising fears within the central government in Bei-
jing of a return to the regional autonomy of the prerevolutionary
warlord era.
• The corrosive effect on military readiness and modernization. The
professionalization and meritocracy of the military was ultimately
undermined by the distractions of its financial pursuits. The con-
nections required to secure a coveted position running a PLA-
owned business, the logistical energy devoted to smuggling, and
the preference for management acumen over battlefield expertise
all incurred significant costs in the realm of military competency
and lost opportunities for modernization.
Ofcourse, the decision to terminate the PLA's commercial endeav-
ors with the Divestiture Act of 1998 was ultimately rooted in the ascen-
dancy of a more pragmatic and technocratic strand in the civilian lead-
ership's inner circle.
As we have seen, this tension between dogmatism and pragmatism
is an omnipresent theme within Iranian political culture and raises the
question of whether the greatest challenges to the IRGC's future might
actually originate within the institution itself—specifically, the poten-
tial for greater fissures and factionalism over questions of ideological
purity, institutional privilege, and national interest.
‘ Lee (2006, p. 448).
APPENDIX A
Business Organizations Affiliated with the IRGC
or Influenced by IRGC Personnel
Khatam al-Anbia
Khatam al-Anbia functions as the IRGC's engineering arm. The orga-
nization conducts a range of civil engineering activities, such as road
and dam construction and the manufacture of pipelines to transport
water, oil, and gas across the country. Khatam is also involved in mining
operations, agriculture, and telecommunications.
Hara Company and Sepasad Engineering Company
Khatam al-Anbia maintains multiple subsidiaries, two of which are
Hara Company and Sepasad Engineering Company. Both subsidiaries
specialize in excavation and tunnel construction.
Ehya Sepahan
Ehya Sepahan is a private-holding company that was established with
help from the IRGC. It is based in Isfahan and owns several industrial
companies. The company's director is Mostafa Safavi, the brother of
former IRGC head Rahim Safavi.
99
100 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
Bahman Group
The IRGC reportedly holds 45 percent of the company's shares. The
group operates an assembly line of Mazda cars in Iran.'
Bonyad-e Mostazafan va Janbazan, or Mostazafan and Janbazan
Foundation (MJF), or Foundation of the Oppressed and War
Veterans
The MJF was created in 1979 under the leadership of Mohammad
Forouzancleh, who was a former IRGC official. The bonyad is the larg-
est in Iran, with an estimated net worth of over $3 billion. The MJF
reportedly has over 200,000 employees and 350 affiliated companies.
It is a state-owned foundation that represented approximately 10 per-
cent of the Iranian government's annual budget in 2003.2 The MJF
provides medical care and recreation for Iran's veteran population. The
organization also has a variety of business interests, both in Iran and
abroad, including agriculture, industries and mines, civil development
and construction, transportation and commerce, and tourism. 3
Bonyad Shahid va Omur-e Janbazan, or Foundation of Martyrs and
Veterans Affairs
The Bonyad Shahid is a governmental entity that receives its fund-
ing directly from the national budget. Former IRGC Air Force com-
mander Hossein Dehghan acts as president and director of Shahid and
also serves as an advisor to President Ahmadinejad. Shahid gives home
loans to thousands of Basijis and the families of martyrs. It has report-
edly loaned 120 million rials to urban families and 150 million rials to
rural families. 4 Shahid is also involved in numerous economic endeav-
ors, much like the MJF.
1 “Malekan-e Sahani-e Khodro Dar Burs-e Tehran” (Shareholders of automobile industry
in Tehran Bourse), Hamshahri, December 20, 2005.
2 Globa lSecurity.org, “Bonyad-e Mostazafan va Janbazan,” October 5, 2003.
“Bonyads Ripe for Restructuring” (1999).
‘ “Iran: Profile of IRGC—Linked Website, Sobhe-Sadegh” (2006).
Organizations Affiliated with the IRGC or Influenced by IRGC Personnel 101
Bonyad-e Hefze Arzeshhaye Defa-e Moghaddas, or Foundation of
Keeping the Memoirs of Sacred Defense Alive
The Bonyad-e Hefze maintains memoirs, notes, articles, lists of com-
manders, and lists of Iranian victims of chemical weapons during the
Iran-Iraq War. The bonyad is affiliated with the Basij. 5
Farhang-e lsaar, or Culture of Self-Sacrifice
Farhang-e Isaar is a governmental project that publishes news, monthly
magazines, and books with the goal of promoting the culture of mar-
tyrdom and self_sacrifice.6 The project is controlled by the Council
of Coordination and Supervision of the Promotion of the Culture of
Martyrdom and Self-Sacrifice and is affiliated with the Basij.
Bank Melli (National Bank of Iran)
Bank Melli provides a variety of banking and financial services to the
IRGC and Qods Force. It is estimated that the bank provided at least
$100 million to the Qods Force alone between 2002 and 2006.
Sajed , homepage , no date.
6 Farhang-e Isaar, homepage, no date.
APPENDIX B
Current and Former IRGC Personnel
This appendix was compiled using open source reporting, which has
been cited in the body of the paper. This is not an exhaustive list of
current (as of fall 2008) and former IRGC personnel in prominent
positions. In addition, some titles and positions may not be current.
Cabinet
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad—President of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
former mayor of Tehran, Basij volunteer during Iran-Iraq War
Saced Jalili—Secretary of the Supreme National Security Coun-
cil and top nuclear negotiator (replacing Ali Larijani), former Basij
commander
A u Larijani—Expediency Council member, former IRGC member,
former head of state TV and radio, former SNSC representative to
Khamenei
Abdoireza Mesri—Minister of Welfare and Social Security, former
director of the Cooperative Office of the IRGC in Western Iran
Mohammad Hoseyn Saffar-Harandi-—Minister of Islamic Cul-
ture and Guidance, former IRGC deputy commander of Hormozgan
province, 1980—1981; former national regional deputy commander
of IRGC, 1981—1983; director of the Political Office of the IRGC,
1989—1993
Mostafa Mohammad Najjar—Minister of Defense and Armed Forces
Logistics; in General Command of Central Headquarters of IRGC
Sistan va Baluchestan province; in charge of the Cooperative Office of
103
104 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
the IRGC, 1981; former deputy director of the Warfare Group of the
Ministry of the Guards Corps (Vezarat-e Sepah); member of IRGC
since late 1979; membership in the board of directors of the Guards
Corps Industries; creation of the Training, Treatment, and Equipment
Center of the Guards Corps Hospital
A u Reza Tahmasebi—Minister of Industries and Mines, former
researcher for defense projects of the Khatam al-Anbia Station of the
Guards Corps, 1985—1987
Seyyed Masud Mirkazemi—Minister of Commerce, former director
of the Center for Basic Studies of the Guards Corps, 2002—2004.
Seyyed Parviz Fattah—Minister of Energy, formerly of the IRGC
A u Reza Tahmasebi—Minister of Industries and Mines, formerly of
the IRGC
Seyyed Masud Mirkazemi—Minister of Commerce, formerly of the
IRGC
Seyyed Parviz Fattah—Minister of Energy, former deputy head of
IRGC-affiliated construction company Sepasad
Hoseyn Dehghan—Deputy to the president and director of the
Bonyad-e Shahid va Omur-e Isargaran (Foundation for the Mar-
tyrs and the Affairs of Self-Sacrificers), former commander of IRGC
of Tehran, former acting commander of IRGC of Isfahan (District
2, National), former commander of IRGC of Lebanon, former com-
mander of District 1 of Sarallah and Sarallah Operations Headquar-
ters, former acting commander of the Air Force of IRGC (Niru-ye
Hava'i-ye Sepah-e Pasdaran), former commander of the IRGC Air
Force, former acting chairman of the joint headquarters of the IRGC,
former general manager of the Cooperatives Foundation of the IRGC
Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr—IRGC member, recently resigned
as Deputy Minister of the Interior; former deputy commander of the
IRGC and one of the founders of Ansar Hezbollah
Hoseini Shahrudi—Director of the Indoctrination Bureau of the
IRGC
Current and Former IRGC Personnel 105
Parliamentarians
Alireza Afshar—Deputy Minister of Interior, responsible for the
administration of the 2008 Majles (parliamentary) elections, including
counting and validating ballots; former Basij commander
Other Government Officials/Advisors
Yahya Rahim Safavi—Assistant and senior advisor to commander-in - -
chief of Iranian Armed Forces (Khamenei), former IRGC chief
Mohsen Rezai—Secretary General of Expediency Council, one of the
original IRGC members
Hojjat ol-Eslam Behzad Jalali—Recently appointed as Khamenei's
new representative in the IRGC
Sadeq Mahsuli—Appointed as presidential advisor in 2006; involved
in construction, oil, and real estate; former IRGC general who fought
in the same division as Ahmadinejad during the Iran-Iraq War
Mayors/Provincial Governors
Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf—Mayor of Tehran, former commander
of the IRGC Air Force, former commander of the LEF
University Chiefs
Kelishadi—Head of Amir al-Mu'minin University
Behrouz Moradi—On faculty at Imam Hosein University; governor
of Hamedan
Mohammad Mehdi Zahedi—Head of the SBO at the Science and
Industry University
Mardani—Head of the Iranian SBO
Ja'far Ya'qubi—Head of the LBO
106 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
Bonyad/Media/Business Heads
Mohammad Forouzandeh—Director of the Mostazafan and Janba-
zan Foundation; former IRGC official
Brigadier General Ehtessam—Director of Hara Company
Hossein Shariatmadari—Director of Keyhan newspaper
Hoseyn Dehghan—Deputy to the president and director of the
Bonyad-e Shahid va Omur-e Isargaran; former IRGC Air Force
commander
Brigadier General Abdolreza Abedzadeh—Reconstruction deputy
of Khatam al-Anbia
Current IRGC Officials
Mohammad Ali Jafari—New IRGC chief
Brigadier General Qassem Soleimani—IRGC commander in charge
of the Qods Force
Hosein Salami—IRGC Air Force commander
General Manouchehr Foruzandeh—Director of Information for the
IRGC
Brigadier General Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr—Deputy Chief of
Staff in Basij Affairs; former Deputy Minister of the Interior
Ali Akbar Ahmadian—Recently appointed by Khamenei to head the
IRGC's Strategic Studies Center
Sekhavatmand Davudi—IRGC commander for Rasht province
Bahman Reyhani—IRGC commander for Kermanshah province
Hojjatol Islam Hussein Taeb—Deputy commander of the Basij
Mohammad Hejazi—Joint Chief of Staff for IRGC, former Basij
commander
General Qassem Kargar—Head of Basij Ashura Brigade
Khalil Rastegar—Basij commander in Hormozgan
General Mehdi Sa'adati—Basij commander in Khuzestan province
Dezham Khoy—Head of the Ardabil Construction Basij
Mohammad Yusef Shakeri—Basij commander in East Azarbaijan
province
Current and Former IRGC Personnel 107
Majid Fathinezhad—Basij pilot and head of Basij air units
Alireza Asgarizadeh—Commander of Hazrat-e Amir Basij base in
Dahaghan (Esfahan)
Karim Qanbarnezhad—Basij commander in Ardabil
Commander Soleymani—IRGC commander of Basij in “factories,
offices, and trades”
Brigadier General Qolam Reza Ahmadi—IRGC commander in
southern Khorassan
Colonel Firuz Jahantigh—Head of Sistan-Baluchistan Construction
Basij
Sa'adati—Basij commander in Khuzestan
General Behrouz Esbati—Basij cultural deputy
Colonel Charragh—Basij acting operations deputy
Former IRGC Officials
Mohsen Sazegara—currently a Harvard research fellow, co-founder
of IRGC
Ali Shamkhani—Head of the Strategic Investigations Center for
Defense Affairs and member of the Foreign Policy Committee, co-
founder of IRGC
Mehrdad Bazrpash—Served as Ahmadinejad's campaign manager
during the 2005 election and was then appointed as the president's
advisor on youth affairs for the first year of the presidency, former head
of Sharif University SBO
Brigadier General Esma'il Ahmadi-Moqaddam-—Reportedly
instrumental in mobilizing IRGC and Basij support for Ahmadinejad
during the 2005 election, appointed by Khamenei as commander of
the LEF and director of its Drug Control Headquarters; former Basij
deputy commander
Mohsen Rafiqdust (Rafiqdoost)—Former head of the IRGC and
former head of the MJF
Ezatollah Zarghami—Director of state radio and television services,
including IRIB, the primary state broadcasting service (replacing Ali
Larjani); former IRGC member
APPENDIX C
Evolution of the Islamic Republic and the IRGC
Figure C.1 on the following pages presents a timeline of important
events for the Islamic Republic of Iran (the top half of the figure) and
the IRGC (the bottom half of the figure).
109
110 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
Iraq invades Iran in the
southern province of
Khuzestan (9/22)
The Assembly
of Experts
approves the
Constitution
of the Islamic
Republic (Oct)
Iranian
Constitution
approved
by public
referendum;
Ayatollah
Khomeini
declares Iran
an Islamic
Republic
(4/1)
victory of
the Islamic
Revolution
(2/11)
1980
Basij force
established
(Nov)
Under direction
from Ayatollah
Khomeini, the
Revolutionary
Guards Corps are
established by a
decree from the
Revolutionary
Council on
May 5, 1979. The
IRGC emerges as
the dominant
revolutionary
armed group. Its
goals are to
combat “counter
revolution” and
assist the
“liberation
movements of
oppressed
people of the
world.”
(late 1979)
MeK bombs the headquarters of the IRP in
response to Khomeini's removal of democratic/
leftist president Banisadr. The attack kills 72
high-level government officials (6/28)
Khamenei elected as president (Oct)
violent clashes occur
between government
forces and the Mek
throughout Iran. Majority
of Mek members killed
(1981/1 982)
Majority of Iraqi
troops withdraw
from Iranian
territory. Khomeini
rejects peace offers
from Saddam Hussein
1986
t
IRGC commander
Mohsen Rezai
supports the notion
of “Islamic warfare”
in stating that Iran
does not need many
tanks and aircraft to
defeat Saddam
Hussein's forces. The
IRGC and regular
army continue to
disagree over both
strategy and tactics.
(1986)
-IRGC leadership insists on continuing
the war with Iraq despite advice from
figures such as Ayatollah Hassan All
Montazeri, who advocates ending the
war in its early stages. (1982)
-Ministry of Revolutionary Guards
created. (1982)
-The IRGC views the war as an opportunity to
institutionalize the revolution within Iranian
society and to politically marginalize the
regular army. (1980)
Key Events in the
Development of the
Islamic Republic
Elections for the fourth maj les
result in a power shift favor-
ing a traditionalist/right
coalition close to Khamenei.
Mohammad Khatami is
accused of supporting liberal
media and is forced to resign
his position as Minister of
Culture (1992)
1990 1992
t
Headquarters
Khatam al-Anbia
established.
(1990)
Rafsanjani encourages
government entities,
including the IRGC, to
engage in business
ventures as a way of
generating independent
income (1993)
Guards Ministry dissolved
-and reintegrated into the new
Ministry of Defense Armed
Forces Logistics (MODAFL)
headed by Akbar Torkan
(1989)
Rafsanjani elected
as president (Jul)—
Khamenei ascends
to power as
Supreme Leader
(1989) —
Ayatollah Khomeini
dies (6/3) —
End of the Iran-
Iraq War (8/20)
(Jun )
Ministry of
Intelligence
and Security
(MDIS) is
established
(Aug )
I IJr
Khomeini appoints
Rafsanjani to re-
organize and lead the
armed forces (Jun)
President Khamenei
re-elected (1985)
‘ h r
I I I
Rafsanj an i
begins to
rebuild
I ndustry/
infrastructure
through a
process of
economic
liberalization
(1990)
+ I
— Iran General
Command
of the Armed
Forces Joint
Staffs
created
(1992)
Rafsanjani
re-elected
as president
(Jun)
1988
1982
IRGC/Basij
respond
ferociously
to the Mek
bombing,
executing
7,000 Mek
(late June)
1994
1984
The IRGC arrests
the Tudeh leader-
ship (1983)
- Head of the Basij,
Hojjat el-Eslam
Salek, states that
the Basij forces
had succeeded in
“doing away with
conventional war-
fare methods and
had introduced a
new method called
Islamic warfare.”
(1982)
Key Events in the
Evolution of the IRGC
RAND MGS2I-Cla
Evolution of the Islamic Republic and the IRGC 111
Key Events in the
Development of the
Islamic Republic
Sayyid Mohammad Khatami
elected president (5/23)
4
1994 1996 1998
I
Ethnic tensions
cause rioting in
Qazvin. Local IRGC
commanders refuse
to fire on unarmed
protesters. (1994)
Khamenei forces
Mohsen Rezai to
resign his position
as commander of
the IRGC (9/9)
Elections for the
seventh majies—
hardliners gain
control (May)
I I I
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
I
Inception of the The IRGC forces the
Construction Basij closure of the newly
(2000) opened Imam Khomeini
Airport (May)
Twenty-four IRGC commanders
write an open letter to Mohammad Au Jafari-
Khatami warning him that they replaces Yahya Rahim
will take military action if he Safavi as the Guards
cannot effectively suppress Commander in Chief
internal dissent (7/19) (9/ 1)
Key Events in the
Evolution of the IRGC
The MOIS admits to
the assassination
of five Iranian
dissidents in
November 1998
(Jan)
— Elections for the
sixth majies: the
reformists win
an absolute
majority (Feb)
Ahmadinejad elected
fPresident (2005)1
Yahya Rahim-Safavi,
the new IRGC
commander,
threatens reformists
clerics with
beheading (Apr)
Command structure of
the IRGC and Basij merge
after IRGC commander
Mohammad All Jafari is
given the added
responsibility of
commanding the Basij by
a directive from the
Supreme Leader's office
(9/29)
RAND MGS2I-Cilb
APPENDIX D
Provincial Map of Iran
Figure D.1
Provincial Map of Iran
RAND MG821-D.1
113
APPENDIX F
Glossary of Persian Terms
Abadgaran-e Iran -c Islami: Developers of Islamic Iran
algharc'ch: mobile units of the IRGC
Artesh: Iran 's regular army
ashura: male Basij battalion
bazaari: member of the traditional merchant class
Bonyad Mostazafan: The Foundation of the Oppressed
Bonyad Shahid va Omur-c Isargaran: Foundation for the Martyrs
and the Affairs of Self-Sacrificers
Bonyad Shahid i ra Omur—c Janbazan: The Foundation of Martyrs
and Veteran Affairs
bonyad: foundation
Daftar-c Rahbar: The office of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei
Edarch amaakcn: Office in Ministry of Justice supervising local res-
taurants, grocery, and retail stores
fatwa: religious edict
Gharbzadch: “Westoxified”
Hczbc E'tedal i ra Tosc'ch: Justice and Development Party
Hezbc Kargozaran Sazandegi: Executives of Construction Party
Jamech Rowhaniyyat-c Mobarez: Association of Militant Clergy
janbazan: veterans
karbala: a type of Basij special combat group
komitchs: committees
maddahs: cantors
Mahdi: The Imam in Occultation
Majies: Iran's national parliament
115
116 Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
Majma-e Rowhaniyoun-e Mobarez: Society for Militant Clerics
marja' taghiced: source of emulation
moavenat bassazi: headquarters of reconstruction
moavenat khodkafaee: headquarters of self-sufficiency
nadanan karl: inexperience
Pasdaran: guards
Sazman-e Harassat: An IRGC office that functions much like a regu-
lar internal security and intelligence office
Sazman-e Mujahidin-e Engheiab-e Isiami: Organization of the
Islamic Revolution Mujahedin
Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Engheiab-e Isiami: Army of the Guardians of
the Islamic Revolution
shahid: martyr
vail faghih: the supreme jurist
veiayat-e faghih: The supremacy or the reign of the qualified Shi'ite
jurist
zahra: female Basij battalion
zoifaqar: a type of Basij special combat group
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