A Faith Denied:
The Persecution of the Bahá’ís of Iran
Iran Human Rights Documentation Center

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To establish an online archive of human rights documents that can one day be used to develop and support a reckoning process in Iran.

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1. Executive Summary

The Bahá’í community of Iran has faced repeated cycles of persecution since the founding of the faith in the mid-nineteenth century. Today the Bahá’ís are not free to practice their religion, they suffer from economic and social exclusion, and they have been subjected to executions, arbitrary arrests and the destruction of their property - all carried out with the support of national judicial, administrative and law enforcement structures. Since the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in June 2005, there is evidence to suggest a new cycle of repression may be beginning.

The report’s key findings are as follows:

- The Shi’a clerical establishment in Iran has long regarded the Bahá’í faith as a heretical deviation from Islam. The Bahá’í community has suffered most severely when the clerical influence in national affairs has been strongest. This report seeks to demonstrate that the clerical establishment has consistently worked to undermine and ultimately extinguish the Bahá’í faith, a project that has been wholeheartedly embraced by the government of the Islamic Republic.

- The 1950s saw organized anti-Bahá’í campaigns resulting in mob violence, the destruction of religious sites and the formation of private anti-Bahá’í organizations, approved and assisted by senior civil, military and religious leadership figures. The propaganda used to cultivate and justify social persecution created negative stereotypes that continue to have repercussions today. Clerics who gained an influential public voice during these campaigns later gained powerful positions in the post-1979 leadership.

- The consolidation of clerical rule after the 1979 revolution gave rise to a centralized and government-directed anti-Bahá’í campaign. The new Islamic constitution explicitly withheld recognition as a religious minority from the Bahá’ís. Instead the Bahá’í faith was categorized as a political threat – a characterization reinforced by frequent accusations of espionage or other anti-revolutionary criminal activity. This effectively criminalized the Bahá’í religion.

- The first years of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) saw the full range of state coercive force deployed against Bahá’ís. The authorities particularly targeted Bahá’í leadership in an attempt to destroy the community. The members of three successive Bahá’í national councils were arrested and summarily executed. A similar fate befell numerous members of local governing assemblies.

- Another recurring feature of anti-Bahá’í campaigns has been the confiscation and destruction of Bahá’í property, including holy sites, cemeteries, personal property and community institutions. The House of the Báb, one of the Bahá’í community’s most sacred religious sites, was demolished by the Islamic Republic in 1979.

- Economic and social exclusion has been a consistent feature of the Islamic Republic’s treatment of the Bahá’í community. Bahá’ís have been purged from educational institutions and from both state and private businesses at the order of the central government.

- The recent election of President Ahmadinejad and resurgence of conservative political figures appears to have emboldened Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. In November 2005, Ayatollah Khamenei instructed military and law enforcement agencies to identify and monitor all Bahá’ís living within their areas of responsibility. Given the historic hostility of the conservative clerical establishment to the Bahá’í community, there is good reason to fear that this measure is laying the foundation for a new cycle of anti-Bahá’í persecution.
2. About the Bahá’ís

2.1. Origin and Early History

The Bahá’í faith originates from two separate but interrelated religious movements founded in 19th century Persia (modern-day Iran). The precursor to the Bahá’í faith, the Bábí faith, began in 1844 when Seyyed ‘Ali Muhammad proclaimed that he was “The Báb” [the Gate], the personification of the “Hidden Imam”, a Messiah-like figure whose return has been awaited by Shi’a Muslims since the ninth century. The Báb also foretold that his appearance signaled the advent of another prophet, “Him Whom God Shall Make Manifest”, whose teachings would establish unity, peace and order on earth.1

The Báb initially attracted many Iranian followers, but the embryonic faith soon met with opposition from the social elites of the time, in particular the Shi’a clergy.2 The Báb’s followers actively pressed their cause, in some cases even engaging in armed clashes with government forces.3 Thousands of Bábís were imprisoned, murdered, and tortured in public at the order of religious and political authorities.4 The Báb was imprisoned and eventually executed in 1850.5 Repression of the Bábí faith was often a coordinated effort of the clergy and the political authorities.6 The former opposed the new faith on religious grounds, while the latter believed that the Bábís were a threat to the security of the state. This latter belief was confirmed by an assassination attempt on Nasser al-Din Shah following the Báb’s execution.7 The failed attempt on the Shah’s life provoked a renewed assault on the Bábí community.8

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2 ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN, IRAN BETWEEN TWO REVOLUTIONS 17 (1982); MOMEN, THE BÁBÍ AND BAHÁ’Í RELIGIONS, supra note 1, at xxv.
6 See generally JUAN R.I. COLE, MODERNITY & THE MILLENNIUM 26-28 (1998); RESURRECTION AND RENEWAL, supra note 1, at 401-402. See also ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN, TORTURED CONFESSIONS: PRISONS AND PUBLIC RECANTATIONS IN MODERN IRAN 20-21 (1999) [hereinafter TORTURED CONFESSIONS] (noting that Bábí prisoners were “paraded in chains through Tehran, with much public torture of those accused, resulting in several thousand deaths,” and asserts that “the truly gruesome aspect of church-state entanglement was demonstrated in the joint efforts of officials and clergy to invent ever more ingenious ways of inflicting pain on those branded heretics.”)
8 See N.Y. TIMES article dated November 16, 1852, at 6, in Wagner, BÁBÍ ATTEMPT ON THE LIFE OF THE SHAH, supra note 7 (reporting that “upwards of 400 Bábís were put to death in Tehran, as accomplices in the recent attempt against the life of the Shah... The unhappy sufferers were all tortured in the most cruel manner.”). See also Janet Afary, Civil Liberties and the Making of Iran’s Constitution, in RETROSPECTIVES ON THE IRANIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, 1905-1909 (Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Duke University Press, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2005) at 41 [hereinafter Afary, Civil Liberties and the Making of Iran’s Constitution]; TORTURED CONFESSIONS, supra note 6, at 20-21 (noting that “[t]he ultimate in the spectacle of cruelty came in the Bábí executions of 1852... Some were blinded before being shot; others were stabbed repeatedly, then decapitated; yet others were beaten mercilessly before being strangled.”)

A decade after the execution of the Báb in 1863, Bahá’u’lláh, one of the followers of the Báb, announced that he was “Him Whom God Shall Make Manifest.” Bahá’u’lláh was imprisoned in the Siyáh-Chál in Tehran for four months in 1852 and thereafter spent much of his subsequent life in prison and then in exile, where he died in 1892, although his teachings continued to be widely disseminated.

One of the central tenets of the Bahá’í faith is the notion of “progressive revelation,” which is the belief that each of the world’s major religions represents an evolution in God’s message to mankind. These teachings, and the claim made by both the Báb and Bahá’u’lláh to be divine messengers, are the main reasons the Bahá’í faith is considered to be heretical by Muslims, who believe Mohammad to be the final prophet. The declaration of the Báb as the “Hidden Imam” is particularly offensive to Shi’ites. This has contributed to a widely-held perception of the Bahá’ís as “public enemies who must be controlled, punished or… forcibly deconverted.” In addition, the interpretation of Shi’a law practiced by the Islamic Republic asserts that conversion away from Islam into another faith—apostasy—is an offense punishable by death. This prohibition is also used to justify punishment of individuals who, under duress, agree to convert to Islam, but subsequently resume the practice of their own faith.

A significant doctrinal shift from the Bábí to the Bahá’í faith was the renouncement of violence, even in the face of persecution. Nonetheless, persecution of the Bahá’ís continued in the late 19th century. Influenced by the Shi’a clergy and fueled by nationalism, in the late 19th and early 20th century Iranians viewed the global message of the Bahá’í faith as an alien, even pro-western influence in Iran. There are presently five million Bahá’í faithful worldwide and an estimated 350,000 Bahá’ís still living inside Iran.

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9 MOMEN, THE BÁB AND BÁHÁ’Í RELIGIONS, supra note 1, at xxii.
10 See Bahá’í International Community, Historical Introduction to Bahá’u’lláh, available online at http://info.bahai.org/article-1-3-2-2.html (accessed November 9, 2006); see also Office of Public Information of the Bahá’í International Community, The BAHÁ’ÍS: A PROFILE OF THE BÁBÁ’Í FAITH AND ITS WORLDWIDE COMMUNITY 54-62 (1994). After Bábís continued to flock to Baghdad to see Bahá’u’lláh, Iran pressured the Ottoman government into removing him further from Iran. The region of Bahá’u’lláh’s exile is now part of Israel and this is seen as the cause of two of the major allegations against the Bahá’ís: first, that they are the same as Israelis and Zionists, and secondly, that their contributions to their World Center in Haifa support Zionist activities. LIFTING THE VEIL, supra note 4 at 223, notes that Bahá’u’lláh was exiled by Ottoman officials to Palestine some 80 years prior to the formation of Israel.

11 Bahá’ís believe that Abraham, Krishna, Zoroaster, Moses, Buddha, Jesus, and Muhammad were all divine messengers; see Bahá’í International Community, The Bahá’í Faith and Other Religions, available online at http://www.bahai.org/dir/other_religions (accessed November 13, 2006).

12 Shi’a doctrine emphasizes that Mohammad bin Mahdi, the Twelfth and last Imam of the Shi’a sect, also known as the “Hidden Imam”, will return at the time of the last judgment and will save the world.


14 Under Iranian jurisprudence (based on interpretations of Khomeini’s Risalih), two forms of apostasy (murtad) are recognized: murtad fitri (referring to a case where an apostate’s family is Muslim) and murtad milli (referring to a case where someone converts to Islam and then converts into another faith). Both types can be punishable by death. In cases of murtad milli, government officials may meet with the accused apostate and try to convince him or her to remain Muslim; if the apostate refuses, a judge will decide the appropriate punishment. See AYATOLLAH Ruhollah Khomeini, TAHIR AL-WASILAH (Beirut: Tawzi’ Dar al-Ta’aruf lil-Matbu’aat) 366, 494-495 (1984).

15 For an example of the legal treatment of individuals accused of apostasy, see Minutes of the Interrogation, Case of Dhabíhu’lláh Mahrámí, Islamic Revolutionary Court of the Province of Yazd (Branch no. 1), Court classification no. 74/2288/D, Appeal no. 74/2312/D-R (January 2, 1996) (on file with IHRDC).

16 ELIZ SANASARIAN, RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN IRAN 51 (2000) [hereinafter SANASARIAN].

17 SHAHROUGH AKHAVI, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY IRAN: CLERGY-STATE RELATIONS IN THE PAHLAVI PERIOD 77 (1980) [hereinafter AKHAVI].

18 See Bahá’í International Community, What is the Bahá’í Faith?, available online at http://www.bahai.org/faq/facts/bahai_faith (accessed November 28, 2006). The banning of Bahá’í administrative institutions has made it difficult to obtain an exact count of the number of Bahá’ís remaining in Iran. The above estimate of the current number of Bahá’ís in Iran was cited by Bahá’í International Community, Persecution, available online at http://www.bahai.org/dir/worldwide/persecution (accessed November 28, 2006).
2.2. Spiritual Assemblies

After the death of Bahá’u’lláh in 1892, his son Abdu’l-Baha strengthened the growing international Bahá’í movement by creating opportunities for Western Bahá’ís to travel and help build the community in Iran, while sending Iranian Bahá’ís to promote the movement in the West. Under his leadership, the Bahá’ís created formal educational institutions in rural areas of Iran and promoted equal rights and education for women. In accordance with Bahá’u’lláh’s teachings, Abdu’l-Baha established democratically elected councils – known as Spiritual Assemblies – as a focus for the Bahá’í community. Spiritual Assemblies have now been established around the globe; they are constituted by election wherever nine or more Bahá’ís reside, in order to provide religious, social and community services.

Internal administrative structures, including Local Spiritual Assemblies, Bahá’í centers, and the Nineteen-Day Feasts, were established for the exclusive use of the Bahá’í community. Other institutions, including schools, medical facilities, and homes for the aged and the orphaned, were established as development programs for the broader community, including non-Bahá’ís. Overseeing these Local Spiritual Assemblies are National Spiritual Assemblies, which are elected annually by local delegates to help the various localities communicate and further the development of Bahá’í principles. Some of the most intense persecution in Iran has been directed at members of these National Spiritual Assemblies (see Section 5.1. below).

The Bahá’í faith rejects the concept of an institutionalized priesthood and so the administrative duties traditionally performed by the clerical leadership in other religions fall to the Spiritual Assemblies. The Spiritual Assemblies oversee the internal affairs of the Bahá’ís, manage their funds and act as channels of communication among the local, national and international bodies. The Local Spiritual Assemblies also empower individuals, committees, and taskforces to conduct community services such as the education, publishing, promotion of Bahá’í teachings, marriage counseling, and fundraising. In essence, these Assemblies are seen as the leadership of the community.

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22 The basis for the functioning of each local Bahá’í community is the Nineteen-Day Feast. This event is held every nineteen days on the first day of each Bahá’í month, and all the Bahá’ís in that area are expected to attend it. The meeting is divided into three parts: (1) a devotional portion where prayers are shared; (2) an administrative portion where the affairs of the community are discussed; and (3) a social portion at which refreshments are served.
23 See, e.g., Amir Banani, The Modernization of Iran 1921-1941 96 (1961) [hereinafter Banani] (stating that a large number of children of influential families of Tehran were enrolled in Tehran’s Bahá’í schools, including Reza Shah’s eldest daughters and eldest son.)
24 See website of the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the United States at http://www.bahai.us/bahai-administration (accessed October 7, 2006).
25 The Islamic Republic considers these assemblies to be part of an espionage network. See, e.g., Musahibiyyih Mathu’atiyyih Hakim-i Shar’ va Dadsitan-i Ingilish-i Islamiyyih Tehran [The Press Conference of the Religious Magistrate and the Islamic Revolutionary Prosecutor of Tehran], Kayhan, 30/10/1360 (January 20, 1982) (on file with the IHRDC) (quoting Ayatollah Mohammad Gilani, the Head of the Central Revolutionary Courts, describing Bahá’ís as “spies—of imperialism, generally, and of Zionism, specifically” and stating that “it is incumbent upon the courts and religious magistrates to see to it that these people meet with their just punishment... In the case of those who were executed, their spying for Israel and its agents has been established and they met with their just punishment according to the orders of the Holy Koran...” He added that there was a group among the Bahá’í community, however, “that has weaknesses of intellect and the courts do them a favor and rehabilitate them... because they are ignorant and do not understand [the gravity of] the issue of spying.”)
26 See website of the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the United States at http://www.bahai.us/bahai-administration (accessed October 7, 2006). Members of these committees, viewed as roles of leadership by the IRI, often became a target of arrest and execution. Being a member of these committees became a crime (see Section 5.1 below).
Complementing these bodies is a second branch of administration, composed of appointed individuals. Bahá’í institutions appoint Bahá’ís of merit and distinction who advance the goals of the community and act as advisors in the community. They are referred to as Continental Boards of Counselors, Auxiliary Board Members and their assistants. While the Counselors work at the continental and country-wide level, Auxiliary Board Members and their assistants remain at the regional and local levels.  

Both branches of Bahá’í administration operate under an international governing body known as the Universal House of Justice. The members of the Universal House of Justice are elected to office every five years, and its headquarters is located in Haifa, Israel, near the city to which Bahá’u’lláh was once exiled and where his remains are buried. Because of its connection to Bahá’u’lláh, Israel is a place of pilgrimage for Bahá’ís.

3. The Roots of Modern Anti-Bahá’ísm

3.1. 20th Century Political Change

The Iranian constitution of 1906 set the groundwork for the institutionalized persecution of the Bahá’í faith and this hostility was further consolidated with the rise to power of the Pahlavi dynasty. Although the most important model for the 1906 Iranian constitution and 1907 supplementary legislation was Belgium’s 1831 constitution, its provisions guaranteeing freedom of worship were conspicuously omitted. While subsequent legislation gave some recognition to Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians as equal citizens before state law, it also “gave unprecedented institutional powers to the clerical establishment,” and did not guarantee freedom of religion.

In the nineteenth century, repression had impacted individual adherents of the Bahá’í faith, but in the first decades of the twentieth century these attacks were accompanied by centrally-directed campaigns that targeted the Bahá’í community in general terms and its institutions in particular. Prohibitions against the Bahá’ís ranged from the censorship of Bahá’í literature to the closure of Bahá’í schools in the 1930s and 1940s.

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29 The constitutional laws contained provisions that were later used to restrict the activities of the Bahá’í community. See, e.g., circular by the Minister of Interior dated 1957, Iqdam Kunid ta az Majami-i Bahá’í Khuddari Shavad [Please Stop the Bahá’ís from Congregating] (asserting that Bahá’ís meetings had been taking place in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution, which prohibited gatherings of all organizations which generated threats to religion or state and disturbed order) (on file with IHRDC); see E.G. BROWNE, THE PERSIAN REVOLUTION OF 1905-1909 (Abbas Amanat, ed., Mage Publishers, 1995) at 375 for full text of provision. SUMMARY OF PERSECUTION DURING THE PAHLAVI REGIME, supra note 4, describes a range of personal status restrictions, affecting marriage, inheritance rights, the ability to obtain identity cards, and the ability to carry out Bahá’í burials, among other rights. Similarly, one of the justifications given for closing the Bahá’í Tarbiyat schools in Tehran was that “the Iranian Government has not recognized the Bahá’í religion as it has other minority religions.” See National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the United States and Canada, THE BAHÁ’Í WORLD (Vol. VI, 1934-1936) at 26.
30 Civil Liberties and the Making of Iran’s Constitution, supra note 8, at 41, 46-48, 57.
31 Id. at 41, 57.
32 See SANASARIAN, supra note 16 at 52 (noting that similar measures were directed against the Armenian, Jewish and Zoroastrian minorities, but that the practice of non-recognition of Bahá’í marriages was specifically targeted at that community); BANANI, supra note 23, at 97; BAHÁ’Í INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, THE BAHÁ’ÍS IN IRAN: THE PERSECUTION OF A RELIGIOUS MINORITY 24 (1981). See also Namiyiyiik Kafîl-i Vizarat-i Ma’ârif iis Madir-i Dabiristan-i Tarbiyat [Letter Ordering Closure of Tarbiyat Boys’ School] dated 1934 (on file with IHRDC). Two of the two largest schools closed were the Tarbiyat boys’ and girls’ schools in Tehran, with an estimated 1500 pupils combined; see National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the United States and Canada, THE BAHÁ’Í WORLD (Vol. VI, 1934-1936) at 27, 96 (listing Bahá’í schools closed throughout the country.)
The most intense wave of repression took place in the 1950s, during the reign of the second Pahlavi monarch, Muhammad Reza Shah. Politically weak and faced with growing nationalism and acute economic difficulties, the Shah conceded control over certain religious affairs to the clergy. This power-sharing resulted, inter alia, in a campaign of persecution against the Bahá’ís which, some scholars believe was most likely intended by the government to distract the citizenry from the country’s other problems. Approved by the highest civil, military and religious leadership in the country, the campaign began in 1955 with national and army radio stations, official newspapers and other publications spreading anti-Bahá’í propaganda intended to incite public passions against the Bahá’ís.

3.2. The Ramadan Riots of 1955

One of the most high-profile anti-Bahá’í propagandists, whose commentaries were widely circulated by the Iranian media in the mid-1950s, was a populist preacher named Sheikh Mohammad Taqi Falsafi, an ally of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Falsafi enjoyed the support and encouragement of prominent religious figures. This is documented in a letter of encouragement from Ayatollah Seyyed Hussein Davani, ed., The Center for Islamic Revolution Documents, 2003) [hereinafter FALSAFI MEMOIRS]. In 1951 Falsafi approached Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh on behalf of Ayatollah Borujerdi in order to discuss the Bahá’ís and their activities, but was rebuffed by Mossadegh who rejected the idea that his attacks throughout Iran.

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33 See AKHAVI, supra note 17, at 77.
34 MARTIN, THE PERSECUTION OF THE BAHÁ’ÍS IN IRAN, supra note 1, at 21 (citing discussion in AKHAVI, supra note 17, at 76-90).
35 AKHAVI, supra note 17, at 77.
36 For discussion of the complex political dynamics underlying the government’s response to these developments, see id. at 76-78.
37 Collection of newspaper articles from 1955, on file with IHRDC. See, e.g., Tiligirafhay-i Vaisilih Darhaviyih Ibraz-i Tanaffur az Bahá’íha [Readers’ Letters Expressing Hatred of Bahá’ís], DAD, Issue No. 3221, 22/2/1334 (May 13, 1955); Takhib-i Hazirat-i-Quds Kafi Nist, Kanunhayih Fisad-i Idarat Ra Viran Sazid [Destruction of the Bahá’í Center was Not Enough; Destroy the Centers of Corruption in the Government Offices], SITARIH-YIH ISLAM, 13/3/1334 (June 4, 1955); Dar Mah Hayih Muharram va Safar Bahá’íyan Ghasel-i Ikhlati Darand [In the Month of Moharram and Safar, Bahá’ís are Planning to Cause Trouble], SITARIH-YIH ISLAM, Issue No. 180, 21/5/1334 (August 13, 1955). There are also many newspaper publications that propagated anti-Bahá’í sentiments on a regular basis, including: Iqdam, Ashuftih, Kayhan, Khandaninha, Luti, Sittahi-yih Islam, DAD, and Tehran-i Musavvar. With regard to Sheikh Falsafi’s radio broadcasts (see below), see IRAN’S SECRET POGROM, supra note 19, at 41 and MARTIN, THE PERSECUTION OF THE BAHÁ’ÍS IN IRAN, supra note 1, at 22 (stating that “[t]he government signaled its approval by putting both the national and army radio stations at [Falsafi’s] service, thus disseminating his attacks throughout Iran.”)
38 See MARTIN, THE PERSECUTION OF THE BAHÁ’ÍS IN IRAN, supra note 1, at 22; see also AMIR TAHERI, THE SPIRIT OF ALLAH: KHOMEINI AND THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 115 (Adler & Adler 1986) [hereinafter THE SPIRIT OF ALLAH]. IRAN’S SECRET POGROM, supra note 19 at 41, states that “Falsafi, [who] at his Tehran mosque, preached sermons against the ‘false religion’ daily… was able to disseminate his views more widely over the radio in an hourly space he had at his command.” See also BAQER MOIN, LIFE OF THE AYATOLLAH 66 (1999) [hereinafter LIFE OF THE AYATOLLAH] (asserting that the Shah “not only tolerated the activities of [Hojjatieh founder] Sheikh Mahmud Halabi and his fellow anti-Bahá’i clergymen, but allowed the clergy’s fight against the Bahá’ís to be aired from the government-controlled media. In an unprecedented move in 1955, Tehran Radio broadcast a series of anti-Bahá’í sermons by Mohammad Taqi Falsafi, Iran’s leading preacher.”) The abstract to Falsafi’s published memoirs acknowledges openly that Falsafi “played an important role in combat with bahaiyyat [Bahá’í]”, see Khatirat va Marhmat-i Hojatolislam Mohammad Taqi Falsafi [THE MEMORIES AND CAMPAIGNS OF HOJATOL-ISLAM MOHAMMAD TAQI FALSAFI] (Ali Davani, ed., The Center for Islamic Revolution Documents, 2003) [hereinafter FALSAFI MEMOIRS].
39 See, e.g., Didari Az Ayatollah Borujerdi az Abbas Furutan [Report by Abbas Furutan on his visit with authorities in Qom], Ashuftih, No. 19, 7-10, 22/2/1334 (May 13, 1955) (referring to Falsafi as a representative of Ayatollah Borujerdi in Tehran and in the Shah’s court, and stating that Sheikh Ahmad Khademi, Seyyed Mustafa Khansari, and Taleqani met with Furutan and discussed their support for Falsafi and his actions.)
40 See AKHAVI, supra note 17, at 77-78; see also Nami-yih Hazrat-i Ayatollah ul’uzma Borujerdi [Letter from Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi: the letter was recited by Hojjatieh Falsafi during sermon at Sultani Mosque], PUST-I TEHRAN, No. 581, 18/2/1334 (May 9, 1955) (on file with IHRDC). Falsafi’s memoirs state that his anti-Bahá’í sermons in 1955 “were done with the previous agreement of Ayatollah Borujerdi and had his complete support.” FALSAFI MEMOIRS, supra note 38, at 202, n.1.
the Bahá’ís were any different than Muslim Iranians. However, after the 1953 coup, Falsafi approached the pro-monarchist government to once again press for action against the Bahá’ís.

In his memoirs, Falsafi described a conversation with Ayatollah Borujerdi shortly before the beginning of Ramadan 1955 in which they discussed possible strategies for pressuring the government to act on the Bahá’ís:

My religious duty compelled me to not be indifferent about this sect and in spite of their connections to the governing body, to propagate against them in my sermons… In the year 1334 [1955], before the beginning of the holy month of Ramadan, I said to [Borujerdi]: “Do you agree with me following up on the Bahá’í issue in my sermons at Masjed-eh Shah, which are broadcast live on the radio?” He thought about it briefly and said: “It would be good if you do this. Now that the authorities are not listening [to our complaints], at least the Bahá’ís will be disparaged in public opinion.”

Borujerdi suggested that Falsafi inform the Shah of his plans beforehand, to ensure that these speeches would not be too provocative for the authorities and prompt a crackdown on religious activism. Such a restriction would, he noted, be a burden on Muslims and make the Bahá’ís “even more bold.” Falsafi thus made an appointment with the Shah’s office, where he received permission. Falsafi then encouraged other members of the Shi’a clergy who were giving sermons during Ramadan to discuss the Bahá’í issue in their sermons as well, which they did. Falsafi went further than most, repeatedly castigating the Bahá’ís in his Ramadan broadcasts.

By the tenth day of Ramadan Minister of Interior Amir Asadollah Alam was sufficiently alarmed by the violence that he contacted Falsafi to voice his concerns that Falsafi’s sermons were disrupting the security of the nation. Alam wrote in his memoir:

Falsafi managed to fool both the Shah and the military authorities and start a campaign against the Bahá’ís that dragged the country to the edge of disaster. It was Ramadan. [Falsafi’s] noon sermons were broadcast throughout the nation via radio and caused violence and terror in many locations. People killed a few Bahá’ís here and there. Falsafi justified these acts by saying that they increased the Shah’s prestige. I had no choice but to order him, in my own rash way, to refrain from giving further speeches until order was reestablished.

Falsafi was not so easily deterred and as a result, a week or so later, the Shah sent the Head of the Police Force, General Alavi Moghaddam, and Brigadier General Teymur Bakhtiar to order Falsafi to stop referring to the Bahá’ís in his sermons as it was creating a security concern. Falsafi bluntly refused to comply with the order:

It is not possible… If you want to discontinue the radio broadcasts, do it. Arrest me if you want to. Otherwise, I must continue my speeches until the end of Ramadan… If I don’t say anything… I’ll dishonor Islam and Marjas [higher-ranking clergy] and I’ll never do that.

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41 Id. at 138-139, and 200 (complaining that Mossadegh “didn’t see Bahá’ís as a threat and generally considered them part of the nation of Iran, [entitled to] the same rights as the Muslims.”)
42 Id. at 200.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. Falsafi relates that he stated to the Shah: “Ayatollah Borujerdi has agreed that the issue of the Bahá’ís’ influence, which has been worrying Muslims, will be discussed in the Ramadan sermons broadcast on the radio. Does His Royal Highness agree?” The Shah reportedly replied, after a pause, “Go and tell.” Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 201-202.
49 Id. at 205-207.
Falsafi continued his sermons until the end of Ramadan and avoided arrest, but he was never again admitted into the Shah’s presence and was henceforth banned from preaching the Friday sermon at the Masjed-eh Shah, at the time one of the country’s most influential religious platforms.50

The Ramadan sermons inspired mob violence directed against the Bahá’í community.51 In the third week of Ramadan the Military Governor of Tehran, Teymur Bakhtiar, ordered his forces to occupy the National Bahá’í Center (Hazíratu’l-Quds) in Tehran, an important religious site.52 Ayatollah Seyed Mohammad Musavi Behbehani53 sent congratulatory messages to the Shah, Borujerdi and Falsafi marking the event.54 On May 22, 1955, a delegation headed by senior army officials, Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Nâdir Batmanghlich and the Military Governor, Brigadier General Teymur Bakhtiar, led the demolition of building’s dome.55 The Muslim Spiritual Community of Qom subsequently issued a statement applauding the destruction of this “house of corruption” and stated that this act had attracted “special attention from the [Mahdi] and had certainly met with the agreement of His Excellency [the Shah].”56

The well-publicized drama surrounding the seizure of the National Bahá’í Center provoked further anti-Bahá’í attacks outside Tehran. On July 28, 1955, in the village of Hurmuzdak in Yazd, seven Bahá’ís,

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50 Id. at 209. The Masjed-eh Shah is a mosque located in Tehran.
51 Falsafi states that “[t]he speeches against the Bahá’ís in Masjed-eh Shah and their broadcast from the radio caused a strange stir in the country and people who had suffered at the hands of this wayward sect were excited. Everywhere one would go, there was talk of the necessity of suppressing the Bahá’ís who were connected to Zionism and America.” Id at 201.
52 See Subh-i Imruz Qva-yih Intizami “Hazíratu’l-Quds” Markaz-i Tablïqat-i Bahá’íyan Ra Isghhal Kard [This Morning the Armed Forces Occupied “Hazíratu’l-Quds”, Bahá’ís’ Propaganda Center], KAYHAN, No. 3571, 16/2/1334 (May 7, 1955); Markaz-i Bahá’íyan Chigunih Viran Shud [How Was the Bahá’í Center Destroyed], TULU’, 4/3/1334 (May 26, 1955). This was the national Bahá’í center where a large collection of documents and records were kept.
53 Ayatollah Behbehani, along with Borujerdi, headed the dominant faction among the Iranian clergy during the 1940s and 1950s. See AKHAVI, supra note 17, at xvii.
54 See Tiligiaf-i Ayatollah Behbehani bih Pishgah-i Alahzarat-i Humayumi va Hazrat-i Ayatollah ul’Uzma Borujerdi, [Telegram from Ayatollah Behbehani to Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi and His Eminence the Shah], text reproduced in SHURA, No. 52, 19/2/1334 (May 10, 1955); Payam-hayih Muhimmi Kih Bayn-ih Ayatollah Borujerdi va Maghamat-i Mu’assir Rad va Badal Shudih Ast [Important Messages Exchanged Between Ayatollah Borujerdi and Important Officials]. KHANDANIHA, No. 690, 111-112; see also AKHAVI, supra note 17, at 77 (noting that Ayatollah Behbehani suggested that henceforth the day of this attack be observed as a religious holiday.)
55 Id. at 87. See also, e.g., Subh-i Imruz Kharab Kardan-i Hazíratu’l-Quds Agaz Shud; Timsar Sarlashkar Batmanghlich Avalin Kuling Ra Bih Zamin Zad [The Demolition of Hazíratu’l-Quds Started This Morning; General Batmanghlich Was The First to Strike With a Pickaxe], ETTELA’AT, 31/2/1334 (May 22, 1955) (stating that Batmanghlich brought the first blow to the building, Bakhtiar was present and assisted, and Falsafi was also present). Bakhtiar was supported by the Muslim clergy; see, e.g., Mulaqat-i Timsar Bakhtiyar ba Ayatollah Borujerdi [The Meeting of General Bakhtiar with Ayatollah Borujerdi], ITTIHAD-I MILLAL, 29/5/1334 (August 21, 1955) (reporting that Borujerdi thanked Bakhtiar for his work during the month of Ramadan.)
56 Nami-yih Jami‘iyih Rawhaniyun-i Qom [Statement from [Muslim] Clerical Community of Qom], SITARIH-YIH ISLAM, 27/3/1334 (June 18, 1955). Such language was presumably intended to emphasize that the attack on the center was approved of by both religious and secular authorities. In 1957, several years after it was occupied by the military, an order was issued for the return of the National Bahá’í Center in Tehran to the Bahá’í community. See National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’í of the United States and Canada, THE BAHÁ’Í WORLD (Vol. XIII, 1954-1963) at 295 [hereinafter BAHÁ’Í WORLD XIII].
ranging in age from nineteen to eighty years old, were killed by a large mob who hacked them to pieces with spades and axes. In Shiraz, parts of the House of the Báb, one of the Bahá’í faith’s most sacred sites, were damaged. Raids and attacks on the Bahá’ís in nearby villages resulted in 800 apparently coerced recantations by members of the Bahá’í faithful which were signed and submitted to the local Islamic authorities. In Rasht, Ahvaz, Shiraz, Isfahan, Karaj, Mahfuruzak, Abadeh, Reza’iyeh, Takur and Hisar, public and private Bahá’í properties were raided and destroyed, and homes, businesses and Bahá’í centers were looted and burnt. The Bahá’í community responded to these events by appealing to various international bodies, including the newly-formed United Nations.

Even those merely sympathetic to the plight of the Bahá’ís could find themselves the target of religious extremists. When the Governor of Fars Province, Brigadier-General Himmat, attempted to take action against the instigators of a local anti-Bahá’í uprising, he was accused of being a Bahá’í himself and was dismissed from his post.

3.3. Tackling “the Bahá’í Problem”

As anti-Bahá’í violence flared in cities across the country, Iranian politicians conducted equally incendiary debates about “the Bahá’í problem” in the Iranian Parliament or Majlis. On May 10, 1955, Seyyed Ahmad Safa’i, the Qazvin deputy, with the support of Borujerdi and Falsafi, introduced a bill in the Iranian Majlis which proposed a four-part solution to the problem:

**Article 1** - The corrupt community of the Bábís and their adherents, the Azalis and the Bahá’ís, are opposed to the security of the country and are declared illegal.

**Article 2** - Henceforth, membership in this community, and any pretense and adherence to it in any way, constitute a misdemeanor and the perpetrator will be sentenced to solitary confinement from 2 to 10 years and be deprived of all civil rights.

**Article 3** - The properties [in form of estate, land or house] that are places of congregation and organizations related to this community or revenue spent on issues related to this community will be transferred to the Ministry of Culture to be used for the purpose of establishing educational organizations and spreading religious and godly principles.

**Article 4** - People adhering to this community who are serving in government offices and related organizations, will from this day be fired from civil service and in no way will be subject to the employment law [cannot be hired].

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58 Jaryan-i Kamil-i Hadisiyyih Shiraz va Abadeh va Ardestan [Complete Coverage of the Incidents of Shiraz and Abadeh and Ardestan], SITARIH-YIH ISLAM, No. 175, 10/4/1334 (July 2, 1955).

59 See NAMES AND NUMBERS, supra note 57, at 196-197.


61 See Ustandar-i Fars Taq’ir Mikunad [Governor of Fars Will Change], SITAR-RIYIH ISLAM, No. 177, 24/4/1334 (July 16, 1955) and Jaryan-i Kamil-i Hadisih-yih Shiraz va Abadeh va Ardestan [Complete Coverage of the Incidents of Shiraz and Abadeh and Ardestan], SITAR-RIYIH ISLAM, No. 175, 10/4/1334 (July 2, 1955).

62 AKHAVI, supra note 17, at 78-80; FALSAFI MEMOIRS, supra note 38, at 207.

63 See generally AKHAVI, supra note 17, at 78-80 for a description of the debates surrounding this legislation; for text of bill, see FALSAFI MEMOIRS, supra note 38, at 207, citing to KAYHAN, no. 3575, 20/2/1334 (May 11, 1955). Safa’i, who had introduced the bill at the request of Borujerdi, subsequently continued to urge the implementation of point # 4, the purging of Bahá’ís from government positions (AKHAVI, supra note 17, at 80-83). See also Bakhshnamiyyih Vazir-i Kishvar Raji’ Bih Firgiiyyih Bahá’i [Circular from Minister of Interior about the Bahá’í sect], published in ETELA’AT, no. 8677 on 26/2/1334 (May 17, 1955) (warning that centers and societies that are anti-religion would be dissolved, but that attempts to disrupt order on the pretext of
Safa’i’s bill failed to garner sufficient support to pass into law, due in part to the government’s anxieties over the potential international repercussions and concern about the legality of such measures.

On May 17 Minister of Interior Alam presented the Majlis with a draft decree the government proposed to circulate to provincial and city governors in accordance with the government’s decision to put down all anti-religious manifestations and demonstrations. Some deputies complained that the decree did not explicitly identify the Bahá’ís as agitators, making it difficult for the local authorities to know exactly where their duty lay, and they pressed Alam to implement the policies suggested in Safa’i’s bill. Alam responded that the government was prepared to act but only within the constraints of the law.64

Majlis Deputy Dr. Shahkar proposed a compromise that he felt would obviate the government’s concern for legal proprieties.65 Dr. Shahkar suggested that Alam’s decree be amended to include the following formulation:

The formation of sects which, under the guise of religion, spread disorder, and which have adopted the name of Bahá’ism in order to implement political objectives is proscribed, inasmuch as their existence is illegal and the cause of the dissolution of order and security; and since they contradict the true religion of Islam.66

Although this language was not retained in the final version of the decree, which simply restated the position of Ja’fari Shi’ism as the official state religion, this formula for dismissing Bahá’ism as a political movement rather than a faith was one to which the IRI authorities would later return.

The decree ultimately issued by Minister of Interior Alam empowered local authorities to “take measures to dissolve those social centers which are causing religious and secular sedition and are the source of the attack against security and order.” 67 However, in a firm rebuff to the clergy and their supporters in the Majlis, Alam’s decree also underlined that taking such measures was the sole responsibility of government officials and instructed local governors “to take measures” against anyone provoking unrest “under the guise… of struggling against deceiving sects.”68

Throughout the 1950s the clergy consistently spearheaded the repression of the Bahá’í community. Their efforts, however, were ultimately checked by government ministers, who, although sympathetic to the popular anti-Bahá’í sentiment, feared that anti-Bahá’í violence would spin out of control and attract
international criticism. Once clerical rule was established through the Islamic Revolution, the clergy was free to revisit the objectives it had failed to attain in the 1950s without interference. As will be seen below, most of Safa’i’s proposals were ultimately implemented by the new Islamic Republic, although they were now couched in the language suggested by Dr. Shahkar.

As Hojjatolislam Falsafi observed in his memoirs:

Although the sermons of Ramadan 1334 [1955] dealt a blow against the Bahá’ís, what really destroyed Bahá’ísm was the Islamic Revolution…

3.4. The Rise of the Hojjatiyeh

The 1950s also saw the rise of private religious societies like the Hojjatiyeh. The Hojjatiyeh, or Anjuman-i Khayrriyyeh-yi Hujjatieh-yi Mahdaviyyat (Charitable Society of the Mahdi), was a fundamentalist Islamic organization, founded by a clerical student named Sheik Mahmoud Zikrzadih Tavalla’i, also known as Halabi. Sometimes termed the “anti-Bahá’í society,” the principal aim of the Hojjatiyeh society was to combat the Bahá’í faith and it devoted much of its energies to training cadres in the “scientific defense” of Shi’a Islam in the face of the Bahá’í theological challenge. The organization attracted the support of such key religious leaders as Ayatollah Borujerdi, Hojatolislam Falsafi, Ayatollah Mara’shi Najafi, Ayatollah Milani, Seyyed Abdullah Shirazi, and Ayatollah Baha’eddin Mahallati. Other alleged members of Hojjatiyeh who obtained powerful positions after the 1979 revolution were Supreme Leader Seyyed Ali Khamenei, Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati and the Minister of Education and President Mohammad Ali Raja’i.

In 1970 several members of Hojjatiyeh sent a letter to the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini seeking his opinion about the group’s activities. The letter opened by recapitulating the organization’s recent achievements:

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69 See Akhavi, supra note 17, at 79 (noting that “[t]he regime faced the dilemma of requiring clergy support for its internal and foreign policies but not wishing to lose control over events and be castigated by international opinion for its complicity in the anti-Bahá’í campaign.”) According to Akhavi, a distinctive feature of the anti-Bahá’í actions in the 1950s was that “[t]he clergy was consistently leading the way [in anti-Bahá’í actions], and the government was holding back.” However, he notes, while “[t]he ulama manifestly created the issue”, “[t]he regime, presented with it, tried to take advantage of it for its own purposes,” although it made efforts to minimize its participation. Id. He adds that “[e]ven if they had not won all the points in 1955, the religious leaders obviously had managed to rivet the government’s attention to their demands in general and gain its respect in the public policy arena.” Id. at 79-80.


71 See Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran 157 (1988) [hereinafter The Turban for the Crown]; Michael Rubin, Into the Shadows: Radical Vigilantes in Khatami’s Iran 13 (2001) [hereinafter Rubin]. The organization’s name refers to Hojjat, a title of the Hidden Imam Mahdi, awaited by Shi’a Muslims, as a sign of opposition to the Bahá’ís who believe the Báb was the Hidden Imam. Hojjatiyeh is said to be affiliated and at times considered synonymous with the Anjuman-i Tablighat-i Islami (Islamic Propaganda Society); see Rubin, at 14.


73 In Farsi, Anjuman-i Zidd-i Baha’iyat; see Rubin, supra note 71, at 13.

74 Sanasarian, supra note 16, at 120. See also Michael Fischer and Mehdi Abedi, Debating Muslims: Cultural Dialogues in Post-Modernity and Tradition 49 (1990).


78 Mansour Farhang, Farhang Replies, The Nation, February 27, 1982 at 226; Sanasarian, supra note 16, at 120.
It has been a few years since several religious and pious people led by Haji Aqa Sheikh Mahmud Halabi for the purpose of systematically combating the fabricated sect of Bahá’ísm, have formed structured classes where they teach useful material and introduce people to the high position of His Holiness, the Guardian of the Age [the Twelfth Imam]. The areas of activity of these classes have stretched beyond Tehran, Isfahan, Mashhad, and Shiraz... and now are even working in the remote villages... and have so far been able to convert around five hundred of the followers of the wayward sect of Bahá’ísm back to the straight path of Oneness (tawhid) [Islam].

The authors then asked Ayatollah Khomeini:

First, what is Your Eminence’s exalted opinion about this group and their acts? Second, what are the rules for collaborating with them and strengthening them - how should one go about it? Third, can legal Islamic tax money be given to this cause if necessary? It is humbly requested that you give your exalted opinion clearly.

Khomeini responded:

The actions of these gentlemen will be appreciated and please God and also collaboration with them will please the heart of the Guardian of The Age. Furthermore, Muslims are allowed to give them [Hojjatiyeh] money from the... [Islamic legal taxes]. If necessary, it is allowable for one third of the Imam’s share to be given to them. Of course under supervision of trusted parties, [so] if Mr. Halabi is able, the money should be placed under his supervision.79

Hojjatiyeh members were able to infiltrate Bahá’í groups throughout the country in the years leading up to the Islamic Revolution; Iranian scholar Eliz Sanasarian notes that “the sweeping tide of Bahá’í arrests, imprisonment and executions after the revolution is often attributed to Hojjatiyeh infiltrators’ access to Bahá’í registration books and confidential correspondence.”80

At various points during the Pahlavi era, anti-Bahá’í organizations appear to have cooperated with the government’s intelligence agency, SAVAK.81 Halabi reportedly requested SAVAK to gather information on the religious affiliation of every citizen through their enforcement of the Civil Service Code, requiring every employee and applicant to identify their religious affiliation.82

By the late 1970s, Hojjatiyeh grew to include more than 12,000 members,83 and its mission expanded to include the repression of other minorities, such as Christians.84 Many individuals trained by the

79 SAHIFFIH III (COLLECTION OF KHOMEINI’S WRITINGS) (Vol. 2, October 7, 1970) at 299-300. However, Khomeini later changed his mind about Hojjatiyeh and wrote a letter expressing his disapproval of Hojjatiyeh, on the basis that it removed the focus from his agenda, establishment of an Islamic Republic. Id. at 357.
80 SANASARIAN, supra note 16, at 120.
81 See BAHÁ’Í INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, THE BAHÁ’ÍS OF IRAN: A REPORT ON THE PERSECUTION OF A RELIGIOUS MINORITY 83 (1982) [hereinafter BIC REPORT ON THE PERSECUTION OF A RELIGIOUS MINORITY] for a copy of a letter sent by a secret service official to the director of SAVAK regarding Anjuman-i Tablighat-i Islami [the Islamic Propaganda Organization], dated November 1972 (stating that the head of the organization “has requested necessary assistance from SAVAK to attack the Bahá’ís in a reasonable [logical] way”, and emphasizing the need to “make them understand that their actions must not be of a provocative and disruptive nature.” See also letter sent by Parviz Sabeti to Minister of Court, Darbariyih Ta’sis-i Markaz-i Barqiyih Maslak-i Zaliyyih Bahá’i [Regarding establishing a center for the wayward sect of Bahá’í], reproduced in MARTIN, THE PERSECUTION OF THE BAHÁ’ÍS OF IRAN, supra note 1, at 35 (agreeing that the Anjuman-i Tablighat-i Islami should be allowed to carry out their anti-Bahá’í activities “so long as they do not create public disorder.”) SANASARIAN, supra note 16 at 120, notes that SAVAK also possessed information on the Bahá’ís that fell into the regime’s hands); see also Kazemzadeh, supra note 76 (stating that Hojjatiyeh and SAVAK worked together.)
82 See MARTIN, THE PERSECUTION OF THE BAHÁ’ÍS OF IRAN, supra note 1, at 26 (describing a “series of discriminatory regulations against Bahá’ís adopted by the government and enforced by SAVAK: a new Civil Service Code required applicants for government jobs to state their religion, and attendant regulations made it clear that candidates could be accepted only if they professed one of the recognized faiths.”)
Hojjatiyeh eventually held powerful positions in the Islamic Republic during the early years of the Revolution, particularly in the judiciary system and Ministry of Education and Training.85

After the Islamic Revolution, IRI leaders began to voice doubts about a future role for the group. In a sermon in 1981, the Friday prayer leader of Qom, Hojatolislam Jannati issued a series of critical questions to the “anti-Bahá’í groups”, commenting:

Previously you were working in connection with the anti-Bahá’í movement and were saying they [the Bahá’ís] are a danger to Islam, and we too were saying we know they are a danger. You were saying that they are connected to Israel, and we knew that, too. Every thing you said, we agreed with. Then we said that their roots must be destroyed. But you were only cutting off their leaves and branches… Very well, today there is no place for [the Bahá’ís] in the Islamic Republic. The atmosphere of the Islamic Republic would not even allow Bahá’ís and any anti-Islamic group to breathe. What is your mission now in this establishment [the Islamic Republic]. Your previous goal is long established, what is, then, your present goal?86

The group was soon disbanded by the authorities and it faded from the political scene, at least overtly, though it continued to have influence among conservative elements.87 However, since the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad there have been reports suggesting the possible reemergence of Hojjatiyeh, as well as what is alleged to be a more violent offshoot calling itself Mahdaviyyat (belief in the messianic tradition of Mahdi, the hidden Imam and general messianism).88

85 See Hojjatiyeh entry, ENCYCLOPEDIA IRANICA 427, available at http://www.Bahi.org/persecution/iran/iranica2 (accessed June 28, 2006) (stating that “between the early 1950s and 1970s a great number of the future elite of the Islamic revolution were trained… in pedagogic and practical venues provided by Hojjatiyeh.”)
87 See Rubin, supra note 71, at 25-31.
Ayatollah Khomeini: Anti-Bahá’í activities in the 1950s and 1960s

When Ayatollah Borujerdi was being considered for the role of Marja'-e-Taqlid, Khomeini strongly supported him and played an important role in persuading him to come to the Islamic religious center of Qom. Khomeini later used this relationship to try to recruit Borujerdi’s support during the anti-Bahá’í campaign of 1955, but did not obtain as much success as he would have wished. One biographer quotes Khomeini expressing his frustration as follows:

I went every day to encourage his Holiness’s [Borujerdi’s] anti-Bahá’í activity in order to rid the administration of Bahá’ís, but by the following day he had gone cold on the issue.

After Borujerdi died in 1961, Khomeini was accepted as Marja'-e-Taqlid by a large number of Iranian Shi’as. In October of 1962, the government promulgated new laws governing elections to local and provincial councils which removed the previous requirement that those elected be sworn into office on the Koran and abolished the requirement that candidates be Muslim and male. Khomeini’s response was swift:

Seeing in this a plan to permit the infiltration of public life by the Bahá’ís, Imam Khomeini telegraphed both the Shah and the prime minister of the day, warning them to desist from violating both the law of Islam and the Iranian Constitution... failing which the “Ulama” would engage in a sustained campaign of protest.

When the government went ahead with its plans despite his intervention, Khomeini took a prominent role in the protest campaign, and joined by religious leaders elsewhere in the country, was able to force the repeal of the laws in November, just seven weeks after they had been promulgated. This achievement “marked his emergence on the scene as the principal voice of opposition to the Shah.”

From the post-1955 period through the revolutionary years, Khomeini continued to speak against foreign powers, the Jews, and the Bahá’ís:

Remind the people of the danger posed by Israel and its agents. Recall and explain the catastrophes inflicted upon Islam by the Jews and the Bahá’ís.

As Khomeini moved to further strengthen his position as the leader of the revolutionary movement, he built alliances with figures who were members of anti-Bahá’í organizations or appear to have had vehemently anti-Bahá’í viewpoints. Many of these men held powerful positions after the 1979 Revolution, notably President Seyyedd Ali Khamenei, Foreign Minister Ali-Akbar Velayati and the Minister of Education and President Mohammad-Ali Raja'i.

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90 Id. at 6 (Section 3: The Years of Spiritual and Intellectual Formation in Qom (1923-1962). However, Moin in Life of the Ayatollah, supra note 38, at 67, asserts that “Halabi [Hojjatiyeh founder] and others finally obtained a fatwa from the leading clerics, including Borujerdi, banning transactions with Bahá’ís.”
91 Id.
92 Algar Biography, supra note 89, at 6 (Section 4: The Years of Struggle and Exile, 1962-1978).
93 Id.
95 Algar Biography, supra note 89, at 6 (Section 4: The Years of Struggle and Exile, 1962-1978).
96 Id.; see also Islam and Revolution I, supra note 94, at 16 and 161-2, n. 151 (citing S.H.R, Barrasi va Tahlili [Study and Analysis] 142-187).
4. The Iranian Revolution and the Bahá’ís

4.1. 1977: General Unrest and Mob Attacks

In the 1960s and 1970s the Shah's authority was challenged by a growing number of factions in Iranian society, including religious conservatives led by Ayatollah Khomeini. Despite being forced into exile in 1964, Khomeini continued to campaign for an end to the Shah’s absolute monarchy. Khomeini also railed against what was termed the “Westoxication” of Iranian society, accusing Iranians cooperating with Western business interests of conspiring to rob Iran of its resources and its culture, and denying the religious authorities their historical responsibility to guide government and society. By 1977, Khomeini’s message, recorded on audio cassettes, was being distributed across the country. While many of Khomeini’s speeches focused on the need to topple the monarchy, his message of anti-Bahá’í propaganda continued, as in this example from 1971:

“[T]here are centers of evil propaganda run by the churches, the Zionists, and the Bahá’ís in order to lead our people astray and make them abandon the ordinances and teachings of Islam.”

As Khomeini’s lectures gathered more popularity, the Shah’s regime increasingly lost legitimacy and one consistent criticism was that his pro-western policies were detrimental to Iran. The crisis of “Westoxication” began to dominate the national debate. Khomeini’s supporters actively began to agitate against any individual or group seen as promoting Western values, including the Bahá’ís, who had long been viewed as agents of Western powers.

97 ALGAR BIOGRAPHY, supra note 89, at 6 (Section 4: The Years of Struggle and Exile, 1962-1978). Khomeini spoke proudly of this accomplishment, noting that: “those who are destroying the welfare of Islam and trampling on the rights of the weak- it is they whom we must force to desist from evil… If a collective protest were made… they certainly would desist. … When the ulama of Qom met and banded together on one occasion, and the provinces supported them by sending delegations and delivering speeches to show their solidarity, the regime retreated and canceled the measure we were objecting to.” ISLAM AND REVOLUTION I, supra note 94, at 118.

98 See, e.g., THE SPIRIT OF ALLAH, supra note 38, at 132, citing to Gazidiyyih Payam-hayih Imam Khomeini [Selection of Imam Khomeini’s Messages] 81 (Tehran 1970). In another speech Khomeini stated clearly that “the Bahá’ís are not a religion but a secretive organization plotting to subvert the Islamic Republic”; see ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN, KHOMEINISM 124 (1993). See also Khitatrati-i Sheikh Mustafa Rahnama [Memoirs of Sheikh Mustafa Rahnama (Descendant of Fadaiyan Islam Members) Were Published], available at http://www.mehrnews.com/fa/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=277838 (accessed October 2006) (alleging that Bahá’ís collaborated with SAVAK in attacking demonstrators on several occasions, including in Qom in March 1963.) Accusations of this type aimed at generating popular anger against Bahá’ís are presumably the reason why, when Khomeini was arrested in 1963, angry protesters responded by desecrating the Bahá’í cemetery in Tehran (see photographs of 1963 attacks on cemetery, on file with IHRC.)

99 Mansour Farhang, Farhang Replies, THE NATION, February 27, 1982 at 226; SANASARIAN, supra note 16, at 120; see also Rubin, supra note 71, at 25.

100 “Westoxication” (Gharbzadegi) is a notion popularized in the 1960s by Jalal Al-e-Ahmad. He used the phrase to refer to what was perceived as an illness that affected Iranian culture as it diminished and gave way to an identity born out of Western values and dependencies. See JALAL AL-E AHMAD, Gharbzadegi (1962).


102 THE IRANIANS, supra note 101, at 276-77.

103 ISLAM AND REVOLUTION I, supra note 94, at 128.

104 THE IRANIANS, supra note 101, at 253.

105 See, e.g., Ilamiyyih Jam’i az Ruhaniyyun-i Hawziyyih Ilmiyyih Khorasan Darbariyyih Khianathayi Firqiyyih Zalliyyih Bahai’yat [Announcement of a Group of Clergy from the Theology School of Khorasan Regarding the Treachery of the Bahá’ís], March 2, 1979, on file with IHRDC (stating that Bahá’ís, contrary to their claims, were backed by foreign political powers, including the Russians and British, asserting that Bahá’ís gave the UK assistance in exchange for tax exemptions in Israel, and naming Amir Abbas Hoveida, Parviz Thabiti, Ayadi, Taslimi, Shapur Rasikh, Habib Sabit, Hujabr Yazdani as Bahá’ís who betrayed Iran through various posts at the time of the Shah.) It states that “[the Bahá’ís’] new mask is the image of ‘meekness’. This [group] who have always been the best collaborators and friends of International Zionism and the usurper, Israel, are now screaming cries of meekness and have written letters to every place they could, insisting on attracting the support and intervention of the foreign governments so that once again, the foreigners come to their aid. The fighting Muslim nation of Iran… [with the aid of] Ayatollah Khomeini… will no longer allow the crimes and treachery [of the Bahá’ís] to continue.”
The pressure against the Bahá'ís built up as the anti-Shah movement gained momentum. Revolutionary propaganda alleged that some of the Shah’s close advisors were Bahá’ís. A common slur was that these pro-western Bahá’ís were the real power behind the throne. The prominence of wealthy Bahá’í industrialists like Habib Sabet and Qulamhusseyn Jalili was further grist for the rumor mill. In a pattern all too familiar to minority communities around the world, the Bahá’ís found their business successes turned against them, as they were portrayed as a “favored elite” benefiting from unspecified advantages, while the local economy struggled. A new caricature of the Bahá’ís as an economic threat to Iranian society joined more “traditional” cultural and religious grievances. Fueled by incendiary sermons, popular hatred for the Bahá’ís among parts of the Iranian populace intensified.

4.2. A Revolution Underway

In 1978, as pro-Khomeini marches spread across the country, physical attacks against the Bahá’ís increased. In February 1979 Hojjatiyeh gunmen invaded the Bahá’í national headquarters in Tehran and other provincial capitals, taking over the buildings, expelling the staff, and seizing confidential documents including personnel files and membership lists. These stolen files were later used to more effectively direct the Hojjatiyeh’s anti-Bahá’í activities. In more than fifty cities and towns across the country, Bahá’ís reported incidents of persecution including arson, looting, mob attacks, forced recantations, and suspicious deaths and murders. In addition, one clinic, one agricultural institute, twenty two Bahá’í Centers and cemeteries, as well as hundreds of Bahá’í homes, gardens, businesses, and shops were damaged or destroyed.

In Sa’adi (Sa’adiyeh), part of Sarvestan, over the course of a few days in December 1978, there were wide-scale mob attacks on Bahá’ís and their property. It was estimated that several hundred Bahá’í houses in the area were set on fire and looted or vandalized and more than 1,000 Bahá’ís were made...
homeless.\textsuperscript{115} According to eyewitness accounts,\textsuperscript{116} the incident began when a group went to the house of Sifatu'llah Fahandizh, a Bahá’í man, and threatened to kidnap his daughter. In an attempt to ward off attackers who were climbing the walls of their house, Fahandizh and some male family members went to the rooftop and began firing shots at the crowd, injuring some people. Early the next morning, a mob set fire to Fahandizh’s house as well as the houses of other Bahá’ís in the area. The mob went door-to-door, looting property (including sheep, clothing, carpets, and electronic equipment) before setting fire to the houses.\textsuperscript{117} A number of people (both Bahá’í and non-Bahá’í) were reportedly killed or injured in the violence that ensued.\textsuperscript{118}

Contemporary reports suggested that these mob attacks did not occur spontaneously, but were in fact instigated by the military government appointed by the Shah.\textsuperscript{119} Observers particularly highlighted the apparent reluctance of government forces to intervene to stop the violence. For example, one contemporary written account reported that:

\begin{quote}
Eye-witnesses stated that… while the shooting was still continuing, the Military Government did not do anything to stop the incident. One of the police, who was having tea in a teahouse, was heard to have said that “it [was] not time yet.”\textsuperscript{120}
\end{quote}

This statement further alleged that government forces provided both tacit and active support during the attacks; it stated that the army was slow to respond to arson attacks against Bahá’í houses, and alleged that a list of Bahá’ís was distributed by SAVAK, along with addresses, and that the crowd was encouraged to set those houses on fire. Observers alleged that when the army finally showed up, it did not take action to prevent the fires from spreading, and army trucks actually transported youths to the Pepsi-Cola building (said to be owned by a Bahá’í) and encouraged the group to set it on fire. It was also reported that another Bahá’í-owned building was targeted by an explosion in which one person died. The statement concludes, based on evidence and testimony gathered by the author(s), that “the [killings] in Sa’adi, fires, looting, and subsequent killings in Shiraz and other cities of Fars [province]” were “carried out by the direct provocation and encouragement of the Army.”\textsuperscript{121}

These allegations were corroborated by a public statement released by the National Organization of the Universities of Iran (Shiraz Division), on December 16, 1978, which stated:

\begin{quote}

\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{115} OLYA ROOHIZADEGAN, OLYA’S STORY: A SURVIVOR’S DRAMATIC ACCOUNT OF THE PERSECUTION OF THE BAHA’IS IN REVOLUTIONARY IRAN 12 (1993); NAMES AND NUMBERS, supra note 57 at 202-203.
\textsuperscript{116} See Saadi dar Atash va Khun; Guzarish-i Yik Shahid-i Iyni [Saadi in Flames and Blood (an eyewitness account)] (undated document) (on file with IHRDC) [hereinafter Saadi in Flames and Blood]. The author is described as “a real Shi’a, follower of Ali,” and states that “[t]he Muslim and clerical community of the world curses those who incited this incident. I do not understand how we, who consider ourselves followers of Ali, could become so cruel and vicious.”
\textsuperscript{117} Id.
\textsuperscript{118} Id. See also BAHÁ’Í INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, THE BAHA’Í QUESTION: CULTURAL CLEANSING IN IRAN 79 (2005) [hereinafter THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION: CULTURAL CLEANSING IN IRAN].
\textsuperscript{120} Facts on Sa’adiyeh Massacre, supra note 119.
\textsuperscript{121} Id.
In the last two or three days a number of suspicious individuals, using the religious emotions of the bereaved people and employing professional mobs, have engaged themselves with careful planning in destroying, burning, and looting the houses and shops of individuals who are associated with Bahá’ísm. It is strange that all through these incidents, the police and the military Government have not interfered at all.

Although martial law was announced by the Shah’s government in November 1978 in an attempt to bring public unrest under control, the attacks against the Bahá’í is continued with impunity. On January 12, 1979, four days before the Shah fled Iran, a Bahá’í community was attacked in the tribal region of Boyer Ahmad, near Isfahan. Several hundred non-Bahá’í members of the Sadat-Mahmoudi tribe surrounded the homes of their fellow tribesmen who were Bahá’ís in the village of Kata. They fired at the Bahá’í families, destroyed their homes, burnt the town’s mill, uprooted orchards, and forced them to flee to the mountains. As attacks on the Bahá’ís in the region continued for weeks and extended from village to village, a number of clerics came to Kata to ask the Bahá’ís to recant their faith if they wanted to save their lives and property.

On May 8, 1979 an article in Ayandegan described a demonstration held by 300 residents of Boyer Ahmad province who went to the Gata area near Yasuj demanding that the Bahá’ís in that area convert to Islam. They warned the Bahá’ís that if they did not convert, their homes and belongings would be looted. However, the demonstrators were apparently prevented from carrying out their violent threats by the arrival of Ayatollah Malak Hussein, a local cleric and spiritual leader, accompanied by Lieutenant Baqiri, a senior local law enforcement official. Nonetheless, by the end of May 1979, the continuing violence had forced Bahá’ís in the area who refused to recant to leave home and set up refugee camps in the Isfahan area for a number of weeks. They were not able to return to their villages until mid-July.

4.3. 1979 and the Victory of the Islamic Revolution

The Shah departed from Iran on January 16, 1979. With the Shah gone, the government of Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar collapsed. On February 1, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran after 15 years in exile and appointed Mahdi Bazargan, a religious nationalist, as provisional prime minister. Bazargan was the former deputy prime minister under Mohammad Mossadegh, and as such his appointment was intended to appease other members of the anti-Shah opposition. The official government led by Bazargan was composed of mostly men from the National Front and prominent leaders of the anti-Shah movement.

Before returning to Iran, Khomeini had established a secret Revolutionary Council. The purpose of this Council was to establish a government-in-waiting that could lay the groundwork for a new regime based on Islamic principles. The Revolutionary Council ran parallel governmental agencies, intervened in the conduct of public affairs, and soon began to eclipse the official government led by Bazargan.
Other parallel government institutions such as local Revolutionary Committees, the Revolutionary Courts, and the Revolutionary Guards all helped to implement Khomeini’s agenda. The Revolutionary Committees, or Komitehs, were Islamic groups organized around mosques in communities around the nation. The backbone of the anti-Shah strikes and demonstrations in 1978, the Komitehs became a rival authority to the police after Khomeini’s return, and without any central oversight or control began enforcing what they viewed as the dictates of Shari' a law by arresting and punishing private individuals. The Revolutionary Courts emerged in the revolutionary period to put an end to the executions ordered by the individual Komitehs, and asserted control over the judicial authority of the state. Run by militant clerics, the Courts often operated beyond the scope of the government. The Revolutionary Guards, or Sepah-eh Pasdaran, served as the military arm of the Revolutionary Council. The Guards were a paramilitary force that also answered directly to the clerics, not the state.

Khomeini and the Revolutionary Council gradually consolidated their control over all three institutions. To consolidate control over the Komitehs, Khomeini appointed Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani to impose and administer the Komitehs, which were merged into major district committees headed by clerics. Although he was an original member of the Revolutionary Council, Bazargan was unable to prevent the Council, the Revolutionary Guards, or the Revolutionary Courts from undermining his cabinet.

The Islamic Constitution and the Bahá’í Community of Iran

The protégés of the most prominent anti-Bahá’í clerics of the 1950s and 1960s were now represented in the highest echelons of the nation’s government and so were able to enact many of the anti-Bahá’í bills and policies that had been blocked under the Pahlavi regime. Bahá’ís would soon lose what little informal recognition they received as a religious minority and find themselves firmly categorized by the new regime as political opponents and counter-revolutionaries.

In an interview with Professor James Cockroft published in the magazine Seven Days on February 23, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini made clear his views on Bahá’ís:

Cockroft: Will there be either religious or political freedom for the Bahá’ís under an Islamic government?
Khomeini: They are a political faction; they are harmful. They will not be accepted.
Cockroft: How about their freedom of religion – religious practice?
Khomeini: No.

Within two weeks of Khomeini’s arrival in Iran, his spokesman in America, while reassuring American Jewish representatives that religious minorities would retain full political, cultural and religious rights, emphasized that the Bahá’ís would not receive the same guarantees. Other senior members of the regime echoed similar sentiments.

130 Id. at 82; THE IRANIANS, supra note 101, at 289.
131 THE IRANIANS, supra note 101, at 289; MENASHRI, supra note 119, at 82.
132 THE TURBAN FOR THE CROWN, supra note 71, at 136; MENASHRI, supra note 119, at 83.
133 THE TURBAN FOR THE CROWN, supra note 71, at 136; THE IRANIANS, supra note 101, at 290.
134 Id. at 288-90; MENASHRI, supra note 119, at 82.
135 Id. at 31; THE TURBAN FOR THE CROWN, supra note 71, at 135.
136 THE TURBAN FOR THE CROWN, supra note 71, at 135.
137 THE IRANIANS, supra note 101, at 288-91; MENASHRI, supra note 119, at 82.
139 See 2 U.S. Jews Hold Talk With Khomeini Aide on Outlook For Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1979 (describing interview with Shahriar Rouhani). The article explained that “the Ayatollah is said to regard [the Bahá’ís] as a political rather than a religious movement.”
140 See, e.g., MARTIN, THE PERSECUTION OF THE BAHÁ’ÍS IN IRAN, supra note 1, at 43.
Initially, Bazargan and his cabinet were emphatic in their public statements that all Iranians would enjoy the same civil rights, regardless of ethnic or religious background. Nonetheless, Iranian embassies around the world began issuing statements denying reports of persecution and insisting that the Bahá’ís were an anti-revolutionary political movement. These allegations were personally endorsed by the Foreign Minister, Ebrahim Yazdi, a close associate of Khomeini who had also played a major role in the first post-revolutionary trials.\textsuperscript{141}

After a national referendum organized by Khomeini provided an overwhelming mandate to create an Islamic Republic,\textsuperscript{142} a debate began on the new government’s constitution.\textsuperscript{143} The initial draft of the constitution, proposed by the Bazargan government, was significantly rewritten by a newly elected Council of Experts, chaired by Khomeini’s close associate Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri, with Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini Beheshti as vice-chairman.\textsuperscript{144} This new draft intentionally excluded the Bahá’ís from protection as a religious minority,\textsuperscript{145} a right that was accorded other groups, specifically Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians. Political scientist Eliz Sanasarian describes the debate concerning this point recorded in official transcripts of the drafting proceedings:

\begin{quote}
Anti-Bahá’ísm was obvious throughout the proceedings. This was most apparent in haggling over every word and expression of certain articles to assure the exclusion of the Bahá’ís. For instance, Article 26 of the constitution addresses the right to form political parties, societies, and professional associations whether they be Islamic or belong to one of the recognized religious minorities. In the ensuing debates the original version referred to “official religious minorities.” The speaker of the committee that had worked on the wording of the article explained that the expression was selected on purpose in order to ensure that the Bahá’ís would not be included. In another discussion over the issue of freedom of the press, a deputy commented that, if the press was allowed to operate freely, “the stray Bahá’í sect” through their publications would “seduce” the people.\textsuperscript{146}
\end{quote}

This final version took the concept of “official” religions one step further explicitly withholding recognition as such from the Bahá’ís in Article 13:

\begin{quote}
Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian Iranians are the only recognized religious minorities, who, within the limits of the law, are free to perform their religious rites and ceremonies, and to act according to their own canon in matters of personal affairs and religious education.
\end{quote}

In Article 14 Montazeri’s Council of Experts set the frame that would justify the coming persecution: non-Muslims judged to be engaging in conspiracy or activity against Islam would be exempted from

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{141} Id. at 40-43.
\textsuperscript{142} Over the opposition of Bazargan and other nationalists, Khomeini organized a referendum on March 30 and 31 1979, asking the nation only one question: “Islamic Republic?”, with a ballot of two colors, green for yes and red for no. Opponents of this type of referendum had wished for an open question referendum, allowing voters to specify the type of government they wanted. Khomeini refused, and personally campaigned for the referendum. The 92.5% turnout of eligible voters and the 92.8% “yes” vote were raised suspicions of irregularities, especially in light of the fact that the election was supervised by the Revolutionary Guards. MENASHRI, supra note 119, at 84.
\textsuperscript{143} Id. at 85.
\textsuperscript{144} Id. at 86-7.
\textsuperscript{145} As Reza Afshari notes, the very notion of enumerating a list of “protected” religious minorities conflicts with the concept of religious freedom: “it was derived from the clerics’ ancient understanding of the country as a sacralized land with an eternal religious (Islamic) essence, the abode of Islam,” implying that “the non-Muslims just happened to be there, more or less as guests.” The Zoroastrian parliamentary representative complained that the result was that religious minorities “who are indigenous to this land and have no country other than Iran are only recognized as second-class citizens.” REZA AFSHARI, HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAN: THE ABUSE OF CULTURAL RELATIVISM 132 (2001) [hereinafter AFSHARI].
\textsuperscript{146} SANASARIAN, supra note 16, at 64, citing to comment in Qa’emi in Surat-e Mashruh-e Mozakerat-e Majlis-e Barrasi-ye Nahaiye Qanun-ye Asasiye Jomhuri-ye Islami-ye Iran [The Complete Proceedings of the Assembly for the Final Revision of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran], 26th session, 31/6/1358 (September 22, 1979) at 669; and 28th session, 1/7/1358 (September 23, 1979) at 722.
\end{footnotes}
protection of the Constitution. Written with the Bahá’ís firmly in mind and driven by an animus which regarded the Bahá’í religion as heresy, Article 14 effectively criminalized the faith:

In accordance with the sacred verse "God does not forbid you to deal kindly and justly with those who have not fought against you because of your religion and who have not expelled you from your homes" [60:8], the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and all Muslims are duty-bound to treat non-Muslims in conformity with ethical norms and the principles of Islamic justice and equity, and to respect their human rights. This principle applies to all who refrain from engaging in conspiracy or activity against Islam and the Islamic Republic of Iran.147

Iranian officials brushed off the growing concerns of the international community about the constitutional status of the Bahá’ís. A spokesman for the Iranian Embassy in Argentina explained that the exclusion was prompted by the fact that the Bahá’ís were a “misguided group… whose affiliation and association with world Zionism is a clear fact” and who could not be “in the same category as minorities like the Christian, Jews and Zoroastrians.”148 Hassan Habibi, a Minister in the Bani-Sadr government which succeeded Bazargan149 and an expert in Islamic constitutional law, asserted that “Bahá’ism is not a religion, but a political doctrine.”150 However, authorities often stated that if Bahá’ís converted to Islam, their rights would be immediately restored, effective confirmation that these individuals were being targeted solely for their religious affiliation rather than because of any political activity.151

 Ramirez of Exclusion of the Bahá’ís from the Constitution

In a 1981 report, the Bahá’í International Community highlighted the consequences of the omission of the Bahá’ís from the 1979 and the 1906 Constitutions:

1. The followers of the Bahá’í faith are deprived as Bahá’ís of any form of protection under the law, including their civil rights and liberties.
2. Deprived of constitutional safeguards, Bahá’ís are subject to discriminatory legislation, and to rules and regulations which do not affect other citizens. A great mass of this kind of legislation was enacted during the Pahlavi regime.
3. In many areas of their daily lives, and in matters related to civil rights, Bahá’ís are denied the ability to live according to the laws and teachings of their faith.152

The document goes on to specify four categories of ‘disabilities’ stemming from this omission:

1. Personal Status. Refusal to legally recognize Bahá’í marriages, led to the categorization of Bahá’í wives as mistresses and Bahá’í children as illegitimate. As a result, Bahá’ís frequently

149 After the resignation of Prime Minister Bazargan, a presidential election was held under the auspices of the new constitution resulting in the election of Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, who was sworn into office on July 22, 1980. On June 21, 1981 the Majlis voted Bani-Sadr out of office. See MENASHRI, supra note 119, at 122, 181.
150 MARK KRAVETZ, IRANO NOX 237 (1982).
151 See, e.g., Namiyih Ustandar-i Fars Ni’matullah Taqah Karmand-i Bahá’i [Circular Letter from the Office of the Fars Provincial Governor addressed to suspended employees of the Governorate of Fars], (date not legible) (on file with IHRC). See also Bih Ittiham-i Hamkari ba SAVAK va Bahá’ígari, 153 Nafar az Amuzish va Parvarish-i Azerbaijan-i Sharqi Ikhray Mishavanad [Convicted of Collaboration with SAVAK and Bahá’ísm, 153 People will be Fired from the Department of Education of Eastern Azerbaijan], ETTELA’AT, 29/11/1358 (February 18, 1980) [attached as Appendix 1] (quoting the Director of the Department of Education in Eastern Azerbaijan, Dr. Nayyirivand, as stating that during that week, 50 Bahá’ís had been dismissed from their jobs, and adding that “[i]f the Bahá’ís accept the true faith of Islam, they will be hired again; otherwise, they will be referred to the Revolutionary Court of Tabriz for further investigation of their files.”)
had difficulty obtaining passports and identity cards, which were denied to children based on the non-recognition of their parents’ marriage. Similar arguments were often invoked to block Bahá’í children claiming their inheritances;

2. Education. Bahá’í students could be expelled on the grounds of their religion;

3. Employment. Various measures prevented Bahá’ís from professional advancement if employed, or denial of benefits when retired. Their profession of faith could even lead to their dismissal;

4. Religious practice. Bahá’ís were not accorded freedom of expression or assembly as a religious community.\textsuperscript{153}

5. Post-Revolutionary Persecution of the Bahá’ís of Iran

As clerical rule became more consolidated in post-revolutionary Iran, persecution of the Bahá’ís became more overt, more widespread and more systematic. Local clerics, through the newly reorganized Komitehs and Revolutionary Courts, began to target the Bahá’ís in their individual communities using the Revolutionary Guards to conduct interrogations and arrests, confiscate property, expel Bahá’ís from both private and public institutions, and even execute religious leaders. The IHRDC believes that the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran deliberately set in motion a plan to eliminate the Bahá’í leadership inside Iran and to suffocate the community.

5.1. Arrest, Torture, and Execution of Bahá’í Leaders

In the early 1980s the institutions of the newly formed Islamic Republic systematically targeted the leadership of the Bahá’í community. The Revolutionary Committees focused on the Bahá’ís’ Local and National Spiritual Assemblies. By 1986, over half of the Bahá’ís executed by the IRI had held a community leadership position at the time of their deaths.\textsuperscript{154} In addition, IHRDC has gathered accounts of 183 executions of Bahá’ís in non-leadership positions that occurred between May 1980 and November 1985. By 1986 the IRI had eliminated the members of three successive National Spiritual Assemblies formed in Tehran, and most of the Local Spiritual Assemblies found in major cities around the country.\textsuperscript{155}

First National Spiritual Assembly of Iran

Throughout 1980, members of the National Spiritual Assembly were repeatedly harassed. In February 1980, National Spiritual Assembly member Dr. Husayn Nají sent a telegram to Ayatollah Khomeini, President Bani-Sadr, the Minister of Health Hadi Manafi, Attorney General of the Revolutionary Court Ayatollah Ali Qodusi, and the Iranian Medical Association describing several invasions of his home by armed men and the arrest of his wife. He requested advice about what he could do to stop this harassment.\textsuperscript{156} His protest was of little avail; all nine members of the National Spiritual Assembly were summarily arrested by Revolutionary Guardsmen on August 21, 1980, along with two members of the Auxiliary Board, while they were attending a regular National Spiritual Assembly meeting at a private home.\textsuperscript{157}


\textsuperscript{154} BAHÁ’Í INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, PERSECUTION OF THE BAHÁ’ÍS IN IRAN 1979-1986: A 7-YEAR CAMPAIGN TO ELIMINATE A RELIGIOUS MINORITY, at 3 (1986) [hereinafter CAMPAIGN TO ELIMINATE A RELIGIOUS MINORITY].

\textsuperscript{155} LIFTING THE VEIL, supra note 4, at 224.

\textsuperscript{156} Translation of Statement by Dr. Nají, NSA Member (1980) (on file with the IHRDC).

\textsuperscript{157} See Statement made by the Bahá’í International Community to the UN Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 34th Session, August 28, 1981. According to THE BAHÁ’Í WORLD XVIII, supra note 113, at 257, the individuals forcibly disappeared include: Mr. ’Abdu'l Husayn Taslimí, Mr. Húshang Mahmúdí, Mr. Ibráhím Rahmání, Dr.
Families of the missing individuals relentlessly pursued the case from the date of their disappearance to the end of January 1981, meeting with Attorney General Ayatollah Qodusi, Head of the Iranian Judiciary Ayatollah Muhammad Beheshti, and Speaker of Parliament Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. In a meeting on September 10, 1980, Rafsanjani confirmed that an order had been issued for the arrest of eleven Bahá’ís, but told family members that they would be denied access to the prisoners until their interrogation was complete. However, on October 9, 1980, Rafsanjani changed his story, telling family members that the government had not arrested any members of the National Spiritual Assembly, and instead rather implausibly suggested that an independent “group” might be behind their disappearance.

The fate of the nine National Spiritual Assembly and two Auxiliary Board members remains unknown, although there are reports that they were briefly held in Evin prison; there has been no further news of them since August 29, 1980 and they are all now presumed dead.

**Second National Spiritual Assembly of Iran**

Soon after the disappearance of the members of the National Spiritual Assembly, Iranian Bahá’ís gathered to elect a new National Spiritual Assembly. The members of this second National Assembly were fully aware that they risked being subjected to the same treatment as their predecessors.

The authorities immediately targeted the new leadership. Amnesty International reported that on December 13, 1981, Iranian authorities arrested eight of the nine new National Spiritual Assembly members at the home of Zough’ullah Momen. The eight NSA members arrested were Mehdi Amin Amin, Jalal Azizi, Izzatu’llah Furuhji, Ginous Ni’mat Mahmudi, Mahmud Majdhub, Qudratu’llah Rawhani, Sirus Rawshani, and Kamran Samimi. Momen was also detained as was Farideh Samimi, wife of the Assembly’s Secretary Kamran Samimi, who had been helping out as a hostess. Amnesty International issued an Urgent Action memo calling for appeals to be sent directly by telegram and postal service to the Head of the Supreme Court, Ayatollah Mousavi Ardebili, Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi, and Prosecutor-General Rabbani Ardebili demanding further information on the location of those arrested, as well as suggesting that appeals be sent by telex to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of the Interior.

In an interview with IHRDC, Farideh Samimi, who was arrested along with the second National Spiritual Assembly, described the events. Mrs. Samimi explained that because “there was always a fear that the [Assembly members] would be arrested”, the Assembly had taken the precaution of regularly changing their meeting place to different buildings and neighborhoods. Only four of the Assembly’s nine members would meet at a time, designating an intermediary to act as a go-between with the absent members.

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Husayn Najj, Mr. Manuhir Qaim-Maqami, Mr. ‘Ata’ullah Muqarrabi, Mr. Yusif Qadimi, Mrs. Bahiyih Nahiri, Dr. Kamibz Sadluzadhe, Two Auxiliary Board Members, Dr. Yusif Abasiyan and Dr. Hishmatullah Rawhani, also disappeared.

158 For details of steps taken to pursue the case, see Bahai International Community, Statement to the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (January 31, 1981) [attached as Appendix 2].
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 The Bahai’i World XVIII, supra note 113, at 256-7. Since the execution of the second National Spiritual Assembly of Iran, it has been assumed that the first National Spiritual Assembly suffered the same fate.
162 For example, Farideh Samimi, who was arrested along with the second National Spiritual Assembly, described precautionary measures the NSA had taken, such as meeting only in small groups and frequently changing meeting locations. See Oct. 17, 2006 Statement of Farideh Samimi (on file with IHRDC) [hereinafter Statement of Farideh Samimi].
163 The ninth member was not present at the meeting (see below) and was able to escape Iran at a later time.
Mrs. Samimi explained that on the day of the arrests, December 13, 1981, the Assembly had, contrary to its usual practice, met in plenary session - only Gitti Qadimi Vahid (who was undergoing surgery) was missing. Mrs. Samimi provided the IHRDC with the following account of what happened next:

[T]wo of the members, Ginous and another Assembly member, were saying goodbye and leaving. But a few minutes later, they returned, accompanied by three Revolutionary Guards with guns. It seemed that several other Revolutionary Guards were surrounding the house, we could hear them outside. When the Revolutionary Guards came, they immediately told everyone to stand with his or her face to the wall without making any noise. So we all obeyed and they searched our bodies... They knew everything: that I wasn’t a member of the Assembly, that I was Kamran’s wife, detail by detail, they knew everything... They did not show us a warrant. Mr. Mehdi Amin Amin who was a lawyer (there was three lawyers altogether on the Assembly) asked them if they had a paper for our arrest, but the Revolutionary Guards didn’t need any warrants. Whatever they said would go. They just said get ready... they blindfolded and simultaneously questioned every one and said that they would take us but didn’t say where.165

The National Spiritual Assembly members and their two hosts were blindfolded, put into a van and driven to Kakheh Javanon, a temporary holding facility. Once there, Mrs. Samimi was interrogated at least once a day:

We were at Kakheh Javanon a total of 5 days (maybe a week). We were interrogated every day. Ginous’ interrogations were written and not oral and she was questioned more extensively because she was an NSA member. When we returned to the cell we would share the details of our interrogations with each other...

Our first interrogation was unlike any of the others. They took Ginous to another room and then four people came to where I was. Out of the four, three were clergy. The fourth one was one of the Revolutionary Guards who had arrested us... One of them was a Majles representative and the other was a representative of some sort... They entered the prison, only this one time I was not blindfolded for interrogation. They started to ask me questions. They said if I told them a single lie they would know and they would send me to Evin. They would ask questions that they already knew the answers to; I knew this because when I would make a mistake they would correct me. During the daily interrogations they would take off my blindfold and position me so that I was facing the wall and couldn’t see who my interrogator was, but I know that it was a man. I don’t know if he was a Revolutionary Guard, I never saw him, but I doubt it because the person asking the questions seemed to have more knowledge than an ordinary Revolutionary Guard would. During these interrogations, they always asked us for names of other Bahá’ís.166

As reported by Mrs. Samimi, statements by the interrogators made it clear that the Bahá’í prisoners were being targeted for their religious beliefs:

There were two other Bahá’ís in a different cell, a man and a woman; God knows what they did to one of them, because she recanted her faith. The authorities asked questions and she answered and finally recanted. And so they brought us sweets and offered them to us to eat, telling us that those two have recanted from our wayward sect and have come to Islam. It was never clear to us what happened that made them recant. The other person was in the same situation and was made to recant.

During my first interrogation... the Revolutionary Guard asked me if I wanted to recant my faith and become a Muslim. I said no and said that if being a Bahá’í is a crime, then I’m a criminal. They would try this with everyone. Before we were arrested, Kamran and I would always buy the newspapers and the names of those who had recanted were printed in them. They always asked

165 Statement of Farideh Samimi, supra note 162.
166 Id.
Throughout these questions. They did not use torture, at least with me, though I don’t know what happened with others.  

After being held for nearly a week, Mrs. Samimí was released, but the Assembly members she had been arrested with remained behind in Kakheh Javanan. While processing her release, Samimí’s jailers demonstrated that they had previously gathered extensive information on the activities of her and her husband. They knew the locations of each building the couple had lived in previously, despite the fact that they had moved frequently and tried to keep their whereabouts closely held:

[H]e [the Revolutionary Guard] took me to Gitti Ghadimi’s house… he asked me if I knew where we were. I said no... He listed all the places that Kamran and I had lived in, all the places that we had thought no one knew about; he knew about all of them.

Even after Mrs. Samimí was released, Revolutionary Guards continued to stop by her house several times a week, pressuring her to help them identify other Bahá’ís:

Several times a week, they'd come and take me to the Revolutionary Guards (Sepah Pasdaran) headquarters to ask me questions about Kamran's friends. They'd also take me to the rooftop and ask me to show them the houses of the Bahá’ís… They'd tell me to give them the names of Kamran’s friends and I gave the names of those who had been executed. They would respond by saying that the people I had named had all been executed. I'd say, “Those are the ones I know.”

On December 27, 1981, eight of the nine members of the second National Spiritual Assembly of Iran were executed without trial. Mrs. Samimí later discovered from the authorities that their bodies were buried in Tehran’s Kufarabad cemetery. She described how the executions were portrayed by the Iranian media:

A cleric was interviewed on TV, it was Ayatollah Ardebili. He said that the regime didn't kill any Bahá’ís… They didn’t want to acknowledge that it is an independent religion. They just said that they killed people who had committed treason [khiyanat] against the government.

After initially denying that the executions took place, the new Head of

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167 Id.
168 It appears that Farideh Samimi was released because her husband convinced the Revolutionary Guards that she had no useful information to provide, since she was not an Assembly member and had no senior position in the Bahá’í administration.
169 Statement of Farideh Samimi, supra note 162.
170 Id.
172 Statement of Farideh Samimi, supra note 162.
173 Id.
the Judiciary, Ayatollah Ardebili, finally acknowledged the execution of eight Bahá’ís on grounds of “espionage for the benefit of foreign powers.” Ardebili reportedly told the Iranian News Agency IRNA that there was no religious motivation behind the killing. Later that month, Ayatollah Mohammadi Gilani, Head of the Central Revolutionary Courts, justified the executions of the second National Spiritual Assembly’s members by alleging that membership in the Bahá’í community was synonymous with spying for a foreign power:

It has become clear that [the members of] this group or sect spy for imperialist espionage organizations and the damages they have caused to this country [is immeasurable] ... In the case of those who were executed, their spying for Israel and its agents has become quite clear and they met with their just punishment according to the orders of the Holy Koran.

Although the executions were not officially announced, the Bahá’í community was able to locate the burial sites in the “infidel” section of the Kufrabad cemetery; some of the bodies had been thrown in a collective grave. It was reported by Ramna Mahmúdí Núrání, Ginous Ni’mat Mahmúdí’s daughter, that some families were not able to discover the location of their loved ones’ bodies until they paid the authorities for the bullets used to execute them.

**Attacks on the Local Spiritual Assemblies**

In addition to targeting the national Bahá’í leadership, the judicial authorities also pursued members of the local Bahá’í Spiritual Assemblies.

**Tehran and Karaj**

In Tehran the first Local Spiritual Assembly member to be executed was Alí-Akbar Khursandí, who was hanged on April 12, 1979. Khursandí’s execution was followed by the execution of seven further prominent members of the city’s Bahá’í community between May and December of 1980: Ghulám-Husayn A’zamí, Alí-Akbar Mu’íni, Badi’u’lláh Yazdání, Yusíf Subhání, Yadu’lláh Mahbubíyán, Dhabíhu’lláh Mu’míní and Bihrúz Saná’í.

Buzurg ‘Alavíyán, a member of the Local Spiritual Assembly in Tehran was executed on June 23, 1981. The official charges cited in his original indictment included “active membership in [the] Zionist establishment of the misguided Bahá’í sect,” in particular “membership in the Bahá’í center of command in [Tehran]” and holding “anti-Islamic and constitutionally illegal meetings for the sole purpose of strengthening the misguided sect [Bahá’í] at his own home”, as well as the provision of financial assistance to Bahá’í organizations outside of Iran. In addition, the indictment notes that ‘Alavíyán’s

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174 Téhéran dément l’exécution de huit responsables Bahá’ís [Tehran denies the execution of eight Bahá’í leaders], LE MONDE, January 5, 1982 at 6 [hereinafter Tehran denies Execution]; Téhéran confirme – après l’avoir démentie – la mise a mort de huit responsables Bahá’ís [Tehran confirms – after having denied – the execution of eight Bahá’í leaders], LE MONDE, January 8, 1982.

175 Tehran denies Execution, supra note 174, at 6.


178 Id.

179 THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION: CULTURAL CLEANSING IN IRAN, supra note 118, at 79.

180 Id. at 80.

181 Other charges included “ex-membership on the Board of Directors of the Umana Company” (see discussion of Umana company in section 5.2), and being a managing director of the Ránkin Company. See Bill of Indictment for Buzurg ‘Alavíyán, dated April 5, 1981, on file with IHRDC, at 1 [hereinafter Bill of Indictment for Buzurg ‘Alavíyán]. It should be noted that these charges were brought several years prior to the August 29, 1983 decree by Prosecutor General Tabrizi officially banning participation in Bahá’í assemblies (see Section 5.1 below.)
“confessed that he would give reports of his imprisonment and detention to the NSA of Iran,” as evidence of his “complete obedience to the House of Justice in Haifa.”\textsuperscript{182} The indictment notes that the other Local Spiritual Assembly members participated in Bahá’í meetings.\textsuperscript{183}

On the same day that 'Alavíyán was executed, two members of the Local Spiritual Assembly in Karaj also shared the same fate: Háshim Farnúsh and Farhang Mavaddat.\textsuperscript{184} The following day, on June 24, 1981, Dr. Masih Farhangi, a member of the Continental Board of Counselors who had also served on the National Spiritual Assemblies of Iraq and Iran, the prominent Bahá’í author Bādi'ulláh Faríd, and Yadu'lláh Pústchí were also executed, after sixteen months of imprisonment.\textsuperscript{185} Varqá Tibyáníyán was executed along with them, although he, like Faríd and Pústchí, held no official position in the Bahá’í administration.\textsuperscript{186}

Only a few months after this group execution, two more Bahá’ís from the Tehran community were executed: Husayn Rastigár-Námdár on August 5, 1981 and Habíbu'lláh ‘Azízí, a member of the Local Spiritual Assembly of Tehran, on August 29, 1981.\textsuperscript{187} On November 3, 1981, six members of Tehran’s newly elected Local Spiritual Assembly, were arrested along with the owners of the house they were meeting in.\textsuperscript{188} On January 4, 1982, all six were executed along with Shídrukh Amir-Kiyá Baqá, the woman in whose house the meeting had occurred.\textsuperscript{189} A cousin of Shívá Mahmúdí Asadu'lláh-Zádíh - one of the executed members of the Assembly – reported that while they had been held in solitary confinement the Assembly members had been given the opportunity to recant their beliefs and reclaim their place in society.\textsuperscript{190} Only one of those arrested, Shídrukh Baqá’s husband, recanted and was released.\textsuperscript{191}

An additional eighteen prominent members of Tehran’s Bahá’í community who did not hold official leadership positions were killed or died in prison in Tehran between October 1981 and August 1985.\textsuperscript{192}

\textit{Yazd}

On September 2, 1980, fifteen Bahá’ís, including members of the Auxiliary Board and the Local Spiritual Assembly, were tried in Yazd on charges of “leading Muslims astray and drawing them towards...
blasphemy”, “membership in the Zionist party”, and “spying for the United States and Israel.”

The following exchange was recorded between the defense attorney, Yadu’llah Lutfi, and the prosecutor, Mr. Ghods:

Mr. Lutfi asked Mr. Ghods: “Is the Bahá’í faith being put on trial?” He answered in the negative. “Is the Bahá’í community being put on trial?” Again the response was negative. Then he asked: “So who are you putting on trial?” Mr. Ghods replied: “We are trying the leaders of the Bahá’ís.” Mr. Lutfi pointed to Mr. Badi’ullah Saadatmand, accused person # 9, who was sitting next to him, and said: “This man who is from Minshad and is a farmer who hardly ever comes to the city… is this man a leader of the Bahá’ís?”

In their defense, the accused asserted that Bahá’ís deeply respect Islamic teachings and that they shared information about their own religion not to lead Muslims astray, but to counter unfounded accusations. They argued that Bahá’í religious beliefs prohibited them from engaging in espionage or membership in political parties and that Bahá’ís sent donations to Israel to support the upkeep of Bahá’í holy sites there, not the Israeli government. The defense attorney, Mr. Lutfi, further noted that the SAVAK reports offered by the prosecution had no obvious connection with the accused, whose names were not even mentioned in the documents.

As evidence that one of the accused, Mr. Faridani, was a Zionist spy, the prosecution appears to have simply cited his contacts with Bahá’í institutions and administrative bodies. The questioning proceeded as follows:

Mr. Faridani said: “I have been working in the education office for over 30 years and fulfilled my duties with honesty and compassion and no one ever had a complaint about me.” Mr. Ghods replied: “[t]hat you are a spy is [complaint] enough.” Then Mr. Kazemi [another accused person] recited a few lines from the Koran, and Mr. Ghods asked him: “Are you a Bahá’í or not?” He kept repeating his question and once he received an affirmative response, he said: “Very well, this is enough.” Mr. Kazemi responded: “this is not a trial and there is no justice; this is a battlefield.”

The trial was partially televised, and covered by the media. An article in the state-run newspaper, Kayhan, described the events:

The Revolutionary Court of Yazd studied [the evidence] and sentenced seven of the accused to be executed, in accordance with Shari’a law. The sentence was carried out early this morning on the anniversary of the Black Friday of Tehran, 17 of Shahrivar [September 8, 1980]. This act of the Islamic Revolutionary Court of Yazd was done as a salute to the brave men who willingly gave their lives to overthrow the tyrannical Pahlavi regime and kept the Holy Revolution of Iran alive with their blood. With this revolutionary action [the Islamic Revolutionary Court of Yazd] pays homage to the pure blood of the martyrs and warns the enemies of Islam and Iran that our beloved Iran will never again fall in the arms of the foreigner, and the enemies of Islam will be dealt with decisively.

A statement prepared by Yadu’llah Lutfi describes how the remaining prisoners learned of the execution of seven of their members:

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193 The Bahá’í World XVIII, supra note 113, at 279; Statement Prepared by Yadu’llah Lutfi, the defense attorney representing the Bahá’ís in this case (on file with IHRDC) [hereinafter Statement of Yadu’llah Lutfi]. Mr. Lutfi was imprisoned along with the clients he represented.
194 Id. at 280.
195 Statement of Yadu’llah Lutfi, supra note 193.
196 Id.
197 Bih Jurm-i Khiyanat bih Millat-i Muslaman-i Iran, 7 Bahá’ís dar Yazd Tirbaran Shudand [For Committing Treachery Against the Muslim Nation of Iran, 7 Bahá’ís Were Executed by Firing Squad in Yazd], Kayhan, No. 11089, 18/6/1359 (September 9, 1980), reporting from Islamic Revolutionary Court of Yazd. The victims included eighty-four-year-old ‘Abdu’l-Vahháb Kázemí-Manshádí.
That night [September 8, 1980], Mr. Ghods accompanied by a few Revolutionary Guards entered
the cell and read the names of Mr. Dhabibian, Mr. Faridani, Mr. Kazemi, Mr. Akhtar-Khavari, Mr.
Mostaghim, Mr. Mostahhari, and Mr. Hassanzadeh. He said that since their files had been
transferred to Tehran, they should gather their belongings and leave for Tehran immediately. Of
course, there was some doubt about the veracity of this. The seven aforementioned individuals
said goodbye and left the rest worried. A few hours later, one of the Revolutionary Guards who
had left with them returned. He threw Mr. Kazemi’s hat through the window of the prison cell and
said: “The minibus that was taking them had an accident.” Then he threw [a Persian sweet] into
the cell for the prisoners and said: “Tonight, Abbas Effendi [a reference to Abdu’l-Baha, the son
of Bahá’u’lláh] is crying.”

The media coverage of the events in Yazd was apparently so graphic that the Revolutionary Court of
Yazd received complaints from the general public who did not wish to see such events televised. The
Revolutionary Courts refrained from publicizing further executions, although the authorities continued to
engage in the confiscation of Bahá’í property and the expulsion of Bahá’ís from schools and jobs." The
eight surviving detainees were released four months later in December 1980.

Tabriz

In late 1979 two members of the Tabriz Local Spiritual Assembly, Yadu’lláh Ástání and Dr. Farámarz
Samandari, were arrested and charged with conspiring against the government, spying for Israel, plotting
against Islam, participating in Bahá’í conferences in London and New Delhi, prostitution and immorality,
and conspiring against the sovereignty of the country. Dr. Samandari was also formally charged with
being the Chairman of the Local Spiritual Assembly of Tabriz. The hearing was presided over by the
Head of the Iranian Judiciary, Ayatollah Ardebili. There were no witnesses present and the defendants
were not permitted defense counsel. The proceedings of this trial were not made public; however, the
execution of the two men by a firing squad was announced by Tehran Radio on July 14, 1980.

On July 29, 1981, all nine members of Tabriz’s reconstituted Local Spiritual Assembly were executed
together in the courtyard of Tabriz prison. Each member of the Tabriz assembly had originally been
arrested individually. On June 14, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini’s personal representative in Tabriz, Judge
Tabataba’í, arrested and imprisoned 'Abdu'l-'Ali' Asadyári for ten days before releasing him. On June 10,
1980 Adayari received a summons to return to court, at which point he was placed in solitary confinement
for 21 days before being transferred to a regular cell where he was kept for over a year. Dr. Parvíz Fírúzí
was arrested and imprisoned on July 19, 1980. Mr. Mihdí Báhirí was arrested on August 3, 1980. Dr.
Masrúr Dakhílí was arrested on July 6, 1981. Husayn Asadu'lláh-Zádih was arrested in July 1980 in his
home by Revolutionary Guards. Alláh-Virdí Mítháqí a nd Manúchihr Khází’í were arrested with 17 others
(some of who were eventually released) meeting to discuss their dismissal from jobs because of their
Bahá’í affiliation. Habíbu'lláh Tahqíqi was arrested in March 1981. Mr. Ismá'il Zilhtáb was first arrested
on September 18, 1979 by Revolutionary Guards at a Local Spiritual Assembly and was released on April
11, 1980. He was rearrested on July 18, 1981 and was executed along with the others 11 days later.
**Hamadan**

On June 14, 1981, seven members of the Local Spiritual Assembly of Hamadan were executed by a firing squad. The bodies were released to the Bahá'í community for appropriate burial. Examination of the corpses while the bodies were being prepared for the funeral revealed that six of these men had been physically tortured before their deaths. The body of the seventh was “riddled with bullets.”

Reuters published a detailed account of the men’s injuries:

> The body of Husayn Motlaq Aráni showed no signs of torture but he had been shot nine times. Muhammad Baqer Habibi had a broken shoulder; Dr. Násir Vafá’i had had his thighs cut open as far as the waist and had been shot seven times; Husayn Khándil had had the fingers of one hand pressed and his back had been burned; Sohráb Habibi had had his back burned and had been shot five times’ and Tarázu'lláh Khuzayn suffered a smashed chest and left hand and had been shot seven times.

Similar reports reached the Bahá’í international community:

> The ribs of Tarázu’lláh Khuzayn were crushed, and his hands were slashed. His legs and thighs had been pierced with a bayonet, and the injuries had turned his skin black and the tissues were swollen. [He was sixty-four when he died.] Suhayl Habíbi’s back had been branded with a hot ring – his own – and he had severe burns. The fingers of Husayn Khández had been slashed and his abdomen had been cut open. Dr. Na'imí’s back had been broken and Dr. Vafá’í’s thighs had been cut open; Suhayl Habíbi’s shoulders had been broken and smashed. Hossein Mutlaq had not been tortured but his body showed the greatest number of bullet wounds.

**Shiraz**

The Bahá’ís of Shiraz witnessed the largest waves of arrest and executions. From 1978 through 1981 the Bahá’í community of Shiraz had already suffered a large-scale mob attack (see 4.2 above), the destruction of the House of the Báb (see 5.2 below), and the execution of five prominent members of the community. On October 23, 1982 about forty-five Bahá’ís were arrested and taken to Sepah Prison for interrogations.

In the month of November, the public prosecutor’s office ordered the arrest of an additional 40 Bahá’ís. The grounds for the arrests were not publicized; some detainees were subsequently released while others were held for nearly a year before being executed.

On February 22, 1983, the newspaper *Khabar-i Jonub* reported that Hojatolislam Qaza’í, the Religious Magistrate and Head of the Revolutionary Court of Shiraz, had announced that the court had issued an order for the execution of twenty-two unnamed Bahá’ís. The court order provoked an international outcry. Three Bahá’í detainees - Túbá Zá’írpuír, Yadu’lláh Mahmúdnizhád, and Rahmatu’lláh Vafá’í - were executed on March 12, 1983. On May 23, 1983 U.S. President Ronald Reagan appealed to Ayatollah Khomeini not to allow the executions to continue, commenting “these individuals are not guilty of any political offence or crime, they have not plotted the overthrow of the regime and they are not responsible for the deaths of anyone.”

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**Notes:**

205 They were: Mr. Muhammad (Suhárb) Habíbi, Mr. Muhammad-Báqir (Suhayl) Habíbi, Mr. Husayn Khándil, Mr. Tarázu’lláh Khuzayn, Mr. Husayn Mutlaq, Dr. Fírúz Na’ími, Dr. Násir Vafá’í. See PR Newswire articles, June 15 and June 17, 1981 (citing statement released by the NSA of Bahá’ís of the U.S.); see also *7 Bahá’ís Executed by Iran*, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 15, 1981 at p. 12.

206 For more information regarding Hamadan Local Spiritual Assembly (date unknown) (on file with IHRDC).

207 Reuters article regarding Hamadan Local Spiritual Assembly (date unknown) (on file with IHRDC).

208 See THE BAHÁ’Í WORLD XVIII, supra note 113, at 261; Reuters article regarding Hamadan Local Spiritual Assembly (date unknown) (on file with IHRDC).


210 *Guft-u-Guyih Ikhtisasiyyih Khabar Ba Hojatolislam Qaza’í Hakim-i Shar’ va Ra’is-i Dadgah-i Enghilab-i Shiraz, Hakem-i Shar’-i Shiraz: Biis Bahá’í-ían Tazakkur Midaham Biis Daman-i Islam Biyayand* [Exclusive Interview of Khabar with Hojatolislam Qaza’í, the Religious Magistrate and Head of the Shiraz Revolutionary Court; the Religious Magistrate of Shiraz: “I Warn Bahá’ís to Come to the Hem of Islam” [i.e., into the Arms of Islam]], KHABAR-I JONUB, No. 782, 3/12/1361 (February 22, 1983).

211 THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION: CULTURAL CLEANSING IN IRAN, supra note 118, at 80.

Ayatollah Khomeini responded to President Reagan’s appeal in a speech delivered at the celebration of the anniversary of the birth of Imam Mahdi on May 28, 1983:

Mr. Reagan says that these poor, calm Bahá’ís are silently doing their prayers and religious ceremonies; and that Iran has arrested them only because our beliefs are against their beliefs. Were these people not spies, you would not be raising your voices! You are doing this because you benefit from them... Bahá’ís are not a religious group, they are a party which was previously supported by the British, and now is being supported by the United States. They [the Bahá’ís] are spies like them [the Americans and British].

213 See Imam-i Ummat dar Didar-i bah Mas'ulih-i Kishvar bih Munasibat-i Milad-i bah Sa'adat-i Imam-i Zaman (AJ): Mavara'iyih Taz'if-i Urganhayih in Jumhuri Dastha-i Ast kih Gardanandih Hastand [Imam of the nation in a visit with the
Present at the Ayatollah’s speech were senior members of the clergy, high-ranking military officers and members of the government, including President Seyyed Ali Khamenei, Prime Minister Mir Hussein Musavi and Chief Justice Abdolkarim Musavi Ardebili.214

Just two weeks later, on June 16 and June 18, 1983, sixteen more of the Bahá’í detainees in Shiraz were executed: Bahrám Afnán, 'Abdu'l-Husayn Azádí, Kú rush Haqbín, 'Ináyatu'lláh Ishráqí, Jamshíd Siyávushí, Bahram Yaldá’í, Shahin (Shírín) Dáltvand, 'Izzat Jánamí Ishráqí, Ru'yá Ishráqí, Muná Mahmúdnizhád, Zarrín Muqimidibiyání, Mahshíd Nirúmand, Simin Sábíri, Táhirih Arjumandí Siyávushí, Akhtar Thábit, and Nusrat Ghufrání Yaldá’í.215 In all, 31 Bahá’í residents of Shiraz were killed between 1978 and 1983. The youngest victim was 17-year-old Muná Mahmúdnizhád, and the oldest was 62–year-old Ináyatu'lláh Ishráqí.216

Elsewhere in Iran

Throughout many smaller cities in Iran, authorities used the same pattern of targeting the Bahá’í leadership. The following are representative examples and are not intended to constitute an exhaustive list: in March 1981, Hidáyatu'lláh Dihqání, a member of the Abadeh Local Spiritual Assembly, was charged with having connections with Israel and “being a corrupt and seditious person and waging a war on God and his messenger and the Imam of Time [Mahdi]” and was executed;217 in May 1982, two members of the Local Spiritual Assembly in Urumiyeh (Urmia) were executed;218 and in April 1982, eight members of the Local Spiritual Assembly in Qazvin were detained and questioned. Following their arrest, four were executed on July 9, 1982, and another three recanted under pressure and were released.219 In Zanjan, six members of the Bahá’í Assembly of Zanjan were arrested.220

Third National Spiritual Assembly of Iran

On August 29, 1983, Attorney-General of the Revolution, Seyyed Hussein Musavi-Tabrizi, announced a legal ban on all administrative and community activities undertaken by the Bahá’í community.221 This order required the dissolution of the third National Spiritual Assembly and roughly 400 local assemblies.222 Membership in any Bahá’í organization or engagement in acts which could be construed as religious instruction to non-adherents were strictly prohibited.223 The government justified its decision by...
claiming that the administrative Bahá’í bodies were “at war with God (maharib),” “conspirators,” and engaging in espionage.\textsuperscript{224}

Attorney General Musavi-Tabrizi stated in an interview with the government-funded newspaper \textit{Kayhan Hava’i}:

\begin{quote}
[The Bahá’ís] agitate and sabotage in some affairs, and spy for others... All of these problems have caused us to announce right now that all the collective and administrative activities of Bahá’ism in Iran are, and have always been, banned. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Constitution of the country does not recognize them.\textsuperscript{225}
\end{quote}

Before the Bahá’í National Spiritual Assembly complied with the ban, they released an open letter to Iranian leaders refuting the government's allegations. The letter detailed the abuses faced by the Bahá’ís in the Islamic Republic, and appealed to the Iranian people, to the Islamic government and to God to restore their rights as Iranian citizens and as human beings. This letter was the final act of the National Spiritual Assembly before they voluntarily disbanded.\textsuperscript{226}

Despite the dissolution, IRI authorities continued to harass and intimidate the former National Spiritual Assembly members, former members of Local Spiritual Assemblies and other administrative officials around the country, as well as every individual who had signed the open letter defending the Bahá’í community. Between late 1983 and early 1984 over 500 Bahá’ís – most of whom were former council members or related to former members – were arrested without charge.\textsuperscript{227}

In time, seven former members of the third National Spiritual Assembly were arrested and eventually executed by the government:\textsuperscript{228}

\begin{quote}
Jahángír Hidáyatí, who had already attracted much hostile attention from the Islamic regime as a board member of the Bahá’í-run \textit{Nawnahálián} Corporation (see 5.2), was arrested on June 30, 1983, and held in solitary confinement in Evin prison for eleven months, during which time he was repeatedly tortured in an effort to persuade him to recant his faith on public television. He refused. Hidáyatí was executed on May 15, 1984.\textsuperscript{229}
\end{quote}
Shápür (Húshang) Markazi was arrested in September 1983. During the course of his imprisonment, torturers broke his ribs and damaged one eye so badly that it seriously impaired his vision. Their goal was reportedly to force him to admit to false charges implicating the Bahá’í institutions as a network involved in espionage and himself as a spy. 230 He was executed on September 23, 1984.

Ahmad Bashiri was arrested in July of 1983 for serving on several Local Spiritual Assemblies in different towns and eventually on the National Spiritual Assembly of Iran. He was severely tortured during his 15 months in prison and finally executed on November 1, 1984. 231

Dr. Farhád Asdaqí was called to Tehran and asked to serve on the National Spiritual Assembly after the arrest of the second National Assembly. He did this until the third National Assembly was disbanded in September 1983. Dr. Asdaqí went into hiding in 1983 but was finally arrested in June 1984. He was executed on November 19, 1984 – after four months of imprisonment and torture.

Farid Bihmardi was elected and served on the last National Spiritual Assembly of Iran. He was arrested in the streets of Tehran and was imprisoned a total of twenty-two months in Evin prison. During this period he was tortured and spent nearly 9 months in solitary confinement. He was never allowed visitors and was executed on June 10, 1986. It is believed that he was hung; however, since he was buried before his family was told of his execution, no proper examination was done to determine the cause of death. 232

Ardishír Akhtarí was arrested by four Revolutionary Guards from Zarbat Group at Evin on September 11, 1984 at his home. He spent over three years in prison before he was finally executed on September 28, 1987. 233

Amír-Husayn Nádírí was also arrested on September 11, 1984. He was imprisoned at Evin and Gohardasht where he was tortured extensively. He was held in detention for over three years before being executed with Ardishír Akhtarí on September 28, 1987. 234

The IHRDC concludes from the events outlined above that the Revolutionary Courts and other agencies of the Islamic Republic pursued a deliberate strategy designed both to deprive the Bahá’í community of leadership and to criminalize an entire faith. The widespread and systematic nature of the persecution of the Iranian Bahá’ís strongly suggests coordinated action and the public statements of senior members of the Iranian regime serve only to further reinforce this impression.

5.2. Cultural and Social Repression

In addition to targeting individuals that were imprisoned, tortured or executed, the government of the Islamic Republic also launched a direct assault on the collective cultural and social fabric of the Bahá’í community in Iran through the destruction of important religious, historical and cultural sites, and the confiscation of collectively-held community property.

230 Id. at 208.
231 Id. at 211.
233 Id. at 387; Mahmehir Golistaneh, A Tribute to the Faithful (1992) 210.
234 Bahá’í World XX, supra note 232, at 387; Mahmehir Golistaneh, A Tribute to the Faithful (1992) 211.


Destruction of Religious and Cultural Monuments

Numerous Bahá’í religious and cultural monuments were seized, desecrated and/or demolished in the post-Revolutionary period. The first step towards the identification, confiscation and destruction of Bahá’í cultural monuments was the simultaneous confiscation in February 1979 of the assets of two companies: Nawnahálan and Umaná. These were longstanding Bahá’í commercial ventures allowing Bahá’í individuals to own and invest property despite the Pahlavi-era restrictions on property ownership by the Bahá’í community.\(^{235}\)

According to Bahá’í records, the premises of both companies were taken over by Revolutionary Guards during the summer of 1979.\(^{236}\) While Nawnahálan was an investment company, Umana (“Trustees”) was created to be the holding company for all Iranian Bahá’í properties, including almost all of the sites of historical or religious significance.\(^{237}\) The confiscation of Umana therefore allowed the government to easily and quickly identify all the sites of importance to the Bahá’ís through the inspection of the company’s records.

Between March and April 1979, a number of Bahá’í religious monuments were confiscated or destroyed. In Reza’iyeh (Urumiyeh), authorities confiscated the upper room of a building where the Báb had stayed. Another Bahá’í holy site, Siyáh-Chál, was confiscated in Tehran, and in Isfahan, a holy place known as the “House of the King of Martyrs and Beloved of Martyrs” was confiscated. The Garden of Badasht, where Bábís held their first conference in 1848, was demolished.\(^{238}\) The Home of Bahá’u’lláh in Darkula was demolished and the House of Bahá’u’lláh in Takur, where the Bahá’í founder spent his youth, was confiscated. In December 1981, it was completely destroyed and the land sold.\(^{239}\) On July 24, 1979, the holy site known as “the House of the Martyrs” in Arak was destroyed by an unknown group, who also removed the remains of the people buried there.\(^{240}\)

The House of the Báb

The culmination of the attacks on Bahá’í religious monuments was the confiscation and destruction of the House of the Báb in Shiraz, considered a place of pilgrimage to Bahá’ís all over the world. On April 26, 1979, the Bahá’í community in Shiraz was given a notice that the Revolutionary guards were confiscating the property. Local Bahá’ís were informed by the office of the Sepah-eh Pasdaran [Revolutionary guards] that “[in order to protect and prevent possible damage,] [to the House of the Báb] is [being] placed under the supervision of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards of Shiraz.”\(^{241}\)

\(^{235}\) See, e.g., **Summary of Persecution During the Pahlavi Regime**, supra note 4, at 6 (asserting that “[p]roperties belonging to the Bahá’í community could neither be held under the name of the Bahá’í community nor registered for religious purposes. Such properties had to be registered under the names of individual Bahá’ís, and thus [even religious sites] became subject to property and inheritance taxes.”)

\(^{236}\) See **The Bahá’í World XVIII**, supra note 113, at 252. Among the properties the Umana Company held were holy places, including the House of the Báb in Shiraz, the houses of Bahá’u’lláh in Tehran and Takur, a temple site, the national Bahá’í headquarters, Bahá’í cemeteries, and a Bahá’í-operated hospital in Tehran; see **The Universal House of Justice, Messages from the Universal House of Justice 1963 to 1986: The Third Epoch of the Formative Age** (compiled by Geoffrey W. Marks, 1986) at 753.

\(^{237}\) See **The Universal House of Justice, Messages from the Universal House of Justice 1963 to 1986: The Third Epoch of the Formative Age** (compiled by Geoffrey W. Marks, 1986) at 748, 753.

\(^{238}\) See **Map of Bahá’í Holy Places Confiscated or Destroyed (March-April 1979)** in National Spiritual Assembly of the United Kingdom, **Attacks on the Bahá’ís of Iran** (September 9, 1979).


\(^{240}\) Letter from the Department of the Secretariat, International House of Justice to the Bahá’í International Community (August 2, 1979) (on file with IHRDC).

\(^{241}\) **Namiyyih Sepah-i Pasdaran-i Inqilab-i Islamiyyih Fars Darbariyyih Khantiyyih Seyyed Báb** [Notice of Confiscation of the House of the Báb by the Sepah-eh Pasdaran in Shiraz], 6/2/1358 (April 26, 1979) (on file with IHRDC) [attached as Appendix 3].
Although the property was confiscated in April, the government’s ultimate intentions did not become apparent until September. On September 1, 1979, several laborers under the instruction of Mr. Shumali, the head mason responsible for carrying out the destruction of the House of the Báb, began the demolition of other buildings surrounding the House in the building complex. Bahá’í communities around the world, attempting to save the monument, mobilized an international letter-writing campaign to pressure the Islamic Republic to relent. Kúrush Talá’í, a member of the Bahá’í community in Tehran sent to bear witness, concluded that the final decision to destroy the house was probably made on September 7, during a meeting held at the house of Mr. Mo’takif, the mayor of Shiraz, and attended by Ayatollah Mahallati.

A decree confirming the decision to proceed with the demolition was issued by the Attorney General of the Revolutionary Court in Tehran. On September 8, Kúrush Talá’í arrived at the site to find the road blocked, and saw that municipal vans filled with pickaxes and spades were being taken to the building across from the site. Later that day, events began to escalate. Talá’í recounted:

At 11 o’clock in the morning, a group of people arrived in the street. In front of them was an old man called Haji Sharif, who is an official in the Endowment Department in Shiraz. Next to him was a mullah called Tuba’i, who was marshalling a number of armed men. Behind them were about 150 people. The armed men from the Mihdiyyih Komiteh numbered about 30, and about 10 to 12 ordinary people carried arms, as well. They came near Hosseiniyyih and suddenly they broke the lock of the house no. 5, which was not under Bahá’í occupation and had already been confiscated by the Revolutionary forces, and then they entered the house no. 2 before entering the House of the Báb next door. When they arrived, they didn’t waste a minute and started demolishing it. Haji Sharif and a few others whom I had met before in the house of Mahallati were giving orders. One of the first to enter the House of the Báb was the attendant of the [Mihdiyyih Komiteh]. The Mullah who was in front of the procession was giving orders also. On the upper rooms of the House of the Báb they started destroying the plaster and opening the walls to the house no. 3.

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242 Statement by Kúrush Tala’i forwarded by Hushmand Fatheazam regarding the House of the Báb in Shiraz (October 2, 1979) at 1 [hereinafter Statement by Kúrush Tala’i regarding the House of the Báb] (on file with IHRDC).

243 See, e.g., Telegraph from Bahá’í community of Taichung, Taiwan to Ayatollah Khomeini, dated June 23, 1979 (appealing, in the name of the standards of “justice and tolerance promoted by Islam”, for the expropriation of Bahá’í holy sites to be stopped) (on file with IHRDC).

244 Mr. Tala’i was subsequently executed in January 1982 as a newly elected member of the Local Spiritual Assembly in Tehran. See THE BAHÁ’Í QUESTION: CULTURAL CLEANSING IN IRAN, supra note 118, at 81.

245 Statement by Kúrush Tala’i regarding the House of the Báb, supra note 241, at 2.

246 Id. at 4.

247 The Endowment and Charity Organization (Sazmanih Owqaf va Umurih Khairiyyih) is a sub-organization of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance but manages to maintain its independence by having a director appointed by the Supreme Leader. The scope of this organization's work includes looking after mosques, endowments (typically land and buildings) and holy places, publishing Islamic educational material, and engaging in charitable activities; see http://english.awqaf.ir/ (accessed November 22, 2006).

248 This was one of the local Komitehs; its name is a reference to the awaited Twelfth Imam (or Mahdi).

249 Statement by Kúrush Tala’i regarding the House of the Báb, supra note 242, at 4.
'Abdu'l-Husayn Taslímí, with a few others, approached Ayatollah Bahá'eddín Mahallati to appeal to him, as a senior cleric in Shiraz, to prevent further destruction of the building. Mr. Taslímí gave an account of what then took place:

[Mahallati] knew all the details and said, “yes, that is the House of Heresy. It has been so for 130 years and now it should be demolished.” I replied, “the brick and wood of a house cannot be heresy. Besides, what is the fault of innocent people living on this street or the houses in the vicinity that they should be constantly threatened with the demolition of their houses?” His reply was, “these people either should become Muslims, or anything may befall them.” I replied, “Mr. Mahallati, sir, is this the meaning of Islamic justice? What about the humanitarian principles of Islam?” His answer was, “those are for Jews and Christians. But these people (Bahá’ís) either should become Muslim, or it will not be a problem if their homes are demolished. That House of Heresy (House of the Báb) should also be destroyed.” When the conversation reached this point we thought there would be no use to continue… We departed with the understanding that Ayatollah Mahallati was one of the main architects of the demolition of the House.250

In 1981, the site was transformed into a road and public square.251 The area was eventually completely razed to prepare for the construction of the Mosque of Mahdi, which was built over the site.252

**Destruction of Bahá’í Centers and Desecration of Bahá’í Cemeteries**

The Islamic Republic also seized and destroyed Bahá’í community centers around the country. On March 6, 1979, Ayatollah Qomi told the newspaper *Ettelā‘at* that the Bahá’ís were spies for Britain, Russia, the USA, and Israel; which justified the confiscation and destruction of all Bahá’í centers, and the confiscation of all Bahá’í documents.253 In Tehran, the publishing offices of the Bahá’í National Center and the local Bahá’í center were closed and sealed, and the books and documents within were removed.254 The Bahá’í center in Marvdasht was razed to the ground.255

The desecration of Bahá’í cemeteries occurred across the country; in Sangsar, Bahnamir, Koshkak, Shahsavaran, Babolsar, Manşhad, and Chahabar, local Bahá’í cemeteries were destroyed.256 In Sa‘ādi, Yazd and Shiraz, Bahá’í remains were exhumed by vandals, and families were prevented by the authorities from re-burying their dead.257 On December 5, 1981, the Bahá’í cemetery in Tehran was confiscated and closed, and thirteen cemetery employees were arrested, by an order of the Central Revolutionary Court.258

Only one month later, on January 14, 1982, the Bahá’í cemetery of Bab-salman, a village near Tehran,
was also closed, and the Bahá’ís of Tehran were compelled to bury their dead in an area reserved by the authorities specifically for “infidels” - a barren area known as La’nat-Abad (“City of the Accursed”).

In December 1983, the Bahá’í cemetery in Babolsar was confiscated by the Foundation for the Dispossessed and Bahá’í representatives were forced to seek judicial intervention in order to bury their dead.

**Destruction of Bahá’í Community Property**

Government authorities also confiscated and closed down Bahá’í community properties such as schools, hospitals and playgrounds. The Institution of Higher Education, the Summer School (Hadiqih), youth recreation grounds in Shiraz and Tehran, and the School of Hushangi in Yazd were all closed in the post-revolutionary period.

**Mitháqiyyih Hospital**

One of the best documented cases of confiscation is that of the Mitháqiyyih Hospital, a Bahá’í-owned and run hospital in Tehran. In early June 1979, Professor Manúchihr Hakím, the founder of the hospital, learned that the Mehrabad Komiteh had labeled the hospital “anti-Islamic and anti-revolutionary” and had demanded the right to supervise the hospital’s activities. Arguing that such interference by a Komiteh would be illegal, Prof. Hakím contacted the Komiteh and the Medical Association of Iran, requesting that any such action be supported by a written order. His request provoked a visit from two men who presented Prof. Hakím with a letter from the Deputy Chief Administrator of the Office of Confiscated Material Foundation for the Dispossessed, Abulqasim Sarhadizadih. The document stated:

> According to this order, Dr. Khosrow Sadiqi Tehrani and Mr. Mohammad Raziqi are assigned to investigate and identify all of the affairs of the Mitháqiyyih Hospital that was confiscated according to the Revolutionary Court and take necessary actions regarding the [confiscated hospital].

Professor Hakím recorded the details of this meeting:

> These two people, Dr. Khosrow Sadiqi Tehrani and Mr. Raziqi, questioned [me] the whole day, and while Dr. Tehrani was doing the interrogation, Mr. Raziqi… was interjecting remarks… [asserting that] 1) one-half of the people in charge of torturing others were Bahá’ís; 2) Mr.

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259 *Id.*

260 This is one of the most powerful of the various state-run foundation-corporations established after the revolution to help the government consolidate economic and political control. This foundation controls thousands of workshops, factories, hotels and other properties obtained when they were nationalized in the earlier years of the revolution. The Foundation for the Dispossessed is under the authority of the Supreme Leader and exempt from oversight by other government organs. See Ali Aboualebi, *State-Society Relations and Prospects for Democracy in Iran*, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 3. (September 2001). It was reported that the Foundation for the Dispossessed controls as much as $80 billion in assets and has an annual turnover of $10 billion. See Amir Taheri, *Who Rules Iran*, Iran Press Service, March 2004, available at [http://www.iran-press-service.com/articles_2004/Mar_04/who_rules_iran_29304.htm](http://www.iran-press-service.com/articles_2004/Mar_04/who_rules_iran_29304.htm) (accessed November 28, 2006).

261 *Namiyyih Ra’is Shabiyyih Yik-i Dadgah-i Babolsar bih Shahrdar-ih Babolsar Darbariyyih Ghabristan-i Bahá’i ha* [Letter from the Ministry of Justice of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the mayor and district governor of Babolsar regarding arrangements for burying dead Bahá’ís in confiscated Bahá’í cemetery], dated December 26, 1983 (on file with the IHRDC).

262 *Id.*

263 *Namiyyih Doctor Manúchihr-i Hakím Darbariyyih Bimaristan-i Mitháqiyyih* [Letter from Professor Manúchihr Hakím regarding confiscation of Bahá’í hospital], dated 26/4/1358 (July 17, 1979) (on file with the IHRDC).

264 *Id.*

265 *Id.*

266 *Id.*
Hoveida, General Nasiri and Mr. Sabiti were Bahá’ís; 3) the Shah and Queen Farah were Bahá’ís.267

The Central Revolutionary Court further formalized the takeover of the hospital by ordering its confiscation. The court order cited the influence of Bahá’ís in founding, funding and operating the hospital, its connection to the Universal House of Justice, accusations of anti-Islamic propaganda and Zionism as reason for the confiscation.268 Other charges included that “out of the 290 employees of the Hospital, the 123 Bahá’ís ‘most probably have been responsible for advancing the interests of imperialism.”269

Through an emissary, Prof. Hakim appealed to Prime Minister Bazargan on behalf of the hospital. The Prime Minister responded that he had no authority and that “[t]his confiscation is done by the Revolutionary Committee, which is under direct supervision of the Imam [Ayatollah Khomeini].”270 Prof. Hakim was murdered in Tehran by an unknown gunman on January 12, 1980.271

As with the targeting of the Bahá’í leadership, the IHRDC concludes that the systematic destruction of important historic, cultural and religious monuments was designed to expunge all traces of the origins of the Bahá’í faith in Iran and to intimidate the Bahá’í community into abandoning their beliefs. The deprivation of objects of great significance and the destruction of community institutions seem explicitly designed to destroy the community’s sense of identity and cohesiveness.

5.3. Economic and Social Repression

The post-revolutionary period was also a time of acute discrimination for ordinary members of the Bahá’í faithful. The authorities of the Islamic Republic imposed a number of hardships on members of the Bahá’í faith apparently designed to suffocate the economic life of the community. These included bars to employment and rules preventing Bahá’ís from entering educational institutions or owning property. This further resulted in a loss of livelihood, and economic stability for adults, and the deprivation of educational opportunities in public schools and higher education for their children. Bahá’í businessmen were denied permits, licenses, and government contracts. Because many of the individuals mentioned in this section of the report still reside in Iran, it has been necessary to conceal their identities behind pseudonymic initials. In each instance, specific documentation relating to these victims is held on file at the IHRDC.

Property

As late as 1982, the authorities made a regular practice of seizing the assets of executed Bahá’ís and their family members.272 In some cases, the houses of executed Bahá’ís were actually seized prior to a public acknowledgment of their execution.273 There are numerous reported incidents of looting, vandalizing, and

268 Ra’y-i Dadgáh-i Inqiláb Darbáriyyih Mo’assasín-i Bimaristán-ih Mítháqíyyih [Excerpts from the verdict of the Central Revolutionary Court ordering the confiscation of the Bahá’í Hospital (Mítháqíyyih Hospital) in Tehran], reprinted in BIC REPORT ON THE PERSECUTION OF A RELIGIOUS MINORITY, supra note 81, at 80.
269 Ra’y-i Dadgáh-i Inqiláb Darbáriyyih Mo’assasín-i Bimaristán-ih Mítháqíyyih [Excerpts from the verdict of the Central Revolutionary Court ordering the confiscation of the Bahá’í Hospital (Mítháqíyyih Hospital) in Tehran] (on file with IHRDC), reprinted in BIC REPORT ON THE PERSECUTION OF A RELIGIOUS MINORITY, supra note 81, at 80.
273 Id.
setting fire to the private property of Bahá’ís, beginning in the months just prior to the Revolution and continuing after the Revolution. These events occurred across the country, ranging from villages, such as Kata, Khurmauj, and Sangsar, to large cities like Shiraz, Tehran, and particularly Yazd. In many other cases, the properties of Bahá’ís were confiscated on orders from government officials and well respected clerics. Some of these properties were seized while the Bahá’ís were still alive, others were prohibited from passing through intestacy.

**Ruling 59/70**

In 1980, the Revolutionary Court in Yazd passed “Ruling 59/70” which empowered the local authorities led by Ayatollah Saduqi to confiscate privately-held Bahá’í property following the death of the owner. The actual text of this ruling has remained secret and inaccessible, although its implementation sheds much light onto its contents. At first, the damaging effects of this ruling were not immediately apparent, and its implementation proceeded very gradually. In the initial stages, individual Bahá’ís would be summoned to the Revolutionary Court, where it was confirmed that the individual was indeed Bahá’í and determined what property he or she held. From that hearing onwards, the property was considered to be confiscated. However, the ruling permitted the owner to remain, with his or her family, in the residence for the remainder of the owner’s life. Upon the owner’s death, however, the property could not remain in the family unless it was inherited by a Muslim family member. If no Muslim relative could be found, the property automatically transferred to the ownership of Imam Khomeini’s Charitable Organization (Komitiyyih Imdadih Imam Khomeini). A copy of a letter from the Property Office of the Province of Yazd to the Registrar’s Office of Yazd illustrates how Ruling 59/70 was enforced:

According to verdict number 73/861/D/R-23/6/73 issued by the Islamic Revolutionary Court of Yazd, considers the accused, Mihrabán Ahurá’í, son of Jamshid, as applicable to the ruling 59/70. Therefore, an ownership deed is in the process of being issued in the name of the Commerce Complex of the Imam Khomeini’s Charitable Organization in Yazd for the orchard… The aforementioned individual’s deed of ownership [for this property] is therefore void and if the deed is presented to you by anyone, first, you are to refrain from doing any transaction with that individual and second, take possession of the presented deed and send it to this office.

IHRDC has obtained several letters of this type, each detailing a near identical story. The court rulings include such language as “in light of the content of the file and the report… which indicates that the aforementioned and his wife have passed away and that their children are also Bahá’ís – hence this case is subject to ruling 59/70 of this court, and therefore an order in favor of the confiscation of their properties for the benefit of the Commerce Complex of the Imam’s Charitable Organization is issued and announced.”

Ayatollah Saduqi proved particularly assiduous in his persecution of the Bahá’í community of Yazd. In a Friday sermon delivered on June 20, 1980, Ayatollah Saduqi denounced the Bahá’ís as heretics and announced that the Bahá’ís “were plotting in all the towns of Iran.” He invited the “faithful” to “seek out

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274 See generally Recent Attacks (1978), supra note 255.
275 Id.
276 Namiyiyih Bahá’iyan-i Yazd [Letter from Yazd], 25/9/1374 (December 16, 1995) at 1 (on file with IHRDC).
277 Id.
278 Dadgah-i Inqilab-i Islamiyyih Yazd, Barg-i Bazju’i va Suratmajlis, Darbariyyih Amval-i CA [Islamic Revolutionary Court of Yazd, Record of Interrogation and Proceedings regarding the property of CA], dated 2/12/1372 (February 21, 1994).
279 Namiyiyih Bahá’iyan-i Yazd [Letter from Yazd], 25/9/1374 (December 16, 1995).
281 Dadgah-i Inqilab-i Islamiyyih Yazd, Barg-i Bazju’i va Suratmajlis, Darbariyyih CB [Islamic Revolutionary Court of Yazd, Record of Interrogation and Proceedings, regarding the case of CB], dated 22/8/1373 (November 13, 1994) (on file with the IHRDC) [attached as Appendix 4].
the Bahá’ís and deliver them to the revolutionary prosecutor’s office.”

His remarks provoked a mob attack resulting in the destruction of hundreds of Bahá’í homes and the dismissal of several hundred Bahá’ís from their jobs.

Purging Committees

On June 12, 1980, Ayatollah Khomeini appointed a Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution (SCCR), tasked with “Islamizing” the universities, training and selecting professors and students, and bringing the university curriculum and management policies in line with the goals of the Cultural Revolution. The SCCR was initially composed of six members, but over time it expanded to include “the heads of the three branches of government,” which at the time included Khamenei (Executive), Ardebili (Judiciary) and Rafsanjani (Legislative), as well as the Ministers of Education and Culture and other members of parliament.

Inspired by the Supreme Leader’s initiative, a number of other “purging committees” sprang up during the summer of 1980 to eliminate supporters of the Shah and Westernized elements from the government and workplace. It has been estimated by the historian Said Amir Arjomand that by the beginning of July 1980, after less than ten days of purges, over 1,000 functionaries had been discharged and that 150 “purging committees” were operating across the country. Certain government ministries had individual “purging committees” which reviewed employee files and removed those deemed unsuitable. While some of these committees may have formed spontaneously, it appears that the government in other instances set up these committees. Inevitably, Bahá’ís were among those targeted in these “purging” campaigns.

282 Eric Rouleau, Des militaires de haut rang sont arrêtés pour complot [High-ranking military officers are arrested for plotting], LE MONDE, June 24, 1980; see also Letter from the Bahá’í International Community to Dr. Mansour Farhang, Permanent Representative to the UN (June 26, 1980) (on file with HRDC) and THE BAHÁ’Í WORLD XVIII, supra note 113, at 256.

283 THE BAHÁ’Í WORLD XVIII, supra note 113, at 256.


285 Khomeini appointed the six original members of the SCCR in his order of June 1980. They were: Dr. Bahonar, Dr. Hassan Habibi, Dr. Shariatmadari, Dr. Abdol-Karim Soroush, Jalaeddin Farsi, Mahdi Rabbani Amlashi and Shams Al-Ahmad. SHARGH, supra note 284.

286 SCCR website, supra note 284, states that the addition of these members was announced by Khomeini in 1984.

287 SHARGH, supra note 284. The SCCR website, supra note 284, states that in 1983, Khomeini responded to a proposal made by then-president Khamenei to restructure the committee, and added the following members: Prime Minister, Ministers of Culture and Higher Education and Culture and Islamic Guidance, two students appointed by University Jihad and Mr. Ali Shariatmadari. Then, in 1984, the heads of the three branches of government were added, as well as Mahdavi Kani, Seyyed Kazem Akrami (Minister of Education), Reza Devri, Nasrollah Pourjavadi and Mohammed Reza Hashemi.

288 SHARGH, supra note 284. In an interview, an SCCR member denied that “cleansing” was a goal of the council—he conceded that “some people might have gone overboard”, but stated these were not the result of a unified program on the part of the committee, but rather arbitrary interactions and personal actions not intended by Khomeini or the SCCR. Id.

289 THE TURBAN FOR THE CROWN, supra note 71, at 144. There is debate over whether these other groups are actually sub-organizations or independent of the SCCR.

290 See, e.g., BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, The Purges in Iran (July 1, 1980) (discussing purge committee for the Oil Ministry and quoting a Ministry spokesman as stating that those expelled include 500 persons associated with the dissolved SAVAK security apparatus, all Freemasons, members of the dissolved parliament and persons associated with the previous regime.)

291 See, e.g., Assef Bayat, Workers’ Control after the Revolution, MERIP REPORTS (March-April 1983) at 20, with regard to factory purging committees: “About a year and a half after the revolution, in August 1980, the government itself moved to set up special committees in [factory] production units dedicated to ‘the purification… from the conspiracies of the agents of the West, the East, and the overthrown Pahlavi regime.’… These purging bodies (hay’at-i paksazi) consisted of a representative each of the provincial governor, the Revolutionary Prosecutor, the factory management, the Ministry of Labor, and one elected employee.”
**Loss of Livelihood**

Soon after the establishment of the Islamic Republic, circulars from the central government were disseminated throughout Iran, instructing that Bahá’ís were to be removed from civil service positions. In a typical example, the Governor of the Province of Fars, Ni’matollah Taqa, circulated a letter marked “confidential” warning that individuals who did not return to Islam would henceforth be expelled from government employment for the crime of immorality and would have no rights, as provided by Article 14, Part 3 of the National Employment Laws.292 The letter emphasized that:

> If you express regret and remorse about your affiliation with the wayward sect [of Bahá’ís]... and seek refuge in the rejuvenating bosom of Islam... your penitence will be accepted and you will be hired to work and your withheld wages will be paid.293

On June 30, 1980, *Jomhouri Eslami* published an article entitled “Payment to Bahá’ís from National Treasury has been declared haram [prohibited].” The article stated that 44 people had been dismissed from their positions under Article 440 of the Civil Service code, “on charges of belief in the Bahá’í creed.”294 When the Ministry of Education assured retired Bahá’ís that they would continue to receive their pensions, Ayatollahs Mahallati, Shirazi, and Dastgheib issued an order stating that giving money from the treasury to Bahá’ís was forbidden, and that anyone who violated this instruction would be considered *khātī* [a transgressor].295 The Organization for Expansion and Renovation of Industries of Iran citing the Ayatollahs’ edict on July 3, 1980, issued a similar circular.296 The circular also indicated that companies operating under the auspices of the organization were responsible, upon the identification of a Bahá’í employee, for suspending that individual and reporting the case to the organization’s “Purge Committee” in Tehran.

Similarly, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs issued a letter to the Labor Department informing it of new regulations regarding the purging of Bahá’í employees. The document specified that:

> In accordance with Paragraph 8 of Article 29 of the Reconstruction of Human Resources Policy for Ministries, Governmental Organizations and other Government-affiliated Offices which was approved on 5/7/136 [Oct. 27, 1981] by the Consultative Islamic Majlis, the punishment for membership in misguided sects recognized by all Muslims to be outside of Islam [having left Islam] or membership in organizations whose doctrine and constitution are founded on the basis of rejecting the divine religions, is permanent dismissal from governmental employment.297

The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs further stated that government officials were forbidden from overturning such dismissal orders. Bahá’í employees, it was argued, had been legally prohibited from government employment since the adoption of the 1922 legislation and therefore, they were required to...

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292 See Nāmiyyih Ni’matollah Taqa bih Karmand-i Bahá’í [Letter of expulsion from Ni’matollah Taqa, Governor of Fars Province] (date not legible) (on file with IHRDC).

293 Id.

294 Az suyih Ayatollah Rabbani Shirazi, Ayatollah Dastgheib va Ayatollah Mahallati Pardakht-i Pul-i Beitu'l-mal bih Bahá’iyan Haram I’lam Shud [From Ayatollah Rabbani-Shirazi, Ayatollah Dastgheib and Ayatollah Mahallati- Payment of money from public funds to Bahá’ís is declared prohibited], *JOMHOURI ESLAMI*, 9/4/1359 (June 30, 1980).

295 Id.

296 Nāmiyyih Hassan Sadr, Mu’avin-i Vazir-i Sana’yih va Ra’is-i Hay’at-i Amil bih Sazman-i Gustari Sh va Nawsaziyyih Sanayi’i Iran [Letter to Organization for Expansion and Renovation of Industries of Iran from the Deputy Minister of Industries and the Head of the Board of Directors, Hassan Sadr] 12/4/1359 (July 3, 1980) (on file with IHRDC) [attached as Appendix 5]. The circular cited a June 30, 1980 issue of *JOMHOURI ESLAMI* and was based on article 440 of the Employment Law of the State. A handwritten note at the bottom of the copy of the order on file with IHRDC requests that the human resources department review all employee files to identify such people.

return all and any wages earned from the National Treasury. In some cases, this would require the employees to return many years’ worth of wages or face jail time.

Sometime after a series of circulars had been distributed by the central government, public announcements were made of dismissals of Bahá’ís from corporations. These notices were either published in large newspapers or were in the form of personal letters to Bahá’í employees.

On August 31, 1980, the Ministry of Oil notified a Bahá’í employee of the National Iranian Oil Company that his salary and pension had been suspended and that he should not come into work until further notice. However, the letter stated that if the employee denied his affiliation with Bahá’ísm in a written statement, his employment might be reconsidered. In Ahvaz, the Board of Reconstruction of Human Resources of the Ministry of Oil notified Bahá’í employees that they had 15 days to report to the Office of Public Relations, or face prosecution. The Board of Reconstruction’s circular also called on all Ministry employees to identify Bahá’ís or anyone in communication with them.

In a letter to the ZamZam Company, the judge of the Islamic Revolutionary Court of Kermanshah announced that “if Bahá’í workers and employees are willing to repent, and write in the personnel files that they adhere to the Islamic Ithna Ashari creed (the followers of the twelve Imams), and reproduce and publish this in the widely circulated newspapers along with their photographs” they could keep their jobs. They were given 20 days to fulfill this demand.

In a February 1982 meeting of the Supreme Council of Banks, the Secretariat stated that Bahá’í employees “should be suspended from work and receive no money pending a final decision by the Board of Reconstruction of Human Resources.” Following this decision, a letter was circulated at Mellat Bank requesting a list of Bahá’ís who refused to recant be sent to the Personnel Department “so that the necessary action [could] be taken.”

Irsaco Company in Tehran notified its Bahá’í employees in 1982 that “as long as they have not cut off their relation with this sect, and have not accepted the Islamic Republic, they do not have the right to enter this factory.” The company emphasized that they were being fired purely on the basis of their faith, not because of any subversive actions.

Bahá’í public servants typically received notification of their dismissal through a letter from their employer, instructing them to refrain from coming to work in the future unless they were prepared to publicly recant their faith. Letters of dismissal commonly noted that if the employee would simply recant, their employment or pension could be reinstated.

298 Namiyyih Vazir-i Kishavarzi va Umran-i Rusta'i bih Karmand-i Ikhrajiiyih Bahá’í [Statement by Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Construction, Stopping Payment to Bahá’ís], dated 26/6/1360 (September 17, 1981) (on file with IHRDC) [attached as Appendix 6].
Some employers appear to have been reluctant to enforce the dismissal orders and provided letters which attested to the skills and contributions of those Bahá’ís who were fired. Warehouse manager CD was dismissed from the army because he was Bahá’í, despite the fact that his superiors testified that he “performed his duties to perfection.”\(^{305}\) In a similar instance, CE was dismissed from as an employee of a Tehran Travel Agency. The Agency’s termination letter recognized his “sincere services” and wished him “every success,” before adding regretfully: “[Because] you refused to conceal your belief and explicitly stated in this questionnaire [that was filled earlier] that you were a Bahá’í, hence… your employment is hereby terminated.”\(^{306}\)

Occasionally, Bahá’ís employed in the private sector were also affected by the prohibition on Bahá’í employment. CF was instructed by the Revolutionary Committee in Gorgan to close down his independent business because of his “suspicious connection with anti-revolutionary elements and religious minorities is a danger to the revolution.”\(^{307}\)

Employees in the education sector were also significantly affected. In June 1979, Muhammad Ali Raja’i, the Minister of Education, issued a memo referring to decree no. 14974/2 which ordered the expulsion of all Bahá’í teachers from the nation’s schools. The memo explained that “the Ministry of Education... will not allow, like the previous regime, the followers of the Bahá’í sect to stay in its educational unit, and through this channel, defile and lead astray the pure minds and thoughts of the innocent students,” and that “dismissal according to the existing law is a minimum punishment.”\(^{308}\) The ramifications of this memo extended across the Islamic Republic of Iran. For example, in Fars, a local “Purge Committee” under the Department of Education dismissed 44 Bahá’í teachers.\(^{309}\) In June 1980, an order was circulated by the superintendent of Sabzevar requiring the Sabzevar Ministry of Education to halt payment of all Bahá’í employees and send their names and last pay stubs to the Central Employment Office.\(^{310}\)

As with the dismissal of Bahá’ís from other sectors, Bahá’í employees under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education were given the option of recanting their faith in order to maintain their position. This was the case for CG who was told that she could either “announce that you do not adhere to this sect in one of the widely published newspapers (Kayhan, Ettela’at, Jomhouri Eslami) and send the clipping to the [Ministry of Culture and Higher Education]” or seek to “obtain a testimony from one of the Marjas of Islam showing you do not adhere to the Bahá’í sect.”\(^{311}\)

By 1987, over 11,000 Bahá’í government employees had lost their jobs as a result of the anti-Bahá’í legislation.\(^{312}\)

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\(^{305}\) Namih az Dayiriyyih Makhazin – Shubiyyih Khudruha-yeh Artish Darbariyyih Agha-yih CD [Letter from Army (Storage-Automotives Branch) about Mr. CD], dated 20/11/1358 (February 9, 1980) (on file with IHRDC).

\(^{306}\) Namih az, Ra’is-i Shirkat-i Mosaferiyatiyyih bigh Agha-yih CE [Letter to CE from his employer], dated 21/6/1373 (September 12, 1994) (on file with IHRDC).


\(^{308}\) Namiyiyih Mohammad Ali Raja’i Sarpasra[i- Vizarat-i Amuzish va Parvarish Darbariyyih Hukm-i 14974/2-J-4-1358 [Letter from Muhammad Ali Raja’i, Guardian of the Ministry of Education of the Islamic Republic of Iran referring to Decree No. 14973/2], dated 1/4/1358 (June 22, 1979) (on file with IHRDC).

\(^{309}\) Tavasut-i Kumisiun-i 5 nafariyyih Paksazi, 104 Farhangiyyih Fars Ikhraj va Baznishastih Shudand [As Directed by the Five-member Purging Committee, 104 members of the Education Department of Fars have been Expelled and Put On Pension], KAYHAN, dated 9/4/1359 (June 30, 1980).


Bahá’í students were also targeted in the purge of the education system. In the post-revolutionary period, schools across Iran issued blanket statements prohibiting the enrollment of Bahá’í students, as was the case with Pishahang High School in July 1979; the school authorities distributed instructions to applying students which stated that “students must be followers of one of the official religions of the country (Muslim, Jewish, Christian or Zoroastrian).”

Many Bahá’í students who wished to enroll for the 1981-1982 school year were required to complete an application form issued by the Ministry of Education which included questions such as whether the applicant or his family were Bahá’í, and if so, if he or she was willing to recant. Those who affirmed their Bahá’í faith were prohibited from admission. Bahá’í students already in school were often expelled in this period. Often they would receive individual letters notifying them of their expulsion which cited their faith as the reason for the decision, as was the case with CH who was expelled from his high school in the province of Kerman. CI received a similar letter of expulsion from the head of her high school in 1981 because she admitted to being a Bahá’í and had “refused to participate in demonstrations or political debates.”

The Ministry of Education formalized the prohibition against Bahá’ís in the university system by issuing a decree in September of 1981, which identified membership in the “misled and heretical sect” of the Bahá’í faith as a “crime,” and prohibited Bahá’í professors and students alike from working for or attending colleges. In a 1982 letter to CJ, the University Purge Committee of her university in Mashhad made it clear that her expulsion was a result of her Bahá’í faith, explaining that “all sects of Islam including the Shi’a consider the Bahá’í faith as a misguided sect for many reasons such as the system of belief in the Prophet, the imamate and their particular adherence to religious laws and regulations which are not derive from the Koran and tradition.”

Bahá’í students studying abroad also had their educational opportunities curtailed. In 1981 Kayhan newspaper reported a new law that defined thirty categories of students who were ineligible to receive a subsidized exchange rate for Iranian students studying abroad; category seven were those “students who are not followers of one of the official religions of the state.”

The IHRDC concludes that the totality of cultural, social and economic pressures placed on Bahá’ís individually and collectively were deliberately calculated to make normal life for the Bahá’í community of Iran unsustainable.

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313 Namih bih Awliyayih Danish Amuzan Az Dabiristan-i Pishahang [Instructions to the Parents from the Pishahang high school] (regarding the qualifications required of students, one of which was belief in one of the state religions, excluding Bahá’ís), dated 15/4/1358 (July 6, 1979) (on file with the IHRDC).
317 BIC REPORT ON THE PERSECUTION OF A RELIGIOUS MINORITY, supra note 81, at 17.
318 Namih bih Khanun CJ az Danishgah [Letter of expulsion to CJ from University Crusade organization of a University in Mashhad], 27/12/1360 (March 18, 1982) (on file with IHRDC).
319 Mugharrarat-i Jadid-i Irsal-i Arz-i Danishfoo-ye Eela’am Shod [New laws for wiring foreign currency to students outside of Iran was announced], KAYHAN, 13/5/1360 (August 4, 1981).
6. Present Conditions

6.1. International Intervention

By 1983, Iran was beginning to face international pressure to end its persecution of the Bahá’ís. UN resolutions initially failed to impact the actions of the Islamic Republic, and on March 14, 1984, the Commission on Human Rights passed resolution 1984/54, which mandated the appointment of a Special Representative to monitor the human rights situation in Iran.

The Special Representative’s reports typically provoked an aggressive response from the Iranian delegation to the UN, especially when it came to the Bahá’í issue. The Islamic Republic's refusal to accept the Bahá’í community as a religious minority became the subject of an ongoing battle between UN Special Representative Reynaldo Galindo Pohl and the Iranian regime, as this passage from one of Pohl’s reports reflects:

He [the IRI delegate, Kamal Kharrazi] said that those resolutions [concerning the Bahá’ís] contained subjective criteria and lacked objectivity and good will. He said, in particular, that, as on previous occasions, such resolutions attempted to confer on groups a status that they did not really have. That indirect language referred to the attribution of the status of religious minority to the Bahá’ís. Those problems had prevented the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran from cooperating fully with the Special Representative…

Iran continued to contend that the Bahá’í faith did not constitute a religious community but was a political organization that fronted as a religion to gain sympathy from the international community. Iranian representatives to the UN and other countries justified mistreatment of the Bahá’ís by claiming, inter alia, that: (a) the Bahá’í faith was created by the British in order to create division amongst Muslims; (b) Bahá’ís were Zionist spies gathering information to be taken back to Israel; and (c) Bahá’ís had...
conspired with the Pahlavi regime and the SAVAK secret police. The Bahá’í International Community invited delegates from the UN Commission on Human Rights to investigate the Bahá’í headquarters in Haifa, Israel, and determine for themselves the accuracy of the Iranian government’s accusations.

By the late 1980s, a combination of increasing international pressure and the internal stresses caused by the Iraq-Iran war seems to have led to a reduction in the overt acts of persecution directed against the Bahá’ís. In 1988, Reynaldo Galindo Pohl reported that, although 152 Bahá’ís were still in prison, the “intensity of the campaign of the persecution against the Bahá’ís had somewhat diminished in the first half of 1988.”

6.2. Renewed Focus on the Bahá’í Question

After the death of Ayatollah Khomeini on June 3, 1989, the constitution was amended and the Assembly of Experts elected a new Supreme Leader. Hojjatolislam Seyyed Ali Khamenei, who had held the office of the presidency from 1981-1989, was elevated by the Council of Experts to the rank of Ayatollah and chosen to be their Supreme Leader. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was elected as the new President.

Evidence of a renewed regime focus on the Bahá’í community came in a confidential memo dated February 25, 1991, written by Dr. Seyyed Mohammad Reza Hashemi Golpaygani, Secretary of the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution. The memo summarizes the steps taken towards the development of a new government policy on “The Bahá’í Question” before enumerating the actual policy initiatives that resulted from the process. In December of 1990, Ayatollah Khamenei instructed President Rafsanjani

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327 See Khosroshahi Transcript, supra note 324, at 7 (stating that “the Bahá’í hypocritical, criminal leaders were they key figures and most important policymakers of the God-forsaken regime of the Shah.”)
330 Khomeini’s initial successor was to be Ayatollah Montazeri, but after Montazeri publicly denounced the mass prison executions which took place in 1988, he was no longer in consideration for this position. See ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN, TORTURED CONFESSIONS, supra note 6, at 219-221; see also Letter from Ayatollah Khomeini to Ayatollah Montazeri (November 22, 1997), available at: http://www.irvl.net/Translation%20of%20Ayatollah%20Khomeini%20Letter%20Dismissing%20Montazeri.htm (accessed October 23, 2006.)
331 LIFE OF THE AYATOLLAH, supra note 38, at 309-310.
332 Namiyyih Seyyed Mohammad Reza Hashemi Golpaygani, Dabir-i Shurayih Aliyyih Ingilab-i Farhangi [Memorandum by Dr. Seyyed Mohammad Reza Hashemi Golpaygani, Secretary of the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, dated 6/12/1369 (February 25, 1991)] [hereinafter SCCR Memorandum] [attached as Appendix 7]. The document also appears to contain a note from the Supreme Leader (see IRAN'S SECRET BLUEPRINT, supra note 186, at 51). This document was brought to the attention of UN Special Representative Reynaldo Galindo Pohl in 1993; see http://info.bahai.org/article-1-8-3-14.html. The IRI, however, claimed the document was a forgery. In 1991, members of the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution included President Rafsanjani, Abdullah Ja’far Ali Jasbi, Ahmad Ahmad, Hassan Ibrahim Habibi, Ali Akbar Velayati, Iraj Fazel, Ali Shariatmadari, and Reza Davari Ardakani.
to address “the Bahá’í Question,” and the issue was referred to the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution (SCCR). It is clear from the text of the memo that Ayatollah Khamenei was seeking concrete policy proposals “devised in such a way that everyone will understand what should or should not be done.” The SCCR took into consideration the contents of the IRI constitution, religious and civil laws and general policies of the country before developing the following policy guidelines:

A. General status of the Bahá’ís within the country system:

1. They will not be expelled from the country without reason.

2. They will not be arrested, imprisoned, or penalized without reason.

3. The Government’s dealing with them must be in such a way that their progress and development are blocked.

B. Educational and cultural status:

1. They can be enrolled in schools provided they have not identified themselves as Bahá’ís.

2. Preferably, they should be enrolled in schools which have a strong and imposing religious ideology.

3. They must be expelled from universities, either in the admission process or during the course of their studies, once it becomes known that they are Bahá’ís.

4. Their political (espionage) activities must be dealt with according to appropriate Government laws and policies, and their religious and propaganda activities should be answered by giving them religious and cultural responses, as well as propaganda.

5. Propaganda institutions (such as the Islamic Propaganda Organization) must establish an independent section to counter the propaganda and religious activities of the Bahá’ís.

6. A plan must be devised to confront and destroy their cultural roots outside the country.

C. Legal and social status:

1. Permit them a modest livelihood as is available to the general population.

2. To the extent that it does not encourage them to be Bahá’ís, it is permissible to provide them the means for ordinary living in accordance with the general rights given to every Iranian citizen, such as ration booklets, passports, burial certificates, work permits, etc.

3. Deny them employment if they identify themselves as Bahá’ís.

4. Deny them any position of influence, such as in the educational sector, etc.

Many of the repressive measures introduced against the Bahá’ís during the 1980s regarding economic, social and cultural rights are reiterated in the 1991 document, demonstrating very little change from policies laid out at the beginning of the revolution.

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333 SCCR Memorandum, supra note 332.
334 Id.
335 Id.
6.3. Bahá’í Institute for Higher Education

Since Bahá’í youths were denied access to a university education, the Bahá’í community created the Bahá’í Institute for Higher Education (BIHE). The school was started as a small, underground operation in 1987 in order to meet the educational needs of the Bahá’í faithful. By 1998, it had a student enrollment of 900 students, a staff of 150 academics and offered complete degree courses in 10 subjects. Classes took place in private homes and were extremely decentralized to avoid provoking the government. Nevertheless, in September of 1998, the Iranian authorities arrested 36 members of the faculty and raided over 500 homes across Iran. Books, computers, records, lab materials, and other equipment were all confiscated. The New York Times reported:

The materials confiscated were neither political nor religious and the people arrested were not fighters or organizers. They were lecturers in subjects like accounting and dentistry; the materials seized were textbooks and laboratory equipment.

After the 1998 raids the BIHE began to rebuild, although it continued to face further obstacles placed in its way by the IRI. From 2001 through 2002, classrooms continued to be shut down, faculty members were harassed and Revolutionary Guards in Mashad and Shiraz confiscated the qualifying exams of students during their examinations. Instruction continues through correspondence courses and where possible classes continue to meet discreetly in small groups. Although Western schools have begun to recognize BIHE graduate degrees, the IRI government refuses to recognize BIHE graduates as members of their profession.

6.4. A New Threat?

Hate Speech

In 2001, the Islamic Republic Documentation Center, which operates under the auspices of the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, also published a book entitled Bahá’ísm in Iran which purports to demonstrate that Bahá’í faith was introduced as a socio-political movement by the colonial powers in an effort to undermine the power and religious authority of the Shi’a clergy.

Since the election of President Ahmadinejad, a new campaign against the Bahá’í community in Iran has begun to take shape in the Iranian media and there some alarming echoes of the 1955 and 1980s campaigns. Four days after the election, Kayhan, the government-sponsored newspaper edited by Supreme Leader's representative, Hossein Shariatmadari, began running a series of negative articles about the Bahá’í faith. The scope of the articles ranged from historical canards to supposed espionage activities, and the alleged immoral conduct of the community. The following titles from articles published by Kayhan in 2005 capture the flavor of their content:

336 IRAN’S SECRET BLUEPRINT, supra note 186, at 63.
338 Ethan Bronner, Iran Closes ‘University’ Run Covertly by the Bahá’ís, NEW YORK TIMES, October 29, 1998, at A7.
341 SEYYED SA’ID ZAHID ZAHIDANI & MOHAMMAD ALI SALAMI, BAHÁ’ÍYAT DAR IRAN [BAHÁ’ÍSM IN IRAN] (Islamic Republic Documentation Center, 2001).
Kayhan followed up these articles in January 2006 by publishing the full text of the indictment and court proceedings of a sensational 1949 case concerning the murder of a Muslim family in Abarqú that was blamed on local Bahá’ís. The officers of the Local Spiritual Assembly in Isfandabad and other prominent members of the Bahá’í community were accused of inciting the crime, motivated by the fact that the victims had been heard slandering and insulting the Bahá’í faith.\(^{351}\)

Since July 2006, Kayhan has serialized - in 77 installments - *The Inauspicious Shadow* by Mahnaz Ra’uﬁ. Ra’uﬁ, who claims to be a former Bahá’í who later converted to Islam, portrays the Bahá’í institutions as being corrupt and hungry for both money and power.\(^{352}\) An extended interview with Ra’uﬁ was published in 14 parts between October 14 and November 2 in which she repeated her accusations about the perfidious character of the Bahá’í faith.

Informal reports from inside Iran suggest that these media campaigns have already provoked acts of violence directed against the Bahá’í community, most notably in the city of Yazd.

**Collecting Names**

On March 20, 2006, Asma Jahangir, the UN Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on Freedom of Religion or Belief received a confidential memo from sources inside Iran.\(^{353}\) The memo, stamped “Urgent”, was distributed by the Central Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Office of the Commander in Chief. It stated:

> According to the instruction of the Exalted Rank of the Supreme Leader, His Holiness Ayatollah Khamenei, the Central Headquarters of the Armed Forces has been given the mission to acquire a comprehensive and complete report of all the activities of these sects (including political, economic, social and cultural) for the purpose of identifying all the individuals of these misguided sects. Therefore, we request that you convey to relevant authorities to collect any and all

\(^{352}\) MAHNAZ RA’UFI, *SAYIYYIH SHUM, KAHTIRAT-I YIK NIJAT YAFTIH AZ BAHÁ’IYAT* [THE INAUSPICIOUS SHADOW; MEMOIR OF A PERSON RESCUED FROM BAHÁ’ISM] (Kayhan Research Institute, 2006). This book was published in serial form by KAYHAN newspaper between July 15, 2006 and October 12, 2006.
information about the above mentioned activities of these individuals, in a highly confidential manner, and report it to this Command Headquarters.\footnote{Namiyyih Sitad-i Kulli Niruhayih Musalah-i Farmandehiyyih Kulli Quva Darbariyyih “Shinasa’iyiyih Afradih Firqiyih Babi va Bahá’í”, [Letter from the Main headquarters of the armed forces of the office of the Commander in Chief to multiple recipients regarding “Identification of Individuals of the Misguided Sects of Bahá’ísm and Bábísm”], dated 7/8/1384 (October 29, 2005) (on file with IHRDC) [attached as Appendix 8].}

The letter is signed by Major General Dr. Seyyed Hassan Firuzabadi, the Chairman of the Central Headquarters of the Armed Forces. The document was forwarded to the Ministry of Information of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Belief-Political [organization] of the [office of] the Commander-in-Chief, the Commander of the Revolutionary Guard, the Commander of the Basij Resistance Forces of the Revolutionary Guard, Commander of the Law Enforcement of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Intelligence Deput y of the Law Enforcement of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Representative of Supreme Leader [Ayatollah Khamenei] in the Revolutionary [Guard], the Chairman of the Belief-Political Organization of the Law Enforcement of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Chief Commander of the Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran.\footnote{Id.}

Soon after the Special Rapporteur received this letter, the Iranian regime started arresting members of the Bahá’í community. Those who were arrested were taken into interrogations and released after a few days. The Bahá’í International Community believes that these “revolving door” detentions were intended to intimidate Iranian Bahá’ís and forestall any further protests. There have been 125 such arrests since the beginning of 2005.\footnote{Bahá’í International Community, \textit{Fifty-four Bahá’ís arrested in Iran} (May 24, 2006), available at: http://www.Bahá’í.org/persecution/newsreleases/24-05-06 (accessed October 18, 2006); Human Rights Watch, \textit{Iran: Scores Arrested in Anti-Bahá’í Campaign} (June 6, 2006), available at: http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/06/05/iran13515.htm (accessed October 23, 2006).}

On May 19, 2006, 54 Bahá’í youths were detained in the city of Shiraz. The youths were part of a larger group engaged in a local educational project, modeled after a UNICEF initiative, in which participants taught classes to underprivileged children. The volunteers, who were both Bahá’í and Muslim, had received permission, in writing, from the Islamic Council of Shiraz, to conduct these classes. The authorities initially detained all the volunteers but soon released the Muslim members of the group and one 15-year-old Bahá’í girl without charge. The remaining Bahá’í volunteers were held for a further month before being released on bail. Their trial is pending although the IHRDC has not been able to establish the charges brought against them.\footnote{Id.}

On August 19, 2006, the Ministry of Interior circulated a letter to the deputies responsible for political security in the Provincial Offices around the country, stating that:

Respectfully, according to the reports we have received, some of the elements of the perverse wayward sect of Bahá’ísm are attempting to proselytize and propagate the ideology of Bahá’ísm, under the cover of social and economic activities. In view of the fact that this sect is illegal and that it is exploited by international and Zionist organizations against the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, we therefore ask you to order the relevant offices to cautiously and carefully monitor and manage their [the Bahá’ís’] social activities. In addition, complete the requested information on the attached form and forward it to this office for its use by 15 Shahrivar [September 6, 2006] so that it can be used.\footnote{Namiyyih Vizaratih Kishvar bih Mu’avininih Siyasi-Amniyatihyiyih Ustandarihayih Sarasar-i Kishvar [Letter from the Ministry of Interior to Political-Security Deputies of the provincial offices of the country], dated 28/5/1385 (August 19, 2006) (on file with IHRDC) [attached as Appendix 9].}
7. Conclusion

Since the foundation of the faith, the Bahá’í community in Iran has suffered waves of persecution. Animosity towards the Bahá’ís has deep roots in the Iranian Shi’á population. The Shi’a clergy and political elites have exploited this hostility on numerous occasions - most notably in the mid-1950s and then again during the Revolution and in the post-revolutionary period.

The clerical establishment in Iran views the Bahá’í religion as being heretical and has been consistent in its efforts to marginalize and otherwise undermine the faith. Since the introduction of the 1979 Islamic Constitution, Bahá’í religious practice has effectively been criminalized inside Iran. The members of three successive Bahá’í national assemblies have been eliminated on the flimsiest of pretexts, as have numerous local community leaders. Sites of immense religious and cultural significance to the Bahá’ís have been destroyed with the connivance of the state authorities. Ordinary Bahá’ís have been subjected to an extraordinary degree of social exclusion.

Although the level of active repression has fluctuated since the initial years of the Islamic revolution because of both domestic political shifts and external pressures, the clerical establishment’s ideological hostility towards the Bahá’í faith has remained constant. The current Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, has been closely associated with anti-Bahá’í campaigns. The 1991 Golpaygani memo provides a graphic insight into Khamenei’s thinking on “The Bahá’í Question.” This document makes clear Khamenei’s intention to exclude Bahá’ís from mainstream Iranian life, block the development of their faith, and perhaps most sinister of all, “destroy” their cultural roots outside the country.

Growing tensions between the Islamic Republic and the international community over Iran’s nuclear program and the return of populist conservative politicians, like President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, to power have strengthened Ayatollah Khamenei’s position to act against the Bahá’ís once more.

It is against this backdrop that the IHRDC views recent instructions from the Supreme Leader to the Iranian security forces to gather identifying particulars on surviving members of the Bahá’í community with alarm. Given the Islamic Republic’s history of implacable hostility towards the Bahá’ís, and the IRI leadership’s personal animus towards the faith, the IHRDC is greatly concerned that the Bahá’í community in Iran may soon face another cycle of repression and violence.
Methodology

IHRDC gathered information for this report from the examination of the following sources:

- **Testimony of victims and witnesses.** These included witness statements taken by IHRDC attorneys, accounts written at the time of the event, and personal memoirs.

- **Government documents.** These include recorded public statements by state officials, statements released by Iranian government agencies and documents relating to judicial proceedings, such as the minutes of revolutionary trials published in the newspapers or transcripts of court proceedings.

- **Documents issued by inter-governmental organizations.** These include UN resolutions emanating from the General Assembly and reports by United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, as well as reports by regional organizations such as the European Union.

- **Documents prepared by NGOs.** IHRDC has used information gathered by human rights monitors such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.

- **Books and articles written by private individuals.** These include accounts published by civil servants from the Islamic Republic of Iran who ordered these violations to be committed, and those who implemented these orders, or simply witnessed their issuance and/or implementation.

- **The Bahá’í International Community.** The Bahá’í World Center and its subsidiary organs have extended the IHRDC access to their archives.

- **Academic articles.** A number of historians and jurists have written on the persecution of the Iranian Bahá’ís.

- **Photographs.** These include photos of attacks on Bahá’í property that have been taken by members of the Bahá’í community as well those published by the Iranian media since 1979.

Where the report cites or relies on information provided by government actors or other involved parties it specifies the source of such information and evaluates the information in light of the relative reliability of each source.

Many individual Bahá’ís mentioned in this report still reside in Iran, so it has been necessary to conceal their identities behind pseudonymous initials. In each instance, specific documentation relating to these victims is held on file at the IHRDC.
A Faith Denied:
The Persecution of the Bahá’ís of Iran

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Appendix 8 - Letter from the Office of the Commander in Chief to multiple recipients regarding “Identification of Individuals of the Misguided Sects of Bahá’ism and Bábism”

Appendix 9 - Letter from the Ministry of Interior to Political-Security Deputies of the offices of the Governors’ General
Appendix 1

Convicted of Collaboration with SAVAK and Bahá’ísm, 153 People will be Fired from the Department of Education of Eastern Azerbaijan. ETTELA’AT, 29/11/1358 (February 18, 1980)

(Followed by Translation)
به اتهام همکاری با ساوا و دوست‌ها از
۱۳۴۳ انفراز آموزش و پرورش
آذربایجان شرقی اخراج می‌شوند

شریف کتاب: طی این هفته ۲۰۰۰۰ هزار آموزش و پرورش آذربایجان شرقی در کنار یک مهمان از رهگیری که به دست‌های مدت‌دار آموزش و پرورش استان تشریح خواهد شد.

در این مورد از حکایت‌های مریمی و همت‌گرایی در این موضوع برای این شهر
۱۳۴۳ اخراج می‌شود.

شیراز، ۱۸ فروردین ۱۳۴۳

تیرمن مهربان
Charged with Collaboration with SAVAK and Baha'ism, 153 People Will be Fired from the Department of Education and Training of Eastern Azerbaijan

Tabriz- The Head of the Department of Education and Training of Eastern Azerbaijan announced in an interview with Ettela'at’s reporter that 153 of the teachers and employees of that office will be purge...
Appendix 2

Bahá’í International Community,
Statement to the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances
Statement to the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances

The Baha'i International Community would like to bring to the attention of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances the matter of the disappearance of fourteen prominent Baha'is in Iran. Eleven were summarily arrested by revolutionary guards on 21 August 1980. Their arrest was originally acknowledged by the authorities, but those same authorities now deny all knowledge of their whereabouts. The remaining three were kidnapped by unknown persons, and it is not known what became of them.

This document contains a summary of the information we have received from various couriers who have been able to transmit messages to us under great difficulties. For obvious reasons, we have not included the names of these couriers, nor have we named the Baha'is who met with officials to make representations and enquiries about the disappearances.

Summary of the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of fourteen Baha'is

1. Mr. Muhammad Muvvahid has been missing since 23 May 1979. A summons for his arrest was issued by the Revolutionary Komiteh of Vali-Abad, Teheran, on 12 May 1979 and was based on Decree No. 1177 of the Attorney-General of the Revolutionary Government. Following the disappearance of Mr. Muvvahid, the Komiteh disclaimed any knowledge of the matter, and the Attorney-General - whilst confirming that he had authorised a summons on the basis of complaints made against Mr. Muvvahid - likewise expressed his ignorance of any subsequent arrest or disappearance. He advised Mr. Muvvahid's wife to contact Qasr Prison, but repeated enquiries failed to reveal her husband's name on the list of prisoners being held there. Enquiries at other prisons were also unsuccessful.

2. Dr. 'Ali-Murad Davud, a retired professor of philosophy at the University of Teheran, was kidnapped on 11 November 1979 while walking in Lalil Park. He has not been seen or heard from since. A written petition to Ayatollah Quddusi, complaining about the disappearance of Dr. Davud, was followed by a meeting with the Ayatollah in which he sympathised with the relatives, stated that the government was not involved, and placed the blame on "irresponsible groups".
3. Mr. Rúhí Rawshání was kidnapped on 13 January 1980 while on his way to work, and all attempts to find him have been unsuccessful. The usual official protests and complaints were submitted to the appropriate authorities, but the government has officially denied having any connection with his disappearance.

4. Eleven Bahá'ís were summarily arrested on 21 August 1980 during the course of a meeting in a private home in Teheran. All of them were well-known Bahá'ís and nine of them composed the entire membership of the National Administrative Council of the Bahá'ís of Iran. The names of these Bahá'ís are as follows:

Manuhiр Qá'im-Maqádimí
Husayn Nájí
Yusif Qadímir
Ibrahím Rahmání
Husayn Mahdíd
'Abdu'l-Ḥusayn Taslímí
'Atá'u'lláh Muqarrabí
Mrs. Bahíyyih Nadírí
Kambíz Sádiqzádíh
Dr. 'Abbásiyán
Hishmátu'lláh Rawshání

The entire membership of the National Administrative Council of the Bahá'ís of Iran

These eleven Bahá'ís disappeared between 4 – 6 p.m. (Teheran time) when a group of armed men, called a task force, appeared at the house apparently with a written order for their arrest.

Subsequent developments, which changed their status from officially arrested to "disappeared" persons, were as follows:

24 August 1980. All efforts to locate the prisoners were frustrated. Contradictory statements were made by different officials, apparently in an attempt to confuse and mislead the relatives, since none of the information given proved to be accurate. It was ascertained that the Attorney-General, Ayatollah Quddúsí, had issued instructions to the Central Revolutionary Komiteh to arrest the nine members of the National Administrative Council and had ordered a certain Mr. Shafá'í to carry out this order. Mr. Shafá'í was approached and agreed that he had received the order, but denied that he had actually carried it out.

28 August 1980. The wives of some of the prisoners met with Ayatollah Beheshtí and presented a petition to him. He undertook to enquire into the matter, but subsequently reported that his investigations had been inconclusive.

29 August 1980. The wife of one of the arrested men went to Evin Prison and, without first asking whether her husband was confined there, sought permission to take some clothes to him. The clerk on duty checked his list of prisoners and confirmed that her husband's name was among them. However, when she returned the following day she was turned away by the official on duty at the gate and was told that no one of her husband's name was being held in the prison.
1 September 1980. A non-Bahá'í source reported that all nine members of the Bahá'í National Administrative Council had been seen in Evin Prison and were alive and well; but this information could not be confirmed.

2 September 1980. Representatives of the Bahá'í community met with the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Mr. Rafsanjání, who told them that the prisoners were being held in Evin Prison and that they had been arrested because of their involvement in the recently-attempted coup d'état. This charge was vigorously denied by the Bahá'í representatives, and Mr. Rafsanjání promised to study the prisoners' files and give a reply in two days' time.

10 September 1980. A further meeting was held with Mr. Rafsanjání, who confirmed that the members of the Bahá'í National Administrative Council had been arrested by order of the Attorney-General. He added that eleven Bahá'ís, not nine, should have been arrested, and was told that eleven had been arrested. He said that no one would be allowed to meet with the prisoners until their interrogation was completed: if they proved to be innocent they would, of course, be released. The Bahá'ís replied that seven innocent Bahá'ís had recently been executed in Yazd and that they feared the same thing might happen again. Mr. Rafsanjání thereupon undertook to investigate the matter further, and asked the Bahá'ís to contact him again in two or three days.

14 September 1980. The wives of three of the missing Bahá'ís sought an interview with Mr. Rafsanjání. This was denied, but they were finally allowed to speak to him on the telephone. He was violently angry, berated them for constantly troubling him and, in reply to their repeated appeals for information, ominously stated that they would receive news of their husbands from the radio and television.

18 September 1980. The Attorney-General stated that the eleven Bahá'ís had been arrested because of their participation in the recent abortive coup.

6 October 1980. Revolutionary guards went to the house where the Bahá'ís had been arrested and asked the Bahá'í householder whether he had seen the number plates of the car which had taken the prisoners away. He answered that he had not. He was then told that the reports of imprisonment were totally false and that the Bahá'ís had, in fact, been taken secretly to Israel by special aeroplane. (Bahá'ís in Iran have repeatedly been falsely accused of being agents of Zionism.) On the same day, another Bahá'í was asked if he knew the whereabouts of his brother - one of the missing men.

9 October 1980. The wife of one of the missing Bahá'ís saw Mr. Rafsanjání, who told her that the government had not arrested the eleven Bahá'ís, and even asked her if she knew where they had gone. He added that the leader of a group which might have some connection with their disappearance was now in custody, and that he might have further news for her shortly. Meanwhile, the two Bahá'ís who were questioned on 6 October had been taken into custody and were also being asked if they had information about the whereabouts of the missing Bahá'ís. The interrogations were carried out by officials of Evin Prison.
12 October 1980. The wives of two of the missing Bahá'ís met with Mr. R afsanjaní, who received them cordially. He told them that the eleven Bahá'ís had been arrested by Komitéh No. 2 of Teheran Vila, Morvarid; that they had all along been in collusion with the head of this Komitéh (a Mr. Lámakán); and that arrangements had been made by the Komitéh to smuggle them out of the country. When the wives protested that this was impossible, Mr. R afsanjani remarked that husbands did not always tell their wives everything, and added that, in any case, Mr. Lámakán had now been arrested and was undergoing interrogation. He then said that the Bahá'ís should have resisted arrest, and referred to a radio broadcast which advised the public not to submit to arrest without a proper court order. The wives answered that a court order had been produced and, furthermore, that armed men had been present to enforce the order. Mr. R afsanjani nevertheless insisted that the Bahá'ís should have resisted arrest. He said that he could do nothing further to help the Bahá'í wives, since that was the duty of the Attorney-General. At the request of the wives, he telephoned the Attorney-General, Ayatollah Quddúsí, who stated that Mr. Lámakán was still being interrogated, but that his replies were "unsatisfactory".

A Bahá'í who had recently been released from Evin Prison reported that it was widely rumoured there that the eleven Bahá'í prisoners had been taken to Europe.

13 October 1980. A Bahá'í wife whose husband had been in Evin Prison for several months reported that, when she had visited him on 12 October, he had told her that three of the missing Bahá'ís were actually sharing his cell. A fourth was also believed to be in the prison, but had not yet been seen.

14 October 1980. Two Bahá'í wives met with the Attorney-General, who assured them that it was his duty to assist the families of the eleven missing Bahá'ís, as well as those of the three who had been kidnapped. He denied that he had issued an order for the arrest of the eleven. Referring to the arrested Komitéh leader, Mr. Lámakán, he said that this man had originally denied all knowledge of the whereabouts of the eleven, but had later changed his story and said that the Bahá'ís had been smuggled out of the country by a private aeroplane operating from a secret landing strip. He had then changed his story again and was now saying that his statement was based solely on rumours he had heard. The Attorney-General stated that the interrogation of Mr. Lámakán was continuing. He promised that he would take up the Bahá'í case, and invited the Bahá'í wives to telephone him for information. In their presence, he telephoned three officials at Evin Prison and enquired about Bahá'í prisoners, but all three denied having Bahá'í prisoners in their wards.

16 October 1980. Further reports were received that all eleven Bahá'ís had been seen in Evin Prison and that all were in good health.

23 October 1980. The Attorney-General, in response to a telephone enquiry from the two Bahá'í wives who had previously met with him, said that he had no information about the whersabouts of the eleven Bahá'ís, but that he would continue his enquiries.
3 November 1980. After 70 days, there was still no reliable information about the whereabouts of the missing Bahá'ís, and it had proved impossible to find any documents indicating that the arrests had been made in accordance with official government instructions.

16 November 1980. The wife of one of the missing Bahá'ís, who by this time was meeting with the Attorney-General two or three times a week, reported that she was convinced that the government had no knowledge of the whereabouts of the eleven Bahá'ís.

18 December 1980. The newspaper "Ingiláb-i-İslámi" published an article concerning a person who had been missing for 40 days. Quoting a normally reliable source, the writer disclosed that Evin Prison contained compounds and wards which were closed to the outside world, and that the names of the inmates of these wards did not appear on any register. This article confirmed the long-standing belief of the Bahá'ís in the existence of such wards.

Conclusion

From time to time the Bahá'ís have received reports that these eleven Bahá'ís, missing since 21 August 1980, have been seen, but it has been impossible to confirm these reports. Relatives have continually pressed the issue with the authorities but up to the end of January 1981 they have been unable to trace any of the eleven.

All indications are that these eleven, as well as Mr. Múvvaḥid, Dr. Dávúdí and Mr. Rawshání (see pages 1 and 2), were chosen as targets by their kidnappers solely because they were prominent members of the Bahá'í community.

Since the start of the Islamic revolution, prominent Bahá'ís in many parts of Iran have been arrested (and, in some cases, executed) as part of a continuing and systematic campaign to demoralize, paralyze and ultimately eradicate the Iranian Bahá'í community. (A statement (copy enclosed) describing these activities against the Bahá'ís in Iran was presented by the Bahá'í International Community, on 4 September 1980 to the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.)

31 January 1981
Appendix 3

Notice of Confiscation of the House of the Báb by the Sepah-eh Pasdaran in Shiraz

(Followed by Translation)
پاسا
سیاه پاسداران
انقلاب اسلامی فارس

برنامه
میلیون‌ها کارگر در حال مرگ به سبب تحریم هدایت‌دهنده کوبه‌ریزی نشته‌اند، نه تنها به سیاست‌های آزمایشگاه‌های تحریم‌گری، بلکه به سیاست‌های سیاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی فارس نیز.

جمع: ۱۲۰۰۰۰۰۰۰ تومان
PASA  
Fars [Province's] Islamic Revolutionary Guards  

Date: 6/2/1358 [4/26/1979]  

In the name of the Exalted  

It is thus announced that the residence known as [house of] Seyyed Báb in Shiraz, for [the purpose of] protection and prevention of possible destruction, was put under the supervision of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards of Shiraz. Supervision date is 6/2/58.

Signature  
Seal
Appendix 4

Islamic Revolutionary Court of Yazd, Record of Interrogation and Proceedings, regarding the case of CB

(Followed by Translation)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>کلاس‌پذیردگان</th>
<th>نام خانوادگی</th>
<th>نام</th>
<th>تاریخ</th>
<th>روز</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>۱۲۰۲۰۴۰۳۰۴</td>
<td>احمدی</td>
<td>محمد</td>
<td>۲۳/۸/۲۲</td>
<td>۱۲</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

شماره دادنامه:

بتاریخ ۲۳/۸/۲۲ ماه‌گزاری به دادگاه انقلاب اسلامی دیپوت سیدکی بهروزه‌مقدمی

امتحان کننده: میلاد گل‌گریست

نام دادگاه: مبارزه موضوعات پرونده جنایی زندانیان ملی و ملی‌العلم و بی‌توجهی

می‌باشد.

راهنمای دادگاه:

درخواست پرونده موضوع:

پرونده موضوع پرونده داده‌ها و گزارشات مربوط به بخش‌های اصلاحات انجام‌نامه‌های

می‌باشد.

نام دادگاه: مبارزه موضوع پرونده اصلاحات حکم ۵۱۹۲۱

می‌باشد.

کمیته‌های دادگاه مبارزه موضوع پرونده.

فلاح

نام‌خانوادگی کلاس‌پذیردگان انقلاب اسلامی:

امامی

مقدم

۱۳۹۰/۸/۲۳
On 22/8/1373 [11/13/1994], a session of Branch Number 1 of the Islamic Revolutionary Court in Yazd was held by the undersigned to investigate file number ________. Having reviewed the contents of the file, the end of the investigation was announced and the following verdict was issued.

The court's verdict:

Concerning file number ________, the case of ________, in light of the contents of the file and report number ________, dated 7/6/1373 [8/29/1994], from the Department of Intelligence of Yazd that indicates that the aforementioned and his wife have passed away and that their children are also Baha'is, [this court recognizes] this case [as] applicable to ruling 59/70 [issued by] this court, and therefore the verdict for the confiscation of their properties for the benefit of the Commerce Complex of the Imam's Charitable Organization is issued and announced.

Fallah  
The Head of Branch Number 1 of the Islamic Revolutionary Court in Yazd  
22/8/73 [signed]

Execution of the verdicts [handwritten]  
[signature]
Appendix 5

Letter to Organization for Expansion and Renovation of Industries of Iran from the Deputy Minister of Industries and the Head of the Board of Directors, Hasan Sadr

(Followed by Translation)
بسمه تعالی

نظر با بینگدم از سوی آقایان آبات عظام ربانی شیرازی دستیابی و ملاحظه

برداخت پول بینانال بال به پیمانان حرام علام شده و کاتینکا از است

دستور سرباز زندگی خاطر محصول می‌شود، لذا کلیه مسئولین شرکتها تابع

مازمان گستر ونوسازی متنازع ایران مؤسسه در مورد شناختي جعبه‌ای

افرادی سین کارکنان می‌افلام به وضع استفاده ایشان را بحال تطبیق

درآورده و پروپنهد را جیه رشیدگی به کمیسیون پاکتی مستقر در سازمان

گستر ونوسازی به تهران ارمال نمایند.

کشی سازی خلیف فری

شماره ۴۷۸

نام و نام خانوادگی و رئیس هیئت اصلی

۱۴۳۹ میلادی

۱۴۳۹ هیگ

مناقب از روزنامه جمهوری اسلامی مورخ ۵/۴/۱۳۵۹ و استناد به ماده ۴۳۰ قانون

استخدام کشور

قرار

۱۴۳۹ میلادی

نام و نام خانوادگی و رئیس هیئت اصلی

۱۴۳۹ هیگ

نظرگاه: سازمان
In light of the decree by the Grand Ayatollahs Rabbani-Shirazi, Dastgheib and Mahallati, the payment of any money from the national treasury to the Baha’is has been declared forbidden (haram) and those who do not abide by this decree will be considered transgressors.* Therefore, all the heads of the companies under the Organization for the Expansion and Renovation of Industries of Iran [OERII] are duty-bound to identify such people among their employees and immediately suspend their employment and forward their files for investigation to the cleansing committee of the organization in Tehran.

Deputy Minister for Industries and Head of the Board of Directors
Hassan Sadr
[Signed]

[Seal of the Ship-building Company of the Persian Gulf]
From: Head of the Company; To: Head of the Administrative Office of Tehran-Bandar Abbas, 14/4/59; Send to: Human Resources

* Quoted from Jomhouri Eslami newspaper of 9/4/59 [6/30/1980] and based on Article 440 of the employment law of the country

[handwritten:]
Human Resources
[Use] for the purpose of looking back in the personnel files and following up to identify these potential people.

[Seal of the OERII] [Signed]
Appendix 6

Statement by Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Construction, Stopping Payment to Bahá’ís

(Followed by Translation)
آذار

اخراج وزارت کشاورزی و صنایع روستایی

دولت جمهوری اسلامی ایران در مطالعه مسلمان و بهداشت کشور ایران مسئولیت ندارد و معیار انتخاب مسلمان، ساخت و ساز به مال مبتنی و نهایتاً با اگر انتخاب مسلمان، بدهندگان به مال و مبنای:

1- سه ساله غرامت کرده گرایه تقسیم پرداخت و
2- تشریفات سنجش فراز
3- سه هزار نیاک
4- همکاری و همکاری
5- قرارداد ریشه ویژه فراز و
6- قرارداد ریشه اصلاح استفاده از جنین انقلاب برای تدوین، مصوب 1301 مجوز نداشته انت و پیش کلیه و نهایتاً را که از صندوق زور تردد دریافت نموده و تا پاره گرایه شود. در

بروک وزارت کشاورزی و صنایع روستایی
Fired employee of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Construction

The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has risen to its responsibilities to the Muslim nation and cannot pay wages and benefits from the Muslim treasury (Bayt’ul Mal) to people who are the followers of the made-up wayward Baha’i principles, and most of the members of their national spiritual assembly [are] people who are traitors to the nation and [country] such as:

1- General Mugharribi, Russian spy  
2- General Dr. Riyaz'ullah Qadimi, special SAVAK doctor  
3- Colonel Naji, fugitive  
4- Dr. Shapour Rasikh, SAVAK collaborator and fugitive  
5- Dr. Mihri Rasikh, Crown Prince’s teacher and fugitive

and hundreds others like them. Furthermore, the hiring of such people had no legal basis according to the law passed in the year 1301 [1922], and hence all payments rendered to them from the national treasury must be returned.

Minister of Agriculture and Rural Construction
Appendix 7

Memorandum by Dr. Seyyed Mohammad Golpaygani, Secretary of the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution

(Followed by Translation)
بسم الله الرحمن الرحیم

مبارک جهان‌السلام جهانبطی امام خمینی

وضع هرچه‌ی دقت‌دار بوده، مطمین نماییم

سال 1377

شماره 4

محمدرضا

به مناها

بسم الله الرحمن الرحیم

در کتاب حجت‌الاَّlama جهان‌السلام امام خمینی

وضع هرچه‌ی دقت‌دار بوده، مطمین نماییم

شماره 4

محمدرضا

به مناها
۲۳- دانشکده ریسینگ، دانشگاه مرکزی تهران

۲۴- دانشکده علوم کامپیوتر، دانشگاه مرکزی تهران

۲۵- دانشکده علوم دانشگاه تهران

۲۶- دانشکده علوم اقتصادی و کسب و کار دانشگاه تهران

۲۷- دانشکده علوم سیاسی و س躬ه دانشگاه تهران

۲۸- دانشکده علوم تجارت، دانشگاه تهران

۲۹- دانشکده علوم زیستی، دانشگاه تهران

۳۰- دانشکده علوم پزشکی، دانشگاه تهران

۳۱- دانشکده علوم سیاسی و س躬ه دانشگاه تهران

۳۲- دانشکده علوم اقتصادی و کسب و کار دانشگاه تهران

۳۳- دانشکده علوم کامپیوتر، دانشگاه مرکزی تهران
CONFIDENTIAL
Dr. Seyyed Mohammad Golpaygani
Head of the Office of the Esteemed Leader [Khamenei]

Greetings!

After greetings, with reference to the letter #1/783 dated 10/10/69 [31 December 1990], concerning the instructions of the Esteemed Leader which had been conveyed to the Respected President regarding the Bahá’í question, we inform you that, since the respected President and the Head of the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution had referred this question to this Council for consideration and study, it was placed on the Council’s agenda of session #128 on 16/11/69 [5 February 1991] and session #119 of 2/11/69 [22 January 1991]. Pursuant to the discussions and further to the [results of the] session # 112 held in this regard on 2/5/66 [24 July 1987] presided over by the Esteemed Leader (head and member of the Supreme Council), the recent views and directives of the Esteemed Leader regarding the Bahá’í question were conveyed to the Supreme Council. In consideration of the contents of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as the religious and civil laws and general policies of the country, these matters were carefully studied and decisions pronounced.

In arriving at the decisions and proposing reasonable ways to counter the above question, due consideration was given to the wishes of the Esteemed Leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran [Khamenei], namely, that “in this regard a specific policy should be devised in such a way that everyone will understand what should or should not be done.” Consequently, the following proposals and recommendations resulted from these discussions.

The respected President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as the Head of the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, while approving these recommendations, instructed us to convey them to the Esteemed Leader [Khamenei] so that appropriate action may be taken according to his guidance.

SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF THE DISCUSSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

A. General status of the Bahá’ís within the country’s system
   1. They will not be expelled from the country without reason.
   2. They will not be arrested, imprisoned, or penalized without reason.
   3. The government’s dealings with them must be in such a way that their progress and development are blocked.
B. Educational and cultural status
1. They can be enrolled in schools provided they have not identified themselves as Bahá’ís.
2. Preferably, they should be enrolled in schools which have a strong religious personnel that is knowledgeable in the principles of the faith.
3. They must be expelled from universities, either in the admission process or during the course of their studies, once it becomes known that they are Bahá’ís.
4. Their political (espionage) activities must be dealt with by devising appropriate government laws and policies, and their religious and propaganda activities should be answered by giving them religious and cultural responses, as well as propaganda.
5. Propaganda institutions (such as the Islamic Propaganda Organization) must establish an independent branch to counter the propaganda and religious activities of the Bahá’ís.
6. A plan must be devised to confront and destroy their cultural roots outside the country.

C. Legal and social status
1. Permit them a modest livelihood as is available to the general population.
2. To the extent that it does not encourage them to be Bahá’ís, it is permissible to provide them the means for ordinary living in accordance with the general rights given to every Iranian citizen, such as ration booklets, passports, burial certificates, work permits, etc.
3. Deny them employment if they identify themselves as Bahá’ís.
4. Deny them any position of influence, such as in the educational sector, etc.

Wishing you divine confirmations,
Secretary of the Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council
Dr. Seyyed Mohammad Golpaygani [signature]

[Handwritten note:] In the Name of God!
The decision of the respectful Supreme Council seems sufficient.
I thank you gentlemen for your attention and efforts.
[signed:] Ali Khamenei
Appendix 8

Letter from the Office of the Commander in Chief to multiple recipients regarding “Identification of Individuals of the Misguided Sects of Bahá’ísm and Bábísm”

(Followed by Translation)
ار: سادات کل نیروهای مسلح

بند: کیوندگان دیل

موضوع: ساسانی افراد قرآنی حاله باقیت و بایت

با سلام و صدای بر محمد و آن محمد (ص)، ضمن عرض شریعت به مناسبی سه‌هاده مولوی

بنویسین ایامی زمانی (و) با آرزوهای فیلسوفی مطالعات و عوادت. پیروی کردارش و واصله از کاهیت و

تشکیل مجموعه حفظ علی شیعه بانی و بایت در هریون و شهرستانی کشور، بهب می‌باشد.

روزهای تعیین م красот خوشن آیت الله معلمی (از آمکان الفُسْقَی) سادات کل نیروهای مسلح صادور

کرده بود که مریف جامع خیال‌ها و کمال از کلیه مکانهای این فرهنگ (اراده اسلام) سیاستی، اقتصادی، اجتماعی

و فرهنگی) جهت تشکیل‌کردن کلیه افراد این فرهنگ علی شیعه بانی که در اطلاعات اسلامی نشانه‌هایی از این فرهنگ و پیشروی خودشی

تأسیسات راهبردی پیش‌روی دیپلماسی قدرت بدنی در این فرهنگ را پیشروی خودشی

زمینه‌های جمع‌آوری و به‌این مسند کراپش فرمان


کیوندگان:

وزارت اطلاعات جمهوری اسلامی ایران

رئیس سازمان امنیت امنیتی اسلامی ایران

فرمانده نیرو انتظامی جمهوری اسلامی ایران

فرمانده نیروی انتظامی جمهوری اسلامی ایران

وزارت بهداشت و درمان در جمهوری اسلامی ایران

فرمانده کل ارتش جمهوری اسلامی ایران

رئیس مجمع دولت نگهبان

بدر علی اباد شاهروی جهت مبارزه با قطعات انتظار

رئیس مجمع دولت نگهبان

امام جمعه مطرح نگهبان

امام جمعه مطرح نگهبان

امام جمعه مطرح نگهبان

امام جمعه مطرح نگهبان
Subject: Identification of individuals of the misguided Sects of Bahá’ísm and Bábism

With salutations and praise to Muhammad and his descendants (Pbuh), and while expressing our deepest condolences on the occasion of the martyrdom of the Master of Believers and the Commander of the Faithful (MPUH) [Imam Ali], and wishing for the acceptance of [our] worships and servitudes, further to the reports received concerning the secret activities and meetings of the misguided sects of Bahá’ísm and Bábism, in Tehran and other cities in the country, and according to the instructions of the Exalted Supreme Leader, His Holiness Ayatollah Khamenei (may his exalted shadow be extended), the Main Headquarters of the Armed Forces has been given the mission to acquire a comprehensive and complete report of all the activities of these sects (including political, economic, social and cultural) for the purpose of identifying all the individuals of these misguided sects. Therefore, we request that you convey to relevant authorities to, in a highly confidential manner, collect any and all information about the above mentioned activities of these individuals and report it to this Headquarters.

This [either this information, or the reports to be received] will be submitted to the Exalted Supreme Leader, the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces (may his exalted shadow be extended).

Signed: Chief of the Main Headquarters of the Armed Forces
Basiji Major General Dr. Seyyed Hassan Firuzabadi

Recipients:
- The Ministry of Information of the Islamic Republic of Iran
- The Belief-Political Section of the office of the Commander in Chief
- The Commander of the Revolutionary Guard
- The Commander of the Basij Resistance Forces of the Revolutionary Guard
- The Commander of the Law Enforcement of the Islamic Republic of Iran
- The Intelligence Deputy of the Law Enforcement of the Islamic Republic of Iran
- The Representative of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei in the Revolutionary Guard
- The Chairman of the Belief-Political Organization of the Law Enforcement of the Islamic Republic of Iran
- The Chief Commander of the Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran

C.C:

The Esteemed Chairman of the Judicial Power - His Holiness Ayatollah Shahrudi for information and necessary action.
The Esteemed Chairman of the Office of the Exalted Supreme Leader - Basiji Brigadier General Mehdi Shirazi for information.
Appendix 9

Letter from the Ministry of Interior to Political-Security Deputies of the offices of the Governors’ General

(Followed by Translation)
معاونان محترم سیاسی امتبای استانداری‌های سوآسر کشور

سلام علیکم

از آن‌جا که این فرآیند غیر قانونی است و از سوی سازمان‌های اسلامی قرار گیرد، خواهشمند است دستور فرمانده نشستگاه‌های مربوط به تحویلات و حساسیت و تفاوت‌های اجتماعی، آنها را کنترل و مدیریت نمایند. ضمناً اطلاعات خواسته که‌رو را طبق قریب‌پیوست تغییر و تایپ نهایی شهروند چهت بهره برداری به این معاونت ارسال نمایند. م‌س ۶۷

سیدمحمدرحیم موالی زاده
مدیرکل دفتر سیاسی
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In the name of the Exalted

To the Honorable Political-Security Deputies of the Provincial Offices of the Country

Greetings to you [peace be upon you],

Respectfully, according to the reports we have received, some of the elements of the wayward sect of Bahá’ism are attempting to proselytize and propagate the ideology of Bahá’ism, under the cover of social and economic activities. In view of the fact that this sect is illegal and that it is exploited by international and Zionist organizations against the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, we therefore ask you to order the relevant offices to cautiously and carefully monitor and manage their [the Bahá’ís’] social activities. In addition, complete the requested information on the attached form and forward it to this office for its use by 15 Shahrivar [September 6, 2006] so that it can be used.

Seyyed Mohammad Reza Mavvalizadih
Director of the Political Office
[signature]
Situations of the Wayward Bahá'í Sect in the Province of …………

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<th>Info</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Financial Situation</th>
<th>Social Cooperation</th>
<th>Social Disputes</th>
<th>Socio-Political Activities</th>
<th>Main Element (member)</th>
<th>Contact with Foreign Assemblies</th>
<th>Burial Place of Their Deceased</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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[Stamp] SCANNED
Look for these forthcoming IHRDC Reports:

**Murder at Mykonos: Anatomy of a Political Assassination**

**A Faith on Trial: A Case Study**
A report on the arrest and execution of twenty-two Bahá’ís in Shiraz in 1983, who refused to recant their faith to save their lives.
On August 21, 1980, all nine members of the Bahá’í National Spiritual Assembly of Iran, were arrested while attending a meeting at a private home in Tehran and subsequently disappeared. Despite repeated requests for information by their families, their fate remains unknown. This is only one incident in a long campaign against the Bahá’í community of Iran.