Aadel Collection
Ministers of Murder: Iran's new security cabinet
H U MAN
RIGHTS
WATC H
Ministers of Murder: Iran 's New Security Cabinet
introduction 1
Pour-Mohammadi and the i988 Prison Massacres 3
Pour-Mohammadi and the 1998 Serial Murders of Dissident Intellectuals 8
Mohseni Ezhei: From Inquisitor to Minister of Information ii
Conclusion 12
Appendix 14
Introduction
InJune 2005, Iranians elected Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who had campaigned on a
platform of improving economic conditions, as their new president. Ahmadinejad
assumed his new post in early August 2005 with the backing of those political factions in
Iran who most vigorously opposed political and social reforms initiated by his
predecessor, Mohammad Khatami. This support, coupled with positions Ahmadinejad
took during the campaign, caused human rights defenders and activists in Iran to view
his rise to power with great concern.
These concerns grew when Abmadinejad introduced his cabinet to the iranian
parliament for approval on August 14, 2005. Most of his nominees hail from security
and intelligence backgrounds, adding to fears that the new government will intensify and
expand repressive measures towards critics and dissidents.
Particularly troubling are President Ahmadinej ad's choices for the powerful positions of
Minister of Interior, Mustafa Pour-Mohammadi, and Minister of Information,
Gholamhussein Mohseni Ezhei. In Iran the Ministry of Information is responsible for
many intelligence functions. This briefing paper discusses credible allegations that both
ministers were involved in extremely serious and systematic human rights violations over
the past two decades.
In 1988 Mustafa Pour-Mohammadi represented the Ministry of Information on a three-
person committee that ordered the execution of thousands of political prisoners. These
systematic killings constitute a crime against humanity under international human rights
law. In his role as a deputy and designated acting minister of information in 1998, Pour-
Mohammadi is also suspected of ordering the murders of several dissident writers and
intellectuals by agents of the Ministry of Information. In addition, while Pour-
Mohammadi headed the foreign intelligence section of the Ministry of Information,
government agents carried out assassinations of numerous opposition figures abroad.
Mustafa Pour-Mohammadi also served as prosecutor of the Revolutionary Court (1979-
1986) and prosecutor of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Court in the western regions
(1986).'
Mohseni Ezhei, for his part, was a high ranking member of the Judiciary over the past
six years and a leading figure in suppressing press freedoms. He was representative of
the Judiciary in the Ministry of Information (1986-1988 and 1991-1994), head of the
prosecutor's office in charge of economic affairs (1989-1990), prosecutor of the Special
Court for the Clergy (1995-1996), prosecutor-general of the Special Court for the Clergy
(1996-present), and head of the Judicial Complex for Government Employees (1996-
2002) 2
As prosecutor-general of the Special Court for the Clergy, Gholamhussein Mohseni
Ezhei led the prosecution of several reformist clerics. In addition, he presided over the
politically-motivated trial of former Tehran mayor Gholamhussein Karbaschi, who had
played a pivotal role in campaigning for Khatami's election to presidency. Mohseni
Ezhei is also suspected of ordering the murder of Pirouz Davani, an Iranian dissident
and activist whom agents of the Ministry of Information allegedly kidnapped and killed
in 1998.
As Ahmadinej ad's new government embarks on solidifying its position, it is imperative
to highlight the abusive records of these two cabinet ministers. Since taking power, the
new government has reaffirmed its intent to continue a broad crackdown against
dissident writers and activists. During the past two months, the Ministry of Information
has summoned and interrogated at least ten journalists and newspaper editors, warning
them not to criticize the new government. 3 Agents of the Judiciary and the Ministry of
1 “Biographies of proposed ministers”, Iranian Students News Agency, August 14, 2005.
http://www.isna.ir/Main/NewsView.aspx ' ?ID=News-568867
2 Ibid.
“Black month for Iran's journalists,” Reporters without Borders, November 23, 2005.
http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=1 5678
2
Information detained Abdolfattah Soltani, a co-founder of the independent Center for
Defense of Human Rights, on July 30 and have held him without charge, mostly in
solitary confinement, since then. In interviews with Human Rights Watch, many activists
and journalists expressed fear that they will be at risk even for their lives, given the
documented history of political killings at the hands of government forces, and in which
Pour-Mohammadi and Mohseni Ejehi allegedly played a significant role. 4
Since taking over as Minister of Interior in August, Pour-Mohammadi has appointed a
large number of security and intelligence officials to powerful posts. He appointed thirty
new provincial governors, of whom eighteen are former commanders of the
Revolutionary Guards. The Revolutionary Guards, the most powerful military force in
Iran, have been associated with numerous serious and systematic human rights abuses,
including secret prisons and illegal detentions. Pour-Mohammadi's top deputy and
designated acting minister, Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, was the acting commander-in-
chief of the Revolutionary Guards until his appointment to the Ministry of Interior on
November 25.
Pour-Mohammadi and the 1988 Prison Massacres
In 1988, the Iranian government summarily and extrajudicially executed thousands of
political prisoners held in Iranian jails. The government has never acknowledged these
executions, or provided any information as to how many prisoners were killed. The
majority of those executed were serving prison sentences for their political activities after
unfair trials in revolutionary courts. Those who had been sentenced, however, had not
been sentenced to death. The deliberate and systematic manner in which these
extrajudicial executions took place constitutes a crime against humanity under
international law.
On July 18, 1988, Iran accepted the United Nations Security Council Resolution 598,
calling for a cease-fire in the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq. On July 24, the
largest Iranian armed opposition group, the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO or
MEK), based in Iraq since 1986, launched an incursion into Iran in an attempt to topple
the government. Although this offensive was easily repelled by Iranian forces, it
For this report Human Rights Watch interviewed twelve Iranian journalists, activists, and former government
officials both inside and outside of Iran. All of them asked to remain anonymous out of concerns for their safety.
“The Interior Minister appoints Commander Zolghadr to the post of Deputy Minister,” Iranian Students News
Agency, November 25, 2005.
3
provided a pretext for the authorities to physically eliminate many political opponents
then in prison, including many I'vIKO members captured and sentenced years earlier.
In the absence of any official acknowledgement of the 1988 prison massacre, the most
credible account of these events comes from the memoirs of Ayatollah Hussein Ali
Montazeri, who was at the time one of the highest ranking government officials in Iran
and the designated successor of Ayatollah Khomeini, then the Supreme Leader.
According to Ayatollah Montazeri, the government formed a three-person committee to
oversee the purge in each prison. 6 The authorities told these committees to interview all
political prisoners and to order the execution of those deemed “unrepentant.” These
committees became known as “Death Committees” [ Hejia'tMarg]. Each comprised a
prosecutor, a judge, and a representative of the Ministry of Information. Mustafa Pour-
Mohammadi represented the Ministry of Information on the committee at Tehran's
notorious Evin Prison. In a letter of protest addressed to Ayatollah Khomeini, dated
August 4, 1988, Ayatollah Montazeri wrote: “The principal role [ in determining which
prisoners to execute] is played by the representative of the Ministry of Information
everywhere and others are effectively under his direct influence.” 7
Ayatollah Montazeri recounts the unfolding events that led to the massacre of prisoners:
A letter was produced on behalf of the Imam [ Khomeini] stating that
based on the discretion of a panel composed of a prosecutor, a judge,
and a representative of the Ministry of Information, imprisoned
members of the hypocrites [ monafeghin, a term used by the government
to refer to the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization] who are still believers
in their cause should be executed. Decisions were to be reached based
on the majority vote. Thus if two out of the three members reached a
decision that a prisoner is still a believer in his cause, even though the
prisoner may have already been sentenced to two or five years in prison,
he would be executed. 8
Ayatollah Montazeri further details the arbitrary and summary character of this process:
6 Ayatollah Montazeri, Khaterat, Vol. 1, p. 623, http://www.amontazeri.com, last accessed September 8, 2005.
Translated by Human Rights Watch.
Ibid., p. 633.
Ibid., p. 623.
4
Visits to prisoners were suspended for a period of time and, according
to people responsible for carrying out these orders, approximately two
thousand and eight hundred or three thousand and eight hundred — I
can not recall exactly — women and men were executed, relying on the
authority of [ Ayatollah Khomeini's] letter. Even people who practiced
religious rituals of prayer and fasting were asked to repent, and they
would be offended and refUse. Then [ the committeej would conclude
that the prisoner is still a believer in his cause and ordered their
executions N
In his August 4, 1988 letter to Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Montazeri gives an
example of the process of questioning prisoners and determining their fates, writing:
Three days ago a religious judge from one of the provinces — a man who
is trustworthy — came to Qum and complained to me of the way your
orders are being implemented. The judge told me: The Ministry of
Information representative or the prosecutor — I don't recall which one
— in order to determine if a prisoner is a believer in his cause asked the
prisoner: “kre you willing to condemn the hypocrites frnonafeghin
organization?” The prisoner answered positively. Then, the prisoner was
asked: “Are you willing to give an interview?” The prisoner answered
positively. He was asked: “Are you willing to go to the war front and
fight the Iraqis?” He answered yes. Subsequently, the prisoner was
asked: “Are you willing to walk over a mine field?” The prisoner
answered, “Not everyone is willing to walk over a mine field.” Following
this exchange, it was determined that the prisoner is still a believer in his
cause. The judge said that he insisted on reaching a decision by
consensus and not by majority vote, but his request was not accepted.'°
Ayatollah Montazeri identified Mustafa Pour-Mohammadi as the representative of the
Ministry of Information in charge of questioning prisoners in Evin Prison and saw him
as being a central figure in the mass executions of prisoners in Tehran. He recounts a
meeting with Pour-Mohammadi and the two other members of the Evin Prison
committee:
Ibid., p.628.
10 Ibid., pg 633.
5
After my second letter of protest [ to Ayatollah Khomeini], there was no
change and [ the executions] continued. On August 15, 1988, I met with
Mr. Nayeri, who was the religious judge in Evin, Mr. Eshraghi who was
the prosecutor, and Mr. Pour-Mohammadi who was the representative
of the Ministry of Information. I told them that they should stop the
executions during the month of Moharram. Mr. Nayeri responded: CCWe
have so far executed seven-hundred and fifty people in Tehran, and we
have identified another two-hundred and fifty people. Allow us to get
rid of them and then we'll listen to you..
Montazeri provides a memorandum of protest addressed to Pour-Mohammadi and the
other two members of the Evin Prison CCDeath Committee” that he wrote on August 15,
1988. In this memorandum to Pour-Mohammadi, Montazeri wrote:
Carrying out a massacre of prisoners and captives without due process
or trail will certainly help our opponent's cause in the long term. It will
also encourage them to carry on armed resistance. The international
community will condemn our actions. 12
With regard to the 1988 mass prison executions, Amnesty International reported in
1990:
The political executions took place in many prisons in all parts of Iran,
often far from where the armed incursion took place. Most of the
executions were of political prisoners, including an unknown number of
prisoners of conscience, who had already served a number of years in
prison. They could have played no part in the armed incursion, and they
were in no position to take part in spying or terrorist activities. Many of
the dead had been tried and sentenced to prison terms during the early
1980s, many for non-violent offenses such as distributing newspapers
and leaflets, taking part in demonstrations or collecting Rinds for
prisoners' families. Many of the dead had been students in their teens or
early twenties at the time of their arrest. The majority of those killed
were supporters of the PMOI [ People's Moj ahedin Organization of Iran,
another English-language name for the Mojahedin-e Khalq
Ibid., p. 635. Moharram, the month when Imam Hussein, the third Imam of the Shi'a, was killed in battle in
680 CE, is one of the most revered months for the Shi'a.
12 Ibid., p. 635.
6
Organization, or MKO]; but hundreds of members and supporters of
other political groups, including various factions of the PFOI [ People's
Fedayeen Organization of Iran], the Tudeh [ Communist] Party, the
KDPI [ Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran], Rah-e Kargar [ Workers
Party] and others, were also among the execution victims. 13
Ayatollah Montazeri, citing officials in charge of carrying out the executions, puts the
number of executed prisoners between 2,800 and 3,800, but he acknowledges that his
recollection is not exact. Iranian activists have published the names of 4,481 executed
prisoners. 14 As long as the government rethses to announce a complete list of those
executed or even to acknowledge that these executions took place, the extent of this
massacre remains unknown.
The families of executed prisoners have repeatedly written to the government officials
asking for the number of executed prisoners and their place of burials. In January 2003,
they also wrote to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights at the
time, Mary Robinson, and the then-chairman of the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detentions, Louis Joinet, seeking their help in determining the truth behind the mass
executions. 15 According to the families of some of the executed prisoners, the bodies of
many are buried in unmarked graves and mass graves in the hills of Tehran's Khavaran
district. Families often congregate in Khavaran to remember their executed relatives. 16
Families of some of the executed prisoners told Human Rights Watch that in September
2005 the new government started to reconfigure the Khavaran site and that makeshift
gravestones, put in place by the families, have been destroyed. They said that the
government is preparing for a major overhaul of this area to destroy any evidence of
burials.
13 ”Iran: Violations of Human Rights 1987-1990,” Amnesty International, Index: MDE 13/2/90.
14 The list of executed prisoners is available at http://www.asre-nou.net . Last accessed October 24, 2005.
15 The texts of these three letters is available at http://www.bidaran.com/article.php3'?id_article=25 ,last
accessed on October 24, 2005.
16 Information on Khavaran is available at http://www.bidaran.com/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=13 , last
accessed on October, 24, 2005.
7
Pour-Mohammadi and the 1998 Serial Murders of Dissident
Intellectuals
Mustafa Pour-Mohammadi was the deputy minister of the Ministry of Information in
1998, when agents of that ministry killed the following five prominent intellectuals and
political activists:
• Darioush and Parvaneh Forohar were killed on December 13 in their Tehran
home.
• Majid Sharif was “disappeared” on November 20; his body was found in a
Tehran street on November 24.
• Mohammad Mokhtari was “disappeared” on December 3; his body was found in
a Tehran city morgue on December 9.
• Jafar Pouyandeh, was “disappeared” on December 9; his body was found on
December 13 in Shahr-e Ray, a suburb of Tehran.
Darioush and Parvaneh Forohar were long-time political activists and had been leaders
of the Mellat Party of Iran since 1951. Sharif Mokhtari, and Pouyandeh were well-
known dissident journalists and writers.
These killings are known in Iran as the “serial murders.” Under pressure from then-
President Mohammad Khatami, on January 5, 1999, the Ministry of Information
acknowledged that its agents had perpetrated the murders. Subsequently, the authorities
arrested eighteen people and tried them in connection with the killings. On June 20,
1999, the prosecutor of the Judicial Complex for the Armed Forces announced that the
mastermind behind the serial killings was a high-ranking official of the Ministry of
Information, Saeed Emami, and that Emami had committed suicide while in custody.
Human Rights Watch interviewed several Iranian journalists and human rights defenders
who alleged that the chain of command responsible for the serial murders involved
other high ranking officials in the ministry. Akbar Ganji, a prominent investigative
reporter, has written extensively on this issue. 17 With regard to these allegations, Nasser
Ghavami, former head of the Parliament's Judicial Committee, said: “Unfortunately, the
judicial process did not proceed along the lines of a credible investigation. Those
responsible for ordering these murders were never brought to justice and charges were
17 See Akbar Ganji, Tarik-khaneh Ashbah (The Darkroom of Ghosts) and All jenab Sorkhpoosh (The Red
Eminence). Ganji was sentenced to six years in prison in April 2000 because of his writings. He remains
imprisoned.
8
not filed against them.” 8 In November 2000, another parliamentarian, Davood
Suleimani, complained that the masterminds and instigators behind the serial murders
remain beyond the focus of the judicial investigations. He said, “In this [ judicial] case,
the issue of those who ordered the crimes and the fbnctionaries who implemented them
remains a mystery. This has not satisfied the public opinion. .. .those who ordered these
murders as well as the agents [ responsible] must be put on trial.” 19
The Article 90 Commission of the Parliament, named for the article in Iran's
Constitution empowering the Parliament to investigate complaints against any of the
three branches of government, launched its own investigation in August 2000, but was
unable to complete it.20 As Hussein Ansari-Rad, the head of the commission, said, “Our
investigations led to certain people whom we did not have the power to deal with. That's
why the investigations stopped.” 2 ' He fUrther said, “There is much credible and reliable
evidence pointing to involvement and participation of others.” 22
A source with first-hand knowledge of the Article 90 Committee's investigation told
Human Rights Watch: “The investigators implicated Pour-Mohammadi and even an
arrest warrant was about to be issued for him. But instead it was arranged that he leave
his post in the Ministry of Information.” 23 Another authoritative source, who also asked
to remain anonymous, confirmed to Human Rights Watch that the investigations indeed
implicated Pour-Mohammadi. Human Rights Watch wrote to Mustafa Pour-
Mohammadi on October 28, 2005 asking for his response to these allegations. As of
December 8, 2005, Human Rights Watch did not receive any response to its inquiry.
The murders of government opponents were not limited to those inside Iran. From
1990 to 1999, Pour-Mohammadi was also the director of foreign intelligence in the
Ministry of Information. During this period, dozens of opposition figures were
18 “A brief history of the serial murders,” Iranian Students News Agency, November 20, 2004,
www.isna.ir/Main/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-457431.
19 Ibid.
20 Article 90 of the Iranian Constitution states that: “Whoever has a complaint concerning the work of the
Assembly or the executive power, or the judicial power can forward his complaint in writing to the Assembly.
The Assembly must investigate his complaint and give a satisfactory reply. In cases where the complaint relates
to the executive or the Judiciary, the Assembly must demand proper investigation in the matter and an
adequate explanation from them, and announce the results within a reasonable time. In cases where the
subject of the complaint is of public interest, the reply must be made public.”
21 “A brief history of the serial murders,” Iranian Students News Agency, November 20, 2004,
www.isna.ir/Main/NewsView.aspx'?ID=News-457431.
22 Ibid.
23 Human Rights Watch interview, September 12, 2005. This person asked to remain anonymous out of
concerns for his safety.
9
assassinated abroad. In some of these cases — the assassination of Shahpur Bakhtiar, a
former prime minister, and the killings of three Kurdish leaders in exile in Germany, the
hand of the Iranian government is well established, while in others there are credible
allegations of government involvement. 24
Some members of parliament questioned Pour-Mohammadi's nomination as extreme
and dangerous. During confirmation hearings, Imad Afrough, a conservative, opposed
his nomination based on his prior performance in security and intelligence posts. “The
interior minister must have a deep understanding of citizens' rights,” Afrough said. ccJf
[ the minister] has a one-sided view of these rights, it will lead to crisis.” Referring to
Pour-Mohammadi's role in suppressing urban uprisings in 1992, Afrough asked CCJ want
to know how [ Pour-Mohammadi] would deal with [ regional] forces that oppose the
central government? I have not forgotten how the urban uprisings in Shiraz, Mashad,
and Mob arakeh were suppressed brutally and violently, shedding much blood.” 25 In his
speech, Afrough said that Pour-Mohammadi
hails from a place [ Ministry of Information] ... where they are used to
closing their eyes and ears, or they are used to coercing others to close
their eyes and ears. . .The nature of the Interior Ministry is such that the
minister must be open to seeing and listening [ to others]... This
gentleman comes from an institutional background where there hasn't
been sufficient oversight. Have you forgotten the events that occurred
in the Ministry of Information? How were the murders [ of intellectuals
and writers] dealt with? 26
During the same session of the parliament, Elias Naderan, another conservative MP,
noted that Pour-Mohammadi's tenure as head of the foreign intelligence unit coincided
with the assassination of numerous government opponents who were abroad. “With the
appointment of an intelligence agent to head the interior ministry, the government's
external challenges will be intensified. Imagine when the interior minister visits a country
where there are [ judicial] proceedings against us, he can be arrested,” Naderan said. 27
24 ”lran: ‘Mykonos' trial provides further evidence of Iranian policy of unlawful state killings,” Amnesty
International, April 10, 1997, Index: MDE 13/01 5/1 997. “Iran: Amnesty International concerned about possible
government involvement in deaths of Iranian nationals,” Amnesty International, February 28, 1996, Index: MDE
13/007/1996.
25 “Parliament discusses nomination of Interior Minister,” Iranian Labour News Agency, August 24, 2005,
http://www.ilna.ir/shownews.asp?code=225685&codel =11.
26 Ibid.
27 “Price of opposing the most controversial proposed minister,” BBC Persian, August 24, 2005,
www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/story/2005/08/050824_mf_afrough.shtml.
10
Mohseni Ezhei: From Inquisitor to Minister of Information
Gholarnhussein Mohseni Ezhei, the new Minister of Information, has been a leading
figure in prosecuting reformist clerics and politicians, as well as suppressing press
freedoms, in his various capacities with the Judiciary. In January 1999, he signaled the
Judiciary's offensive against the press that has since resulted in the closure of more than
100 newspapers:
The tone of Tus newspaper is instigating people to act against national
security. If these crimes are proven in the courts, those responsible are
guilty of active resistance [ mohareb] against the state and the law is clear
what their punishment should be... As the head of the Judicial
Complex, I declare that if the opposition newspapers do not heed the
Supreme Leader's second warning, we are responsible to confront them
with all our might and seriousness using public courts as well as
revolutionary courts 28
On July 6, 1999, the daily Salam published a government memorandum written by Saeed
Emami, the intelligence agent who allegedly masterminded the serial murders. In this
memorandum, Emami outlined plans for suppressing reformist publications. Mohseni
Ezhei, as the prosecutor general of the Special Court for the Clergy (SCC), ordered
Sa lam's closure the next day. He brought an indictment against Salam's publisher,
Hojatoleslam Seyyid Mohammad Musavi-Khoeiniha, who was convicted a few weeks
later by the SCC on charges of defaming a government official, publishing insulting
language, and misinforming the public. 29
As the prosecutor general of the SCC, Ezhei also supervised the prosecutions of leading
reformist clerics, notably Abdullah Nun and Mohsen Kadivar. In March 1999, the SCC
charged Kadivar, a respected Shi'a reformist scholar, with disturbing public opinion,
based on a public speech in which he discussed the motives of those responsible for the
serial murders. The court also charged him with “propaganda against the sacred system
of the Islamic Republic” stemming from an interview in which Kadivar said that
structures of shah's government remained intact. The court sentenced him to one-and-a-
half years in prison on both charges. 3 ° In November 1999, the SCC convicted Abdullah
28 Khordad Daily, January 16, 1999; as quoted by Akbar Ganji in Tarik-khaneh Ashbah.
29 “Assault on independent press in Iran intensifies,” Human Rights Watch, July 28, 1999.
30 Text of Mohsen Kadivar's Trial, Bahay-e Azadi (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 2000).
11
Nun, a former minister of interior and publisher of Khordad newspaper, on charges that
his newspaper published articles that Ccdefamed the system” and spread lies and
propaganda against the state. He was sentenced to five years in prison. 3 '
Several journalists and activists have alleged that Mohseni Ezhei ordered the murder of
Pirouz Davani, a dissident and political activist who was allegedly kidnapped and killed
by the agents of the Ministry of Information in 1998. Davani's body has never been
recovered. During his trial in November 2000, Akbar Ganji accused Mohseni Ezhei of
ordering Davani's murder. 32 Abdullah Nun and the investigative journalist Emadin
Baghi have made similar accusations against Mohseni Ezhei. 33 An authoritative Iranian
source told Human Rights Watch that he had first-hand knowledge of the existence of a
letter signed by Mohseni Ezhei ordering government agents to kill Davani. He asked to
remain anonymous out of concerns for his safety.
In June 1998, Mohseni Ezhei was the presiding judge in the trial of Tehran's former
Mayor Gholamhussein Karbaschi. As mayor, Karbaschi had actively campaigned for the
election of Mohammad Khatami as president in 1997. A number of Karbaschi's deputies
were also arrested and Karbaschi said they had been tortured in order to obtain
confessions that would incriminate him. 34 During his trial, Karbaschi repeatedly asked
Mohseni Ejehi to investigate torture and ill-treatment of his co-defendants, but his
requests were ignored. The court sentenced Karbaschi to three years in prison and
banned him from public office for ten years. 35
In 2004, Mohseni Ezhei also served on the Committee to Oversee the Press as the
Judiciary's representative. In one shocking incident, Mohseni Ezhei physically attacked
and bit a prominent reformist journalist, Issa Saharkhiz, during a meeting of the
committee on May 23, 2004.36
Conclusion
Text of Abdullah Nun's Trial, Showkaran Eslab (Tehran: Tarh Now, 1999).
32 “Call for an end to impunity for murderers and those behind serial killings of intellectuals and journalists,”
Reporters without Borders, November 21, 2003. http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=8580.
“Damage' to the intelligence system,” Roozonline Daily, August 15, 2005.
http://roozonline.com/O2anticle/009392.shtml.
Text of Gholamhussein Karbaschi's Trial, Mohakemeh va Defa', (Tehran: Farhang va Andisheh, 1998).
Ibid.
36 “Mohseni Ezehi bites Saharkhiz,” BBC Persian, May 24, 2004.
www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/story/2O04/05/O4O524_mf_fight.shtml.
12
The allegations raised in this briefing paper are extremely serious and the Iranian
government should convene a thorough, impartial, and independent investigation into
the conduct of these cabinet members. Because the allegations are credible, and involve
serious crimes, President Ahmadinejad should relieve Mustafa Pour-Mohammadi and
Mohseni Ezhei of their duties as Minister of Interior and Minister of Information,
respectively, pending the outcome of such an investigation. The results of the
investigation should be made public. If the charges are substantiated, the individuals in
question should be prosecuted to the frill extent of the law, in judicial proceedings that
meet international fair trial standards.
As one of the officials allegedly responsible for ordering the mass killings of political
prisoners in 1988, Pour-Mohammadi is suspected of active participation in crimes
against humanity. Crimes against humanity were first classified in the charter of the
Nuremb erg Tribunal and constitute crimes “which either by their magnitude and
savagery or by their large number or by the fact that a similar pattern was
applied.. . endangered the international community or shocked the conscience of
mankind.” 37 Recently, crimes against humanity have been incorporated into several
international treaties and the statutes of international criminal tribunals, including the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 38
If President Ahmadinejad does not immediately relieve Pour-Mohammadi and Mohseni
Ezehi of their present duties and order an independent investigation into their alleged
responsibility for these serious crimes, the Parliament should conduct a vote of no
confidence for these ministers and itself establish an independent commission to
investigate the charges. 39
Such an independent investigation should aim to identify those responsible and
document their alleged roles. International human rights standards, in particular the U.N.
Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Judicial, Arbitrary, and
Summary Executions (see appendix), provide guidance for conducting an independent
History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War(1 943), p.
179, quoted in Rodney Dixon, ‘Crimes against humanity,” in Commentaiyon the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (0. Triffterer, ed.) (1999), p. 123.
38 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force July 1, 2002. Also see
Rodney Dixon, “Crimes against humanity,” in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (0. Triffterer, ed.) (1999), p. 122. This is the standard applied by Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court. Iran is not a state party to the Rome Statute and is therefore not bound by it, but
the definition in Article 7 accords with the conception of crimes against humanity in customary international law.
The Parliament has already rejected three candidates proposed by President Ahmadinejad for the post of
Minister of Oil.
13
investigation into suspected cases of extra-judicial, arbitrary, and summary executions,
the most serious allegation leveled against Mustafa Pour-Mohammadi and
Gholamhussein Mohseni Ezhei. In accordance with these Principles, other governments
should consider measures including diplomatic interventions and public denunciations,
as well as the use of intergovernmental mechanisms, in order to bring about effective
action against these practices.
Iran's Judiciary has as a body been implicated in many of the abuses described in this
briefing paper, and thereby has demonstrated that it is unable to conduct an impartial
investigation into these matters.
There is a serious crisis of impunity and accountability at the highest reaches of the
Iranian government, a crisis that casts its shadow over the legitimacy and credibility of
the new government, in the eyes of both the Iranian public and the international
community. A serious independent inquiry to determine if these new ministers were
among the perpetrators of these crimes and atrocities is absolutely essential in order to
begin to address this crisis.
Appendix
From the Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Judicial,
Arbitrary, and Summary Executions, recommended by the United Nation Economic and
Social Council Resolution 1989/65 of 24 May 1989.
Principle 9 outlines the manner in which such an investigation should be conducted:
There shall be thorough, prompt and impartial investigation of all
suspected cases of extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions,
including cases where complaints by relatives or other reliable reports
suggest unnatural death in the above circumstances. Governments shall
maintain investigative offices and procedures to undertake such
inquiries. The purpose of the investigation shall be to determine the
cause, manner and time of death, the person responsible, and any
pattern or practice which may have brought about that death. It shall
include an adequate autopsy, collection and analysis of all physical and
documentary evidence and statements from witnesses. The investigation
shall distinguish between natural death, accidental death, suicide and
homicide.
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Principle 11 states that
In cases in which the established investigative procedures are inadequate
because of lack of expertise or impartiality, because of the importance of
the matter or because of the apparent existence of a pattern of abuse,
and in cases where there are complaints from the family of the victim
about these inadequacies or other substantial reasons, Governments
shall pursue investigations through an independent commission of
inquiry or similar procedure.
Principle 19 states that:
Without prejudice to principle 3 above, an order from a superior officer
or a public authority may not be invoked as a justification for extra-legal,
arbitrary or summary executions. Superiors, officers or other public
officials may be held responsible for acts committed by officials under
their authority if they had a reasonable opportunity to prevent such acts.
In no circumstances, including a state of war, siege or other public
emergency, shall blanket immunity from prosecution be granted to any
person allegedly involved in extra-legal, arbitrary or summary
executions 40
Principle 8 provides for an intergovernmental and/or international dimension to such
investigations and to efforts
to prevent extra-judicial, arbitrary and summary executions through
measures such as diplomatic intercession, improved access of
complainants to intergovernmental and judicial bodies, and public
denunciation. Intergovernmental mechanisms shall be used to
investigate reports of any such executions and to take effective action
against such practices.
40 Principle 3 states that: “Governments shall prohibit orders from superior officers or public authorities
authorizing or inciting other persons to carry out any such extra-legal, arbitrary or summary executions. All
persons shall have the right and the duty to defy such orders. Training of law enforcement officials shall
emphasize the above provisions.”
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