Panel Discussing Baha’is in Iran on Macneil/Lehrer Report

          
          , , I U IL ,v,aL.rIL.II..LI I ,rIL.rI rfl...r %Jr .
          , , . iita ,' ,
          Iran's Victory
          (Teasel
          ROBERT MacNEIL (voice-over): Victorious Iranian troops display captured Iraqi prisoners
          while crowds in Tehran celebrate a major victory by the forces of the Ayatollah Khomeini.
          [ TitlesJ
          MacNEIL: Good evening. Iraq claimed still to be ffighting Iranian troops near the city of
          Khurramshahr today, but did not dispute Iran's claim IIat it had recaptured the key port
          yesterday. Iraq's military command said its planes had attacked Iranian positions north of the
          city, and claimed that its troops had killed 238 Iranians. At the United Nations here in New
          York, Secretary General Perez de Cuellar made a new appeal to Iraq and Iran to end their
          20-month-old war. OEat war appeared to take a decisive turn yesterday when Iran said it had
          taken back Khurramshahr, captured by Iraq early in the lighting. OEe success of the Ayatol-
          lah's troops' has raised fears of new instability in the Gulf region, Conservative nil-producing
          Gulf states are reported to fear that Iran might press on into Iraq and open the way for Iran's
          Shiite Muslims to spread their militancy. But the new twist in the ffiglfling also has broader
          implications touching the United States and the Soviet Union. Tonight, the impact of Iran's
          victory. Jim?
          JIM LEHRER: Robin, who is on whose side in this war has been a tangled. confused web
          since IIe beginning; since Iraqi artillery opened lire on an Iranian-held bottler town in
          September, 1980. The U.S. position has been mostly one of neutrality, although then-
          President Carter did deplore Iraq's aggression, despite the fact that iran was still holding 53
          American hostages at the time. A formal position of neutrality has been maintained by the
          Reagan administration. But the pressure to take sides has been great. From Israel. which
          considers both Iran and Iraq enemies, but Iraq the worst of the two. Thus, has reportedly
          been providing arms to Iran and, in doing so. ffinding itself in company with one of Israel's
          ‘ other arch enemies. Syria. Syria is virtually alone among Arab states in supporting Iran. All
          of the rest are on Iraq's side, particularly Jordan and Saudi Arabia. OEey have been urging
          ‘ the United States to support Iraq, too. And, ffinally. just to complicate things more, there's
          the Soviet Union. It has been supplying arms to both sides. It had an arms agreement with
          Iraq when IIe war started, but it also didn't want to alienate Iran. In other word.s. nothing's
          simple for anyone concerning this war. Robin?
          MacNEIL: First, this evening. Iran's point of view. The senior Iranian diplomat in the
          United States is their ambassador to the United Nations, Said Radjai. Mr. Ambassador, first
          of aft, do you have late news of the situation in Khurramshahr? Is there still tlghting around
          it, do you know? ,
          Amb. SAID RADJAI: I think there is no ffighting around Khurramshahr. I believe some of
          the people have already returned back to Khurramshahr, and the city is under complete
          control. OEe police station is set up already, and it's going to be very active soon, by the
          grace of God.
          , MacNEIL: Will Iran's troops, now that they have made such a tremendous recovery of the
          land, will IIey now stop at Iraq's bottler, or are they going to push further in?
          Amb. RADJAI: I wish every audience of mine could put himself in the shoes of all the
          Iranians. I wish they in here could think of a foreign enemy who might have just attacked the
          United States and occupied an important part of the country, arid then the people of the
          , , United States, after a lot of austerities and hardship, would have been able to push the enemy
          back. OEen what would they do at the borders? Would they say, “Well, welcome, thank you
          very much”? Or they would have further arguments to be settled?
          -I-
          I
        

          
          MacNEIL: Will those further arguments involve pushing on and invading Iraq?
          Amb. RADJAI: OEese arguments are basically satisfaction ol the conditions we produced at
          the beginning of the war, and we have been abiding by thcm and sticking to them constantly.
          We said IIat the Iraqi troops must withdraw without any condition. OEis condition can no
          more be satisffied because IIey were expelled from the country by force, or some of them are
          already captives inside the country. So this condition is—
          MacNEIL: OEey can't withdraw voluntarily anymore?
          Amb. RADJAI: They can't withdraw voluntarily anymore. The second condition was
          rrpiu'.tiion of the war. We believe that we havc been nggrcssed by the Iraqi forces. Wc
          believe tlint the imperialisi forces Inside the area, and particularly outside the area— at lhc
          l p ‘if which you know v,1i, 1w I i ,—
          MacNEIL: No. I don't. Who are you referring to?
          Amb. RADJAI: We believe that the United States is responsible for all IIe tension and
          problems and casualties and what is happening to us and to the Iraqi people because Saddam
          Hussein started this war under the instigation of the United States.
          MacNEIL: Can I stop you there and ask you a couple of questions. OEe reparations. Will you
          demand those only of Iraq or other countries you believe involved?
          Amb. RADJAI: We believe some other countries also have been involved in the war, but we
          take it from Iraq. Of course, others can assist Iraq in peace as they have been in war.
          MacNEIL: Others could help her pay the reparations.
          Amb. RADJAI: Yes.
          MacNElL: OEose reparations— I have seen huge sums mentioned: figures like $150 billion.
          Are you talking of sums of that magnitude?
          Amb. RADJAI: I do not have an exact number to give you, but I can assure you that some of
          the losses are just priceless. For instance, there was a dome in Basra— you may already
          know that the city of Basra is totally exploded by the rocket troops before they evacuate from
          the city. Now, in the city there was a dome, a very ancient dome known to the people as the
          Dome of Ishmael. It is exploded. It is a great historical monument. It was a great religious
          place. You cannot replace it no matter how many billions of dollars. Many old mosques have
          been destroyed. A great hospital in the area has been destroyed. Hospitals, schools, libraries,
          departments of the—
          . MacNEIL: So you're going to make Iraq pay, in other words?
          Amb. RADJAI: OEese things can be replaced, but some of the monumental, let's say.
          monumental, historical sites cannot be replaced at all. So we believe that Iraq and particularly
          Saddam Hussein of Iraq, not the people of Iraq, -is responsible for all these losses.
          MacNEIL: Are you going to insist that he be removed from power before you will make a
          peace treaty with Iraq?
          Amb. RADJAI: OEis is also a very good question which can he put to the American people.
          They have to think that a foreign enemy has attacked their country and now the foreign
          enemy has inflicted so many losses in life and in material upon them, and now he is going to
          go just beyond the border. Well, what would they do? OEey would shake hands with him and
          say thank you? I think he must go.
          MacNEIL: He must go. Jim?
          LEHRER: And your country will not stop and will not be satisfled until he is in fact gone. Is
          that correct, sir?
          Amb. RADJAI: Oh, I think we have a better choice in front of us with regard to very reliable
          ‘ Sulaimaniya anciother cities are demonstrating. OEere have been shootings. Two ladies have
          been killed arid so many have been wounded. OEcrefore, the people of Iraq are quite in a
          position to handle the matter, and overthrow the regime which has been imposed upon them.
          LEHRER: So you might not have to do it yourself? You think the people of Iraq will do it'.
          themselves.
          Amb. RADJAI: We don't need to do it. Exactly. OEere is another thing which is to be taken
          into consideration. We have more than 100,000 Iraqi refugees in Iran, and I htnk they have
          to go back. OEey have properties conflscated by the government, and they have a lot to say to
          Mr. Saddam Hussein.
          LEHRER: Mr. Ambassador, the American people of course are used to having people from
          Iran blame everything on the United Slates. But let me ask you, what is your evidence to your
          claim that the United States is responsible for Iraq's invasion of your country?
          Amb. RADJAI: Oh, it's very simple. You look at the papers today. When Saddam Hussein
          started his war against us everybody was foreseeing that IIe Islamic Republic of Iran will
          collapse in the very near future — in a day or so, probably, they would say. It was a very
          wishful thinking, which fortunately never happened. But now when Saddam Hussein is
          falling, everybody has got so much concern for him, and they want stability and peace. What
          is that peace that they never remembered when the war started?
          LEHRER: Well, my question, though, is what is your evidence that the United States was
          responsible for the initial military action taken by Iraq. sir?
          Amb. RADJAI: Well, some of the information we have we cannot— we just can't tell the
          people. We cannot produce evidence at this talle here to them, but we have reliable
          information that Saddarn Hussein started this war aifier consultation with authorities of the
          United States. Second, we know that all the pro-American regimes in the area have been
          actively participating in the war and assisting Saddam Hussein. We know some of the
          regimes cannot eat, drink water without the permission of the United States, and they have
          been very active in the war. OEeir soldiers are now captives. We have their tanks. We have
          their military hardware, some of them undamaged. So we know where they're coming from.
          LEHRER: Is it true, though, that one of the United States' major, if not the maor ally in the
          Middle East, Israel, has in fact been supplying your country with arms to fight Iraq 7
          Amb. RADJAI: I think this is sort of allegation which is produced in order to instigate the
          good feeling of the Arabs and turn it into bad feelings against us. OEey know that Israel—
          everybody knows that Israelis the greatest enemy of Islam and the greatest enemy of Arabs.
          So by accusing us of this, they have been doing their best in order to distort and destroy our
          relations with our neighbors, and they are doing it now. OEey are threatening the Muslim
          people of the area from Islam. I think it is the imperialism and Zionism that all the people in
          the area must be afraid of, not Islam, because they are already Moslems and very good
          observant Moslems, I believe.
          LEHRER: Mr. Ambassador, to again repeat my question, has Israel in fact supplied arms to
          your country in this war against Iraq?
          Amb. RADJAI: No. -
          LEHRER: What support have you received from Syria? Syria is one of the one countries that
          has supported you publicly, is that correct?
          Amb. RADJAI: We are an independent country. and we have been under economic sane-
          lions — different kind of sanctions. We have done our best to get whatever we needed from
          the free market, but we have not had any relations in this time with South Africa. with Israel.
          with Egypt, and with the United States. -
          LEHRER: What about the Soviet Union, sir? -
          —2—
          —3— f
        

          
          frnrn the side of the Soviet Union. Fortunately enough. plenty of Soviet arms have been taken
          from the Iraqis. If you remember, when we liberated the city of Bhutan. there we had access
          to enough tanks, lorries and other military hardware and ammunitions— enough for three
          complete months of the war all along the borders. And we still have them and we are using
          them.
          LEHRER: Mr. Ambassador, thank you. Robin?
          Amb. RADJAI: OEank you.
          MacNEIL: Now, another perspective. We were unable to obtain an Iraqi spokesman for this
          program. We get nnotlicr perspective from Karen F llioti House. diplomatic correspondent of
          the Wall Street Journal. Ms. I louse has covered Arab politics extensively, and returned only
          last wcek from a trip to Iraq. Ms. I-louse, what ne the worries otthc stales around Iran now?
          KAREN ELLIOTT HOUSE: Well, precisely what you alluded to earlier, that even if the
          Iranians don't physically move into Iraq, that the enthusiasm of this victory is going to
          encourage them to tly to spread IIeir revolutionary view of Islam into Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
          Bahrain, other countries in the Gulf.
          MacNEIL: Which countries are most worried? OEe ones you just mentioned or—
          Ms. HOUSE: Yes, and obviously, we're most worried about the Saudis.
          MacNEIL: Are other Arab states committed to the survival of Saddam Hussein of Iraq?
          Ms. HOUSE: I don't think them is a whole lot of personal commitment to Saddani Hussein
          necessarily. I think he is viewed as at least as a figure of stability, and thus to see him go,
          there is a fear that that would only encourage the Kurds in Iraq, the Shias versus the Sunnis—
          I mean, all of the eIInic and religious tensions in that country to expand.
          MacNElL: If Iran, which has the most powerful military forces in the area, at least except
          for Israel—. if it presses for reparations from Iraq. are other states in the region likely to try to
          help Iraq meet them? .
          Ms. HOUSE: I think—
          MacNEIL: You heard what the Ambassador said earlier.
          Mn. HOUSE: Yes. There's been talk about that even before the war reached this critical
          point. The Saudis, among, others, are apparently willing in help Iraq pay reparations, and
          then' have been nitnors all over here In the last er itiple of days t hat A bit Dhahl has iiliriidy
          trnnskned money to Iran. And these am the sorts ni things that it's very diflicult to prove, but
          1 think there is definitely a willingness; if money is all that stands in the way of a settlement
          that stops the Iranians, then the Saudis will be happy to pay.
          MacNEIL: You heard the Ambassador say that there were signs of unrest in Iraq against
          Saddam Hussein. Does he appear secure to you? You were just iii that country.
          Ms. HOUSE: Well, it's obviously extremely diff cult to know. I don't think— I mean, he's
          been a rather effcient leader at maintaining control and at eliminating his enemies, some of
          whom were once his friends. So I think that it would be premature to assume that in the next
          few days we're going to see Saddam Hussein out in the street. But clearly this is not a happy
          day for him because he has been so personally identified with the war, and it must be a bit
          like Jimmy Carter the morning aifier the failure of the hostage rescue mission in Iran.
          MacNEIL: If Saddam— you say people are talking of stability. If Saddam Hussein falls. iii
          what way is his survival important to the United States?
          Ms. HOUSE: I think only for the same mason that some of the Arabs feel that it's important
          — simply because if you have a change of leadership, it's likely to encourage and unleash
          other ambitions nnd cfl'orts, and— for instance, the Kurds in Iraq. It could encourage their
          —4—
          the country; and that, in a time when there is enough instability, is not what you want.
          MacNEIL: Well, thank you. Jim? ,
          LEHRER: Let's look at the so called Big Power stake in all this now. We get the perspective
          of William Olson of the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies here in
          Washington. His specialty is the international politics and strategies concerning the Persian
          Gulf region. If Iran does in fact end up winning this war, as it looks like it's going to. what
          would that mean for the United States and its interests? . ,
          WILLIAM OLSON: Well, the whole situation in the Middle East, as a result of the Iran-Iraq
          war, has been a nettle for the United States because it has been put in the position of. after the
          fall of the Shah, of losing whatever influence it had in Iran, and of having virtually no
          influence in Iraq. And as the result, the United States is now in the position of two countries
          at war in an area of vital concern to the United States, but has no leverage to exercise its
          influence in the area. OEis is of course very worrying to deal with because of the threat to the
          Saudis and of oil.
          LEHRER: You heard what the Ambassador said, his charge that the United States actually
          precipitated this whole thing on the part of Iraq. Does that have a ring of truth to you?
          Mr. OLSON: From an Iranian perspective, probably so. I don't think that it's a very realistic
          one, no. OEe United States has nothing to gain from this kind of promotion of Iraq, and the
          United States did not have this kind of influence in Iraq. OEe Soviet Union had the influence,
          and the treaty of friendship with Iraq, and they might have restrained Iraq, but I don't think
          that even they could have stopped the Iraqis from moving. OEis was something that was done
          purely for local motives, and there is very little that can be done by a superpower in this kind
          of situation. . ,
          LEHRER: Well, there's nothing the United States could have done to influence events in
          this, you're saying? Even the course of the last 20 months of the war?
          Mr. OLSON: Well, that's been one of the real problems with the United States, is that we
          have had few levers of power in the area. We have no military forces to influence the region.
          Our ‘inability to do anything about the hostage situation, I think, is a key of how low the
          American ability has sunk to afl'ect interests or events in the area.
          LEHRER: So jttst in terms of (lie region, you agree with Karen, then, that the main threat to
          ll.S. interests is the instability that this will cause, right'?
          Mr. OLSON: That's one of the principal sources ol' concern.
          LEHRER: Let's talk about the Soviet Union now. What are the potential wins and losses that
          it could get from this?
          Mr. OLSON: Well, the principal gain at the moment for the Soviet Union is the fact of the
          destruction of American interests in Iran. This was a real plus for the Soviet Union. and it
          gives them an opportunity to inject their interest into the area by helping, in this case, the
          Iranians, because I believe the Soviet Union sees Iran as the strategic key to the area, and by
          providing what services they can to Iran, they can hope to increase their influence. Now.
          them am some chances that this might cost them in the area because of alienating the Arab
          states, but the problem at the moment is that the Arabs themselves are divided over the issue
          of the Iran-Iraq war. And you have the regional states, of course. supporting Iraq. I m you
          have Syria, Libya, Algeria. the PLO and Yemen all supporting the Iranians in this situation.
          So it has divided the Arab community as well. And this means the Soviet Union can try to
          then sail between these interests and increase its total influence in the area by relations with
          Iran.
          LEHRER: But most likely by siding more firmly with Iran rather than Iraq?
          Mr. OLSON: Oh, absolutely. I mean, they have a treaty of friendship with Iraq. which they
          —5—
          .— ,
          I
        

          
          nave nor jivea up to. i nave not pruviueu tire runu or racirrues to uaq ulat uric wouru nave
          expected of a loyal ally, and there were over the years— the last few years has been a
          deterioration in the Soviet-Iraqi relationship, and with the fail of the Shah the Soviets, I
          believe, saw an opportunity. This was a target of opportunity, and similar to the incidents in
          the Horn of Africa in the relationship between Ethiopia and Somalia. the Soviets shifled
          gmund and went to the power they thought was more influential in the region.
          LEHRER: 1 know this is a vety diffcult question, but I'm going to ask it anyhow. Looking
          ahead, with all the considered if's that you want to add into it, do you see, as a result of
          what's happened in this Iran-Iraqi war and the conclusion that it looks like it's headed for,.
          causing some kind of major confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union?
          Mr, OLSON: It certainly has this potential. One is concerned (hat this might be our Balkan
          ? lit?J iIt i On—
          LEHRER: Meaning what?
          Mr. OLSON: OEe prelude to the First World War sort of situation: the confrontation of the
          two powers over extremely important strategic interests to both sides in a situation in which
          they cannot back down. The problem at the moment for the United States in the region is that
          it has very little with which to uphold its power.
          LEHRER: So the Soviet Union's in better shape (uninrelfrgibkJ than we are?
          Mr. OLSON: Much better shape. OEe Soviet Union is a regional power. and it has some-
          thing on the order of 20 divisions martialled in the region — of Central Asia and Afghanistan
          — and the United States has a nascent RDF. which is not particularly an impressive force.
          LEHRER: Rapid Deployment Force.
          Mr. OLSON: Or, as I heard it described, a rapidly deplorable force.
          LEHRER: Okay. Well, we'll leave that alone. Thank you. Robin?
          MacNEIL: Mr. Ambassador, you heard Karen Elliott llousc say that the states neighboring
          Iraq — the Gulf states, and she named them — fear that this is going to mean the spread of
          your revolution into their— or at least the militant Shiite Muslim spirit into their countries.
          Arc they right to fear that? I mean, is that what you will now attempt to do?
          Amb. RADJAI: No. I think most of the interpretations presented by the gentleman are not
          correct. OEc problem is that you have got access to a lot of information, but when you come
          to the interpretation the whole issue changes. I am sure you remember that all what you have
          foreseen about the future of Iran, even before the revolution, around the time of the collapse
          of the Shah's regime (uninfelligibleJ — all of those things happened to be false. OEis is
          simply because those who interpret the information, they do not have access to some of the
          clues— .
          MacNEIL: What is the correct interpretation?
          Amb. RADJAI: OEe correct interpretation is reference to Islam and to the Holy Koran,
          which is very diffcult for some of the learned scholars in this part of the world. For instance,
          they put their fingers upon the Sunni-Shiite issue. It is absolutely irrelevant. We have a good
          number of Sunni brothers inside Iran who are defending their own land—
          MacNEIL: OEat is the other— the major sect in the world of the Muslim faith,
          Amb. RADJAI: You see, it is not a sectarian issue. We believe, and we think it is quite
          justified to believe so, that even raising up this issue, flaring up this issue, is in itself an
          instigation and probably a sort of. you know. conspiracy.
          MacNElL: Let me ask Mr. Olson— .
          Amb. RADJAI: We have Shiites and Sunnis in Iran. OEey have both members in the
          Parliament, and they are working hand in-hand. We speak in terms of Islam, neither Shiite
          nor Sunni, and mind you, the Sunni broIIers Insrae me otnercuuuruics ainullu ‘ ‘
          happy to practice their Islam, and they are looking forward to that. If the impact ot the
          revolution has resulted in a sort of political awareness or religious awareness or both in the
          area, it is inevitable. Religion is something innate. People want it. OEey have been Moslems
          for years, and they want to hr Moslems. We cannot be blamed for that.
          MacNEIL: Well, let me ask Ms. House whether the states she has been visiting recently see
          it that way. How do they see it?
          Ms. HOUSE: Well, the Iraqis would make the same point he does in defense of their own
          very sharp division between numbers of Shia.s and Sunnis that whatever they are, whether
          Shia or Sunni. that they are Iraqi first. Now, that's not exactly the way the Saudis look at it.
          OEey're much more concerned, and their Shia population is very small — about 250.000 out
          of 4 million, 4 z million Saudis. But they're still very concerned about that, and thcy rc very
          concerned about the Shia population in Bahrain, the appeal of the Iranian eLort to try to stir
          up these minorities, which was going on. It's one of the reasons that we're—
          MacNEIL: Excuse me, which IIey fear might result in the overthrow of IIeir rather con-
          servative regimes? Is that what you mean?
          Ms. HOUSE: Yes. OEat you could generate something that spins out of control.
          MacNEIL: Arc you not interested in subverting and exporting your revolution to those
          countries?
          Amb. RADJAI: We are not interested in any intervention, overt or covert, in the affairs of
          our neighbors — our brothers and sisters in the Persian Gulf area.
          MacNEIL: So they don't have anything to worry about in your view?
          Amb. RADJAI: OEcy have something to worry about.
          MacNEIL: What is that?
          Amb. RADJAI: That is that they know what they have done to President Saddani Hussein in
          terms of supporting him in the war against us. If this war worries them, this is not very
          significant. We have always extended our hand to them for friendship. OEey can always
          shake it. We arc ready. We are not going to have any territorial ambition, any aggression
          against any of these states. We are Moslems. We speak in the language of the Holy Koran.
          OEey have the same language, and we can communicate very easily. If some of the regimes
          are womed by what their own people might wish to do against them or for them, that is their
          own business. .
          MacNEIL: Let me ask Mr. Olson. Would that kind of declaration from Iran, Mr. Olson,
          relieve the anxieties of U.S. policymakers concerned with the area?
          Mr. OLSON: I don't think so. I mean, what we're dealing with here is an excellent case of
          revolutionary double talk in that you assure people that you don't intend to interfere in their
          country but promote a transnational idea that is guaranteed to stir up local populations. And
          the Iranians at the moment are in the process of building a number of radio stations — 1 think
          the number is somewhere over I SO— with facilities to broadcast throughout the Middle East
          in a variety of languages, which they are in the process of doing. spreading the Islamic
          revolution, or their idea of the Islamic revolution: and any number of the leaders of the
          country have talked about the fact that you cannot contain the revolution. It's like spring
          weather: it spreads abroad as it is. And the states in the region, of course, are going to view
          this as interference in their aLairs. as the Iranians would regard it as interference in their
          affairs if the local regimes broadcast into Iran to threaten— ‘
          MacNEIL: Let's get the Ambassador's comment on that. -
          Amb. RADJAI: I think the impact of the revolution—
          MacNEIL: I mean, are you in fact installing all these radio stations to do this?
          —6—
          —7—
        

          
          many languages.
          MacNEIL: No. but I mean are you, to answer Mr. Olson's point.
          Amb. RADJAI: Yes, we have diLerent languages on our radio, and we preach. We have
          press. We have TV and people are quite free to listen to us. OEc problem is, what we are
          teaching or preaching in our radio stations and through our media is not something contraly to
          the principles of IIe belief of the people. We don't want them to overthrow their regimes. We
          just teach them the principles of IIe Holy Koran.
          MncNEIL: We have to leave it there, Mr. Ambassador. OEank you very much for joining us.
          That's the end of our lime ronighl. Karen Ellunt House, Mr. Olson, thank you for joining us.
          Good night, Jim.
          LEIlfllZR: C]ood night, Robin,
          MacNEIL: OEat's all for tonight. We will be back tomorrow night. I'm Robert MacNeil.
          Good night. .
          Transcript produced by Joumal Graphics, Inc., New York, N.Y.
          —8-——
          . 1