Aadel Collection
Report of the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran
United Nations
O General Assembly Distr.: General
10 August 2001
Original: English
Fifty-sixth session
Item 131(c) of the provisional agenda*
Human rights questions: human rights situation and
reports of special rapporteurs and representatives
Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran
Note by the Secretary Genera1**
The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the
General Assembly the interim report prepared by Maurice Copithorne, Special
Representative of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human
rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran in accordance with a decision taken by the
Economic and Social Council at its substantive session of 2001.
* A1561150.
** In accordance wiII General Assembly resolution 55/222, part III, para. 10, IIis report is being
submitted on 10 August 2001 so as to include as much updated information as possible.
01-50649(E) 190901
II0 II I 0II 100 1101 100 I I I IV II
A156/278
Report of the Special Representative of the Commission
on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the
Islamic Republic of Iran
Summary
There is a strong and growing demand for reform from the Iranian people. The
progress to date has been made despite the continuing efforts of some elites to
frustrate that demand.
The sweeping suppression of the mainly reformist press over the past 15
months has had a serious negative impact on the promotion of human rights in the
Islamic Republic of Iran.
The status of women, particularly their legal status, remains highly
discriminatory. Modest efforts to improve it have been mostly rejected by unelected,
conservative political elites. Patriarchal attitudes are very much in evidence in the
form of domestic violence and the limited prospects for women to enter the labour
force.
There are early signs of important change within the legal system, but there is a
long way to go. So far, there appears to be no let-up in the abuse of persons in
pretrial detention. Many of the punishments in use are gross violations of
international human rights standards, including in particular, the use of stoning and
decapitation.
Iranian society has had little experience with civil discourse leading to peaceful
change. The treatment of activists and dissidents, particularly by the security forces
and the judiciary, displays a fearful intolerance of alternative views. The treatment of
such persons, some of whom participated in the struggle against the Shah, is little
short of vicious.
There is a stalemate between the elected and unelected branches of government
over important policy and legislative decisions concerning reform. The Iranian
people are paying dearly for it.
Religious and ethnic minorities continue to face official and societal
discrimination and in some cases, persecution. They are becoming more outspoken in
their demands, particularly concerning economic and cultural rights.
Iran is facing a major economic crisis. Inflation, unemployment and poverty are
among the causes of the deteriorating social condition of most Iranians. The human
rights cost of the crisis is very high. A comprehensive economic and social
development strategy needs to be among the Government's top priorities.
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Contents
I. Introduction .
II. Freedom of expression .
III. Status of women
IV. Legal subjects
A. Reform of the legal process . . . .
B. Prisons
C. Punishment
V. Status of intellectuals and of political,
A. Student unrest
B. The serial murders
C. Religious dissidents
D. Berlin conference trial
E. Detention of religious/nationalist
VI. Democratic governance
VII. Status of minorities
A. Religious minorities
B. Ethnic minorities
C. A national minorities policy . . . .
VIII. Economic, social and cultural rights. .
A. Economic circumstances
B. Situation of workers
C. Poverty
D. Investment stimulation
IX. Other important issues
A. National human rights bodies
B. Iran in the international human rights system
X. Conclusions and recommendations
I. Information on the situation of the Baha'is 21
II. Supporters of the religious/nationalist movement believed to be in detention, as of
15July2001 22
III. Correspondence between the Special Representative and the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, December 2000-June 2001 24
student and religious dissidents
activists
Paragraphs
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28—32
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Aimexes
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I. Introduction
1. The period under review in this report that is,
the first six months of 2001 was again a tumultuous
one in the Islamic Republic of Iran. In general, the
voices calling for reform grew stronger,
notwithstanding the suppression of much of the
reformist press. The President in large part remained
true to his vision of an Islamic Republic”, but he
faced formidable opposition to the realization of the
road map that he had set out for the country. In the
run-up to his re-election in June, there were many
voices, particularly younger ones, expressing open
frustration at the slow pace of reform.
2. The argument is often heard that allowance has to
be made for a society like Iran's, in that it has known
only despotism over its long history. However
dedicated it may be to the modern concepts of the rule
of law, democracy and human rights, such a society has
to travel a difficult road on which there will be many
obstacles to overcome. The reinventing of society,
when it has been successful, has usually been a long
and painful process.
3. In this context, the Special Representative is
often told that the Islamic Republic of Iran should be
judged more on the overall trend of its development
than on the obstacles it is facing. The Special
Representative understands and sympathizes with this
perspective. However, one cannot simply close the
door for a few decades before evaluating a country's
progress towards its declared goals. Iran is fully
engaged with the international community in many
respects. It is a party to most of the core human rights
instruments, including certain instruments of the
International Labour Organization (ILO), each of
which involves a reporting and examination process.
The world is at the Islamic Republic of Iran's doorstep,
and the interaction with the international community
can only increase. In the Special Representative's view,
it is simply no longer possible to deflect the world's
gaze away from a Government's treatment of its own
citizens.
4. The Special Representative has no doubt that the
majority of Iranians, in all walks of life, believe that at
the beginning of the twenty-first century, they deserve
better and more accountable governance and a society
that has more respect for the inherent dignity of
individuals.
5. The Special Representative believes that progress
is being made in the incorporation of human rights
values into Iranian society. The change in the discourse
over the past six years is testimony of progress. In
some respects, however, the Government seems to be
lagging behind the people, who have made clear,
through their elected representatives, their desire for
change.
6. In the present report, the Special Representative
has done his best to capture the range of important
human rights developments in the Islamic Republic of
Iran over the first six months of the year. They may be
significant in their own right or significant as
indicators of a broader trend. This necessarily involves
a prioritization of areas and issues, and the Special
Representative understands that not everyone is likely
to agree with his choices. The overall picture is
certainly a mixed one. One must hope that, in the
interest of all Iranians, faster progress can be made
towards the goal of embracing human rights and all the
values that they represent.
7. In seeking to discharge his mandate, the Special
Representative has used many sources of information,
including the Government of the Islamic Republic,
other Governm ents, individuals, non-governmental
organizations and the Iranian and international media.
II. Freedom of expression
8. In his last interim report to the General Assembly,
the Special Representative described the early stages of
what became a widespread crackdown on the press,
instituted by elements in the judiciary in April 2000
(A/55/363, paras. 12-21). The process has continued.
During the past 15 months (to early July 2001), more
than 40 publications, daily newspapers and weekly
magazines have been closed down for various periods
of time, some indefinitely. (In the Islamic Republic of
Iran, as elsewhere, publications sometimes close for
purely financial or editorial reasons.)
9. In addition, editors and journalists have been
charged with various offences and fined, sent to jail or
banned from journalism for a period of years or, in
some cases, a combination of the above. At least one
was sentenced to be lashed, a sentence subsequently
overturned. The numbers are uncertain, but the best
recent estimate available to the Special Representative
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is that since April 2000, more than 20 journalists have
spent time in jail, in either pre- or post-trial detention.
10. Typical charges are
(a) Defamation;
(b) Publishing false information;
(c) Publishing criminal material;
(d) Publishing sensational material contrary to
modesty;
groups.
(e) Collaborating with counter-revolutionary
11. The campaign against the press has spread
beyond the usual definition of journalist”. A theology
student was brought before the Special Clerical Court
for articles deemed to be propagating against the
Islamic Republic; a number of university students were
detained for articles in their student newspapers
deemed to be blasphemous, an offence that could draw
the death penalty; and a cartoonist was charged with
publishing an offensive caricature of the judiciary.
According to press reports, the complaints against the
press are being brought chiefly by six state agencies,
and this has given rise to the term OEerial plaintiffs”.
The campaign against the press appears to be waged by
these agencies with the willing support of a small
group of judges.
12. It has been pointed out in the Iranian press that,
despite the fact that the existing, rather conservative
press law provides for a maximum suspension of six
months, many papers have been sentenced to longer
periods of closure and some have remained closed even
after the expiry of the prescribed closure period. The
judges involved have gone outside the press law and
invoked sections of the Constitution as well as other
legislation, particularly the Precautionary Measures
Law, which both refer to the prevention of crime. One
journal was closed for insulting the President, who
replied that he knew of no law that prescribed a
punishment for such an act.
13. In discussing the repression of the Iranian press,
it is clear that the vagaries of many Iranian laws,
including the Constitution, are being taken full
advantage of. The various laws that have relevance to
criticism, insult and defamation are perhaps typical in
this regard. Procedural issues are also very much part
of the problem. There are many examples of arbitrary
arrest, prolonged detention prior to trial, often in
solitary confinement, and denial of the elements of fair
trial. Clearly, reform is needed, both legislative (in
order to give greater precision as to the offences
involved) and judicial (in order to ensure the
implementation of procedures that protect the rights of
the accused).
III. Status of women
14. The condition of women in the Islamic Republic
has remained much the same for some years: steady
improvements in some respects such as education but
no change in the foundational, legalized discrimination
faced by women almost across the board. Perhaps the
most graphic recent portrayal of this situation is the
Iranian film, The Circle”, with its strong overtones of
the Islamic Republic as a prison for women.
15. At the time the present report was being prepared,
a spirited debate was under way as to the number of
women who should be included in the new cabinet of
the President. In late June, a senior Majilis figure
declared that it was not dignified for women to be put
on display in government. A female member of the
Majilis quickly responded, Our men should guard
against the sickness of immaturity.” The 12 women
members of the Majilis prepared their own list of three
women candidates for the cabinet.
16. The recent presidential election and the action of
the Guardian Council in not approving any of the two
dozen female candidates has focused attention on the
eligibility of women to hold public office.
17. Another side of women's plight is what has
become known as the feminine face of poverty”. It
was reported that at a meeting to mark 15 May,
International Day of the Family, a number of officials
described the situation in graphic terms. There are now
some 1 million single-mother families in the Islamic
Republic. Twenty-nine per cent of the families below
the poverty line are single-mother families. Seventy per
cent of the single mothers in rural areas are illiterate. In
37 per cent of single-mother families, only one person
is employed. The General Director of the Office to
Combat Poverty reportedly stated that, while the law
requires the minimum wage to be paid to all families
headed by women, it is paid at only 50 per cent of the
rate because of budget shortfalls.
18. The issue of the physical abuse of women within
the family remains in the spotlight. The press reports
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that to get around the reluctance of the police to
become involved in such cases, hotlines” are being
established for women to seek urgent help. More
fundamentally, however, Iranian women continue to
press the point that the issue is rooted in the cultural
approach of men towards women. A member of the
Women's Participation Centre in Tehran was quoted
recently as saying that women had become more
frequently the victims of beatings, rape, abortions,
financial and mental pressures, and verbal abuse from
their husbands, brothers and even children. The Special
Representative notes that the alleviation of patriarchal
attitudes is also a key to opening up more and better
job opportunities for women. The Special
Representative has been made aware of the many
activities and programmes for promoting women's
rights, but he nevertheless urges the Government to
take a leadership role in tackling the cultural issue. It
needs to have a very clear focus and to allocate
sufficient human and monetary resources to undertake
major educational programmes in the schools, on
television and through other public channels. The
longer the Government delays taking serious action,
the more women will suffer, and probably needlessly
so. It is an issue that the Government, in good
conscience, must address urgently.
19. Finally, there is the long outstanding benchmark
issue of the minimum age of marriage, particularly that
for girls, which is nine years. The Special
Representative has discussed this issue in earlier
reports (A/55/363, para. 31; E/CN.4/2001/39, para. 24).
The Special Representative notes the recent action of
the Guardian Council of rejecting the Majilis bill that
would have addressed this black spot on the reputation
of the Islamic Republic. If argument is still needed, the
Special Representative would draw attention to the
article on early childhood marriage in the UNICEF
Innocenti Digest No. 7 (March 2001), which declares
that pregnancy-related deaths are the leading cause of
mortality of girls aged 15-19 worldwide. The Special
Representative once again appeals to all branches of
the Government to work together to bring new
legislation into effect as quickly as possible as a mark
of respect for the girl-children of their country.
(In February, a girl's shelter in Karaj, the Jasmine
Centre, was closed down after an investigation had
reportedly revealed that it had become involved in the
trafficking of girls. The press focused on the high-level
connections of the operators of the Centre. A judge of
the Revolutionary Court was subsequently charged in
the affair.)
11/. Legal subjects
A. Reform of the legal process
20. In late March, the Special Representative
received from the Government a list of legal reforms
that were being implemented. The most pressing
perhaps was the long-promised re-establishment of the
procuracy which could potentially go a significant way
to reduce the absolute discretion that judges have had
in the court room, including in most cases being judge
and prosecutor and, in some cases, jury and defence
counsel as well. That draft legislation was approved by
the Majilis judicial affairs commission in late June and
was introduced on the floor of the Majilis in early July.
21. A second important reform is the amendment of
the punishment provisions concerning dishonoured
loans. Many individuals so convicted reportedly remain
in jail after having served their conviction, being
unable to pay back the underlying debt. This practice
has apparently been so widespread that the group has
become the second largest category of prison inmates.
Such persons will now be released on completion of
their term.
22. A third project is the establishment from 1
September 2001 of the right of students holding a BA
(Law) to take an examination and, if successful, to be
qualified as lawyers and permitted to practice under
supervision. The purpose is to increase significantly
the number of lawyers in the country. The Independent
Bar Association has objected to this initiative under
the guise of an economic bill”, and as a severe assault
on the independence of the Bar. This development
follows on the other encroachments that have occurred
on the autonomy of the Bar, including control over who
stands for election to the Bar Council, the disciplining
of members of the Bar and indeed the OEuitability” of
all applicants for admission to the Bar (see A/55/363,
paras. 44-46). The Special Representative shares the
concern of the Bar Council in this regard, noting that
the independence of the Bar is a vital ingredient in any
human rights enforcement regime.
23. The fourth reform is the introduction of what is
known in some other cultures as alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) that is, the provision of
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reconciliation/rn ediation facilities to rern ove certain
types of cases frorn the court and expedite their
settlernent. It should also reduce the backlog in court
calendars.
24. The fifth project, already rnentioned in an earlier
report (E/CN.4/2001/39, para. 109), is the
establishrnent, with the cooperation of UNICEF, of a
systern of juvenile courts. The Special Representative
is inforrned that this project is on track and the judges
in training will be going abroad to learn frorn the
experience of other jurisdictions.
25. A sixth project concerns the disciplining of
judges that is, to treat rnore seriously any
infringernent by judges of the provisions of the law.
The Special Representative has earlier referred to the
apparent blatant disregard by at least a few judges of
the instructions set out by the Head of Judiciary,
particularly in the rnatter of pre-trial treatrnent of
suspects (E/CN.4/2001/39, para. 31). The Judicial
Tribunal, a little known and apparently underutilized
institution, rnay be now facing its first test in this
regard. When asked by the Special Representative
about the processing of cornplaints by the farnilies of
detainees against Judge Saeed Mortazavi and Judge
Hassan Ahrnadi Mogaddas, governrnent officials
responded that those and other cornplaints against
judges were now before the Tribunal. A governrnent
official reported that 40 judges had been suspended in
the past four rnonths. The Special Representative trusts
that the Tribunal will act expeditiously and that its
decisions will be rnade public. Such action could go a
long way towards restoring confidence in the Iranian
Judiciary. It is perhaps worth adding that a judicial
systern needs the support of the people in order to earn
their respect and to rnake legitirnate its exercise of
power over their lives. In this regard, the Special
Representative notes the President's speech on 29 June
in which he declared that the rnain rnission of the
Judiciary, in accordance with the constitution, was to
support individual and social rights of the people and
to realize social justice within the cornrnunity. The
rnain criteria of a systern built on that foundation was
respect for the hurnan being, ensuring the rights of the
hurnan beings and the realization of justice. The
President went on to call upon judges to put aside
cynicisrn and prejudgernent and to respect the principle
of innocence until proven guilty.
26. Other reforrns rnentioned to the Special
Representative were the re-introduction of res judicata,
a concept that had been abandoned at the tirne of the
Revolution, as having lost its value”, and the
reduction of the cases being referred back by the
Suprerne Court for a new hearing. In other words, the
Suprerne Court would rnore often be the final judicial
step. The Special Representative believes that these
changes would increase the predictability and fairness
of the legal systern and reduce the case backlog that
currently exists. Another prornised reforrn is legislation
to narrow the definition of moharab (waging war on
God) to those acts involving the use of firearrns. This
will rernove a very dangerous weapon frorn the judicial
arsenal that, while only occasionally invoked, has hung
over the heads of all those advocating change. Yet
another new rneasure is the establishment of a non-
governrnental organization to focus on the rights of
prisoners.
27. In conclusion, it is clear frorn the above that the
task of legal reforrn has begun or is at least about to
begin. The Special Representative looks forward to
reporting its successful irnplernentation.
B. Prisons
28. Two of the rnost pressing issues with regard to
prisons in the Islarnic Republic are overcrowding and
the existence of detention centres outside the control of
the National Prisons Organization. With regard to the
first, no recent figures on the nurnber of inrnates have
corne to the attention of the Special Representative. In
late June the Head of the National Prisons Organization
noted that the high nurnber of prisoners was the result
of social circurnstances outside the prisons, and that the
organization was unable to settle all prison problerns.
He said that the prison population had increased by 40
per cent over the past year and that two thirds of the
inrnates were there for drug-related offences. Most of
the inrnates are between 22 and 30, and less that 3 per
cent of thern are wornen.
29. In light of the huge growth in the nurnber of
persons incarcerated for drug-related offences, one
proposal has been to segregate such persons into new
purpose-built institutions in the countryside. Other
steps discussed have been reducing the nurnber of
inrnates by reducing the nurnber of offences calling for
incarceration and rnaking greater use of probation,
particularly for wornen and children. A further
proposal for reducing the prison population is to
elirninate the holding of certain inrnates beyond the
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term of their sentence when they are unable to pay off
their civil debts (see para. 21 above).
30. As for the non-official detention centres where
much of the prisoner abuse takes place, in early June a
member of a Majilis commission looking into prisons
told the press that there were as many secret detention
centres as there were secret service and military
establishments combined with even non-military and
non-secret service establishments. He added no
military or security establishment had the right to its
own prison. The Head of the National Prisons
Organization has declared that all non-official
detention centres have now been brought under the
control of his organization. He also stated that the
notorious Toweed Prison has finally been completely
closed.
31. It is worth reporting that after the re-election of
the President, a proposal was floated in the Majilis to
change the status of the Prisons Organization by
moving it from under the judiciary to the portfolio of
the Minister of Justice, where it would be subject to
oversight by the Majilis.
32. It is to be hoped that these various reform
measures are pursued vigorously. In particular, the
Special Representative would be pleased to record in
his next report to the Human Rights Commission that
control of all of the illegal detention centres is
finally in practice as well as in form in the hands
of the National Prisons Organization.
C. Punishment
Executions
33. The number of executions continues to be high.
Based on the information received by the Special
Representative, some 60 executions took place in the
first six months of the year. It would seem that around
two thirds of them were carried out in public, despite
reports from government sources, according to which
punishment takes place principally in camera. These
include the public hanging of a woman on 19 March
2001 in Tehran, an extremely rare event in the Islamic
Republic. In what seems a retrograde step, it was
reported that the state television has broadcast scenes
of public hangings on two occasions since the
beginning of 2001.
34. In the period under review, there have been
disturbing reports of resort to especially barbaric and
unusual forms of execution, such as beheading and
stoning. According to press reports, an Afghan man
was publicly decapitated in Zabol in June 2001. This is
the first time the Special Representative has received
reports of the use of this form of punishment, and he
has asked for the comments of the Government. The
practice of stoning, which finally appeared to be
declining, would seem to have been resumed. Since
January 2001, the Special Representative has received
information concerning the stoning of two women and
the sentencing to death by stoning of at least one other.
According to reports in the press, an unnamed woman
was stoned to death at Evin prison, Tehran, on 20 May
2001. The woman, aged 35, was arrested eight years
ago on charges of acting in pornographic films. In
January 2001, the Supreme Court reportedly upheld the
death sentence by public stoning of Maryam Ayoubi,
38, convicted for the murder of her husband. Iranian
press reported her stoning to death in Evin prison,
Tehran, on 11 July 2001. A third woman, named
Robabeh, was also reportedly sentenced to death by
stoning in June 2001 for the murder of her husband.
The Special Representative has raised these reports
with the Government. He urges the Government to
remove article 82 (b), concerning stoning, from the
Islamic Criminal Code and to undertake a policy of
actively suppressing recourse to stoning throughout the
country.
35. According to information received from the
Government, there was an executive decision in 2000
to put an end to the imposition of the death penalty
against minors. However, the Special Representative
has recently received reports of the execution of one
minor and the sentencing to death of another one. As
reported in the Iranian press on 29 May 2001, Mehrdad
Yusefi, an 18-year-old boy, was hanged in the south-
western region of 11am for a crime which he had
committed when he was 16 years old. In June 2001, the
press reported the decision of an Iranian court to
sentence to death Azizullah Shenwari, a 14-year-old
Pakistani convicted on drug charges. He was reportedly
kidnapped from Peshawar, Pakistan, in November
1999. The Special Representative has raised these
cases with the Government.
36. The Special Representative joins the
on the Rights of the Child in expressing
concern at the application of the death
Committee
his serious
penalty for
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crimes committed by persons under 18 and in
emphasizing that such a penalty is incompatible with
the Convention to which the Islamic Republic is a party
(CRC/C/15/Add.123, para. 29). The Special
Representative also notes that the Commission on
Human Rights, in resolution 2001/65, called upon
States that have not yet abolished the death penalty to
comply with their obligations as assumed under
relevant provisions of international human rights
instruments, including in particular articles 6 and 14 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and article 37 of the Convention on the Rights
of the Child”. The Special Representative urges the
Government to comply in full with the above-
mentioned Commission resolution.
37. The Iranian Government has repeatedly stated
that a large number of the executions are carried out in
the course of its fight against drugs. According to press
reports, the head of the judiciary has stated that there
are 800 drug traffickers on death row. While
acknowledging the magnitude of the challenge faced
by the Government and described in his last report to
the Commission, the Special Representative reiterates
his request for more precise information on the
protection of human rights within the Islamic
Republic's drug interdiction programmes.
38. The Special Representative wishes to reiterate
that the statistics mentioned above are drawn from
press accounts, with all of the margin of error that that
implies. He calls upon the Government once again to
make official figures publicly available.
Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment
39. The Special Representative continues to receive
reports of torture in the legal system, particularly in
pre-trial detention. The Special Representative
reiterates his call last year for full compliance with
Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/43 in
which, among many provisions, the Commission calls
upon all Governments to implement fully the
prohibition of torture, to address the need for
investigation and documentation as set out in the
principles annexed to the resolution, and to address the
issue of impunity for those responsible.
40. There continue to be reports of amputations and
public floggings. Once more, the Special
Representative recommends that the Government of the
Islamic Republic commit itself to the abolition of this
form of punishment.
V. Status of intellectuals and
of political, student and
religious dissidents
41. Openly expressed dissent continues to grow, and
increasing numbers of dissenters are finding
themselves in jail. In June, it was estimated that 50-60
reformist journalists, political and student activists,
dissident clerics, and veteran religious nationalists
were detained at Evin prison north of Tehran and that
the famous institution was once again becoming a
focus of political life. One judge attempted the time-
honoured manoeuvre of barring the publication of
letters or messages from prisoners that had not been
vetted by prison authorities.
42. For those who are released on pre-trial bail, the
problem is different. The Special Representative is told
that the bail is often set so high as to be inaccessible to
retirees and others living on modest means.
43. It would appear that in political cases the pre-trial
enquiry stage is often the harshest. The public
statements of released detainees speak of being
confined to small cells, interrogated in blind-folds,
subjected to various kinds of psychological and
physical pressure to cooperate and, according to one
group of recent reports, probably subject to some form
of drug treatment to induce passivity and cooperation
in front of the interrogators. Several improbable
confessions” were released by the judicial authorities,
including those of veteran journalist Ezzatollah Sahabi
and student leader Ali Afshari. Once convicted, the
conditions of some seem to improve substantially but
not for others, such as Akbar Ganji, who as of the
middle of June had spent 105 days of his 15 months in
jail in solitary confinement.
A. Student unrest
44. Campus political activism continued to grow in
the months leading up to the June presidential
elections. Some observers described the tone as
increasingly one of anger and despondency which led
to rallies protesting the treatment of detained students,
support for dissident clerics such as Ayatollah
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Montezari, and open criticism of the political
establishment, including both the Supreme Leader and
the president. Groups of hooligans, including, in
particular, the Ansar-i-Hezbullah, often confronted
such student rallies.
45. In May, Ali Afshari, a leading dissident student
leader held in solitary confinement for five months,
reportedly confessed to being involved in what was
described as activities to overthrow the system by
peaceful means”. As of mid June it was reported that
up to 20 students were being detained. A number of
them were convicted for their participation in the
student demonstrations in July 1999. It should be
observed that the perpetrators of the raid on the
University of Tehran which triggered the student
protests have apparently been released, without
conviction, after secret hearings because, in the
surprising words of the judge, there were no private
plaintiffs involved” (see A/54/365, paras. 16-20 and
annex I).
46. In early July student protest rallies on and off the
campus of the University of Tehran marked the second
anniversary of the 1999 student demonstrations in
Tehran and Tabriz. An unconfirmed number of persons
was detained in connection with the rally outside the
campus.
47. In April 2001, a provincial court in Khorrambad
convicted 121 persons, mainly students, but including a
deputy governor of the province, of participating in
riots” there in August 2000. The unrest grew out of
attacks by hooligans on a national meeting of Iranian
students and the blockading of the meeting's invited
speakers. As seems to be the pattern in such cases, the
hooligans themselves are not charged, let alone
convicted (see E/CN.4/2001/39, paras. 20-22).
B. The serial murders
48. These grisly events in late 1998 and early 1999
created significant concern and anger in the Islamic
Republic (see, most recently, E/CN.4/2001/39, paras.
82-87). The closed military court trial of the alleged
perpetrators, said to be renegade officers of the security
agency, convicted 15 persons in January 2001, with
three sentenced to death and 12 to imprisonment. There
has remained widespread criticism by the families and
others that those higher-ups involved in varying
degrees in the murders have remained unidentified and
uncharged. After the conviction of the 15, the families
of the victims declared that they disagreed with the
verdicts, including both capital punishment and
incarceration, as they did not want OE vendetta”. The
families had boycotted the trial in protest against its
closed nature and the removal of key evidence from the
court files. The lawyer of the families was briefly
detained in December 2000 for comments implying
that the serial killings were part of a campaign by death
squads aimed at silencing the opposition.
49. Despite the closed nature of the trial, some
observers found the 17-page judgement revealing.
According to one, what comes across, on the one hand,
is a total disregard for human life and, on the other, a
complicity in murder justified by the orders of a
superior in a long chain that many say has not been
followed to the end. In the words of another, the group
came across as OE structured death machine”.
According to the judge, there was a hit list of 40-45
targets. He also recorded that some of the defendants,
including the most senior, attempted to place the blame
on their minister, an allegation the judge dismissed for
lack of evidence and the minister's declaration of
innocence under oath.
50. The Special Representative, for his part, doubts
that the full truth in this matter has yet come out. He
notes the continuing rumours that there were in fact
more than 80 murders and disappearances stretching
over a 10-year period that were likely part of a wider
campaign to silence dissent. He notes that leading
figures in the Majilis have called for a special
parliamentary commission on the grounds that the trial
did not reveal the real motives behind the killings or
whether more senior figures were involved.
C. Religious dissidents
51. Perhaps, the most visible religious figure in jail is
Hassan Yousefi-Eshkevari, who, in a trial related to his
participation in a meeting in Berlin in the spring of
2000, was convicted of apostasy, waging war on God”
and OEorruption on earth”. He was reported at first to
have been sentenced to death but that was later
overturned. On 20 June his son wrote to the Special
Clerical Court to ask that a medical team approved by
the Court examine his father, who is severely diabetic.
The Court reportedly rejected the request. Also in June
his son was quoted as saying that he had not heard
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from his father for nearly 70 days, since he was moved
to Prison 59.
52. According to press reports, religious figures
brought before the Special Clerical Court during the
period under review include the son-in-law and two
associates of Ayotollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri, the
most prominent religious dissident who,
notwithstanding being under house arrest, managed to
make public his memoirs in December 2000. One of
Montazeri's sons is reportedly already in prison, in
connection with the distribution of what is said to be an
embarrassing report on the case of the serial murders
(see paras. 48-50 above).
D. Berlin conference trial
53. The origin of this trial was set out in the Special
Representative's last report to the Commission
(E/CN.4/2001/39, paras. 88-94). The denouement
dragged on during the period under review. It would
appear that some of those charged have been in
detention for months, while others were released on
bail. The Special Representative was informed in April
by a senior Iranian judge that none of the persons
charged was being tried merely for attending the
conference but rather on other, pending charges.
54. In a written official communication in April, the
Special Representative was informed that 17 of the
Iranian participants in the conference had been
summoned to court. Eleven were convicted and six
acquitted. Seven of the convicted were released on bail
while their appeal was being heard. The four others
were imprisoned for charges other than participation in
the Berlin conference.
55. A list of those convicted and the correspondence
exchanged by the Special Representative and the
Government of the Islamic Republic on this subject is
attached as annex II. One of the most distinguished of
the detainees was probably Ezzatollah Sahabi, a
journalist, a long-time opponent of the Shah's regime
and a former member of the Majilis with links to the
Freedom Movement. Sahabi, 75 years old, was for an
extended period apparently in solitary confinement in
an unknown place. According to press reports, he was
charged a second time in December for making
insulting comments about the Supreme Leader. In
January he was sentenced to 4 ‘/2 years in prison for
participating in the Berlin conference. His family fears
for his health.
56. The Special Representative has recently been
assured by a senior judiciary official that legal action is
under way to vacate all the convictions concerning
participation in the Berlin conference.
57. The Special Representative shares the opinion
that the charges against these persons were
transparently political and that the conditions of their
pre-trial detention as well as the closed trials
themselves were a violation of international standards.
E. Detention of religious/nationalist
activists
58. Another politically oriented legal process began
this spring, with the detention of the followers of what
has been generally described as OE religious/nationalist
alliance of intellectuals advocating political pluralism”.
Some were connected with the Freedom Movement, the
unregistered but long-tolerated organization founded
by the first post-revolution Prime Minister, and some
were Muslim reformers of long-standing, active in the
struggle against the Shah.
59. On 11 March 2001, the Revolutionary Court
ordered the detention of 21 individuals associated with
the group, 11 of whom were later released. One month
later, on 7 April 2001, the same court ordered the
nationwide arrest of 42 more members. In mid April a
court statement declared that the mission of some of
the detainees was to weaken the faith of students and
youth in religion and Islamic principles”. The court
later said that the dissidents OEimed to set up a western-
style government and, to achieve this sinister goal, they
were considering active resistance and eventually
armed resistance”.
60. The Special Representative understands that some
of the detainees were apparently released on bail, with
a remaining majority still being held in temporary”
solitary confinement in Revolutionary Guards barracks.
The families of the detainees repeatedly complained to
the authorities about ill-treatment from Revolutionary
Court employees. Specifically they have asserted that:
(a) Contrary to articles 20, 22, 32 and 37 of the
Constitution, as well as article 22 of the Penal Code, no
concrete evidence has been presented in support of the
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charges brought against them. Furthermore their files
have not been put at the disposal of their lawyers;
(b) Temporary detention orders have been
issued against them, with total disregard for articles 32,
35 and 37 of the Constitution which clearly limit the
cases in which judges can resort to this measure;
(c) Contrary to article 38 of the Constitution,
which protects prisoners against torture and the forcing
of testimonies or confessions, they have been held in
continued incommunicado detention in unknown
locations and have been exposed to physiological and
physical pressure, including drugs, to extract
confessions”;
(d) They have been denied the right to legal
counsel, including during and after prolonged
interrogations;
(e) Some have been in incommunicado
detention in unknown locations;
(I) Some have been subjected to the use of
physiological and physical pressure, including drugs to
extract confessions”, as well as the disregard of
detainee's personal medical regimes;
(g) There have been threats and pressure
brought on political prisoners' families to remain
silent.
61. One of those freed on bail, an 84-year old former
minister of justice, told the press that the guards took
away his glasses and blindfolded him when he went to
the shower. He declared that there was no evidence that
anyone connected with the Freedom Movement had
done OEnything that might be interpreted as an attempt
to overthrow the regime”. His family posted their
house ownership documents as collateral for his
release.
62. In May, a friend of one of the detained dissidents
told the press his friend had been told he had been
charged with waging war against God, an offence that,
as noted above, can attract the death sentence. In early
June, a member of the Majilis Commission looking
into the prisons objected to the detention of the
religious/nationalist group of activists, saying, the
Guards Corps Protection of Information Unit and
Dejban 66 (the military police) cannot legally detain
civilians”.
63. At the time of writing the present report, the
Special Representative had been informed by the
Iranian authorities that all detainees were about to be
released on bail. According to the same sources, the
court processes of Mr. Sahabi, Mr. Ahmadzadeh and
Mr. Peyman were going to be expedited, to take into
account their age.
64. Annex II contains a list of the
religious/nationalist activists who remain in prison at
the time of writing, according to the information
received by the Special Representative.
VI. Democratic governance
65. In a speech in late June, the President declared,
The basic right of people in today's world mainly
means the right of people to have control over their
own destiny. A popular system is a system that
recognizes this right and devises its laws, rules and
regulations on this basis. On the whole, when one is
talking about the basic rights of the people, one means
their rights vis- -vis the state, which enjoys great
authority in society. When we say people have rights, it
means that the authority of the state stems from the
will of the people and that this authority will be
supervised by the people, and that the state, including
all its components, is answerable to the people
regardless of where the foundation and essence of the
legitimacy of this power lies.”
66. In the spring of 2001, the judiciary began to
challenge the authority of the Majilis, notably their
efforts to open an enquiry under article 90 of the
Constitution, into complaints received by the Majilis
into the conduct of the judiciary, particularly in high
profile political cases. Senior members of the judiciary
reacted angrily, arguing the independence of their
branch of government. The judiciary also began to call
to account individual reformist members of the Majilis
as well as such figures as the Governor of Kurdistan,
the latter on charges of defaming the Guardian Council
by criticizing its annulment of the results in 17
constituencies in the 2000 Majilis elections. In June,
two members of the Majilis were sent to jail. One was
sentenced to 12 months for making an inciting
speech” at a student conference in August 2000 and the
other to 13 months for OElandering the judiciary” in a
speech in the Majilis. The member's claim to privilege
was rejected.
67. At the same time, the Supreme Leader came to
the support of the judiciary in its efforts to resist
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oversight by the Majilis. The Leader declared,
Support for a person charged by the judiciary is an
affront to the law, and is in itself an offence.”
Meanwhile, the Majilis Enquiry Commission decided
to report to the Majilis the judiciary's failure to
cooperate in its enquiry into the complaints received
from the public. In the Special Representative's view it
is one thing to say that the judiciary must be
independent but quite another to say that it is beyond
reproach. In early July the Special Representative was
informed that there had been established a joint
Majilis/Judiciary Liaison Committee and that it was
working to create a smoother relationship.
68. For some time the pressure has been building for
a law on political offences, largely in response to the
treatment of intellectuals and political dissidents in the
courts. Such a bill would implement a neglected
provision of the Constitution. The Majilis proponents
of such a bill argued that it would contribute to the
stabilization of the political system”, pave the way for
the rule of law, leading political movements towards
peaceful activities”, institutionalize political
pluralism”, and treat persons with moral and
honourable motives” in a manner distinct from other
offenders. The bill that came out of the Majilis this
spring, in addition to defining the term political
offence”, required such charges to be heard by juries in
open, civil courts i.e., not special courts such as the
Revolutionary Court and the Special Clerical Court
limited pre trial detention to 15 days, and declared the
right of the accused to have a lawyer present during the
pre-trial enquiry phase. In combating human rights
offences in the political sphere, it would be difficult to
point to a more important and urgent initiative than
this. In late June, the Guardian Council rejected the bill
as unconstitutional and contrary to religion”.
69. The role of the Guardian Council in vetting
candidates for elected office came in for sustained
criticism this year in the context of the presidential
election and the related Majilis by-elections. The
Constitution gives the Council the responsibility of
supervising the elections”. The Council has, in the
words of its critics, exercised OEpprobatory
supervision”, rather than OEdvisory supervision” in
order to weed out would-be candidates who do not
meet its own standards. The Council does not give
reasons for rejecting specific candidates but, according
to the press, has made it known that the rejections were
for drug and alcohol trafficking, connections with the
banned Mujahedin Khalg organization or the
monarchy, and graft of various kinds. The rejection of
prominent reformist figures, such as the one who had
been in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, the
Majilis and the Tehran Municipal Council, served to
heighten cynicism over the process.
70. The Interior Minister denounced the
unprincipled disqualification” of candidates. His
ministry had disqualified only 34 of the candidates
running in the by-elections while the Council
disqualified about 100, or more than a quarter of the
total. The critics, including some religious figures,
refer to the writings of those involved in the drafting of
the Constitution to argue that there is no evidence that
the vetting of candidates for political office was in the
minds of the drafters. Others argue that it is up to the
Majilis to pass legislation defining the basic
qualifications to stand for political office.
71. The re-election of the President in June 2001
turned out to be something of an anti-climax. He
received a higher percentage of a lower turnout than in
1997. He immediately reaffirmed his commitment as
his first priority to foster democracy which as a
precondition, requires freedom of speech, criticism and
even protest within the law”.
VII. Status of minorities
A. Religious minorities
72. The Special Representative has discussed the
status of religious minorities in earlier reports. At this
time he wishes to mention a government initiative to
form, by presidential decree, the National Committee
for the Promotion of the Rights of Religious
Minorities. According to government sources, the
Committee is to review the problems that religious
minorities face and recommend corrective policies. It is
reported that representation of the minorities in the
work of the Committee has been ensured”.
73. In the present report, the Special Representative
will focus on the Sunnis, Baha'is, Jews and
Zoroastrians, leaving the Christian community for the
next report. At that time he will also address the
problem of Diyah, or blood money”, which, as the law
stands, discriminates against both women and non-
Muslims.
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Sunnis
74. The Government has been reluctant to recognize
the Suimis as a distinct minority, but it is clear that they
face various forms of discrimination, particularly
where they are also ethl1ic minorities. For example, for
years, Sunni Kurds have complained of non-
cooperation from officials in terms of permits for
building or renovating their mosques. However, it was
recently reported that the harassment of Kurdish Sunni
clerics by the Special Clerical Court had ended.
75. In April, the press reported that some 30 Iranian
parliamentarians had noted their dissatisfaction with
the Ministries of Education and of Foreign Affairs for
failing to provide employment opportunities for
Sunnis. A request from a Kurdish member of the
Majilis to the President to appoint an adviser on Sunni
affairs was turned aside. Finally, there is the long-
standing request of the Sunnis for permission to build a
mosque in Tehran.
Baha'is
76. Concern about the human rights situation of the
Baha'is remains on the agenda of the Special
Representative. Despite some promising reports, the
Special Representative understands that the Baha'i
community continues to experience discrimination in
the areas of, inter alia, education, employment, travel,
housing and the enjoyment of cultural activities.
Baha'is are still, in effect, prevented from participating
in religious gatherings or educational activities.
77. Baha'i property continues to be subject to
confiscation. The Special Representative has received
reports of such properties being confiscated in Kata,
Buyr-Ahmand, where a number of Baha'i families were
reportedly forced to leave their homes and farmlands in
the first months of 2001. According to information
received, in 2000, four buildings were confiscated in
Tehran, three in Shiraz and one in Isfahan. It is also
reported that the issuance of business licences to
Baha'is has been delayed and that some stores and
business owned by Baha'is have been closed.
78. The Special Representative wishes to reiterate his
appeal to the Government of the Islamic Republic to
implement his outstanding recommendations (A/53/423,
para. 45), as well as those of the Special Rapporteur on
religious intolerance (E/CN.4/1996/95/Add.2). In
particular and, as a step that would go a long way in
confirming the Government's commitment to the
rights of citizenship”, the Special Representative
urges the Government:
(a) To allow Baha'is places to bury and honour
their dead.
The Baha'i cemeteries seized shortly after the
1979 revolution have not been returned. In 2000, a
piece of land officially used by the Baha'i as a
cemetery in the city of Abadeh was reportedly
bulldozed;
In his most recent report to the Commission, the
Special Representative reported information received
from government sources that the Baha'is would be
allowed to re-establish their cemetery in Tehran. Since
a complex was built over the old cemetery, the Iranian
authorities have already allotted some other land for
this purpose;
(b) To guarantee Baha'is freedom of movement.
It is reported that, although consular instructions
to Iranian missions abroad have eliminated questions
regarding religion on application for the issuance of
passports and visas, these instructions are not
uniformly implemented. It is also reported that Baha'is
in Iran still face difficulties getting a passport;
(c) To guarantee Baha'is access to education.
Baha'is continue to be denied access to higher
education in legally recognized public institutions.
Recently three classrooms used by the Baha'is for their
own educational purposes were seized;
(d) To guarantee Baha'is security of person.
Since his last report, the Special Representative
has received information which indicates that the death
sentence of Mr. Musa Talibi has been revised to life
imprisonment and that Mr. Mansur Haddadan,
Mr. Manuchechr Ziyai and Mr. Ziaullah Mizapanah
have been released. Seven Baha'is remain imprisoned,
and at least two of them, Mr. Bihnam Mithaqi and
Mr. Kayvan Khalajabadi, are subject to the death
sentence (see annex I). The Special Representative is
particularly concerned that the latter two individuals
remain on death row five years and a half after he
visited them in Evin prison.
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Jews
79. In December the Jewish member of the Majilis
spoke up about economic discrimination against the
community in terms of government employment,
stating I particularly wish to point out that the
marginalization of our educated youth from
government services, the blocking of their way for
participating in specialization and supra specialization
courses and denying them the chance to have access to
higher education is against the higher goals of the
Islamic Revolution.”
Zoroastrians
80. Zoroastrians have described their community as
the pure” Persians, reflecting the proud heritage they
claim. However, they too have complaints. A
community leader was recently quoted as saying, In
recent years, no Zoroastrian has been employed by
state organizations.”
B. Ethnic minorities
Azeris
81. Azeris are the largest of Iran's ethnic minorities
as well perhaps as the most successfully integrated (see
A/55/363, paras. 68-70). However, open voices of
discontent are now being heard more often. According
to press reports from Tabriz, a group of Azeri
legislators, academics and intellectuals wrote to the
President demanding greater language rights in
education and broadcasting. They reminded him of
campaign words in which their identity, language and
culture were sometimes mocked.
Kurds
82. There are a number of interesting developments
concerning the Kurdish community (see A/55/363,
paras.63-67). To begin with, President Khatami appears
to be the first non-Kurdish political figure to be
popular among the Kurds. He won their votes in
overwhelming numbers in the recent election. His
appointment of the first Kurd to hold the position of
Governor of Kurdistan reinforced his popularity. The
Governor appears to have been able to facilitate what
one Kurdish editor describes as OE process of
reconciliation”. It is said to have lead to a greater sense
of security. In the words of one Kurdish social worker,
the hatred that divided families is now over. Now
social concerns are paramount.” Among other things,
Kurdish cultural expression now appears to be
encouraged. Kurdish language weeklies and monthlies
are on the rise, a programme of government-subsidised
Kurdish language classes has begun, and there is the
prospect of several hours of daily Kurdish television
broadcasting in Sannandaj. The Kurdish community
was presumably heartened by the appearance of
Drunken Horses”, reportedly the first Kurdish
language film. This is of course a good begiiming, but
it remains to be seen to what extent the Kurdish
language will, for example, be allowed in schools.
83. Kurdistan rates as the second poorest province,
by almost all indicators. There is talk of stagnation, of
job loss and of emigration to other provinces. One
Kurdish member of the Majilis has demanded a
dialogue with the President regarding the Kurd's
cultural, social and economic problems. In December a
peaceful demonstration by Kurdish students of the
University of Tehran was reportedly broken up by the
police, with accompanying arrests and injuries.
84. One of the dividing lines in the Kurdish
community is religion. The majority Sunni group has
been resentful of the favourable treatment apparently
accorded to the minority Shia community, and some of
the stronger words by Kurdish members of the Majilis
have been in that context.
C. A national minorities policy
85. It is clear that the minority communities feel
aggravated in cultural terms and in economic terms.
Young members of the communities seem to be
resorting more and more to emigration. The estimate
carried in an Iranian paper is that some 15,000-20,000
Armenians, of an estimated current population of
around 300,000, are emigrating every year. The
information brought to the attention of the Special
Representative concerning the Zoroastrians and the
Jews is equally bleak.
86. In several of his recent reports, the Special
Representative has come back to the proposal for a
national minorities policy (see A/55/363, paras. 77 and
79 and E/CN.4/2001/39, paras. 80 and 81). The only
positive step in this direction that has come to his
attention is the establishment of the National
Committee for the Promotion of the Rights of
Religious Minorities (see para. 72 above). For their
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part, as described above, minority spokesmen are
becoming increasingly outspoken about the perceived
discrimination their people face, particularly in the
economic field. The Special Representative urges the
Government to give the Committee clear instructions
as to the inclusion of minority representatives, a three-
year agenda of issues to be addressed, and firm
timelines for reporting back to ministers with
recommendations.
VIII. Economic, social and
cultural rights
A. Economic circumstances
87. Experts both within and outside of the Islamic
Republic seem to agree that one of the greatest crises
facing the country is the economy. Little has changed
in the first four-year term of the President, but the
surge in the world price of oil has hidden the depth of
the problem by improving some of the key statistics.
Underneath, the structural state of the economy, the
generally poor level of management, the low level of
investment and reinvestment, and a floundering
privatization drive have all contributed to the economic
and social hardship faced by most of society that is,
primarily those not in a position to benefit from the
surge in petro-dollars.
88. The prolonged and widespread drought is also
having a staggering impact on the people and the
economy.
B. Situation of workers
89. Unrest among Iranian workers has been growing
for some time. In the period under review, labour
demonstrations seemed to have focused primarily on
unpaid wages, sometimes for over 12 months. The
press carried stories of unrest in Tehran, Isfahan,
Khorramabad and elsewhere. The closing of one textile
mill in Tehran reportedly put 1,700 persons out of
work.
90. In early July, the President declared job creation
to be a grave and important task”. The Government,
he added would launch a plan to revive the textile
industry. That will not be an easy task. Since the early
1980s, the sector has been in decline, with imported
cloth, mostly smuggled, seen everywhere. For many
years overemployment in the sector was supported by
state subsidies. Now the drive to privatize has revealed
how weak the sector really is. A member of the Majilis
who is himself a labour leader told the press in early
July that about 1,400 companies, chiefly in the textile
sector, are in a critical state and that there are now over
80,000 workers who are not being paid. It is reported
that the government-sponsored House of Workers” has
over the past two years increased the amount of its
budget distributed to unpaid workers from 30 per cent
to 60 per cent.
91. Officially, unemployment stands at 16 per cent of
the work force and is fast closing on 6 million people.
Two thirds of the population are reported to be under
the age of 30.
92. The most frequently mentioned causes of
unemployment are corporate mismanagement over the
years, the failure of the Government to establish an
investor-friendly investment regime, and the 1 million-
plus refugees and other foreigners in the work force.
Regarding this last argument, the Special
Representative acknowledges that the efforts made by
the Islamic Republic to host the largest refugee
population in the world has strained its resources and
created social tension. The Special Representative
wishes, however, to note that Afghan refugees are
conventionally said mainly to fill jobs that Iranians
would prefer not to take. Furthermore, the Special
Representative cautions against the use of arguments
that would inevitably increase intolerance and
exacerbate social tension. There are reports of such
tension in the Iranian press, such as one concerning the
anti-Afghan rally that took place in Isfahan on 27 June
2001.
93. According to an Islamic Republic News Agency
report in late May, a senior official of the State
Management and Planning Organization expressed a
very optimistic view of the employment prospects,
predicting 600,000 new jobs would be created in 2001-
2002, the results of a variety of governmental measures
and market mechanisms. He identified particularly the
need to prevent unlicensed aliens from working” (read
Afghan, Iraqi and other refugees”) and the
improvement of security of investment by enhancing
legal, social, economic and political stability and the
introduction of an OEppropriate” labour law.
94. The existing Iranian Labour Code is sometimes
regarded as a tough law which virtually forbids
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dismissals. In fact, according to a 1999 press report,
the then chairman of the managing board of the Tehran
Islamic Councils Society reported that 400,00
industrial workers were dismissed between 1991 and
1997. Employers had learned to get around the
provisions of the Code by such devices as requiring
undated registration letters before hiring and hiring
under temporary contracts. Further, the Government
makes no serious efforts to enforce [ the Code]”. He
concluded, Under the present circumstances, workers
have no job security.”
95. A new labour law is clearly badly needed, one
that would balance the need to restructure the economy
with the need for reasonable job security The workers
need to be accorded the right to organize and to strike,
a demand expressed in the course of a peaceful rally of
workers outside the Majilis on May Day. The Special
Representative finds it passing strange that the Islamic
Republic is not a party to the relevant ILO Convention
No. 87, Freedom of Association and the Right to
Organize, to which 137 other countries are party. It is
to be noted that the same core rights are set out in
article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, to which the Islamic Republic is a
party.
C. Poverty
96. Poverty has become an issue that can no longer
be ignored. In mid April 2001, after a strenuous debate
on the definition of the term, the press reported that,
according to the Management and Planning
Organization, 40 per cent of Iranians are living in
OEbsolute and relative poverty”. The gap between rich
and poor is widening.
97. In mid March, the President was reported as
declaring, I know that a considerable proportion of the
people are suffering hardship. The food on their table is
meagre. They work very hard. They receive little in
return. Our weakness, problems and obstacles and the
existing pressures, the shortcomings, the shortages,
primarily affect that sector of society.” The President
has expressed recognition that only increased economic
activity and in particular economic growth can address
this problem.
D. Investment stimulation
98. Much debate swirls around the need for reform
and type of reform required to attract foreign and
expatiate Iranian investment to the Islamic Republic.
The most recent effort by the Majilis to draft a new
foreign investment law was rejected by the Guardian
Council. However, even if the bill is subsequently
accepted, it will not by itself solve the problems
plaguing the economy. The President himself has
recognized the need to streamline the bureaucratic
process involved. Reportedly, private manufacturers
are required to pay more than 50 types of taxes. The
problems go deeper. A Tehran newspaper recently
quoted a member of the Majilis Planning and Budget
Committee as saying, The present predicament of our
country is not just reduced to economic problems; it
can also be found in the political and social sectors.
After all, we cannot fool ourselves. In a country where
a minister is beaten up in broad daylight, it is very
interesting that we should expect to attract job creating
investments.”
IX. Other important issues
A. National human rights bodies
99. In December 2000, the Executive Director of the
Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC), speaking
at the University of Shiraz reportedly told students, If
anyone claims that there are no problems with human
rights in the country, either he is totally uninformed or
else he is chanting slogans.”
100. For some years now, the Special Representative
has been reporting on the development of IHRC (see,
for example, E/CN.4/2001/39, paras. 117-121). Each
year, it appears to be making progress in terms of the
quantity of communications it receives, the extent of its
educational programmes, and the frankness with which
it reports on the nature of the human rights problems
the Islamic Republic faces from certain government
agencies. Its reports could use still further precision
with regard to certain statistics it publishes, along with
greater definition of the remedies it has helped
complainants obtain.
101. The report of the Commission for the period from
April to November 2000 continues to cite incompetent
judicial authorities” as the single largest subject of
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complaints received by the Commission. With regard to
the non-cooperation of certain government agencies,
the Executive Director reportedly told the press that, as
to the detained religious/nationalist activists, the
judiciary was not even acknowledging the
Commission's letters and that the families had no
recourse but to appeal to outside human rights bodies.
102. In June it was reported in the press that,
following a gap of some years, the Majilis Human
Rights Commission was being re-established. The
Executive Director of IHRC welcomed the
development, as it is obvious that just one
independent organization cannot alone solve all of
these problems”. The Special Representative also
welcomes re-establishment of the Majilis Human
Rights Commission and looks forward to following its
work.
B. Iran in the international human
rights system
103. In recent years Iran has appeared before the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
and the Committee on the Rights of the Child, in the
discharge of its reporting commitments under the
International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Convention on
the Rights of the Child. The Special Representative
referred to the Committee on the Rights of the Child's
findings in his most recent report to the Commission on
Human Rights and joined the Committee in
encouraging the Government to review its broad and
imprecise general reservation to the Convention, with
the objective of withdrawing it in accordance with the
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action
(E/CN.4/2001/39, paras. 108-116).
104. In the period under review, the ILO Committee of
Experts, responsible for the examination of the
compliance by ILO member States with ILO
conventions and recommendations, issued an
individual observation” concerning the Islamic
Republic's implementation of Convention No. 111 on
Employment Discrimination. There is a long-running
dialogue between the ILO and the Iranian Government
on equality rights in employment, especially with
regard to women, and to recognized as well as
unrecognized religious minorities, in particular the
Baha'is. Another ILO expert mission is scheduled to
visit the Islamic Republic in the fall of 2001.
105. The Special Representative wishes to note with
concern that the Iranian authorities did not issue visas
for the accredited representatives of the Baha'i
International Community to attend the regional meeting
for the World Conference against Racism, held in
Tehran in February 2001. Such conduct is quite
incompatible with the responsibilities of a State hosting
a United Nations meeting.
X. Conclusions and recommendations
Freedom of expression
106. The Special Representative's conclusion is that
the suppression of much of the press, a major actor in
the struggle for better and more caring governance, has
had a serious negative impact on the promotion of
human rights in the Islamic Republic.
107. The Special Representative's recommendations
are that the present arbitrary and punitive measures be
abolished in favour of a predictable, jury-driven
process with powers limited to recommending
suspension for a maximum of six months.
Status of women
108. The Special Representative's conclusion is that
despite the evident desire of the Iranian people to
improve the legal status of women, the stalemate
between the branches of government on the very
limited measures that have so far been proposed must
leave the Islamic Republic, as a country, in an
extrem ely embarrassing position.
109. The Special Representative's recommendations
are that the various branches of government work out a
phased road map for the implementation of the
legislative and regulatory changes necessary to give
women genuine substantive equality and that the
Government embark on a strategically designed public
education campaign to reduce society's tolerance of
domestic violence against women.
Legal subjects
110. With regard to the reform of the legal process, the
Government has identified a significant number of
reforms that would, among other things, certainly make
the Constitution a more meaningful document. The
Special Representative recommends the speedy and
complete implementation of most of them.
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111. WiII regard to IIe condition of IIe prisons, IIe
Special Representative notes IIe continuing
overcrowding and IIe de facto control that a variety of
security agencies appear to have over certain prisons.
The Special Representative recommends IIat IIe
seven! proposals for afreviating overcrowding in
prisons be pursued urgently. He also recommends IIat
IIe dafiy operations as weft as formal control of a!!
prisons in IIe Islamic Republic be placed under IIe
National Prisons Organization.
112. WiII regard to punishments, IIe Special
Representative fmds IIat IIe situation remains bleak.
The Islamic Republic is in violation of a number in
international standards in terms of IIe punishments it
imposes, some of which can only be characterized as
savage. The Special Representative recommends IIat
IIe Government, at IIe highest level, decide IIat
reform is necessary and important and that a plan to
that end be developed in IIe course of IIe current yeat
Status of Intefrectuals and of political, student
and religious dissidents
113. There is a new wave of political prisoners or
prisoners of conscience entering Iranian prisons.
Openly expressed calls for IIe reform of IIe
governance system or criticism of, for example, the
judiciary can result in charges of acting against
national security, even waging war against God”, an
oLence IIat can attract IIe deaII penalty.
114. The Special Representative considers that the
Majfiis judged correctly that the first step in addressing
the manipulation of IIe legal system was legislation
defining a political oLence. OEe Special Representative
deeply regrets the rejection of IIe bfil by the Guardian
Council and calls on all branches of government to
work for IIe enactment of such legislation as soon as
possible. The Special Representative believes IIat a
second important step is IIe imposition of stringent
discipline upon the judges hearing political cases
starting with IIe full implementation — in IIe spirit as
well as the letter — of IIe circular letter of IIe Head of
the Judiciary on judicial behaviour.
Democratic governance
115. The stalemate reached between IIe branches of
government over important policy and legislative
decisions has led to a significant degree of paralysis in
the implementing of critically needed human rights
improvements in the country. OEe Special
Representative believes IIe people of IIe Islamic
Republic deserve bettet
116. The Special Representative believes that the
situation must be resolved in accordance wiII IIe
President's recent declaration that the basic right of
people in today's world means IIe right of people to
have control over IIeir destiny. This points clearly to
the need for IIe elected agencies of government to have
precedence in IIe case of disagreement.
Status of minorities
117. The Special Representative fmds that,
notwiIIstanding IIe equality provisions of IIe
Constitution, religious and ethnic minorities continue
to face varying degrees of official and societal
discrimination. In some cases, such as IIose of IIe
Baha'is, IIe evangelical Christians and, fflom time to
time, some of the eIInic Sunni communities, IIe
treatment amounts to persecution. For IIeir part, the
representatives of some of IIe minorities are becoming
more outspoken, particularly concerning cultural and
economic rights.
118. The Special Representative recommends IIat the
Government seriously consider IIe promulgation of a
national minorities policy. In IIe meantime, IIere are
many small steps that can be taken, including a
speeded up implementation of IIe rights of citizenship
concept, to be applied to boII eIInic and religious
minorities. There needs to be a proactive development
policy to include, in particular, IIose depressed areas of
the country in which minority groups are an important
component of IIe population. Government departments
need to introduce affirmative action employment
policies. There needs to be more enlightened provincial
leadership, such as is apparently IIe case in Kurdistan.
Economic, social and cultural rights
119. The Special Representative fmds that IIe Islamic
Republic is facing an economic and social crisis IIat is
causing great hardship for most Iranians. Inflation,
unemployment, poverty are some of IIe problems;
growing emigration is one of IIe symptoms.
120. The Special Representative recommends IIat a
comprehensive economic restructuring plan be
developed and that it include privatization as well as
the stimulation of foreign and expatriate investment
The deteriorating condition of workers must be
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addressed wiII more than words. They should have IIe
right to organize and to strike, as provided in
international human rights standards.
121. Finally, IIe Special Representative has to record
once again IIat he has not been invited to visit IIe
Islamic Republic since February 1996.
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Annex I
Information on the situation of the Baha'is
The following is based on information received by the Special Representative.
1. Mansur Haddadan (arrested on 29 February 1996 and sentenced to three years
in prison), Manuchechr Ziyai (arrested on 1 May 1998) and Ziaullah Mizapanah
(convicted on 16 March 1999), have now reportedly been released.
2. The death sentence of Musa Talibi, arrested on 7 June 1994 and charged with
apostasy, has now been revised to life imprisonment. He has reportedly been
transferred to a prison in Isfahan.
3. Other Baha'is remaining in Iranian prisons include Bilmam Mithaqui and
Kayvan Khalajabadi (arrested on 29 April 1989 and sentenced to death);
Dhabihu'llah Mahrami (arrested on 6 September 1995, charged with apostasy and
sentenced to life imprisonment, following commutation of a death sentence by the
President); Sirus Dhabihi-Muquaddam, Hidayat Kashifi Najafabadih and Ata'u'llah
Hamid Nasirizadih (arrested in November 1997, sentenced to seven, five and four
years' imprisonment, respectively, following commutation of death sentences in the
case of the first two).
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Annex II
Supporters of the religious/nationalist movement believed to
be in detention, as of 15 July 2001
The list below is based on information received by the Special Representative
and may not be exhaustive.
Arrested 11 March 2001 in Tehran
1. Mohammad Mohammadi Ardahali, businessman
2. Mohammad Basteh-negar, writer-researcher
3. Mahmoud Emrani, writer-editor
4. Nezamoddin Ghahari
5. Mehdi Ghani
6. Morteza Kazemian, journalist
7. Saeed Madani, editor, political scientist
8. Mohammad Maleki, former chancellor of Tehran University
9. A u Mohammadi Gorgani
10. Mohammad Mohammadi-Gorgani
11. Massoud Pedram, writer-researcher
12. Habibollah Peyman, doctor, writer-researcher
13. Hossein Rafiee, chemist, Tehran University
14. Taqi Rahmani, journalist
15. Reza Reiss-Tousi, political scientist, Tehran University
16. Alireza Rajai, post-graduate student, Tehran University
17. Bahman Rezakhani
18. Hamid Zeydabadi
Arrested 7 April 2001
1. Seyed-Jafar Abbaszadegan (Tehran)
2. Ahmad Aghai (Tehran)
3. Taher Ahmadzadeh, 80 years (Machhad)
4. Hamed Alavian (Tehran)
5. Ali-Akbar Badizadeghan (Tehran)
6. Mohammad-Hossein Baniassadi (Tehran)
7. Abolfaz l Bazergan (Tehran)
8. Seyed Mohammad Erteza (Machhad)
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9. Morteza Eshfagh (Ispahan)
10. Ghaffar Farzadi (Tehran)
11. Bagher Fathali-Beyghi (Tehran)
12. Seyed-Ali-Asghar Gharavi (Tehran)
13. Hadizadeh (Tehran)
14. Abolfaz l Hakimi (Tehran)
15. Majid Hakimi (Tehran)
16. Nasser-Seyed-Hadi Hashemi-Rad (Tehran)
17. Mohammad-Mehdi Jafari (Chiraz)
18. Jafar Keyvan-Chehr (Tabriz)
19. Jamshid Mansurian (Machhad)
20. Khosro Mansurian (Tehran)
21. Reza Masmui (Tehran)
22. Mostafa Meskin (Ispahan)
23. Mirzadeh (Tehran)
24. Mahmoodm Naimpoor (Tehran)
25. Hosein Razmjoo (Machhad)
26. Hashem Sabaghiyan (Tehran)
27. Fazlollah Salavati (Ispahan)
28. Ali-Akbar Sarjami (Tehran)
29. Mirsaleh Seyed-Gorgani (Tehran)
30. RaoofTaheri (Tehran)
31. Ali-Farid Yahyai (Tabriz)
32. Jamal Zerehsaz (Chiraz)
Other intellectuals afffiliated to the religious/nationalist movement, arrested
earlier
Hassan Youseffi-Eshkevari (see also annex III)
Ezzatollah Sahabi (see also annex III)
Hoda Saber and Reza Alijani, editors of Iran-c Farda, arrested on 29 January 29
2001 and 25 February 2001, respectively. Mr. Saber has been reportedly transferred
twice to outside hospitals because of cardiac problems, and his family is very
concerned for his health.
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Annex III
Correspondence between the Special Representative and the Government
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, December 2000-June 2001
1. By letter dated 8 January 2001, the Permanent
Representative transmitted the following information
received from the concerned authorities in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, in response to the Special
Representative's urgent appeal on behalf of Mahmood
Salehi, dated 23 November 2000 (see E/CN.4/2001/39,
annex II, para. 16):
Mr. Mahmood Salehi was prosecuted and
convicted to 10-months imprisonment on charges
of involvement in a terrorists group called
Komoleh. According to the prison doctors, Mr.
Salehi's health situation is unaffected and gives
no cause for concern. The hearing of his case was
carried out in two phases, and the verdict, after
due review by the appeal court, went into effect
as of 28 August 2000.
By law, Mr. Salehi was entitled to appoint a
lawyer of his choice and enjoyed all the rights
made available to prisoners. He had access to
medical check ups, the results of which show that
he was not suffering from any kind of disease. It
should be noted here, however, that there exists
the possibility of his early release.
2. On 11 January 2001, the Special Representative
drew the urgent attention of the Iranian authorities to
the health of the writer, editor and human rights lawyer
Mehrangiz Kar, who, according to the information
received, had been diagnosed with breast cancer and
was denied permission to seek medical attention
outside the Islamic Republic. The Special
Representative urged the Government to give her
access, on humanitarian grounds, to all necessary
medical treatment as a matter of urgency, including
permission to seek medical attention outside the
Islamic Republic. (Ms. Kar was allowed to leave the
country to receive medical treatment.)
3. Ms. Kar was reportedly on trial in connection
with her participation in a conference held in Berlin
organized by the Heinrich Boell Institute on 7 and 8
April 2000. In this context, the Special Representative
also joined the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of
the right to freedom of opinion and expression in
addressing an urgent letter to the Minister for Foreign
Affairs concerning the verdicts issued by a
revolutionary court in Tehran on 13 January 2001
regarding the Iranian citizens, including Ms. Kar, who
participated in that conference. In the letter dated 24
January 2001, the signatories expressed their concern
over the charges, which did not appear to justify the
conviction of the defendants, and urged the
Government to use all resources at its disposal to make
sure the charges were reviewed and dropped upon
appeal. The letter made specific reference to the
following individuals:
(a) Mehrangiz Kar and Shahla Lahiji, publisher,
sentenced to four years' imprisonment;
(b)
to nine years;
Khalil Rostam-Khani, translator, sentenced
(c) Ali Afshari, student leader, and Ezatollah
Sahabi, politician, sentenced to five and four and one
half years, respectively;
(d)
to nine years;
Khalil Rostam-Khani, translator, sentenced
(e) Akbar Ganji, journalist, and Saeed Sadr,
translator for the German embassy in Tehran, sentenced
to 10 years. Mr. Ganji was also reportedly sentenced to
an exile for an additional five years in a remote
southern part of the Islamic Republic;
(I) Hassan Yousefi-Eshkevari,
sentenced to death by the Special Clerical Court.
allegedly
4. The Permanent Representative forwarded to the
Special Representative the following information
regarding those convicted for their participation in the
Berlin conference.
By letter dated 5 April 2001
Regarding the charges of those persons who
had participated in the Berlin conference, I would
like to clarify the following points:
(a) There were many Iranians who took
place in the Berlin conference, but only 17 of
them were summoned to the court;
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(b) Out of those 17, only 11 were
convicted, the other six were acquitted;
(c) Out of those 11 convicted in the
primary court, seven were released on bail,
waiting for the court of appeal;
(d) The four others were imprisoned on
charges other that their participation in the Berlin
conference.
In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that
nobody is in jail for participation in the Berlin
conference.
On Akbar Ganji
According to a letter from the head of Branch 3
of the Revolutionary Court in Tehran and to an
announcement by the National Prisons
Organization, dated 4 December 2000, the
allegations of torture and ill-treatment undergone
by Mr. Akbar Ganji are entirely false. On the
basis of a medical check-up made by a team from
the Forensic Medicine Department, the
aforementioned was found to be in perfect health,
with his speech, intellectual processes and powers
of expression absolutely unimpaired.
Letter dated 31 January 2001 (see E/CN.4/2001/39,
annex II, para. 15)
Tehran's Appeals Court reduced the sentence
issued by a lower court against Mr. Akbar Ganji
from a 10-year jail term to six months. The
Appeals Court has also dropped the sentence of
five years' internal exile ... . The final
proceedings are now pending in the Supreme
Court.
Letter dated 23 May 2001
On Hassan Youseffi-Eshkevari
I would like to inform you that there has been no
confirmation of his conviction on charges of
apostasy and that legal proceedings are now
pending in the relevant appeal court.
Letter dated 17 April 2001, addressed to the Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary of Arbitrary
Executions and copied to the Special Representative
Tehran's Appeals Court revoked a death sentence
given to Mr. Hassan Yousefi-Eshkevari by the
Special Clerical Court.
Letter dated 23 May 2001 (see E/CN.4/2001/39, annex
II, paras. 1 and 2)
5. On 11 January 2001, the Special Representative
joined the Special Rapporteur on the independence of
judges and lawyers and the Special Representative of
the Secretary-General on Human Rights Defenders in
sending an urgent letter to the Minister for Foreign
Affairs concerning the arrest of Nasser Zarafchan, a
human rights defender and lawyer. Mr. Zarafchan, the
lawyer for the families of the intellectuals murdered in
1998, was allegedly arrested on 16 December 2000
owing to his comments implying that the killings were
part of a campaign by death squads aimed at silencing
the opposition. Reference was made to the fact that he
was the second lawyer for the families of intellectuals
against whom legal action had been taken. It was
alleged that these actions were aimed at impeding the
lawyer's free exercise of their responsibilities and to
disadvantage their clients. In the letter, the signatories
referred to the fundamental principles set forth in the
Declaration on the Rights and Responsibility of
Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote
and Protect Universally Recognised Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and to the United Nations
Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers.
6. The Special Representative joined the Special
Rapporteurs on the question of torture, on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions and on violence
against women in sending an urgent appeal on 23
January 2001 on behalf of Maryam Ayoubi, reportedly
sentenced to death by stoning. In the letter the
signatories expressed their concern with the fact that
those sentences were still being issued in the Islamic
Republic of Iran and strongly urged the Government to
overturn the sentence. Following reports that the
Supreme Court had upheld the death sentence by public
stoning, the same signatories sent a new urgent appeal
on her behalf on 18 April 2001.
7. Also on the subject of stoning, on 30 May 2001
the Special Representative sent to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs an information request concerning the
reports in the press of the stoning to death of an
unnamed woman at Evin prison, Tehran, on 20 May
2001. The woman, aged 35, was reportedly arrested
eight years ago on charges of acting in OEbscene
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films”. In this context, the Special Representative
referred to his previous representations on behalf of
Maryam Ayoubi, expressed his concern with those
reports, which implied that stoning had been resumed
in the Islamic Republic and asked for clarification.
8. In a letter dated 31 January 2001, the Permanent
Representative submitted to the Special Representative
information received from the relevant authorities in
Tehran as a response to his urgent appeal on behalf of
Latif Safari, dated 26 March 2000 (see A/55/363,
annex III, para. 4).
According to the announcement made by the
Justice General Administration of Tehran
Province, the latest situation regarding Mr. Latif
Safari is as follows:
Following two rounds of hearing in the presence
of the accused, his defence counsel and jury, the
aforementioned person was sentenced to two
years and three months and a day of
imprisonment, plus five years of deprivation of
journalistic activity and the nullification of his
affiliated newspaper licence, on charges of
insulting sanctities and breaching interior
security. The duration of his imprisonment was
reduced to one year and three months and a day
during the course of revision.
9. By letter dated 18 April 2001, the Special
Representative drew the attention of the Iranian
authorities to several cases of alleged lack of respect
for the dignity of those facing pre-trial detention and
lack of a fair trial during that process. The letter
specifically referred to the following cases:
(a) Ali Afshari's attorney's declarations in
December 2000, according to which the court had
turned down his requests to meet with his client, to
commute the order of detention to release on bail, and
to hear the case in open court (see para. 3 above);
(b) Marzieh Mortari's declaration according to
which the 21 persons arrested by the Tehran
Revolutionary Court in early December 2000 were
blindfolded and taken to an unknown place;
(c) Farshad Ebrahimi's letter to the Justice
Department in January 2001, indicating that he had
been kept in solitary confinement for 126 days, his trial
had been held behind closed doors, visits of his lawyer
were banned and interrogations had continued after the
end of the court proceedings;
(d) Declarations of the families of the
supporters of the Iran Freedom Movement arrested on
11 March 2001, including Dr. Habibollah Peyman,
according to which they were kept in solitary
confinement in an undisclosed detention centre,
without access to lawyers or family, and the judge had
refused to provide information about their
whereabouts;
(e) Reports that Ibrahim Sheikh, summoned to
the Revolutionary Court in March 2001 as a witness in
the case of Ali Afshari, had been arrested when he
appeared before the court and taken to an unknown
place.
10. In the letter, the Special Representative referred
to the circular letter sent by the head of the judiciary to
all judges, warning them against some of these
practices; in view of the above, it seemed to have had
little impact. The Special Representative expressed his
concern with these reports and asked the Iranian
Government for comments.
11. The report of the Special Representative to the
Commission on Human Rights in 2001
(E/CN.4/2001/39, para. 75) referred to the report from
government sources that the Baha'is would be allowed
to re-establish their cemetery in Tehran. Following
information received on the lack of implementation of
this decision, the Special Representative requested
clarification by letter dated 18 April 2001 to the Iranian
authorities.
12. In a letter dated 30 May 2001, the Special
Representative joined the Special Rapporteur on the
question of torture in sending an urgent appeal to the
Iranian Government concerning the situation of the 20
supporters of the Iran Freedom and Millli Mazhabiu
(religious/nationalist) Movement, arrested on 11 March
and allegedly being held in solitary confinement,
without access to a lawyer. It was also reported that
they had been threatened in order to force them to write
repentance letters and that their families reported that
they sounded as if they had been drugged. Special
reference was made to Dr. Reza Reiss-Toussi who was
believed to be in bad health and had marks of torture
on his legs. The signatories requested the Government
to provide information about the situation of the above-
mentioned persons, including their trial or release, as
well as the assurance of their humane treatment while
in detention.
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13. In the same letter, reference was also made to the
case of Ali Afshari, a detained student leader whose
confession” was reportedly broadcast on 16 May 2001
before he had been charged or brought to trial. Mr.
Afshari was reportedly being held incommunicado,
without access to his lawyer. Reference was made to
previous urgent appeals sent by different special
mechanisms of the Commission on Human Rights on
his behalf (see A/55/363, annex III, para. 5 and paras. 3
and 9 above).
14. The Permanent Representative forwarded to the
Special Representative the following information:
(a) By letter dated 7 February 2001, comments
on the Special Representative's report to the General
Assembly regarding education and the judiciary;
(b) By letter dated 11 May 2001, information
on developments in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
particularly regarding the situation of the press,
including the number of licences for periodicals issued;
the declaration of the head of the judiciary concerning
the prisons organization; an International Conference
on Human Rights and Dialogue among Civilisations
held in Tehran in May 2001; and the Supreme Leader's
mandate against corruption;
(c) By letter dated 23 May 2001, information
about the number of licences issued by the Press
Supervisory Board;
(d) By letter dated 29 March 2001, information
about the serial murders;
(e) By letter dated 4 June 2001, information
concerning the approval by the Majilis of the outlines
of a new bill on political crimes.
15. Where appropriate, this information has been
used by the Special Representative in the preparation
of the present report.
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