Aadel Collection

Report of the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran

          
          United Nations
          O General Assembly Distr.: General
          10 August 2001
          Original: English
          Fifty-sixth session
          Item 131(c) of the provisional agenda*
          Human rights questions: human rights situation and
          reports of special rapporteurs and representatives
          Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran
          Note by the Secretary Genera1**
          The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the
          General Assembly the interim report prepared by Maurice Copithorne, Special
          Representative of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human
          rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran in accordance with a decision taken by the
          Economic and Social Council at its substantive session of 2001.
          * A1561150.
          ** In accordance wiII General Assembly resolution 55/222, part III, para. 10, IIis report is being
          submitted on 10 August 2001 so as to include as much updated information as possible.
          01-50649(E) 190901
          II0 II I 0II 100 1101 100 I I I IV II
        
          
          A156/278
          Report of the Special Representative of the Commission
          on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the
          Islamic Republic of Iran
          Summary
          There is a strong and growing demand for reform from the Iranian people. The
          progress to date has been made despite the continuing efforts of some elites to
          frustrate that demand.
          The sweeping suppression of the mainly reformist press over the past 15
          months has had a serious negative impact on the promotion of human rights in the
          Islamic Republic of Iran.
          The status of women, particularly their legal status, remains highly
          discriminatory. Modest efforts to improve it have been mostly rejected by unelected,
          conservative political elites. Patriarchal attitudes are very much in evidence in the
          form of domestic violence and the limited prospects for women to enter the labour
          force.
          There are early signs of important change within the legal system, but there is a
          long way to go. So far, there appears to be no let-up in the abuse of persons in
          pretrial detention. Many of the punishments in use are gross violations of
          international human rights standards, including in particular, the use of stoning and
          decapitation.
          Iranian society has had little experience with civil discourse leading to peaceful
          change. The treatment of activists and dissidents, particularly by the security forces
          and the judiciary, displays a fearful intolerance of alternative views. The treatment of
          such persons, some of whom participated in the struggle against the Shah, is little
          short of vicious.
          There is a stalemate between the elected and unelected branches of government
          over important policy and legislative decisions concerning reform. The Iranian
          people are paying dearly for it.
          Religious and ethnic minorities continue to face official and societal
          discrimination and in some cases, persecution. They are becoming more outspoken in
          their demands, particularly concerning economic and cultural rights.
          Iran is facing a major economic crisis. Inflation, unemployment and poverty are
          among the causes of the deteriorating social condition of most Iranians. The human
          rights cost of the crisis is very high. A comprehensive economic and social
          development strategy needs to be among the Government's top priorities.
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          Contents
          I. Introduction .
          II. Freedom of expression .
          III. Status of women
          IV. Legal subjects
          A. Reform of the legal process . . . .
          B. Prisons
          C. Punishment
          V. Status of intellectuals and of political,
          A. Student unrest
          B. The serial murders
          C. Religious dissidents
          D. Berlin conference trial
          E. Detention of religious/nationalist
          VI. Democratic governance
          VII. Status of minorities
          A. Religious minorities
          B. Ethnic minorities
          C. A national minorities policy . . . .
          VIII. Economic, social and cultural rights. .
          A. Economic circumstances
          B. Situation of workers
          C. Poverty
          D. Investment stimulation
          IX. Other important issues
          A. National human rights bodies
          B. Iran in the international human rights system
          X. Conclusions and recommendations
          I. Information on the situation of the Baha'is 21
          II. Supporters of the religious/nationalist movement believed to be in detention, as of
          15July2001 22
          III. Correspondence between the Special Representative and the Government of the Islamic
          Republic of Iran, December 2000-June 2001 24
          student and religious dissidents
          activists
          Paragraphs
          1—7
          8—13
          14—19
          20—40
          20—27
          28—32
          33—40
          41—64
          44—47
          48—50
          51—52
          53—57
          58—64
          65—71
          72—86
          72—80
          8 1—84
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          Aimexes
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          I. Introduction
          1. The period under review in this report that is,
          the first six months of 2001 was again a tumultuous
          one in the Islamic Republic of Iran. In general, the
          voices calling for reform grew stronger,
          notwithstanding the suppression of much of the
          reformist press. The President in large part remained
          true to his vision of an Islamic Republic”, but he
          faced formidable opposition to the realization of the
          road map that he had set out for the country. In the
          run-up to his re-election in June, there were many
          voices, particularly younger ones, expressing open
          frustration at the slow pace of reform.
          2. The argument is often heard that allowance has to
          be made for a society like Iran's, in that it has known
          only despotism over its long history. However
          dedicated it may be to the modern concepts of the rule
          of law, democracy and human rights, such a society has
          to travel a difficult road on which there will be many
          obstacles to overcome. The reinventing of society,
          when it has been successful, has usually been a long
          and painful process.
          3. In this context, the Special Representative is
          often told that the Islamic Republic of Iran should be
          judged more on the overall trend of its development
          than on the obstacles it is facing. The Special
          Representative understands and sympathizes with this
          perspective. However, one cannot simply close the
          door for a few decades before evaluating a country's
          progress towards its declared goals. Iran is fully
          engaged with the international community in many
          respects. It is a party to most of the core human rights
          instruments, including certain instruments of the
          International Labour Organization (ILO), each of
          which involves a reporting and examination process.
          The world is at the Islamic Republic of Iran's doorstep,
          and the interaction with the international community
          can only increase. In the Special Representative's view,
          it is simply no longer possible to deflect the world's
          gaze away from a Government's treatment of its own
          citizens.
          4. The Special Representative has no doubt that the
          majority of Iranians, in all walks of life, believe that at
          the beginning of the twenty-first century, they deserve
          better and more accountable governance and a society
          that has more respect for the inherent dignity of
          individuals.
          5. The Special Representative believes that progress
          is being made in the incorporation of human rights
          values into Iranian society. The change in the discourse
          over the past six years is testimony of progress. In
          some respects, however, the Government seems to be
          lagging behind the people, who have made clear,
          through their elected representatives, their desire for
          change.
          6. In the present report, the Special Representative
          has done his best to capture the range of important
          human rights developments in the Islamic Republic of
          Iran over the first six months of the year. They may be
          significant in their own right or significant as
          indicators of a broader trend. This necessarily involves
          a prioritization of areas and issues, and the Special
          Representative understands that not everyone is likely
          to agree with his choices. The overall picture is
          certainly a mixed one. One must hope that, in the
          interest of all Iranians, faster progress can be made
          towards the goal of embracing human rights and all the
          values that they represent.
          7. In seeking to discharge his mandate, the Special
          Representative has used many sources of information,
          including the Government of the Islamic Republic,
          other Governm ents, individuals, non-governmental
          organizations and the Iranian and international media.
          II. Freedom of expression
          8. In his last interim report to the General Assembly,
          the Special Representative described the early stages of
          what became a widespread crackdown on the press,
          instituted by elements in the judiciary in April 2000
          (A/55/363, paras. 12-21). The process has continued.
          During the past 15 months (to early July 2001), more
          than 40 publications, daily newspapers and weekly
          magazines have been closed down for various periods
          of time, some indefinitely. (In the Islamic Republic of
          Iran, as elsewhere, publications sometimes close for
          purely financial or editorial reasons.)
          9. In addition, editors and journalists have been
          charged with various offences and fined, sent to jail or
          banned from journalism for a period of years or, in
          some cases, a combination of the above. At least one
          was sentenced to be lashed, a sentence subsequently
          overturned. The numbers are uncertain, but the best
          recent estimate available to the Special Representative
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          is that since April 2000, more than 20 journalists have
          spent time in jail, in either pre- or post-trial detention.
          10. Typical charges are
          (a) Defamation;
          (b) Publishing false information;
          (c) Publishing criminal material;
          (d) Publishing sensational material contrary to
          modesty;
          groups.
          (e) Collaborating with counter-revolutionary
          11. The campaign against the press has spread
          beyond the usual definition of journalist”. A theology
          student was brought before the Special Clerical Court
          for articles deemed to be propagating against the
          Islamic Republic; a number of university students were
          detained for articles in their student newspapers
          deemed to be blasphemous, an offence that could draw
          the death penalty; and a cartoonist was charged with
          publishing an offensive caricature of the judiciary.
          According to press reports, the complaints against the
          press are being brought chiefly by six state agencies,
          and this has given rise to the term OEerial plaintiffs”.
          The campaign against the press appears to be waged by
          these agencies with the willing support of a small
          group of judges.
          12. It has been pointed out in the Iranian press that,
          despite the fact that the existing, rather conservative
          press law provides for a maximum suspension of six
          months, many papers have been sentenced to longer
          periods of closure and some have remained closed even
          after the expiry of the prescribed closure period. The
          judges involved have gone outside the press law and
          invoked sections of the Constitution as well as other
          legislation, particularly the Precautionary Measures
          Law, which both refer to the prevention of crime. One
          journal was closed for insulting the President, who
          replied that he knew of no law that prescribed a
          punishment for such an act.
          13. In discussing the repression of the Iranian press,
          it is clear that the vagaries of many Iranian laws,
          including the Constitution, are being taken full
          advantage of. The various laws that have relevance to
          criticism, insult and defamation are perhaps typical in
          this regard. Procedural issues are also very much part
          of the problem. There are many examples of arbitrary
          arrest, prolonged detention prior to trial, often in
          solitary confinement, and denial of the elements of fair
          trial. Clearly, reform is needed, both legislative (in
          order to give greater precision as to the offences
          involved) and judicial (in order to ensure the
          implementation of procedures that protect the rights of
          the accused).
          III. Status of women
          14. The condition of women in the Islamic Republic
          has remained much the same for some years: steady
          improvements in some respects such as education but
          no change in the foundational, legalized discrimination
          faced by women almost across the board. Perhaps the
          most graphic recent portrayal of this situation is the
          Iranian film, The Circle”, with its strong overtones of
          the Islamic Republic as a prison for women.
          15. At the time the present report was being prepared,
          a spirited debate was under way as to the number of
          women who should be included in the new cabinet of
          the President. In late June, a senior Majilis figure
          declared that it was not dignified for women to be put
          on display in government. A female member of the
          Majilis quickly responded, Our men should guard
          against the sickness of immaturity.” The 12 women
          members of the Majilis prepared their own list of three
          women candidates for the cabinet.
          16. The recent presidential election and the action of
          the Guardian Council in not approving any of the two
          dozen female candidates has focused attention on the
          eligibility of women to hold public office.
          17. Another side of women's plight is what has
          become known as the feminine face of poverty”. It
          was reported that at a meeting to mark 15 May,
          International Day of the Family, a number of officials
          described the situation in graphic terms. There are now
          some 1 million single-mother families in the Islamic
          Republic. Twenty-nine per cent of the families below
          the poverty line are single-mother families. Seventy per
          cent of the single mothers in rural areas are illiterate. In
          37 per cent of single-mother families, only one person
          is employed. The General Director of the Office to
          Combat Poverty reportedly stated that, while the law
          requires the minimum wage to be paid to all families
          headed by women, it is paid at only 50 per cent of the
          rate because of budget shortfalls.
          18. The issue of the physical abuse of women within
          the family remains in the spotlight. The press reports
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          that to get around the reluctance of the police to
          become involved in such cases, hotlines” are being
          established for women to seek urgent help. More
          fundamentally, however, Iranian women continue to
          press the point that the issue is rooted in the cultural
          approach of men towards women. A member of the
          Women's Participation Centre in Tehran was quoted
          recently as saying that women had become more
          frequently the victims of beatings, rape, abortions,
          financial and mental pressures, and verbal abuse from
          their husbands, brothers and even children. The Special
          Representative notes that the alleviation of patriarchal
          attitudes is also a key to opening up more and better
          job opportunities for women. The Special
          Representative has been made aware of the many
          activities and programmes for promoting women's
          rights, but he nevertheless urges the Government to
          take a leadership role in tackling the cultural issue. It
          needs to have a very clear focus and to allocate
          sufficient human and monetary resources to undertake
          major educational programmes in the schools, on
          television and through other public channels. The
          longer the Government delays taking serious action,
          the more women will suffer, and probably needlessly
          so. It is an issue that the Government, in good
          conscience, must address urgently.
          19. Finally, there is the long outstanding benchmark
          issue of the minimum age of marriage, particularly that
          for girls, which is nine years. The Special
          Representative has discussed this issue in earlier
          reports (A/55/363, para. 31; E/CN.4/2001/39, para. 24).
          The Special Representative notes the recent action of
          the Guardian Council of rejecting the Majilis bill that
          would have addressed this black spot on the reputation
          of the Islamic Republic. If argument is still needed, the
          Special Representative would draw attention to the
          article on early childhood marriage in the UNICEF
          Innocenti Digest No. 7 (March 2001), which declares
          that pregnancy-related deaths are the leading cause of
          mortality of girls aged 15-19 worldwide. The Special
          Representative once again appeals to all branches of
          the Government to work together to bring new
          legislation into effect as quickly as possible as a mark
          of respect for the girl-children of their country.
          (In February, a girl's shelter in Karaj, the Jasmine
          Centre, was closed down after an investigation had
          reportedly revealed that it had become involved in the
          trafficking of girls. The press focused on the high-level
          connections of the operators of the Centre. A judge of
          the Revolutionary Court was subsequently charged in
          the affair.)
          11/. Legal subjects
          A. Reform of the legal process
          20. In late March, the Special Representative
          received from the Government a list of legal reforms
          that were being implemented. The most pressing
          perhaps was the long-promised re-establishment of the
          procuracy which could potentially go a significant way
          to reduce the absolute discretion that judges have had
          in the court room, including in most cases being judge
          and prosecutor and, in some cases, jury and defence
          counsel as well. That draft legislation was approved by
          the Majilis judicial affairs commission in late June and
          was introduced on the floor of the Majilis in early July.
          21. A second important reform is the amendment of
          the punishment provisions concerning dishonoured
          loans. Many individuals so convicted reportedly remain
          in jail after having served their conviction, being
          unable to pay back the underlying debt. This practice
          has apparently been so widespread that the group has
          become the second largest category of prison inmates.
          Such persons will now be released on completion of
          their term.
          22. A third project is the establishment from 1
          September 2001 of the right of students holding a BA
          (Law) to take an examination and, if successful, to be
          qualified as lawyers and permitted to practice under
          supervision. The purpose is to increase significantly
          the number of lawyers in the country. The Independent
          Bar Association has objected to this initiative under
          the guise of an economic bill”, and as a severe assault
          on the independence of the Bar. This development
          follows on the other encroachments that have occurred
          on the autonomy of the Bar, including control over who
          stands for election to the Bar Council, the disciplining
          of members of the Bar and indeed the OEuitability” of
          all applicants for admission to the Bar (see A/55/363,
          paras. 44-46). The Special Representative shares the
          concern of the Bar Council in this regard, noting that
          the independence of the Bar is a vital ingredient in any
          human rights enforcement regime.
          23. The fourth reform is the introduction of what is
          known in some other cultures as alternative dispute
          resolution (ADR) that is, the provision of
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          reconciliation/rn ediation facilities to rern ove certain
          types of cases frorn the court and expedite their
          settlernent. It should also reduce the backlog in court
          calendars.
          24. The fifth project, already rnentioned in an earlier
          report (E/CN.4/2001/39, para. 109), is the
          establishrnent, with the cooperation of UNICEF, of a
          systern of juvenile courts. The Special Representative
          is inforrned that this project is on track and the judges
          in training will be going abroad to learn frorn the
          experience of other jurisdictions.
          25. A sixth project concerns the disciplining of
          judges that is, to treat rnore seriously any
          infringernent by judges of the provisions of the law.
          The Special Representative has earlier referred to the
          apparent blatant disregard by at least a few judges of
          the instructions set out by the Head of Judiciary,
          particularly in the rnatter of pre-trial treatrnent of
          suspects (E/CN.4/2001/39, para. 31). The Judicial
          Tribunal, a little known and apparently underutilized
          institution, rnay be now facing its first test in this
          regard. When asked by the Special Representative
          about the processing of cornplaints by the farnilies of
          detainees against Judge Saeed Mortazavi and Judge
          Hassan Ahrnadi Mogaddas, governrnent officials
          responded that those and other cornplaints against
          judges were now before the Tribunal. A governrnent
          official reported that 40 judges had been suspended in
          the past four rnonths. The Special Representative trusts
          that the Tribunal will act expeditiously and that its
          decisions will be rnade public. Such action could go a
          long way towards restoring confidence in the Iranian
          Judiciary. It is perhaps worth adding that a judicial
          systern needs the support of the people in order to earn
          their respect and to rnake legitirnate its exercise of
          power over their lives. In this regard, the Special
          Representative notes the President's speech on 29 June
          in which he declared that the rnain rnission of the
          Judiciary, in accordance with the constitution, was to
          support individual and social rights of the people and
          to realize social justice within the cornrnunity. The
          rnain criteria of a systern built on that foundation was
          respect for the hurnan being, ensuring the rights of the
          hurnan beings and the realization of justice. The
          President went on to call upon judges to put aside
          cynicisrn and prejudgernent and to respect the principle
          of innocence until proven guilty.
          26. Other reforrns rnentioned to the Special
          Representative were the re-introduction of res judicata,
          a concept that had been abandoned at the tirne of the
          Revolution, as having lost its value”, and the
          reduction of the cases being referred back by the
          Suprerne Court for a new hearing. In other words, the
          Suprerne Court would rnore often be the final judicial
          step. The Special Representative believes that these
          changes would increase the predictability and fairness
          of the legal systern and reduce the case backlog that
          currently exists. Another prornised reforrn is legislation
          to narrow the definition of moharab (waging war on
          God) to those acts involving the use of firearrns. This
          will rernove a very dangerous weapon frorn the judicial
          arsenal that, while only occasionally invoked, has hung
          over the heads of all those advocating change. Yet
          another new rneasure is the establishment of a non-
          governrnental organization to focus on the rights of
          prisoners.
          27. In conclusion, it is clear frorn the above that the
          task of legal reforrn has begun or is at least about to
          begin. The Special Representative looks forward to
          reporting its successful irnplernentation.
          B. Prisons
          28. Two of the rnost pressing issues with regard to
          prisons in the Islarnic Republic are overcrowding and
          the existence of detention centres outside the control of
          the National Prisons Organization. With regard to the
          first, no recent figures on the nurnber of inrnates have
          corne to the attention of the Special Representative. In
          late June the Head of the National Prisons Organization
          noted that the high nurnber of prisoners was the result
          of social circurnstances outside the prisons, and that the
          organization was unable to settle all prison problerns.
          He said that the prison population had increased by 40
          per cent over the past year and that two thirds of the
          inrnates were there for drug-related offences. Most of
          the inrnates are between 22 and 30, and less that 3 per
          cent of thern are wornen.
          29. In light of the huge growth in the nurnber of
          persons incarcerated for drug-related offences, one
          proposal has been to segregate such persons into new
          purpose-built institutions in the countryside. Other
          steps discussed have been reducing the nurnber of
          inrnates by reducing the nurnber of offences calling for
          incarceration and rnaking greater use of probation,
          particularly for wornen and children. A further
          proposal for reducing the prison population is to
          elirninate the holding of certain inrnates beyond the
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          term of their sentence when they are unable to pay off
          their civil debts (see para. 21 above).
          30. As for the non-official detention centres where
          much of the prisoner abuse takes place, in early June a
          member of a Majilis commission looking into prisons
          told the press that there were as many secret detention
          centres as there were secret service and military
          establishments combined with even non-military and
          non-secret service establishments. He added no
          military or security establishment had the right to its
          own prison. The Head of the National Prisons
          Organization has declared that all non-official
          detention centres have now been brought under the
          control of his organization. He also stated that the
          notorious Toweed Prison has finally been completely
          closed.
          31. It is worth reporting that after the re-election of
          the President, a proposal was floated in the Majilis to
          change the status of the Prisons Organization by
          moving it from under the judiciary to the portfolio of
          the Minister of Justice, where it would be subject to
          oversight by the Majilis.
          32. It is to be hoped that these various reform
          measures are pursued vigorously. In particular, the
          Special Representative would be pleased to record in
          his next report to the Human Rights Commission that
          control of all of the illegal detention centres is
          finally in practice as well as in form in the hands
          of the National Prisons Organization.
          C. Punishment
          Executions
          33. The number of executions continues to be high.
          Based on the information received by the Special
          Representative, some 60 executions took place in the
          first six months of the year. It would seem that around
          two thirds of them were carried out in public, despite
          reports from government sources, according to which
          punishment takes place principally in camera. These
          include the public hanging of a woman on 19 March
          2001 in Tehran, an extremely rare event in the Islamic
          Republic. In what seems a retrograde step, it was
          reported that the state television has broadcast scenes
          of public hangings on two occasions since the
          beginning of 2001.
          34. In the period under review, there have been
          disturbing reports of resort to especially barbaric and
          unusual forms of execution, such as beheading and
          stoning. According to press reports, an Afghan man
          was publicly decapitated in Zabol in June 2001. This is
          the first time the Special Representative has received
          reports of the use of this form of punishment, and he
          has asked for the comments of the Government. The
          practice of stoning, which finally appeared to be
          declining, would seem to have been resumed. Since
          January 2001, the Special Representative has received
          information concerning the stoning of two women and
          the sentencing to death by stoning of at least one other.
          According to reports in the press, an unnamed woman
          was stoned to death at Evin prison, Tehran, on 20 May
          2001. The woman, aged 35, was arrested eight years
          ago on charges of acting in pornographic films. In
          January 2001, the Supreme Court reportedly upheld the
          death sentence by public stoning of Maryam Ayoubi,
          38, convicted for the murder of her husband. Iranian
          press reported her stoning to death in Evin prison,
          Tehran, on 11 July 2001. A third woman, named
          Robabeh, was also reportedly sentenced to death by
          stoning in June 2001 for the murder of her husband.
          The Special Representative has raised these reports
          with the Government. He urges the Government to
          remove article 82 (b), concerning stoning, from the
          Islamic Criminal Code and to undertake a policy of
          actively suppressing recourse to stoning throughout the
          country.
          35. According to information received from the
          Government, there was an executive decision in 2000
          to put an end to the imposition of the death penalty
          against minors. However, the Special Representative
          has recently received reports of the execution of one
          minor and the sentencing to death of another one. As
          reported in the Iranian press on 29 May 2001, Mehrdad
          Yusefi, an 18-year-old boy, was hanged in the south-
          western region of 11am for a crime which he had
          committed when he was 16 years old. In June 2001, the
          press reported the decision of an Iranian court to
          sentence to death Azizullah Shenwari, a 14-year-old
          Pakistani convicted on drug charges. He was reportedly
          kidnapped from Peshawar, Pakistan, in November
          1999. The Special Representative has raised these
          cases with the Government.
          36. The Special Representative joins the
          on the Rights of the Child in expressing
          concern at the application of the death
          Committee
          his serious
          penalty for
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          crimes committed by persons under 18 and in
          emphasizing that such a penalty is incompatible with
          the Convention to which the Islamic Republic is a party
          (CRC/C/15/Add.123, para. 29). The Special
          Representative also notes that the Commission on
          Human Rights, in resolution 2001/65, called upon
          States that have not yet abolished the death penalty to
          comply with their obligations as assumed under
          relevant provisions of international human rights
          instruments, including in particular articles 6 and 14 of
          the International Covenant on Civil and Political
          Rights and article 37 of the Convention on the Rights
          of the Child”. The Special Representative urges the
          Government to comply in full with the above-
          mentioned Commission resolution.
          37. The Iranian Government has repeatedly stated
          that a large number of the executions are carried out in
          the course of its fight against drugs. According to press
          reports, the head of the judiciary has stated that there
          are 800 drug traffickers on death row. While
          acknowledging the magnitude of the challenge faced
          by the Government and described in his last report to
          the Commission, the Special Representative reiterates
          his request for more precise information on the
          protection of human rights within the Islamic
          Republic's drug interdiction programmes.
          38. The Special Representative wishes to reiterate
          that the statistics mentioned above are drawn from
          press accounts, with all of the margin of error that that
          implies. He calls upon the Government once again to
          make official figures publicly available.
          Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
          treatment or punishment
          39. The Special Representative continues to receive
          reports of torture in the legal system, particularly in
          pre-trial detention. The Special Representative
          reiterates his call last year for full compliance with
          Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/43 in
          which, among many provisions, the Commission calls
          upon all Governments to implement fully the
          prohibition of torture, to address the need for
          investigation and documentation as set out in the
          principles annexed to the resolution, and to address the
          issue of impunity for those responsible.
          40. There continue to be reports of amputations and
          public floggings. Once more, the Special
          Representative recommends that the Government of the
          Islamic Republic commit itself to the abolition of this
          form of punishment.
          V. Status of intellectuals and
          of political, student and
          religious dissidents
          41. Openly expressed dissent continues to grow, and
          increasing numbers of dissenters are finding
          themselves in jail. In June, it was estimated that 50-60
          reformist journalists, political and student activists,
          dissident clerics, and veteran religious nationalists
          were detained at Evin prison north of Tehran and that
          the famous institution was once again becoming a
          focus of political life. One judge attempted the time-
          honoured manoeuvre of barring the publication of
          letters or messages from prisoners that had not been
          vetted by prison authorities.
          42. For those who are released on pre-trial bail, the
          problem is different. The Special Representative is told
          that the bail is often set so high as to be inaccessible to
          retirees and others living on modest means.
          43. It would appear that in political cases the pre-trial
          enquiry stage is often the harshest. The public
          statements of released detainees speak of being
          confined to small cells, interrogated in blind-folds,
          subjected to various kinds of psychological and
          physical pressure to cooperate and, according to one
          group of recent reports, probably subject to some form
          of drug treatment to induce passivity and cooperation
          in front of the interrogators. Several improbable
          confessions” were released by the judicial authorities,
          including those of veteran journalist Ezzatollah Sahabi
          and student leader Ali Afshari. Once convicted, the
          conditions of some seem to improve substantially but
          not for others, such as Akbar Ganji, who as of the
          middle of June had spent 105 days of his 15 months in
          jail in solitary confinement.
          A. Student unrest
          44. Campus political activism continued to grow in
          the months leading up to the June presidential
          elections. Some observers described the tone as
          increasingly one of anger and despondency which led
          to rallies protesting the treatment of detained students,
          support for dissident clerics such as Ayatollah
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          Montezari, and open criticism of the political
          establishment, including both the Supreme Leader and
          the president. Groups of hooligans, including, in
          particular, the Ansar-i-Hezbullah, often confronted
          such student rallies.
          45. In May, Ali Afshari, a leading dissident student
          leader held in solitary confinement for five months,
          reportedly confessed to being involved in what was
          described as activities to overthrow the system by
          peaceful means”. As of mid June it was reported that
          up to 20 students were being detained. A number of
          them were convicted for their participation in the
          student demonstrations in July 1999. It should be
          observed that the perpetrators of the raid on the
          University of Tehran which triggered the student
          protests have apparently been released, without
          conviction, after secret hearings because, in the
          surprising words of the judge, there were no private
          plaintiffs involved” (see A/54/365, paras. 16-20 and
          annex I).
          46. In early July student protest rallies on and off the
          campus of the University of Tehran marked the second
          anniversary of the 1999 student demonstrations in
          Tehran and Tabriz. An unconfirmed number of persons
          was detained in connection with the rally outside the
          campus.
          47. In April 2001, a provincial court in Khorrambad
          convicted 121 persons, mainly students, but including a
          deputy governor of the province, of participating in
          riots” there in August 2000. The unrest grew out of
          attacks by hooligans on a national meeting of Iranian
          students and the blockading of the meeting's invited
          speakers. As seems to be the pattern in such cases, the
          hooligans themselves are not charged, let alone
          convicted (see E/CN.4/2001/39, paras. 20-22).
          B. The serial murders
          48. These grisly events in late 1998 and early 1999
          created significant concern and anger in the Islamic
          Republic (see, most recently, E/CN.4/2001/39, paras.
          82-87). The closed military court trial of the alleged
          perpetrators, said to be renegade officers of the security
          agency, convicted 15 persons in January 2001, with
          three sentenced to death and 12 to imprisonment. There
          has remained widespread criticism by the families and
          others that those higher-ups involved in varying
          degrees in the murders have remained unidentified and
          uncharged. After the conviction of the 15, the families
          of the victims declared that they disagreed with the
          verdicts, including both capital punishment and
          incarceration, as they did not want OE vendetta”. The
          families had boycotted the trial in protest against its
          closed nature and the removal of key evidence from the
          court files. The lawyer of the families was briefly
          detained in December 2000 for comments implying
          that the serial killings were part of a campaign by death
          squads aimed at silencing the opposition.
          49. Despite the closed nature of the trial, some
          observers found the 17-page judgement revealing.
          According to one, what comes across, on the one hand,
          is a total disregard for human life and, on the other, a
          complicity in murder justified by the orders of a
          superior in a long chain that many say has not been
          followed to the end. In the words of another, the group
          came across as OE structured death machine”.
          According to the judge, there was a hit list of 40-45
          targets. He also recorded that some of the defendants,
          including the most senior, attempted to place the blame
          on their minister, an allegation the judge dismissed for
          lack of evidence and the minister's declaration of
          innocence under oath.
          50. The Special Representative, for his part, doubts
          that the full truth in this matter has yet come out. He
          notes the continuing rumours that there were in fact
          more than 80 murders and disappearances stretching
          over a 10-year period that were likely part of a wider
          campaign to silence dissent. He notes that leading
          figures in the Majilis have called for a special
          parliamentary commission on the grounds that the trial
          did not reveal the real motives behind the killings or
          whether more senior figures were involved.
          C. Religious dissidents
          51. Perhaps, the most visible religious figure in jail is
          Hassan Yousefi-Eshkevari, who, in a trial related to his
          participation in a meeting in Berlin in the spring of
          2000, was convicted of apostasy, waging war on God”
          and OEorruption on earth”. He was reported at first to
          have been sentenced to death but that was later
          overturned. On 20 June his son wrote to the Special
          Clerical Court to ask that a medical team approved by
          the Court examine his father, who is severely diabetic.
          The Court reportedly rejected the request. Also in June
          his son was quoted as saying that he had not heard
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          from his father for nearly 70 days, since he was moved
          to Prison 59.
          52. According to press reports, religious figures
          brought before the Special Clerical Court during the
          period under review include the son-in-law and two
          associates of Ayotollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri, the
          most prominent religious dissident who,
          notwithstanding being under house arrest, managed to
          make public his memoirs in December 2000. One of
          Montazeri's sons is reportedly already in prison, in
          connection with the distribution of what is said to be an
          embarrassing report on the case of the serial murders
          (see paras. 48-50 above).
          D. Berlin conference trial
          53. The origin of this trial was set out in the Special
          Representative's last report to the Commission
          (E/CN.4/2001/39, paras. 88-94). The denouement
          dragged on during the period under review. It would
          appear that some of those charged have been in
          detention for months, while others were released on
          bail. The Special Representative was informed in April
          by a senior Iranian judge that none of the persons
          charged was being tried merely for attending the
          conference but rather on other, pending charges.
          54. In a written official communication in April, the
          Special Representative was informed that 17 of the
          Iranian participants in the conference had been
          summoned to court. Eleven were convicted and six
          acquitted. Seven of the convicted were released on bail
          while their appeal was being heard. The four others
          were imprisoned for charges other than participation in
          the Berlin conference.
          55. A list of those convicted and the correspondence
          exchanged by the Special Representative and the
          Government of the Islamic Republic on this subject is
          attached as annex II. One of the most distinguished of
          the detainees was probably Ezzatollah Sahabi, a
          journalist, a long-time opponent of the Shah's regime
          and a former member of the Majilis with links to the
          Freedom Movement. Sahabi, 75 years old, was for an
          extended period apparently in solitary confinement in
          an unknown place. According to press reports, he was
          charged a second time in December for making
          insulting comments about the Supreme Leader. In
          January he was sentenced to 4 ‘/2 years in prison for
          participating in the Berlin conference. His family fears
          for his health.
          56. The Special Representative has recently been
          assured by a senior judiciary official that legal action is
          under way to vacate all the convictions concerning
          participation in the Berlin conference.
          57. The Special Representative shares the opinion
          that the charges against these persons were
          transparently political and that the conditions of their
          pre-trial detention as well as the closed trials
          themselves were a violation of international standards.
          E. Detention of religious/nationalist
          activists
          58. Another politically oriented legal process began
          this spring, with the detention of the followers of what
          has been generally described as OE religious/nationalist
          alliance of intellectuals advocating political pluralism”.
          Some were connected with the Freedom Movement, the
          unregistered but long-tolerated organization founded
          by the first post-revolution Prime Minister, and some
          were Muslim reformers of long-standing, active in the
          struggle against the Shah.
          59. On 11 March 2001, the Revolutionary Court
          ordered the detention of 21 individuals associated with
          the group, 11 of whom were later released. One month
          later, on 7 April 2001, the same court ordered the
          nationwide arrest of 42 more members. In mid April a
          court statement declared that the mission of some of
          the detainees was to weaken the faith of students and
          youth in religion and Islamic principles”. The court
          later said that the dissidents OEimed to set up a western-
          style government and, to achieve this sinister goal, they
          were considering active resistance and eventually
          armed resistance”.
          60. The Special Representative understands that some
          of the detainees were apparently released on bail, with
          a remaining majority still being held in temporary”
          solitary confinement in Revolutionary Guards barracks.
          The families of the detainees repeatedly complained to
          the authorities about ill-treatment from Revolutionary
          Court employees. Specifically they have asserted that:
          (a) Contrary to articles 20, 22, 32 and 37 of the
          Constitution, as well as article 22 of the Penal Code, no
          concrete evidence has been presented in support of the
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          charges brought against them. Furthermore their files
          have not been put at the disposal of their lawyers;
          (b) Temporary detention orders have been
          issued against them, with total disregard for articles 32,
          35 and 37 of the Constitution which clearly limit the
          cases in which judges can resort to this measure;
          (c) Contrary to article 38 of the Constitution,
          which protects prisoners against torture and the forcing
          of testimonies or confessions, they have been held in
          continued incommunicado detention in unknown
          locations and have been exposed to physiological and
          physical pressure, including drugs, to extract
          confessions”;
          (d) They have been denied the right to legal
          counsel, including during and after prolonged
          interrogations;
          (e) Some have been in incommunicado
          detention in unknown locations;
          (I) Some have been subjected to the use of
          physiological and physical pressure, including drugs to
          extract confessions”, as well as the disregard of
          detainee's personal medical regimes;
          (g) There have been threats and pressure
          brought on political prisoners' families to remain
          silent.
          61. One of those freed on bail, an 84-year old former
          minister of justice, told the press that the guards took
          away his glasses and blindfolded him when he went to
          the shower. He declared that there was no evidence that
          anyone connected with the Freedom Movement had
          done OEnything that might be interpreted as an attempt
          to overthrow the regime”. His family posted their
          house ownership documents as collateral for his
          release.
          62. In May, a friend of one of the detained dissidents
          told the press his friend had been told he had been
          charged with waging war against God, an offence that,
          as noted above, can attract the death sentence. In early
          June, a member of the Majilis Commission looking
          into the prisons objected to the detention of the
          religious/nationalist group of activists, saying, the
          Guards Corps Protection of Information Unit and
          Dejban 66 (the military police) cannot legally detain
          civilians”.
          63. At the time of writing the present report, the
          Special Representative had been informed by the
          Iranian authorities that all detainees were about to be
          released on bail. According to the same sources, the
          court processes of Mr. Sahabi, Mr. Ahmadzadeh and
          Mr. Peyman were going to be expedited, to take into
          account their age.
          64. Annex II contains a list of the
          religious/nationalist activists who remain in prison at
          the time of writing, according to the information
          received by the Special Representative.
          VI. Democratic governance
          65. In a speech in late June, the President declared,
          The basic right of people in today's world mainly
          means the right of people to have control over their
          own destiny. A popular system is a system that
          recognizes this right and devises its laws, rules and
          regulations on this basis. On the whole, when one is
          talking about the basic rights of the people, one means
          their rights vis- -vis the state, which enjoys great
          authority in society. When we say people have rights, it
          means that the authority of the state stems from the
          will of the people and that this authority will be
          supervised by the people, and that the state, including
          all its components, is answerable to the people
          regardless of where the foundation and essence of the
          legitimacy of this power lies.”
          66. In the spring of 2001, the judiciary began to
          challenge the authority of the Majilis, notably their
          efforts to open an enquiry under article 90 of the
          Constitution, into complaints received by the Majilis
          into the conduct of the judiciary, particularly in high
          profile political cases. Senior members of the judiciary
          reacted angrily, arguing the independence of their
          branch of government. The judiciary also began to call
          to account individual reformist members of the Majilis
          as well as such figures as the Governor of Kurdistan,
          the latter on charges of defaming the Guardian Council
          by criticizing its annulment of the results in 17
          constituencies in the 2000 Majilis elections. In June,
          two members of the Majilis were sent to jail. One was
          sentenced to 12 months for making an inciting
          speech” at a student conference in August 2000 and the
          other to 13 months for OElandering the judiciary” in a
          speech in the Majilis. The member's claim to privilege
          was rejected.
          67. At the same time, the Supreme Leader came to
          the support of the judiciary in its efforts to resist
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          oversight by the Majilis. The Leader declared,
          Support for a person charged by the judiciary is an
          affront to the law, and is in itself an offence.”
          Meanwhile, the Majilis Enquiry Commission decided
          to report to the Majilis the judiciary's failure to
          cooperate in its enquiry into the complaints received
          from the public. In the Special Representative's view it
          is one thing to say that the judiciary must be
          independent but quite another to say that it is beyond
          reproach. In early July the Special Representative was
          informed that there had been established a joint
          Majilis/Judiciary Liaison Committee and that it was
          working to create a smoother relationship.
          68. For some time the pressure has been building for
          a law on political offences, largely in response to the
          treatment of intellectuals and political dissidents in the
          courts. Such a bill would implement a neglected
          provision of the Constitution. The Majilis proponents
          of such a bill argued that it would contribute to the
          stabilization of the political system”, pave the way for
          the rule of law, leading political movements towards
          peaceful activities”, institutionalize political
          pluralism”, and treat persons with moral and
          honourable motives” in a manner distinct from other
          offenders. The bill that came out of the Majilis this
          spring, in addition to defining the term political
          offence”, required such charges to be heard by juries in
          open, civil courts i.e., not special courts such as the
          Revolutionary Court and the Special Clerical Court
          limited pre trial detention to 15 days, and declared the
          right of the accused to have a lawyer present during the
          pre-trial enquiry phase. In combating human rights
          offences in the political sphere, it would be difficult to
          point to a more important and urgent initiative than
          this. In late June, the Guardian Council rejected the bill
          as unconstitutional and contrary to religion”.
          69. The role of the Guardian Council in vetting
          candidates for elected office came in for sustained
          criticism this year in the context of the presidential
          election and the related Majilis by-elections. The
          Constitution gives the Council the responsibility of
          supervising the elections”. The Council has, in the
          words of its critics, exercised OEpprobatory
          supervision”, rather than OEdvisory supervision” in
          order to weed out would-be candidates who do not
          meet its own standards. The Council does not give
          reasons for rejecting specific candidates but, according
          to the press, has made it known that the rejections were
          for drug and alcohol trafficking, connections with the
          banned Mujahedin Khalg organization or the
          monarchy, and graft of various kinds. The rejection of
          prominent reformist figures, such as the one who had
          been in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, the
          Majilis and the Tehran Municipal Council, served to
          heighten cynicism over the process.
          70. The Interior Minister denounced the
          unprincipled disqualification” of candidates. His
          ministry had disqualified only 34 of the candidates
          running in the by-elections while the Council
          disqualified about 100, or more than a quarter of the
          total. The critics, including some religious figures,
          refer to the writings of those involved in the drafting of
          the Constitution to argue that there is no evidence that
          the vetting of candidates for political office was in the
          minds of the drafters. Others argue that it is up to the
          Majilis to pass legislation defining the basic
          qualifications to stand for political office.
          71. The re-election of the President in June 2001
          turned out to be something of an anti-climax. He
          received a higher percentage of a lower turnout than in
          1997. He immediately reaffirmed his commitment as
          his first priority to foster democracy which as a
          precondition, requires freedom of speech, criticism and
          even protest within the law”.
          VII. Status of minorities
          A. Religious minorities
          72. The Special Representative has discussed the
          status of religious minorities in earlier reports. At this
          time he wishes to mention a government initiative to
          form, by presidential decree, the National Committee
          for the Promotion of the Rights of Religious
          Minorities. According to government sources, the
          Committee is to review the problems that religious
          minorities face and recommend corrective policies. It is
          reported that representation of the minorities in the
          work of the Committee has been ensured”.
          73. In the present report, the Special Representative
          will focus on the Sunnis, Baha'is, Jews and
          Zoroastrians, leaving the Christian community for the
          next report. At that time he will also address the
          problem of Diyah, or blood money”, which, as the law
          stands, discriminates against both women and non-
          Muslims.
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          Sunnis
          74. The Government has been reluctant to recognize
          the Suimis as a distinct minority, but it is clear that they
          face various forms of discrimination, particularly
          where they are also ethl1ic minorities. For example, for
          years, Sunni Kurds have complained of non-
          cooperation from officials in terms of permits for
          building or renovating their mosques. However, it was
          recently reported that the harassment of Kurdish Sunni
          clerics by the Special Clerical Court had ended.
          75. In April, the press reported that some 30 Iranian
          parliamentarians had noted their dissatisfaction with
          the Ministries of Education and of Foreign Affairs for
          failing to provide employment opportunities for
          Sunnis. A request from a Kurdish member of the
          Majilis to the President to appoint an adviser on Sunni
          affairs was turned aside. Finally, there is the long-
          standing request of the Sunnis for permission to build a
          mosque in Tehran.
          Baha'is
          76. Concern about the human rights situation of the
          Baha'is remains on the agenda of the Special
          Representative. Despite some promising reports, the
          Special Representative understands that the Baha'i
          community continues to experience discrimination in
          the areas of, inter alia, education, employment, travel,
          housing and the enjoyment of cultural activities.
          Baha'is are still, in effect, prevented from participating
          in religious gatherings or educational activities.
          77. Baha'i property continues to be subject to
          confiscation. The Special Representative has received
          reports of such properties being confiscated in Kata,
          Buyr-Ahmand, where a number of Baha'i families were
          reportedly forced to leave their homes and farmlands in
          the first months of 2001. According to information
          received, in 2000, four buildings were confiscated in
          Tehran, three in Shiraz and one in Isfahan. It is also
          reported that the issuance of business licences to
          Baha'is has been delayed and that some stores and
          business owned by Baha'is have been closed.
          78. The Special Representative wishes to reiterate his
          appeal to the Government of the Islamic Republic to
          implement his outstanding recommendations (A/53/423,
          para. 45), as well as those of the Special Rapporteur on
          religious intolerance (E/CN.4/1996/95/Add.2). In
          particular and, as a step that would go a long way in
          confirming the Government's commitment to the
          rights of citizenship”, the Special Representative
          urges the Government:
          (a) To allow Baha'is places to bury and honour
          their dead.
          The Baha'i cemeteries seized shortly after the
          1979 revolution have not been returned. In 2000, a
          piece of land officially used by the Baha'i as a
          cemetery in the city of Abadeh was reportedly
          bulldozed;
          In his most recent report to the Commission, the
          Special Representative reported information received
          from government sources that the Baha'is would be
          allowed to re-establish their cemetery in Tehran. Since
          a complex was built over the old cemetery, the Iranian
          authorities have already allotted some other land for
          this purpose;
          (b) To guarantee Baha'is freedom of movement.
          It is reported that, although consular instructions
          to Iranian missions abroad have eliminated questions
          regarding religion on application for the issuance of
          passports and visas, these instructions are not
          uniformly implemented. It is also reported that Baha'is
          in Iran still face difficulties getting a passport;
          (c) To guarantee Baha'is access to education.
          Baha'is continue to be denied access to higher
          education in legally recognized public institutions.
          Recently three classrooms used by the Baha'is for their
          own educational purposes were seized;
          (d) To guarantee Baha'is security of person.
          Since his last report, the Special Representative
          has received information which indicates that the death
          sentence of Mr. Musa Talibi has been revised to life
          imprisonment and that Mr. Mansur Haddadan,
          Mr. Manuchechr Ziyai and Mr. Ziaullah Mizapanah
          have been released. Seven Baha'is remain imprisoned,
          and at least two of them, Mr. Bihnam Mithaqi and
          Mr. Kayvan Khalajabadi, are subject to the death
          sentence (see annex I). The Special Representative is
          particularly concerned that the latter two individuals
          remain on death row five years and a half after he
          visited them in Evin prison.
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          Jews
          79. In December the Jewish member of the Majilis
          spoke up about economic discrimination against the
          community in terms of government employment,
          stating I particularly wish to point out that the
          marginalization of our educated youth from
          government services, the blocking of their way for
          participating in specialization and supra specialization
          courses and denying them the chance to have access to
          higher education is against the higher goals of the
          Islamic Revolution.”
          Zoroastrians
          80. Zoroastrians have described their community as
          the pure” Persians, reflecting the proud heritage they
          claim. However, they too have complaints. A
          community leader was recently quoted as saying, In
          recent years, no Zoroastrian has been employed by
          state organizations.”
          B. Ethnic minorities
          Azeris
          81. Azeris are the largest of Iran's ethnic minorities
          as well perhaps as the most successfully integrated (see
          A/55/363, paras. 68-70). However, open voices of
          discontent are now being heard more often. According
          to press reports from Tabriz, a group of Azeri
          legislators, academics and intellectuals wrote to the
          President demanding greater language rights in
          education and broadcasting. They reminded him of
          campaign words in which their identity, language and
          culture were sometimes mocked.
          Kurds
          82. There are a number of interesting developments
          concerning the Kurdish community (see A/55/363,
          paras.63-67). To begin with, President Khatami appears
          to be the first non-Kurdish political figure to be
          popular among the Kurds. He won their votes in
          overwhelming numbers in the recent election. His
          appointment of the first Kurd to hold the position of
          Governor of Kurdistan reinforced his popularity. The
          Governor appears to have been able to facilitate what
          one Kurdish editor describes as OE process of
          reconciliation”. It is said to have lead to a greater sense
          of security. In the words of one Kurdish social worker,
          the hatred that divided families is now over. Now
          social concerns are paramount.” Among other things,
          Kurdish cultural expression now appears to be
          encouraged. Kurdish language weeklies and monthlies
          are on the rise, a programme of government-subsidised
          Kurdish language classes has begun, and there is the
          prospect of several hours of daily Kurdish television
          broadcasting in Sannandaj. The Kurdish community
          was presumably heartened by the appearance of
          Drunken Horses”, reportedly the first Kurdish
          language film. This is of course a good begiiming, but
          it remains to be seen to what extent the Kurdish
          language will, for example, be allowed in schools.
          83. Kurdistan rates as the second poorest province,
          by almost all indicators. There is talk of stagnation, of
          job loss and of emigration to other provinces. One
          Kurdish member of the Majilis has demanded a
          dialogue with the President regarding the Kurd's
          cultural, social and economic problems. In December a
          peaceful demonstration by Kurdish students of the
          University of Tehran was reportedly broken up by the
          police, with accompanying arrests and injuries.
          84. One of the dividing lines in the Kurdish
          community is religion. The majority Sunni group has
          been resentful of the favourable treatment apparently
          accorded to the minority Shia community, and some of
          the stronger words by Kurdish members of the Majilis
          have been in that context.
          C. A national minorities policy
          85. It is clear that the minority communities feel
          aggravated in cultural terms and in economic terms.
          Young members of the communities seem to be
          resorting more and more to emigration. The estimate
          carried in an Iranian paper is that some 15,000-20,000
          Armenians, of an estimated current population of
          around 300,000, are emigrating every year. The
          information brought to the attention of the Special
          Representative concerning the Zoroastrians and the
          Jews is equally bleak.
          86. In several of his recent reports, the Special
          Representative has come back to the proposal for a
          national minorities policy (see A/55/363, paras. 77 and
          79 and E/CN.4/2001/39, paras. 80 and 81). The only
          positive step in this direction that has come to his
          attention is the establishment of the National
          Committee for the Promotion of the Rights of
          Religious Minorities (see para. 72 above). For their
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          part, as described above, minority spokesmen are
          becoming increasingly outspoken about the perceived
          discrimination their people face, particularly in the
          economic field. The Special Representative urges the
          Government to give the Committee clear instructions
          as to the inclusion of minority representatives, a three-
          year agenda of issues to be addressed, and firm
          timelines for reporting back to ministers with
          recommendations.
          VIII. Economic, social and
          cultural rights
          A. Economic circumstances
          87. Experts both within and outside of the Islamic
          Republic seem to agree that one of the greatest crises
          facing the country is the economy. Little has changed
          in the first four-year term of the President, but the
          surge in the world price of oil has hidden the depth of
          the problem by improving some of the key statistics.
          Underneath, the structural state of the economy, the
          generally poor level of management, the low level of
          investment and reinvestment, and a floundering
          privatization drive have all contributed to the economic
          and social hardship faced by most of society that is,
          primarily those not in a position to benefit from the
          surge in petro-dollars.
          88. The prolonged and widespread drought is also
          having a staggering impact on the people and the
          economy.
          B. Situation of workers
          89. Unrest among Iranian workers has been growing
          for some time. In the period under review, labour
          demonstrations seemed to have focused primarily on
          unpaid wages, sometimes for over 12 months. The
          press carried stories of unrest in Tehran, Isfahan,
          Khorramabad and elsewhere. The closing of one textile
          mill in Tehran reportedly put 1,700 persons out of
          work.
          90. In early July, the President declared job creation
          to be a grave and important task”. The Government,
          he added would launch a plan to revive the textile
          industry. That will not be an easy task. Since the early
          1980s, the sector has been in decline, with imported
          cloth, mostly smuggled, seen everywhere. For many
          years overemployment in the sector was supported by
          state subsidies. Now the drive to privatize has revealed
          how weak the sector really is. A member of the Majilis
          who is himself a labour leader told the press in early
          July that about 1,400 companies, chiefly in the textile
          sector, are in a critical state and that there are now over
          80,000 workers who are not being paid. It is reported
          that the government-sponsored House of Workers” has
          over the past two years increased the amount of its
          budget distributed to unpaid workers from 30 per cent
          to 60 per cent.
          91. Officially, unemployment stands at 16 per cent of
          the work force and is fast closing on 6 million people.
          Two thirds of the population are reported to be under
          the age of 30.
          92. The most frequently mentioned causes of
          unemployment are corporate mismanagement over the
          years, the failure of the Government to establish an
          investor-friendly investment regime, and the 1 million-
          plus refugees and other foreigners in the work force.
          Regarding this last argument, the Special
          Representative acknowledges that the efforts made by
          the Islamic Republic to host the largest refugee
          population in the world has strained its resources and
          created social tension. The Special Representative
          wishes, however, to note that Afghan refugees are
          conventionally said mainly to fill jobs that Iranians
          would prefer not to take. Furthermore, the Special
          Representative cautions against the use of arguments
          that would inevitably increase intolerance and
          exacerbate social tension. There are reports of such
          tension in the Iranian press, such as one concerning the
          anti-Afghan rally that took place in Isfahan on 27 June
          2001.
          93. According to an Islamic Republic News Agency
          report in late May, a senior official of the State
          Management and Planning Organization expressed a
          very optimistic view of the employment prospects,
          predicting 600,000 new jobs would be created in 2001-
          2002, the results of a variety of governmental measures
          and market mechanisms. He identified particularly the
          need to prevent unlicensed aliens from working” (read
          Afghan, Iraqi and other refugees”) and the
          improvement of security of investment by enhancing
          legal, social, economic and political stability and the
          introduction of an OEppropriate” labour law.
          94. The existing Iranian Labour Code is sometimes
          regarded as a tough law which virtually forbids
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          dismissals. In fact, according to a 1999 press report,
          the then chairman of the managing board of the Tehran
          Islamic Councils Society reported that 400,00
          industrial workers were dismissed between 1991 and
          1997. Employers had learned to get around the
          provisions of the Code by such devices as requiring
          undated registration letters before hiring and hiring
          under temporary contracts. Further, the Government
          makes no serious efforts to enforce [ the Code]”. He
          concluded, Under the present circumstances, workers
          have no job security.”
          95. A new labour law is clearly badly needed, one
          that would balance the need to restructure the economy
          with the need for reasonable job security The workers
          need to be accorded the right to organize and to strike,
          a demand expressed in the course of a peaceful rally of
          workers outside the Majilis on May Day. The Special
          Representative finds it passing strange that the Islamic
          Republic is not a party to the relevant ILO Convention
          No. 87, Freedom of Association and the Right to
          Organize, to which 137 other countries are party. It is
          to be noted that the same core rights are set out in
          article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and
          Political Rights, to which the Islamic Republic is a
          party.
          C. Poverty
          96. Poverty has become an issue that can no longer
          be ignored. In mid April 2001, after a strenuous debate
          on the definition of the term, the press reported that,
          according to the Management and Planning
          Organization, 40 per cent of Iranians are living in
          OEbsolute and relative poverty”. The gap between rich
          and poor is widening.
          97. In mid March, the President was reported as
          declaring, I know that a considerable proportion of the
          people are suffering hardship. The food on their table is
          meagre. They work very hard. They receive little in
          return. Our weakness, problems and obstacles and the
          existing pressures, the shortcomings, the shortages,
          primarily affect that sector of society.” The President
          has expressed recognition that only increased economic
          activity and in particular economic growth can address
          this problem.
          D. Investment stimulation
          98. Much debate swirls around the need for reform
          and type of reform required to attract foreign and
          expatiate Iranian investment to the Islamic Republic.
          The most recent effort by the Majilis to draft a new
          foreign investment law was rejected by the Guardian
          Council. However, even if the bill is subsequently
          accepted, it will not by itself solve the problems
          plaguing the economy. The President himself has
          recognized the need to streamline the bureaucratic
          process involved. Reportedly, private manufacturers
          are required to pay more than 50 types of taxes. The
          problems go deeper. A Tehran newspaper recently
          quoted a member of the Majilis Planning and Budget
          Committee as saying, The present predicament of our
          country is not just reduced to economic problems; it
          can also be found in the political and social sectors.
          After all, we cannot fool ourselves. In a country where
          a minister is beaten up in broad daylight, it is very
          interesting that we should expect to attract job creating
          investments.”
          IX. Other important issues
          A. National human rights bodies
          99. In December 2000, the Executive Director of the
          Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC), speaking
          at the University of Shiraz reportedly told students, If
          anyone claims that there are no problems with human
          rights in the country, either he is totally uninformed or
          else he is chanting slogans.”
          100. For some years now, the Special Representative
          has been reporting on the development of IHRC (see,
          for example, E/CN.4/2001/39, paras. 117-121). Each
          year, it appears to be making progress in terms of the
          quantity of communications it receives, the extent of its
          educational programmes, and the frankness with which
          it reports on the nature of the human rights problems
          the Islamic Republic faces from certain government
          agencies. Its reports could use still further precision
          with regard to certain statistics it publishes, along with
          greater definition of the remedies it has helped
          complainants obtain.
          101. The report of the Commission for the period from
          April to November 2000 continues to cite incompetent
          judicial authorities” as the single largest subject of
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          complaints received by the Commission. With regard to
          the non-cooperation of certain government agencies,
          the Executive Director reportedly told the press that, as
          to the detained religious/nationalist activists, the
          judiciary was not even acknowledging the
          Commission's letters and that the families had no
          recourse but to appeal to outside human rights bodies.
          102. In June it was reported in the press that,
          following a gap of some years, the Majilis Human
          Rights Commission was being re-established. The
          Executive Director of IHRC welcomed the
          development, as it is obvious that just one
          independent organization cannot alone solve all of
          these problems”. The Special Representative also
          welcomes re-establishment of the Majilis Human
          Rights Commission and looks forward to following its
          work.
          B. Iran in the international human
          rights system
          103. In recent years Iran has appeared before the
          Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
          and the Committee on the Rights of the Child, in the
          discharge of its reporting commitments under the
          International Convention on the Elimination of All
          Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Convention on
          the Rights of the Child. The Special Representative
          referred to the Committee on the Rights of the Child's
          findings in his most recent report to the Commission on
          Human Rights and joined the Committee in
          encouraging the Government to review its broad and
          imprecise general reservation to the Convention, with
          the objective of withdrawing it in accordance with the
          Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action
          (E/CN.4/2001/39, paras. 108-116).
          104. In the period under review, the ILO Committee of
          Experts, responsible for the examination of the
          compliance by ILO member States with ILO
          conventions and recommendations, issued an
          individual observation” concerning the Islamic
          Republic's implementation of Convention No. 111 on
          Employment Discrimination. There is a long-running
          dialogue between the ILO and the Iranian Government
          on equality rights in employment, especially with
          regard to women, and to recognized as well as
          unrecognized religious minorities, in particular the
          Baha'is. Another ILO expert mission is scheduled to
          visit the Islamic Republic in the fall of 2001.
          105. The Special Representative wishes to note with
          concern that the Iranian authorities did not issue visas
          for the accredited representatives of the Baha'i
          International Community to attend the regional meeting
          for the World Conference against Racism, held in
          Tehran in February 2001. Such conduct is quite
          incompatible with the responsibilities of a State hosting
          a United Nations meeting.
          X. Conclusions and recommendations
          Freedom of expression
          106. The Special Representative's conclusion is that
          the suppression of much of the press, a major actor in
          the struggle for better and more caring governance, has
          had a serious negative impact on the promotion of
          human rights in the Islamic Republic.
          107. The Special Representative's recommendations
          are that the present arbitrary and punitive measures be
          abolished in favour of a predictable, jury-driven
          process with powers limited to recommending
          suspension for a maximum of six months.
          Status of women
          108. The Special Representative's conclusion is that
          despite the evident desire of the Iranian people to
          improve the legal status of women, the stalemate
          between the branches of government on the very
          limited measures that have so far been proposed must
          leave the Islamic Republic, as a country, in an
          extrem ely embarrassing position.
          109. The Special Representative's recommendations
          are that the various branches of government work out a
          phased road map for the implementation of the
          legislative and regulatory changes necessary to give
          women genuine substantive equality and that the
          Government embark on a strategically designed public
          education campaign to reduce society's tolerance of
          domestic violence against women.
          Legal subjects
          110. With regard to the reform of the legal process, the
          Government has identified a significant number of
          reforms that would, among other things, certainly make
          the Constitution a more meaningful document. The
          Special Representative recommends the speedy and
          complete implementation of most of them.
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          A/56/27S
          111. WiII regard to IIe condition of IIe prisons, IIe
          Special Representative notes IIe continuing
          overcrowding and IIe de facto control that a variety of
          security agencies appear to have over certain prisons.
          The Special Representative recommends IIat IIe
          seven! proposals for afreviating overcrowding in
          prisons be pursued urgently. He also recommends IIat
          IIe dafiy operations as weft as formal control of a!!
          prisons in IIe Islamic Republic be placed under IIe
          National Prisons Organization.
          112. WiII regard to punishments, IIe Special
          Representative fmds IIat IIe situation remains bleak.
          The Islamic Republic is in violation of a number in
          international standards in terms of IIe punishments it
          imposes, some of which can only be characterized as
          savage. The Special Representative recommends IIat
          IIe Government, at IIe highest level, decide IIat
          reform is necessary and important and that a plan to
          that end be developed in IIe course of IIe current yeat
          Status of Intefrectuals and of political, student
          and religious dissidents
          113. There is a new wave of political prisoners or
          prisoners of conscience entering Iranian prisons.
          Openly expressed calls for IIe reform of IIe
          governance system or criticism of, for example, the
          judiciary can result in charges of acting against
          national security, even waging war against God”, an
          oLence IIat can attract IIe deaII penalty.
          114. The Special Representative considers that the
          Majfiis judged correctly that the first step in addressing
          the manipulation of IIe legal system was legislation
          defining a political oLence. OEe Special Representative
          deeply regrets the rejection of IIe bfil by the Guardian
          Council and calls on all branches of government to
          work for IIe enactment of such legislation as soon as
          possible. The Special Representative believes IIat a
          second important step is IIe imposition of stringent
          discipline upon the judges hearing political cases
          starting with IIe full implementation — in IIe spirit as
          well as the letter — of IIe circular letter of IIe Head of
          the Judiciary on judicial behaviour.
          Democratic governance
          115. The stalemate reached between IIe branches of
          government over important policy and legislative
          decisions has led to a significant degree of paralysis in
          the implementing of critically needed human rights
          improvements in the country. OEe Special
          Representative believes IIe people of IIe Islamic
          Republic deserve bettet
          116. The Special Representative believes that the
          situation must be resolved in accordance wiII IIe
          President's recent declaration that the basic right of
          people in today's world means IIe right of people to
          have control over IIeir destiny. This points clearly to
          the need for IIe elected agencies of government to have
          precedence in IIe case of disagreement.
          Status of minorities
          117. The Special Representative fmds that,
          notwiIIstanding IIe equality provisions of IIe
          Constitution, religious and ethnic minorities continue
          to face varying degrees of official and societal
          discrimination. In some cases, such as IIose of IIe
          Baha'is, IIe evangelical Christians and, fflom time to
          time, some of the eIInic Sunni communities, IIe
          treatment amounts to persecution. For IIeir part, the
          representatives of some of IIe minorities are becoming
          more outspoken, particularly concerning cultural and
          economic rights.
          118. The Special Representative recommends IIat the
          Government seriously consider IIe promulgation of a
          national minorities policy. In IIe meantime, IIere are
          many small steps that can be taken, including a
          speeded up implementation of IIe rights of citizenship
          concept, to be applied to boII eIInic and religious
          minorities. There needs to be a proactive development
          policy to include, in particular, IIose depressed areas of
          the country in which minority groups are an important
          component of IIe population. Government departments
          need to introduce affirmative action employment
          policies. There needs to be more enlightened provincial
          leadership, such as is apparently IIe case in Kurdistan.
          Economic, social and cultural rights
          119. The Special Representative fmds that IIe Islamic
          Republic is facing an economic and social crisis IIat is
          causing great hardship for most Iranians. Inflation,
          unemployment, poverty are some of IIe problems;
          growing emigration is one of IIe symptoms.
          120. The Special Representative recommends IIat a
          comprehensive economic restructuring plan be
          developed and that it include privatization as well as
          the stimulation of foreign and expatriate investment
          The deteriorating condition of workers must be
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          A/59278
          addressed wiII more than words. They should have IIe
          right to organize and to strike, as provided in
          international human rights standards.
          121. Finally, IIe Special Representative has to record
          once again IIat he has not been invited to visit IIe
          Islamic Republic since February 1996.
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          Annex I
          Information on the situation of the Baha'is
          The following is based on information received by the Special Representative.
          1. Mansur Haddadan (arrested on 29 February 1996 and sentenced to three years
          in prison), Manuchechr Ziyai (arrested on 1 May 1998) and Ziaullah Mizapanah
          (convicted on 16 March 1999), have now reportedly been released.
          2. The death sentence of Musa Talibi, arrested on 7 June 1994 and charged with
          apostasy, has now been revised to life imprisonment. He has reportedly been
          transferred to a prison in Isfahan.
          3. Other Baha'is remaining in Iranian prisons include Bilmam Mithaqui and
          Kayvan Khalajabadi (arrested on 29 April 1989 and sentenced to death);
          Dhabihu'llah Mahrami (arrested on 6 September 1995, charged with apostasy and
          sentenced to life imprisonment, following commutation of a death sentence by the
          President); Sirus Dhabihi-Muquaddam, Hidayat Kashifi Najafabadih and Ata'u'llah
          Hamid Nasirizadih (arrested in November 1997, sentenced to seven, five and four
          years' imprisonment, respectively, following commutation of death sentences in the
          case of the first two).
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          Annex II
          Supporters of the religious/nationalist movement believed to
          be in detention, as of 15 July 2001
          The list below is based on information received by the Special Representative
          and may not be exhaustive.
          Arrested 11 March 2001 in Tehran
          1. Mohammad Mohammadi Ardahali, businessman
          2. Mohammad Basteh-negar, writer-researcher
          3. Mahmoud Emrani, writer-editor
          4. Nezamoddin Ghahari
          5. Mehdi Ghani
          6. Morteza Kazemian, journalist
          7. Saeed Madani, editor, political scientist
          8. Mohammad Maleki, former chancellor of Tehran University
          9. A u Mohammadi Gorgani
          10. Mohammad Mohammadi-Gorgani
          11. Massoud Pedram, writer-researcher
          12. Habibollah Peyman, doctor, writer-researcher
          13. Hossein Rafiee, chemist, Tehran University
          14. Taqi Rahmani, journalist
          15. Reza Reiss-Tousi, political scientist, Tehran University
          16. Alireza Rajai, post-graduate student, Tehran University
          17. Bahman Rezakhani
          18. Hamid Zeydabadi
          Arrested 7 April 2001
          1. Seyed-Jafar Abbaszadegan (Tehran)
          2. Ahmad Aghai (Tehran)
          3. Taher Ahmadzadeh, 80 years (Machhad)
          4. Hamed Alavian (Tehran)
          5. Ali-Akbar Badizadeghan (Tehran)
          6. Mohammad-Hossein Baniassadi (Tehran)
          7. Abolfaz l Bazergan (Tehran)
          8. Seyed Mohammad Erteza (Machhad)
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          9. Morteza Eshfagh (Ispahan)
          10. Ghaffar Farzadi (Tehran)
          11. Bagher Fathali-Beyghi (Tehran)
          12. Seyed-Ali-Asghar Gharavi (Tehran)
          13. Hadizadeh (Tehran)
          14. Abolfaz l Hakimi (Tehran)
          15. Majid Hakimi (Tehran)
          16. Nasser-Seyed-Hadi Hashemi-Rad (Tehran)
          17. Mohammad-Mehdi Jafari (Chiraz)
          18. Jafar Keyvan-Chehr (Tabriz)
          19. Jamshid Mansurian (Machhad)
          20. Khosro Mansurian (Tehran)
          21. Reza Masmui (Tehran)
          22. Mostafa Meskin (Ispahan)
          23. Mirzadeh (Tehran)
          24. Mahmoodm Naimpoor (Tehran)
          25. Hosein Razmjoo (Machhad)
          26. Hashem Sabaghiyan (Tehran)
          27. Fazlollah Salavati (Ispahan)
          28. Ali-Akbar Sarjami (Tehran)
          29. Mirsaleh Seyed-Gorgani (Tehran)
          30. RaoofTaheri (Tehran)
          31. Ali-Farid Yahyai (Tabriz)
          32. Jamal Zerehsaz (Chiraz)
          Other intellectuals afffiliated to the religious/nationalist movement, arrested
          earlier
          Hassan Youseffi-Eshkevari (see also annex III)
          Ezzatollah Sahabi (see also annex III)
          Hoda Saber and Reza Alijani, editors of Iran-c Farda, arrested on 29 January 29
          2001 and 25 February 2001, respectively. Mr. Saber has been reportedly transferred
          twice to outside hospitals because of cardiac problems, and his family is very
          concerned for his health.
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          Annex III
          Correspondence between the Special Representative and the Government
          of the Islamic Republic of Iran, December 2000-June 2001
          1. By letter dated 8 January 2001, the Permanent
          Representative transmitted the following information
          received from the concerned authorities in the Islamic
          Republic of Iran, in response to the Special
          Representative's urgent appeal on behalf of Mahmood
          Salehi, dated 23 November 2000 (see E/CN.4/2001/39,
          annex II, para. 16):
          Mr. Mahmood Salehi was prosecuted and
          convicted to 10-months imprisonment on charges
          of involvement in a terrorists group called
          Komoleh. According to the prison doctors, Mr.
          Salehi's health situation is unaffected and gives
          no cause for concern. The hearing of his case was
          carried out in two phases, and the verdict, after
          due review by the appeal court, went into effect
          as of 28 August 2000.
          By law, Mr. Salehi was entitled to appoint a
          lawyer of his choice and enjoyed all the rights
          made available to prisoners. He had access to
          medical check ups, the results of which show that
          he was not suffering from any kind of disease. It
          should be noted here, however, that there exists
          the possibility of his early release.
          2. On 11 January 2001, the Special Representative
          drew the urgent attention of the Iranian authorities to
          the health of the writer, editor and human rights lawyer
          Mehrangiz Kar, who, according to the information
          received, had been diagnosed with breast cancer and
          was denied permission to seek medical attention
          outside the Islamic Republic. The Special
          Representative urged the Government to give her
          access, on humanitarian grounds, to all necessary
          medical treatment as a matter of urgency, including
          permission to seek medical attention outside the
          Islamic Republic. (Ms. Kar was allowed to leave the
          country to receive medical treatment.)
          3. Ms. Kar was reportedly on trial in connection
          with her participation in a conference held in Berlin
          organized by the Heinrich Boell Institute on 7 and 8
          April 2000. In this context, the Special Representative
          also joined the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of
          the right to freedom of opinion and expression in
          addressing an urgent letter to the Minister for Foreign
          Affairs concerning the verdicts issued by a
          revolutionary court in Tehran on 13 January 2001
          regarding the Iranian citizens, including Ms. Kar, who
          participated in that conference. In the letter dated 24
          January 2001, the signatories expressed their concern
          over the charges, which did not appear to justify the
          conviction of the defendants, and urged the
          Government to use all resources at its disposal to make
          sure the charges were reviewed and dropped upon
          appeal. The letter made specific reference to the
          following individuals:
          (a) Mehrangiz Kar and Shahla Lahiji, publisher,
          sentenced to four years' imprisonment;
          (b)
          to nine years;
          Khalil Rostam-Khani, translator, sentenced
          (c) Ali Afshari, student leader, and Ezatollah
          Sahabi, politician, sentenced to five and four and one
          half years, respectively;
          (d)
          to nine years;
          Khalil Rostam-Khani, translator, sentenced
          (e) Akbar Ganji, journalist, and Saeed Sadr,
          translator for the German embassy in Tehran, sentenced
          to 10 years. Mr. Ganji was also reportedly sentenced to
          an exile for an additional five years in a remote
          southern part of the Islamic Republic;
          (I) Hassan Yousefi-Eshkevari,
          sentenced to death by the Special Clerical Court.
          allegedly
          4. The Permanent Representative forwarded to the
          Special Representative the following information
          regarding those convicted for their participation in the
          Berlin conference.
          By letter dated 5 April 2001
          Regarding the charges of those persons who
          had participated in the Berlin conference, I would
          like to clarify the following points:
          (a) There were many Iranians who took
          place in the Berlin conference, but only 17 of
          them were summoned to the court;
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          (b) Out of those 17, only 11 were
          convicted, the other six were acquitted;
          (c) Out of those 11 convicted in the
          primary court, seven were released on bail,
          waiting for the court of appeal;
          (d) The four others were imprisoned on
          charges other that their participation in the Berlin
          conference.
          In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that
          nobody is in jail for participation in the Berlin
          conference.
          On Akbar Ganji
          According to a letter from the head of Branch 3
          of the Revolutionary Court in Tehran and to an
          announcement by the National Prisons
          Organization, dated 4 December 2000, the
          allegations of torture and ill-treatment undergone
          by Mr. Akbar Ganji are entirely false. On the
          basis of a medical check-up made by a team from
          the Forensic Medicine Department, the
          aforementioned was found to be in perfect health,
          with his speech, intellectual processes and powers
          of expression absolutely unimpaired.
          Letter dated 31 January 2001 (see E/CN.4/2001/39,
          annex II, para. 15)
          Tehran's Appeals Court reduced the sentence
          issued by a lower court against Mr. Akbar Ganji
          from a 10-year jail term to six months. The
          Appeals Court has also dropped the sentence of
          five years' internal exile ... . The final
          proceedings are now pending in the Supreme
          Court.
          Letter dated 23 May 2001
          On Hassan Youseffi-Eshkevari
          I would like to inform you that there has been no
          confirmation of his conviction on charges of
          apostasy and that legal proceedings are now
          pending in the relevant appeal court.
          Letter dated 17 April 2001, addressed to the Special
          Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary of Arbitrary
          Executions and copied to the Special Representative
          Tehran's Appeals Court revoked a death sentence
          given to Mr. Hassan Yousefi-Eshkevari by the
          Special Clerical Court.
          Letter dated 23 May 2001 (see E/CN.4/2001/39, annex
          II, paras. 1 and 2)
          5. On 11 January 2001, the Special Representative
          joined the Special Rapporteur on the independence of
          judges and lawyers and the Special Representative of
          the Secretary-General on Human Rights Defenders in
          sending an urgent letter to the Minister for Foreign
          Affairs concerning the arrest of Nasser Zarafchan, a
          human rights defender and lawyer. Mr. Zarafchan, the
          lawyer for the families of the intellectuals murdered in
          1998, was allegedly arrested on 16 December 2000
          owing to his comments implying that the killings were
          part of a campaign by death squads aimed at silencing
          the opposition. Reference was made to the fact that he
          was the second lawyer for the families of intellectuals
          against whom legal action had been taken. It was
          alleged that these actions were aimed at impeding the
          lawyer's free exercise of their responsibilities and to
          disadvantage their clients. In the letter, the signatories
          referred to the fundamental principles set forth in the
          Declaration on the Rights and Responsibility of
          Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote
          and Protect Universally Recognised Human Rights and
          Fundamental Freedoms and to the United Nations
          Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers.
          6. The Special Representative joined the Special
          Rapporteurs on the question of torture, on extrajudicial,
          summary or arbitrary executions and on violence
          against women in sending an urgent appeal on 23
          January 2001 on behalf of Maryam Ayoubi, reportedly
          sentenced to death by stoning. In the letter the
          signatories expressed their concern with the fact that
          those sentences were still being issued in the Islamic
          Republic of Iran and strongly urged the Government to
          overturn the sentence. Following reports that the
          Supreme Court had upheld the death sentence by public
          stoning, the same signatories sent a new urgent appeal
          on her behalf on 18 April 2001.
          7. Also on the subject of stoning, on 30 May 2001
          the Special Representative sent to the Minister of
          Foreign Affairs an information request concerning the
          reports in the press of the stoning to death of an
          unnamed woman at Evin prison, Tehran, on 20 May
          2001. The woman, aged 35, was reportedly arrested
          eight years ago on charges of acting in OEbscene
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          films”. In this context, the Special Representative
          referred to his previous representations on behalf of
          Maryam Ayoubi, expressed his concern with those
          reports, which implied that stoning had been resumed
          in the Islamic Republic and asked for clarification.
          8. In a letter dated 31 January 2001, the Permanent
          Representative submitted to the Special Representative
          information received from the relevant authorities in
          Tehran as a response to his urgent appeal on behalf of
          Latif Safari, dated 26 March 2000 (see A/55/363,
          annex III, para. 4).
          According to the announcement made by the
          Justice General Administration of Tehran
          Province, the latest situation regarding Mr. Latif
          Safari is as follows:
          Following two rounds of hearing in the presence
          of the accused, his defence counsel and jury, the
          aforementioned person was sentenced to two
          years and three months and a day of
          imprisonment, plus five years of deprivation of
          journalistic activity and the nullification of his
          affiliated newspaper licence, on charges of
          insulting sanctities and breaching interior
          security. The duration of his imprisonment was
          reduced to one year and three months and a day
          during the course of revision.
          9. By letter dated 18 April 2001, the Special
          Representative drew the attention of the Iranian
          authorities to several cases of alleged lack of respect
          for the dignity of those facing pre-trial detention and
          lack of a fair trial during that process. The letter
          specifically referred to the following cases:
          (a) Ali Afshari's attorney's declarations in
          December 2000, according to which the court had
          turned down his requests to meet with his client, to
          commute the order of detention to release on bail, and
          to hear the case in open court (see para. 3 above);
          (b) Marzieh Mortari's declaration according to
          which the 21 persons arrested by the Tehran
          Revolutionary Court in early December 2000 were
          blindfolded and taken to an unknown place;
          (c) Farshad Ebrahimi's letter to the Justice
          Department in January 2001, indicating that he had
          been kept in solitary confinement for 126 days, his trial
          had been held behind closed doors, visits of his lawyer
          were banned and interrogations had continued after the
          end of the court proceedings;
          (d) Declarations of the families of the
          supporters of the Iran Freedom Movement arrested on
          11 March 2001, including Dr. Habibollah Peyman,
          according to which they were kept in solitary
          confinement in an undisclosed detention centre,
          without access to lawyers or family, and the judge had
          refused to provide information about their
          whereabouts;
          (e) Reports that Ibrahim Sheikh, summoned to
          the Revolutionary Court in March 2001 as a witness in
          the case of Ali Afshari, had been arrested when he
          appeared before the court and taken to an unknown
          place.
          10. In the letter, the Special Representative referred
          to the circular letter sent by the head of the judiciary to
          all judges, warning them against some of these
          practices; in view of the above, it seemed to have had
          little impact. The Special Representative expressed his
          concern with these reports and asked the Iranian
          Government for comments.
          11. The report of the Special Representative to the
          Commission on Human Rights in 2001
          (E/CN.4/2001/39, para. 75) referred to the report from
          government sources that the Baha'is would be allowed
          to re-establish their cemetery in Tehran. Following
          information received on the lack of implementation of
          this decision, the Special Representative requested
          clarification by letter dated 18 April 2001 to the Iranian
          authorities.
          12. In a letter dated 30 May 2001, the Special
          Representative joined the Special Rapporteur on the
          question of torture in sending an urgent appeal to the
          Iranian Government concerning the situation of the 20
          supporters of the Iran Freedom and Millli Mazhabiu
          (religious/nationalist) Movement, arrested on 11 March
          and allegedly being held in solitary confinement,
          without access to a lawyer. It was also reported that
          they had been threatened in order to force them to write
          repentance letters and that their families reported that
          they sounded as if they had been drugged. Special
          reference was made to Dr. Reza Reiss-Toussi who was
          believed to be in bad health and had marks of torture
          on his legs. The signatories requested the Government
          to provide information about the situation of the above-
          mentioned persons, including their trial or release, as
          well as the assurance of their humane treatment while
          in detention.
          26
        
          
          A156/278
          13. In the same letter, reference was also made to the
          case of Ali Afshari, a detained student leader whose
          confession” was reportedly broadcast on 16 May 2001
          before he had been charged or brought to trial. Mr.
          Afshari was reportedly being held incommunicado,
          without access to his lawyer. Reference was made to
          previous urgent appeals sent by different special
          mechanisms of the Commission on Human Rights on
          his behalf (see A/55/363, annex III, para. 5 and paras. 3
          and 9 above).
          14. The Permanent Representative forwarded to the
          Special Representative the following information:
          (a) By letter dated 7 February 2001, comments
          on the Special Representative's report to the General
          Assembly regarding education and the judiciary;
          (b) By letter dated 11 May 2001, information
          on developments in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
          particularly regarding the situation of the press,
          including the number of licences for periodicals issued;
          the declaration of the head of the judiciary concerning
          the prisons organization; an International Conference
          on Human Rights and Dialogue among Civilisations
          held in Tehran in May 2001; and the Supreme Leader's
          mandate against corruption;
          (c) By letter dated 23 May 2001, information
          about the number of licences issued by the Press
          Supervisory Board;
          (d) By letter dated 29 March 2001, information
          about the serial murders;
          (e) By letter dated 4 June 2001, information
          concerning the approval by the Majilis of the outlines
          of a new bill on political crimes.
          15. Where appropriate, this information has been
          used by the Special Representative in the preparation
          of the present report.
          27
        

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