Aadel Collection
Stifling Dissent: The Human Consequences of Inter-Factional Struggles in Iran
May 2001 Vol.13, No.4 (E)
STIFL1NG DISSENT:
The Human Rights Consequences of
Inter-Factional Struggle in Iran
I. SUMMARY 2
II. RECOMMENDATIONS 5
To the Government of Iran 5
To the European Union and Member States 5
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPASSE 6
IV. MUZZLING THE PRESS 9
V. SILENC1NG CRITICS 13
The Berlin Conference Participants 13
Other Prosecutions of Dissidents 13
Suppression of the Religious — Nationalist Alliance 14
VI. LEGAL BACKGROUND 16
International Law 16
Domestic Law 17
VII. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 19
I. SUMMARY
Four years ago, President Mohammad Khatami crested to power on a wave of popular support as Iranians
went to the potts in their millions to support his platform for reform. The scale of his victory dealt a serious blow
to the conservative religious forces that dominated Iranian public and political life since the revolution of 1979
that overthrew the Shah. To most commentators at the time, it appeared that a sea change had taken place. A
younger generation, it seemed, grown to adulthood since the revolution and tired of enduring the strictures of the
state, had spoken out for change. Iran, it appeared, was entering a new era, and at last about to end its self-
imposed isolation and open up again its communication and cooperation with the wider world.
Today, four years on, as President Khatami seeks reelection for a second term on June 6, the optimism that
greeted that previous victory looks increasingly hollow. The past year, in particular, has brought a much harsher
reality. The prospect of reform is now much more in the balance. As recently as Febmary 2000, supporters of
President Khatami won a further, convincing victory in elections to the Majies, or parliament, seemingly
consolidating the process of reform. Since then, however, religious conservatives and opponents of reform have
utilized their entrenched control over certain key institutions to mount a growing and effective counter surge
against the reformists.
Their ability to do so stems directly from powers contained in Iran's post-revolution constitution. This strikes
an uneasy balance between institutions of popular sovereignty and those charged with ensuring that governance
accords with the precepts of divine law. This arrangement effectively pits the popularly -elected bodies, notably
the presidency and the Majles, against the unelected religion-based institutions, comprising the Supreme Leader,
the Council of Guardians, and the judiciary. The Supreme Leader is particularly powerful. He is chosen by a
popularly-elected group of senior religious scholars and pious laymen known as the Assembly of Experts, and he
appoints the Head of the Judiciary, who in turn appoints all chief judges. The Supreme Leader, advised by the
Head of the Judiciary, also appoints the Council of Guardians, composed of twelve senior clerics whose
responsibility it is to ensure that all laws passed by the Majles are compatible, in their view, with Islam.
Compounding their control over these important institutions, it is clear that the conservative religious forces
opposed to President Khatami's reform agenda also maintain strong links with and influence over Iran's extensive
internal security apparatus, notably the powerftil Ministry of Intelligence.
Perhaps stung by Khatami's supporters' victory in the Febmary 2000 election and threatened by an
increasingly inquisitive and combative press, the conservatives have mounted an increasingly effective
counteroffensive against the proponents of reform. In particular, they have used their dominance within the
judiciary and the Council of Guardians to rein in and smother what had emerged as the engine of reform, the new,
independent newspapers and journals. In little more than a year, the courts, under the control of the conservatives,
have closed down more than thirty independent newspapers and journals, and sentenced at least twenty leading
journalists, editors and publishers to prison terms.
The independent press was a particularly important target as it had emerged as the major mobilizing force for
the reform movement during the first years after President Khatami's election. Writers and thinkers initiated
debates about a broad range of subjects previously considered taboo in the Islamic Republic, including the role of
the Supreme Leader and the place of the clergy in government and politics. Independent newspapers and journals
carried exposés of cormption 2nd the involvement of senior religious and government officials in illegal political
violence as well as discussion about the role of women in society. The Majles also sought to amend the law to
allow greater press freedom, only for this to be blocked by the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i, and the
Council of Guardians, on the grounds that such a change would be “un-Islamic.”
But the fallout from the factional stmggle has extended far beyond the press. Allies of President Khatami
have been forced out of their positions in government, and some have been tried and imprisoned. Khatami's
efforts to normalize relations with Europe and the West have also been undermined by high-profile prosecutions
of members of religious minorities and of Iranians who participated in an international conference in Berlin. Most
Human Rights Watch 2 May 2001, Vol. 13,No. 4(E)
recently, the conservatives have turned their attention to intellectuals and political activists who advocate reform,
at least twenty of whom have now been detained without trial or jailed after unfair legal proceedings.
State agencies controlled by forces opposed to Khatami have also been involved in instigating and canying
out political violence, including killings of dissident intellectuals and activists since late 1998. According to an
official inquiry, set up with President Khatami's support, Ministry of Intelligence agents were implicated in these
politically motivated crimes. As a result, the president was able to obtain the removal of the intelligence minister,
Gorban Ali Dori-Naj afabadi, and his replacement by a more sympathetic appointee, but questions remain about
the role of senior officials in ordering or sanctioning political murders. Three high-ranking security agents
accused of carrying out these killings together with ten other lower level officials were tried behind closed doors
and convicted in January 2001, leaving many questions unanswered. Dori-Naj afabadi, despite being made to
stand down as intelligence minister, remains a senior official within the judiciary. High officials alleged to have
been involved in killing of dissidents both at home and abroad have been untouched by the inquiries to date.
Other policies of the Khatami presidency, such as easing restrictions on social interaction between the sexes
and a more relaxed social climate, have also been rolled back in recent months by strict enforcement of a dress
code and regulations concerning private social gatherings. The sense of greater personal freedom among young
people and women as well as the professional middle class has been eroded by the activities of vigilante groups
linked to hard-line conservative clerics.
By these various means, religious conservatives have progressively chipped away at President Khatami's
powerbase and exposed his inability to push forward his popular mandate for reform or, indeed, to face down his
main opponents. In the face of conservative hostility, Khatami appears to have calculated that if he were to give
his full and overt support to the reformists it could provoke his removal from office and so destroy any hope of
gradual reform from within the system. Throughout, he has trodden a careftil line, seeking to identify himself as
the defender of constitutionally legitimate institutions and to speak out in favor of the rule of law. As most victims
of arbitrary and illegal acts are his supporters, however, his public criticisms of departures from legal procedure
are widely interpreted by both his supporters and adversaries as coded support for imprisoned reformists.
With his first term in office about to end, the reform proposals that were at the center of Khatami's previous
election campaign remain largely unrealized, and many of his principal supporters in the reform movement have
been effectively neutralized. Khatami's own, and the reformists', main claims to influence continue to flow from
the widespread popular support that they have repeatedly been able to demonstrate at the polls. But by silencing
the independent press, playing on fears of foreign interference, and jailing reform leaders, the conservatives have
struck at the heart of the reform movement.
As the critical June 6 election approaches, both sides in this ongoing factional struggle now face dilemmas.
For the conservatives, the question is whether, despite his continued alvocacy of reform, President Khatami
represents less of a threat in office, where his stature helps to channel discontent in a manner that preserves the
Islamic Republic, than out of it. For the reformists, many of whom assert that Khatami's removal would bring
catastrophic civil unrest, the calculation is the reverse: whether the minimal space they have been able to secure
under Khatami is worth the stability this affords to the conservatives, who continue to exercise effective power.
It is against this IBckground of continuing factional struggle among Iran's political and religious leaders, and
it adverse implications for human rights, that the June 6 election is being played out. The outcome of the election
will be cmcial in determining both the future political direction of Iran and the extent to which existing human
rights problems are addressed, and it will also have important implications for human rights in the wider Islamic
world. Within Iran, the reformists have increasingly based their arguments on human rights principles, demanding
greater freedom of expression, an independent judiciary and the rule of law, and the primacy of democratic
accountability over clerical authority in essentially secular political matters. As recent events have demonstrated,
currently there are no durable safeguards for human rights in Iran, the courts are subject to political manipulation
and offer no protection under the law, and shadowy paramilitary and vigilante groups are able to kill and maim
with impunity under the protection of leading state and clerical officials.
Human Rights Watch 3 May 2001, Vol. 13,No. 4(E)
In this report, Human Rights Watch traces the impact on human rights of the conservative counterattack of
the past year, and identifies major steps that should be taken by the Iranian authorities, and by those who may
have influence upon them, to address human rights violations and bring government policies into conformity with
its obligations under international law.
Human Rights Watch 4 May 2001, Vol. 13,No. 4(E)
II. RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Government of Iran
• Release immediately all writers, editors, publishers, members of the Iran Freedom Movement and others
detained or imprisoned for their peaceful exercise of freedom of expression, and ensure that others against
whom charges are being brought have immediate and regular access to legal counsel and family and
medical visits.
• Lift the banning orders on newspapers, and amend the press law and related legislation to guarantee
freedom of expression, in accordance with Iran's obligations as a state party to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. In particular, provisions in the press law that permit the prosecution of
writers and journalists on charges such as “questioning the tenets of Islam and the revolution” should be
revoked.
• Amend articles 24 and 26 of the constitution as well as relevant laws and administrative procedures to
ensure that they are not used arbitrarily to penalize the exercise of basic civil and political rights such as
freedom of expression and freedom of association.
• Revise the legal and administrative procedures of the Revolutionary Courts and the Special Court for the
Clergy to bring them into full conformity with international fair trial standards. This includes ensuring
that defendants are allowed prompt and regular access to defense counsel and that they have the right to
call defense witnesses and question prosecution witnesses, and have the right to appeal to a higher
independent tribunal.
• Revoke the banning of the Iran Freedom Movement by the Tehran Revolutionary Court.
To the European Union and Member States
• Call publicly on the government of Iran to release unconditionally persons imprisoned on charges
stemming from their presence at the April 2000 Berlin conference on the future of Iran, and drop all
pending charges against persons for attending this conference.
• Make clear that improvements in political and economic relations between Iran and the E.U. and its
member states depend on government efforts to implement the recommendations above.
• Adopt a Community-wde position linking further aid and concessionary trade arrangements with Iran to
unambiguous steps by the government to promote and protect the ability of Iranians to exercise their
rights to freedom of expression, freedom to impart or receive information, and freedom of association.
Human Rights Watch 5 Ma 2001, Vol. 13,No. 4(E)
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPASSE
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, promulgated in 1979 and amended in 1989, locates its
source of power in two realms. It speaks of the sovereignty of the will of the people and simultaneously enshrines
the principle of the velayat-e faq /h (rule of the supreme jurist), whereby the most learned Islamic scholar
interprets and applies divine law. It creates both religiously -guided and popularly -elected political institutions.
Since the earliest days of the republic, a tension has existed between the appeal to popular sovereignty, which
united the many diverse groups that came together to overthrow the autocratic rule of the Shah, and the
commitment of many of these same forces to rule in accordance with divine law.
The constitution gave ultimate authority to religious rule in what was seen as a political triumph for
Ayatollah Khomeini, the first Supreme Leader. Constitutional articles upholding and protecting basic rights and
freedoms were vitiated by qualifying clauses stating that such rights and freedoms can only be exercised in
accordance with Islamic principles. The primacy of Islamic principles is asserted repeatedly throughout the
Constitution, while the practical meaning of these directives is left vague. Similarly, Iranian criminal law
includes such loosely defined offenses as “endangering Islamic principles,” or “waging war on God.”
Authoritative interpretations are necessary to give meaning to these charges and directives.
The constitution provides for certain institutions and bodies to make these interpretations. At the top of the
pyramid is the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, the Faqih, whose interpretations of how divine law
should be applied in any given circumstances carries the most weight. 1
The position of Supreme Leader is rooted in the Shi'a Muslim tradition of emulation of a marl ‘a taqild, a
senior religious scholar recognized by his followers as a source of guidance for the faithful in resolving questions
of how to live an observant religious life in the world. Traditionally, at any one time there have been a handful of
Grand Ayatollahs to whom the Shi'i faithftil have looked for guidance. These learned jurists have produced
books offering guidance for their followers in many areas of personal life. They have traditionally been based in
seminaries in the great centers of Shi'i religious learning in Qom, Mashad or Naj af, where they have educated
generations of clerics who have devoted their lives to study or have gone out into the world as preachers in
mosques throughout the Shi'i Muslim world. The essence of the tradition ensured diversity within mainstream
Shi'i teaching. If a believer did not find the directives of one maria ‘a to his or her liking, then he or she was free
to choose another.
The creation of a kind of “state maria ‘a” with the establishment of the position of Supreme Leader of the
Islamic Republic was a radical departure from this tradition, in that it fused spiritual and temporal power in an
unprecedented manner, and it greatly increased the temporal power of one maria ‘a over that of his fellows. There
were eminent dissenters to this during the ten years that Ayatollah Khomeini occupied the position he had created
for himself, 2 but his prestige and political acumen, and the need for national unity during the bloody war with
Iraq, ensured that he was easily able to override such opposition.
The problems inherent in the position of Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic became more apparent
with the selection by the Assembly of Experts of Ayatollah Khamene'i as Khomeini's successor. Ayatollah
Khamene'i was not widely regarded as one of the leading Islamic jurists of his day, and his status as a Grand
Ayatollah was questioned by many. Some saw his appointment, therefore, as an essentially political choice,
understandable for a position exercising the political authority of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic but
detracting from his prestige as the supreme spiritual guide. As time passed, the Leader's overt political role, often
seeking to balance antagonistic conservative and reformist political forces, became apparent. Inevitably, questions
arose that if this was a temporal political office like any other, in fact more powerful than any other, then why
1 He is chosen as the most learned jurist by a popularly elected group of senior religious scholars and pious laymen, the
Assembly of Experts.
2 Eminent dis senters included Grand Ayatollah Shar'iat Madari, and also traditional figures like Grand Ayatollahs
Golpaygani and Araki.
Human Rights Watch 6 May 2001, Vol. 13,No. 4(E)
should it not be filled by direct popular election? Some questioned the need for the position of Leader at all, or
advocated a symbolic, politically neutral role for the Leader. Such discussions took on considerable momentum in
the independent print media after President Khatami's election in 1997, providing conservatives with great
incentive to close down the media.
A second body created by the constitution with the explicit purpose of safeguarding the Islamic character of
the state, and therefore in determining what that character should be, is the Council of Guardians. The council has
the power to vet all laws passed by the parliament, a power that it has exercised liberally throughout the history of
the republic. This has taken on particular importance since the parliamentary election of May 2000, which
resulted in the reformists gaining a majority for the first time. The council has acted repeatedly to block
parliamentary attempts to advance reform measures.
The council exercises a second powerful influence over the legislature in vetting the fitness for office of
prospective candidates for parliament and other elective offices in the Islamic Republic, including the president.
The council is charged with assessing their piety, and may reject candidates without providing reasons. These
powers have ensured that elections in Iran have been largely limited to competitions among those supporting the
clerical leadership. Secular politicians and opponents of clerical rule have consistently been barred from seeking
office. Prior to the Feb r uary 2000 parliamentary elections, there was considerable concern among reformists that
the council would exercise its powers to block reform supporters from standing as candidates. Some called for
the council's powers over electoral candidates to be diminished, or at least for their deliberations to be made more
transparent. In fact, the council vetoed relatively few reform candidates in the 2000 elections, thus heading off a
conflict on that issue, but the council's position as a counterweight to the legislature ensures that it will be a target
for reformist criticism in the future.
The third body charged by the constitution with carrying out its functions in accordance with Islamic
principles is the judicial branch. The Supreme Leader directly appoints the Head of the Judiciary to a five-year
term, and the latter appoints half the members of the Council of Guardians, all members of the Supreme Court,
and the chief judges in all Iran's provinces. Islamic judges are empowered to apply the law in accordance with
their interpretations of Islamic law. Much Iranian criminal law leaves broad scope for interpretation both in the
definition of crimes and in devising remedies for victims and penalties for offenders. In recent years, the judicial
branch has emerged as the major weapon in the hands of the conservatives in their fight against the reformists. It
used the Press Court under its jurisdiction to imprison editors, publishers and journalists for “offending Islamic
values.” Reformists who are clerics can also be tried in Special Clergy Courts if they are accused of deviating
from Islamic orthodoxy. The judicial branch has also become a target for much criticism for reformists.
Thus conservative clerics exercise control over the major state institutions that have the power to impose
authoritative interpretations of Islamic law. They are thus in a position to interpret the constitution and the law to
their advantage. Conservatives also control the security forces, enabling them to enforce their mlings. Their
domination of the broadcast media provides them with an advantage in the baffle of ideas, although many Iranians
are able to overcome the state broadcast news monopoly by listening to broadcasts in Farsi from overseas, and
increasingly viewing satellite television broadcasts as well.
Reformists, for their part, now have control over the state institutions elected by popular vote, principally the
presidency and the Islamic Consultative Assembly or Majies, the Iranian parliament. The president appoints
ministers (except the Head of the Judiciary) and has a responsibility to ensure that the constitution is upheld. In
practice, the powers of the presidency and the legislature are limited by conservative control of the judiciary and
the Council of Experts. The main source of power for the reformists is the support they receive from the
electorate. Thus, reformist rhetoric makes frequent reference to the importance of public opinion. For example,
on Febmary 12, 2001, addressing a conference at the Ministry of the Interior, President Khatami stated:
Human Rights Watch 7 May 2001, Vol. 13,No. 4(E)
We should be worried, God forbid, one day our people will feel the authorities are not meeting their real
demands and that dirty hands have succeeded in disappointing them and thus alienating them. 3
Conservatives counter such criticism by emphasizing the importance of promoting public respect for state
institutions. Ayatollah Khamene'i responded to President Khatami's speech by asserting:
No person can allow himself to weaken the institutions which are the origin of national security like the
police, the intelligence ministiy and notably the judiciaiy. 4
Over the past year a pattern has emerged of reformists challenging the prerogatives of conservative-
dominated non-elected state institutions and being met with increasing repression from these institutions. This is
the context in which the mounting incidents of arbitrary detention and restrictions of basic freedoms of
expression, association and assembly have taken place.
BBC News, “Supreme Leader attacks reformists”, Feb. 13, 2001.
4 Ibid.
Human Rights Watch 8 May 2001, Vol. 13,No. 4(E)
IV. MUZZLING THE PRESS
Since April 2000, more than thirty independent newspapers and magazines have been closed down in Iran.
usually by order of the judiciary. in direct violation of both Iranian law and of Iran's obligations under
international human rights law, including as a state party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) to uphold freedom of expression.
The independent media's contentious relations with judicial authorities date back to before the Khatami era.
The Press Court and other judicial authorities had closed numerous titles in previous years, but after 1997 the
country witnessed a rapidly expanding independent print media expressing a wide array of opinions.
The Press Court is a branch of the General Court that usually deals with offenses related to the press.
According to Article 168 of the Constitution. trials for press offenses should be held openly and in the presence of
a jury, whose composition is defined in the Press Law. Article 6 sets out loosely defined restrictions on the press
forbidding the publication, for example, of material that “harms the bases of the Islamic Republic.” The
prohibitions are subject to much arbitrary use.
In July 1999, the closure of the popular Scilam newspaper and threats by the parliament—then dominated by
conservative forces—to pass new legislative restrictions on the press sparked the most serious civil unrest in more
than a decade. After students at Tehran University took part in a peaceful demonstration on July 8, 1999,
members of an unidentified uniformed militia force entered the student dormitories that night and attacked
students, throwing some out of the windows and arresting others. At least four students were killed in the assault,
three hundred wounded and over four hundred arrested. Over the next days, students took to the streets in Tehran
and numerous other cities, protesting the assault on the dormitories, demanding an inquiry and calling for the
release of those detained. Protests degenerated into riots as enforcers associated with conservative leaders within
the government, the Ansar—e Hezbollahi (Partisans of the Party of God), joined security forces in breaking up
demonstrations.
Both President Khatami and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i condemned the raid on the university
dormitories. Minister of Interior Abdullah Mousavi-Lari declared that it had taken place without ministry
authorization. Senior Tehran police chiefs were charged with responsibility for allowing the raid, although the
head of Tehran's police department, Hedayat Loffian, was exonerated. In mid-August 1999 a hard-hitting report
by the National Security Council criticized the police and conservative militia groups, and President Khatami
declared that “police officers and non-military personnel” were responsible for the raid, but no public criminal
proceedings were instituted. The full stow of who ordered the raid and which forces carried it out remain
shrouded in mystery.
Pressure on the independent media intensified after the Febmarv 2000 parliamentary elections but before the
new parliament assumed office. The outgoing, conservative-dominated parliament had passed a series of
amendments to the Press Law holding individual writers as well as editors and publishers accountable for articles
deemed to be offensive to Islam or to have incited public opinion. The amended law required applicants for new
newspaper licenses to obtain prior approval from the judiciary. This closure of a previous loophole that had
enabled dosed newspapers to reopen under a different name within a few days has proved cmcial in enabling the
judiciary to suppress Iran's independent print media.
The Supreme Leader openly sanctioned the assault on the press. Speaking at Friday prayers on April 22,
2000, Ayatollah Khamene'i characterized the press as a “stronghold of Western influence” in Iran. He defended
the new spaper closures b/ sa ing we are tr/ ing to stop the enem from realizing his propaganda conspirac
President Khatami was far less direct, simply hinting that conservatives were exploiting religious values to
increase their grip on power:
A coordination hod of senior leaders of the security forces headed h the president.
Human Rights Watch 9 Ma 2001, Vol. 13,No. 4(E)
The political tendencies and groups. by relying on religious sanctities and everything that is held in
respect and honor by the people, take unfair advantage of the situation to enhance factional interests and
specific tendencies.
At the same time, Khatami was careful to distance himself from some of the independent media, whose
content, he warned, signified an unacceptable “shift towards secularism” in Iran.
Twelve titles (eight daily newspapers, three weekly titles and a monthly magazine 6 ) were closed in one day.
on April 23, and several more in subsequent days. In issuing the closure orders on April 23 the judiciary
announced that the banned publications had consistently ignored warnings to stop publishing material that
“denigrated Islam and the religious elements of the Islamic revolution.” The statement from the judicial
department said that the titles had “brought smiles to the faces of the enemies of the Islamic Republic and hurt the
feelings of devout Muslims.” Judicial officials alleged that the press was working in behalf of foreign powers.
The mass closures did not comply with the requirements of Iran's press law, which requires that formal
charges be lodged against publications prior to their closure and that there be a court hearing. Nevertheless,
additional closures were ordered in the following days. Those shut down included Mosharekat. the daily
newspaper associated with the Islamic Iran Participation Front, a reformist political faction, and Sobh-e Imrouz,
another popular daily that was published by Said Hajjarian. a senior advisor to President Khatami. A month
earlier, in March, Hajjarian had been the victim of an assassination attempt, apparently planned within the
security forces, that left him confined to a wheelchair. His newspaper was ordered closed, according to a judicial
official, because the judicial department had received more than ninety complaints against it. Hajjarian. then still
in critically injured after the attempt on his life, was in no position to respond.
The press closures were accompanied by the imprisonment of prominent editors, journalists and publishers.
On April 10, Mashallah Shamsolvaezin. a pioneering editor of independent newspapers, was sentenced to thirty
months of imprisonment for “insulting religious values.” Complaints had been made against him to the Press
Court by the Ministry of Information and the state broadcasting agency. More cases i' imprisonment of writers
and editors followed.
On April 22 investigative journalist Akbar Ganji. the editor of Fath newspaper, was summoned before the
Tehran press court and after several hours of interrogation was ordered to be detained “temporarily.” He had been
investigating the role of senior state officials in a series of political murders that took place at the end of 1998. His
articles had implicated many powerful figures, including former President All Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. He was
later sentenced to ten years of imprisonment to be followed by five years of internal exile in the south of Iran. On
May 15, Tehran' s Appeals Court reduced the sentence to six months from ten years. 7
The following day, Latif Safari, publisher of the banned newspaper Neshat, was sentenced to two-and-a-half
years in prison for publishing articles “offensive to Islam.” The article which sparked his prosecution had
questioned the use of the death penalty and the application of the Islamic principle of qisas, or retribution.
The Press Court was not the on'y weapon at the disposal of the conservatives in their war against the
reformist press. In June, the Special Court for the Clergv,b an extra-constitutional body created by decree of the
Supreme Leader to discipline dissident clerics, ordered the closure of Bayan, a newspaper published by
Hojatoleslam Ali Akbar Mohtashami. a former minister of the interior and senior advisor to the president. Prior
to the parliamentary election campaign the Special Court for the Clergy had sentenced Hoj atoleslam Abdullah
Nouri to prison for five years. He had been seen as the likely reformist candidate for the position of speaker of
6 The dailies were: Guzrish-e Ruz, Banidad-e IVà, Aftab-e Iniruz, Pcrvani-e Azadi, Fat/i, Aiva, Asr-e Azaa'egan and Manateq-e
Azad. The three weeklies were Pavani—eHajar, Abaji and Azresh. The monthl magazine was Iran—c Farda.
7 hlqmiL RepubliL New AgenL/ (IRNA) w eh ite w w irn Lom Mq/ 15 2001
The SpeLi l Couit Ioi the Cleig/ i n e/tI Lon titution l both LIe ted h/ deLlee ol A/ toll h Khomeini nd uh equentl/
ratified h Ayatollah Khamene'i. Some jurists argue that the creation of the court violates the constitution because it is not
compatible with the principle of equality before the law.
Human Rights Watch 10 Ma 2001, Vol. 13,No. 4(E)
parliament. His trial was widely reported by the independent media, and he used the occasion to advocate reform
and criticize the conservative's dominance of state institutions. His defense arguments in court were collected and
published in what became a best-selling book. 9
Because the Special Court for the Clergy has no legal jurisdiction over the press, Hojatoleslam Mohtashami
had ignored previous summonses to the court to answer charges relating to the newspaper. The Special Court
announced that it ordered the closure in order to prevent further offenses by the newspaper. Among the articles
that raised objections was one criticizing the judiciary for overstepping its competence and entering into the
political realm.
The new parliament, convened at the end of May, sought to reverse the restrictions on the press imposed by
the outgoing Majles. This included the requirement that applicants for new newspaper licenses obtain prior
approval from the judiciary which had closed a previous loophole that had enabled banned newspapers to reopen
days later under a new name. At the beginning of August the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamene'i, stepped in
to head off a brewing confrontation between the parliament and the Council of Guardians, frustrating the
reformist agenda. In a letter to the Majles dated August 6, 2000 he wrote:
Should the enemies of Islam, the ievolution and the Islamic system take over or infiltrate the press, a
great danger would threaten the security, unity and faith of the people and, therefore, I cannot allow
myself and other officials to keep quiet in respect of this cmcial issue...
The current law, to a degree, has been able to prevent the occurrence of this great calamity, and its
interpretation, amendment and similar actions that have been anticipated by the Majles conmiittee are
not legitimate and not in the interest of the country and the system.
On behalf of the parliament, the Speaker, Mehdi Kahroubi, agreed to cease all debate on the amendment to the
press law.
Several reformist members of parliament criticized this unprecedented intervention by the Supreme Leader in
parliamentary affairs, but they were drowned out by conservatives who strongly supported the Leader's action
and received no evident support from President Khatami, who refrained from criticizing the intervention.
In July and August 2000 the number of newspaper closures rose to more than twenty 1 ° and other journalists
were sentenced to prison terms. They included Emadedin Baqi, member of the editorial board of Fath, who was
sentenced to five-and-a-half-years of imprisonment by the Press Court for questioning the tenets of Islam and of
the revolution in violation of Article 6 of the Press Law. In August, journalist Ahmad Zeidabadai was detained for
failing to answer a summons to appear before the Press Court to answer charges relating to articles he had
published for several independent newspapers, including Hamshahri, a newspaper published by the Tehran
municipality. Other journalists for independent newspapers, including Massoud Behnoud and Ebrahim Nabavi,
were also taken into custody.
As press closures and arrests of journalists continued, reformists appealed to the rule of law. Deputy
Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance for Press Affairs Shaban Shahidi stated on August 19, “It would be
ideal if no publication is shut down before going to trial, and that no journalist or managing director would be
arrested without an open trial in front of a jury.” He also stated that reopening some of the closed newspapers
“could help calm down the atmosphere in the country.” President Khatami finally spoke out on the press clamp
down on August 21, 2000 at a televised news conference, “The situation which has come about nowadays for our
press and mass media is not satisfactory,” he said.
The title, “The Hemlock of Reform,” suggested that the reform movement was being poisoned by his prosecution.
10 These include: Gozaresh-e Ruz, Bamdad-e No, Aftab-e Emruz, Payam-e Azadi, Fath, Arya, Asr-e Azadegan, Azad,
Payam-e hajar, Aban, Arzesh, Iran Farda, Akhbar Eqtesad, Manatq-e Azad, Mosharekat, Ava, Tavana, Ruzdaran, Bahar,
Jvanan-e Qorveh and Qeseh-yi Zendigi.
Human Rights Watch 11 May 2001, Vol. 13,No. 4(E)
I agree completely that any offense or deviation should be dealt with, but within the framework of the
law... A selective approach to the press and the people is not desirable. Everything should be done
within the framework of the law and regulations. We should know that our regime is strong enough so
as not to give the impression that, God forbid, it is weak and afraid because of such a method. 1 '
Nevertheless, conservatives kept up their pressure. On October 3, Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, in remarks at
Qom's Abshar mosque, said, “if the government had done its duty, it would have hanged all these idle babblers
from gallows, so that the people might utter their worst curses over them.” 2
Eight more publications were closed down in October. The few independent publications that remained faced
constant harassment from the judicial authorities as their elitors and journalists were repeatedly summoned to
appear before the Press Court to answer for perceived offense in articles they published.
In December 2000 advocates of greater press freedom suffered a further blow when Minister of Culture and
Islamic Guidance Ata'ollah Mohajerani resigned. He was seen as the main guiding hand behind efforts to
liberalize and increase press freedom and had been repeatedly challenged to resign by conservatives. In 1999, he
had escaped an attempt to impeach him only by making an impassioned and eloquent defense of press freedom on
the floor of the parliament. Mohajerani's departure from office represented for many the end of the period in
which the independent print media had been able to act as the public voice of the reform movement. He had
worked with diminishing success from within the system to safeguard an independent voice for the press.
Attacks on the press and on journalists continued in 2001. In January, the authorities closed the philosophical
and cultural monthly Kiyan. The journal had published academic articles debating the philosophical
underpinnings of the reform movement. Among the journalists most recently detained are Fariba Davoodi-
Mohajer, arrested on February 18, and Mohammad Vali Beig, head of the Jaine-e Rota publishing society. On
February 28, 2001, journalist Massoud Behnoud was sentenced to nineteen months of imprisonment for
“spreading untruths and insulting the Islamic system.” Two independent journalists, Hoda Saber and Reza Alijani,
were taken into detention in March 2001 and as of late May were still being held in an unknown location. On
March 18, 2001 the Press Court ordered the closure of four more independent newspapers, one daily, Douran-e
Emrouz, and three monthly publications, Peyam-e Emrouz, Jamaeh Madam? and Mubayyin.
“Islamic Republic News Agency, (IRNA) website www.irna.conj Aug. 21, 2000.
newspaper, Oct. 3, 2000.
Human Rights Watch 12 May 2001, Vol. 13,No. 4(E)
V. SILENCING CRITICS
As well as journalists and editors, many prominent reformist activists who published their views in the
independent media were caught up in the crackdown on independent publications and charged on account of
articles they had published. Meanwhile, the judiciary has also mounted prosecutions against other leading
reformists and political activists.
The Berlin Conference Participants
One group that the judiciary targeted were Iranians who participated in an international conference on the
future of Iran that was held in April 2000 in Berlin. The conference, organized by Germany' s Green Party and
several German foundations, aimed to examine the prospects for reform in Iran following the reformists' success
in the February 2000 elections. Those who attended included a number of Germany-based Iran experts as well as
Iranian activists living in exile, but also Iranians who traveled to Germany from Iran in order to take part. Soon
after their return to Iran, however, several of the latter were detained and questioned, among them veteran
independent politician Ezzatollah Sahhabi and women's rights activists Mehrangiz Kar and Shala Lahidji. The
reformist cleric Hoj atoleslam Hassan Youssefi Eshkevari, who delayed his return to Iran until August, was also
later detained.
In October 2001 at least twelve reformist activists who had attended the Berlin conference were brought to
trial before the Revolutionary Court in Tehran. though the number of named defendants eventually reached
seventeen. On January 13, 2001, the court convicted seven of them on vague charges of having “conspired to
overthrow the system of the Islamic Republic.” The court convicted three other defendants on lesser charges,
imposing fines and suspended sentences, and acquitted seven others. Even so, the trial breached recognized
international fair trial standards: the authorities held several of the defendants for months without access to legal
counsel and the judge, as is common in Revolutionary Court cases, acted also as prosecutor. Further, the trial was
conducted behind closed doors.
Investigative journalist Akbar Ganji (see above) received a particularly severe sentence, ten-years of
imprisonment to be followed by five years of internal exile in the south of Iran. 13 He had previously published
articles implicating powerful, high-level officials in the 1998 killings of leading dissident writers and intellectuals,
and the assassination attempt on Said Hajj arian (see above). Two translators employed by the German Embassy in
Tehran, Saeed Sadr and Khalil Rostamkhani, received ten and nine-year sentences respectively. Khalil
Rostamkhani had not actually attended the Berlin conference, though he had helped in its preparation. His wife,
Roshanak Darioush, a prominent translator of German literature into Persian, served as a translator at the
conference, but she did not return to Iran to face charges. Ganji's sentence was subsequently reduced to six
months imprisonment on appeal.
The Revolutionary Court in the Berlin case also sentenced student leader All Afshari to five years in prisons,
and veteran politician Ezzatollah Sahabi to serve four-and-a-half years. Both of them were already detained for
their criticism of government policy by the time the Berlin prosecutions were announced in October. Their
families had not been informed of their places of detention Shahla Lahidji and Mehrangiz Kar each received four
year prison sentences. Ms. Kar, recently diagnosed with breast cancer, was for a time prevented from leaving the
country for medical treatment. Hojatoleslam Hassan Youssefi Eshkevari, remained in prison awaiting sentencing
by a Special Court for the Clergy on charges of apostasy. He was originally sentenced to death, but this verdict
was quashed by an appeals' court in May 2001. Two other writers, Changiz Pah evan and Kazem Kardavani, have
not returned to Iran from Germany. having been informed that charges have been prepared against them also.
Other Prosecutions of Dissidents
On December 9, 2000 Saeed Montazeri, a son of the dissident cleric Ayatollah Hossain All Montazeri, was
summoned by the Special Court for the Clergy for distributing copies of his father's memoirs. Ayatollah
Montazeri, for many years the designated successor to Ayatollah Khomeini as Leader of the Islamic Republic, fell
13 Tehran's Appeals Court reduced the sentence from ten years to six months on May 15, 2001 .
Human Rights Watch 13 Ma 2001, Vol. 13,No. 4(E)
out of favor in 1989 and has spent much of the last decade under house arrest in Qom. His views, critical of the
institution of velctyat-e thqih. have been a thorn in the side of the authorities throughout this period. His relatives
and followers have been frequent targets for prosecution by Special Court for the Clergy.
In attempting to weaken President Khatami' s bid for a second term of office in the June 2001 elections,
conservatives also targeted Deputy Minister of the Interior Mustafa Tajzadeh. Tajzadeh had been responsible for
administering the Febmarv 2000 parliamentary elections, and was held by many conservatives to be responsible
for their loss in those elections. He is also facing legal charges following the ministry's report about serious
unrest at a rally in Khorramabad in August 2000, when students gathered to hear speeches by Mohssen Kadivar
and Abdol Karim Soroush. The report, for which Tajzadeh was responsible, attributed much of the blame to
violent vigilantes who attacked the students. The charges against Tajzadeh appeared designed to remove him
from his position and disqualify him from supervising the forthcoming presidential elections. He was forced to
resign from his position in April 2001.
On March 26, 2001 member of parliament Fatima Haghighatj 00 was detained on charges of inciting public
opinion and insulting the judiciary followng remarks she made on the floor of the parliament. She was released
on bail the next day, but continues to face prosecution. She is the first sitting member of parliament to be
prosecuted for statements made under cover of parliamentary privilege.
Suppression of the Religious — Nationalist Alliance
On March 18, 2001, the Tehran Revolutionary Court ordered the effective closure of the Iran Freedom
Movement, an unlicensed political party, on the grounds that it was attempting to “overthrow the Islamic regime.”
This was in contravention of Iran's political parties law, which states that the courts may not take action against a
political party before a special committee responsible for overseeing par activities files a formal complaint. 14
No such complaint has been made against the Freedom Movement, which had attempted to register as a political
party in the early 1980s. The Ministry of the Interior turned down its application in July 1992. The par
appealed, but no court hearing was ever scheduled.
The Freedom Movement, throughout its fifly-year history, has been an advocate of constitutional Islamic rule
with respect for democratic principles. Several of its leaders, including former Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan,
served in the first government of the Islamic Republic in 1979. Since then it has attempted to nominate candidates
for parliamentary and presidential elections, but its candidates have almost always been mled inadmissible by the
Council of Guardians.
The closure of the Freedom Movement followed the arrest and detention of twenty-one independent political
activists associated with the religious nationalist trend at a political meeting in Tehran on March ii. The meeting
was held in the home of Mohamed Basteh-Negar, son-in-law of Grand Ayatollah Taleghani. a renowned critic of
the Shah and an inspirational figure for supporters of a liberal view of Islamic government in Iran. The
Revolutionary Court stated that the activists, who are associated with various movements and parties, were linked
to the Freedom Movement.
The adherents of this loose alliance support the reform policies of President Khatami and have criticized
efforts to block reform by conservative clerics. They had held weekly meetings since 1984 at which they debated
current political events. Since the 1997 election of President Khatami, they had widened participation in this
fomm and attendance had increased accordingly.
Eleven of those arrested have not been allowed access to legal counsel, doctors or their families. They are
being held incommunicado, in violation of Iranian and international law, and their whereabouts remain unknown.
Among the eleven who remain in detention are: Dr. Mohammad Maleki. the former chancellor of the University
of Tehran. Dr. Habibullah Peiman, Taghi Rahmani. Mohammad Basteh Nagar, Dr. Ali Reza Rajaei. Mahmoud
Omrani, Saeid Madani-Farokhi, Mohammad Mohammadi-Ardehali, Dr. Hossein Rafei, Dr. Reza Reiss-Toussi,
14 This committee is also known as an “Article 10 Commission” in reference to Article 10 of the political parties law .
Human Rights Watch 14 Ma 2001, Vol. 13,No. 4(E)
Dr. Massoud Pedram and Morteza Kazemian. The elderly veteran political activist Ezzatollah Sahabi also
remains in detention on unknoi charges at an unknoi location.
More than forty independent political activists have been rounded up in Tehran and around the country since
April 7. Many of them were associated with the Iran Freedom Movement. Among those detained was eighty-year-
old Dr. Seyed Ahmad Sadr Haj Seyed Javadi, a founding ntmber of the Freedom Movement and a prominent
legal scholar. An extensive legal archive dating back to the pre-Revolutionary period was removed from his house
at the time of his arrest.
In the course of the raids, security forces ransacked the offices of the Bazargan Cultural Foundation and the
Association of Islamic Engineers. They seized computers and files dating back many years. The Bazargan
Foundation and the Association were legally registered under Iranian law. Detentions took place in many cities. 15
15 The list of detainees from different cities compiled by Human Rights Watch names the following:
• Tehran: Dr. Seyed Ahmad Sadr Haj seyed Javadi, former Minister of Justice and the Interior during the transitional
government; Hashem Sabaghian, former Deputy Prime Minister and spokesman for the transitional government;
Mohammad Tavasoli, former mayor of Tehran; Dr. Oholam-Abas Tavasoli, former chancellor of Isfahan University;
Abolfazl Bazargan engineer and deputy prime Minster in the transitional government; Reza Masmouie, engineer;
Mahmoud Naimpour, engineer; Dr. Hossesin Bani-Assadi; Mr. Abouzari, the head of Bazargan Cultural Foundation;
Dr. Razmjou; Bagher Valibeik; Vahid Mirzadeh; Mr. Aghaei; Mr. Badeizadehgan, head of the Bazargan
Foundation; Dr. Khossro Mansourian;
• Mashhad: Mr. Taher Ahmad-Zadeh, 80 year old former governor of Khorasan province; Dr. Del-Assay, Physician;
Dr. Aliakbar Sar Jamei; Mr. Hamed Alavi; Hojatoleslam Etezagh; Dr. Hadi Hadizadeh, well-known Iranian
physicist;
• Isfahan: Dr. Reza Oharavi; Mr. Mostafa Messkin; Mr. Eshghaghi; Mr. Moslehi; Mr. Salavati, managing director of
closed Mofid newspaper; Tabriz: Dr. Ohafar Farzadi, professor at Tabriz University;
• Zanjan: Mr. Ahad Rezaei; Raouf Taheri;
• Boukan: Khossro Kord-pour, teacher;
• Shiraz: Dr. Seyed Mohammad Mehdi-Jafari, professor of Shiraz university; and Abbas Zadegan.
Human Rights Watch 15 May 2001, Vol. 13,No. 4(E)
VI. LEGAL BACKGROUND
International Law
Under international human rights law, the Iranian government is obliged to uphold basic freedoms of
expression and association, and to protect against arbitrary detention and unfair trials. Since 1975. Iran has been a
party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). which codifies these fundamental
rights. In its efforts to stifle dissent, Iranian authorities have violated international human rights law through its
enforcement of abusive laws, the use of courts that do not meet international standards, and various other
practices.
International human rights law safeguards the right to freedom of expression.
Article 19 of the ICCPR. ratified by Iran in 1975, reads in part:
1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2) Every one shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing
or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
The ICCPR requires that restrictions on expression “will onlx be such as are provided by law and are
necessary: a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; b) For the protection of national security or of
public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals (article 19 (3)).” The prosecutions of attendees at an
international conference in Berlin, for example, constitute a violation of Article 19 (2) of the ICCPR, which
protects the right to “seek, receive and impart information of all kinds, regardless of frontiers.”
The U.N. Human Rights Committee, which oversees the compliance of ratifring states to the ICCPR, has
noted that the maimer in which a state c fines and restricts expression determines the extent to which individuals
enjoy that right: “It is the interplay between the principle of freedom of expression and such limitations and
restrictions which determine the actual scope of the individual's right... [ Wihen a State party imposes certain
restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression, these may not put in jeopardy the right itself. lb Several of
the restrictions on freedom of expression in Iranian law and practice create unacceptable infringements of the
right to freedom of expression.
Many independent activists have been subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention in violation of Article 9 of the
ICCPR. Detainees have been held indefinitely in incommunicado detention, and their right to habeas corpus
denied, in clear violation of Article 9 (4) of the Covenant, that states:
Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a
court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his
release if the detention is not lawful.
Legal actions against activists, journalists, and others who have been detained or imprisoned also violate
international standards. Article 14(1) of the ICCPR provides that “in the determination of any criminal charge
against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, every one shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing
by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”
The denial of access to legal counsel during the pre-trial detention period is a violation of Article 14 (3) of
the Covenant, which states:
16 United Nations, Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty
Bodies, I- J/GEN/1/Rev.2, March 29, 1996, p. 11.
Human Rights Watch 16 Ma 2001, Vol. 13,No. 4(E)
In the determination of any criminal charge against him. every one shall be entitled to the followng
minimum guarantees in full equality:
(...)
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defense and to
communicate with counsel of his own choosing.
Article 22 of the ICCPR protects the right to freedom of association. Restrictions imposed on the Freedom
Movement and on other independent political groupings exceed those peniiitted under Article 22 (2) of the
Covenant. This states (in relevant part):
No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are prescribed by law
and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety.
public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.
Domestic Law
Basic civil liberties and political rights, including freedom of expression and freedom of association, are not
adequately protected in Iranian law. For instance, Article 24 of the constitution, establishing the right to freedom
of expression, qualifies that right by wde-ranging restrictions on its exercise:
Publications and the press have freedom of expression except when it is detrimental to the fundamental
principles of Islam or the rights of the public. The details of this exception will be specified by law.
The 1985 press law, which details the legal procedures for dealing with offenses by the press. narrowly
defines the role of the media in violation of the right to freedom of expression. Article 6 of the law establishes the
purpose of the press:
a) To enlighten public opinion and raise public knowledge and understanding
b) To advance the objectives set forth in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran;
c) To strive to eliminate false and divisive social boundaries and to avoid setting different social groups and
classes against each other by classifring them on the basis of ethnicity, language, mores, and local
customs;
d) To stmggle against the manifestations of the colonialist culture (such as profligacy, love of luxury,
rejection of religiosity, propagation of prostitution);
e) To maintain and strengthen the policy of “neither east nor west.” 17
In addition, the law prohibits the press from engaging in discourse “haniiful to the principles of Islam”
(mabani va ahkam—e Isicimi) or to the “public interest” (houghugh omumi). Article 6 of the Press Law is extremely
imprecise. Phrases such as “harmful to the principles of Islam” give little meaningful guidance to journalists and
editors, but provide officials wth ample opportunity to censor, restrict, and initiate legal proceedings.
The 1985 press law stipulates that in exceptional circumstances the Supervisory Press Board within the
Ministry of Information is empowered to close newspapers or magazines by administrative order. The two
instances specified n the law are insulting the Leader of the Islamic Republic or the “recognized sources of
emulation” inarja-e taghlid), and repeatedly insulting public morals. The powers of the Supervisow Press Board
are not clearly defined in the press law. Its administrative powers to close newspapers and detain journalists and
editors have been used extensively against the independent media.
The Supervisory Press Board, dominated by members of the executive branch of government is neither
independent nor impartial. is quasi-judicial powers to determine violations of the Press Law run counter to
17 Press Law, article 6.
Human Rights Watch 17 Ma 2001, Vol. 13,No. 4(E)
Article 14 (1) of the ICCPR, which provides that in a suit at law, “everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”
The Press Law ostensibly forbids censorship while broadly establishing a basis for the harsh punishment of
content deemed inappropriate. Article 4 declares that “no official or unofficial authority has the right to exert
pressure on the press for the publication of any material or article, or to attempt to censor or control the press.”
But Article 6 forbids, among other things, publishing material which “creates divisions among the different strata
of society,” or “harms the bases of the Islamic Republic.” Such sweeping language is open to abuse. As described
above, Article 6 of the law sets broadly defined restraints for the press, using sweeping language, that has been
manipulated to target criticism of government policies, and diverse views on social and religious subjects. Such
limitation of speech is in contravention of international law.
The authorities have on occasion employed other courts, such as Revolutionary Courts, to prosecute
publishers, editors and journalists for their press activities. The Revolutionary Courts, established ostensibly as a
temporary measure in 1979, remain a fixture of the Islamic Republic's justice system. They are empowered to try
“any offense against internal or external security.” Procedures in such courts fall far short of international
standards: defendants may be held indefinitely in incommunicado pre-trial detention, proceedings are held in
secret, and the defendant has no right of access to legal counsel. This is also in apparent contravention of the
constitution's article 168, which states that “political and press offenses will be tried openly and in the presence of
a jury, in courts of justice.” 18 A second exceptional court, the Special Court for the Clergy, has also been used in
some freedom of expression and press-related cases where the defendants have been Muslim clerics. This court
also offers few safeguards to the defendant and its proceedings are usually held in secret.
In recent newspaper closure cases the Press Court has justified its actions as being in accordance with Article
156 (5) of the constitution (which empowers the Press Court to take “appropriate measures in order to prevent
crime”) and by reference to Articles 12 and 13 of the Precautionary Measures Law of the Iranian penal law
(which empowers courts to order the seizure of “instruments used for committing crimes”). The use of these
provisions farther undermines the protection for press freedom provided for in Iranian law. On March 18, 2001
the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance issued a statement regretting the use of these provisions by the
Judiciary in its actions against the press:' 9
The right to freedom of association is also strictly qualified under the constitution. Article 26 of the
constitution authorizes the “formation of parties, societies, political or professional associations, as well as
religious societies, whether Islamic or pertaining to one of the recognized religious minorities,” but with the
proviso that “they do not violate to principles of independence, freedom, national unity, the criteria of Islam, or
the basis of the Islamic Republic.” This falls short of the right to freedom of association set forth in Article 22 of
the ICCPR.
18 Article 168 then states that “the manner of the selection of the jury, its powers, and the definition of political offenses, will
be determined by law in accordance with Islamic criteria.
19 Islamic Republic News Agency, Mar. 18, 2001, www.irna.com.
Human Rights Watch 18 May 2001, Vol. 13,No. 4(E)
VII. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This report was researched and wriften by Elahe Sharifpour Hicks. researcher for the Middle East and North
Africa Division of Human Rights Watch. The report was edited by Hannv Megally. executive director of the
Middle East and North Africa Division; Joe Stork, Washington director for the Mddle East and North Africa
Division: Malcolm Smart, program director of Human Rights Watch: Wilder Taylor. legal and policy director of
Human Rights Watch; and Jim Ross, senior legal advisor of Human Rights Watch. Production assistance was
provided by Erin Sawaya. associate for the Middle East and North Africa Division.
Human Rights Watch 19 May 2001, Vol. 13.No. 4(E)
Human Rights Watch
Middle East and North Africa Division
Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights of people around the world.
We stand with victims and activists to bring offenders to justice. to prevent discrimination, to uphold political
freedom and to protect people from inhumane conduct in wartime.
We investigate and expose human rights violations and hold abusers accountable.
We challenge governments and those holding power to end abusive practices and respect international human
rights law.
We enlist the public and the international communi1 to support the cause of human rights for all.
The staff includes Kenneth Roth, executive director; Michele A'exander. development director; Reed Brodv.
advocacy director; Carroll Bogert. communications director; Barbara Guglielmo, finance director; Jeri Laber
special advisor; Lotte Leicht, Brussels office director; Michael McClintock, deputy program director; Patrick
Minges, publications director; Maria Pignataro Nielsen, human resources director; Jemera Rone, counsel;
Malcolm Smart, program director; Wilder Tayler. general counsel; and Joanna Wesch er. United Nations
representative. Jonathan Fanton is the chair of the board. Robert L. Bernstein is the founding chair.
Its Middle East and North Africa division was established in 1989 to monitor and promote the observance of
internationally recognized human rights in the Middle East and North Africa. Hannv Megally is the executive
director; Eric Goldstein is the deputy director, Joe Stork is the advocacy director; Virginia N. Sherry is associate
director; Hania Muffi is the London office director; and Clarisa Bencomo and Elahé Sharifpour-Hicks are
researchers; Tobie Barton and Erin Sawava are associates. Lisa Anderson and Gary Sick are co-chairs of the
advisory committee and Bmce Rabb is the vice chair.
Web Site Address: http://www.hrw.org
Listserv address: To subscribe to the list, send an e-mail message to majordomo igc.apc.org with “subscribe
hrw-news” in the body of the message (leave the subject line blank).
Human Rights Watch 20 May 2001, Vol. 13,No. 4(E)
