Aadel Collection
Stones aimed at us: an overview of the discourse and strategies of the stop soning campaign
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An Overview of the Discourse and
of the Stop Stoning Forever
& a aa p a a a at t
Stones Aimed at Us: An Overview of the
Discourse and Strategies of the Stop Stoning
Forever Campaign
Stop Stoning Forever Campaign
Shadi Sadr
Women's Bodies as a Symbol of Post-Revolutionary Iran's
Identity
There has never been a clear and uncontroversial definition of religious
fundamentalism and there is no consensus as to whether religious
fundamentalism is a phenomenon, a movement, or a process. Nevertheless,
having been exposed to religious fundamentalism in its fullest meaning
after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iranian women and an analysis of their
experience might offer a proper definition.
The secularist women who, in the lead up to the Revolution had
demonstrated in the streets and shouted for “Independence, freedom,
Islamic Republic!” had never imagined what their status would turn out
to be in an “Islamic Republic.” Less than one month after the victory
of the Revolution, the office of Ayatollah Khomeini,' the Leader of the
Revolution, announced that the Family Code stood repealed because its
provisions were contradictory to Islamic regulations. The most important
consequence of this order was that for women divorce was now only
possible through a difficult and lengthy process. 2 A couple of days later,
Ayatollah Khomeini personally announced that women were not allowed
to enter government offices without Islamic hejcth, interpreted as covering
the whole body except the face, the hands up to the wrist and the legs
down to the ankle. In response, women active in political parties, unions
and some minor independent women's groups organized the largest
demonstrations by women in the history of Iran, lasting for a couple of
days. ' Exposed to such massive action, the government withdrew from
its stance on hejt1th, but the Revolutionary Court nevertheless began
sentencing prostitutes to death and men and women to lashing and even
death for sexual relationships out of wedlock.'
The movement against the Shah of Iran was a diverse coalition only
unified by opposition to the Pahlavi dynasty (192 5-1979). Although it had
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women's
rights
Campaign
I
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included different women's groups, religious as well as secular, the lack of
gender sensitivity amongst secular political parties who were part of this
opposition—including the Conmumist Tudeh Party and other Marxists like
the Iranian Mujahideen that were actively allied with Khomeini—meant the
Islamists were able to repress women's numerous objections to Islamization.
Thus, once again, women lost almost everything they had, just like a
previous generation. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, women had
been active in political movements such as the Tobacco Protest and the
Constitutional Revolution but had ultimately been denied the right to vote in
the new Constitution.
All these measures were happening even before any referendum had
been held to officially establish an Islamic Republic and formalize
the government (eventually held in April 1979) and while the newly
established government did not yet have a Constitution (adopted later in
October 1979). Consequently, even before the legitimization of the Islamic
Republic, Islamization dominated women's lives. The main difference
between “practicing Islam” and “Islamization” is the factor of domination.
Islamization, according to the preamble of the 1979 Constitution, is building
all “cultural, social, political and economic institutions of the Iranian society
based on the Islamic legislation.” But this definition is incomplete because
it ignores the fact that in the practice of the Islamic Republic, Islamization
is imposed. Islamization arose in the bipolar Cold War context, where the
political leadership sought to identify as “neither eastern nor western” and
to confront the two dominating powers of the time as well as the Pahlavi
dynasty. Rapid Islamization was the main strategy of the new government,
used to gain legitimacy and define its identity. Like all fundamentalists,
the new government based its identity on building boundaries between the
“self” and “others,” especially recognizing that women and issues affecting
women were the best tool for defining these boundaries. “If controlling the
enemy within, the intimate other, is basic to the building of borders that is
at the heart of fundamentalism, equally basic is the creation of the worthy
enemy against whom borders are drawn and barriers built.”
Only two months after the victory of the Revolution and in response to the
massive demonstrations of March 8th against forced hejab, the dominant
Islamic Republic Party announced the birthday of Fatemeh, daughter of the
Prophet Muhammad, as the official women's day in the Islamic Republic,
replacing March 8th. The official posters published for this day feature a
woman completely covered in a black veil except for her face and hands, with
a baby in one hand and a gun in the other. Government literature followed
the same image. An “ideal woman” was a “Muslim revolutionary woman”
who is completely covered in hejab and who “observes chastity” (avoiding
any unnecessary contact with men who are strangers), while undertaking
both her duties as a mother and her social responsibiities.'
This imposed “ideal woman” was the new regime's replacement for the
traditional woman who observed hejab and chastity, was a perfect mother
and wife but who would never participate in the social arena, as well as a
substitute for the “western” woman who never observed hejab and chastity
and was not a perfect mother and wife but who was involved in social
activities. This new ideal, which questioned the pattern of modern women
that had emerged during the Pahlavi dynasty, found its way into society due
to the anti-Shah sentiments that prevailed during this period.
There were other factors that strengthened the focus on women's bodies.
The eight-year Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) created new links between the
symbolic use of women's bodies and nationalism. While men fought to
preserve the country's territory, women “fought a war” to preserve their
bodies. Official slogans placed the value of women's hejab and chastity
even higher than the blood of the war's martyrs; guarding women's bodies
and sexual behaviour became the symbol of guarding the identity of the
Islamic regime. Disobedience towards this ideal was accompanied by severe
penalties.
There are four ways the theocratic government has used control of sexuality
to define the boundaries between self and other (meaning the existing
political opposition as well as preceding regimes). These are: in the public
arena, first, all women, even non-Muslims, were forced to observe strict
rules concerning hejab and second, gender segregation was applied as far as
possible in public spheres; in the private arena, third, all the rights granted
through the previous Family Code were removed, and fourth, all sexual
relationships out of wedlock were considered a crime. Women's lives were a
crucial part of this control.
ini er jious K Amenta lism
Due to the absolute unity of the politics of the Islamic Republic's leaders
and fundamentalist religion, a specific type of fundamentalism has
been established in Iran that can be called “governmental religious
fundamentalism,” which is to a great extent distinct from other types
of religious fundamentalisms. In theory and in practice they followed
Seyyed Hassan Modarres, a cleric opposing the Shah who said: “Our
politics is the same as our religion and our religion is the as same our
politics.” ‘ According to this definition, the final goal of governmental
religious fundamentalism is the absolute unity of the two concepts
such that it is impossible to distinguish one from the other. Within
this structure, no political party has the right to operate except Islamic
parties. In order to obtain a license to operate, political parties have to
undertake to define the framework of their activities as the inevitable
and unchanging unity of religion and government, while according to
the Constitution, religion shall be the permanent political framework in
2
the Islamic Republic of Iran. The only factor that can change is the extent
to which fundamentalists or reformists dominate within this framework.
Thus, despite the fact that there has always been an ongoing power
tussle within the government, which has sometimes opened a space to
question gender and sexuality issues, “reformist” in Iran is a relative
term and does not necessarily indicate a complete rejection of the unity
between religion and government.
From the experience of Iran, religious fundamentalism is a combination
of traditional religion (specifically It /ma Ashari Shia Islam), political
power, and the element of domination. “Traditional religion” in Iran's
context is the religious rules or fiqhl2 formed through the “common
fatwas” of Shia clerics, meaning those fat was (legal opinions/
interpretations) on which there has been consensus over the years,
regardless of whether or not the source is the Quran. In Shia Islam,
although diverse fatwas exist regarding various matters and in many
cases these fat was are conflicting, the ruling system in Iran recognizes
only those that are the most common, and the fatwas of modern clerics,
who are mostly a minority, are ignored. The fat was that legitimize
gender discrimination are usually derived from common fat was.
In all forms of religious fundamentalism, it can be seen that religion is
oppressively used to gain power. Fundamentalism gains its authority
through emphasizing religious traditions that have been legitimized
through their prevalence in history and society. The power gained
through harnessing this legitimacy is then used to impose these
traditions on everyone and to forcibly make society homogenous. In
a circular process, the power and legitimacy of traditional religion
is thus reinforced and the power of the religious fundamentalists is
also promoted. For instance, the government's control over women's
bodies and daily lives is justified with reference to “public virtues” and
religious beliefs concerning hejab and chastity. This justification is then
used to implement government policies that universally and forcibly
impose strict hejab, which in turn reinforces a public culture that values
“traditional religion virtues” concerning women's hejab and chastity.
The key ingredient is state force. While the regime has obtained its
legitimacy through reference to religious traditions, it uses all possible
tools of the state to impose such values on all people as the sole way of
life, while using severe penalties to prohibit other lifestyles.
A major feature of governmental religious fundamentalism is the total
elimination of the private arena and its integration with the public arena,
making it a space where the government has the right to intervene.
Shia jurisprudence has rules and regulations covering all aspects of a
human's life and all daily actions fall within three main categories: ha /al
(permissible, lawful), haram (prohibited and therefore a sin), and mobah
(neither prohibited nor specifically permissible; no particular provision
is made in the Quran). The integration of religion and politics in Iran
means that all these concepts including their application fall within the
Islamic government's control. Consequently, all acts considered haram
are a “crime” according to the government and punishable; instead of
damnation for one's sins, the punishment is in this world, even if these
acts are private or just involve a human being's relationship with God.
In addition, certain broad acts are defined as sins (“beyond God's limits”
or hodud) in the Quran. Iranian Shia jurisprudence has elaborated
the precise nature of the acts that constitute hodud sins as well as
the punishments that should apply. These acts include extra-marital
sexual relations, sodomy, lesbianism, pimping, qadhf (slanderous or
malicious accusation, especially the baseless accusation of adultery),
consumption of alcohol, theft, and fasadh/niufsid fil-'ardh (engaging in
spreading corruption on earth) and these carry the penalties of stoning,
execution, lashing or amputation of the hand or foot, depending on
the crime. Hodud crimes are usually categorized as hagg-ullah (“God's
right”); in other words, punishment rests with God. However, despite
massive criticism within Iran and the Islamic world regarding the
implementation of hodud, the integration of religion and politics in Iran
has meant that the Islamist government substitutes itself for God by
adjudicating such crimes and applying penalties.
Apart from the fundamentalist political parties that occupy the
majority of seats in parliament, the main sector with the power to
influence public policy, especially concerning women, is the howza
(religious schools). The howza, whose main task is to train clerics, are
those religious schools that, before the Revolution, were supported
through religious taxes (khoms and zakat) considered obligatory for Shia
Muslims. After the Revolution, the howza grew and developed, and also
became independent from government funding.
The howza are able to influence and enforce fundamentalist policies in
several ways. First, according to the Constitution, the Supreme Leader
and members of the most important government institutions must be
religious clerics. Many judges are clerics as well. Second, the howza
also hold immense influence among some sectors the population,
particularly the “traditionalist” parts of society and are able to mobilize
them effectively around various issues.' For instance, the howza have
frequently reprimanded the government for avoiding the execution of
hodud penalties such as stoning, lashing, and cutting off of hands and
feet in public. Third, government officials request the howza provide
legitimizing religious opinions (fatwa) that fit their political needs before
they implement a particular policy In fact, many of the fundamentalist
Shadi adr S
4
public lashing: the boy to 25 lashes and the girl to 100 lashes.'
policies regarding women were first developed in the seminaries
through government commission. Finally, the howza have served as
a key barrier to changing discriminatory laws and policies that harm
women. For instance, in the last few years the howza women's study
centre, which previously succeeded in preventing Iran from signing the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW), issued a statement that demanded the government
plan projects that would reduce employment among women, reduce the
rate of divorces filed by women, increase control over men and women's
sexual relations, and increase strict enforcement of hejab.
Shia clerics have a hierarchical structure and only a few are considered
rnuftis or religious authorities with the right to issue fat was and define
what is religiously legitimate and what is not. In Iran, lower order clerics,
students of religious studies and ordinary people are “followers” who
cannot practice Islam based on their own perceptions but have to choose
one leader out of the ten living leaders to follow, basing their lives on
the fat was of that leader. Women, even if they are competent enough
to reach the level of an authority, are not allowed to have followers
and their fat was are only binding on themselves. Except for religious
authorities and lower-level clerics, ordinary people are not supposed to
involve themselves in religious affairs. Obviously such a hierarchy, along
with the organic relationship between the howza and the government
and the full incorporation of the clerical hierarchy into the government
via the establishment of the Guardian Council, paves the way for the
fundamentalists to offer one sole interpretation and repress all other
possible interpretations of religion. The Constitution provides for the
Guardian Council to review the resolutions of Parliament and their
compliance with Shariah. The six clergy members of this institution
are all appointed by the Supreme Leader and during the past thirty
years they have always regarded the common fat was of the religious
authorities as the main criteria for the legitimacy of parliamentary laws.
V
Immediately after the Revolution, Islamic Revolutionary Courts were
established to adjudicate crimes committed against the country under
the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahiavi (1941-1979). The Revolutionary
Courts were the manifestation of the Revolution's judicial power and
their judgements in sexual crimes indicates the importance of these
courts to the fundamentalists.
Less than two months after the Revolution in Amlash, a small town
in northern Iran, a boy and a girl were convicted of “immoral values”
by the Revolutionary Court. They refused to accept the Revolutionary
Committee's pressure on them to marry and the court sentenced them to
Other aspects of Islamization in the area of sexuality and the limiting
of sexual expression to the frame of the family included the execution
of prostitutes or those in charge of running prostitution rings or
brothels, and the stoning of women who had committed adultery. Since
the Revolution, the penalty of stoning has been the harshest tool for
controlling women's sexuality to the extent that even victims of rape, for
fear of being unable to prove rape and therefore being exposed to the
accusation of adultery and stoning, in most cases did not file a complaint
against the perpetrator.' 5
The first case of a woman being stoned to death was reported in July
1980. The news was reported through government television, the only
legal channel since the Revolution. According to the reports, two couples
were convicted of adultery and were stoned in Kerman, one of the
biggest cities in southeastern Iran. Azam Taleghani, a woman Member of
Parliament who had been active in the Revolution, protested. In her view,
stoning was against Islamic justice and dissemination of such news
would weaken the newly established Islamic Republic and strengthen
opposition propaganda against the Revolution. In her gendered critique
of a regime that she was part of, she asked why such penalties should be
applied against women while the Revolution's promises to women had
not yet been realized and women were still being oppressed daily.16
Diversity within the Iranian Government: Pragmatists and
Fundamentalists
In Iran, the government is the key agent of promoting religious
fundamentalism. Nevertheless, because Iran works to maintain a
somewhat “democratic” image (through elections, populist support for
the Islamic Revolution, and so on), it must balance its fundamentalist
vision with a pragmatic need for stability. As a result, the government
structure and policies are still affected, albeit somewhat inconsistently,
by pressure from opposition forces.
Since the emergence of fundamentalism, resistance to such projects has
existed at different levels: women resisted in their daily lives as well
as managing to participate in various groups even under conditions of
repression. But, following the large-scale repression of opposition forces
in the early 1980s, which in effect pushed secular actors out of the
formal political arena in Iran, one of the key levels of resistance has been
the forces within the dominant political power structures. Alongside
the discourse of fundamentalism runs another discourse which I call
“pragmatism.” While the pragmatists are apparently supportive of
the enforcement of Shariah and believe in Islamist governance, they
6
differentiate between governance and religion, and prioritize stable
governance. Pragmatists can be modern reformists or conventional in
their religious beliefs, but what unites them and segregates them from
the fundamentalists is the fact that they accept the reinterpretation of
Shariah in order to maintain their political power, especially those rules
whose implementation has a high national and international political
cost. They agree that in this modern era, the implementation of Shariah
might contradict the needs and demands of the public and seek updated
fat was in order to resolve these contradictions. The politicians who are
today known as Iran's religious reformists and who were among the
higher ranks of authority during the first decade of the Revolution, had
generally been supporters of the strict application of Shariah but have
gradually come to realize that in many cases it was not possible to rule
society on the basis of Shariah. With the establishment of pragmatism
during the first decade after the Revolution, and the reinforcement of
pragmatism during the post Iran-Iraq War period and the emergence
of the liberal governments of Ayatollah Au Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani
(president, 1989-1997) and Seyed Mohammad Khatami (president, 1997-
2005), the political arena of Iran has constantly witnessed the conflict of
two these political forces: the pragmatists and the fundamentalists.
Their constant battle has led to some of the most important political
and social changes since the Revolution. The key difference between
fundamentalist and pragmatist policies has been the level of
influence that social pressure and resistance has over them. While
fundamentalists show minimum responsiveness to the social will,
pragmatists are ready to negotiate their policies—and even occasionally
to withdraw in the face of social resistance—in order to maintain
political power and Islamist governance; for the pragmatists, any act that
may bring hatred towards the Islamic Republic has to be stopped. Thus,
the issue of stoning has always been a matter of dispute between the
fundamentalists and the pragmatists.
Even Ayatollah Khomeini, the architect of Islamization, could not avoid
this conflict. On the one hand, Article 102 of the 1991 Iranian Penal
Code provides that a woman or man accused of adultery and convicted
to stoning is to be shrouded and then buried in a hole previously
prepared; the woman up to her shoulders and the man up to the waist.
Article 104 states: “... the stones should not be too large so that the
person dies on being hit by one or two of them; nor should they be so
small that they could not be defined as stones.” This is the country's law.
On the other hand, when he was informed that a conference was to be
held abroad which would highlight Islam as a cruel and violent religion
and that the issue of stoning was to be discussed, Ayatollah Khomeini
ordered all judges to stop passing verdicts of stoning and substitute
them with alternative penalties. Sayyid offers a comprehensive analysis
saying: “Khomeini had argued that only a strict application of Shariah
was legitimate and activities not sanctioned by the Shariah could not be
undertaken. However, once in power, Khomeini realized that such an
adherence would be difficult to implement and he was willing to support
the needs of the Islamic Republic above a strict adherence to traditional
interpretations of the Shari'ah.”
Although even an order from Ayatollah Khomeini could not prevent
the application of the stoning provisions in the Penal Code, in order to
reduce international pressure, the execution of stoning sentences was
gradually moved away from public eyes and carried out inside prisons
while the media were prohibited from covering stonings. Consequently,
for 30 years censorship has been a barrier to establishing the exact
number of stoning cases, but one estimate from Amnesty International
states that in 2001 only two women were stoned.'
At the end of talks with the European Union in December 2002,
when pragmatists occupied the majority of seats in Iran's Parliament,
international pressure regarding the inhuman and violent nature of
the stoning penalty forced the Iranian authorities to announce that
executions by stoning had been stopped.' But this was not the end of the
story in Iran.
The Rise of Hardline Islamists and the Start of the Stop
Stoning Forever Campaign
Individual and collective resistance to Islamization in Iranian
society (and especially from women) brought many changes in the
fundamentalists' regulations and policies, but the emergence of the
fundamentalist government of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
in 2005 started a new era of Islamization. This new wave of
fundamentalism, claiming to fight economic corruption, promote
equitable distribution of wealth, and revive the values of the Revolution,
received the support of two groups: first, the poor who were suffering
the pressures of inflation caused by the neoliberal policies of the
reformist governments, and second, religious and conventional groups
who believed that reformist policies meant a move away from Islamic
values and a rapprochement with the West.
This new wave of Islamization attacks the reforms started after the
Iran-Iraq War during the presidencies of Rafsanjani and Khatami; its
main goal regarding women is to return them to the home. Women's
gains regarding Family Code reforms and the right to divorce (although
limited) are vanishing, while the new government is seeking approval
of new laws to make polygamy easier for men. Legislation based on the
concept of “chastity” (efaaf) is aimed at introducing repressive rules
8
covering all aspects of women's lives, including their clothing, their
behaviour in public and even their occupational relations or general
interaction with men.
In response, different women's groups reorganized their activities
and, working through informal networks, launched various campaigns
such as the One Million Signatures Campaign to change discriminatory
regulations,20 the Stop Stoning Forever Campaign, and the campaign to
defend women's right to attend football matches and sports events in
public stadiums.21
In 2006, a year after the fundamentalists reasserted themselves and
four years after the suspension of stoning as a penalty, rumours spread
among human rights activists that once again a man and a woman had
been executed by stoning. Later research by feminist activists, including
this author, proved that in 2006, Mahboubeh M. and Abbass H. had
indeed been stoned to death secretly in the early hours of the morning
in the cemetery of the religious city of Mashhad by the authorities and
volunteer militia.22
Mahboubeh, who had forcibly been married to her cruel, addict husband
at the age of 16 and whose attempts to divorce had failed, collaborated
with her lover to kill her husband. For some months, nobody dared to
talk about Mahboubeh's stoning. Since speaking of stoning was taboo
and printing news regarding stoning would put a newspaper in great
danger, the press were not willing to print anything. Many thought this
had been an exceptional case that would never be repeated.
But in August 2006, Ashraf Kalhori called her attorney from Evin Prison
in Tehran and said she was to be stoned in 15 days. Ashraf had often
complained to the courts about being beaten by her husband but her
divorce had been rejected for “lack of evidence.” She also denied having
any relationship with her husband's friend who had killed him but the
court rejected her defence. This was right at the time when women's
activists were thinking of starting a new project against stoning,
and wondering how to spread the news about Mahboubeh and Abass'
stoning as well as how to raise the issue of stoning in the context of
repression and censorship. In the breathtakingly short time of 15 days,
this group which was denied any local media access for awareness-
raising, spread the news at the international level and called upon
women's organizations and human rights institutions to save Ashraf
Kalhori. Amnesty International and
(WLUML), which later supported the Campaign, issued a declaration.
Equality Now sent a letter containing thousands of signatures to the
Head of Judiciary in Iran while inside Iran almost 3,000 signatures
were collected in this short period of time. The Judiciary and Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Iran were suddenly exposed to the international
human rights community, and recognized the political cost of stoning
an ordinary woman. The execution was ultimately called off, but this
was not enough. So long as the penalty of stoning existed in the law
books, Ashraf and many other women remained exposed to the threat
of stoning. This led to the Stop Stoning Forever Campaign. Although the
Campaign's main objective was to eliminate the penalty of stoning from
the Penal Code, defending accused women and saving them from such
sentences were also objectives.
Discrimination: The Gender Component
In collaboration with the Volunteer Lawyers' Network, the Campaign
conducted research and identified 12 men and women facing such a
verdict, though they were sure there were others. All of the women
were victims of diverse forms of discrimination. Some had experienced
forced marriage and constant violence, and others had been forced into
prostitution by drug addicted husbands; none had had any legal means
of escaping their harsh conditions. Some had applied for divorce and
each time, due to lack of support from their families or rejection of the
case by the judge, had been forced to return to their violent situations.
Two of the women who were from very conservative tribes in southern
Iran were sure that if they had raised the issue of divorce and taken
any step in this regard, they would have been killed by their families.
In some rare cases, accidentally or planned, they had helped men with
whom they had some relationship to kill their husbands. The Campaign's
feminist discourse was developed out of these women's life stories.
Before this Campaign, only Iranian opposition groups and some
international human rights groups had taken up the issue of stoning.
The political opposition used stoning as a tool to demonstrate the cruel
nature of the Islamic Republic while international human rights groups
emphasized the anti-human rights aspect. But none had none had
conducted any in-depth study or offered a gender discourse.
Based on the studies of the Volunteer Lawyers' Network, for every 12
women sentenced to stoning, only two men faced the same sentence.
The Stop Stoning Forever Campaign asked why is it that despite similar
penalties for adultery for men and women, stoning is a women's penalty.
Under Iran's Penal Code and in judicial practice, crimes relating to
extra-marital sexual behaviour range from “relations with strangers”
to “adultery” (zina). The provisions for these “crimes” are supposedly
gender-neutral (except homosexuality for which lesbian behaviour
is punishable by lashing while the punishment for gay behaviour is
the death penalty). But in practice married women are more at risk of
haai 11
10
becoming the victims of Iran's harsh penal laws and being sentenced to
stoning than married men.
In Iran, men can legally have four permanent wives and an infinite
number of temporary wives.2 This gives men the opportunity to have
diverse sexual partners and turns a man accused of having a sexual
relationship out of wedlock into someone who has simply made a small
mistake of having an affair rather than categorizing him as a criminal;
he can escape a penalty by claiming either that the relationship was
a polygamous marriage which was not properly regularized or that a
short-term marriage had taken place. But a married woman facing the
same accusation of having had a sexual relationship with another man is
regarded as having committed a major crime; she is not able to contract
multiple concurrent marriages. She is regarded as not only having
questioned the rules of patriarchy but also having destroyed the image
of a “chaste” woman whose physical integrity and sexuality is expected
to be under the control of one man. She has acted against the interests
of her husband as well as transgressed one of the main boundaries in
building fundamentalist identity and has therefore also acted against
the government and must be sentenced to the most severe penalty. The
sentencing to stoning of three women who were forced into prostitution
by their husbands indicates that even forced prostitution cannot be an
excuse for breaking these government-made moral rules.
A review of the case files of women convicted to stoning shows that in
addition to gender, women's social class, tribe or religion also play a role
in discrimination and control of women's sexuality. Two of the convicts
were women from the Bakhtiyari tribe and one a Kurd, all illiterate and
from communities where access to education was limited. Hajiye, a
Turkish-speaking woman who spent seven years in prison and was about
to have her sentence carried out before finally being pardoned, has many
times said: “When they convicted me of adultery, I didn't even know what
it meant.”24 The lack of financial resources needed to employ an attorney
has also prevented them from accessing justice. Most of the convicted
women were from the poorer classes, and villages or marginal areas of
the cities and all except one were unemployed.
From the Stop Stoning Forever Campaign's point of view, patriarchy and
discrimination based on gender, race and class as individual factors are not
enough to lead to the stoning of women. The Campaign sees stoning as the
result of a combination of patriarchy, other forms of discrimination (such
as class and tribal structures), and religious fundamentalism (see Figure 1).
In the context of Iran, governmental religious fundamentalism is the most
important factor. In the 30 years since the Revolution, out of all the reported
cases of stonings of women, only one case has been reported where a
stoning was carried out by the woman's family.25
Judicial attitudes are an important part of this governmental religious
fundamentalism. The Qur'an spells out harsh penalties for adultery, but
it also spells out a high standard of evidence (four witnesses or voluntary
confession) required for these penalties. In Iran, the concept of “judicial
discretion” is used in order to avoid this practical limitation to the
application of hodud penalties. Using their discretion, judges have the
right to convict someone of a sexual offence even if there are no witnesses
and no voluntary confession. More than 80% of adultery cases where a
sentence of stoning was passed were at the discretion of the judge. As
already seen, this discretion is also applied in a very gendered manner.
In other words, it is the way the fundamentalists use the rules that not
only legitimizes their practice but also reinforces patriarchal customs
relating to the control of sexuality such as honour killings. For this
reason Vahdati characterizes stoning in Iran as honour killing that is
conducted by the government, and that is why stoning is perceived as a
“woman's penalty.”
Shadi Sadr 13
Figure 1: The Overlapping Factors behind Stoning
Governmental
Religious
Fundamentalism
Stoning
Patriarchy
Other Forms of
Discrimination
12
This part of the case study discusses the key strategies of the campaign
in detail. Some of the strategies were part of the Campaign from the
beginning while some of them were adopted due to the challenges and
necessities of the emerging conditions.
The Stop Stoning Forever Campaign started its activities in circumstances
where publication of any news regarding stoning was taboo. In some
cases, newspapers only reported that a woman had been executed “due
to adultery”; since the penalty for adultery was stoning, people would
understand she had been stoned. Also, NGOs and women's rights activists
faced restricted access to public spaces. So the Campaign initially
decided to work on the issue indirectly and through international human
rights organizations. Our job, inside the country, was to identify those
sentenced to stoning, conduct research, defend their cases as volunteer
attorneys and publish press releases about their status. At that time it
was not possible to directly contact government authorities to convince
them that stoning had to be omitted from the Penal Code. So the Stop
Stoning Forever Campaign focused its activities on awareness-raising
regarding stoning cases and their critical situation among activists in
international human rights and feminist organizations. This was why,
from the beginning, the Campaign invited experienced women activists
from inside Iran who had transnational links as well as activists from
the transnational women's movement outside Iran who had good links
with activists inside Iran to be consultants and advisors. This meant
the Campaign could not only disseminate its message to the public and
government inside Iran but could also convince international institutions
to impose pressure on the Iranian government. It was just like the Farsi
idiom: it makes no difference whether you put the food directly in your
mouth or take the mouthful the long way by stretching your arm around
the back of your head; it still gets eaten! The international allies of the
Campaign had a crucial role, especially Amnesty International, Women
Living Under Muslim Laws, Equality Now and the other 70 organizations
who signed the Campaign's petition during the 2007 Feminist Dialogue in
Nairobi, Kenya.
International pressure regarding the cases raised by the Stop Stoning
Forever Campaign forced the Iranian authorities to offer a formal
response. On November 21st 2007, a spokesman for the judiciary in
Iran gave the first formal response to the Campaign, saying at a press
conference: “It might be that a court passes a sentence of stoning
but considering that it is really difficult to prove this crime, during
review hearings the sentence has been cancelled and generally in
practice stoning has never been executed.”27 The newspapers that had
previously avoided using the term “stoning” in print now published the
spokesman's words in bold headlines. Although the official response was
to deny any practice of stoning in Iran, publication of this speech had a
positive effect on the Campaign with the judicial authorities breaking
the silence they had built around the issue. Gradually the media began to
publish news, reports and analysis by the Campaign.
I_)isur 111111 IdLI(..)i
During sessions to plan the Campaign's public advocacy, especially when
talking to people who were mostly unaware of the details of stoning due
to 30 years of censorship, the members of the Campaign realized that
stoning could be a unique starting point for raising the broader issue of
discrimination against women.
Most people in [ ran, when they learned how stoning is actually carried
out—that a woman is buried up to her chest in the ground and stones
are thrown at her until she dies—were against this punishment. This
reaction opened the door to a longer discussion between activists and
audiences and even between the Campaign and the government; not
only about stoning but also regarding all measures to control women's
sexuality which hampered the achievement of their rights. It was an
entry point for a detailed analysis of how these women are the victims
of forced and underage marriages, poverty, discrimination, continuous
domestic violence and deprivation of basic rights such as divorce. Within
traditional communities, this was a rare opportunity to raise issues
of physical integrity and women's sexual rights. Although some young
activists in the Campaign believed that emphasizing women's sexual
rights should be one of our principle strategies, in practice the Campaign
was unable to obtain support for sexual autonomy and there remained
people who believed that a woman who “betrayed” her husband should
be punished. But what was always effective was the Campaign's strategy
of arguing that “If this woman had the right to divorce, she would never
have betrayed her husband or wouldn't have killed him and ended up
being sentenced to stoning. What has to be stoned are the rules and
regulations that have exposed women to stones every day”
Trying to raise this issue through abstract discussions about structural
discrimination against women would not have been effective or attracted
the audience's support for the Campaign. But talking about the horrible
penalty awaiting illiterate, poor victims of violence, women who had
simply fallen in love or were forced into prostitution by their husbands,
brought greater empathy in society along with sympathy for the Campaign.
Shadi Sadr 15
14
It was in this process that we also found an answer to our critics within
the Campaign who believed that Iranian women were facing more
important issues than stoning. Stoning allowed a discussion about all
kinds of discrimination caused by patriarchy, governmental religious
fundamentalism, discrimination in society and by the government,
including against non-Farsi-speaking ethnic minorities. It also enabled
us to raise the issue of “love” in relation to some of the women's cases,
as well as issues of sexuality, consensual sexual relations outside
of marriage and freedom of choice in the matter of sexual partners,
although traditional attitudes and fundamentalist control of the media
meant these discussions were not raised widely.28
aria Vii tuai Spaces
In 2006, a couple of days before International Women's Day, police
arrested 33 women activists who had gathered outside the Revolutionary
Court in Tehran to protest the case against five other activists. Four
members of the Stop Stoning Forever Campaign were among those
arrested. Although all 33 were released some 20 days later, a new phase
of repression against the women's movement had started. Three NGOs
whose managers were accused of violating national security were shut
down and their bank accounts frozen. They included Raahi, which had
established the Volunteer Lawyers' Network to defend women at risk
and which had trained most of the attorneys following the cases of
women sentenced to stoning, and the NGO Training Centre (NGOTC)
which held trainings for the Campaign. The Campaign lost both its
public space and internal support institutions. Although all the activists
of the Campaign were volunteers and from the beginning it had been
decided that they would only use donations from individual activists, the
Campaign had nevertheless been using institutional support from Raahi,
the NGOTC and other NGOs for mobilizing activists, training them and
holding discussion sessions and other activities. Most of the Campaign's
activists were busy with their own criminal cases, facing accusations
of attempted violation of national security, and the opportunity to hold
bigger sessions was rare. Clearly, new strategies were required if the
Campaign was to continue.
Then, on a Tuesday evening in the summer of 2007, the Campaign
learned that a woman and a man were to be stoned on Thursday in
Takestan, a small city 250 km outside the capital. A member of the
Volunteer Lawyers' Network had accidentally learned that holes had
been ordered to be dug for stoning two people in the public cemetery.
It was the first time in 20 years that stoning was to take place in public
and undoubtedly was an indicator of the increasing power of the
fundamentalists within the government. The Campaign had less than
48 hours to save Mokarrameh Ebrahimi and Jafar Kiani.29 We contacted
every newspaper that we thought might agree to publish the news, but
all refused. Only (the Campaign's official website,
meaning “Women's Field”) and other Internet news sites were available.
By the start of the working day on Wednesday, Meydaan-e-Zanan carried
the telephone numbers of the city of Takestan's judicial authorities and
other high-ranking members of the Islamic Republic's judiciary, urging
all to contact them and object to the execution. By noon, thousands
of contacts had been made, and while the Campaign's volunteers were
preparing to travel to Takestan to stop the process, an official news
agency announced that the stoning had been halted and the Head of the
Judiciary had ordered the case transferred to Tehran.
This short telephone campaign revealed a vast network which had
previously been invisible even to the Campaign's activists. It included
activists from the women's and human rights movements in the
provinces and outside Iran as well as a large number of people who had
been made aware of the issue by the Campaign.
The lack of access to effective public spaces on the one hand and the
visibility of this network on the other, opened up a new strategy. The
Campaign had used the Internet as a tool for publishing news and
reports on stoning before, but we had never thought about the Internet's
capacity for facilitating mobilization and networking. This experience
around the Mokarrameh and Jafar case showed that even a simple laptop
connected to the Internet could fill the gap left by the closure of NGO
offices and the spaces they had provided for meeting. The “backpack
office” strategy meant that all the alternative spaces vital for achieving
the goals of the campaign could be packed into a backpack, easily
accessible and safe from being shut down by the authorities. In fact, the
Meydaan-e-Zanan website became the Campaign's most effective tool
over the next few years.
neiur II IIbLb
Three weeks after the success in rescuing Mokarrameh and Jafar,
Jafar Kiani was secretly stoned to death in a desert outside the city of
Takestan on the judge's orders and using local police. The publication of
the horrible details about Jafar's death, including pictures of the stones
still covered in blood, motivated others such as religious figures and
religious elites to get involved in the question of stoning. They published
articles trying to prove that stoning is not rooted in the Quran and
should be stopped for religious reasons. One religious leader even issued
a fatwa that stoning is prohibited in today's era.
Shadi Sadr 17
16
Given that stoning has it roots in Shariah and was being practiced by a
religious political regime, it was essential both from the point of view of
discourse and strategy that the Campaign define its approach to religion.
It seemed there were two options: one was to work within the framework
of Shariah and through the study of religious literature prove that
stoning is not rooted in the Quran and is just a penalty from a barbarian
era that does not comply with contemporary needs; the other was to
work outside the religious framework and instead base the Campaign on
the lived experience of women.
The Campaign's approach towards this question was clear from the
beginning: after long discussions, the activists reached the conclusion
that the Campaign's dominant discourse should always be secular but
that it would encourage clerics and the religious elites to prove that
stoning is not rooted in the Quran. You could say the Campaign preferred
one option but did not exclude the other. This strategy was the result of
years of experience of women's struggle in a fundamentalist context.
For at least two decades, both religious women and secular activists
had fought within the framework of Shariah to achieve reform. But this
strategy had been ineffective because women were excluded from the
Shia hierarchy and because of resistance from the Guardian Council
which was responsible for approving all laws. The Islamic Republic
regime has proved time and again that the only “religion” it cares about
is its own; any other interpretation of Islam is deemed as “illegitimate,”
“inauthentic” or “corrupted.” Although the religious interpretations
and reasoning offered by a group of secular women lacked legitimacy,
they nevertheless showed that secular activists could be effective: they
could represent lower-income women as attorneys and be defenders
of women's human rights; they had increased social pressure against
stoning to the extent of forcing the government to stop stoning in order
to prevent damage to the political system.
Nevertheless, since the beginning the Campaign had sought the support
of religious reformists. For example, to save Mokarrameh the campaign
had collected fat was from three clerics (muftis), who all stated that since
Mokarrameh believed she was officially married to Jafar, she had not
committed adultery and their two children were legitimate. These three
fat was, which were widely published in the newspapers, played a critical
role in saving Mokarrameh after eight years of awaiting death by stoning.
Looking at both the women's movement's strengths and the realities
of the context, the strategy of the Campaign as regards religion was
to remain secular while finding allies among the religious elites and
pragmatists in the government structure to open up new religious angles
on the issue. If we consider the movement's arena a football field, it was
obvious that it was best for the activists to play the role they had the
capacity for: to set up the opportunity to score but pass the ball to the
religious reformists who could play forward and put the ball into the net.
Only a team whose players were playing to their best capacities would
be successful. Without secular feminists, the reformists would not have
had the public support necessary for changing the law, and without the
reformists' cooperation the Campaign would have never have been able
to lobby the government.
The stoning of Jafar Kiani significantly reinforced the unwritten
coalition against fundamentalism between the secular activists and the
religious reformists. For the first time clerics raised the need to repeal
stoning and some confessed that Ayatollah Khomeini in a confidential
circular had many years earlier ordered the courts to choose alternative
penalties for stoning. ° Consequently, this brought new political pressure
on the judiciary and legislative bodies to repeal stoning.
Although the Campaign had some successes despite the continuing
repression of civil society activists and constant threats and investigation
by the intelligence services, the Campaign felt the need for a qualitatively
different level of solidarity, specifically among activists in countries where
women were being punished in “honour”-related matters. Our objective
was to establish a coalition with activists in other countries against
stoning and the use of cultural excuses for killing women so as to build
an international mechanism that could force the Iranian government to
stop honour-related penal provisions such as stoning.
In 2007, in collaboration with WLUML, the
was launched in Istanbul, Turkey. ' We hoped
that the campaign would lead stoning to be considered a form of torture
by international human rights mechanisms.
LooKing Mnead: Success and i-resn . haIIenges
Since its start in 2006, through its hard work the Stop Stoning Forever
Campaign has rescued seven women and one man from stoning and
secured their release from prison, while also getting the execution of
one woman's sentence stayed; sentences for three additional cases we
focused on have been altered to lashing or imprisonment. In response
to a press conference by the attorneys of women sentenced to stoning,32
a judiciary spokesman said, “The implementation of stoning has ceased
in Iran”. However, from the Campaign's point of view such expressions
were not to be trusted while stoning remained in the Penal Code; during
.
18
the three years of the campaign, one woman and five men have been
stoned in different parts of Iran.
On the other hand, stoning as a punishment and the institutional
discrimination suffered by convicted women have become public
issues, with over 20,000 people signing our Petition to the Head of the
Judiciary. Over the past year, we have seen major changes in the law
regarding stoning as a result of pressure by the Campaign. In 2008,
the new Islamic Penal Code Bill was introduced in Parliament by the
pragmatists who at present dominate the judiciary. Under this bill,
if a prosecutor believed the implementation of punishments such as
stoning was likely to cause rnafsada (degradation and disgrace), he could
request the Head of Judiciary to permit an alternative punishment
such as lashing or execution by hanging. In Iran's law, mafsada has a
broad meaning and includes various aspects of weakening the Islamic
Republic of Iran, ranging from threatening the security of a small city
to the threat that children will be orphaned if a woman is executed by
stoning. However, the Campaign was critical of the proposed revisions:
the penalty of stoning had not been omitted while the implementation
of such sentences was left to the discretion of the local prosecutor. Then
in May 2009, the Judicial Commission of the Iranian Parliament passed
an amendment to the same bill that eliminated stoning altogether.
With the international community carefully observing Iran's human
rights situation following the June 2009 presidential election and the
harsh repression of street protests, Parliament passed the new Penal
Code which has omitted the sentence of stoning without any debate. At
the time of writing the bill still awaits approval of the Parliament and
Guardian Council in order to become law.
In the bill, the punishment for adultery is not explicitly stated in
the text of the law. However, according to Article 167 of the Iranian
Constitution, a judge can decide a punishment by referring to fiqh
(Islamic jurisprudence) based on the fatwas of the grand clerics (i ilama).
Members of the Judiciary Commission have stated that the only fatwa
acceptable for such rulings is the fatwa of the Supreme Leader, or
Ayatollah Khamenei. As of writing, Ayatollah Khamenei has not yet
issued any fatwa on stoning. If the bill is approved, the assumption
by many analysts is that the judiciary will ask the Supreme Leader
for a fatwa concerning stoning and it is unlikely he will give a fatwa
approving stoning. The argument is that the image of Iran was damaged
in the past by the stoning law. So the new law will most likely state
that the punishment for adultery will be lashing and imprisonment, as
specified in the Quran.
If the bill is approved and the Campaign manages to secure the
elimination of stoning from the Penal Code, the question remains: will
the Stop Stoning Forever Campaign continue? This is currently a point of
internal disagreement among Campaign activists. Personally, although
we have to think about it, I'd probably say the Campaign should end
because it has reached its goal. I believe we should announce the end
of the Campaign because then it can be considered one of the biggest
achievements of the secular feminist movement in Iran. On the other
hand, Mahboubeh Abbasgholizadeh argues that the Campaign should
continue in a different form. In a personal interview for this case study
conducted by Rochelle Terman in May 2009, Mahboubeh stated: “I don't
think we should say that the IStop Stoning] campaign is finished. It's
not 100 per cent yet. It's still too soon for us to declare victory... I'm
scared about a backlash. ... As for ending the campaign, we might
end a campaign asking for a change in the law to eliminate stoning,
but we might continue a similar campaign addressing other issues of
discrimination that affect women.”
The Iranian Revolution and the discourse it established have inevitably
influenced the spread of religious fundamentalisms, at least in the
Muslim world. Before the Revolution “political Islam” had never been
as dominant in Iran as it is now and had never been supported by
the majority of the people or high-ranking political leaders. But
today, despite the opposition to fundamentalism, Islam is usually
misinterpreted as synonymous with political Islam; Islam has been
equated with fundamentalism.
At the beginning of the Campaign, most of us, who had been children
during the post-Revolution years and had not experienced the first
wave of fundamentalism, did not have a clear understanding of
fundamentalism and its effect on women's lives. But through the long
and difficult struggle related to the Stop Stoning Forever Campaign, our
understanding of fundamentalism grew, and we believe our experience
can serve as an example for women in other countries fighting similar
battles. Some of the learnings that we would like to share include the
analysis that:
1. In a context in which there is little possibility for negotiation
with the government over issues surrounding violence and
formal discrimination, women's activists can steer their efforts
towards regional and international networks and alliances.
2. Especially in countries such as Sudan, where there is
fundamentalist repression and censorship, activists can
utilize alternative tools and spaces for information sharing,
21
20
organization and mobilization of forces, especially through
virtual technology and the Internet.
3. The strategies adopted by Stop Stoning Forever Campaign
challenge the idea that the only way to fight against religious
fundamentalism is using the language of “religion.” This
experience proves that even under a religious fundamentalist
government, there is a secular way of fighting by obtaining
legitimacy through the voices of silenced women.
In sum, the experience of the Stop Stoning Forever Campaign relates
a message that is relevant to all activists who are engaged in these
struggles: there is no one single strategy for fighting against religious
fundamentalism; we have used several complementary strategies.
Conclusion
Today in Iran, we are facing a new wave of governmental religious
fundamentalism that targets all aspects of women's lives through policy
and legislation. The objective over the past four years has been to control
women's physical integrity and psychological agency, to engineer a new
social structure that forces women back into the home. Imposing severe
penalties such as stoning for extra-marital sexual relations is part
and parcel of a political structure that advocates for easier polygamy;
more severe restrictions on hejab; increased gender segregation at
universities, sporting events and public spaces; and restrictions on girls
attending university and reductions in women's working hours. The
key challenge for the Stop Stoning Forever Campaign is finding ways to
combat all symbols of the new wave of fundamentalism. This requires
a revision of existing strategies and the creation of active coalitions
between the Campaign and other groups fighting the manifestations of
fundamentalism both at the domestic and international levels.
Ultimately what global women's movement activists can learn from the
Stop Stoning Forever Campaign is that religious fundamentalism is not
an issue that solely and uniquely concerns us. Religious fundamentalism
is both widespread and belongs nowhere, and even though activists
in other countries may not struggle with stoning per se, the rocks of
fundamentalism are being aimed at women everywhere.
1 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini served as the first Supreme Leader of the Islamic
Republic of Iran from 1979 until his death in 1989.
2 Parvin Paidar, Women and the Political Process in Twentieth-Century Iran, Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 1995: 290.
3 floma Hoodfar, “The women's Movement in Iran: women at the Crossroads of
Secularization and Islamization,” wLUML, The women's Movement Series, No.1, 1999:
24.
4 Although at first the government backed down from its initial stance, hejab was in
fact gradually enforced over the first three years after the Revolution.
5 Paidar, op. cit.: 228.
6 To read more, see: Janet Afary, The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906-1911:
Grassroots Democracy, Social Democracy, and the Origins of Feminism. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1996.
7 Parvin Paidar, “Cr :rary: I he I neonnH-'r hel//een I emin isni and
ICE TThS111 iii (or n,' UNRISD Democracy Governance and Human
Rights Programme Paper No. 6, Oct. 2001: 17.
Freedman, “The Challenge of Fundamentalisms,” wLUML, Dossier 19, 1998, pp.
96-120: 101.
9 Freedman, op. cit.: 101
‘°Asadollah Badamchian, Feminism Siasi va Resa late Zan Mosalman (Political Feminism
and the Duty of the Muslim Woman), Tehran: Andishe Naab, 2005: 20.
Ma1ek Mohamadi and Hamide Reza, Modarres va Siasatgozari Omumi (Modarres and
General Policymaking), Tehran: Markaz Asnad Fnghelab Fslami, 2004: 256.
12 to Ziba Mir-Hosseini, “Towards Gender Equality: Muslim Family Laws
and the Shari'ah” in W4NTFD: Fquality and Justice in the Muslim Family. Sisters in
Islam, Kuala Lumpur, 2009: “The distinction between Shari'ah and fiqh: Shari'ah,
which literally means ‘the path or the road leading to the water,' in Muslim belief is
the totality of God's will as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad. Fiqh, which literally
means ‘understanding,' denotes the process of human endeavour to discern and
extract legal rules from the sacred sources of Islam: that is, the Quran and the
Sunnah (the practice of the Prophet, as contained in Hadith, Traditions).” The common
fatwa are part of fiqh.
13 One example is the basij, a volunteer militia established by Ayatollah Khomeini
in November 1979. The basij (officially titled Nirou-ye Moqavemat-e-Basij literally
“Mobilization Resistance Force”) in theory receive their orders from the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards and the current Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. However,
they have also been described as “a loosely allied group of organizations” including
“many groups controlled by local clerics.” Drawn from Wikipedia entry on “Busij”
Shadi Sadr 23
22
‘ 4 ”Dokhtar vu Pesar ra dar Malae Asm Shalagh Zadand (Flogging a Girl and a Boy in
Public),” Kayhan (newspaper), 17 Mar. 1979: 2. Note that the penalty of lashing applies
to an unmarried person engaging in sexual relations (classified as fornication)
while stoning applies to a married person engaging in extramarital sexual relations
(classified as adultery).
15 In a lot of cases of self-defence, women argued that if they had not killed the rapist,
they would have been executed by stoning. So, because of the fear of stoning, they
committed murder. See for example the well-known self-defence case of Afsaneh
Norouzi: “1 ru i i 1< ill or ni rupisi reprie/ e' I,” BBC, 27 July 2004.
i6 “Eteraze Shadide Azam Taleghani be Sangsar Zanan dar Kerman (Azam Taleghani's
Protest against the Stoning of Women in Public),” Kayhan, 19 July 1980: 3.
S. Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism, London:
Led Books, 2003 (2nd Ed.): 12.
i 8 Amnesty International, Iran nd xecu lions by Stoning, 2008.
ir about the Stop Stoning Forever
‘ p/node/3C9i.
30 Cited in Mahboubeh Abbasgholizadeh, “Nazam-e ghazaryi dar tangena: Tahlili bar
arayesh niruha-ye movafegh va mokhalef-e sangsar (The Judicial System in Crisis: An
Analysis of the Formation of Pro- and Anti-Stoning Forces)”, Zanan, No. 86 (2007).
3i For more information on the Global Campaign to Stop Killing and Stoning Women
refer to the website of the campaign at wwwsi op-s Inning
32 Tait and Noushin Hoseiny” vomen and a man fat s on ng in Iran for
aduJter ,” The Guardian, 21 July 2008.
“Iranians suspend :leath by stoning,” BBC, 5 Aug. 2008.
34 Nikki R. Keddie, Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi'ism from Quietism to Revolution.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983.
i 9 Sadeq Saba, “Improve human righ s F urges Iran,” BBC, 4 Feb. 2003.
20 The One Million Signatures Campaign to change discriminatory regulations was
launched in September 2006; see the campaign website: www.we-change.org/english.
2 iThe campaign regards restrictions on women's right to attend sports stadiums as a
symbol of gender segregation in the public arena; see Meydaan-e-Zanan
website: u u w mevd ann. no /(ngl I sh.
22 Stop Stoning Forever Campaign, “Statemon t on Reneni Remarks b/ te Judiciary
Spokesman,” Meydaan-e-Zanan website, 27 Nov. 2006.
23 Some interpretations of Islamic law permit a marriage to be contracted for a
specified period of time, even a few hours; under current Iranian law, temporary
marriage (known as mut'ah or sigheh) requires few formalities.
24 SoheilaVahdati, “II tel e rs Sm r n Stoning,” Iran Emrooz, 15 Nov.
2006.
25 “An Sangsare Khanenadeqi Gu i hi in 4 Sale! ( ni v Stoning 1 a 4-'1? ar Did Girl),”
Radio Farda, 19 Feb. 2008.
26”/ Rain ol Si n's: h Sai3alnterviewwith Snh i a/ hdati Bana,” Satya Magazine,
Feb. 2007.
27 Mehdi Khalaji, ‘ anqcir P .cht J)j t una I hi nki si ri h u ‘ eroi n i i s
BBC Persian, 21 Nov. 2006; “ 1 r iFle: run: H
website, (undated, 2007); Soheila Vahdati, “S
the Issue,” Women's eNews, 4 Jan. 2007.
23 Kayhan, “Khod Efshaei Havadare Teze Chand Shohari (Confession of a Fan of
Multiple Husbands),” 25 ApL 2007: 2.
Author Bios:
Shadi Sadr is an Iranian lawyer, journalist and human rights activist. An expert on
women's legal rights in Iran, she was the director of Raahi, a legal advice centre for
women, before the government shut it down in 2008. She is one of the founders of
Meydaan-e-Zanan (Women's Field), a group devoted to various women's campaigns
and initiatives. Ms. Sadr was one of the 33 women arrested in March 2007 after
gathering outside a Tehran courtroom to peacefully protest the trial of women's
rights defenders, and was arrested again in July 2009 as part of a nationwide
crackdown on civil society following the disputed June Presidential elections. Ms.
Sadr is the recipient of the Ida B. Walls Award for Bravery in Journalism and the
Human Rights Defenders Tulip Award.
Campaign Bio:
The Stop Stoning Forever Campaign is an Iranian initiative that advocates for
repealing Iranian Penal Code provisions regarding stoning. The Campaign was
formed in 2006 by women's rights activists in partnership with the Volunteer
Lawyers' Network, a group of pro bono lawyers in Iran. Since its inception, the
Campaign has appealed over 20 cases of stoning in Iran, and with the help of the
Campaign, many of these defendants were acquitted of all charges and released or
had their stoning sentences commuted. The Campaign also engages in international
advocacy, raising awareness on stoning and other forms of religiously-justified
violence against women, as well as discrimination more broadly
// no nii'/ Dunn net /nnpl isli
Shadi Sadr 25
29 See the WLUML website for a short ill
Campaign and Mokarrameh's case: w w
S c
n,' WLUML
1 Cnn I n S i'
24
