The forgotten core of the Kurdish crisis

          
          5/27/2011
          Article - Untitled Article
          h i
          g “A*k-T
          NSbat4 ; )
          Seeds ) S ‘TEI IRAW
          Sa usad4.
          m i IRAN t,
          THE LAST Eurdish strong-
          hold has falita, . ,d hans
          central authorities 4a
          gained fragile control of a
          province still seething with
          bitterness a6ter some of the
          bloodiest lighting since The
          Shah's overthrow;
          The worst of the, crisis
          seems over, but no one is
          pretending that the Kurdish
          problem ‘will dlsa - -..
          overnight. Hewing driven the
          rebels from their towns, the
          Iranian Government is In all
          prs*llity guaranteeing Its
          security forces a long, thawn-
          out guerrilla wat whith the
          country can neither afford
          nor probably ever win.
          But, more Important in the
          short term, has been the
          growing suspicion 1n Tehran
          that the Kurdish crisis three
          weeks a u w c pot'reallv a
          crisis at all, and that the ‘bit-
          ter fighting was sparked off
          and then stage-managed as a
          ready vehicle oat which the
          central authorities could teas-
          sert their crumbling author-
          ‘Such suspicion was fuelled
          last week when the Prime
          Minister, Mr MthdI Basargan,
          publicly admitted that Aya-
          tollah Khomeini's. general
          mobilisatlon order of, two
          weeks earlier was based on
          “false Information.”
          No one would deny that
          trouble had been brewing in
          the western' province of
          Kurdistan , a land of gently
          farmland suddenly
          risiqg to' high mountain
          peaks along the border with
          Iraq. Evrr since the éollapse
          of the ‘Shah's regime ' seven
          months ago, the Kurds have
          been pushing for — and, In
          sonic cases, realising — a
          degree of de facto self-rule
          that was evidently Intolerable
          to the central powers In both
          Tehran and the holy city of
          Qom.
          Few. too, would entirely
          dispute the Ayatollah's alle-
          gations that “We are not
          I acing a Kttrdlsb question.
          but ‘ a - one.”
          Kurdistan has long been
          aw&sli I , lusslen-made rifles
          and' Czech pistols, and their
          leaden' open espousal of
          groups professing Marxist '
          Leninist ideology has only
          damned the Kurdish Demo-
          cratic Party Kori in the
          eyes of the Shl'a Mosque
          which has stoutly maintained
          the deposed Shah's anti-
          Soviet position.
          But the tIming of the Kur-
          dish campaign. The see.rlthTr
          retectance of both aides to
          fight, and the apparent mani-
          pulation of news, has raised
          some very real doubts as to
          the long-term Intentions of
          the central authorities.
          Ayatollah IChothelai was
          believed to have had several
          motives in seeking to crush
          the.Kurds, Chiefly, he wanted
          to demoustrate to all Iran's
          mutinous minorities thr'fltt'
          lity of insurrection. Later,
          the Xurdlsh -challenge was
          evidc tl, ,. .,sldered to be as
          good as any other vehicle to
          boost the morale and stiffen
          the backbone of the badly de-
          moralised armed frees.
          Crushing the Kurds would
          further more t!prtve the
          Moflque'a highly' organised
          Left-wing oppoaçnts of the
          refuge tradItionally provided
          by the Kurt.
          It wa—rtangerous game
          to play and, despite the fall
          of all major Kurdish towns
          to the TebrL,4vw a 5 5, it
          was unlikely that the Govern-
          ment realised the apparent
          risks. As Ayatollah Shariat-
          mi lan, one of Iran's three
          most Importaiit—Migioaas
          leaders, has ‘pointed out:
          “P ace attained (through the
          barrel of a' ‘gun) loses much
          of Its value.”
          The timing of the Kurdish
          campaign' was unfo.L..,.L
          Exactly a ‘week after bloody
          Tehran rioting led to the
          silencing nf virtually all thc
          leftist papers, Ayatollah Kho-
          mcliii assumed the title of
          Supreme Commander of the
          armed forces and ordered the
          frreops Into ‘ICurdistan. Ironi.
          tally, the P , 0 l ,,,, J 4 te was
          Itiordaste 23—the same day
          exactly 26 years ago when
          the Shah staged his return
          from exile and embarked on
          a brutal campaign' to crush
          all dissent
          Significantly ‘the introduc-
          tion of the armed forces into
          Kurdistan was gradual. When
          fial . ,l .e first broke out in the
          small town of Parch three
          weeks ago, reinforcements
          from the Islamic Guard
          (bearded young men fiercely
          loyal to the Ayatollah) were
          sent in Eighteen guardsmen
          were reportedly beheaded
          before the jown was recap-
          tured.
          Two days later. on August
          19, it was the turn of the
          town of Sanandaj and the
          first serious mobilisation of
          the armed forces. Events in
          Kurdistan appeared to have
          p , L. , ,.,d down with the
          occupation of Psych when the
          country was suddenly
          stunned by reports (later de-
          nounced as “lies” by Gov-
          ernor-General lii o h a m in ad
          Bashid-Shakiba), that rebel
          Kurds had attacked the army
          Wee—in Samandal and taken
          soldiers' wives and children
          as hostages.
          The result was three days
          of well-pubhicised de-
          monstrations outside the
          Prime Minister 's officio in
          Tcbtan. The' Ayatollah
          announced that he would
          personally come to the capi-
          tal and take command, if
          necessary, of the Kurdish
          troubles. The KDP w
          banned and their leaden,
          Shelkh Esruddin Hosselni
          and Dr Ghesseinlan were
          declared traitors, As import-
          ant, the army Joined the
          Islamic guard for ,what
          turned out to be a non-event,
          The Iranian military
          finally twt tlra lead in the
          battle for Sa4qe; further
          north. Local pressmen - filed
          vivid .descrtptlo,ns of intense
          fighting and tough Kurdish
          resistence, but the tu - .
          taken with relative ease and
          © Guardian News and Media Limited
          Publication: Guardian 1821-2000; Date: Sep 10, 1979; Section: None; Page: 13
          LIZ THURGOOD in Tebran examin s the motives of the Ayatollah in crushing the ICurds
          The forgotten core of the Kürclish crisis
          foreign correspondents latcr
          in the area reported little
          evidence of heavy fighting.
          Next came the collapse of
          Mahabad and then last
          Thursday, Sardasht close to
          the Iraqi border. The Kurds,
          ii seemed, were never' Tm!'r
          any real illusion that these
          towns could be held against
          the might ,of the Iranian
          military machine — ltnepe'
          tatInn was tarnished in Ihe
          February uprising which
          swept the Ayatollahs to
          power, hut nevertheless it is
          a'force to be reckoned with,
          J'ust before the fall of
          Mahabad, KDP leader Dr
          Ghassemlou said: “Ever
          since the (February) revolu-
          tIon we ‘have tried hard to
          reach an agreement with the
          Government. . - I met ICho .
          mcmi twice. I told him that
          the Kurds had been seeking
          auto not just today but
          for Ihe past 34 years. Always
          they said: “All right, we are
          all brothers, we are all Mos-
          lens and evcrybndy will have
          their rights'. . -“ -
          Such Intentions, however
          well-meaning, were clearly
          unpalatable to the lcurds who
          saw the chaos folle'wPr the
          Ayatollahs' rise to power as
          possibly the last opportunity
          to carve nut theIr demands
          for autonomy. The Kurds.
          spread through threr7rei
          vinces and believed to
          number over four million,
          have never trusted Tr'hran.
          thanks largely to the Shah's
          old Dolicies of buying off big
          landowners and quasi ICiar-
          dish leaders. Moreover, tI*e
          Sir Shah before them, The
          new Government evidently
          helieved that the KDP's calls
          for autonomy amounted In
          nothing more than the start
          of a gradual orocess aimed at
          separating Kurdestan from
          Iran.
          tre Immediate political
          spin-oils from Kurdistan were
          not readily ,,l l.eyond ,
          perhaps, the incontestable dl i-
          p1ev of Ayatollah Khomeini's
          authority after months of
          hovering unhappily on the
          political sidelines.
          The only other gains
          annenred In have lallen to
          r lepamtv Prime Minister l r
          Mostafa Chamran who also
          doubles as head of Internal
          security, and Shoikh Rhalk-
          hali who lisa sent over more
          than 30 Kurds before Islamic
          firing saatt Dr Chamran,
          still something of a mystery
          in local political circles, has
          been acclaimed a national
          hero by the local press, hut
          privately many Iranians
          believc that thc iu u lw
          spent many years with the
          right-wing Al-Anial militia in
          the Lebanon was largely rcs-
          pnnaible for bringing a sian .
          nicrtng crisis to a badly
          timed head and, in his
          efforts to re-establish central
          control. treated more friction
          and had feciin than the
          situation warranted.
          Initial fears that the in-
          creased power and authority
          given the armed forces dur-
          Ing the Kurdish campaignine
          might ,l, , ground-work
          for a later coup against the
          clerical establishment seemed
          premature.
          But as the dust settled
          over Kurdesten last week,
          everyo pe cp,, a ,ed to be stu-
          diously ignoring the core of
          the crisis: Kurdish demands
          for aulonu, ,, , Kurdish
          control of their own - grrmdtr '
          merle and police forces, cul-
          tural and linguistic rights.
          and a greater role in local
          des'elopment projects.
          The prime ministcr's mis-
          sion to Mnhabad last Friday
          was an obvious attempt to
          try to show the Kurds a
          modicum of Goee'rnment
          goodwill. In addition, the
          Government has shown readi-
          ness to allow a Kurdish it-
          volutlonary corp. . ., the
          small town, the conversion of
          the local garrIson into a Kur-
          dish university, and the -per
          tat- of all KDP members.
          And here lay what was
          potentially the biggest stum-
          bling block: the pardon has
          not been ,extended to the
          KDP leadership who in the
          words of one local newsman
          have only expressed what
          the Kurds really, feel.”
          A T !Thh Khomeini has
          branded the pair, Sheilch
          Hosselni and Dr Ghassemlou.
          “traitors” and said they
          should be executed for being
          “corrupt on earth.' it was
          never ea ' to rescind an
          order made in the name of
          Allah ,
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